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CHAPTER EIGHT: INDIAN RESISTANCE POLITICS IN TRANSITION, 1990-1996

I
am convinced...that if we give [Indians] the choice, you'll
be able to lead this country and no other community will be able
to obscure you.
N.Mandela, 26/06/96.

The
more I see [Rajbansi] and listen to him, the more he looks and
sounds like South Africa's new Indian
Andries Treurnicht (late leader of the Conservative Party).
Somebody please go and
wake [him]
up...and tell him this is the new South Africa. We are one nation
and [he] must stop playing the ethnic guitar. All Indians are
South Africans like me, there is no place for ethnic politics.

FW de Klerk, 29/6/96.

We were the first to expose the fact that affirmative action is hurting Indians,
Coloureds and whites...vote [for] the real home for all minorities...vote the
Minority Front.
A.Rajbansi, 29/6/96.

We are pleased to single out [Indians] because our president Mr
Mangosuthu Buthelezi has had a long association with Indians. Now
is the time to cement and deepen that relationship. We are not being
opportunistic and this is not propaganda to catch votes. We believe
that Zulus and Indians are not only the dominant cultural groups
in KwaZulu, but we also have a lot in common. In both communities
we take our work, religion and culture seriously.

Z.Jiyane, 6/4/1996

Introduction

The unbanning of resistance organisations in February 1990 opened
up a new era in South African politics. The reform process forced
upon the state by a combination of internal and external pressures
changed the face of resistance politics and found most anti-apartheid
organisations ill-prepared to deal with its implications. The new
context challenged existing political cultures across the ideological
spectrum. The NIC, which had been a legal component of the Congress
Alliance since the 1960s, and had acted as an ANC voice, no longer
occupied a unique position. The uncertainty of the transition meant
that organisations such as AZAPO, NIC, UDF and the legal ANC would
have to evolve flexible strategies to cope with the political changes.
The National Party (NP) might have been pressurised into fundamental
reform but it was able to set the initial broad terms and pace of
the transition, and develop strategies to undermine its political
opponents. It was also largely able to decide the timing of crucial
political and constitutional events. While the liberation movements
began the project of transforming themselves into political parties,
the NP held on to state power, and financial, ideological, institutional
and material resources. The context was set for political fluidity,
as exiles returned, prisoners were released and new organisational
challenges presented themselves.

The
period under examination represents an important intellectual moment
in progressive scholarship in South Africa.
Previously political
activists and academics were reluctant to discuss ethnicity as
it was seen as legitimising and giving credence to apartheid.
However, by the late 1980s this position was strongly challenged.
As discussed
in chapter one, a concerted effort was made to understand the
implications of South Africa's ethnic heterogeneity and its relation to
political resistance. This thesis and my earlier work have already
documented attempts by some activists to prosecute resistance during
the 1980s with sensitivity to class, ethnic, gender and religious
differentiation. However, the NIC's interventions had failed
to creatively deal with ethnicity and class, despite its focus
on mobilising Indians. It therefore entered the 1990s with little
support
among working-class Indians and without an effective organisational
structure.

The results of the April 1994 national elections and the June 1996
local government elections in Durban constitute an important part
of this chapter. The elections provided a measurement of Indian identification
with the ANC. This chapter confirms that the gradual but strengthening
shift in the structural context during this period deterred popular
alignment with the ANC and its allies. The task of winning Indian
support for the non-racial project of the ANC was in conflict with
the structural location of the majority of Indians who in 1994 were
still politically introverted, inactive and ambivalent. The disintegrating
apartheid state exercised considerable power during the transition,
and it is within this context that I critique the organisational
effectiveness of the ANC and NIC. In addition, the establishment
of ANC branches in Indian areas and the performance of the ANC in
government is analysed.

Durban in the 1990s

Indians across the class divide, when compared to other South Africans,
were more anxious about the uncertainties of transition. Despite
the reduction in repression, Indians continued to shy away from
politics as those Indians in public life had a bad image. Chapter
seven detailed the conflict within and between the NIC and the
UDF. In addition, the HoD attracted constant ridicule. Contempt
for the HoD was evident in community theatre, informal public discussions
at social occasions, and in placards displayed during demonstrations.

The
NP's strategy to alienate Indians from
the rest of the oppressed had largely succeeded. As a journalist
from India noted:

An air of confusion grips many Indian South Africans who believe that life
under a black majority government will be no better or far worse than under
the present racist regime. A lot of the uncertainty within the Indian community
appears to have been contrived by the white minority regime and its allies
in an attempt to continue to hang on to power in a post-apartheid society.

Earlier
chapters show that the NP had failed to win Indian support for
its reforms. However, the party's
survival now depended on securing support from Indians in KwaZulu-Natal
and Coloureds
in the Western Cape. The NP, like other ANC opponents, emphasised
concerns
around security, which were shared by Indians across the class-divide.

Fears
of racial conflict were reinforced by a series of incidents early
in 1990. At the busiest commuter interchange
used by blacks
in central Durban, several Indian women's traditional wedding
necklaces were ripped off and two Indian men were stabbed to death
in what was interpreted to be racial attacks. Tensions were fuelled
by an anonymous pamphlet accusing Indians of taking over jobs from
Africans. The ANC-alliance accused government agents of stirring
these conflicts. However, one UDF official conceded that in addition
to the complicity by the state, "political ignorance among
some elements within our comrades should be held responsible for
the carnage." SouthScan observed that the involvement of
avowed COSATU members in these conflicts reflected long-standing
tensions
between Africans and Indians in the workplace.

ANC
claims of government instigation were accepted by sections of the
Indian middle-class. The impact on popular
consciousness
was
devastating: "In the buses, trains, shopping centres, and temples,
it was stated that Mandela's release has given African people
confidence and therefore they were doing this." This was so,
even though the ANC, COSATU and their allies patrolled the affected
area and the incidents soon stopped. However, the ANC-alliance was
often unable to react in this proactive and immediate manner as its
organisational strength was weak and the gap between activists and
their constituency was vast. These events easily evoked flashbacks
to the 1949 and Inanda riots which remained present in the popular
psyche, of most Indians. The fact that violence had escalated nationally
soon after Mandela's release and had mainly affected African
people, was ignored.

In his first KwaZulu-Natal address, Mandela made peace and unity
his central themes. He drew out four strands of Natal resistance
history: Zulu and Indian resistance, white opposition to apartheid,
and worker struggles. Keen to stress the need for greater societal
and organisational coherence among ANC supporters, he glossed over
structural and subjective contradictions and declared that:

Our struggle has won the participation of every language and colour, every
stripe and hue in this country. These four strands of resistance and organisation
have inspired all South Africans, and provide the foundations of our struggle
today.

Mandela
told the mainly African crowd at the rally of the "long
and proud tradition of co-operation between Africans and Indians
against racial discrimination"; and how the "common nature
of Indian and African oppression" made united resistance necessary
from 1947. He said the ANC was "extremely disturbed by recent
acts of violence against our Indian compatriots. The perpetrators
of these acts are enemies of the liberation movement." Most
Indians did not hear his reference to them, nor the concerns
he articulated and the assurance he was trying to provide. A
few Indian
newspapers
reported this but the message did not penetrate the Indian populace.

The
NP readily linked the escalating political violence to Mandela's
release. The euphoria that accompanied the legalisation of the ANC
declined to a subdued confusion, and the fear of violence became
the dominant concern of most South Africans. Media coverage of violence
in Black areas increased substantially from February 1990. The SABC,
which remained firmly under government control until late 1993, either
stated directly, or implied that the ANC was responsible. Evidence
has now emerged to show that elements close to the NP government
used violence as part of an overall political strategy to undermine
the ANC. Amidst allegations of the existence of a state-sponsored "third
force", the following observation was made:

A reign of terror was unleashed by the government and its Inkatha supporters,
leaving more than a thousand dead, displacing thousands more and seriously
affecting the morale and confidence of most people in the Indian community...a
large percentage of Indians are better off than their African counterparts
and as a distinct and highly visible minority, many...Indians have a real fear
of violence. They believe that...in [a] post-apartheid South Africa they will
be the first targets of uneducated and deprived mobs...acts of violence by
blacks against the Indian community have sown seeds of fear among many Indians
about the future under a black majority government.

A significant section of Indians began to see themselves as victims
of the transitional process rather than as active participants and
beneficiaries. Freund observed at the time that:

Indians remain frightened by Africans, who are poorer and have
claims on resources that might threaten and endanger their own
gains. To what extent an ideology
of "non-racialism" will bring people to redefine their identity
in other than racial terms, the future...of ethnicity in a "new South
Africa", is quite uncertain.

In the period after the legalisation of political organisations,
there was widespread speculation, backed by a range of opinion polls,
that fear would lead substantial numbers of Indians and Coloureds
to vote for the NP.

In
the run up to the election, urban legends recounting fantastic
tales of plots by maids and gardeners to take over
their employers' homes
once "freedom" was attained were indiscriminately related.
The ANC was unable to counteract these rumours, especially since
in Cato Manor months before the election, African squatters "invaded" new
houses earmarked for Indians who had been on the council's
waiting list for years. Nobody claimed responsibility for organising
the protest, but nor was the action condemned by the ANC until much
later. Although Mandela visited the area and tried to placate fears,
the impact on popular perceptions remained negative. The Mandela
visit did not attract much media attention, neither was it given
much prominence, as it seemed that the ANC did not want to appear
too soft on Indians in a province where the IFP was a serious electoral
threat. The Cato Manor homes had been vacant for eight months due
to an administrative bungle and Indians perceived the "invasion" as
a denial of housing to them. The fact that people also felt threatened
by the mushrooming shack settlements nearby rendered the situation
ripe for ethnic manipulation. Memories of the 1949 and 1985 Inanda
riots and the attacks in Warwick Avenue in 1990 fuelled Indian
anxiety, and probably contributed to a drop in support for the
ANC.

However,
a survey, entitled Negotiations and Change: An Opinion Poll of
3275 South Africans, July 1990, suggested
that the outcome
of the Indian and 'Coloured' vote was not a foregone
conclusion. It found that more than three quarters of Indians,
Africans, whites and Coloureds favoured negotiations to bring
about change.
Armed struggle was favoured by about 5% of Indians as compared
to 16% of Africans. Only one in ten Indians felt that parliament
could
be used to facilitate change. The ANC was the most favoured party
(35%) followed by the NP (24.5%), the NIC (11.3%), the DP (8.9%),
COSATU (3.8%) and the UDF (2.4%). Only two percentage points
separated De Klerk, who led Mandela as choice for Prime Minister.
Despite
concerns over violence, the majority of Indians were optimistic
about the
transition. The survey concluded that:

All three disenfranchised race groups are closer to each other in their attitudes
to capitalism, socialism and a mixed economy; they support the ANC and want
a new constitution on the basis of universal adult franchise, and a single
parliament in a unitary state. There is a general rejection of minority rights.
However, Indians and Coloureds are closer to whites than Africans on the issues
of the armed struggle, total nationalisation and the participation of workers
in companies. Until racism is destroyed, a long and difficult process in the
South African climate, it may well be that as the African muscle strengthens,
so the three minority race groups may come closer together.

The survey suggested that Indians were not homogenous and while
many were keen to eschew politics directly, they were open political
game. As a result, Indians as a constituency attracted the enthusiastic
attention of all the major political parties.

The establishment of ANC branches

Forming ANC branches throughout the country was a challenging and
difficult process. For the first time, membership cards were issued
and people were required to pay a fee of R12 a year. Patrick Terror
Lekota, the convenor of the Southern Natal Regional Interim Leadership
Committee (RILC), appointed only one Indian, Billy Nair, to the
RILC. Nair was closely aligned to the cabal, but when choosing
the other 14 members of the RILC, Lekota avoided people associated
with the cabal and the NIC. This circumspection and under-representation
of Indians was seen as a rebuff to the NIC.

Middle-class
Indians, few of whom had been involved in the struggle, dominated
the formation of ANC branches, even
in the predominantly
working-class townships of Phoenix and Chatsworth. This was common
across the racial divide and was the source of resentment and
disillusionment as many activists felt that too many professionals
were elected
to branch executives despite their having been "Olympic-level
fence-sitters during the days of struggle." This policy of
broadening the "peoples' camp" meant that almost
anyone was welcomed, irrespective of their past and any undercurrents
surrounding some of these "2nd February 1990 converts".
Working-class Indians were under-represented on branch executives
and in the general membership of the ANC. Younger leaders were
well represented on the branch executives as many ANC supporters
were
associated with youth organisations or were politicised as students.

The enthusiastic participation of an estimated 5% of Indians in
the formation of ANC branches in Durban was seen as significant support
for the organisation. It was observed that
Indians, like their [African] and Coloured counterparts rejoiced, and many
rushed to join the ANC. Branches of the ANC began to spring up in Indian localities
and townships all over the country. This flood of support for the ANC shocked
the white minority regime and its allies, particularly the [IFP], who realised
that if this went unchecked they would be swept aside in the event of free
democratic elections [particularly in KwaZulu Natal].

However, the conflict over the role of the NIC in the formation of ANC branches
was the source of much confusion both amongst activists and the general public.

In
Chatsworth, there was disagreement over whether or not to form
one or several branches. In this area the debate
showed how deeply
the conflicts around cabalism and control of the political process
had permeated Indian left politics. It also reflected how ethnicity
had become an issue. For instance, those who favoured a single
branch described Chatsworth "as a single geopolitical unit".
Their opponents maintained that such an assertion was a euphemism
for saying that Chatsworth was an Indian area which should focus
narrowly on Indian concerns. The thrust of the argument of those
wanting several branches was that there would be greater expansion
of the political life of township residents, and participation in
the ANC would increase. They argued that outlying parts of Chatsworth
could go into partnership with neighbouring African areas when forming
branches, and that a single branch would create only nine Chatsworth
ANC leaders while five branches would create forty-five. Those mooting
one branch said there were not enough skilled people to run several
branches and that they would not be organisationally viable. Chatsworth
activists eventually opted for five branches to serve its 350,000
residents while Phoenix with 400,000 people chose one branch. These
branches were part of the ANC's first regional conference
in 1991, when four Indians were elected to serve on the Regional
Executive
Committee, with only one having a direct association with a working-class
area. Significantly, two NIC/ANC stalwarts, Billy Nair and Pravin
Gordhan, were defeated, presumably because of their cabal associations.

In
addition the state-controlled SABC radio and television were also
able to negatively influence Indian perception
of the ANC.
Although there was a low level of politicisation among Indians,
there was
a high degree of literacy. However, the SABC's Radio Lotus
had a greater penetration than the ethnic editions of major Sunday
newspapers and other Indian weeklies, which readily supported
the ANC and its newly-returned exiles. As violence escalated
around
the country, the NP government was able, through the SABC news,
to depict
a society riven apart by ANC-inspired violence. The SABC, without
blatantly spelling out ethnicity, constantly reiterated the insecurities
of minorities by portraying the ANC as an exclusively African
organisation. Although Indian ANC activists had good media skills
and through
pamphlets, posters and roadside banners tried to counter the
state propaganda,
they were not effective. The organisation also relied on the
positive images of leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki
and Mac Maharaj
to help influence the Indian public. However, the continued disjointed
media coverage did not help in the debates around the relationship
between the NIC and ANC.

Statements
by the NIC that it would dissolve once the ANC was legalised, as
the movement's strategy was not to organise along ethnic
lines, were accepted as conventional wisdom by most progressives
and some of the newspapers. The debate was complicated since, despite
the Congress alliance's commitment to non-racialism, Indians
were starting to see themselves as a separate group that could come
under attack as violence increased. While there was significant support
for disbandment, one school of thought asserted that the NIC was
necessary to encourage Indian participation in politics and to promote
the ANC's political agenda. The argument in support of retaining
the NIC was that it could play a pro-ANC role during multi-party
negotiations and thus off-set the conservative Indian parties' alliance
with the NP. However, some contended that those who wanted the continuance
of the NIC were mainly hoping to use it as a spring-board to higher
political office. It was also argued by others that those in the
NIC who were against disbanding, were afraid of being sidelined by
Africanists within the trade union movement and the ANC in Natal.
A number of Indian ANC members who saw themselves as "ANC comrades" and
not "Indian comrades" disagreed with the NIC/TIC
position which promoted the idea of a group identity which was
contrary
to the ANC policy of non-racialism. However Ahmed Kathrada pointed
out
that it [was] useless to shout non-racialism when the ANC had
not succeeded in reaching out to other (racial) groups.

The
raging debate around disbandment was eventually resolved when,
at a meeting chaired by ANC deputy president Walter
Sisulu, it
was decided that the NIC and TIC would continue to exist. The
discussions were wide-ranging and took into consideration the insecurities
of
Indians as an ethnic minority. A statement issued after the meeting
revealed the contradictions and tensions around the desire to
build
a non-racial ANC while trying to gauge whether the NIC was the
better organisation to mobilise Indians. The 'consensus' at
the meeting declared that the ANC
is the primary organ to mobilise the Indian community as an integral part
of the South African people and that the strengthening of the
ANC within the Indian
community is among our common, vital tasks. At the same-time, and for the
present, there is a continuing role for the TIC and NIC in the
Congress tradition, to
help bring about unity in action between the Indian community as a whole
and the ANC-centred national liberation movement.

Rajbansi
pointed out that "if the NIC and TIC are to organise
Indians into the ANC, does this mean that the ANC is accepting group
representation within its own ranks." Ismail Omar, of Solidarity
stated that the decision of the NIC:
to act as a conduit in the Indian Community to gather support
for the ANC amounts to a total vote of no-confidence in the ability
of Africans in the ANC being able to gather Indian support. This...tarnishes
the Indian community as being racial. In adopting this line,
it would appear as if the NIC has taken over policies it attacked
in the past.
For the NIC to say that Indians had to be organised as Indians
and that a link had to be found between ethnicity and nation
building
makes even Solidarity blush.

One
ANC member who did not want to be named argued that the NIC "is
doing nothing more than accept the basis under which the tricameral
government was formed - that of separate race groups to be represented
separately".

It
should be noted that despite its commitment to non-racialism, the
ANC, and before that the UDF, were largely
comfortable with
allies who concentrated on organising along racial lines. Unlike
AZAPO and
the PAC, it did not define or propagate unity among Indian, African
and Coloured people on the basis of being black, neither was
patriotism equated with a total identification with being a South
African.
Debates around identity and racial definition were prominent
since the Africanists
split from the ANC to form the PAC in 1959 and continued beyond
the rise and decline of the Black Consciousness Movement. The
government and its supporters referred only to Africans as black
in order
to
stress the differences from Coloureds and Indians. But in the
1970s and 1980s, progressives increasingly used 'black' to
refer to anyone who was not white. During the debate around the NIC's
future, some of its leaders and activists reverted to the apartheid
definitions. While it was argued that this was how the majority of
Indians and Coloureds saw themselves, and that it was therefore appropriate
to use such terms, it must be remembered that during the repressive
1980s NIC leaders used black as an inclusive term. Mandela and some
ANC leaders still refer to "all blacks, including Indians,
Africans and Coloureds". However, it can be argued that
the ANC was not strategic in its handling of ethnicity. Instead
of
encouraging black people to see themselves as an amalgamation
of diverse and
culturally rich groups, sensitivities around ethnicity led to
the different races retreating into their own laagers.

Campaigning for the April 1994 national elections

The first democratic elections were held after four years of
transition and intense negotiations. It was inevitable that
elections for
a new government would be the result of the talks at CODESA,
and the ANC tried to prepare for this from as early as 1991,
which
was declared the year of "mass action for the transfer of
power to the people". The year 1992 was declared the year "of
democratic elections for a constituent assembly". While some
hoped that elections would occur soon after CODESA began, the vagaries
of the negotiations process dictated otherwise. The ANC's
patriotic front walked out of the talks after the June 1992 Boipatong
massacre. However, it was the uncertainty following Chris Hani's
assassination, that made urgent the setting of an election date.
Racial violence and polarisation led to a fear that the country
was on the brink of disaster. However, Nelson Mandela emerged as
the unifier and leader of the country, calling for calm in an address
on April 10, 1993 to the nation on prime time television, while
De Klerk's government was relegated to the shadows.

ANC
electioneering took place against this background of increasing
violence, right-wing threats of mass destruction
and latent feelings
of hopelessness amongst many South Africans. The only certainty
the ANC enjoyed was the majority support of Africans. Almost
all the
polls at the time showed that the ANC would have difficulties
in capturing the support of Indians, Coloureds and whites. Eighty
percent of Indians named the NP as their first, second or third
choice. The
ANC's sophisticated campaign failed to work on obvious weaknesses
- such as its lack of support among Indians. The ANC's mistake
was that it failed to take into account the specific insecurities
Indians felt as a minority. At best, messages in pamphlets tried
to reassure Indians that all would be well under the ANC, but the
media and politicians opposed to the ANC painted a confusing picture
for the electorate. ANC MP Pregs Govender asserted: "Many Indians,
by the time of the elections were unable to distinguish between the
ANC and the IFP". This was largely because the media began
to apportion almost equal blame for the violence on both parties.

Paradoxically,
collaborationists such as Rajbansi maintained a high profile. Despite
limited support among Indians
in the 1980s,
when
he was declared unfit to hold office, and a rapid decline in
his relationship with the NP, he refined his ethnic approach and
stayed
the course. After he failed to secure an alliance with the ANC,
inviting stringent protests from Indian activists about such
a deal, he formed
the Minority Front (MF) which focused narrowly on Indian interests.
Rajbansi conveyed three simple messages: he understood and appreciated
Indians' concerns and was willing to represent those interests;
he was able to speak on behalf of and make known the demands of Indians
as an interest group; and finally that ethnicity was a central force
in national politics. While it was not possible for the ANC to advance
Rajbansi's narrow Indian ethnocentrism, it is possible that
the ANC's electoral perfomance might have been better if
there was greater sensitivity towards Indian concerns.

By appropriating Indian cultural and ethnic symbols, Rajbansi was
able to carve a political niche for himself. He criticised the NP
for not including Indian religions in the new constitution; sought
restitution for victims of the Group Areas Act; promoted cultural
ties with India; declared that curry was a vital negotiating instrument;
and sought to assure Indian South Africans of their safety under
an African-dominated government if he represented them. He became
the sole representative of his party in the HoD when the rest of
his members defected to the NP in the run-up to the elections. To
calls that he be expelled from the multi-party talks, he retorted:

For the benefit of the writer who belongs to a small clique that
has failed to deliver the Indian community to liberation as promised,
and to others, I
say that the Bengal Tiger's real political career has just commenced.

His
campaign consisted of modest newspaper advertisements and several
public meetings for supporters. While he believed
that
he was the
head of a political movement and aspired for national and regional
seats, Singh pointed out that the MF was "in constitution,
in goals and in rhetoric...the realisation of one man's conceptualisation
of what an Indian minority party should represent". Nevertheless,
the MF's win of a single critical seat was an indicator
of an ethnic strand amongst Indians as it was the only party
with
an exclusively pro-Indian agenda.

Meanwhile,
the ANC had alienated some of its members and the NIC by initially
including JN Reddy, the former HoD leader
and another
of his colleagues on its list of candidates. The move indicated
the fissure between the ANC's national leadership, who approved
of Reddy's inclusion, and its regional membership, who saw
Reddy as a political foe. It also reflected the organisation's
concern about the conservatism of Indians and the need to be uniform
in dealing with those who had collaborated with apartheid. Several
African homeland leaders had been incorporated onto the ANC lists.
By embracing Reddy as a candidate, the ANC conceded that the collaborationists
could possibly deliver more Indian votes than its own members. Reddy
was placed at number 256 on the list which meant that he would have
to work hard to deliver the Indian vote to secure his election as
an ANC MP, and then only if the organisation won 64% of the total
vote. The lack of confidence in ANC branches and the NIC was not
helped by its weak campaign in many Indian areas. However, in several
areas, including Chatsworth, the ANC branches ran highly efficient
and thorough election campaigns, though as one activist put it, "all
the organisation in the world could not dislodge an anti-ANC consciousness
that has been constructed by the state over the last fifty years".

After
the elections, the results from each polling station were not made
available so as to avoid identifying how
communities voted
and to prevent retaliation by losing parties. Instead, the results
were given as district and provincial totals, making analysis
of class or residential voting patterns difficult. Assumptions
about
how different classes or residential areas voted depended on "extrapolation
from polls, and from the opinion of informed and anonymous individuals
involved in the election process." Nationally, it was estimated
that the ANC gained 150,000 Indian votes (constituting 1.5% of the
ANC's national vote - See Table 8.1) and the NP gained 300,000
votes (constituting 7% of the NP's national vote). The NP,
which received approximately one-tenth of the KwaZulu-Natal vote,
now depends on its provincial Indian supporters in Chatsworth, and
Phoenix. Herman Giliomee observed that in KwaZulu-Natal only six
out of the NP's top twenty candidates for the National Assembly
were from the "strategically important Indian community,
of which more than half backed the NP."

Most
surprising was the performance of Rajbansi's
MF, which, against all predictions, captured 48,951 votes (1.3%
of the KwaZulu
Natal tally - See Table 8.2) and secured for himself a place
in the Provincial legislature. Rajbansi was the best known Indian
figure
on the ballot form, and would have attracted all those who simply
wanted to vote for an Indian. The most likely reason for people
voting MF was the frustration at feeling excluded from the political
process.
While Indian identity was of importance, it was less of a factor
than this feeling of marginalisation.

Class
and education influenced the estimated 25% Indian vote secured
by the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. Freund notes
that the ANC votes came
disproportionately from younger, more educated middle-class Indians.
In Chatsworth, the ANC secured almost 23% on the provincial ballot
and almost 26% in the national ballot. The ANC also estimated
that they received greater support in the Transvaal and from Indians
outside of KwaZulu-Natal. This was influenced by the distance
from
the intra-Zulu
violence in KwaZulu-Natal and the middle-class profile of these
voters. The IFP gained support from the Indian middle-class and
bourgeoisie
on the North Coast and some parts of the South Coast. In Durban,
the IFP got less than 4% of the Indian vote. The ANC lost votes
to the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal partly because of its own disorganisation
and the "fear of continuing civil conflict may have prompted
many voters to interpret an Inkatha vote as a vote for appeasement
and peace".

How
do we explain the Indian vote? The NIC's Farouk Meer suggests
that fear, racial prejudice and the ANC's poor organisation
among Indians were to be blamed. The high crime rate and violence
in the province also contributed to Indian insecurities. The
NP played the race card in its electioneering and, by doing so,
succeeded
in
winning Indian support. It reminded Indians of dictatorships
elsewhere in Africa and their backlash against Indians. Moreover,
Meer concedes
that
Indian leaders and activists were disillusioned and did not play the role
they played in 1984...this disillusionment had its roots in the
conflicts around
an alleged cabal within the NIC which had inordinate influence over politics
in Natal and this is the final factor in the tensions that had developed
between the NIC and the ANC.

Tensions
between the ANC and the NIC were surprising as the NIC had been
a key ANC supporter. Meer claims that the
national ANC
leadership understood the NIC's position and appreciated their work but
that President Mandela "chastised us for not doing enough as
the NIC".

Conflict
between a hegemonic group in the NIC and members of the MDM, COSATU
and the ANC had persisted since the late 1980s. Meer
asserts that this alienation
had its roots in the feeling that certain NIC leaders had somehow
hijacked the political process in Natal and were calling the
political shots....Through
Kagiso [a funding agency], it was said, we were influencing civic structures
...together with this came the whole question of the cabal......a perception
that there was this shadowy group that was in fact controlling political
events [in Natal] ....Potential African leaders felt that they
were being stifled
by the overwhelming presence of the NIC.....This led to the marginalisation
of key personnel in the NIC itself when it came to the elections and also
when it came to nominating people on to the lists for parliament.

Meer
defended the NIC's mode of operation before the ANC's
legalisation, arguing that repression forced them to work within
a very close network but that they always had clear goals of working
towards the national democratic struggle. He conceded that they "did
exclude people...but this was done inadvertently, not by specific
design".

Historically, sport had played a vital role in building a sense
of community among working-class Indians. A founder member of the
Chatsworth Football Association and the Chatsworth Cricket Association
explained:

When people moved to Chatsworth we first formed civics and sports organisations.
Religious organisation came much later and with it came division amongst religious
groups. There was a conscious decision to focus on sport since this cut through
religious differences and helped to unite the people who had come from a range
of different backgrounds.

To their detriment, the ANC neglected the sports, religious and cultural sectors
in their election campaign just as the NIC had done in earlier campaigns. The
ANC failed to build on the progressive sports tradition of the South African
Council on Sport (SACOS).

The ANC was also unable to harness the support from a plethora of religious
and cultural organisations which had varying degrees of influence amongst
Indians. While individuals from these organisations gave the ANC their
vote, it was
unable to get them to lobby on its behalf. Ultimately, Rajbansi and, to
a lesser extent, the NP made inroads into these groups. In the past, Rajbansi
had also
secured support by lobbying around such issues as the immigration of Indian
brides, and the legalisation of fireworks, which was of significance for
Hindu festivals. As for the NP, most of its candidates were once members
of the parties
that participated in the HoD, and this support appeared to hold. The NIC's
problem was that, with a few exceptions, most of their progressive supporters
had become distanced from religious and cultural organisations. Activists also
believed that the militant rhetoric of the ANC's Peter Mokaba, Winnie
Mandela and Harry Gwala cost them some middle-class support. These leaders
had popular support amongst the African underclass but limited support
amongst Indians.

The
ANC needed to win the KwaZulu-Natal Indian vote in order to influence
the provincial politics while the
NP needed Indian votes
to secure their national seats. While the NP won a large number
of Indian votes, their influence in the KwaZulu Natal legislature
continues
to be limited. Even Rajbansi's MF, which won fewer votes, is
more influential. Provincial politics is dominated by the IFP and
ANC. This is a likely reason why the NP adopted desperate electioneering
tactics. Overtly, and especially to African people, they presented
themselves as a new party, but when trying to win Indian and 'Coloured' support,
they propagated a fear of Africans. Another ploy of the NP was to
depict the ANC as hard-line Communists who would restrict freedom
of religion. While there was a SACP branch in Chatsworth, it had
a low profile and cannot claim to have had popular support. Despite
Communists holding key positions in the Congress and union movements,
the Indian working-class did not gravitate towards the Communist
Party as it had done in the 1940s and 1950s. There was the perception
that the party was fighting "more for the Africans than the
Indians".

During
campaigning for the 1994 election in Bayview, Chatsworth residents
who had been visited three times, assured
fieldworkers
of their vote. However, on election day, despite organisational
support from the ANC, at least half did not vote for the ANC.
Clearly, residents
had lied to ANC campaigners, assuring them of their vote as momentary
appeasement. It is likely that the residents who lied did so
out of an irrational fear. They were also "playing it safe" so
that if the ANC won in the district, they would be able to say
that they had contributed to the victory. What appears to be
common across
the class divide is that significant numbers of Indians, like
most other South Africans, have eschewed direct political involvement.
At most they voted because the election was seen as an historical
moment and one way of confirming their South Africanness. An
estimated
85% of Indians voted in the general elections, most of whom voted
for the NP. After the elections, the debate on disbanding the
NIC continued. Some still felt that the organisation had an important
role to play in persuading Indians to vote for the ANC in the
local
government elections.

The ANC in Government
A breakdown of national parliamentary representation by race
shows that Indians, who make up 3% of the population, have 16%
representation
in Parliament. Among the 40 Indian parliamentarians from all
the parties, there is no MP from Chatsworth or Phoenix, where
almost
two-thirds of the Indian population live. Whites are also "over-represented" having
27% of MPs, while constituting 15% of the electorate. Africans, who
constitute 73% of the population, have just over 50% of MPs. (See
Table 8.3) By October 1996, five ANC cabinet posts were held by Indians:
Mac Maharaj (transport), Jay Naidoo (initially RDP and later posts
and telecommunications), Dullah Omar (Justice and Intelligence),
Kader Asmal (Water Affairs and Forestry) and Mohamed Valli Moosa
(constitutional development and local government). The deputy foreign
affairs minister is Aziz Pahad and President Mandela's advisor
is Ahmed Kathrada. Essop Pahad is the Deputy Minister in Deputy President
Thabo Mbeki's office.

Reynolds
attributes the prominence of Indians in the cabinet and ANC leadership
to the "historical role played by Mahatma Gandhi,
Yusuf Dadoo and the Indian Congresses in opposition to apartheid
and colonialism". However, it is unlikely that the prominence
of Indians is a result of the direct contribution of the NIC.
Prior to the election, a moribund NIC was largely alienated and
had resorted
to simply issuing press statements. It is significant that none
of the Cabinet Ministers have been directly involved with Indian
organisations
in Durban over the last decade and a half. Jay Naidoo, however,
had been briefly involved in civic work in Chatsworth in the
early 1980s.
Despite over-representation in the National Assembly, only five
Indian ANC MPs were elected from KwaZulu-Natal in April 1994.
They are:
Billy Nair (La Mercy), Pravin Gordhan (Overport), Mewa Ramgobin
(Verulam), Ela Gandhi (Central Durban) and Yunus Carrim (Pietermaritzburg).
In the provincial assembly, the ANC has only two Indians: Ismail
Meer (Sydenham) and Yusuf Bhamjee (Pietermaritzburg). There is
no
Indian MP in the 10-person provincial cabinet. Rajbansi is the
only Chatsworth-based MP and Ramesh Romalal of the IFP is the
only Phoenix
MP. The lack of representation from Chatsworth and Phoenix has
contributed to the alienation of the Indian working-class from
the ANC and the
political process.

While Indians involved in the anti-apartheid struggle may have
been formidable cadres and continue to be prominent in post-apartheid
politics, they are out of touch with the average Indian voter.
This
disjuncture is potentially a weapon for those wanting to challenge
the ANC on representativeness in the run-up to the 1999 election.
For example, other groups, whether white, African or Coloured,
can question the disproportionate influence that Indians have
in the
organisation. They would have to bear in mind though, that many
of the Indian ANC parliamentarians, particularly former exiles
and Robben
Islanders, see themselves as black South Africans of Indian origin
rather than as simply Indians. Their rise in ANC ranks happened
through several routes: for example, Jay Naidoo had been General
Secretary
of COSATU, a non-racial sectoral organisation; Mac Maharaj and
Aziz Pahad had distinguished themselves in the ANC's exiled
leadership; Mohamed Valli Moosa and Pravin Gordhan were powerful
leaders in the
Mass Democratic Movement; Ahmed Kathrada had spent more than
25 years on Robben Island; and then there were activist intellectuals
who
were aligned to the struggle either internally, like Dullah Omar,
or externally, like Prof. Kader Asmal.

The
ANC is likely to use an MP's performance rather than race
as the primary criteria to measure the value of a member. Some may
argue that the prominence of Indians' is proof that the ANC's
commitment to non-racialism has worked. Mac Maharaj reflected
this thinking when he declared that:

The only thing I have in common with Indians is that I share
a mutual love of curry and rice. I am [as] non-racial as they
come
or supposedly come, but
don't call me Indian.

This prompted the UK-based Asian Times to observe that:

Indians in the ANC are so sensitive to the real or imagined resentments
of Africans that they have gone out of their way to divorce themselves
from even the most innocuous cultural associations with their people,
sometimes even making fools of themselves in the process.

Nevertheless, the ANC is quick to trot out its Indian parliamentarians
to gain favour from the populace, overlooking the fact that most
of them do not have a social base amongst ordinary Indian voters.
This is because there is a physical, ideological and cultural distance
between these leaders and the Indian working-class.

The
fact that Indian ANC leaders do not have popular support amongst
Indians, is also ignored by President Mandela.
When addressing
a group of about 300 "Indians of influence", the President
chose to highlight "how well represented the Indian community
is within government". Mandela described his old friend
Ahmed Kathrada as his most trusted political advisor, and stated
that
he did not appoint him to the cabinet because he trusted his
judgement the most, and therefore wanted him by his side. Mac
Maharaj was
lauded
as one of the most talented politicians and someone with whom
the President never debated for fear of losing the argument.
Mandela
also reiterated that he had proposed Minister of Water Affairs,
Kader Asmal, as a replacement for the late Oliver Tambo as chairperson
of the ANC, but had been defeated when Thabo Mbeki was elected
to
the position.

Many
South African Indians were concerned about affirmative action and
the process of policy implementation.
Despite repeated ANC
statements that affirmative action would include redress for
all black people,
private sector employers appeared to favour Africans over Indians
and Coloureds, causing much consternation. There was a perception
amongst Indians of being sandwiched between Africans and whites.
On the one hand, Indians see the ANC government as "cosying
up to whites, who many believe, are not running only the economy,
but also controlling vital ministries". On the other hand is
the issue of affirmative action. Senzo Mchunu, provincial secretary
of the ANC claimed that "corporate companies and industries
were exploiting affirmative action to a point of turning Indians
and Coloureds against the ANC". Affirmative action has
been abused by the private sector.

In
September 1995 the situation became explosive as tension erupted
between Indian and African people at UDW "over jobs, power,
the future of the university and the cultural survival of a previously
oppressed and now possibly threatened Indian minority. The progressive
staff, which is still 95% Indian, realise that their composition
has to change, but nevertheless feel threatened, and so the term "affirmative
action" has become a contentious one".

The
civil service is slightly more complex. In the past, Indians were
beneficiaries of a distorted form of affirmative
action under
policies designed to co-opt Indians. (See Tables 8.4, 8.5 and
8.6) The growth in the number of Indian civil servants is one indicator
of how the apartheid government tried to win Indians over. During
the transition, the status and position of the middle-classes
were
and are expected to stay the same. For example, teachers' salaries
will not be raised substantially and discrimination has been addressed.
There is expected to be less motivation for teachers to improve their
qualifications as salary increases are no longer an incentive. Projects
to narrow the gap between teachers will be held and those with lesser
qualifications, mainly African teachers, will be encouraged to study
further. The position of those who are well paid is likely to remain
the same and even the possession of two or more degrees is unlikely
to result in substantially higher pay. Given this, it was inevitable
that there would be insecurity over the new government's
policy as African people, who ha