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CHAPTER THREE: THE EMERGENCE OF GRASSROOTS POLITICS, 1979-1981

My mind went over many things...the call by politicians to me to
declare myself a black. Here I am gobbling curry and rice, speaking
English as my first language, dressing like a westerner, looking
to India as the land of my forefathers and delving into the religion
of my ancestors - and searching for a cultural identity, a political
identity and a few other identities. I suppose I can console myself
with the fact that for political purposes I am black and that for
some other purposes I may be non-white, or an Indian, or an Indian
South African, or a South African Indian.

Talk of the Bazaar, The Leader, 13/3/1981.

Introduction

Indian identity, one hundred and twenty years after the arrival of
Indians in South Africa, was complex, differentiated and multiple.
The high levels of heterogeneity resulted in diverse and disparate
political attitudes. For organisations working to undermine apartheid,
mobilising the support of any group on a racial basis was fraught
with dilemmas, though organisations like the NIC argued that segregation,
division and apartheid were part of the consciousness of all South
Africans. By 1978, thirty years of apartheid social engineering had
entrenched racial segregation into all aspects of South African life:
material, physical, institutional and ideological. The state dealt
differently with the various racial and ethnic groups, and this meant
that mass mobilisation at community (residential) level was bound
to be influenced by race. The key question is whether, in seeking
to deal with the realities of apartheid socialisation, organisations
also undermined the basis of apartheid ideology. For example, in
their mobilisational strategies, were they successful in extending
the experience of their constituents along race, class, gender, age
and other non-ethnic lines?

This chapter looks at the impact of the 1980 school boycotts and
traces the rise of civic organisations in response to the rent boycotts
and the housing struggles of 1980 and 1981. It also explores the
anti-Republic Day festival and anti-SAIC election campaigns in 1981.
In so doing, it will chart the expansion of political organisation
and consciousness over this period. By building on the analysis presented
in chapter one, it will be shown that Indians continued to exhibit
multiple identities with varying class, gender, and age interests
and histories, and that these distinctions were central to determining
their political response to apartheid.

Prelude to the 1980s

The banning of newspapers and nineteen Black Consciousness-aligned
organisations on 19 October 1977 and the repression that followed
left internal resistance in disarray. Grassroots structures
had virtually ceased to exist, and pockets of progressive leadership
lacked the means to communicate effectively with their communities.
A re-evaluation of resistance strategies and tactics was necessary
if the anti-apartheid forces were to rebuild their combative
capacity. It was recognised that greater emphasis should
be
placed on grassroots
participation and communities organising around "bread-and-butter" issues.
The public crushing of the BC-movement instilled fear into
both activists and non-activists. Thus, in thinking through
new organisational
interventions, repression was a key consideration. The resistance
movement came to realise that unless it could harness substantial
mass support, it would easily be crushed by the state.

The
government's ideological influence was even stronger than
its coercive control. The South African Broadcasting Corporation
(SABC), which started television broadcasting in 1976, and Radio
Lotus, which broadcasted to Indians, were powerful propaganda tools.
The then Prime Minister, P. W. Botha, declared that the SABC would
be directed not to give prominence to "revolutionary activities".
Since the SABC was financed by the state, he would ensure that it
followed this policy. According to the official opposition, the Progressive
Federal Party (PFP), the bias of the SABC had left whites in complacent
ignorance of the tensions building up in the country. This description
could be extended to the majority of Indians. Following a decision
by church leaders not to participate in SABC broadcasts because they
were vehicles for racist propaganda, Bishop Stephen Naidoo and others
withdrew from the religious programme, Epilogue. Foreign Minister
Pik Botha pressurised the Transkei authorities about broadcasts on
Capital Radio, which was located in the homeland, and noted that "despite
promises, the situation has not improved. It is being considered
to buy out the radio station in order to bring the situation under
control." Capital Radio was the only non-state owned
electronic media source with a presence and influence in Durban.

As already noted in chapter two, Durban Indians were affected most
by the Group Areas Act (GAA). By 1970 about 37,653 Indian families
had been moved, representing over 300,000 out of a total Indian population
of about 624,000. The forced relocation was mostly into Chatsworth,
which absorbed almost a quarter of a million people in the space
of fifteen years. These persons experienced accelerated social and
cultural changes. For example, an increase in crime in the area suggested
that social and psychological breakdown had contributed to the spread
of unrest and dissatisfaction. Levels of social interaction, together
with practicalities like the transport networks, had all been adversely
affected. Furthermore, there was little stability and contentment
since residents were not actively involved in problem identification
and decision-making. By the early 1980s, 8% of houses and 0.5% of
flats in Chatsworth were shared by two or more households. Overcrowding
was most serious in rented outbuildings, some of which averaged 11
persons per building. There was an average of 4.4 persons per single
family occupying outbuildings, and Indians had an overall average
of 3.1 individuals per room in greater Durban. Lack of space became
one of the most pressing social problems.

During the 1970s, Chatsworth and Phoenix became established working-class
townships and accommodated over 50% of the national Indian population;
however, there were also several middle-class enclaves. The older
Chatsworth township had an established Local Affairs Committee (LAC)
system which Phoenix lacked. In both townships, overall levels of
economic stratification were extreme, and for any political organisation
trying to draw Indians into resistance, it was essential to consider
the economic and political realities of these townships. The vast
economic and infrastructural differences that existed between African
and Indian townships suggested that on balance, the Indian working-class
held an advantage. The physical infrastructure of the townships had
several shortcomings and appeared extremely poor when compared to
the white working-class living conditions of Durban. In 1980, Chatsworth
had one swimming pool, two public libraries and several mediocre
sports fields to serve more than 300,000 people and was thus able
to boast a better level of development than African townships.

By
1980 several programmes of co-option and control of blacks by the
establishment had generally succeeded. For example,
the
number
of Coloureds, Africans and Indians in the South African Defence
Force (SADF) had risen to 5,250, constituting 15% of the army's and
one-third of the navy's permanent force. In the police force,
blacks were promoted more readily and given greater responsibility
for work in their own areas. By the end of 1980 there were 21 Indian,
43 Coloured and 85 African commissioned officers in the police force,
while nearly 50 police stations were under "non-white" command.

Fear
of political reprisals for opposing the state was intense and political
frustration found other outlets. By
the late 1970s
there
was a definite disaffection with white minority rule. However,
at the same time it was generally recognised that there was
no single
political party that could claim to represent Indians. The
NIC had already called for a boycott of the SAIC elections and was
an important
voice of the left in Indian politics. On the conservative front,
the Indian Reform Party (RP), which dominated the existing
nominated
SAIC, joined ranks with Inkatha and the Coloured Labour Party
to form the South African Black Alliance (SABA) in 1978. Most Indians
viewed the SAIC as government puppets. Dr. Yunus Moolla, chairman
of the SAIC, confirmed these perceptions by his frequent comments
which reiterated the government's point of view. The SAIC projected
themselves as responsible citizens who needed to support the apartheid
establishment's policy on all major issues. Conflict was mainly
restricted to issues of tactics and detail without opposing apartheid
per se. Much of their concerns centred around the greatest gain for
the emergent Indian bourgeoisie. Their sensitivity to developing
a popular profile appeared to be largely incoherent despite the substantial
backing of the state's ideological apparatus and the extensive
physical and human resources at the SAIC's disposal.

By
the late 1970s the NIC could correctly be described as being "for
all practical purposes a body in name only." There was criticism
from both the left (mainly AZAPO) and the right (mainly SAIC) of
the NIC's "strictly non-racial but wholly Indian" nature.
This view was confirmed, for example, by the failure of the NIC to
support the strike by about 160 bus operators which affected several
Indian commuters. There was a suggestion in some quarters that if
the NIC ceased to be an "Indian organisation they would lose
even the few supporters they at present have". Others maintained
that even though "it is an Indian ethnic body", it still "has
a useful role to fulfil." A growing distance between the male,
middle-class leadership of both the NIC and the SAIC and the working-class
was evident. It was asserted that if the NIC called for a one-day
strike by Indian workers, and "even if it had six months to
campaign for such a strike, it would not get more than a handful
to stay away from work." This was because it simply had "no
support worth the name" amongst the working-class, and
tended to issue pious statements instead of doing anything
of a practical
nature.

Those
Indians involved in politics, or seen as a political constituency,
were predominantly middle-class. Major
concerns focused primarily
around the GAA and the limitations placed on Indian immigration.
The Leader suggested that "what the Indian people are far more
interested in at the moment is to be left alone with regard to their
properties. What they want is power to repeal the [GAA]." The
possible removal of 30,000 Africans from Groutville evoked
concern amongst Indian farmers in the area because they were
unable to
find such cheap and willing labour elsewhere. The proposed
eviction of
9,000 mainly working-class Indians from Motala farm, just outside
Chatsworth, again illustrated the marginalisation of the Indian
working-class.

NIC
general secretary, Farouk Meer, recalls that the NIC's
understanding of its task and its constituency was as follows:
The NIC recognised class, cultural and religious differences. Indians
were not a homogeneous grouping. We did not engage in any specific
strategies aimed at any particular group. We were mindful that we
were having difficulty reaching the working-class, we did not have
trade union people...[Indian] trade unionism was never strong in
the 1980s and that was one of the difficulties of reaching out to
the workers. While we were conscious and aware of these factors we
did not develop any specific strategies for any particular interest
group within the Indian community. We went along and treated the
Indian community as one entity. To try to discern the different interests
for the different sectors of the community and to link those specific
interests for the Indian community and to try and link them with
the needs of the majority and thereby promote non-racialism and unity.
That was the strategy we adopted.

This
strategic choice not to disaggregate Indians and speak to their
concerns beyond a generalised notion of "Indian" will
receive greater scrutiny later. However, for now it must be
noted that the imperative to respond to the concerns of Indians should
not have been expressed in the failure to speak to youth, women,
and different religious and cultural clusters amongst Indians
- a failure which helps to explain the low level of solidarity
across
the racial divide.

The
Botha government's vague constitutional proposals suggested
that Indians and Coloureds would enjoy a greater say in their own
affairs. This earned the derision of the NIC and other liberal voices
who maintained that it seemed as though "the government wants
to create the illusion that Indian people, and other blacks are represented
on decision making bodies and are responsible for decisions which
affect them." There was consternation when the Reform
Party met Botha and when the Natal Association of Local Affairs
Committees
supported the new proposals. Despite these criticisms, 150
people applied for four SAIC vacancies when they became available.
These
were mainly middle-class, professional people, but there were
also two trade union-related applicants: the secretary of the
Durban
Leather Workers Union, who had been involved in pension fund
fraud, and another
from the Garment Workers Union. Both these unions were associated
with the conservative Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA)
to which the majority of unionised Indian workers belonged.

During
1979 there appeared evidence of Indians being recognised as "The Best Hated Racial Group". As one observer put
it: "Numbering 788,000 in a population of 27.4 million the
Indians are a distinctive minority, yet the majority of that minority
are poor enough to be despised, and of the others a number rich enough
to provoke the envy of other race groups." Besides the fear
that Indians as a minority might have felt, the memory of the 1949
riots was exploited by right-wing politicians to herd Indians into
the apartheid laager. "As a minority group the Indian community
must therefore adopt the role of diplomacy and tactfulness," said
a SAIC leader. Pat Poovalingam, one of the first black appointees
onto the President's Council (PC), made a veiled reference
to the riots. He suggested that it was "a small wonder that
a shudder of fear goes through Indians every time there is a riot
anywhere in South Africa, [they are] all too aware that [they offer]
a ready and defenceless target for the anger of a majority." These
comments sought to position Indians not as partners in the
resistance but as targets of the protests. In any event, this
collaborative
segment in Indian politics sometimes (and with some timidity)
included Africans in their pleas for equity.

Throughout
1979 there was restlessness about various civic issues. Civic organisations,
sometimes outside the ambit
of influence of
the NIC, used these issues to mobilise popular participation.
For example, the Phoenix Working Committee (PWC) was active in
addressing the need for transport for schoolchildren in Phoenix;
the Motala
Farm Ratepayers Association campaigned for support against
their threatened removal; and the Shallcross Residents and Ratepayers
Association struggled to get formal recognition from the Town
Council.
The NIC
was also indirectly involved when Indian and African lawyers
launched the Democratic Lawyers Association in May 1979. In Phoenix,
the
audience walked out in protest at the launch of the National
Indian Labour
Party - a group that was still-born. The organisers were jeered
for suggesting that they should be grateful for government-provided
housing,
and that Indian people should not consider the problems facing
Africans until they had "filled their own plates".
Around that time, there was also a furore over the exclusion
of an African woman
from the UDW residence on the grounds that Indians would not
like her presence. The mainly Indian student body were incensed
by this
comment and later by the continued refusal of the rector to
admit the student to the residence. Subsequently a petition
campaign
was launched in support of the student. This collective restlessness
at grassroots level helped draw the NIC into civic work.

Before
these developments the NIC had been relatively stagnant, in a largely
reactive mode, and mainly issued press
statements.
There was a lack of grassroots mobilisation, and progressive
political consciousness amongst Indians was low and largely confined
to a
small
activist core influenced by Marxist revolutionary ideas. Various
reasons were advanced for the lack of mobilisation: the fact
that Indians belonged to conservative unions (a number of union
organisers became members of the SAIC); the "inward-looking" nature
of Indians, which was due in part to religious influences; the sensitive
relationship between Africans and Indians; and finally, the fact
that Durban had been relatively untouched by the events of 1976.
A group of young intellectuals in the NIC offered their analysis,
arguing that to stimulate grassroots activity, some form of public
political intervention was necessary. This turning to the masses
also invited some ridicule and the criticism that the NIC was not
engaged in "real politics" since civic work at this stage,
which was small and locally contained, was not regarded as politically
significant. Therefore, before 1980 most people held the view that
the SAIC was ineffectual because of its origins and its performance
to date. The NIC was believed to have greater credibility and potential,
but it needed to engage in practical work instead of indulging in
idealistic political rhetoric. The NIC appeared to heed this criticism
and publicly repositioned itself in 1980. The first thrust of its
interventions was to support the creation of several housing action
committees that co-ordinated municipal tenants' protests
and their campaign for the lowering of rentals in Indian and
Coloured areas.

The housing struggles and the rise of a civic movement

As early as 1977, civic organisations in Coloured areas, Chatsworth
and Phoenix were active in housing-related struggles. However,
until 1980 each community fought its own battles, making no
serious attempts to join other organisations and communities
to work
out joint programmes of action. By 1980 agitation from the
NIC and
the Anti-SAIC committees had resulted in a fairly clear political
identity for the civic associations. The difference between
the Croftdene Residents Association in Chatsworth and the LACs,
according
to one resident, was that "civic bodies are organisations
created by the people for the people." This rise in civic
agitation was also reflected in the support given to the boycott
of a bus service in the Natal North Coast, with residents and
students resolutely trudging the three kilometres to Stanger
each day for
three months. The NIC was clearly becoming an integral part
of community struggles, as were the Democratic Lawyers Association,
the Anti-SAIC Committee and, to a lesser extent, AZAPO. UDW
students
were also becoming more involved in community issues, and at
a meeting of approximately 1,500, they elected to support the
civic
housing struggle. On 29 March 1980 the NIC, together with representatives
of approximately 50 organisations, formed the Durban Housing
Action Committee (DHAC) to co-ordinate the work of various
civic groups.
For the first time, an attempt was made to link the housing
struggles of Indians and Coloureds to the broader struggle
against apartheid.

Women
played an active role in the rent campaigns. Their actions were
related to their identities as mothers, with
comments like "The
spectre of hungry mouths to feed, to any mother, particularly, would
certainly not provide any frivolity". Women's actions
were also some of the most confrontational, and their voices often
reflected militancy and frustration. "They are killing our
children. Why don't they come with bombs and do it quicker",
one woman cried at a meeting to discuss rents. In both Phoenix
and Chatsworth, although in a minority, some women emerged
as senior civic leaders. The photographs of elderly Indian
women
giving the
clenched fist salute at mass rallies appeared in several publications.

Coupled
with the rent struggles, there was a campaign to prevent the Department
of Community Development and the Durban
City Council
from selling houses to tenants for more than the original cost
of the building. In July 1980 the government gave in to these
demands by changing the interest rate structure. However, there
remained an unresolved debate about whether it was in residents' interests
to remain tenants or to purchase homes. Despite a DHAC workshop to
try and reach consensus on this, the debate continued well into 1981.
Early in the year there were discussions on changing strategy in
favour of small house meetings to improve communication between the
leadership and the grassroots. However, open mass meetings provided
militancy and power in negotiations and these were too valuable to
forego permanently. The increase in rates drew the attention of civic
leaders and the anger and concern of homeowners. There was increased
political consciousness as some civic bodies, which had previously
concentrated only on local issues, now adopted political demands.
Thus, the Asherville Housing Action Committee (ASHAC) asserted that "no
matter what they give us - even if it is free housing schemes
- so long as we have no representation in the city councils,
provincial
councils and parliament, we are slaves."

In
April a candlelight vigil was held to show solidarity with tenants
whose electricity was disconnected for withholding
rentals.
There
was 100% support in Sydenham Heights, nearly 100% in Newlands
East and 70% in Phoenix. This also helped to bolster support for
the
rent boycott at a time when support was waning. Eventually
DHAC was forced
to abandon the boycott in the face of "the evident intransigence
and insensitivity of the council to the plight of the people." However,
DHAC claimed that it "had served its apprenticeship in the
civic struggle and could claim to be a grassroots political body
representing a greater group of people than any other body has ever
achieved in Durban." This claim was made despite the fact that
DHAC had developed no constituency amongst Africans in the city.
It would also be fallacious to assume that militant articulations
at well attended meetings were an adequate assessment of the general
attitude of Indians. It would appear that those who shifted towards
an anti-government stance were those who felt particularly and directly
aggrieved with the local government. The NIC made the most of the
militancy, and infiltration of popular bodies, such as welfare and
sports organisations, became a conscious strategy. However, the real
extent of their support at this time was debatable, with only 100
people attending the annual commemoration of Gandhi's birthday
organised by the NIC. It was apparent that people responded to political
mobilisation by the NIC and its allies on the basis of their self-interest
rather than in support of the NIC's political vision.

In the furore over the repressive action taken against boycotting
children, DHAC maintained that as a civic body it was concerned not
only with housing, but also with the inter-related problems of education
and employment. Moves to consolidate the gains achieved in the community
were evident with the revival of the Southern Durban Civic Federation
and the merger of the Committee of Ten and the Central Parents Support
Committee. The development of inter-racial unity was evident when
a historic protest meeting of about 2,000 Indian, African and Coloured
residents, which included worker unions, religious organisations
and sporting bodies, voted to continue to withhold rent. However,
the housing struggles had limited mobilisational potential. The issues
directly affected only a small proportion of municipal tenants and
did not engage the youth. This was to change in April 1980 when Durban
students joined their national counterparts in protests against apartheid
education.

The 1980 education boycott

The credibility of Inkatha had declined since 1976, when the organisation
played an important role in stemming the militancy of its student
population. By 1980, on the eve of the boycotts, the political
climate in Natal allowed student activity to flourish. Coloured
students in the Western Cape, aggrieved by text book shortages,
precipitated what was to become a national protest against the
discriminatory nature of black education. These events coincided
with the achievement of liberation from white minority rule in
Zimbabwe. Although the boycotts in Natal began at Coloured high
schools, they found immediate support among Indian and African
students. At UDW and at the University of Natal Medical School,
where 700 students met and resolved to re-educate fellow students
and to sensitise themselves to the conditions of blacks in South
Africa specifically and in Africa generally, there was almost total
support for the boycott. Students at UDW elected to form a Students
Representative Council based on a constitution drawn up by the
students. The education protest was not aimed at short-term benefits;
instead student leaders and their supporters saw it as an opportunity
to gather support for the ongoing struggle against apartheid. The
authorities responded with repression, and there were daily reports
of children being chased by police dogs, beaten with batons, and
having tear gas thrown at them.

For
the first time ever substantial numbers of Indian school students
participated across the country in protest
against apartheid education.
The solidarity with Coloured and African school children was
unprecedented. A new youth politics was born as a result of these
spontaneous
boycotts which led to, in certain cases, violent confrontation
with the state.
The conflict was clearly children versus the state; something
which the state was ill-prepared for. In response to the targeting
of
their children, several parent committees were formed in Indian
areas throughout
Durban. The large turnout at mass meetings (sometimes up to
1,500 children and parents) was indicative of the militancy of the
various affected communities. Despite the fact that the NIC made
much capital
out of these independent student actions, many of the slogans
reflected a sympathy with BC: "One Azania One Nation"; "Black
Power White Bums"; "Sell Outs Will Never See Azania".
The popularity of the British pop group Pink Floyd's song "Another
Brick in the Wall", which included the line "we don't
need no thought control", became so popular that it was
promptly banned by the NP government.

After about 10,000 pupils were suspended by broederbonder Gabriel
Krog, the Director of Indian Education, parental support for the
boycotting children faltered. Many working-class parents expressed
fear, scepticism and confusion about the goals and purposes of the
education boycott. One survey showed that only 26% of white collar
workers were completely supportive. In discussing the sympathy between
youth and parents, one observer pointed out that:
What is crucial is that their thinking does bear some relationship
to the thinking and discussions which take place in their parents' drawing
rooms. The parents are however inhibited from action because
they are government servants,
or employees in big firms.

Central
to the parents' concern was the morality of action
which harmed children - newspaper headlines proclaimed "Don't
Touch Our Children - Parents Warn", highlighting the
crisis. The then cautious Durban Indian Child and Family Welfare
Society
condemned the arrests of schoolchildren. Members of the Teachers
Association of South Africa (TASA) called for meetings with
the education authorities to discuss the suspension and expulsion
of children and
400 threatened to strike if no action was taken. A later poll
showed that over a third of teachers were prepared to strike
for an improvement
in education. This constituted significant support since teachers
were hitherto one of the most solidly co-opted fractions of
the
Indian middle-class. The suspensions of some students disunited
students
and resulted in the ending of the boycotts without coherence
and lacking the unity that marked their commencement.

Fraser
studied the attitudes and motivations of students six weeks after
the boycotts ended. Contrasting her
study with that of Schlemmer's,
which was conducted in 1977 among similar constituents, she identified
a definite increase in political consciousness. In 1977, with a sample
drawn from M.L. Sultan Technikon and Springfield College of Education
and carried out in the wake of the 1976 uprising, it was found that
only 11% of the sample accepted the term "Black" to describe
themselves. In 1980 17% of Indian office workers, and an equal percentage
of the M.L. Sultan Technikon students, found the term acceptable,
with 22% of the UDW students classifying themselves as such. A more
salient political perspective becomes apparent when the 1980 sample
was divided according to commitment to the boycott. While both those
fully committed to the boycott and those with reservations about
it or who disagreed totally with it found the term "South African" equally
acceptable, 83% of the students committed to the boycott found the
term "Black" acceptable, while only 17% of those not
supporting the boycott accepted the term. In 1977 the term most favoured
was "Asian" (18%) but this had only 5% support in 1980.
In addition, the term "Brown" received 13% support in
the 1977 study and 0% support in 1980. However, this probably indicated
the effect of Black Consciousness (BC) on the student body rather
than political radicalism brought about by the boycotts. Of the percentage
referring to themselves as "Black", 78% favoured majority
rule (a significant increase from the 39% of those favouring "Black" who
supported majority rule in 1977). The finding that of the 72% who
accepted the term "South African", 71% favoured
majority rule showed that the students were generally politicised.

The
study also found there to be little differentiation between the
ideology of BC and that of Congress. This suggested
a high
degree of rhetorical mobilisation with little input to ensure
that the militancy
was channelled into sustainable political organisation. An
equal percentage (40%) of the group who accepted the term "South
African" supported the NIC and AZAPO. A slightly higher degree
of politicisation was evident in the group referring to themselves
as "Black", although they too did not distinguish
between NIC and AZAPO, with 51% supporting the NIC, and 51%
supporting AZAPO. Clearly, while militancy and mobilisation
may have been
high, political
education and ideology were largely neglected. The boycott,
whilst widespread, was without a great deal of co-ordination,
and attempts
at forming Pupil Representative Councils (PRCs) at high schools
were restrained by fear of the repression which would have
almost certainly
followed the election of leaders. Later, when the boycott began
to develop clearer strategic aims, the demand for PRCs became
the
prime
concern.

UDW
students were also aware of the problems they would have in sustaining
student unity and action. The SRC had
only recently
been formed and was particularly sensitive to state repression
as student
activists were detained in a police crackdown in June 1980.
The students' strategy
was to form residential area committees to co-ordinate their actions
off-campus as more educational institutions closed and student leaders
continued to be detained. Community work included a "Keep Chatsworth
Clean Campaign". However, about 100 UDW students (along
with their brooms and buckets) were arrested. Students also
made an
effort to apply themselves to other concerns; for example,
they raised money
for fired strikers from Frame Textile Mills. In October 1980
UDW students launched a fund-raising drive to aid the boycotting
tenants.
Together with DHAC, the Community Services Unit - a body set
up to involve students in community activism and labour issues
- ran
a
workshop on housing which drew 300 students.

Another
concern which emerged was that some student leaders were from wealthy
homes and so could afford to boycott
government schools: "Many
students were cynically dishonest about their boycott. They led their
schools in boycott from the hours 8am to 3pm, and then rushed off
to their private tuition. They did not lose anything." Fraser's
study shows some support for this suggestion, with 63% of the university
students from upper socio-economic backgrounds supporting the boycott
as opposed to 50% of those from middle-class backgrounds and 51%
of those from working-class backgrounds. Many working-class parents
also criticised those NIC leaders who advocated a boycott but had
their children in private white schools. My father, for example,
said that while he supported the boycott, it would appear that the
boycott leaders could easily send their children overseas or to private
schools if they got expelled. "Chatsworth and Phoenix
parents would just not have been able to afford that."

The
Release Mandela Campaign (RMC), launched before the boycotts commenced,
was boosted by the national climate of
resistance. In
Natal there was sensitivity about how to deal with Mangosuthu
Buthelezi, who had only offered lukewarm support for the RMC, a
factor which
contributed to the ANC severing links with him in June 1980.
The Inkatha leader had also sought to prevent African participation
in student boycotts and worker strikes. His support for federalist
options
also manifested itself in June 1980, when he appointed the
Buthelezi Commission to explore the development of a "multiracial entity" in
KwaZulu and Natal. This cautious approach was also taken by the largest
trade union in Natal, the Federation of South African Trade Unions
(FOSATU), when Buthelezi was invited to address important trade union
gatherings. For example, at the launch of the shopstewards' council
in Northern Natal, Buthelezi asserted that "Inkatha is
the only black organisation in Natal which can possibly take
up the
major political issues on your behalf."

When
ANC-aligned Soweto leader Dr. Nthato Motlana was invited to speak
at a Free Mandela rally there were behind-the-scenes
attempts
to ensure that he did not attack Buthelezi. The rally was a
resounding success with about 5,000 calling for the release of Mandela.
Numbers were also high at other meetings addressed by NIC leaders
at the
height of the education and housing protests. More than 3,000
gave NIC vice-president, M.J. Naidoo, a standing ovation at a meeting
convened by the Merewent Parents' Action Committee; 4,000 attended
a meeting to protest against the detention of NIC and student leaders;
and Indian shopkeepers in Durban closed their shops, displaying notices
saying "We are closed in protest against the detention of our
leaders: Attend mass meeting at Orient Hall." There was a discernible
drop in attendance at mass meetings after these periods of high mobilisation.
In December 1980 only 300 attended a function to commemorate India's
awarding of the Nehru Peace Prize to Mandela, and only 100
people attended the annual Gandhi birthday commemoration. Earlier
only
300 people were at the airport to greet NIC leaders returning
from prison,
and 700 people turned out to welcome home student leaders from
detention. Nevertheless, the NIC had made massive strides in
visibility and
profile since the start of 1979, and entered 1981 with substantially
greater confidence, clout and potential, having succeeded in
establishing itself as an indispensable component of political
praxis amongst
Indians and blacks more generally.

In Chatsworth and Phoenix neither the NIC nor its pre-boycott activists
actively sponsored the development of youth organisations. Only a
few newly-emergent student leaders, largely on their own initiative,
turned to this task. For example, Helping Hands in Chatsworth focused
on youth concerns and the need to support charity work amongst Indians,
Coloureds and Africans. There was little opportunity for youth to
develop the distinctive life style they might have desired. Because
of the dearth of facilities, lack of resources and poor standard
of education they readily supported the education boycott. Active
religious denominations and pop culture, however, also provided some
sense of direction and had substantially more currency than political
activism. It must also be appreciated that Indian youth constituted
a fractured entity and displayed great heterogeneity. With regard
to religion, one study found that Muslim youth - who were very active,
especially after 1976 - had a higher regard than Hindus and Christians
for the notion of youth activism. Less openness to the ideas of youth
was detected amongst Hindus and Christians, with Christians generally
tending to be a little more conservative than Hindus. Nevertheless,
Indian youth were increasingly likely to react against paternalism
and authoritarianism.

The anti-Republic festival campaign (ARFC)

Another issue of great importance during this time was that of
the twentieth anniversary celebrations of the declaration
of the Republic
of South Africa, when the government scheduled a month of festivities
to culminate on May 31, 1981. The advance notice of the festivities
was seen by some as "a critical blunder" by the state,
since it gave the ANC and its internal allies time to organise
a counter campaign. More than 50 organisations, including churches,
universities, political and student organisations, committed themselves
to boycotting the celebrations. In armed struggle terms, the campaign
was judged by Howard Barrell as the ANC's most successful
year inside South Africa since the Rivonia setback in 1963. Government
agents attacked Motala in Mozambique on 31 January 1981. Among
the casualties was Krishna Rabilal of Merebank. There was no public
outpouring of anger by Indians. The commemoration of his death
took place three years later, by which time levels of politicisation
had grown. Of the 55 attacks carried out by Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK)
in 1981, ten were in Durban. The ANC's Mac Maharaj suggested
that the success of the anti-republic campaign lay in how:

by sheer accident, despite the [ANC] military's wishes,
for the first time, military work was a complement to political
work.
Visibly through the media, the matter became presented as a unified
thing: that military action was complementing political action,
and political action facilitating military action.

It was in this context of emerging alliance politics that the first
call for a United Front was made by Popo Molefe in May 1981 in an
address to the South African Council of Churches (SACC).

Most
of the criticisms of participation in the celebrations were either
along the line of "last time (in 1971 during the 10th
Republic Day anniversary) we participated and got nothing out of
it", or along the NIC line that Indians and blacks generally
had nothing to celebrate, not having been given any socio-economic
and political freedoms to mould their existence. Supporters of the
celebrations included the likes of The Leader columnist Fakir, who
was very proud that his grandfather had arrived as a common "coolie" labourer,
and that he himself was now a doctor. Attempts were made by
the education authorities to get Indian children to participate
without
their knowing
exactly what they were doing. As agitation around the issue
spread, pupils from several schools withdrew despite being
trained for
various events. Festival workers were called on to resign,
and a blacklist
of athletes who participated in the celebrations was drawn
up by sports groups. Despite threats of state repression, the
NIC
convened
an anti-Republic festival celebrations conference involving
190 delegates from a broad range of organisations. By the week
before
the festival,
interest escalated with more than 200 Chatsworth scholars,
including the writer, and 315 from Merebank being expelled
for boycotting
classes in protest against the celebrations. Prior to the outbreak
of the
boycotts, the education authorities sent threatening letters
to parents warning that their children would be expelled if
they joined
the
boycott.

A
student-parent meeting called to address the expulsions drew 1,500
people, and some parent leaders pleaded: "Don't force
your children to go back in a manner detrimental to the community
in the future." UDW students responded by adding a demand for
the reinstatement of expelled pupils to their own demands for cancellation
of examinations to be held on June 16. This resulted in another boycott
of classes. Meanwhile, more than 50% of the suspended scholars signed
forms promising not to boycott again so that they would be allowed
to return. However, of the 547 "apologies" which were
given by the children involved in the boycotts, only 180 were accepted,
leaving some 367 scholars with no schooling. The expelled students
were re-instated in 1982 only after winning a court battle. They
were allowed to write the end-of-year examinations at schools other
than their own to prevent them from further "agitation".
There were two outcomes: some of the expelled students became
dedicated activists and were later involved in a range of other
organisations,
including the ANC underground, while many others, mainly under
parental pressure, eschewed politics.

UDW students demanded the removal of riot police from their campus,
the removal of weapons carried by internal security personnel, the
lifting of a ban on meetings and the re-admission of suspended students,
pending the outcome of disciplinary hearings against them. The UDW
administration adopted a hard line, believing that the concessions
they made in 1980 had contributed to the confidence of the 1981 protests.
The intransigence of the authorities led to an escalation of activity.
Parents protested by marching on the department of Indian education
and demanding a meeting with director Gabriel Krog. Nearly half of
the UDW student population (about 3,000 students) opted to boycott
examinations when the authorities refused to re-schedule examinations
set for June 16, Soweto Day. About 500 students also de-registered
in protest.

In
Reiger Park, Transvaal, there had been four days of sporadic rioting
when residents of the predominantly
Coloured township protested
against an Indian shopkeeper who had tried to erect a shop
on ground marked for residential development. There was a shortage
of
houses
and residents were opposed to the land being used for commercial
purposes. Two teenagers were shot dead, and nearly 40 cars,
three shops, a garage, and a home were destroyed by arsonists. While
this was an attack on the merchant class and a reflection of
historical antagonism between merchants and residents, the media
portrayed
it
to Durban residents as a racial incident. The Leader, taking
a different perspective, observed that: "The Reiger Park tragedy is not
the result of racial conflict but is one of the direct effects of
the [Group Areas Act]." It was against this background
of resistance and uncertainty that the SAIC election campaign
was
waged.

Anti-SAIC elections campaign

Until 1981 the SAIC, set up under the SA Indian Council Act of 1968,
had no directly elected members. They were appointed by the government
or indirectly elected by members of local government structures
which had little or no support from Indian voters. The election
date had been postponed several times since 1977 due to opposition
from voters who ignored the requirement to register. Why the state
persisted in proceeding with these elections remains unclear; instead
it displayed confusion and incoherence when faced with opposition
from blacks across class lines. It has been suggested that although
it planned to abolish the SAIC, the state was still keen to legitimise
it. The government was also hopeful that the NIC would fragment
in disunity over debates on whether or not to contest the elections.
However 80% of voters had registered by election day on 4 November
after threatened reprisals by the state.

Several
independent candidates announced their intention to contest the
40 elected seats. A new political party,
the Democratic Party,
was established to fight the elections. Eventually, 81 candidates
contested 34 seats and 6 seats were uncontested. The government's
relationship with the outgoing nominated SAIC was strained, and this
meant that there were no substantial pre-election incentives for
the SAIC to offer the electorate. The SAIC Executive Committee held
the view that the holding of the elections would "be an exercise
in futility". However, this did not prevent many from
making themselves available for election.

Three provincial anti-SAIC committees were created to co-ordinate
opposition to the elections. This was another attempt early in the
decade to form a political alliance comprising a range of organisations
around a single issue. However, this process was preceded by debate
within the NIC on the pros and cons of participating in the SAIC
elections. Some members of the NIC - particularly a small, younger
intellectual group - initially advocated participation in the elections.
This group had several meetings with small groups of activists to
discuss the issue. Discussion revolved around three propositions:

(1) That participation in state institutions need not necessarily
imply acceptance of that institution and its functions. Participation
in these bodies could
be used for tactical gain. To support this argument, examples were given
of the participation of the Social Democratic Party under the
leadership of Lenin
in the 'toothless' Duma parliaments after the failure of
the 1905 revolution.

(2) That political boycotts should be used as a strategic weapon
and should only be utilised when the popular classes could gain from
it. At each stage of the struggle, the situation should be reassessed
and action should be changed accordingly. A boycott cannot be an
inflexible matter of principle.

(3) The effectiveness of the boycott strategy of the NIC had led
to a growing alienation between the progressive leadership and its
support base. Contesting the SAIC elections could facilitate extensive
support and participation. The campaign itself would allow for public
political discussion and the spreading of ideas which are otherwise
difficult, given the repressive nature of the state in South Africa...an
anti-election campaign could be effectively crushed by the state
and participation in the SAIC could lend a certain amount of protection
from that repression.

This debate generated frustration and confusion among NIC supporters.
It also provided ammunition for NIC-detractors who charged that:

The truth of the matter is that if the NIC had played a more meaningful
role in the struggle for democracy; if it had reached out to the
people and won their confidence and if it had effectively organised
the people there would have been no chaos today.

Conflicts emerged amongst former allies. NIC leaders Pravin Gordhan
and Yunus Mahomed were asked to leave the Phoenix Working Committee
because they supported participation in the elections. The PWC was
then criticised as it was a civic organisation and not a political
body, and therefore had no mandate to support or condemn SAIC elections.
However, there was limited grassroots support for participation in
the election and there were no similar calls for other civics to
adhere solely to civic issues. This conflict suggests that while
these emergent civic bodies were within the realm of influence of
NIC leaders and activists, a degree of independence was maintained
and there was a willingness to defy their political counsel. This
was particularly significant as Gordhan and Mahomed were among the
more hardworking and visible NIC leaders involved in civic issues
in Phoenix.

Gordhan,
Mahomed and Jerry Coovadia (interestingly all of Gujerati, merchant
class backgrounds) were also part of
a highly-regarded
ANC unit. They defined "rejectionist participation" as taking
part in the elections in order to take over the SAIC and destroy
it from within. It has now emerged that this position was adopted
by the ANC NEC in relation to the SAIC in August 1979. Given that
the pro- and anti- factions were at loggerheads, the ANC's
Mac Maharaj intervened with the backing of Dr Yusuf Dadoo, who was
still held in high esteem by progressive Indians. The antagonistic
groups met Maharaj in 1979 in London, where he told them that there
were two basic considerations in deciding tactics for the anti-SAIC
campaign: ensuring "the involvement of the masses" an