South African History Online

Political report of the National Executive Committee, to the 49th National Conference of the ANC by President Nelson Mandela

Bloemfontein, 17 December 1994

Comrade Chairperson;
Officials and members of the NEC;
Fellow
delegates;
Members of the Diplomatic Corps;
Distinguished Guests:

"There is no doubt that the road to Union Buildings and Tuynhuis has become
the shorter". With these words we concluded the 48th National Conference of the
ANC in Durban barely over three years ago. It was the first constitutional
National Conference of our organisation held within South Africa in over three
decades.

Then, we were celebrating the unbanning of the African National Congress, and
struggling to secure normal political activity, including the release of many
political prisoners who remained behind bars.

And so we assemble today, at this the 49th National Conference of the African
National Congress, converging from Union Buildings and Tuynhuis; from parliament
and regional legislatures; from ministries and provincial governments - as the
majority organisation in the first ever democratically-elected government of our
country. We have converged from the shop-floor and informal settlements; from
places of worship and learning; from urban and rural areas; as business-persons
and professionals - African, Coloured, Indian and white - a microcosm of South
African society.

For the first time in the history of our country, we have under one roof,
sharing the same vision and planning as equals, delegates from every sector of
South African society, including those who hold the highest offices in the land.
This in itself vividly captures the qualitative change our country has
undergone: a dream fulfilled and a pledge redeemed.

That pledge, made in this mother-city of the ANC 83 years ago by yet another
representative gathering, was to transform South Africa into a non-racial and
democratic society. As we meet in the environs where they planted the seed, we
can proudly say to the founders: the country is in the hands of the people; the
tree of liberty is firmly rooted in the soil of the motherland!

This Conference is the first such assembly after our momentous elections, the
convention which signals the closing of a painful and yet glorious chapter in
the history of our country and our organisation, and the opening of a new
chapter of freedom, dignity and prosperity.

On behalf of the National Executive Committee, I welcome you all - delegates,
observers from allied organisations and our friends representing governments
across the globe. On your behalf, I wish to express our gratitude to the Free
State Province of the ANC for the hospitality accorded us; and to the National
Conference Preparatory Committee for the excellent organisation that should help
make this Conference the success that it promises to be. We congratulate all the
delegates and the Regions and branches for the seriousness with which they have
prepared for this historic event.

Yesterday, December 16, was the anniversary of that bloody battle on the
banks of the river Ncome, as warriors sought to stave off the persistent
incursion into ancestral lands, into their freedom and their dignity. Many
perished in honour, as have thousands before and after them. Even as we met in
Durban in 1991, massacres underpinned by the same bent to impose white
supremacy, were continuing.

A great many patriots, some of whom were with us at the last Conference have
passed away. Oliver Tambo, former President of the ANC who steered our
organisation during difficult moments; Chris Hani, the outstanding people's
soldier who was gunned down in cold blood; Elias Motsoaledi and our former
Treasurer-General Thomas Nkobi. We also fondly remember Reggie Radebe, Lambert
Mbatha, Helen Joseph, Susan Keane, Firoza Adams, Elijah Barayi, Sam Ntambani,
Oscar Mpetha and many more leaders and cadres who contributed in no small
measure to the victory we celebrate today. In honour of these martyrs, I ask you
to stand and observe a moment of silence.

Indeed, as we get down to the business of Conference, we need always to
remember that, the stroke of good fortune that has allowed us to be there and at
the helm in the democratic transition, is at the same time a grave
responsibility to ensure that the ideals for which these heroes perished and the
cause which consumed their lives, finds concrete realisation in a better life
for all our people.

For, proud as we should be of the achievements made, the reality is that
democratic forces in our country have captured only elements of political power.
South Africa is not yet out of the woods.

We have assembled at this Conference precisely to chart the way forward to a
truly free and prosperous nation. The real measure of success or failure of this
Conference will be whether we will emerge motivated and stronger than before,
and whether the decisions we take bring practical relief to the millions who so
graphically demonstrated their confidence in the ANC and in democracy last
April.

Their eyes are trained at this Conference, and their ears strain to hear our
decisions. They wait expectant that we will bring new hope and justify their
trust.

Comrade Chairperson and Delegates:

As we met in July 1991, the apartheid regime was well-entrenched, relating to
the liberation movement with arrogance, as if we were hapless petitioners.

The talks-about-talks aimed at freeing the political environment were
grinding along at a slow pace; political violence against the people was on the
increase; and many political prisoners were still behind bars. The rulers of our
country were confident that they could drag out the process, undermine the ANC
and impose a political settlement that would leave the essence of apartheid
intact.

It was therefore natural that our debates had to focus on the advisability or
otherwise of negotiations and the fate of the four pillars of our struggle in a
changing South Africa and a changing world.

Our conclusion that the regime was in crisis and unable to rule in the old
way; that it was forced to unban the ANC and yet sought to delay the transition;
inspired us to pursue negotiations combined with mass action as well as
strengthening our organisational and military capacity. This was reinforced by
our assessment of the new international order characterised by the general
pursuit of multi-party democracy and human rights and the collapse of the
socialist world. We also had to adopt a new approach to our own relations with
the international community, to ensure that the world supported change in a
manner that strengthened the forces of democracy in our country.

The decisions of the 48th National Conference created the basis for the ANC
to take the lead on all fronts. Yet, while we can confidently say that the
transformation that has taken place vindicates this conclusion, we should also
admit that, in the process we did also falter. What is crucial though is whether
we were able to learn from our mistakes and to adapt our approach to a changing
and dynamic situation.

Soon after National Conference, the National Executive Committee reviewed
progress in the talks-about-talks and, as instructed by Conference, recommitted
itself to the content of the OAU Harare Declaration. However, it was agreed that
a review of our approach to the phases of the process was required. You will
remember that we had then identified the achievement of free political activity,
including release of all political prisoners and an end to the violence, as
necessary conditions for substantive negotiations to start.

In our discussion, and in consultation with a number of leaders on the
continent, we came to the conclusion that we needed to proceed apace to real
negotiations. Given that the apartheid regime was inherently violent, and given
that it sought to drag out the transition, we felt it necessary to deprive it of
the initiative it was exercising over the process. While we continued to pursue
the removal of all the identified obstacles, we then started to prepare for an
all-party conference, the central aim being to curb the monopoly of power of the
apartheid regime itself, the real obstacle to the democratic transition.

This tactical flexibility on our part, popularly known as the "strategic
shift" laid the basis for the holding of the Convention for a Democratic South
Africa (Codesa I) in December 1991. The adoption, at that Convention, of the
Declaration of Intent, committing virtually all political players to a
democratic settlement based on internationally-accepted principles, was a
historic landmark in the evolution of South Africa's entire political life.

By this time, too, we had started examining the actual meaning of the concept
of interim government to supervise elections for a Constituent Assembly. This
culminated much later in narrowing the mandate of such a transitional mechanism
to areas specifically to do with normal political activity and the conduct of
free and fair elections.

In the same period, a wide variety of forces had come to realise that
violence posed a serious threat to the process and that joint efforts were
needed to eradicate it. In particular, the religious community initiated a
process which led to the National Peace Convention and the adoption of the
National Peace Accord. Debate will continue on the actual impact these
structures made to contain political violence, as well as the approach
underpinning the regime's participation in them.

Yet it can be said, without any shadow of doubt, that, to the extent that the
NPC created a moral and structural basis for dealing with the violence; to the
extent that it monitored incidents and identified the causes; and to the extent
that its wealth of experience informed the electoral process as well as concrete
proposals regarding the introduction of community policing, it was an important
contribution to the transition, uniting a wide range of forces and expressing
the sentiments of virtually all South Africans. In this context, it also became
the forum through which the international community launched its observer
missions.

On our part, we actively took part in these structures to help protect the
people. We also saw it as our task to harness community efforts to defend
themselves. This was not made easy by the fact that the same forces responsible
for the violence were at the centre of maintaining apartheid legality. Yet, in
the overall, while there were many weaknesses of organisation, discipline,
infiltration by state agents as well as minimal capacity on the part of
communities, we can say that community self- defence, with the participation of
many cadres of Umkhonto we Sizwe, combined with local political initiatives, was
the cutting edge in preventing worse disaster.

Both to strengthen forces of the oppressed and democratic forces, and to deny
the regime fertile ground to pit these forces against one another, the ANC took
the leading role in initiating the broad patriotic front. This reinforced
earlier efforts to bring into the fold of democratic opposition the various
bantustan and tri-cameral parties and to reinforce co- operation with hundreds
of civil society formations. The basic platform for this initiative was the
central demand for a sovereign Constituent Assembly and the steps required to
reach that goal.

The Broad Patriotic Front Conference in October 1991 as well as the strong
working relations that developed both within and outside negotiations vindicated
the correctness of this approach. Even in fora in which participants in
apartheid structures constituted the majority, the regime and its allies found
themselves isolated.

In the period leading up to the Broad Patriotic Conference and immediately
thereafter, it became clear to us that the leadership of some so-called
liberation movements had either not done sufficient work among their members or
failed to appreciate the strategies required to bring fundamental change to our
country. This lack of leadership, coupled with the tendency to pander to
populism, undermined our efforts to ensure that these forces play a significant
role with us in the transition.

The aim here is not to denigrate any self-professed patriotic organisation.
Rather, it is to record the tragic fact that, as previous experience had shown,
a blind pursuit of cheap popularity, has nothing to do with revolution. The
April election results demonstrated in no uncertain terms that the masses
themselves are able to distinguish between serious conduct of struggle and petty
politicking.

The lesson needs to be kept in mind especially in the current period when we
have to contend with serious difficulties of governance and delivery, that the
solution lies in involving the people through all stages of the process and
honestly explaining to them the difficulties we face and the reasons behind some
unpopular decisions we may have to take. This is the best antidote to attempts
by opportunists of all hues to gain popularity on the basis of radical-sounding
but impractical propositions.

All these developments were taking place in a period in which the
international community was redefining its own role with regard to our struggle.
Proceeding from the decisions taken by Conference, the NEC consulted first and
foremost the Front-line States and the OAU, to work out joint strategies aimed
at ensuring a phased lifting of sanctions in accordance with progress in the
negotiations process. As a result, at the Harare Commonwealth Summit of October
1991, and later at the United Nations and other fora, the ANC's perspective was
adopted; thus undermining attempts by the regime to weaken international
opposition to the system of apartheid.

Because of these initiatives and due to its own conduct, the ANC's standing
improved in all capitals of the world. It became accepted among all forces,
including political and business, not only as a major player to be reckoned
with, but also as the custodian of the democratic transition.

It was in the context of this unfolding situation that the ANC and the
democratic movement as a whole started to take both the strategic and tactical
initiative. As recommended by Conference, the Negotiations Commission was
constituted to plan and prepare for negotiations and conduct them in close
consultation with the NEC, the Regions, branches and the broad patriotic forces.

Comprised of senior and capable leaders of our organisation, and constantly
seeking the mandate of the broader movement, the negotiating team acquitted
itself well. And we should congratulate them for a job well-done.

In time, the movement emerged as the driving force both of the content and
form of negotiations.

This naturally frightened the regime and other counter-revolutionary forces.
The process collapsed at Codesa II, because these forces feared the advent of
democracy; they were worried about the pace of change; and for the ruling
National Party in particular, misled by their seemingly universal popularity at
the instance of the whites-only referendum in March 1992.

So confident were they of their fortunes that they calculated that they could
delay the process that much longer, and in the intervening period, disorganise,
weaken and discredit the ANC.

By then, it had become clear to most South Africans that one of the regime's
main weapons in this regard was Low Intensity Conflict against black people,
particularly in Natal and the PWV. With the Boipatong massacre, the ANC felt
obliged to call off negotiations and call for decisive steps to deal with the
violence and to secure a commitment from the regime to real democracy, a
sovereign Constituent Assembly and definite time frames.

With the advantage of hindsight, we can safely conclude that the regime's
behaviour in the first half of 1992 constituted its most serious strategic
miscalculation, the beginning of a process which saw it permanently lose the
tactical initiative.

Comrade Chairperson and Delegates;

Perhaps we should pause here and reflect in depth on four particular issues
which affected the entire transition and still contain strategic relevance in
the current situation.

The first is the question of violence.

Between January and June 1992, political violence had so intensified that
1,806 were killed and 2,931 were injured.

The African National Congress had in 1990 already stated its view that this
violence was organised and had deeper roots than the so-called "black-on-black"
analysis churned out by the media and the regime's spokespersons.
Incontrovertible information now available to the public shows that indeed there
was a network of senior members of the security services responsible for this.

We are convinced that these actions had the backing of some leaders of the
National Party; and that those who were not directly responsible, did, by
omission, abet these crimes, hoping that this would weaken their main adversary,
the ANC. In so far as Natal and the PWV are concerned, the earlier approach had
been to bolster and build an alliance with the IFP against the ANC, and later,
to blame both the ANC and the IFP and seek to make political capital out of it.

Yet built into this strategy were many inherent contradictions. For a start,
it undermined the economy and therefore generated wider opposition than the
regime expected. As time went by, the involvement of the state became more and
more obvious, thus further undermining its legitimacy.

This Conference will need to reflect on this issue to the extent that it
affects the security of democracy today. In some areas political violence still
persists, though much reduced. This includes the ugly phenomenon of taxi
violence which has also been linked to the counter-revolutionary strategy. It is
no secret that much of the network responsible for this violence still exists,
either burrowed in the nooks and crannies of the state apparatus or in private
front companies.

We will also need to take into account the fact that the extreme right-wing,
both black and white, sought to use certain issues to mobilise a social base
around themselves. In this regard, we should examine the question whether there
are such issues which can still be used for reactionary mobilisation, depending
on how we handle them.

In Natal, particularly, a desperate struggle by elements within the IFP to
maintain a power-base among traditional leaders as an extension of the party
does pose a danger of an eruption. The challenge for us in this regard is to
ensure that traditional leaders are themselves liberated to become non-partisan
servants of the people. We should also, while meeting the commitment to
international mediation, challenge the notion that any party anywhere in South
Africa can arrogate to itself the status of being representative of any King or
Kingdom.

Our political initiatives should be combined with clear measures to ensure
the dismantling of the counter-revolutionary network and firm law- enforcement.
We should be firm on violence wherever it comes from. It is our responsibility
as ANC to ensure that the people of KwaZulu-Natal, like those in other parts of
our country, do not continue to live under tyranny. We should, at this juncture,
reiterate our recognition of, and respect for, the institution of traditional
leaders in all parts of our country. We should also emphasise, as many of these
leaders would agree, that restoring this institution to its respected role does
not mean that the right of citizens to determine their destiny or for
communities to exercise democracy, should be subverted, simply because they
happen to live in rural areas.

The second major question pertains to the role of the international
community.

We refer to the issue of international mediation conscious of the fact that
the international community has always held the view that it is here, within
South Africa, where the repository of potential solutions to our problems
reside. This has been our approach as well.

It is in this context that, when negotiations broke down in 1992, we sought
increased international involvement to help reinforce initiatives that South
Africans themselves were engaged in. Assisted by the OAU, we managed to raise
the profile of UN and other agencies within the country, particularly after the
Security Council debate in July of that year.

We should take this opportunity to thank the international community for the
magnificent role they played in helping steer our transition. Without their
scrupulous mechanisms of monitoring and bold pronouncements; without their wise
counsel away from the public eye and without their material support; our
transition would have been that much more difficult and costly.

It was in recognition of the importance of their involvement, that Conference
instructed us to organise a summit of anti-apartheid forces, which finally took
place in February 1993. The decisions taken by representatives of the
international community at that summit, pertaining to measures to help speed up
the negotiations process, support for the election campaign and plans to assist
the process of reconstruction and development contributed immensely to much of
our current successes.

Among other things, we also called for preparations to start for the post-
sanctions era. In this regard, our experts also started to interact with
relevant government departments on matters pertaining particularly to facilities
offered by the IMF and negotiations for debt rescheduling.

The third major area is the issue of the relationship between negotiations
and mass mobilisation as well as the capacity of both ourselves and the regime
to qualitatively shift the balance of forces. This arose particularly after the
Boipatong massacre, and in the context of the Campaign for Peace and Democracy.

Out of that campaign, we were not only able to secure our central demands as
reflected in the Record of Understanding. We also managed to activate and thus
strengthen our organisational structures, the Tri-partite alliance and relations
with mass democratic structures. The supremacy of the ANC as the foremost
political representative of the majority of South Africans was asserted beyond
question. At the same time, we dare acknowledge that in these actions, we also
learnt the need for tighter discipline and better assessment of situations to
avoid errors of the Bisho type.

As we proceeded to break the logjam, we had to more earnestly address the
questions: if mass action helps to shift the balance of forces, to what extent;
would our objective be to so shift this balance that we exact a negotiated
surrender on the part of the regime; at what cost would this be achieved; and
were there any alternatives?

This inspired an open debate, continuing what had long been taking place
within senior organs of the movement. Emerging from this was the Strategic
Perspectives document on government of national unity, approach to the civil
service and the issue of provinces in the transition. The ultimate product of
this is Government as we have it today.

It might be a moot point to debate whether these conclusions and decisions
were based on a correct assessment of the strategic balance; or whether we are
today reaping the whirlwind of a terrible misjudgement. Yes, we did make
compromises. But there can be no gain-saying that the approach to use the
negotiations process to capture beach-heads within the power equation; and then
proceed to strengthen our forces from a new vantage point, helped speed up the
process to the great achievements we celebrate today. The challenge we face,
which we will reflect on later, is whether we are utilising the new positions we
occupy effectively to bring about fundamental transformation.

The fourth major area is the relationship between the ANC and the National
Party. This arose particularly from the fact that we chose deliberately to
resume negotiations with the NP government first, before multi-party
discussions. Much speculation and accusations were also fuelled by the adoption
of that Strategic Perspectives document.

Our decision to proceed in this manner was premised on the understanding that
the ANC and the NP government were the major players in the transition. This was
because, on the one hand, the ANC was the premier liberation movement; and on
the other, the NP was the administration in power. The two parties differed
fundamentally on the basic questions facing the country. Yet, they had to
co-operate to ensure implementation of decisions the NP government was forced to
agree to in negotiations.

The situation had to be handled in such a manner that we could tactfully
persuade the leading forces within the NP that the transition was also in their
interests; to assist them in appreciating the need to close a treacherous
chapter in South Africa's history. Transition with the minimum of disruption
required their co-operation. This did not mean a submerging of the fundamental
contradictions; but it helped pave the way for the final settlement.

In broad terms, this principle helps to define the current relationship in
the Government of National Unity. The situation has markedly changed, tempered
by the electoral results, the fact that the ANC is the leading organisation in
government and that we do not need a mediator to deal particularly with the
various layers of the state machinery.

We have, as before, to skilfully broaden and deepen the areas of consensus,
which today include essential elements of the Reconstruction and Development
Programme, and ensure that all parties, especially those in government,
co-operate in the realisation of this programme.

We should accept that it is the necessary thorny crown of leadership that,
like a suitor, we have to patiently bring in line elements whose own sense of
self-importance lies in making a relationship tempestuous. We have to understand
the reasons behind this, at the same time as we challenge the false notion that
the Government of National Unity arrangement is God- given, and therefore, that
governance and investor confidence would collapse without the participation of
forces other than the majority party.

Comrade Chairperson and Delegates:

When negotiations resumed in the multi-party negotiations forum, it was
easier to streamline discussion and move with speed to the desired agreements.
New forces had made their entry into the process, but they could not prevent
speedy movement to the final objectives.

Our basic aim was to move quickly to transitional mechanisms that would
deprive the NP of the monopoly of power and secure free and fair elections.

It was with this aim in mind that we approached the heinous murder of Chris
Hani, outstanding leader of the ANC and General Secretary of the South African
Communist Party. In channelling popular anger and managing what was a national
crisis of great proportions, we sought to turn this tragic event into a platform
to hasten movement to democracy. We hope that, by attaining an election date
that became sacrosanct, we paid worthy tribute to this fallen hero.

Within a few months, comprehensive agreements, including the interim
constitution and structures to supervise elections, were reached. After years
without legitimacy, the regime formally surrendered its legality as the
tri-cameral parliament passed the transitional legislation and accepted the new
centres of power in the Transitional Executive Council and related bodies.

However, lurking in the background were the extreme right-wingers whose
politics of desperation centred around crude maintenance of the status quo,
racism, tribal chauvinism and violence. Their alliance, though representing a
small fraction of society was made the more dangerous because it included
elements in the state apparatus, bantustan power bases and, with some of them,
potent issues to mobilise backward forces within society.

Our approach to engage these forces helped weaken their cohesion and resolve.
In so far as the white right is concerned, we persisted with discussions which
culminated in compromises offering them a feeling of security and a
constitutional channel to address their apprehensions. The more far-sighted
among them do realise that it was not all in vain, and they are co-operating
with us in search of a stable and prosperous future for all our people.

We have already referred to the issue of international mediation as it
affects the IFP. In so far as Ciskei and Bophuthatswana were concerned, the
former could not sustain its resistance once the process gathered momentum; and
the latter collapsed in shame at the instance of a popular uprising.

In engaging these forces, we had also noted that prominent forces within the
regime's security establishment either hid behind the extreme right- wing or
themselves engineered some of the disruptive actions. We can today reveal that,
especially in the build-up to election day, we had to engage some of these
elements and secure a commitment that they would act in defence of the process.

We did so to save lives and secure our people's right to a democratic
election.

It is fitting at this juncture, to single out our Elections Commission and
related structures at regional and branch level for the splendid and
professional manner in which they led the ANC's campaign. When history is
finally written, tribute will go to the unsung organiser who trudged the
campaign trail to educate our people and prepare them for election day. Tribute
will go above all to the people themselves who grasped the historic opportunity
with both hands and braved the threats from all kinds of quarters. For, it is on
those momentous days that the saying rung truer than ever before: that the
people are their own liberators.

The content of the ANC's election campaign reflected our strategic objective
of the political and social liberation of South African society. It set the tone
for an inclusive approach to the task of nation-building and helped create the
basis for the smooth post-elections transition. From the very beginning, we
adopted an approach that underlined our serious intent and respect for the views
of the mass of the people. We committed ourselves to concrete programmes, worked
out professionally and based on the needs of the people. Thus we nipped in the
bud any attempts by the parties of apartheid to fudge the issues.

We were fully aware that we had established a yardstick by which the people
would judge our performance in government. And we wish to reiterate today, that
we remain true to those commitments; and we shall assert our authority wherever
we are, in order to realise the objectives we articulated in the election
campaign. As we stated on countless occasions then, we are mindful of the fact
that this will take time and much effort. We are also aware that it will require
maximum co-operation among all sectors of society. For this to happen, the
people should know and understand what government is doing. The ANC and its
allies have a crucial role in this regard, as part of our task to ensure that
the process of deepening democracy, including reconstruction and development, is
people-driven and people-centred.

We have over the past months outlined in our discussion documents the initial
assessment of the election results and their implications for nation-building
and reconstruction. Suffice it to emphasise that our characterisation of
ourselves as an organisation representing the oppressed people and other
democrats was vindicated by the results.

At the same time, serious weaknesses in a number of areas were exposed. One
of them, whose significance transcends narrow interests of the ANC, is the
extent to which particularly poorer sections of the Coloured and Indian
communities found solace in the racist mobilisation of the National Party, and
voted in a manner that demonstrated fear of their counter- parts among Africans.

For a start, this demonstrated weaknesses in our message and organisation. It
also brought out in sharp relief a reality that we barely wished to admit. In
class terms, it is a tragedy that working people from these communities should
respond with fear to the prospect of their brothers and sisters attaining
equality.

Like a predator at the smell of blood, the National Party latched onto this,
and it continues to do so today, an exercise which can only widen the racial
chasm. It is also a challenge to us that, while many whites recognised the
legitimacy of the ANC and correctness of its positions, they chose to vote on
the basis of racial sentiment.

This therefore makes the challenge of deracialising South African society one
of the most important campaigns we have to undertake. Our nation shall never
truly come of its own, if the racial compartments apartheid has imposed on us,
both in our way of thinking and physical areas of abode, are not eradicated.

Much has been said about the reasons behind our defeat in KwaZulu-Natal. We
are proud of the fact that, despite the security problems, over a million voters
in this Province braved all odds to put their cross next to the ANC. Our support
in the major urban areas was massive. It is not a secret that with better
supervision and security, the outcome would have been markedly different. But it
is doubtful whether we would have won a majority, given our weaknesses of
organisation; problems of divergence of approaches among the leadership; and
weak presence in the rural areas - all of which we were unable to rectify in
time.

These are some of the challenges that we will need to keep in mind as we move
to Local Government elections. It is quite clear, without pre- empting
discussion in the relevant commissions, that we should not allow any political
provocation to distract us from our central message that, together, we should
build a better life for all.

This is even more crucial because many of the weaknesses in the
implementation of our objectives arise from the absence of legitimate local
government. We are the custodians of the RDP, and we have to ensure that those
who know what the RDP is; why it is needed and how it should be implemented, are
elected into local government. In this sense, the Local Government elections are
a continuation of April 27, because there cannot be full democracy without
democratic local government.

Chairperson and Delegates;

No doubt we shall be judged in these elections on the basis of how we perform
now rather than simply on our message. It will therefore be crucial for
Conference to apply its mind seriously to issues of governance, taking into
account the background we have outlined in earlier parts of this report.

In this respect, we need to avoid two extremes.

The one is to conclude that we are merely in political office - weak, tied
hand and foot by some terrible agreements that we reached in negotiations. This
then leads to a tendency to pander to the resistance to change by the NP, IFP,
DP and other parties and elements in the state machinery.

The other extreme is to create the impression that we are all-powerful, ready
to realise each and everyone of the programmes we would like to implement. This
then leads to populist and ambitious pronouncements that have nothing to do with
objective reality, only to retreat in embarrassment down the line.

South Africa has undergone its most fundamental political transformation in
centuries. But the socio-economic problems arising from colonial domination
remain as stark as they were under apartheid. To refer to the 5-million
unemployed, the 7-million without real housing and the millions who are
illiterate, is to state the obvious yet daunting challenges.

What April 27 means is that we have attained crucial elements of political
power: a new, interim constitution; a democratic parliament in which we have a
convincing majority; dominance in the executive at national level and all but
two provinces; and formal authority over state structures such as the army,
police and intelligence services. Yet, pending its full transformation, and
despite genuine pronouncements of loyalty, this state machinery is to all
intents and purposes not representative of society and it is premised on
previous values and norms.

While we have achieved support across the board for the RDP, we have to
contend with rear-guard resistance from the parties of apartheid and white
privilege, from influential elements within the civil service and the security
establishment. In addition, the networks which ran Low Intensity Conflict
continue to exist. These include agents infiltrated into the ANC and the rest of
the democratic movement, universities, the media and other institutions.

Our socio-economic problems are compounded by the fact of the serious
economic crisis, and that the funds to accelerate reconstruction and ensure
economic growth are concentrated in a few white hands. Thus, we also face
serious problems regarding attempts to discourage new entrants and foreign
investors because the cartels over-charging society fear competition. We also
have to deal with tax evasion and issues of competitiveness of our industries
and productivity of our work-force.

Within government, the litany of corruption, self-enrichment, and a lop-
sided skills base within departments is only now coming to the open, exposing
the decay of an NP edifice that presented itself as efficient; as well as the
rampant pillaging of public funds in the last days of apartheid rule. Combined
with the level of crime, our society became one in which the dividing line
between the legal and the illegal had become blurred. Added to this is the
non-payment for services which was directed against illegitimate local
government structures.

This is the mess of apartheid we have inherited. Yet, as we have stated on
countless occasions, to lament over it does not help eradicate it. We must all
get down to work to build a better life for all.

The central challenge as we got into government in May 1994, was how to
ensure a smooth transition, given the balance of forces we have referred to
above; and how to do this in such a way that we do not postpone change. Above
everything else, we relied on support among the people, the legitimacy of the
new structures locally and internationally, and the fact that our moral appeal
went far beyond our support-base.

The approach to reconciliation and nation-building was, and still is,
premised on the need to harness the goodwill of all society behind the new
tasks. Reconstruction and development cannot be realised in any meaningful way
without peace and stability. Thus it was crucial that we deny the
counter-revolutionary forces the platform from which to mobilise openly against
the new government. In other words, reconstruction and reconciliation are not
separate programmes directed variously at specific racial groups. They are
mutually-reinforcing tasks in the national effort to change South African
society for the better.

It is, in the main, a measure of the political maturity of the ANC that we
have had a relatively smooth transition. Perhaps because of this, we tend to
take this achievement for granted; to wonder whether it was and is an exercise
in "pandering to white fears" as some would describe it.

This approach created favourable conditions to start implementing the RDP;
not to supplant it. On the basis of the policies that we had already adopted at
numerous policy conferences, we proceeded to work on concrete plans, taking into
account the realities that we found within government, as well as the inputs,
especially of the NP and IFP - to the extent that such contributions did not
contradict our fundamental approach. Among these realities was a budget already
worked out by the previous administration, with minimum consultation.

It is thanks to the creativity of our ministers and the co-operation of the
others that we were able, in a short period, to introduce changes that released
funds for the launch of the RDP. The central aim was to ensure that we start
re-orienting government expenditure to bring it in line with the new objectives.
Preparations now under way for next year's budget have already yielded many good
decisions to achieve this aim.

From time to time, our reference to fiscal discipline, macro-economic
stability and economic growth tend to irritate those justifiably impatient about
change. Yet these are neither luxuries nor requirements foreign to the ANC's own
policies. Sheer logic tells us that our programme cannot be carried out in a
sustainable way without a rational utilisation of the resources at our disposal.

The constraints imposed on us by the reality of an over-taxed society,
arising from the regime's efforts to mobilise funds for the defence of
apartheid, are real. Neither can we rely on hand-outs from donors or on
increasing government debt. Rather, we must operate within our means as we
rearrange government spending and create optimum conditions for economic growth.
In other words, for us, fiscal discipline means a responsible, sustainable and
transparent usage of people's resources by a people's government. Further,
basing ourselves on experiences throughout the developing world, our approach to
donor funds is to seek to integrate them into our own programmes.

The tendency for ruling parties is to claim success for each and every step
they have taken in government. Let us be honest and say that we would have been
satisfied if more people could concretely feel the impact of social change. Let
us be sincere and admit that perhaps the planning and introduction of necessary
legislation took longer than the situation demanded.

Yet inherent to our approach to changing society is that we should ensure
broad consultation. The more thorough the planning process, the better would be
the final product; the less likely for us to commit fundamental errors; and the
more lasting the changes. Ours is not a programme of quick hand-outs; but one
for serious and lasting transformation.

It is in this context that we should be proud of the progress made in
finalising policy decisions on reconstruction and development, including
programmes such as urban and rural renewal, education, housing, health, land
reform, labour relations, broad economic policy, intelligence matters and other
areas. This includes the pending launch of the National Economic, Development
and Labour Council which will lay the basis for joint strategies between
government, labour and business and a social understanding around
transformation. This is besides the opening up of our society and public
institutions to a new culture of openness and adherence to basic human rights
principles.

Throughout the country, as a result of the new health programme for children
under the age of six and pregnant mothers and the school nutrition scheme,
people most in need are starting to feel the real meaning of change. In a number
of areas, the projects on housing and infrastructure, land restitution and
resettlement, electrification, water supply and so on have been launched.

Needless to say, visible change will need to be the prime feature of
government operations next year. This will have to be within the context of a
clear industrial strategy to expand our economic base and provide jobs.

To succeed, we must transform the state itself into a more effective driving
force of change. Reducing the budget deficit and eliminating wasteful
expenditure are among our prime objectives. So are the steps that we have taken
to tighten the belts of public officials and reprioritise expenditure. We are
also assessing all state assets to determine how they can be used more
efficiently to facilitate reconstruction and development. For us, the question
whether to expand state involvement or to privatise or sell some of the assets
and enterprises depends not on ideological imperatives, but on the balance of
economic necessity.

The ANC will continue to urge that the belt-tightening measures and steps to
narrow the wage gap which government has undertaken, is an example that should
be followed by the private sector.

Restructuring of the state also means, more than anything else, transforming
the public service into a representative, equitable and efficient arm of the
government. The need for such change is acknowledged by all and sundry.

All ministers who have earnestly started changing their departments have,
without exception, complained of the slow manner in which these matters are
being handled. Conference will need to come up with solutions to this problem,
including the possibility of legislative measures, within the constraints set
out in the interim constitution.

In so far as the army and the police are concerned, we will all agree that
urgent steps are required to firm up civilian control of these institutions.
Progress has already been made in preparation for this.

There is no doubt that, had this been in place, the problems that beset the
integration process would have been minimised. Though these problems are
essentially resolved, Conference needs to examine the reasons for the weaknesses
that played themselves out with regard to the behaviour of some cadres of the
people's army, Umkhonto we Sizwe. We also need to look at ways in which we can,
as ANC, pre-empt any such problems in the future, including, addressing the
blockages to the process of transformation.

The implementation of the plans to transform the police service will go a
long way towards establishing community policing. Especially at local level,
where the police interact with communities, the ANC should be in the forefront
of building police-community forums and combating crime.

Immediate problems in the area of education need our special attention.
Government has planned to start phasing in free and compulsory education from
Grade I next year. How does the ANC mobilise communities, including the
religious groups and business, to help implement this measure and prevent any
possible disruptions? How do we mobilise for joint efforts to handle the problem
of this year's matriculants, particularly those who may not pass? This again is
a matter that Conference should address, with the intention of launching a
broad-based campaign, to work with government in dealing with the education
crisis we have inherited.

The problem of corruption within the public and private sectors as well as
non-payment for services, which we referred to earlier on, relate intimately to
the question of proper governance and the nation's morality. Apartheid nurtured
the very opposite. We need to launch a campaign to set the country on a new
moral footing; normalise governance especially at local level; ensure delivery
of services and that people develop a culture to pay for such services. Such a
campaign should involve all social sectors. In particular, the active
participation of the religious community in this regard will be crucial.

The implementation of people-centred governance is a task that equally faces
the Provinces. And it should be underlined that, despite explicable delays in
the granting of powers due to them, Provincial Governments have taken the
initiative to tackle many problems, effect plans of central government and
initiate programmes on the ground. The impact of ANC leadership has also been
felt in Provinces not under ANC-led administrations.

Yet we need to reflect on how the provinces handle matters of governance
without undermining the unity and integrity of the country and the ANC itself.
We have to approach this challenge conscious of the fact that we do not
unwittingly promote the interests of those whose aim has always been to
balkanise the country along ethnic and racial lines. Related to this is the
question of inter-provincial relations, particularly between governments which
are in fact led by the ANC.

The transformation that South Africa is going through has been aptly captured
by the vibrant debates and decisions emerging from our legislatures and the
Constitutional Assembly.

The ANC has been at the head of this process, including tabling proposals on
the transformation of these institutions to make them more accessible to the
people and open to the public. However, have we been effective in using these
institutions to promote reconstruction and development? This certainly requires
thorough planning and strategic interventions.

In so far as the Constitutional Assembly is concerned, we should emphasise
that the drafting of the new constitution offers all of us a new historic
opportunity, after the democratic elections, to shape our country's future.
Conference will need to give the necessary broad mandate on our approach in this
institution, taking into account our strategic objective of democratic majority
rule. On this perspective there cannot be any compromise. We should also
identify the issues around which we are likely to achieve consensus and consider
the question of possible alliances in case of need.

Above all, we should educate and mobilise the people to contribute to the
ANC's own positions and participate as fully as possible in the process of
drafting the new constitution.

Comrade Chairperson and Delegates;

These are matters that affect the ANC wherever its cadres may be deployed,
both within and outside government. In the same vein, the question of building a
strong ANC affects all of us.

The Secretary-General will go into detail on the steps taken over the past
three years to build the organisation and ensure the massive support and
confidence that the people have shown in the ANC. Among the lessons that we have
learnt, which will always stand us in good stead, is that we were able to carry
out this task effectively when and where we had identified campaigns around
which to mobilise the people.

Over this period we intensified the task of building a pool of skilled cadres
at the same time as we prepared for governance. Our Policy Conference in May
1992 set the stage for an unprecedented process of consultation with the
Tri-partite Allies, democratic sectoral organisations, business, experts and
others in a protracted campaign to finalise what was adopted as the RDP in
January of this year. Yet it was our interaction with the mass of the people,
through People's Forums and other platforms, which gave real life to the content
of the programme.

Many of the cadres who were upgraded in this period are today to be found at
various levels in the state. But compared to the actual demand, this programme
was woefully inadequate. The challenge therefore remains.

At this juncture, we should congratulate the former cadres of Umkhonto we
Sizwe and our Intelligence and Security Services who are now entering
non-partisan service in government. We are confident that they will acquit
themselves in this new role with even more commitment and distinction.

A number of broader questions are on the agenda of Conference: the character
of the ANC now that it is also in government; whether we have in our ranks the
cross-section of the working people and other sectors of society; and how we
build an expanding pool of cadres grounded in the policies and traditions of the
ANC. We do face a danger that many ruling parties have experienced: that the
organisation could turn into a mere conveyer-belt of government decisions or, on
the other hand, a force steeped in a resistance mode. Similarly, without a clear
organisational strategy and cadre policy, we could end up attracting to our
ranks merely those who seek careers in government.

One of the most spirited discussions at the last Conference was on visible
and effective measures to ensure that women are accorded their deserved
recognition at all levels, as part of a programme to bring about gender equality
within the ANC and the rest of society. Both in our programme for social
transformation and in the manner in which we constituted our new parliament, the
ANC has made giant strides in this regard. This Conference should take this
process forward, precisely because the inequalities of the past remain.

Similar consideration should be given to the conditions of the majority our
youth, suppressed and denied opportunities by apartheid. Now that we are in
power, we have tremendous possibilities to tackle these problems through
governmental programmes and institutions. But this will only bear fruit if the
ANC Youth and Women's Leagues play their leadership role within these sectors of