CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
There are different accounts of the number of casualties sustained by the Rhodesian security forces and the ANC-ZAPU guerrillas respectively. For the fatalities suffered by the Rhodesians I accessed the Rhodesian Roll of Honour whose statistics I accept as accurate, with the exception of one date.1 The roll does not include statistics around the injured Rhodesians or the names of the South African security forces that were killed in Rhodesia.2 Eight members of the Rhodesian security forces were killed during the time of the Wankie campaign and 15 were wounded.3 The names of the deceased are as follows:
13 August 1967
1. Davison, Acting/Corporal, First Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles, killed in action by a gunshot wound
2. Karoni, Private, First Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles, killed in action by a gunshot wound
22 August 1967
3. Pierson, K., Lieutenant, First Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles, killed in action by a gunshot wound in a contact
4. Smith, N.J., Lieutenant, First Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles, killed in action by a gunshot wound in a contact
5. Timitiya, WO2, First Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles, killed in action by a gunshot wound in a contact
23 August 1967
6. Cosmas, Corporal, First Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles, killed in action by a gunshot wound in a contact
7. Thomas, S.T.M., Patrol Officer, British South Africa Police, Dog Section, killed in action
24 September 1967
8. Nyika, Private, First Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles, killed in action by a gunshot wound in a contact, 24 September 1967. Although the date is 24 September,
I am convinced this is meant to be 4 September, and is supported from the situation report as follows.
4 September
Western Sector
Three guerrillas were killed by 10 Platoon RAR at NJ200800. Rhodesian casualties:
One RAR dead, one RAR wounded. The guerrillas were identified as deserters from the main group three days after the crossing. All were carrying AK rifles.4
In accounting for what happened to the 80 guerrillas the Rhodesian statistics on
8 September 1967 were as follows: Thirty of the joint ANC-ZAPU unit died: 29 in Rhodesia and one in Botswana. Of the 30 who died 25 were ANC members and one assumes the other five were ZAPU members. Of the 44 imprisoned, 15 were in Rhodesia and 29 in Botswana. In addition four PAC members were also imprisoned in Botswana. 5
In the course of my research I have accepted the statistics released by the ANC in its submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of the Luthuli Detachment members who died. The names of the ZAPU members who died are not available. The ANC lists the names of 25 guerrillas who died during the Wankie campaign and are as follows:
ZIMBABWE - WANKIE 1967
1st Battle: 13/8/67 RECONNAISSANCE
1 State
2 February, Basil (Paul Peterson) *[Should actually read 16 August 1967]
3 Makgotsi, Jones
4 Mampuru, Christopher
5 Maseko, Don Donga - Died later of kidney problems
6 Masemeni, James
7 Mhlongo, John - Injured left with Zapu died later
8 Modumo, Ernest (Steven Maelebyane)
9 Motsepe, Andries
10 Sharp, Alfred
11 Sibanyoni, Delmas
2nd Battle 21/8/67 *[Should actually read 22 August 1967]
12 Baloi, Robert
13 Masipa, Barry
14 Moloi, Sparks
15 Setsoba, Charles (Jack Simelane)
3rd Battle 22/8/67 *[Should actually read 23 August 1967]
16 Donda (from Natal)
17 Mahamba, Sparks
18 Mhambi, Charles (Rhodes Msuntu Ngamela)
19 Nduna, Eric
WANKIE: 1967 (UNKNOWN BATTLE)
20 Donga
21Mbali, Jackson
22 Ndlovu, Joseph Spoe
23 Nduku, Knox
24 Nondulo, Ernest
25 Theo, Mkhaliphi
This accounts for 74 members of the 80 men. What happened to the other six?
Some of the infiltrators managed to escape back into Zambia, others made it to Swaziland, while one managed to make it back to South Africa and was later arrested.
Following the Wankie campaign, during September 1967, nine of the guerrillas were convicted in Bulawayo of contravening the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act by possessing offensive weapons and materials. The leader was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and the rest were jailed for periods from 10 to 14 years.
Early in November 1967, seven guerrillas appeared in the Salisbury High Court.
Two were ANC members and five were ZAPU members. The seven were identified as part of the Lupane-bound group who participated in the Battle of Inyatue on 13 August 1967. Two ANC members gave evidence for the crown although they were not present during the fighting. These two admitted receiving training in Moscow and Algeria. All accused were sentenced to death for the murder of two policemen and illegal possession of weapons and explosives.
Later the same month another seven infiltrators were sentenced to death. They had been captured after two engagements in August during which four security force members were killed and eight guerrillas killed. All the ANC members convicted in Rhodesia as a result of their participation in the Wankie campaign were released on the eve of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.
The ANC Chief of Staff was Leonard Derrick Nkosi who managed to travel to Durban. He wrote to the ANC in Lusaka, Zambia and to some of the Luthuli Detachment members in the Botswana prisoner saying he had reached home. The SA Security Police, who were working hand in hand with the Botswana authorities, intercepted the letter and subsequently arrested Nkosi. At the trial of James April, in which Nkosi was a state witness he admitted taking Captain Stadler and section officers of the Rhodesian security police to identify from a helicopter where the fighting had taken place, where arms had been hidden [by the guerrillas] and various other spots. 6 This is what happened to Nkosi after the 23 August battle:
Mr Rees : (The prosecutor) No. M'Lord, he went back to the republic, finally. I don't want to lead all the evidence.
KENNEDY, J . : (The judge) I just wanted to know what the link was, how he came back: Now I know that he deserted and he gave certain information. You deserted, and then did you make your way back to South Africa? ---Yes.
Did you go up, later, by helicopter? ---Yes.
And you indicated what? --- Where we had the fight, and where we had hidden our firearms.
Mr Rees : Did you point out, also, to them the donga along which you and the other members of your group had walked shortly after this engagement? ---Yes.
And the spot in the donga where you and others crossed after this engagement? ---Yes.
And the place where you were given shelter, subsequently? ---Yes.
And the place where you concealed your firearms? ---Yes.
And did you also subsequently point out to Mr Hartley (a member of the South African security Police) your own particular firearm? ---Yes, I did. 7
Once Nkosi became an askari it was said he developed a reputation of ?viciousness' towards ANC cadres. It seems he might have felt betrayed by the ANC, although it was his own doing which led to his arrest. Unknown assailants in Natal in the 1980s subsequently assassinated Nkosi. 8
It may be useful to utilise Howard Barrell's approach to MK with the three questions he posed.
What did the ANC and MK think was necessary and possible in 1967?
The joint action drew sharp criticism from both the PAC and ZAPU. A PAC pamphlet entitled, ?The Wankie fiasco in retrospect' said inter alia, you cannot hope to gobble up a regular army, all at once in a conventional style war, as our brothers tried to do, and still claim to be waging guerrilla warfare. 9
The PAC found the ANC's actions wholly unacceptable in theory and practice. Although once the news of the Luthuli Detachment hit the international press the PAC also attempted to infiltrate a small group of its members into South Africa via Rhodesia. These few PAC members spent time in goal with the Luthuli detachment members in Botswana in 1967.
ZANU's official publication, Zimbabwe News, observed in September that if the ANC wanted to help the struggle in Zimbabwe it should fight at home, and not in Rhodesia, thereby dividing the enemy forces, and not in Rhodesia, which had led to a concentration of forces.
Both the PAC and ZANU were breakaway groups from the ANC and ZAPU respectively. Some writers described their criticism as sour grapes as the Wankie campaign overshadowed the other two movements. The reasons for the PAC's and ZANU's criticism could be linked to the fact that both these movements received the bulk of their support from China and therefore supported the Maoist approach to guerrilla warfare. This was different from the theories of the Soviet Union, which supported both the ANC and ZAPU.
Pallo Jordan argues that no one could fault the plan of the Wankie campaign, which to a great extent depended on the political strength of the Zimbabwean movement. The route to South Africa via Rhodesia was the ANC's only viable means to return home. 10
How well did the Luthuli Detachment carry out the task they set themselves?
Lodge argues that despite the sophistication of the guerrillas' equipment and their military competence, they were poorly prepared for their journey. The planners of the campaign had badly underestimated the time it would take to cross Rhodesia; the guerrillas ran out of food and lost their way through inaccurate maps. Scouts spotted both the South African bound and the Lupane-bound group. 11
There is no doubt that the Luthuli Detachment fought bravely. Venter says this, the guerrillas fought until their ammunition was exhausted and most of their colleagues killed. A handful were taken prisoner but only because they had nothing more to fight with. Few surrendered voluntarily. Afterwards the Rhodesians commented on the groups determination and in particular Basil February's bravery in the face of tremendous odds nor did the [Rhodesian] government security forces come out of the fray unscathed. 12
Morris says ?the tactical skill and other attributes of the group showed clearly that they were vastly better trained, much tougher and more adequately equipped and armed?' than previous groups. 13
What actions can we now say were necessary and possible in any phase for the ANC and MK to have made progress?
Astrow argues that the joint ANC-ZAPU campaign was a complete fiasco, with most of the contingent destroyed. He claims that the Wankie campaign (and the two other incursions that followed) was virtually suicidal.
Astrow's main criticism is that the Zimbabwean nationalist parties were operating from exile and had practically no organizational infrastructure left inside the country in the immediate post-UDI period and the essential groundwork for guerrilla warfare had not been done. He maintains that the nationalist leaders embarked on the Rhodesian incursions to maintain credibility in the eyes of the African people, especially after the heavy defeats of the UDI period. 15
According to Astrow ?despite the total defeats of the ZAPU-ANC (SA) incursions one observer pointed out that ANC spokesmen throughout the world, and their friends, hailed the Wankie disaster as a ?victory?. 16
Astrow continues by saying that when the truth emerged about these episodes it helped to further isolate the exiled nationalists from the African masses, and also to highlight the problems facing both ZANU and ZAPU. In the long run the Rhodesian incursions had retarded the struggle for liberation. 17
Jordan asserts that the success of the Wankie campaign to a large extent depended on the strength of the liberation movement in Rhodesian. The ANC-ZAPU strategy of insurgency was based on the premise that people had been mobilised on the ground and the military action of the unit would be given impetus by the political support of black Rhodesians. Alas, it would appear that ZAPU had overestimated the level of support it enjoyed inside the country. 18
On 29 August 1967 Zambia protested to the Commonwealth office, condemning the presence of the South African security forces in Rhodesia and requested Britain ?not only to repulse the invaders (a reference to the SAP) but to quell the rebellion. Britain was requested to militarily intervene. The Zambians further suggested that the true reason for the South Africa paramilitary presence in Rhodesia was to keep Smith in power. 19
On 5 September 1967 Kaunda's office announced that the Zambian Army would mount patrols along the borders with Rhodesia to ?allay the fears of border inhabitants who felt endangered by the increased Rhodesian and South African Security presence in the border area. 20
The British Foreign Office responded on 11 September 1967 by issuing an official statement saying amongst other things that ?no foreign security forces have the right to enter or operate there without the consent of her majesty's government'.
The British government launched a formal protest with the South African government against the presence of the South African Police in Rhodesia on 14 September 1967. 21
President Kaunda summoned the Acting British High Commissioner in Lusaka, Geoffrey Crossley, on 25 September 1967 and lodged a strong protest against ?Rhodesian violations of Zambian airspace and territorial integrity'.
In December 1967, five South African security men, who were first sent to into Rhodesia in August ?were off-duty and inadvertently, while sight-seeing, wandered across the center-line painted on the bridge, which denotes the border'. The men were arrested and a diplomatic wrangle took place. President Kaunda insisted that the South Africans were members of their country's army and not its police service. 22
The ZAPU dominated unit had considerable success in its initial attempts to mobilise villagers, according to Duka. 23 Lodge argues that this reception must have given impetus to the second ANC-ZAPU incursion into Rhodesia in December 1967. 24
This second incursion consisted of a larger group under ANC command. This unit remained undetected for 3 months from December 1967 until March 1968. Fierce fighting between the guerrillas and the Rhodesians took place between March and June of 1968. The Rhodesians claimed to have killed 55 insurgents and to have captured many more. A third ANC-ZAPU incursion took place in July 1968 and the guerrillas allegedly attacked a Rhodesian army camp. By now the South African security reinforcements were firmly part of the Rhodesian security forces, unlike during the Wankie campaign. This time the ANC guerrillas got to fight the South African police. 25
After the Wankie campaign the Rhodesian government needed more manpower for its army. In 1966, compulsory conscription or ?peace training' as it was termed increased from 137 to 245 days. At the end of 1970 it was decided that males between 18 and 25 years, whether alien or not could be called up. National service took the form of four and a half months training and the rest of the time was spent on operational duties in the bush. In 1972, the Defence Act was passed and the Rhodesian regime increased national training from 245 to 365 days. 26
In the ensuing years the Republic of South Africa became increasingly more involved with the security situation of its northern border. The South African troops rested, trained, and re-equipped themselves in South Africa before returning to Rhodesia. Maxey says 2 000 ? 3 000 South African security personnel were present in Rhodesia in 1975. He further estimates that the South African contingent was at least equal in total size to the Rhodesian regular army. In 1968, the SA government had budgeted an extra 730 000 pounds for reinforcements in Rhodesia: of this 250 000 was for subsistence, 467 000 for motor transport and 8 000 for the motor boats patrolling the Zambezi River. The Daily telegraph reported that in September 1967 that the South Africans had brought four Alouette helicopters and two spotter aircraft with them. 27 According to Maxey, one of the spotter aircraft, a Cessna crashed near Gwelo in July 1969.
White co-operation in Southern Africa It is certain that the Wankie Campaign prompted the forging of a good military co-operation among the ruling White powers in Southern Africa. The presence of the South African security forces in Rhodesia served to solidify this co-operation. This good working relationship between SA, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonial authorities lasted until the coup in Portugal in 1974. Some examples of this cooperation can be gleaned from the Operations War Diary (OWD). 28
13 September
Genl Pina C Army Staff, Portugal replied to a letter from Lt genl CA Fraser C Army SADF and submitted a memorandum of equipment that the RSA could help Portugal with. The equipment would be on lending lease basis. Pina offered FN rifles to South Africa. 29
15 September
Brig Dillon (SAP) visited HQ JCF and passed on the information contained in the attached minute. 30
19 September
GOC JCF wrote to Surgeon General about medical support for Op Chinaman. 31
21 September
SG wrote to GOC JCF about medical support for Op Chinaman. 32
The memo on RSA/Portugal co-operation drafted by Lt Genl Fraser, C Army and Genl Pina had to be ratified by the respective governments. A copy was sent to the Dept of Foreign Affairs. There was a delay and Genl Pina who urgently needed RSA support was worried. He expressed his views to the military attache in Lisbon who wrote a personal letter to Lt Genl Fraser. 33
22 September
Lt Genl Fraser wrote to genl Pina to inform him that the dept. of Foreign Affairs was in the process of studying their joint memorandum on SADF/PAF cooperation. 34
25 September
Brig. Dillon submitted a written request for a weekly shuttle between Pretoria, Katima Mulilo, Victoria Falls and Rhodesia to support the SAP there. Dillon also mentioned that the Prime Minister had consented to the SAAF aircraft bearing Air Force markings when employed on transport support. 35 GOC JCF approved this request and asked CAF to initiate this service. 36
26 September
GOC JCF requested CAF to make radio operations available to the SAP in Rhodesia. 37
27 September
GOC JCF requested CDS to confirm that SAAF transport aircraft in support of the SAP in Rhodesia could fly under SAAF colours and the crews could wear SAAF uniform. 38 A meeting was held at HQ JCF to determine progress iro operations on SWA and Rhodesia. 39
28 September
GOC JCF wrote to the CDS in support of a SAP request for teleprinters that were required to establish a direct link between the security forces in Rhodesia and the SAP. 40
The then South African Minister of Police said that a volunteer police corps was to gradually take over all duties along the South African and Rhodesian borders. These volunteer policemen would receive extra benefits. The reason given: that ?the fight against terrorism in Rhodesia was becoming a matter of conventional warfare, (and) the service given by South African policemen took place under highly dangerous conditions. 41
Dissatisfaction in the Umkhonto we Sizwe training camps in Tanzania, arose partly from the Zimbabwean campaigns, and helped to bring about the first major ANC conference since the Lobatsi meeting in Botswana in 1962. As a result a number of organisational reforms were introduced. 42
The Morogoro Conference in Tanzania in 1969 was the first ANC conference held outside of the country. The Robben Island leadership sanctioned the conference. It is said that the conference was O.R Tambo's constructive way of dealing with the criticism of guerrillas who wished to return home. 43
Jordan contends that the Wankie campaign highlighted the need for the ANC leadership in exile to work on reconstructing an internal underground structure.
This fact was addressed at the Morogorro Conference, yet was not resolved until the early 1970s. Jordan recalls that James April was sent into the country at the beginning of 1970, in order to build an underground movement. It was only a matter of time before he was caught. Chris Hani was likewise sent into South Africa and was forced to retreat into Lesotho.
The ANC's armed involvement in Rhodesia paved the way for a broader alliance of the liberation movements in Southern Africa. 44
In conclusion, it is clear that from a military point of view, there is no unanimity regarding the efficacy of the Luthuli Detachment. While writers like Astrow, Lodge, McKinley and others emphasise its overall military failure and destruction others, including ANC commentators, stress its role in morale-building and publicising the movement. Although Chris Hani's declaration that ?I want to emphasise the question of victory because the Luthuli Detachment was never defeated in battle?, 45 perhaps overstates its military achievement. It does suggest an important kernel of truth, namely, that the Wankie campaign was despite its seemingly ignominious end, a turning point in the armed struggle.
The dispatch of the Luthuli detachment signaled the determination of the ANC to mount a guerrilla war in South Africa. That the guerrilla thrust was defeated by Rhodesian forces reinforced by South African combat police, spotter aircraft, helicopters and armoured cars, in no way nullifies its importance in formulating ANC strategy. The mission showed the extraordinary difficulty in establishing routes into South Africa, whose borders remained shielded by the Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique, by the Rhodesian regime and by South Africa's occupation of South West Africa (Namibia). Henceforth, it could only have become clear to ANC strategists that popular mobilisation within South Africa was critical for the sustenance of guerrilla activity. Given severe police restriction, the isolation of centres of support, and political and economic repression, it was obvious that it would be a long and difficult process.
Still the Luthuli Detachment firmly established a sound cooperation with other regional liberation movements like ZAPU and reinforced a sense of unity among the oppressed Black peoples of Southern Africa. The Wankie campaign caused international ripples. As The Times of London, correctly argued, the Wankie guerrillas had ?changed the military map of Africa by bringing South African Security Forces openly into Rhodesia'. 46 This had important international ramifications. On 14 September 1967 Britain formally protested about the South African presence in a note to the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr H Muller. 47 A week later, Harold Wilson's government officially informed Zambia of the protest and requested an assurance that the Zambian Government was not affording support to armed incursions into Rhodesia. For its part, the smith Government in Rhodesia reacted with anger to the Wankie incursion. Significantly on 19 September 1967, the Rhodesian Parliament passed the law and order (Maintenance) Amendment bill, which made mandatory the death sentence on any person, convicted of possessing arms of war. 48
With all the growing complications, South Africa continued to implement its brutal apartheid policy, confident of its inviolability. With the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in the 1970s, the strategic fa?e of ?White' invulnerability in Southern Africa cracked wide open. South Africa's borders became accessible and for young Black South Africans, especially after the Soweto uprising of 1976, the ANC provided a ready military and political instrument. The ANC could offer a younger generation a lengthy tradition of historical resistance. The Luthuli Detachment and its role in the Wankie campaign was an important part of this memory, and for this reason, deserves to be recorded and commemorated.
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/deathlst.html * Denotes my comments.
M. Horrell, A survey of race relations (Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1967) p.68
Interview with James April (Cape Town, September 1990)
The State vs James Edward April , Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 ?15 May 1971 p.79
Interview with James April (Cape Town, September 1990)
D Martin and P Johnson, The struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1981) p.10
Interview Dr Pallo Jordan (Pretoria, January 1996)
T. Lodge, Black politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986) p.296
A. J. Venter, The Zambezi salient: Conflict in Southern Africa (Cape Town, Howard Timmins, 1974) pp.77-78
M. Morris, South African terrorism ( Cape Town, Howard Timmins, 1971) p.41
H. Barrell, MK: the ANC's armed struggle , (London, Penguin books, 1990) p.1
A. Astrow, Zimbabwe: A revolution that lost its way (London, Zed Press, 1983) p.40
M. Morris, South African terrorism ( Cape Town, Howard Timmins, 1971) p.41
B. C. Richmond, From Shantytown to forest, the story of Norman Duka (London, LSM Information Centre, 1974) pp. 92-94
T. Lodge, Black politics in South Africa since 1945 , (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986) p.299
K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p.36
M. Morris, South African terrorism ( Cape Town, Howard Timmins, 1971) p.42
Ibid. s.n.15 Reply is Appendix J
Ibid. s.n.16 Extract of letter is Appendix K
Ibid. A copy of the minutes is attached. See Appendix O
M. Morris, South African terrorism ( Cape Town, Howard Timmins, 1971) p.42
T. Lodge, Black politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986) p.296
Oliver Tambo: his Life and Legacy, p.7 @ www.anc.or g .za/ancdocs/history/or/tambo.htm
F. Meli, A history of the ANC: South Africa belongs to us (Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988) p.162
C. Hani, ?The Wankie Campaign?, @ www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html, p.3
M. Morris, South African terrorism ( Cape Town, Howard Timmins, 1971) p.42
M.C. White, Smith of Rhodesia (Cape Town, Don Nelson, 1978) p.57
