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CHECKMATE FOR APARTHEID? July 1991-June 1992

In Chapter 8 we examined the emergence of a strategy of destabilisation alongside talks during the year from July 1990 to June 1991. It took the ANC up until April 1991 to fully recognise the tactic and to react to it by threatening to withdraw from all talks unless and until the government addressed the political violence. To emphasise the ultimatum, mass protest occurred throughout the country in May 1991.

The present chapter covers the second year of destabilisation (July 1991 to June 1992), which showed little abatement, if any, in the levels of violence but some shift in the patterns. Instead of the open massive forays from the hostels that characterised the first year, the violent events decreased in individual magnitude while increasing in frequency. For example, the number of incidents recorded went up by 63% for more or less the same number of deaths (over 3000 for each year) while the number of major massacres reduced from 34 to 15. This second year was also characterised by new and insidious forms of terrorising township communities, such as indiscriminate train attacks (accounting for 227 deaths) and attacks on busses and taxis (another 119 deaths). Assassination of political figures by unknown hit squads jumped from 28 to 96. But vigilantism remained the major source of political violence and even this was supplemented by alliances with notorious criminal gangs such as the Three Million Gang, the Black Cats and many others.

Mass protest, a national strike (November 1991) and international condemnation had the effect of forcing the Nationalist government into a national peace accord (September 1991) and the start of formal negotiations at CODESA I (December 1991) and CODESA II (May 1992). The second year of destabilisation, however, closed on a disastrous note, that of the appalling massacre in Boipatong (June 1992), which precipitated the withdrawal of the ANC from negotiations as an expression of their profound mistrust of the real intentions of the government. Nevertheless, it was a year in which apartheid power was beginning to run out of options and its continued survival was placed in question.

This chapter is based on the following appropriately titled special report: 'Checkmate for apartheid?' (August 1992)

Another feature of this particular document is its analysis of which the stakeholders are in apartheid power and what contribution they make to the 'third force' in their struggle to maintain and preserve that power.

CHECKMATE FOR APARTHEID?

A special report on two years of destabilization July 1990-June 1992
HRC, August 1992

Part 1. The record of destabilization

1.1 The toll of death and injury

1.2 The record of the security forces

1.3 The record of the vigilantes

1.4 The record of the hit squads

1.5 The record of the 'right wing'

Part 2. Destabilisation - the indictment

2.1 Centres of destabilisation 1 2.2 Acts of destabilisation

Part 3. Apartheid survival strategy

3.1 Structures and stakeholders of apartheid power

3.2 Threats to apartheid power

3.3 Evolution of apartheid survival

3.4 The chances of survival

Preface

South Africa has entered into the last stages of a struggle that may be likened to a hard-fought game of chess. On the one side it is a struggle for the survival of Apartheid Power, on the other a struggle by the majority population to emerge from the shadows and take its rightful place in the sun. At times, the movement of millions of people has been part of the play to arrange the pattern of the board to the liking of one of the players. At other times, pieces have disappeared from the board without trace or have been dealt with in many ways, which are not to be found in any internationally accepted book of rules. While the game has essentially been fought on a black-and-white checkerboard pattern, growing numbers of white knights (and bishops) have joined the side of those struggling for liberation. Simultaneously some black pawns have allowed themselves to be co-opted onto the side of Apartheid Power in the hope that they might become kings, or at least continue to live in their castle. The game has gone badly for Apartheid Power, and in the last two years it has been fighting a bitter rearguard action in which thousands of black lives have been sacrificed. It is a play called Destabilisation. It was tried in Namibia and it failed. We believe it will fail here, and soon. Checkmate is nigh.

Part 1. The record of destabilisation

Introduction

The 2-year record of political violence contained in this report is drawn from 24 monthly issues of the HRC Area Repression Report, comprising the following:

? 2166 incidents from July 90 to June 91 (Year 1)

? 3534 incidents from July 91 to June 92 (Year 2)

? A total of 5700 incidents for the 2-year period.

1.1 The toll of death and injury

The death count

The month-by-month death count for the 2-year period is depicted in Fig. 16. Politically related deaths recorded by HRC amounted to a total of 6229 or an average of 260 per month or an average of 8.53 per day. Year 1 accounted for 3190 deaths while year 2 accounted for 3039 deaths, or a small reduction of 4.7%.

The early months of the period are highly significant. July 1990, although numerically a low month, signalled the start of the violence outside of Natal, particularly in the PWV region (Pretoria, Witwatersrand, and Vaal) and coincided with the launch by Inkatha of a national political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). August 1990 witnessed simultaneously the suspension of the armed struggle by the ANC in the Pretoria Minute of 6 August, and the full emergence of Inkatha onto the national stage from its previous base of Natal/KwaZulu. That month over 700 people died, 570 of them in the PWV alone; these are figures, which have not been remotely approached since. However, in the last 4 months deaths have again reached horrifying levels, at an average of 366 per month, even more than the level of the 4-month period of August to November 1990.

The injury count

During the 2-year period, HRC recorded injuries inflicted on 11 888 persons. However, it is suspected that this is a very conservative figure, since many injuries would go unreported. Also it is impossible to assess how many of these injuries were so serious as to produce permanent disability.

Sources of the violence

The HRC discerns 4 sources of political violence, which impacted on communities throughout the country during the 2-year period, namely:

1. Security force actions 352 deaths (5.7%)

2. Vigilante-related actions 5060 deaths (81.2%)

3. Hit squad attacks 126 deaths (2.0%)

4. Right wing attacks 44 deaths (0.7%)

In addition there were incidents responsible for 576 deaths ( 9.2%), around which there was insufficient information to determine a source; and a small number of definable actions not fitting into the above categories, responsible for 71 deaths (1.2%).

It is abundantly clear from the above statistics that vigilantism is by far the dominant factor in the carnage. It is no exaggeration to say that vigilantes have been the shock troops of community destabilisation.

Regional analysis of the violence

During the 2-year period the Natal region accounted for 32.2% of deaths, the PWV region for 58.9%, and the rest of the country combined for only 8.9%.

Natal/ region

The violence in Natal dates back to long before the present 2-year period. It has its origins in the rapid development of country-wide popular support for the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) from 1984 onwards, a development which did not bypass Natal, and which was perceived by elements within Inkatha as a threat to Inkatha dominance in the region. That perceived threat intensified further when the ANC was unbanned in February 1990. Insofar as the current 2-year period is concerned. Fig. 16 shows that the month-by-month death count in Natal has been remarkably stable. In year 1, there were 1004 deaths and in year 2, there were 1004 deaths, producing a total for the period of 2008 deaths or an average of 84 per month.

PWV region

During the 2-year period, the PWV region recorded 3670 deaths or an average of 153 per "* month. By contrast with the pattern in Natal, the month-by-month death count in the PWV region shows very considerable fluctuation, from as low as 13 in February 1991, to as high as 570 in August 1990. Clearly it is the PWV region which is responsible for the ^ on/off character of the overall monthly death count referred to previously.

Other regions

The fact that all other regions of South Africa outside of Natal and PWV account jointly for only 8,9% of all deaths, is an indication of the relative freedom of these areas from vigilantism and of the relative unity of the communities in these areas. There are, however, some exceptions:

? Vigilante groups sometimes with aligned criminal gangs were active in Eastern and Western Transvaal, often combining with police to oppose consumer boycotts, etc. or with mine security to attack mineworkers.

? Nearly half the deaths reported in the Western Cape were linked to the complex 'taxi-war'.

? The OFS region was plagued by the activities of a vigilante grouping known as the 'Three Million Gang'.

Major massacres

Amongst the 5700 incidents monitored by the HRC over the last 2 years, there were 49 ^ incidents in which 10 or more people died and which the HRC has classified as major massacres. The first massacre occurred on 22 July 1990, at Sebokeng in the Vaal, around the launch of the Inkatha Freedom Party in the area and can be said to be the event which opened the floodgates of violence in the PWV region. The latest massacre on the list was the infamous Boipatong massacre of June 1992, which occurred but a few kilometres away from the first.

The 49 massacres accounted for 1250 lives, or 25 deaths per massacre on average. In 15 cases the death toll was higher than 25. Natal accounted for 11 massacres costing the lives of 167 persons while the PWV accounted for 38 massacres costing the lives of 1083 persons.

 

The victims of the violence

First and foremost amongst the victims of the violence that has swept the country have been the ordinary residents of black townships. White communities have physically been virtually untouched, and were it not for their newspapers, radio and TV screens they would hardly be aware that their black neighbours have been dying at the rate of over 250 per month for the last 2 years. Some of the violence has been targeted at specific groups or individuals active in the political arena but more and more of the violence seems to be totally random and indiscriminate with the only possible motive being to cause alarm, despondency and terror as a destabilising tactic. This is designed to discourage involve­ment in political activity. Some typical victims in both categories are analysed below.

Commuters

Commuters travelling on trains, buses and taxis have been coming under increasing attack and are daily being exposed to the danger of losing their lives while simply travelling to and from their places of work.

Train attacks in particular are taking a terrible toll of deaths and injuries during attacks in stations, on trains and being thrown from trains. The record of deaths and injuries in train attacks is as follows:

? Year 1 67 deaths and 284 injuries in 16 incidents.

? Year 2 227 deaths and 566 injuries in 230 incidents.

? Total 295 deaths and 850 injuries in 246 incidents.

In the second half of year 2, train attacks accounted for over 10% of all deaths, an indication of urban terrorism of a special kind. One particular train attack ranks as a major massacre. This was the incident starting at Jeppe Station in Johannesburg on 13 September 1990, which resulted in the slaughter of 21 passengers.

Bus and taxi attacks have appeared as a new form of terrorism supplementing the attacks on trains. In year 2, there were 27 attacks on buses, killing 53 and injuring 126; and 45 attacks on taxis, killing 66 and injuring 104.

In summary, 346 commuters died during year 2, representing 11.4% of all victims.

Women and children

Given the random and indiscriminate nature of many of the attacks on the community, it is not surprising that women and children should figure amongst the casualties. Whilst some of them may be ascribed to 'cross-fire' situations, there is no doubt that many have been deliberate and in cold blood. The records for year 2 show the following:

? Women 189 deaths and 227 injuries.

? Children 106 deaths and 87 injuries.

? Total 295 deaths during year 2 (close on 10% of all deaths).

In the Boipatong massacre, 25 out of 46 deaths were women and children.

Township communities

In reviewing the records of deaths and injuries within township communities, it is possible to determine from the reports the affiliation or location in the community of 50% of the victims. For the rest there is insufficient information to identify the victims. Within the identified victims, the records show the following for year 2:

? IFP/Inkatha members, supporters and occupants of Inkatha controlled hostels
Deaths - 234
Injuries - 306

? ANC members and identified supporters
Deaths -274
Injuries - 310

? Township residents
Deaths - 979
Injuries -1165

Thus, IFP victims account for 15.7% of the dead and 17.2% of the injured, while ANC and residents account for 84.3% of the dead and 82.8% of the injured.

Within the list of 49 major massacres over the 2 years, ANC and residents were the victims in 40 massacres, IFP supporters in 3 massacres, while in 6 massacres it was not possible to determine which party was the victim and which the attacker.

Security force members

In recent months, members of the security forces have increasingly fallen victim to political violence. During year 2, HRC recorded the following casualties incurred by the South African Police (SAP): 65 dead and 175 injured in 197 incidents. Figures recently released by the minister of law and order claim a higher figure of 97 deaths since January 1992. In addition, HRC recorded casualties incurred by the South African Defence Force (SADF) as follows: 3 dead and 104 injured in 8 incidents.

1.2 The record of the security forces

The security forces of the apartheid state include the South African Police (SAP), South African Defence Force (SADF), homelands police such as the KwaZulu Police (KZP), homelands armies, municipal and council police and other parastatal law enforcement entities.

Actions by the security forces, which impact upon township communities, are of 2 general kinds:
1. Actions which have the force of law under security and related legislation which apart

from providing powers of arrest also provide for the use of force that may lead to injury and even death. 2, Actions, which fall outside of the law.

Incidents

Incidents involving overt actions by security forces were recorded by HRC as follows:

? Year 1 - 881

? Year 2 - 909

? Total - 1790 incidents

This represents 31.4% of all incidents recorded and is a high level of involvement.

Deaths and injuries

Deaths attributable to the security forces over the 2-year period, are as follows:

? Year 1 - 238

? Year 2 - 114

? Total - 352 deaths

The marked decrease in deaths in year 2 is indicative of the pressures put upon the security forces by public and even judicial criticism of their heavy handed approach to mass protest and demonstrations.

Injuries inflicted by the security forces show a similar pattern:

? Year 1 - 2248

? Year 2 - 1033

? Total - 3281 injuries

However, it should be noted that the level of injuries is extremely high, with the security forces accounting for 27.6% of all injuries, against 5.7% of all deaths.

The security forces have been directly responsible for, or directly involved in a number of massacres:

? SAP for the deaths of 12 in Daveyton on 24 March 1991

? SADF for the deaths of 11 in Sebokeng on 4 September 1990

? SADF for the deaths of 12 in Esikhaweni on 11 April 1992

? KZP for the deaths of 18 in Umlazi on 13 March 1992

Arrests

Arrests made by the security forces are a good barometer of the state's response to political resistance in the form of mass action of all kinds, such as protest marches, demonstrations, industrial action, boycotts, etc. Arrests are of course a precursor to the use of the courts to curb political activity, and are an expression of repressive legislation. The very extensive use made of the powers of arrest during the last 2 years can be seen by the following statistics:

? Year 1 - 8211

? Year 2 - 8725

? Total - 16 936 arrests

Unlike deaths and injuries, arrests by the security forces are on the increase, and are likely to accelerate further in the present climate of mass action. Over half the recorded arrests during year 2 were attributable to security force intervention in civic, labour, political and educational protest.

 

Unlawful actions

Apart from the 'legitimate' actions of the security forces as described above, the record abounds with allegations of unlawful actions perpetrated by the security forces during the 2-year period. Such unlawful actions run the full spectrum from acts of omission to acts of commission; from neglecting to act in performance of their proper and expected duties, to engaging in activities falling outside the law. Most of these alleged acts relate to security force involvement and complicity in vigilante attacks on township communities and are discussed in Part 2 of this report.

Foreign mercenaries

The 'dogs of war' which South Africa has inherited from the disintegration of colonial Southern Africa, including the Selous Scouts of Rhodesia, Koevoet of Namibia and elements of RENAMO and UNITA from Mozambique and Angola respectively, have in many cases found their way into the security forces to be formed into 'special' units such as the 32 Battalion. They have been used extensively in township patrolling, in spite of the fact that their training for lethal warfare makes them totally unsuited to a peace-keeping task. In this context their role is highly suspect.

1.3 The record of vigilantes

Vigilantism in the South African context arose directly out of the formation of homelands administrations and black local councils as essential components of the grand design of apartheid. Those willing to participate in these puppet structures found themselves isolated from the vast majority of the black communities in which they were located. In order to defend their vested interests against the hostile rejection of their undemocratic authority, they formed private 'armies' of vigilantes drawn from traditional and conservative elements, from the unemployed and even from criminal gangs. This develop­ment is known to have received tacit, and then active, encouragement of the apartheid state as an essential component of the total strategy of the Emergency years, which served also to promote the image of 'black-on-black violence' at no political cost to the government.

Vigilante groups started making their appearance in several parts of the country in the mid-1980s, the most prominent and sustained of these groups being elements, primarily 'war-lords', from within Inkatha. Inkatha-supporting vigilantes bear the prime responsibility for the spread of vigilantism in Natal during the 1980s and in the Transvaal during the 1990s.

The initial targets of vigilantes have been community structures, organisations and individuals that were vocal or active in calling for the dismantling of homelands and black councils; but subsequently, during the general destabilisation period of the last 2 years, the targets have become much less selective and tactics have switched to indiscriminate terrorising of township communities.

Incidents

Incidents involving vigilante-related actions were recorded by HRC as follows:

? Year 1 - 884

? Year 2 - 1898

? Total - 2782 incidents

These figures indicate a strong upward trend in vigilante-related activity.

It must be noted that in reporting vigilante-related actions, the HRC includes not only attacks by vigilante groupings, but also retaliatory or pre-emptive measures taken by the affected community in a vigilante-initiated situation.

Deaths and injuries

Deaths attributable to vigilante-related actions were recorded as follows:

? Year 1 - 2640

? Year 2 - 2420

? Total - 5060 deaths

This represents 81.2% of deaths from all sources for the period and emphasises the pre-eminent role of vigilantism in the political death toll, and of vigilantes as the shock troops of destabilisation.

Injuries attributable to vigilante-related actions were recorded as follows:

? Year 1 - 4077

? Year 2 - 3186

? Total - 7263 injuries

The total represents 61.1% of injuries from all sources.

1.4 The record of hit squads




Evidence of the existence of professionally organised and trained hit squads stretches back to the 1970s, but it was only in the dying days of the 1980s that hard evidence came to light to confirm what had been suspected for a long time, namely, that these hit squads were the creation of the state, located within, trained by and financed by the state structures of the South African Defence Force, Police and National Intelligence Service. Before and during the States of Emergency, the state-based hit squads performed a designated role within the total strategy guided by the National Security Management System under the control of the State Security Council. Their activities encompassed South Africa, the Southern Africa region and the world beyond. Numerous hit squad entities have been identified and exposed thus far and doubtless there are others still to come. What is certain, however, is that the activities of organised hit squads continue to this day, in whatever modified or assumed form.

Hit squads are characterised by the clear possession of expertise in the use of weapons, explosives, chemicals, etc. and their ease of access to resources such as information, equipment, bases and funding. In contrast to the use by vigilante groups of widespread and indiscriminate terror to achieve their ends, hit squads are highly focussed in their objectives, which are to eliminate identified and designated political opponents, and to cripple or disrupt targeted organisations.

The record of the 2-year period July 1990 to June 1992 shows the manner in which these 2 specific objectives are currently being pursued by hit squads in their present role of contributing to the onslaught on township communities.

Incidents

Incidents involving hit squad actions were recorded by HRC as follows:

? Year 1 - 99

? Year 2 - 126

? Total - 225 incidents

Deaths and injuries

Deaths attributable to hit squad strikes were recorded as follows:

? Year 1 - 28

? Year 2 - 96

? Total - 124 deaths

Most of the deaths are, in effect, successful assassinations, whilst the rest of the deaths are family members, friends or associates caught in the firing line. It is clear that the trend is drastically upwards.

Victims

Over 100 of the victims listed of hit squads over the past 2 years are clearly identifiable as belonging to the anti-apartheid camp. Of these, 87 were officials, members or supporters of the ANC and its related organisations, 9 were members of civic associations, 4 were trade unionists, 5 were members of the PAC. Eleven victims belonged to the IFF.

In addition a disturbing new trend is the assassination of witnesses and of participants in peace accord structures. Within the list are to be found 6 witnesses (or their relatives) who were assassinated before they could give evidence; and at least two persons who were active in dispute resolution committees.

Finally, note should be taken of the practically non-existent record of success in solving these murders and bringing the perpetrators to book.

1.5 The record of the 'right wing'

The 'right wing' in the present South African context can be described as the residue of apartheid supporting whites left over after the National Party and government opted for a reformist strategy. It consists of the Conservative Party and a proliferation of extra-parliamentary groups bitterly-opposed to the abandonment of legalised apartheid and comprises about one third of the white population or about 5% of the total population.

Within this residue there are militant elements, perhaps amounting to 1% or less of the total population, which are prepared to resort to violence to express their opposition. While some of this violence is directed at white groups supporting reform, the vast majority of actions are targeted on the black community and for that reason are included in this report.

In general there are 2 categories of right wing violence, the one involving semi-spontaneous and indiscriminate acts by individuals or small groups driven by emotional anger; the other organisationally based and involving planning and marshalling of resources.

Incidents

Incidents involving right wing actions were recorded by the HRC as follows:

? Year 1 - 93

? Year 2 - 114

? Total - 207 incidents

Such incidents include the bombing of buildings and attacks on people.

Deaths and injuries

Deaths attributable to right wing attacks were recorded as follows:

? Year 1 - 21

? Year 2 - 23

? Total - 44 deaths

Injuries were as follows:

? Year 1 - 246

? Year 2 - 101

? Total - 347 injuries

This represents a high injury rate relative to the number of deaths.

 

Prosecution of perpetrators

An extraordinary feature of right wing attacks has been the diligence with which the state has investigated them and the extremely high rate of success it has had in making arrests and obtaining convictions. What the reasons are for this outstanding display of political will is not clear but what is clear is that the capacity and ability exists for the solution of crimes of political violence.

Part 2. Destabilisation - the indictment

There are 2 centres of power in South Africa that both have a common interest, each for their own reason, in ensuring that the liberation struggle does not succeed in reaching its objectives. The one is the Nationalist government with its extensive security establishment, the other is the KwaZulu homeland. Both have over the years spawned mechanisms of destabilising the liberation struggle because it represents a threat to their ambitions, and this identity of interests has taken them along parallel, if separate, paths.

 

2.1 Centres of destabilisation

Nationalist government

The Nationalist government cannot be considered apart from its security establishment, since it has the full authority for its control through the relevant departments and ministers and for determining overall policy through the State Security Council and the former National Security Management System (now called the National Co-ordinating Mechanism); it must also accept ultimate responsibility for any actions undertaken by the security forces.

The government is also responsible for the security and related legislation, which determines the parameters within which the security forces are able to operate at an overt level. Furthermore, it provides the funds for their operations and this would include the very considerable funds for secret operations not open to parliamentary or public scrutiny. Government cannot distance itself from involvement in destabilisation tactics carried out by their security forces.

It should also be pointed out that the government has a long history of practising destabilisation of its neighbours in the Southern African region by methods ranging from armed intervention through full-scale invasion, commando raids, abductions and assassinations, to the creation and support of surrogate forces, to the use of political and economic pressures designed to create dependency on South Africa. The heavy interference in the process towards Namibia's independence by promoting the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and emasculating of SWAPO, was a precursor, a rehearsal, of what was to come when the Nationalist government was to turn its expertise in destabilisation inwards on its own population.

The Security establishment

While nominally under the control of the government and its cabinet, the security establishment is widely perceived as a force within a force, with waxing and waning fortunes. During the total strategy era spanning the States of Emergency, its star was in the ascendancy and the State Security Council was the body, which effectively ran the country, completely overshadowing parliament and even the cabinet. After economic collapse began threatening about the time of military defeats in Angola in early 1988, the securocrats were obliged to agree to a shift in strategy and found themselves taking a back seat while the withdrawal from Angola and Namibia was being completed. The unbanning of their former enemies and the commencement of talks in early 1990 was a bitter pill to swallow but probably viewed by them as necessary measures to be followed in due course by others.

The considerable involvement by the security establishment in the destabilisation of the last 2 years raises the question as to whether it was doing the bidding of the Nationalist government along the lines of a carefully orchestrated plan, or whether it has been the prime-mover in the process and has been dragging a more or less passive government behind it, or even running away with the process. Regardless of the answer, final accountability rests with the government.

The security establishment has 3 component parts: South African Police (SAP), South African Defence Force (SADF) and National Intelligence Service (NIS).

South African Police (SAP)

Overt units of the SAP include the normal uniformed police attached to police stations around the country; the Internal Stability Units (ISU) formerly known as the 'Riot Police' and generally wearing camouflage uniform; and the Crime Intelligence Service (CIS) incorporating the security police.

Covert units uncovered so far include the 'counter-insurgency' section Cl based at security police headquarters in Pretoria and operating from bases such as 'Vlakplaas' and 'Daisy'. These were exposed by 'Askari' Almond Nofomela and commander Captain Dirk Coetzee in late 1989 as having a long involvement in political assassinations. More recently, a national network of covert structures was admitted to by the SAP after the discovery by the Weekly Mail in May 1992 of such a structure operating in the Vaal Triangle, involving the targeting of political activists.

South African Defence Force (SADF)

Overt units of the SADF, apart from the conventional forces, include special forces such as Reconnaissance Regiments 1,2,4, and 5, and Battalions 31 and 32 all of which perform roles beyond purely military matters. They also include Military Intelligence (MI) with a strong reputation for playing a political role.

Covert units of the SADF are also only acknowledged by the authorities as and when they are exposed. The existence of the complex network of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) was only revealed in late 1989 after being in existence for several years and its 'disbanding' in August 1990 was unconvincing. Numerous activities involving assassinations, abduction, arson, etc. by the- CCB have been alleged or revealed prior to and during the Harms Commission of Inquiry. A more recent expose has been that of the 'Hammer' units which have operated in the Eastern Cape and in the Witwatersrand. One such unit has been implicated in the assassinations of the Cradock Four in 1985. In addition, numerous front organisations posing as private companies have been exposed by the Weekly Mail as operating in conjunction with Military Intelligence.

National/ Intelligence Service (NIS)

The NIS is seen as the strategising wing of the security establishment but little is known of

its operational role in the destabilisation of the liberation movement.

The KwaZulu homeland

Ever since its establishment in 1970, the KwaZulu homeland has exercised a destabilising influence on the course of the liberation struggle. Besides contributing to the division of the country along with the other homelands, an animosity towards the democratic movement (which gathered strength in 1984 around resistance to the tricameral parliament) was allowed and encouraged to develop within Natal. A territorial war for political influence ensued which continues to this day. It is a war, which spilled over onto the national stage in July 1990, a few months after the unbanning of the liberation movements, which raised longer-term threats to the continued existence of the KwaZulu power base.

Inkatha-supporting vigilantes

An extremely powerful culture of vigilantism, strongly opposed to progressive thought and activism particularly on the part of the youth, emerged as a reactionary force against the growth of the democratic movement in Natal during the 1980s. One of the earliest manifestations of this vigilantism was the 'lesson' inflicted on the students of the University of Zululand on 29 October 1983 when an impi of 500 Inkatha-supporting vigilantes descended on the University at Ngoye, killing 5 and injuring many more because of their intended boycott of an Inkatha rally. Similar vigilante groupings formed around influential warlords rooted in conservative traditionalism emerged in many parts of KwaZulu/Natal, and constituted the foot-soldiers of the War against the encroachment of the democratic movement that swept the rest of the country from 1984 onwards. They were to become the shock troops in the destabilisation of the liberation movements after their unbanning in February 1990 but now their field of operation extended beyond KwaZulu to encompass many parts of the country, in particular the Witwatersrand/Vaal area.

KwaZulu Police (KZP)

Although properly part of the security establishment, the KZP serves 2 masters. Since its establishment in 1980, it has continued to inherit more and more police stations and areas of jurisdiction from the SAP and its current commissioner is General Buchner, seconded from the SAP in November 1987. At the same time it has fallen under Inkatha control from which it is now virtually indistinguishable, especially in terms of allegiance. The KZP role in destabilisation is restricted to the KwaZulu area.

Hit squads

Strictly speaking it is unnecessary to distinguish hit squads as another centre of destabilisation as their existence has already been noted within the ranks of security force structures. This location has long been suspected and now been given ample confirmation by the revelations which began spilling out in November 1989. These revelations are now almost a daily occurrence. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that more or less professional hit squads have emerged quite recently from backgrounds outside of the security forces but possibly with training and resources originating from within the security forces in some cases. These include vigilante-based hit squads, freelance hit squads and right wing hit squads.

Vigilante-based hit squads

A current trend in vigilante activity is generally away from large-scale swoops, towards small group, highly lethal, shock attacks in trains, taverns, night vigils, buses and homes. Such attacks indicate the existence of well trained, well-resourced squads, which have had a remarkable record of making their getaway and concealing their identity.

Freelance hit squads

There are undoubtedly some criminal or mercenary hit squads in circulation whose services are for hire. What is less certain is who would avail themselves of, and pay for, such services.

Right wing hit squads

There is ample evidence that hit squads formed within the ranks of the right wing have been active. However, these have seldom shown a high level of professionalism and have in any event not in general been directed towards consciously destabilising the liberation struggle. One possible exception was the parcel bomb killing of computer consultant and ANC supporter Nicholas Cruse on 2 October 1990 by 3 members of Orde Boerevolk who, however, claimed that the SAP was implicated.

2.2 Acts of destabilisation

Role of the Nationalist government

The role of the Nationalist government in destabilisation has been one of failure, omission and neglect. First and foremost, it has failed to use its security forces to put a stop to the violence, something they have the duty and the capacity to do. In particular, it has neglected to secure hostels against their use as launchpads for violence, in spite of undertakings to do so and in spite of recommendations by the Goldstone Commission. Similarly, it has failed to secure trains against attacks and only after the deaths of nearly 300 victims and a train boycott, are the authorities beginning to take their first hesitant steps towards securing the rail transit system.

The government has vacillated on the issue of carrying dangerous weapons in public, including 'traditional' weapons. At first, in August 1990 the laws relating to traditional weapons were actually relaxed. Subsequently under pressure, the Dangerous Weapons Act Was amended but is often not enforced. The present unclear position is that a ban on the carrying of all weapons is only in effect in unrest areas (of which there are none in Natal, where such a ban is most needed). All this despite the highly increased potential for violence which accompanies the carrying of traditional weapons in public and despite the recommendations of the Goldstone Commission 'that the carrying of any dangerous weapons in public should be outlawed - whether in respect of political meetings or at any other place.'

Another area of neglect is the failure to take meaningful steps towards transforming the security forces from an army of internal occupation with a war psychosis into structures which are accountable to the communities they are supposed to serve; or in the words of the Goldstone Commission 'transforming the police force into a body that has the confidence, respect and co-operation of the vast majority of the people of South Africa'. The retention and continued use of repressive legislation such as the Internal Security Act and Public Safety Act is a serious omission; the declaration of unrest areas serves little purpose other than to antagonise township residents and add to their insecurity. One of the causes of violence ascribed by the Goldstone Commission is 'a history over some years of State complicity in undercover activities, which include criminal conduct'. Failure to reveal and halt this activity is another serious omission.

The continued use of foreign mercenaries within the ranks of the security forces is another area of neglect. Such units (e.g. 32 Battalion, Koevoet, etc.) should have been disbanded long ago and their members returned to their country of origin or, at the very least, confined to barracks pending their demobilisation by an interim government.

Role of the security forces

The role of the security forces in destabilisation needs to be examined at 2 levels - the level of overt official operations and the level of covert extra-legal activities.

Overt official operations




The official role of the security forces and the reason for their existence is supposed to be the protection of the population and preserving the peace. The fact that over 6000 South African citizens have died in political violence over the last 2 years, with twice that number injured, is a measure of the extent to which the security forces have failed in their duty. This failure can be ascribed either to inability or to passive complicity or to active promotion of violence or to combinations of all three. In relation to the first possibility, the Waddington Report on police investigations into the Boipatong massacre of June 1992, found them to be 'woefully inadequate' and 'incompetent', and suggestive of 'an unaccountable police force.' Complicity aside, the nature of security force behaviour at an official level frequently confirms an active promotion of destabilisation and violence beyond the 'legal limits'.

The Security forces have in the last 2 years been responsible for 350 deaths, nearly 10 , times that number of injuries and almost 17 000 arrests.

Security forces have frequently been engaged in operations, some of which fall under the category of massacres, in which 'excessive force' has been used and which have drawn the criticism and condemnation of various commissions of inquiry. Some of these are:
? Sebokeng, 26 March 1990. Police actions against demonstrations in the area resulted in 12 deaths and 281 injuries. A judicial commission of inquiry conducted by Judge Goldstone found the use of police violence as 'immoderate and disproportionate' and made reference to 'an attitude of unconcern for the lethal nature of their ammunition and for the consequences of its use. This is an attitude no police force should tolerate.' The prosecution of a number of policemen involved was recommended but well over 2 years later, the trial has not commenced.
? Sebokeng, 4 September 1990. SADF members opened fire without warning on a group of people, some seated, at Sebokeng hostel, killing 11 and injuring many others. Justice Stafford, who conducted a judicial inquest, criticised the SADF internal inquiry as a 'whitewash' and recommended prosecution of SADF members on 4 counts of murder and 10 of grievous bodily harm against people posing no physical threat. No trial has yet taken place.
? Daveyton, 24 March 1991. Police opened fire on a gathering of ANC supporters in an open field, killing 12 and injuring 37. Justice O'Donovan conducted a judicial inquest, describing the incident as a 'slaughter', finding excessive use of force and recommending prosecutions for murder and culpable homicide. The attorney general declined to prosecute.

? Carletonville, 1990. The Welverdiend Unrest Unit of the SAP in the Khutsong district of the Western Transvaal was implicated during 1990 in the harassment, torture and killing of Khutsong township residents and activists. In July 1991 a police investigation was ordered into the 'ongoing allegations of irregularities'. Several policemen have been suspended, the unrest unit was disbanded in December 1991 and a number of trials are in progress.

? Phola Park, 8 April 1992. Members of 32 Battalion of the SADF attacked the Phola Park squatter camp and were accused of misconduct including assault and rape. A Goldstone commission of inquiry concluded that the members had acted in a manner entirely inconsistent with their peace- keeping function, had been guilty of unjustified violence and that the battalion should not be used for peace-keeping duties anywhere in South Africa. The response by General Meiring of the SADF was that 32 Battalion would be deployed as and where needed. During evidence, an officer of the Battalion said the existence of a 'war-type situation' justified the use of force.

The above are but a few examples of the 'war-psychosis', which seems to guide many security force units and personnel in their behaviour.

Covert operations

Covert operations of the security forces are now well known and no longer occasion much surprise when new facts come to light. The Goldstone Commission comments that in our recent history '[government has failed to take sufficiently firm steps to prevent criminal conduct by members of the security forces' but misses the point that such conduct is condoned within deliberately created covert structures. The practically non-existent record of solving the long catalogue of political assassinations is a product not so much of the lack of firm steps, as a desire and interest in avoiding disclosure. How much more there is to be disclosed is difficult to estimate but in the meantime the increasing frequency with which political assassinations occur is evidence of the continued existence of such covert operations and refutes claims that they have been disbanded. The following evidence, incidents and allegations are relevant:

? The assassination toll over the last 2 years has been 124 deaths, of which over 100 are clearly identifiable as assassinations of anti-apartheid activists or their families. This is 5 times the rate of assassinations during the years of total strategy.

? The Harms Commission of Inquiry into the activities of hit squads within the security forces confirmed the existence of such squads and that they had been engaged in illegal acts. Nearly 2 years after these findings no prosecutions have yet been brought by the state. The SAP Vlakplaas squad still exists, while the SADF CCB squad, though nominally disbanded, still has unfinished business.

? In a court before Judge Kriegler, General Lothar Neethling, an SAP forensic expert, Was found to be lying to the court about supplying poison to the SAP hit squads for use against ANC activists.
? The Goldstone Commission is currently investigating disclosures by the Weekly Mail that the SADF has been funding and training hit squads for promoting destabilisation and violence in KwaZulu and in Wesselton in the Eastern Transvaal. This has involved the creation by Military Intelligence of a complex national network of front organisations with innocent sounding names, and most of which are still in existence. Training took place in a military base in Caprivi and at the Mkuze camp in a remote area of Zululand.
? Another Goldstone Commission inquiry pending, is one into the conduct of the SAP (CIS division) in the Southern Transvaal in instigating violence. This relates to a further Weekly Mail report that covert SAP units are operating in the Vaal from private property, using false company names, false telephone numbers and false registration plates.
? Yet another Goldstone Commission inquiry found prima facie evidence that 2 SAT members in Schweizer-Reneke had conspired to abduct and assassinate Jerry Maine, chairman of the Ipelegeng Civic Association in November 1991 and referred the matter to the attorney-general. Six months later Judge Goldstone had cause to complain about the tardiness of the police in investigating the case.
? Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, member of CONTRALESA and ANC sympathise!" was assassinated in Pietermaritzburg on 25 February 1991, shortly after threats to his life. During the inquest, evidence was presented suggesting security police involvement in the attack, while the Weekly Mail claimed to have information linking Mkuze camp trainees to the assassination.
? The assassination of the Cradock Four (Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkhonto and Sicelo Mhlauli) near Port Elizabeth in June 1985 is having reverberations today. On 8 May 1992, the New Nation published information strongly implicating security forces in the murders. It had obtained a copy of a signal message sent from the Eastern Province JMC to the secretariat of the State Security Council proposing that Goniwe and others be 'permanently removed from society as a matter of urgency'. The message referred to a telephone conversation between Brigadier C.P. van der Westhuizen, then commanding officer of Eastern Province Command (now a lieutenant-general and chief of staff of Military Intelligence) and General van Rensburg, then serving on the State Security Council secretariat. Despite a loud outcry, General van der Westhuizen has not been suspended pending a commission of inquiry. Furthermore, a Mr Andre de Villiers, said to be an informant about the participation of the covert SADF 'Hammer' unit in the killings of the Cradock 4, has himself been assassinated. The above samples of covert security force operations are probably but the tip of the iceberg.

 

Collusion with vigilantes

Over the past 2 years there have been extensive and persistent allegations by to' communities of security force collusion with vigilantes during attacks upon them, primarily from hostels. Furthermore, there have been revelations emerging from press investigations, court actions and commission of inquiry, which give support to these allegations. From HRC records kept during year 2 (July 1991 to June 1992) allegations of collusion were made on no fewer than 92 occasions. Similar allegations were made about 19 out of 49 major massacres. These various acts of collusion may be summarised as acts of omission and acts of commission as follows:

Acts of omission




? Absence from the scene of vigilante attacks or excessively late arrival.
? Not responding to forewarning of attacks or undertakings to protect communities.
? If present, standing idly by, even refusing or ignoring requests to intervene.
? Not countering, deflecting or dispersing attackers.
? Not disarming, arresting or detaining attackers.

? Not charging or prosec