Origins of the Campaign

The idea of the Congress of the People had been mooted on several occasions within the ANC, but it was Professor Z. K. Matthews, President of the ANC, Cape, who officially proposed such an event at the Provincial Conference of the ANC (Cape) held in Cradock on 15 August 1953. Matthews, inspired by the UN Declaration of Human Rights, was the first to publicly suggest die convocation of a national gathering of the people of South Africa with the objective of drafting a Charter of Freedom.

In reviewing the "political situation" at the Conference, Matthews listed the numerous racial, discriminatory and repressive laws enacted by the Nationalist government and declared that the "present state of affairs in South Africa shows signs of an ever deepening crisis in race relations between various groups represented here." He pointed out that various groups, in reaction to the electoral victory of the National Partyin me 1953 general election and the growing political crisis, were considering the idea of a national convention. He motivated that the ANC, as the premier African political organisation, should seize the initiative and provide a direct lead in the matter. Matthews asserted:

I wonder whether the time has not come for the ANCto consider the question of convening a National Convention, a Congress of the People, representing all the people of this country irrespective of race or colour to draw up a Freedom Charter for the democratic South Africa of the future. Once the principle of the establishment of such a Congress of the People was accepted, the details of its implementation could be worked out either by the national executive or by an ad hoc committee with that special duty.

The matter was duly discussed at the Cradock Conference and the following resolution was finally adopted:

That this conference notes with interest the remarks of the president on the need for the establishment at the instance of the ANC and under its leadership, of the Congress of the People in South Africa, to draw up a Freedom Charter or constitution embodying a vision of a future South Africa, as we in Congress see it.... Such a conference would serve to unite all the democratic forces in South Africa among all races into a front against the dangers of fascism; and would enable the ANC to demonstrate in a practical manner its policy for the solution of the problems of the country.

Between the Cradock Conference and the Annual Conference of the ANC in December 1953, it was the National Action Council, which had coordinated the Defiance Campaignthat defined in broad outline the nature of the campaign for the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter. Reference has already been made in the second chapter of the National Action Council's analysis of the organisational shortcomings of the Congresses. It saw as the immediate steps of the ANC and the SAIC the cultivation of a "new approach in the face of the fascist onslaught" that entailed the termination of me period of "political lull" through concrete mass activities against the government's offensive and, around a central objective, the unity of the leadership "by bringing about maximum agreement, understanding and unity of purpose on a common programme" , the isolation of "defeatists and factionalists" , and the strengthening of organisation.

It envisaged a National Assembly for a Freedom Charter as the best "short-term programme" capable of fulfilling the above objectives, arguing that Matthews' proposal "holds out great and powerful potentialities to mobilise our people.. and [raise] the mass activities of the Congresses to a higher level." It recommended that the Annual ANC Conference discuss the proposal carefully and submit a plan to the executives of the ANC and the SAIC before 30 April 1954 .

The Annual Conference of the ANC held in Queenstown December 1953 welcomed the recommendations and adopted resolution instructing its national executive committee "to mal immediate preparations for the organisation of a Congress of the People of South Africa." It urged the national executive committee to convene a meeting of democratic organisations which subscribed to the principle of full citizenship rights for all and place before them plans and secure from them participation for the project. Consequently, Walter Sisulu, Secretary General of the ANC, on 1 March 1954 invited the national executive committees of the ANC, the SAIC, the SACPO and the SACOD to attend a joint conference to discuss the subject of a Congress of the People.

The national executives of the ANC, the SAIC and the SACOD and a member from the Johannesburg branch of the SACPO met in Tongati, Natal, under the chairmanship of Chief Luthuli on 20-21 March 1954. Luthuli introduced the subject by tracing the development of inter-racial political cooperation and unity since 1950. He asserted that "it had now become desirable to enlarge the circle of cooperation, and with the addition of SACOD and SACPO, a force of cooperative effort had been started which would finally defeat reaction in South Africa."

A memorandum outlining the objectives and nature of the campaign was then presented. It began with the exposition of what the ANC considered to be the essence of a democratic system of government - one whose policies and programme of action was an expression of the will of its entire people. It argued that the South African government violated this fundamental principle as "not a single governing body from parliament to local authority was based upon the will of me people" ; and that a racial minority had arrogated itself the "right to govern by taking into account the will of only a section of the population." Consequently, the majority of South Africans were excluded from meaningful and effective participation in the political process.

The end product was that the country was being divided into "two mutually antagonistic camps — a dominant white minority whose political parties were almost completely at one as far as their colour policies are concerned; and a dominated black majority whose patience with the status quois rapidly becoming exhausted." It called for the subjected peoples to make their voices heard and introduce a fundamentally new approach to the problem of race relations in South Africa. At the same time it questioned the legitimacy and prerogatives of political forces rooted in the white sector and operating within the parliamentary terrain. It added that they had no right solely to shape the political destiny of the African majority. The memorandum made me following point:

This need has been reflected in the realignment of political parties at present . . . combined with their attempts at the revision of policies and programmes which have outlived their usefulness. The emergence of the Liberal Party, the Federal Party, the defections from the United Party, the changed outlook of the Labour party all show that the time is long overdue for a thorough ongoing re-examination of the place of the different sections of the population in the South African body politic.

But the questions with which the country is confronted go beyond the competence of political parties whose membership is confined to one section of the population. The broad will of the people of South Africa calls for a much wider basis than that. The ANC executive also noted the intentions of both the Federal Missionary Council of the Dutch Reformed Church and the South African Institute of Race Relations to summon national conventions of various organisations. The ANC, without intending to be dismissive of their plans, felt that they were inherently inadequate initiatives.

The former's social basis was too narrow — it was to be confined to church leaders only; and the latter could not be "a true reflection of the views of all the sections of the population as it [was] likely to be dominated by the representatives of organisations and public bodies in which non-whites [were] not adequately represented or not represented at all." The memorandum ruled out ANC participation in both initiatives, claiming that a project of such magnitude and national importance should correctly emerge from the black communities themselves. "The African people," it proclaimed, "must bear the proper share of responsibility for working out the salvation of the people of South Africa."

The ANC leadership shared the view that if any National Convention or policy document was to become an authoritative expression of the people's will it had to be organised on a democratic basis and in direct consultation with the masses. By implication, this meant that the delegates to such a national gathering should be representative of the people democratically elected; and that the contents of a policy document should emerge from a consultation process conducted nationally and among all sections of the population.

The following suggestions to launch the campaign for Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter were presented by Z. K. Matthews, on behalf of the ANC Executive to the joint conference:

• a) That a public announcement of the Congress of the People Campaign be made by the sponsoring organisations;
• b) That all persons over the age of 21 would have the right to elect representatives;
• c) That a common voters' roll for the Congress of the People be written up;
• d) That a Delimitations Committee be established to define constituencies; and
• e) That a "ways and means" committee be created to coordinate the campaign.

The memorandum was sound in articulating the general political principles that the ANC subscribed to, but it showed a certain lack of clarity as to the precise scope and character of the Congress of the People. The suggestions of a voters roll, a delimitations committee and the creation of constituencies indicated that the Congress of the People was to be of a highly formal character symbolic of an alternative parliament or constituent assembly with legislative powers and authority. This conception was corrected in the course of discussions at the conference. It was pointed out by some delegates that the impression should not be created that the Congress of the People was to be intended as an alternative government or a body claiming authority of state. The ideas of electoral districts and general elections for the Congress of the People were dropped, as they were impractical. Eventually, a loose form of representation that allowed groups of different sizes to elect delegates to the Congress of the People replaced the initial suggestions. A resolution of the Joint Conference denned the Congress of the People "as a democratically elected assembly of representatives of people of all races and all parts of the country to frame and adopt a Freedom Charter expressing the will of the people."

Having accepted the idea of a Congress of the People in principle the Joint Conference established a Joint Planning Committee (and not the National Action Council as suggested by Lodge) consisting of not more than eight representatives from each of the Congresses. Johannesburg was accepted as the headquarters and T. E. Tshunungwa was appointed as the national organiser for the campaign. The task of this committee was narrowly and specifically defined. It had to draft a document entitled "A Call to the Congress of the People" and present a detailed plan for the campaign to another joint conference on 9 May 1954."

The following organisational guidelines were submitted by the Joint Planning Committee and accepted by the May Joint Conference:

• I) That a National Action Council (NAC) for the Congress of the People, composed of an equal number of representatives of the sponsoring organisations, be established to coordinate and direct the campaign;
• II) That me NAC should launch a propaganda campaign, which would explain the nature of the Congress of the People and its historic significance;
• III) That it should ensure that provincial and local Congress of the People committees be set up (the former by 30 June 1954) and structured along the lines of the NAC;
• IV) That these structures should collect, gather and record demands through mass meetings, house-to-house canvassing and group discussions by 30 October 1954, with the overall aim being to enable "ordinary people to speak for themselves and to state what changes are to be made in the way of life, if they are to enjoy freedom" ;
• V) That the NAC should establish a corps of Freedom Volunteers to carry out the campaign and undertake mobilisation work by addressing and taking up the day-to-day grievances of the people and linking these to broader political issues;
• VI) That the elections to the Congress of the People should be direct and that any person publicly elected and representative of the people could become a delegate;
• VII) That local COP committees should work to elicit the active or passive support of every possible local organisation for the Congress of the People; and finally,
• VIII) That the campaign as a whole should be pitched at a level that would have an overall politicising effect on the masses and generate new and wider layers of active participants in the Congresses.

The Conference concluded with the appointment of National Action Council for the Congress of the People (NAC for COP). Each of the Congresses had to nominate eight members, five of whom had to reside in the Transvaal. The NAC enjoyed executive powers to coordinate and organise every aspect of the COP campaign and submit regular reports to the National Executives of the sponsoring Congresses. Walter Sisulu, Yusuf Cachalia, Lionel Bernstein and Stanley Lollan constituted the Secretariat of the NAC. Some other members on the NAC were: J A. Luthuli (Chairman), E. P. Moretsele (Treasurer), O.R. Tambo, R. Resha, T. E. Tshunungwa, J. Slovo, Mrs R. Hodgeson, P. Beyleveld, C.H. Feinstein, G. Peake, P. Vundla and A. Kathrada. M. Motala was employed as a clerk/organiser for the campaign and he was based at No. 110 Fox Street, Johannesburg. The composition of the National Action Council is significant in that it served as the first truly non-racial forum for the planning of joint political work for the Congresses. In this sense it can be seen as the forerunner to the Congress Alliance that emerged after the Congress of the People itself. It must also be noted that the composition for the NAC fluctuated as the campaign unfolded as a number of leading members were subjected to restriction or banning orders.

Political Objectives of the Campaign for the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter

The aims and objectives of the campaign for the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter can only be fully understood if it is located more firmly than is done in the literature on the subject, within an analysis of the 'historical moment' and the tasks and challenges that confronted the Congresses. The historian has to consider the following questions:

• a) Why did the ANC and its allies specifically decide upon the COP for the period 1953 to 1955; and
• b) In which ways was this campaign to allow for the further organisational and ideological growth and development of the constituents of the Congress of the People and the national liberation movement more broadly?

These questions can only be answered after an examination of the Congresses conceptualisation of the state that they were engaging, and their own strategy of opposition to it.

The enactment of the Criminal Laws Amendment and Public Safety Acts brought the Defiance Campaign to an abrupt end. This reality had made political activists more conscious of the fact that political rhetoric; sloganeering, uncoordinated acts of resistance and poor organisation and discipline were not adequate to effect any significant transformation of South African society. This does not mean that demoralisation or capitulation had crept in on a significant scale. Rather the leadership was maturing and coming to the realisation that the transformation of society was a process to be struggled for and that, from time to time, adaptations and changes were needed to advance the struggle. Nelson Mandela dealt with these issues in his Presidential Address to the Provincial Conference of the ANC (Transvaal) in September 1953:

We had to analyse the dangers that faced us, formulate plans to overcome them and evolve new plans of political struggle. A political movement must keep in touch with reality and the prevailing conditions. Long speeches, the shaking of fists, the banging of tables and strongly worded resolutions out of touch with the objective conditions do not bring about mass action.... The conditions under which we meet today are vastly different.... The old methods of bringing about mass action through public meetings, press statements and leaflets calling on people to go to action have become extremely dangerous. These developments require the evolution of new forms of political struggle, which will make it reasonable for us to strive for action on a higher level than the Defiance Campaign.

The Campaign for the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter, like the organisational changes envisaged in the ANC's M-Plan, were a specific response to the changing objective reality. At one level it was spurred on by the intensification of repression and a "reconceptualisation" of the state. At another it grew out of a redefinition of strategy by the Congresses. What is significant is that the Congresses increasingly denned the South African state as a "fascist state" . This did not simply reflect a change of slogan, but a coherent re-analysis of politic reality.

Tambo in his secretarial report to the 42nd Annual Conference of the ANC expounded on this "reconceptualisation as follows:

After six years of nationalist rule, fascism has arrived in South Africa— the first five years of these six years were occupied with the building of the legal framework for this naked police state... the reactionary anti-people legislation inherited by former South African regimes was made more efficient . . . These laws were comprehensive not because they were detailed and defined but because they left all powers of making laws to individual ministers ... In this category comes the Group Areas Act, Bantu Authorities; Act, Native (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act, Native Laws Amendment Act, Population Registration Act, Native Resettlement Act and Suppression of the Communism Act. In the last Act the Nationalist government, following the Hitler pattern, prepared the legal machinery for crushing the most militant opponents of their rule, the working class and the national liberation organisation.

Fascism does not arise until conditions call for it. It arises when the ruling class can no longer look forward to unlimited profits and to an acquiescent people willing to be exploited. As the political consciousness of the people grows and their organisations become more mature and effective in the struggle for economic and political rights, the ruling class dropped the methods of peaceful flattery, diplomacy and bribery and employed force as the ordinary means of enforcing their rule. It is true that force is always there, but before the rise of fascism, force was resorted to in times of crisis. Under fascism the crisis becomes a permanent feature of life and force and intimidation the ordinary methods of rule . . . yes, fascism has indeed arrived in South Africa. A similar analysis of the state was made by the COD Executive Committee:

There have been radical changes since the last conference. These changes mark the maturity of a state of fascism at home; the government has passed from words to deeds . . . the development of fascism has curtailed their (Congresses') legality and their opportunity for mass campaigning and organisation.

Against a background where the scope for legal mass political activity had been severely narrowed, the Congresses had to re-examine their overall strategy and tactics. This evaluation did not amount to a total rejection of past experiences and the abandonment of the strategic direction that crystallised in the 1949 Programme of Action. Instead, the ANC and its allies adopted a more flexible approach, which allowed for the elaboration and extension of their strategy of mass mobilisation on the basis of a united front against fascism.

For the ANC, there were two prongs to the united front strategy. With reference to the African sector the construction of a united front meant the broadening of the sodal basis of the ANC. Being a broad omnibus political organisation, and not strictly a political party, it had to mobilise, organise, articulate, and interpret the demands of all sections and classes of the politically oppressed African people. Tambo defined these, sodal categories of the "African nation" as the urban worker, the peasant, the farm labourer, the domestic servant, the business man, the intellectual and the professional, women and youth. The corollary of this was that organisational networks and structures had to be expanded, new ones created and alliances forged to facilitate the participation of these varied sodal strata in the ANC.

Having at its disposal youth and women's wings and a high percentage of the petty-bourgeoisie and professional representation at leadership levels, very real efforts had to be made to develop a more structured and organic political relationship with organs of the working class and the peasantry and rural workers. In relation to the latter the task proved to be extremely difficult and whatever links there existed remained tenuous and fragile and rural organisations undeveloped and weak. The COP Campaign was to be used precisely to establish contact with rural areas and to develop a political network in the countryside.

With regard to the trade unions and the black working people more generally, forces were at work within the ANC and the trade unions, which set the stage for a more intimate working relationship and, ultimately, a structured alliance. The specific changes taking place within the trade unions had their roots in an assessment of the "limits and the failure of [working class] resistance in the 1940s, the right-wing racism in the Trades and Labour Council, the formation of the racially exclusive African Trade Union Council and resurgent African nationalism."

These developments resulted in a rethinking of strategy and direction within the non-racial unions. The orientation towards political unionism was explained by Billy Nair, a member of Act Trade Union Co-ordination Committee (embryo of SACTU), as follows:

Other federations lacked political direction. They were becoming more and more like social clubs. We differed fundamentally and wanted to give a new direction to the struggle of workers. We found that the Congress movement alone took account of the true aspirations of the workers. There was an identity of interests and an identity of ideas from the word goes. The Defiance Campaign and the various campaigns that were launched by Congress, politicised the African workers, actually politicised the worker at factory level. At this point workers were joining Congress in large numbers.

As events headed constantly towards a clash between the workers and the ruling class it became clear that the workers had to organise themselves differently. They could not concentrate on pure economic issues. There was no alternative but to link political and economic struggles. The strategic approach of political unionism which the SACTU leadership eventually accepted had its origins in the South African Communist Party (SACP) which reconstituted itself on an underground basis in 1953. Much of its political work since then remains a mystery as a result of me highly secretive nature of its political style of work and its deliberate attempts, at least in the 1950s, to mask its precise role in the wider liberation movement.

Recent studies by Hudson and Lambert, however, shed some light on the theory of national democratic revolution and the strategy adopted by the SACP in that period, but their conclusions, in the absence of more substantive material, can only remain tentative. Some understanding of the SACP's analysis and strategy is important principally as these had a resonance and echoed through the participation of the party cadres in virtually all the sponsoring organisations of the COP. Lambert, for example, goes as far as to argue that the SACP played a dominant role in SACTU and served as the "silent generator of SACTU strategy (and its two stage theory) constituted the basis of SACTU'S programme."

It will be remembered that the CPSA already in 1950 had become sensitised to the potential political force of African nationalism in the South African context and re-evaluated its relationship with formal nationalist organisations like the ANC and the SAIC. It called for a closer working relationship between its cadres and these political organs, stressing, however, that narrow based nationalism in the form of Africanism was retrogressive. By 1953 one could comfortably distinguish Africanism from the content of non-racial nationalism, which emerged in me mainstream of me ANC. The SACP believed that the latter was a positive political force, not incompatible with its own political direction. This strategic conception was rooted in its exposition of the two-stage theory of social transformation which had its underpinning in the internal colonialism thesis. Briefly, the SACP saw as the immediate task of the revolution and the Party, in alliance with a range of political forces and classes, the destruction of a highly repressive, colonial-like apartheid state and the construction of a national democratic state.

The establishment of a non-racial democracy in South Africa was seen as creating conditions propitious for an eventual transition to socialism. Tactically, this meant for the SACP the marshalling of a disparate range of social and political forces under the leadership of the working class with the explicit aim of isolating the ruling class and defeating it. In the context of national political oppression affecting all social categories and classes in the black communities, an alliance of the working classes with the black peasantry, petty-bourgeoisie and intelligentsia was objectively possible and a broad popular democratic ideology, rather than a strictly socialistic ideological content, was to be used to cement this alliance, not abstractly, but in the very process of united struggles.

An 'activist' of the period expressed his personal viewpoint in the following way:

The South African people and their various organisations were confronted with a fascist state, which had an impact on all sections for the people. National unity became a priority . . . the SACP accepted the need for a national democratic alliance. It had no ultra leftist perspective; for example, to fight in a straightforward line for a socialist revolution . . . It identified the immediate task as the total defeat of the Nationalists and to lead the struggle for the national liberation of South Africa.

The struggle against national oppression was on—independently of the SACP and being conducted through various political organisations. The SACP and the working class could not just sit back and look on. Revolution involves vast strata of people and many classes and social groups. SACP wanted the maximum unity of democratic forces in which the working class would play a leading role. It had to get involved in the struggle if it wanted to lead; otherwise it would simply isolate itself. Therefore the SACP saw the COP as a campaign initiated by the people and threw its whole support behind it and encouraged its members and supporters to go in and play a direct role, as the COP was an attempt to construct a national democratic alliance with a mass base against a fascist state.

The second component of the ANC's united front strategy involved the construction of a multi-racial, principled alliance with all democratic, anti-fascist forces. The altered political realities of the early 1950s—the increasing repression and the successful experiences of joint actions—highlighted the need for extending alliances and strengthening the existing ones. Mandela expressed this need in the following manner:

In the past we talked of African, Indian and coloured struggles. Though certain individuals raised the question of a united front of all the oppressed groups, the various non-European organisations stood miles apart from one another and the various efforts of those for coordination and unity were like a voice crying in the wilderness; and it seemed that the day would never dawn when the oppressed people would stand and fight together shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy. Today we talk of struggles of the oppressed people, which, though it is waged through their autonomous organisations, is gravitating towards a central command.

In 1954 Chief Luthuli confirmed this outlook and clarified ANC policy on the question of a united front. In his Presidential Address to the 42nd ANC Conference he declared, "Let me here emphatically state that while the ANC must naturally work for it own growth, yet it is equally committed to the policy of forming a multi-racial united democratic front to challenge the forces of reaction in this country" .

What emerges from the above is that the creation of a united front had become more than just a matter of debate between those espousing a multi-racial organisational approach and the Africanists. For the former the construction of a united front— embracing all democratic forces irrespective of past political affiliations and race—had become a strategic necessity.

The ANC had developed to a point where it had abandoned Africanism and called for broader political unity; the SACP displayed a more flexible political approach which responded to the growing momentum of African nationalist politics and the SACTU had, as a result of an appraisal of past trade union experiences and the influence of the SACP, opted for political unionism. Closer unity of loosely associated democratic forces within the broad national liberation movement needed to be consolidated if they were to withstand the assault of the state, and at the same time, advance the national democratic struggle. This was the practical implication of Luthuli's remarks when he opened the Natal Congress of the People Conference in September 1954 with the slogan:

"Let us speak together of Freedom" . He declared, "Let me invite all progressive people and leaders to rally to the cause of freedom.

The ascendancy of the reactionary forces must be halted before they harm the true interests of the country. The time demands that we think courageously together plan boldly together in an effort to bring freedom to all in our land." This unity needed to be forged on the basis of political consensus, on a common acceptance of political principles and demands. The campaign for the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter provided the appropriate vehicle for the establishment of a united front or national alliance of all democratic elements based on a single political programme in the form of me Freedom Charter.

In this sense the immediate objective of the campaign was to adopt a policy document or political programme, which symbolised the alliance. This political programme was to be the product of a dual process—consultation between national political organisations themselves, and between them and the mass of South African citizens—with me aim of building a more coherent, coordinated and cohesive mass popular democratic movement.

The purpose of the first process was to hammer out a common political outlook, a common understanding of the nature and content of the struggle being waged by various national organisations. The aim of the second process was to engage the masses in political dialogue and raise the level of political consciousness. At one level this entailed the injection of political ideology from organisations to the masses, the aim being to politicise, conscientise and make an imprint on the developing consciousness of the masses who were inspired by the new militancy of the ANC and its allies and who gravitated towards the Congresses. At another level it involved the upward 'filtering process' whereby demands and goals were to emerge from the people's lived experiences under an oppressive and exploitative social order.

Basically, this was a campaign designed to bring our organisations close to the ordinary people of South Africa, to enable us not only to talk intimately and simply to them of our outlook and opinions, but also to learn from them of their ideas and, at the same time, to build that organisational link between the Congresses and the people... as is needed for the great political struggles which must be waged before our objectives of liberty are achieved.

The overriding objective of the campaign for the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter was to establish a united front of democratic organisations through an independently initiated, non-reactive, forward looking process of politicisation on the basis of the total experiences and lived realities of all sections of the population.

But there were other objectives as well. The campaign was to equip the Congresses with a political document and with a set of non-negotiable demands; and to guide all its future struggles and political work. It was to serve as a standard reference point for which the Congresses stood and struggled. Luthuli outlined the objective as follows:

Besides this, there was in our minds an appreciation of the need to think creatively about the new South Africa. We are, after all, not mainly devoted to battling against something, though that is imposed on us at present. We are inspired by the ideal of working for something. If we are against passes, it is because we are for human dignity and freedom of movement. If we are against Bantu education it is because we are for education. If when you are constantly impeded in the effort to work towards a worthy goal, there is danger of becoming preoccupied with the impediments. It was felt to be high time to counteract this by defining me goal rather more dearly.

The campaign aimed to arrive at ideological unity within the ANC itself and between various other organisations championing the cause of national liberation. At the same time, the Freedom Charter was to serve as an organising tool and it was to list the basic demands that the Congresses and the emergent national popular democratic movement aimed to achieve. The Preparatory Committee's Memorandum motivating for the Congress of the People expressed the objective as follows:

The main task of the Congress of the People will be to draw up a Freedom Charter for all the peoples and groups in South Africa. From such a Congress will come a declaration, which will inspire all the people of South Africa with fresh hope for the future, which will turn the minds of the people away from the sterile and negative struggles of the past and the present to a positive programme of freedom in our lifetime? Such a charter, properly conceived as a mirror of the future South African society, can galvanise the people of South Africa into action and make them go over to the offensive against the reactionary forces at work in this country instead of being perpetually on the defensive, fighting rearguard actions all the time.

In one sense the campaign for the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter served to 'consummate' past struggles; in another, as Tambo noted, it was to "open a new page, another turning point in the history of our country.” The campaign was to complete one phase of me struggle and open another on the basis of a vision of a social order fundamentally and radically different from that being propagated by me ruling classes and coercively established by the Nationalist government.

Organisationally, stress was to be placed both on quantitative growth and on qualitative development, in terms of the former objective the campaign was to be used to expand the Congress organisational network on a national scale and into hitherto unorganised areas (consistent with the notion of decentralisation underlining me M-plan), to activate structures that had become politically dormant in the immediate post-Defiance Campaign period and to stimulate those that were active. The campaign aimed to energise mass political work on a national scale and to link the organisations more closely and organically with masses. It must be noted that such a campaign, one that was responding or reacting to a specific set of issues or grievances and to be conducted over a long period of time (about 12 months) was suitable for intensive political work nationally and rooting of organisation on a widespread basis.

In the numerous organisational guidelines to Freedom Volunteers constant emphasis was placed on breaking new ground in rural areas. A circular from the National Action Council for the Congress of the people gave the following instruction:

Left us not overlook me countryside. Volunteers from towns |who have relations and families in the countryside must try to get to the rural areas on the weekends and hold discussions on the Charter. They must urge at every meeting in the towns that all people write or visit their friends in the rural areas and in the villages, to tell them about the Freedom Charter, and to urge them to make their demands without delay. Everyone who has made his or her demand must now organise others to do so:

Let the Freedom Charter spread like wildfire to the people. In terms of the qualitative development of Congress members importance was attached to education, training and inculcating discipline. Activists or Freedom Volunteers, as they were called, were to be trained in the art of conducting mass political work. Experienced activists were to accompany new recruits of the organisation in the course of political work and teach the political skills of conducting house meetings relating to ordinary people, tackling controversial issues and answering questions.

A prerequisite for effective mass political work was the political understanding of activists. In addition to the regular circulars and bulletins published by the National and Provincial Action Councils a set of three lectures entitled "The World We Live In" , "The Country We Live In " and "The Need For Change" were to be discussed and studied by Freedom Volunteers. These three lectures make illuminating study, and in all probability members of the reconstituted Communist Party wrote them. "The World We Live In" was divided into three parts: on me historical development of social relations, on surplus value and exploitation under capitalism and on the colonial question. "The Country We Live In" was concerned with the history and state of South Africa in the 1950s, mostly in so far as its economy and socio-political relations were concerned. Concepts such as imperialism, national oppression and fascism were explained and their analytical value in understanding conditions in South Africa elaborated.

The third lecture entitled "Change Is Needed" discussed the strategy that was needed to establish "a people's democracy" based on "a sweeping radical programme" . It ended on the following note: "It [a South African People's Democratic State] can only be achieved if the control and power of the state is taken out of the hands of the old ruling class of exploiters and held firmly by the workers and peasants, allied with all others who see that South Africa's future happiness cannot be won while the state is the property of the exploiters and oppressors."

National Plan of Action

The Campaign for the Congress of the People was boldly planned and outlined in the "Draft Plan" written by the National Action Council, inexplicably described by Lodge as a "bureaucratic blueprint" . Seen in isolation the document might appear to be highly bureaucratic and mechanical in nature, but situated in the context elaborated earlier on, it emerges as a dear guideline for practical and coordinated political action. The Campaign was to have unfolded in three stages. The objectives of the first stage were to:

• a) Make the COP understood country-wide through the distribution of 100,000 copies of "The Call" , 10,000 posters, 250,000 stickers and the publishing of regular newsletters;
• b) Draw into the campaign organisations at national and provincial levels through the distribution of the ANC Presidential appeal, letters of invitation and meetings with prominent national leaders of organisations;
• c) Recruit 50,000 volunteers through the distribution of Luthuli's Call for Volunteers and COP lectures; and,
• d) Set up provincial committees by inviting provincial/local bodies to join the Provincial Action Councils.

The aims of me second phase were to:

• a) Establish a network of local COP committees (an ambitious target of 2,000 had been set);
• b) Gather demands from the whole country by organising gatherings and cultural events "where people can get together to formulate demands on the basis of convictions, national groups and religious beliefs in addition to their primary demands as South African citizens" ;
• c) Prepare material for the election of delegates; and
• d) Finalise preparations for the Congress of the People itself.

The final stage would be completed with the election of delegates, the convocation of the Congress of the People and the drafting and adoption of the Freedom Charter.

The implementation of the plan of action was uneven and varied from region to region depending on the level of organisational preparedness and previous patterns of mobilisation and organisation. The actual running of the campaign was conducted on a decentralised basis with Provincial Councils playing a central role. Apart from the Transvaal, which launched its provincial campaign on the day stipulated by the National Action Council, i.e., 25 July, the other provinces got off on a slow start. There were several reasons for this. Lionel Bernstein, a key member of the National Action Council, asserts that in the first instance, organisations, following the Defiance Campaign and the banning of key leadership elements, were not geared for the campaign.

In addition, internal consultation at a national and provincial level "was slow" and took 'time. But for him the major factor for the delay was the implementation of a "new technique of mobilisation" and "a new concept of organisation" to which both activists and the masses alike had to adjust, familiarise and internalise:

Previously we campaigned for this and that. Activists were talking, leading and initiating. We were fighting for our point of view. Now there was a shift. People had to speak and members had to listen. It took a long time for people to understand mis and for members to develop the appropriate skills and technique. This was not to be just another propaganda campaign. Therefore it took a long time for the demands to come in. Initially mere was a slow response— it really picked up in the few months before the actual COP. Therefore the demands were not as extensive as they should have been. Another factor was that the masses had no electoral experience, they lacked confidence, and this explains the initial hesitancy. This method of organisation, then, represented a leap. You see during the Defiance Campaign masses were inspired by the events; they felt a sense of strength. Now they had to put forward a positive programme for the future."

Natal Campaign for the Congress of the People

The campaign for the Congress of the People in Natal took off in September 1954. This late start was largely due to the dis­organisation of Congress forces in the province, as was characteristic of the few years preceding the campaign. However, once the formal launch took place on 5 September 1954 (and not by August as claimed by Lodge in Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, p.70) at the Kajee Memorial Hall, Durban, the campaign gained momentum rapidly and served to re-activate Congress organisation and mobilisation and strengthen trade union activity in Natal.

The ANC, the NIC and the Congress of Democrats sponsored the launching conference. 309 delegates representing an aggregate membership of 169, 459 from the following sectors and organisations attended it:

Dr.W. Conco (ANC) and Dr. Naicker (NIC), Jan Hoogendyk (COD) chaired the conference and Mannie Pillay (representing the trade union committees) delivered speeches explaining the background and purpose of the Congress of the People. The Natal Action Council was elected at this point and 165 volunteers were signed up." For organisational purposes the province was divided into three regions, viz.. Northern Natal, Midlands and Southern Natal.

Shortly afterwards, on 19 September 1954, a conference of the Northern Natal Region was held in Ladysmith which was chaired by Dr. A. H. Sader (NIC) and N. Nyembe (ANC). A report to the National Action Council noted that it was attended by 238 delegates representing organisations from "Escort to Charlestown, including four reserves" and that 138 volunteers registered for the campaign.

On 5 December 1954, the Natal Midlands Region addressed by R. Resha, Dr. Motala, W. Conco and Hoogendyk (COD), launched the campaign at the Regent Cinema Hall, in Pietermaritzburg. The conference was attended by 53 observers and 97 delegates from the following types of organisations: 5 political organisations; 6 trade unions, 6 student organisations, 5 sporting associations and 4 youth organisations. The areas represented at the Congress included Pietermaritzburg, Ixopo, Richmond, Georgedale, Plessisloer, Mount Patridge, Howick, Sobantu Village, Ashdown, Wonderboom, Elandskop, Slangspruit and Raisethorpe. Messages of support for the campaign were received from the African Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers' Union, Food, Canning and Allied Workers' Union, African Food, Canning and Allied Worker's Union and the Northern Natal Regional Committee. Dr. Motala (MC) and Archie Gumede (ANC) were elected chairpersons and S. B. Mungal (NIC) as secretary of the Midlands Regional Committee of the COP. Other prominent figures who served on the Regional Committee were Harry Gwala, William Khanyile, M. Mabhida and Dr. Omar.

Whilst it is not possible to construct in detail the degree and depth of organisation and political work conducted in Natal a brief description of some efforts shed interesting light on the course and nature of me campaign. Following the launching conferences which secured the participation of a reasonably large number of organisations—a strategy consistent with the united front approach—that were strictly speaking non-political, the campaign proceeded towards the popularisation of the Congress of the People and the formation of local committees. Billy Nair recounted:

"We had regional conferences of all organisations, not necessarily affiliated to Congress—ratepayers, teachers, welfare, community organisations and trade unions as well. So you had a broad spectrum for people representing organisations attending these conferences at which the idea of Charter was thoroughly canvassed. This was part of the mobilisation process . . . "

By February 1955 there was a total of 34 Congress of the People Area Action Committees—actively engaged in popularising the COP and collecting demands— located as follows:

10 in Northern Natal, 9 in Midlands and 15 in the Southern Natal and Durban Districts. The extensive formation of local committees, in Natal at least, appears to contradict Lodge's assertion that "the formation of local committees never really got off the ground and much of the process of collecting demands was carried out through Congress branches and visits by provincial organisers" .

The areas from which activists were drawn also leave us with a picture of the probable areas in which political work relating to the COP campaign was conducted. In Natal the campaign was extensive and enrolment forms of Freedom Volunteers reveal that volunteers were drawn from the following areas:

Cator Manor, Durban, Sydenham, Merebank, S. J. Smith Location, Clairwood, Durban Medical School, Jacobs, Overport, Escombe, Umlazi Native Township, Umbogintwini, Bellair, Malvem, Umgeni, Wentworth College, Greyville, Chesterville Location, Umbilo, Rossburgh, Riverside, Durban North, Lamontville Location, Charlestown, Pietermaritzburg, Ladysmith, Sobantu Village, Danhauser, Ixopo, Ekupomeleni, Queenstown, Umzimkulu, Stanger and Clare Estate.

Freedom volunteers and Congress activists campaigned on an area-to-area basis with house visits, followed by a general meeting. A leaflet published by the Midlands Region explained the emergence of a "fascist state" in South Africa and listed the numerous "Anti-people legislation" enacted by the Nationalist government. It assessed the ability of the opposition parties in bringing about "democracy" in the country, and asserted that they had failed to do so.

Finally, it went to explain, "hope" rested in the hands of "extra-parliamentary forces in their struggle for democracy, and that tine Congress of the People was a concrete beginning in that direction." The Call, a Congress of the People popularising newspaper, reported that by February 1955 the campaign had reached the second stage with demands being collected for inclusion in the Freedom Charter. In the Midlands Region "Volunteers were going house to house . . . (and) the eager response of the people has heartened the local committees and they hope in the next few weeks to have completed their tasks." Likewise in Durban, "a concerted drive is being made to obtain demands for inclusion in the Charter. "The Northern Natal region had reported that demands had already been colleced and processed, and that a "miniature Charter" had been submitted to the National Action Council for consideration. The local committees were divided into different departments—health, social welfare, political, transport, economics, education, culture, and labour each with the instruction to deal with "specific problems of the people" .

Rob Lambert, in his study of SACTU, makes mention of the fact that in Natal the degree of trade union involvement in the campaign for the Congress of the People was substantial. The participation of trade unionists in an explicitly political campaign had the effect of reinforcing both the political and trade union movements and placing in the forefront the demands of the working class. This view is corroborated by information gleaned from the report of the credentials committee at the initial launching conference of the COP campaign in Natal in September 1954. There were 98 worker delegates out of a total of 309—21 from trade unions and 77 from factory committees. Lambert has also argued that the COP campaign was directly employed by SACTU organisers to build me trade union movement which, according to Lodge, was to develop a strong organisation in Durban and me surrounding industrial area. Moreover, full-time officials and organisers served on all me regional committees of the COP.

According to Lambert, SACTU organisers consciously propagated the concept of "political unionism" —an integrated trade union approach which made a dear link between specific economic and political issues with broader societal goals."

Billy Nair, an NIC executive member and SACTU Secretary in Durban in 1955, described the process in the following terms:

"So in the course of training and development of the worker (by SACTU organisers) we put to use all the experience and education we had in earlier years in imparting to the worker a new type of consciousness; mat is, class-consciousness. So that the worker could think not of mere trade unionism for the sake of it, that is merely to gain higher wages and better working conditions, but that he was also to liberate himself politically, free himself from all types of oppression, exploitation by his employer and oppression by the ruling class . . .. The policy declaration of SACTU made it quite clear that the trade union and the political struggle of the workers had to be fought side by side. Hence we threw in our full weight behind the campaign of the COP and the collection of demands for the Freedom Charter. We participated actively in the drawing up of the Charter. This strategic approach resulted in the creation and maintenance (by SACTU) of relatively "stable nuclei within the factories, semi-clandestine in nature and more durable in the face of management and state hostility than the more conventional forms of trade unions."

These small, tightly knit cores of conscious workers were constituted into factory committees; and the launching of the COP campaign in factories became the "key means of initiating the launch of these factory committees" . SACTU organisers concentrated on organising factories separately. They would draw up a programme of factory visits which involved going out to the factory gates and distribute propaganda material on the COP. Lunch hour meetings followed this with small groups of workers, which were 'intensive' in nature.

Organisers at their homes in the townships or at their union offices, where the issues surrounding the COP and the Charter and the need for factory organisation were both discussed, visited those workers who indicated a greater interest in SACT or Congress. They were asked to paste COP/SACT stickers in factories without being seen, and later to establish factory committees of likeminded workers in the factories. Aft this, wider meetings of workers were held on grassed are outside the factories, where demands were collected and brief discussed. Lambert, commenting on the significance of this process, makes the following points:

Workers had the right to full, democratic participation any future state, and they had the right to a dire contribution to debate over the future shape of that society. The COP was viewed as a process facilitating the growth alternative organs of government. This caught the imagination of workers contacted in this way and demand were sent in on a daily basis; and, the propaganda surrounding the COP created the immediate political consciousness in these small, newly establish groups. It was this consciousness that gave these groups stability that enabled them to constitute themselves as future mainstay of SACTU's factory organisation.

Billy Nair has also provided illuminating information relation to SACTU's efforts to penetrate unions belonging to Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) during the course of Congress of the People campaign. Although Nair's comments on this process are lengthy, they are worth reproducing in as it is an aspect of the campaign that has received no attention at all.

Apart from that, SACTU also went out to canvass the' affiliates of TUCSA and uncommitted unions as well. We had meetings directly in the factories of the TUCSA unions. We ignored wholly the leadership (of TUCSA) knowing that the leadership would not support any struggle of Congress," let alone Congress that they wouldn't support any political struggle whatsoever. So appeals were made direct to workers.... (Firstly) we distributed leaflets to the factories, to explain to workers what the COP was all about... Thereafter we got permission from the contacts (workers sympathetic to SACTU) that we had in the various factories to enter these factories and have group discussions with workers in little groups of about 30-40 workers.... We had succeeded in many instances in entering the cloakrooms of these factories illegally, that is without the management knowing, but with the workers actually collaborating.

This was done mainly in TUCSA unions. This was the irony of the situation. For example, we had very strong Congress Committees functioning in the Garment and Leather industries.... Workers were also prepared to collect demands by hand at the factory floor level and select delegates.... So during the campaign for the COP we were able to politicise the worker and draw him nearer to Congress and closer to the more progressive trade union movement, although they may have not breached their links with TUCSA and its reactionary leadership.

Lambert asserts that the Natal political and SACTU leadership were committed to maximising worker participation. Ensuring that workers elected at ANC meetings in the townships could not represent their factory as well enhanced this. Nair claims that the most "democratic methods" were used when delegates were elected. At factory floor level workers met independently and elected the best people—three, four, or five depending entirely on how much funds they were able to raise. In a smaller factory the workers were only able to muster a part of the fare and SACTU made up the balance to send at least one delegate. Approximately 1,500 pounds were raised by workers in a relatively short space of time in me Durban area which gives some indication of the sense of worker participation and enthusiasm created by the intense campaigning for the Congress of the People. In the final analysis, Lambert attributes this "stress on class composition rather than an exclusive focus on race alone as the controversial contribution of the Natal wing of the South African Communist Party which operated most dominantly through SACTU."

It will be remembered that in the Defiance Campaign of 1952/3 the smallest contingent of defiers, relative to the Transvaal and Cape, had come from Natal. Defiance activity was largely confined to the central Durban area. This pattern changed during' the Congress of the People campaign, In addition to the agitation, conducted in the major urban areas, extensive organisation and 3 mobilisation had been carried out in the rural areas. In many instances this was the first formal contact that Congress organisations had with rural residents and the objective of mass work here entailed introducing both the organisation and me campaign simultaneously. Although it has been difficult to obtain a crystal dear picture of these efforts, a general outline of political work does emerge.

A.S. Chetty, from the NIC asserts that the campaign was planned in such a way that activists operated in both rural and urban areas.

We did not plan our organisational programme with a view to just contacting people in urban areas. We planned it in such a way that we made sure we go out to the rural areas. Both ANC and NIC, together, went along to practically every house in the various districts surrounding Pietermaritzburg and its surroundings. Districts such as Willowfontein, Edendale, Plessislaer, Cato Ridge, Elandskop, men Richmond, as far as Greytown, Watburg; in the south: Harding, Escourt, Lions River, Howick right up to Ixopo (were covered). Chetty described the role of the chiefs and explained that in some areas (though not many) they played a direct and facilitating role in me campaign:

Chief Mini was one fellow who was very sympathetic. He was to a large extent responsible for calling up a few meetings in his area ... There were also some Chiefs in the Ladysmith area who were very sympathetic. They used to get their people together for us to come and speak to them.... The Chiefs would arrange for us to speak to them straight after church service.

Similarly, Reggie Vandeyar, an activist from the Transvaal Indian Congress who has spent several years on Robben Island with Harry Gwala and Stephen Dhlamini, remembers the two of them meeting "Gatsha Buthelezi and his people" to discuss the COP campaign. But he was quick to add that "he (Gatsha) was a better chap then." Dorothy Nyembe , from the ANC Women's League, recalls going personally to rural areas in Northern Natal such as Vryheid, Hlobane, in the Pietermaritzburg area to Utretch, Nqutu, Babanago and to Ingwavuma, Ixopo and Umzinkulu.

The number of delegates from the region to the COP itself can in part measure the success of the COP in Natal. A large total of 325 delegates represented the province at the COP. Shortly after the COP; the ANC (Natal) committed itself to (actively) propagate the Freedom Charter.

The campaign for the popularisation of the Freedom Charter the most important organisational task that faces Congress in the coming year. It will be necessary to organise mass meetings, conferences, local campaigns, classes, etc, on this issue, bearing in mind that our programme must not be put before the people in an abstract manner, but related to their everyday needs and problems.

The analysis provided thus far of the campaign in Natal sharply contradicts and belies Johnson's analysis of the NIC's contribution to and role in the COP campaign. He begins by asserting that within the "NIC, opposition to the COP existed. Campaign preparations were criticised because the NIC's organisation and finances were weak, because the general goal of adopting the Freedom Charter was too vague to attract Indian support and because the UN Declaration of Human Rights made the adoption of the Freedom Charter redundant." " He adds that "Provincial leaders were unable to organise the elaborate structures originally anticipated by the NAC" and mat one month before the COP the "Natal COP requested organisers" to please "keep in touch" with the Durban Secretariat, and to "let them know what you are doing, how many meetings you are calling and how many drives you have made and how many delegates you have organised." He finally concludes his investigation by citing a call to volunteers and ordinary residents to independently promote the COP campaign as a failure of the NIC. "Organisation," he says, "was abandoned in favour of spontaneity."

Johnson presents a glossed and simplistic picture of the COP campaign in Natal. Not only does he fail to point out exactly who in the NIC opposed the COP campaign and at what stage, and why precisely Indian people would not support the Freedom Charter, he has also failed to take into account the extensive campaigning that was undertaken by the NIC in conjunction with the Natal ANC and SACTU unions. A slight breakdown in administration and communication is interpreted as a fundamental organisational weakness, and an appeal encourage voluntary and independent mass support for the COP campaign is confused with spontaneity and lack of organisation. Johnson's limitation stems primarily from his heavy reliance on limited documentation and interviewing. His contribution has hardly helped to throw light on the roles and functions of the Regional COP Committees, the COP Area Action Committees, the trade unions and factory committees, the Congresses expansion into rural Natal and on the contributions of institutions and organisations that were up to then not firmly allied to the Congress movement, such as religious and cultural groups and tribal authorities.

The Cape Campaign for the Congress of the People

Activity centred around the Congress of the People in the Cape, with the exception of the Western Cape, formally began with a joint meeting of the ANC (Cape) Provincial Executive and the Cradock Branch Executive on 11 September 1954." The rather late start is surprising as it will be remembered that it was in Cradock, Eastern Cape, that the initial idea of the COP was mooted, and one would have expected the region to have been in a state of readiness to launch the campaign as soon as it gained approval by the national organisations in May 1954.

Two factors explain this delay, both pointing to the severe disorganisation of the ANC in the Cape. T. Tshunungwa's report to the Cape Provincial Conference in 1955 stated, "This report does not present a rosy picture. It presents a situation bristling with difficulties and organisational hurdles ... we have to set our organisational house in order." This organisational disarray stemmed in part from the repression that was meted out to the ANC in the immediate post-Defiance Campaign period, and from internal disputes and a decline in membership. The banishment of leaders like Gwentshe and Lengisi and the banning of Dr. Njongwe, R. Matjie, G Tshume, R. Mhlaba, J. Matthews and Florence Matomela had "crippled the organisation." Moreover, most branches in the region were not functioning effectively and lacked a dynamic internal political life. Tshunungwa was to complain bitterly to the ANC National Executive, "The branch meetings (in the Western Cape that he had attended in January 1955) were a big disappointment, save Paarl. Those that I visited were merely in existence by name. Membership is low. There is nothing to credit the supposed branch leaders with."

A more serious problem, however, was the tension between the Western Cape Region and the Eastern Cape, where the provincial Head Office was located. This conflict can be traced back to June 1954 when the Western Cape branches of the ANC boycotted me Provincial Conference held in Port Elizabeth. Differences between the two regions centred around the breakdown in communication between the Western Cape and the Cape ANC Provincial Executive Committee. The Western Cape branches had apparently broken all their contact with the Provincial Executive, had acted independently and had chosen to report to and receive instructions directly from the ANC's National Executive. This conflict had its roots in a conflict over ANC policy. The Western Cape Region had supported the campaign for the election of Lee Warden as a "Native Representative" for the Western Cape.

The Eastern Cape ANC branches demanded the principled application of the boycott tactic that was embodied in the 1949 Programme of Action. A further source of hostility sprang from the prominent role played by the Congress of Democrats in the Western Cape, largely the result of the weakness of the ANC itself. Members of the ANC in the Eastern Cape expressed misgivings about the seeming loss of independence of the ANC, but were at pains to stress that their criticisms did not originate from the an Africanist inspiration:

What has caused this extreme form of confusion is to find the Congress of Democrat's men taking a lead in ANC meetings. We are the vanguard in the liberatory struggle and those of our people who are not yet well educated about this basis of cooperation...must not expose our allies to unnecessary attacks. A politically raw African who has been so much oppressed, exploited and victimised by Europeans sees red whenever a white face appears. This embarrassing situation, which to a great extent is caused by ignorance of politics and what the COP is driving at, should receive our serious concern since some of those who have this innate hatred of the white man are very influential in their areas."

So, a combination of internal political wrangling, state of repression and organisational inactivity contributed to the slackness of the province in so far as the Congress of the People Campaign was concerned. Nevertheless, a decision was taken by the joint meeting held on 11 September 1954 to invite representatives from various sponsoring organisations and regions in the Cape Province. This consultative meeting was held on 16 October 1954 in George and was attended by six representatives from the Western Cape (two each from ANC, SACPO and COD), three representatives from the Eastern Cape, and two each from the Cape Provincial Executive, the Border and North Eastern Cape Regions and T. E. Tshunungwa, the COP national organiser.

Unlike the other provinces, the COP campaign in the Cape Region as a whole did not begin with a provincial launch. Instead, a Provincial Action Council was first constituted at the meeting of 16 October, composed of two representatives of the sponsoring organisations from each region, viz. Western Province, South Western Province, Eastern Province, Border, Midlands, Transkei, North Eastern Cape and North Western Cape. A Provincial Action Council Organising Committee was elected and, the following persons held office: G. Komani (East London) / Chairperson; Ben Turok (Cape Town) ,Vice-Chairperson; E. Tshunungwa/Administrative Secretary; E. Mfaxa (Stutterheim), Provincial Organiser; G. Ngotyana (Cape Town) Regional Organiser, P. Mashibini (Queenstown), Treasurer and C. Mayekiso (Port Elizabeth), no portfolio. Queenstown was to serve as the Provincial headquarters of the Provincial Action Council. Each region was mandated at the meeting to establish Regional Action Council for the COP and to organise a public launch of the campaign.

By this time—for the reasons previously discussed—the Western Cape had already held a launching conference for the COP at the Cape Town City Hall on 10 August 1954, where the Cape Western Action Council of the COP had been set up. G. Ngotyana was elected the regional organiser for the campaign. Invitations were extended to some 200 organisations and each was requested to send four delegates. Only 27 organisations eventually attended—six trade union?, the Federation of South African Women, the Cape Peace Council, a number of vigilance organisations and the Liberal Party.

Once again the police raided the Regional COP Conference, which was presided over by L. Lee—Warden, National Vice-Chairperson of the Congress of Democrats. "They searched the pockets and briefcases of many delegates . . . including trade unionists, housewives, advocates and medical specialists," reported the bulletin of the NAC. It also stated that all 300 delegates registered as volunteers.

The delegates had come from the following areas in the region: Elsies River, Retreat, Kensington, Sea Point, Paarl, Worcester, Athlone, Cape Town, Mowbray, Nyanga, Eerste Rivier, Huguenot, Langa, Hermanus, Claremont, Kolenhof, Wellington, Stellenbosch, Welcome and Rohlenhof.

The credentials committee reported that representatives of the following organisations were present: Muslim Progressive Society, Food and Canning Workers' Union, African Food and Canning Workers' Union, African Textile Workers' Union, Tin Workers' Union, Liberal Party Housewives' League, South Africa Club, Xmas Club, People's Clothing Club, Cape Peace Council, South African Railway Workers' Union, Athlone Traders Association, Student Democratic Association, Church of Congress, and several vigilance associations. "Some of the people eventually elected to the Western Cape Regional COP Committee were: S. Bunting, Ben Turok, T. Ngwenya, George Peake, J. Nkatlo, Lofty Adams and Archie Sibeko.

Whilst it has not been possible for them to construct a coherent and comprehensive picture of the full breadth of the campaign in the Western Cape, certain broad features are noticeable. Various methods were used to mobilise people for the COP campaign. These included meetings in the locations, local conferences, regional conferences and the 'traditional' public rallies at the Parade in Cape Town. From the available records, Parade rallies were held on 31 October 1954,12 February 1955, 1 May 1955 and 8 June 1955 and they attracted any number between 400 and 1,000 people. Prominent speakers included J. Mtini, Annie Salinga, George Peake, Dora Tamana, and Ben Turok who dealt with various topics ranging from the Congress of the People, me formation of SACTU, the Anti-Bantu Education Campaign and Anti-Western Areas Removal Campaigns. At these various meetings the COP was popularised and demands collected for inclusion in the Freedom Charter.

In February 1955, Ben Turok explained that: the COP is not an organisation that plans a violent revolution such as the government makes it out to be. The COP is a conference ... at which the representatives of the people of South Africa, irrespective of race, will come together to draw up a charter called the Freedom Charter ... You will say in that Charter how you want to be ruled, how you think workers should be remunerated for their labour." In the Western Cape the campaign did lead to an extension of Congress organisation. In various areas Joint Action Committees or United Action Committees of the COP were established which coordinated and planned the campaign at local level. Suttner has cited the work of the Worcester United Action Council which took the initiative in convening a conference of local organisations in the area, which was followed in September 1954 by a six-week campaign of local conferences— under the auspices of the Joint Action Committee (Western Cape)—to set up area committees and enrol volunteers."

The Secretary of the Cape Western Region Committee of the COP, G. Ngotyana, reported to the National Action Council that in the region "a fair number of COP committees (have been) set up and they are sending in demands to us ... we have also issued directives to these committees to, hold preliminary local conferences on 27 March 1955 where they will discuss methods of elections ... to be followed by an election conference in April."

Propaganda for the COP campaign was conducted through the publication of a COP bulletin in the region called "Congressman" . Moreover, several people, who were interviewed, recalled the "organising function" of the New Age newspaper in the Western Cape. Various Congress activists had fixed rounds for the sale of the publication and over a period of time these had become more established political contacts. During the COP campaign these networks—at bus ranks, 'house rounds' or at the station—had been used to popularise the COP campaign, draw references to articles in the newspaper about the COP, collect demands and keep groups of people informed of the development of the campaign.

It appears that the trade union movement in the Cape as a whole had been more active at all levels of the COP campaign than was the case in the Transvaal. Not only did they participate at the formal launching conferences of the COP campaign, but they also took an active organisational interest in the process of mobilisation and canvassing for the COP. Liz Abrahams recalled that in the Paarl "most of the collecting of demands was done by SACTU people. SACTU leader Archie Sibeko went around collecting. Sibeko would go from house to house." Alvin Bennie has described how the Port Elizabeth SACTU local committee mobilised workers around the campaign:

"The workers responded with enthusiasm and we worked day and night preparing for the COP.... That campaign helped us a lot.... The workers would bring their demands to the office after work.... We set up small committees, not only for the Congress, but we would organise a committee of workers so that they could continue with the work of organising for the trade unions—in the dairies, laundries, road construction, with building workers, railway workers etc. The real organising of the workers was boosted by the campaign . . . they had something to keep them together to discuss common problems.... We explained that workers must unite, have a union to represent them. Similarly, Christmas Tinto, who was organising for the Railway Workers' Union, remembered having groups of meetings with railway workers in an attempt to mobilise worker interest in and support for the COP."

The campaign in the Eastern Cape was launched on 26 September 1954 at the Muslim Institute Hall, presumably in Port Elizabeth. ANC branches in this region were called upon to arrange regional conferences before 23 October in me following areas to provide "detailed explanations on the campaign for the COP" :

Kimberley Branch... area between Kimberley and Mafikeng. Queenstown Branch . . . Herschel, Aliwal Norm. East London . . .King Williamstown, Peddie and Stutterheim. Fort Beaufort . . . Alice, Middledrift, Bedford. Cradock . . . Midlands Region. Umtata . . . Transkei Region.

What exactly transpired at these conferences is not known, but Tshunungwa informed the NAC that the "Province has been well-zoned into 8 regions and Regional Action Councils formed with the following regional secretaries: Cape Midlands— Mrs. J. Notwala, Western Border Region—Kenneth Eastern Border Region—E. A. Mfaxa, North Western Region—0. Che, North Eastern Region - Miss B. Sondlo. Transkei —D. Sanana." He had also addressed the Cape ANC Youth League Conference held in Queenstown where he had a "splendid opportunity to speak at length on the COP" concluded his report by adding that "they (the youth) returned home very dear and will work hard in their areas get on with the campaign."

By all indications, the Eastern Cape appears to have conducted an extensive and intensive campaign cutting across urban townships and rural districts. In Korsten, the Korsten Action Committee of the COP was composed of 11 members, 171 volunteer group leaders for the area and a total of 274 volunteers." The New Brighton branch claimed to have sent "more than 50 delegates" to the COP." Wilson Fanti recounted that Port Elizabeth "was a very strong place. There was a strong leadership of people like the comrade in prison—Mbeki (now Deputy President of the Senate), Dr. James Njongwe and Raymond Mhlaba” It was this strength of the urban townships mat enabled the Cape Eastern Provincial Council to undertake extensive political work during me COP campaign in the rural districts.

Both Edgar Ngoyi and Wilson Fanti recalled volunteers campaigning in the rural areas of Mgwali, Stutterheim, Peddie, King Williamstown, Transkei and Pondoland. The demands in these areas centred on the shortage of land. Likewise, Mrs. Sibanda and Mrs. Calata have provided exceptionally interesting accounts to Suttner and Cronin of their work and the issues that the people of Cradock were concerned about. For them "freedom" was not an abstract political concept, but had to be linked to me concrete conditions of people's existence in a specific area, like the shortage of food and wood for fire, expensive school uniforms and high school fees and sanitation facilities."

On the eve of the Congress of the People, the New Age reported that the Transkei Labourers' Organisation demanded shorter working hours for African labourers working 16-18 hours a day on white farms and 'better pay'. It mentioned also that the Thembu tribe of the Tulendivile section of Duncan Village had submitted demands and delegates. It was the strength of the ANC in the Eastern Cape that contributed to Tshunungwa's early optimism about the success of the campaign in that region. As early as October 1954 he replied to the NAC that he had "a good few . . . keen men to spread the gospel" in the rural areas.

One week before the Congress of the People me ANC (Cape) held its provincial conference where the Cape President congratulated all "those who have worked to bring this campaign to a successful culmination" " and the conference adopted the following resolution proposed by J. Calata:

This conference meeting on the eve of the forthcoming historic COP and being aware of the enthusiasm of the people of South Africa for peace among all sections of the population in our beloved country, salute all delegates to the Convocation in the belief that me Freedom Charter to be formulated shall alone be able to restore peace and order to our multi-national society.

Congress of the People Campaign in the Orange Free State

The Congress Movement in the Orange Free State was weak despite the fact that the Africanists had supported Dr. J. Moroka as presidential candidate for the ANC in 1949. In the period 1950-1954 the region was beset with chronic problems. The leadership in the persons of J.M. Nthakha and P. B. Pheteni, provincial president and secretary respectively, was inconsistent and politically ineffective. Furthermore, the provincial executive committee suffered from a severe shortage of funds and a feeling of alienation as a result of being geographically remote from the beehive of political activity—the urban centres—in the country.

Nevertheless, evidence suggests that the COP campaign did have a limited impact on an otherwise politically dormant province. The momentum of the COP campaign, coupled with the election of a new 15 person provincial executive committee in September 1954, did stimulate interest in the wider political developments and in the ANC, particularly in Bloemfontein and Kroonstad. The Kroonstad ANC secretary, V. Motumi, enthusiastically informed OFS ANC president, Mafora, of me new political developments in his area in 1955:

We are very glad to have had a visitor here in me person of C. Matshobi who opened our eyes and minds to a movement that we long wanted to know its all about....

We are already moving on M-Plan accordingly. Please register our branch in no time. It appears that the National Action Council of the Congress of the People did take an interest in the renewed activity in the province, and took' steps to assist in the region. A special conference was held on 5 December 1954 in Bloemfontein to discuss plans for the Congress of the People. The NAC despatched T. Mpomela to Bloemfontein to "assist in the formation of COP committees" and "to help make (the) conference a success" .

It has been extremely difficult to gather information on the patterns of mobilisation for the campaign in the OFS, but it would be correct to assume mat organisational work was carried out exclusively in the name of the ANC. Several demands coming from me Bachabelo Location in Bloemfontein indicated that some amount of organisational and mass political work had been undertaken during the COP campaign. Some of the demands are listed below:

• I) If I was to make the laws that govern the country, I would see to it that justice is done to all;
• II) That every man should have the choice of where to work and where to live freely;
• III) I would like to see to it that housing is adequate and that everyone has healthy food;
• IV) I would like to see it that our police are trained in such a way that they become the guardians of the nation rather than enemies or a nuisance as they turn out to be at times.

The province itself had sent eleven delegates to the COP and a sum of £28-14.8 had to be collected for the purpose. Despite this sketchy outline of the COP campaign, it is apparent that a political revival had taken place in the province. Membership in the Bloemfontein branch increased from 170 in September 1954 to 240 by September 1956. At a provincial conference held on 9 September 1956 there were 25 mandated delegates representing an aggregate membership of about five hundred from Bloemfontein, Bethlehem, Ficksburg, Thaba' Nchu and Kroonstad.

Finally, the following resolution adopted at the 1955 Provincial Conference does indicate that notwithstanding the difficulties and limited strength of the ANC in the OFS, the region made an important contribution to the scope of political work and morale of the Congress:

The Conference passes a vote of confidence in Chief A.J. Luthuli's leadership and his National Executive Committee, and supported the pledge of a million signatures for the Freedom Charter. Thus far I have discussed the origins, the political objectives, me national organisational structure of the Congress of the People campaign and provided a cursory study of its unfolding process in Natal, Cape Province and the Orange Free State. No attempt will be made at this stage to evaluate the successes and deficiencies of the campaign in the light of the political goals of the sponsoring organisations, but it should have become apparent to the reader that from province to province, from area to area, the campaign was implemented with various degrees of efficiency.

This in turn, was dependant upon a host of factors ranging from the material conditions and social background of the masses, the past traditions of struggle, the level of organisational development and preparedness, the initiative and creativity of the freedom volunteers, the effects of state repression and the level of political consciousness of the masses. Yet it can be said that despite this uneveness of me campaign from place to place, it certainly acted as a political catalyst upon the Congresses themselves and the thousands of people that the campaign had reached. This will be more evident from the next chapter, which provides a detailed account and evaluation of the patterns of mobilisation and organisation of the Campaign for the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter in the Transvaal.