Chapter 4: Public Response to Vigilantism and Political Violence in Kwazulu-Natal

4.1 The Role of the media

The media played a significant role in highlighting the activities of vigilantes and political violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the period 1985 to 1994. The role of the media was twofold: some sectors of the media were responsible for enhancing political violence and vigilante activities in the area, whereas other sectors of the media were playing a significant role in tackling the evils of vigilante activities and political violence. The way the media dealt with the KwaZulu-Natal situation had a detrimental effect on the whole scenario of vigilantism and political violence in that region. All the role players relied heavily on whatever form of media they could gain access to for their daily updating or information. This created a situation whereby any incorrect information given to them could have deadly results. Many citizens believed that through the media, they could learn if it was safe for them to go to their places of work for fear of being caught in the crossfire of political violence and vigilante activities.⁹⁷ Basically, the media were at the forefront of many aspects pertaining to vigilantes and political violence in KwaZulu-Natal. For example, when a chaotic situation existed as a result of allegations after an alleged attack on ANC supporters by IFP members or supporters, newspapers like theSowetan would run articles condemning the acts of a third force. This led to the SAP not only having to deal with the said allegation in their investigation, but also with the possibility of the existence of a third force. The media were therefore at times purposefully misleading, while trying to cover for or protecting those it supported; in other words, the reports were biased to such an extent that those who were investigating the lead were misled. The situation was worsened by sensationalist reports in the media, which tended to inflame tensions and trigger more violence in a given area.⁹⁸

The period January 1985 - June 1986 saw a very significant decline in media coverage of the township struggles. The information conveyed was censored on the Government-controlled television. Incidents were rarely, if ever shown and only brief snippets from township battles were selected for broadcasting. Still, local television viewers did view some scenes of intense and mass uprising in townships under the brutal control of the SADF and the SAP. On American and European television, this sort of footage drew howls of condemnation against the South African Government. By the time the Government instructed its controlled television network to censor coverage of township violence in 1986, it was a little too late. The damage had already been done, since clipses of police brutality had been shown in most parts of the world. This was followed by a strong condemnation from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), who laid the blame solely on the South African Government for its failure to combat violence and vigilante activities by whoever was responsible.⁹⁹

According to the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) television news on 17 October 1985, the SAP defended their alleged ambush of stone throwers in the area of Richmond in KwaZulu-Natal earlier in the week. According to the SAP, three people were shot and killed as a necessary technique to protect people using public roads in the area. The SAP stated that the ambush of stone throwers had been widely published and condemned by the South African media, as if they (the SAP) had not been provoked. They also stated that they had no choice but to ambush since the youth in the area had constantly thrown stones at them.¹⁰⁰ It was believed that the motive behind the reporting of the issue was to draw anger from the people of Richmond so as to avenge the ambush. The news was reported as if the SAP had done whatever they had done without any provocation or any given reason whatsoever.

Kim Hodgson, the head of the IFP Institute's Violence Study Unit, stated in 1986 that according to a report released by theHuman Rights Commission (HRC) through theSunday Times, it was quite clear that the ANC vigilantes were carrying out most of the attacks in KwaZulu-Natal. It was alleged that a third force was orchestrating most of the attacks in the region. Thus, an excuse to mobilise was found for the actual perpetrators of vigilante activities and political violence in KwaZulu-Natal. Hodgson went a step further by linking the death of Mfunzelwa Nglongo (IFP Member of Parliament in KwaZulu-Natal legislature) to ANC vigilantes. For theSunday Times to even voice that ANC vigilantes were to be blamed for the death of Nglongo was somewhat bit irresponsible. Obviously, those who supported Nglongo were going to find ways and means of avenging his death. It was wrong timing and insensitive on the part of theSunday Times to release such a report without tangible evidence from the police. Reports such as this triggered more violence and vigilante activities in KwaZulu-Natal. Minaar believes that the motive behind the report in theSunday Times was a political one, namely to create more rivalry between the ANC-alliance and the IFP.¹⁰¹

The way, in which newspapers like theSowetanand the Sunday Times dealt with the Government's role in vigilante activities, left much to be desired. Even some radio stations in KwaZulu-Natal, likeUmkhozi FM, did not make matters easier by the manner in which they chose sides when dealing with issues of political violence and vigilante activities. Many people in KwaZulu-Natal had lost trust in the Government. This stemmed from the fact that various newspapers alleged that the security forces were involved in the violence. Furthermore, the people's hopes of an end to the violence and vigilante activities were dashed every day by the media reporting that even the Government was deeply involved in political violence and knew very well who were behind the vigilante activities. TheSowetan blamed the Government for using vigilante activities and political violence as a ploy to get rid of democratic forces in South Africa. The paper further alleged that the reason why the Government backed Buthelezi was because he was used as a puppet to carry out bad deeds of political violence and vigilantism.¹⁰² At the very same time that the South African Government was held responsible and accused by black supported media for the violence in KwaZulu-Natal,Volksblad, Die Burger andBeeld were alleged by the UDF to be in support of the Government's position in the region. These papers believed that though it was hard to prove that the Government was involved in the instigation of violence and vigilantism in the region, it could be said that under the situation, the Government did its best to protect the region.Die Burger argued that if it was not for the Government's intervention, KwaZulu-Natal could have been in a more chaotic state than the civil war that had befallen Angola. Henceforth, they refuted all claims that the Government was in the thick of things in KwaZulu-Natal as far as violence and vigilante activities were concerned.Volksblad believed that those who were involved in these gruesome acts used the Government as scapegoat in order to draw the attention away from themselves as perpetrators of political violence and vigilantism and lay it at the feet of the Government. The paper further stated that the accusation was inhuman and should be investigated fully to find out who the people behind such damaging allegations were. It was believed that the rumours of Government involvement in political violence and vigilantism were damaging the image of the country internationally.¹⁰³The Starand The Pretoria News were very sceptical with their comments on the alleged role of the Government's involvement in violence and vigilante activities in KwaZulu-Natal. Even though the two papers did not want to commit themselves so much in pointing fingers at those who were responsible for the violence in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands, they believed that it was the Government's responsibility to sit down with all concerned parties in the violence that was plunging the region into turmoil.¹⁰⁴

In 1987,The Citizen did not beat around the bush with its comments concerning the violence in KwaZulu-Natal and the alleged role of the Government in the whole scenario. The paper strongly and vehemently denied any Government involvement in such activities. The paper believed that it was the work of underground forces that wanted to stop Government initiatives in resolving the situation through peaceful means.The Citizen laid the blame on the evil forces of the ANC for spreading or carrying out propagandistic ideologies that were aimed at discrediting the Government. It was believed that it was the ANC's deed to label the Government as an instigator in order to gain sympathy from the international community.The Citizen believed that through the use of the Government's name, the ANC was raising funds for themselves in order to carry out the atrocity of violence and put the blame at the feet of the Government.¹⁰⁵

TheCity Press, as expected since the paper was regarded by many as pro-black or pushing the ideologies of black people, laid the blame for the violence solely at the feet of the Government. The paper claimed that the Government was using dirty tricks to bring confusion among the people of KwaZulu-Natal. What the Government did not know was that innocent people were being killed in the process. TheCity Press further stated that the Government was creating a situation whereby observers would view the whole scenario as black on black violence, whereas the Government was alleged to be behind everything. To theCity Press, the Government knew very well what it was doing in KwaZulu-Natal. It had aims and objectives with regard to the political violence and vigilante activities.¹⁰⁶ It was also reported by theCity Pressin 1987 that when the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, held a meeting with the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce, he made no excuses about the arrest of many people who were not even armed at the time of their arrest. Their only offence was that they tried to find means of ending the political violence in KwaZulu-Natal. This came as a shock to the people of KwaZulu-Natal with regard to the role of the SAP in the activities of vigilantism and political violence. TheCity Press assumed that the SAP was an anti-peacemaker in KwaZulu-Natal since they only arrested those committed to peace. It was also believed that the SAP wanted violence in order to fulfil their acts of vigilantism in darkness.¹⁰⁷ Newspaper reporting in KwaZulu-Natal as far as vigilante activities were concerned was deeply rooted in the structuring of the region; hence more power was indebted to the IFP. It gave the KwaZulu-Natal Legislative more power to dictate terms in most aspects. This brought to the surface the issue of the SAP in KwaZulu-Natal having been given more powers. Newspapers believed that the power of the SAP played a significant role in vigilantism and political violence. It was believed that members of the SAP were often at the forefront of the cruel deeds in KwaZulu-Natal. The way the SAP and the SADF (the security forces) were perceived in KwaZulu-Natal by newspapers, mostly theSowetan and theCity Press, was that of forces that did not tolerate any means of democratic principles being implemented in KwaZulu-Natal. Bearing in mind however that the two newspapers were from anti-apartheid structures, their comments did not surprise many.¹⁰⁸ In January 1988, aNatal Witness editorial criticized the role of the SAP in the storming of a COSATU meeting held in Richmond. The meeting was aimed at helping to find ways for a peaceful KwaZulu-Natal. The editorial stated that the SAP's role in these circumstances should be to crack down hard on the actual perpetrators of violence, and to leave the politicians alone to try and resolve their differences.¹⁰⁹

In February 1988, the security forces in KwaZulu-Natal banned the reporting of any news related to violence and vigilantism. This created suspicions about the role of the security forces in these activities. When complaints were raised about security force activities, the local newspaper, theNatal Witness, was unable to report on them. For example, the contents of a petition drawn up by Ashdown women complaining about police action in the area in February 1988 could not be reported. Another petition drawn up by Slangspruit women outlining allegations against security force action was handed to the local commanding officer of the SADF in March 1988. However, theNatal Witness could not report on these issues. The best it could do was to confirm that the petition was handed to the commanding officer, but it could not comment on the details of the petition. Despite the fact that newspaper reporting on political violence and vigilantism issues was banned, it was alleged that the Government was trying to cover up for the security forces for its role in any misconduct they were executing in promoting violence in KwaZulu-Natal.¹¹⁰

Another interesting aspect of media reporting on the whole issue of political violence and vigilantism, was the manner in which reports were written with regard to the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990. The media (mostly press) stated that Mandela's release had a serious impact on the whole region of KwaZulu-Natal. The area became even more lawless. Vigilantes were at the forefront. Political violence was on the increase. Returning exiles went on the rampage, looting what did not belong to them. The whole region was in a chaotic phase. Most of the activities that took place in KwaZulu-Natal after the release of Mandela were entirely blamed on him. Newspapers blamed Mandela's laid-back approach on issues of violence and vigilantism. It was believed that had Mandela had a firm grip on the whole scenario and outlined his mission for peace in KwaZulu-Natal, immediately after his release, things could have been much better. Newspapers like theSowetan and theCity Press regarded the release of Mandela as a new breath for South Africa and the whole continent of Africa, whereasThe Citizen, with the culmination of bad events in KwaZulu-Natal, started to have serious doubts concerning the release of Mandela. Various newspapers viewed his release as a serious threat to the economic growth of KwaZulu-Natal. The future of businesses was in serious jeopardy due to the increase in political violence and political activities.¹¹¹ Another interesting aspect with regard to media reporting in so far as violence was concerned was the accuracy of statistics when reporting certain issues where killings had occurred. TheNatal Witness mostly used exaggeration and dramatization in order to evoke anger from the other side. Even their statistics on massacres due to political violence in the region of KwaZulu-Natal were over-emphasized and exaggerated. At times the reports would leave out crucial aspects for the fear of more violence. Though their action was justified, the deliberate omission of important information was not fair to the people of KwaZulu-Natal.The Citizen on the other hand reported on less significant issues in order to provoke violence in KwaZulu-Natal.¹¹²

TheSowetanfrom the very beginning was perceived as the pro-ANC paper. In most cases, their statistics fuelled violence for the ANC to take retaliation against whoever was responsible for killing their cadres. The paper justified the ANC's killings as a way of the organisation having to defend itself against its rivalry. IFP statistics in these instances were kept secret to justify every action by the ANC vigilantes.¹¹³

An editorial report by theNatal Witness in 1991 stated that a number of allegations with regard to SAP activity in Richmond had been made. The paper stated that three attacks in separate places in the area had taken place, leaving 23 people dead. In the report it was also claimed that two 4x4 SAP vehicles had off-loaded arms near Townlands, where one of the attacks had occurred, and that SAP members in camouflage jackets had participated in the attack. The report also stated that spent cartridges and some live ammunition belonging to the SAP had been found. Despite public pleas that the SAP were aiding the vigilantes, they seemed to do nothing about it.¹¹⁴

In a SABC debate held in August 1991, Mandela was quoted as saying that the media were doing the right thing by condemning the actions of the Government. Mandela believed that freedom of the press was important in ensuring that the perpetrators of political violence and vigilantism were exposed. He praised newspapers like theNatal Witness, theDaily Timesand the City Press for their continued efforts in exposing the role of the SAP in the violence that occurred in the whole of KwaZulu-Natal. Mandela believed that it was the duty of the media to expose all elements of political violence and vigilantism without any interference from anyone, be it the Government, the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature or even the SAP, who were mostly implicated.¹¹⁵

TheDaily Times believed that there was enough evidence to believe that the Government through its security forces was involved in and supporting vigilante groups. The paper claimed that the violence in KwaZulu-Natal was part of a Government security strategy; a strategy aimed at disempowering black communities and weakening support for the ANC while helping the more conservative, "moderate" black community.¹¹⁶ In January 1992, a former senior IFP member, Mbongeni Khumalo, asserted that this was exactly the case: "The deeper my involvement, the more I realised I was a vehicle for instigating conflict among blacks, for undermining legitimate organisations and maintaining the status quo".¹¹⁷ Khumalo was making this revelation through an article that was published by theNatal Witness. The paper concluded that the SAP were beyond any reasonable doubt aiding the vigilantes to commit acts of violence, thus laying the blame at the feet of political organisations. In May 1992, allegations by the various newspapers that the SAP was behind the violence had become standard in KwaZulu-Natal. In the same month, Mandela was quoted in theNatal Witness as saying: "It's a serious responsibility to accuse a head of state himself for fuelling violence and the killing of innocent people, but facts indicate that De Klerk himself is involved in this".¹¹⁸ Mandela's allegation was based on the fact that De Klerk as the head of the South African state had a say in what the security forces were involved in. If they were tangled in criminal activities such as political violence or vigilante activities, he had a duty to stop them from doing so.

More staggering evidence of SAP involvement in political violence and vigilantism was implicated by theSowetan. In June 1992, a former senior IFP leader was interviewed by a journalist from theSowetan, wherein he mentioned that the security forces were behind most of the vigilante activities and were responsible for the political violence in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands.¹¹⁹ This criticism of the security forces had a serious effect on vigilante activities and political violence in KwaZulu-Natal. People started to lose trust in the security forces and took the law into their own hands by defending themselves in a manner that was unlawful.

In 1994, theNatal Witness reported that a 15-year old resident of Richmond had given evidence that the SAP had him wounded and killed his friend by the SAP while they were lying on the ground. The incident was recorded on a video camera. The camera, however, was resolutely focused on two large stones, presented as an exhibit to the Goldstone Commission. The viewer saw the stones from several positions as the camera zoomed in and out. Visually it was found that the youth's evidence and his version of what had happened during the procession, was overrated by the insistent image of the stones, as though the fact of stone throwing provided an authoritative verdict for the shooting.¹²⁰ Again the SAP was left off the hook for a murder they had committed. Concerning international media reports, the South African Government reacted too late when it banned scenes of violence and vigilante activities on television and in newspapers. When the Government discovered that South African journalists had already transferred most of the clippings that contained violent scenes so other media sources abroad, it was a shock for them, because they never expected it. The international community consequently came down hard on the South African Government, criticising the manner in which it was dealing with the violence. The United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the European Union (EU) were some organisations that wanted South Africa to be banned from the international arena. The OAU called the violence and vigilante activities in KwaZulu-Natal a gross violation of human rights. Other African countries and European countries called for sanctions against the South African Government. They labelled the Government a traitor to its own people.¹²¹

4.2 Government Response to Vigilantes and Political Violence in Kwazulu-Natal

The Government did not lag behind in condemning the acts of vigilantism and political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, despite the fact that the Government itself was accused of being the main perpetrator in vigilante activities and political violence. In spite of all these accusations, the Government still initiated a strong effort by appointing commissions of inquiry. The Goldstone Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Human Science Research Council Committee (HSRCC) were the result of the Government's initiative to find the core of the violence in KwaZulu-Natal.¹²² The most worrying aspect was the Government-related or controlled commission, which at times provided wrong statistics to the public and made the whole issue of vigilante activities and political violence even more complicated. The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) stated that 1990 was the most violent year in the history of political violence and vigilante activities in KwaZulu-Natal. The report attributed 72 attacks to vigilante activities. According to the Human Rights Commission (HRC), 111 of the deaths in 1990 were the result of vigilante attacks. The HRC went a step further by stating that the worst hit place was KwaZulu-Natal. By its own admission, the HRC stated that most attacks were carried out by fighting parties from the ANC, the IFP and special defence units. In a way, the report gave vigilantes a momentum to establish their authority in KwaZulu-Natal.¹²³ The report was therefore damaging and it created more grounds for animosity between organisations in KwaZulu-Natal. The HRC at times tended to justify its findings (in particular the reports they released) by stating that most vigilantes' related attacks were largely blamed on IFP members. Ironically, the HRC stated that the IFP as a party could not be held responsible for vigilantism. The HRC defended the IFP by stating that the party had never issued a word of encouragement to its members to go on rampage along with vigilante activities. The HRC also stated that a total of 240 deaths had been vigilante-related and most of them had occurred in KwaZulu-Natal. To the dismay of many observers, KwaZulu-Natal was an IFP stronghold. As such, it meant that those who were the victims of the violence were in the majority of cases not IFP supporters. These damaging findings by the HRC were a cause for concern for the whole peace process in KwaZulu-Natal. The report did not call on either organisation to unite or to put to an end its atrocities, but provided a finding that was unnecessary at the time and uncalled for. In this manner, the HRC could be held accountable for many vigilante related deaths in KwaZulu-Natal, due to its ill timing in releasing the report.¹²⁴

As already discussed in Chapter 3, the Government also instituted the Goldstone Commission under the leadership of Judge Richard Goldstone, to investigate political violence and vigilantism in KwaZulu-Natal. The Commission's preliminary report was dated 29 April 1992. It detailed the Commission's interim findings on the causes of violence. These included economic, social and political imbalances created by apartheid, the sudden and unexpected legalising of the ANC and other previously banned political organisations, a climate of political intolerance, particularly among blacks, a criminal element that was exploiting the situation, and the existence of hostels and large squatter settlements.¹²⁵ The preliminary report also emphasised the role of the Government and its security forces. It was stated that one of the causes of political violence and vigilantism was a police force and army that for many decades had been instruments of oppression by successive white governments, in order to maintain a society built upon racial discrimination. This involved a police force and an army that, for the majority of South Africans, had not been community based or community orientated. For many South Africans, the SAP and the SADF were not perceived as fair, objective or friendly.¹²⁶ Goldstone himself subsequently criticised the Government for the way in which it handled the press releases, based on the fact that the Government exonerated elements of the security forces from contributing to the violence. The Commission did find that in spite of the fact that there was an unholy presence of the security forces in some parts of the KwaZulu-Natal region, they were more than welcome to stay in a lot of places, since their presence brought peace and stability.¹²⁷

4.3 Conclusion

It is very interesting to note that the role of the media was twofold. Some sectors of the media were quite objective in their reports on the violence and vigilante activities in KwaZulu-Natal, since they were well aware that negative reporting was going to trigger more violence and vigilante activities. Other sectors of the media were only interested in obtaining stories that could sell, without thinking of the consequences of what was going to happen in KwaZulu-Natal as a result of their negative reporting. The various commissions that were instituted to look at violence and vigilantism in KwaZulu-Natal also did not help the situation. Instead of being fair and honest, they released unreliable statistics, which were biased at times and led to more violence in KwaZulu-Natal.