THE cuban forces: school of thought on the intentions and the outcomes of the battle
One school of thought (supported by the ANC, Cuba, other liberation movements and several historians) is that South Africa’s decision to launch the attack was influenced by their intention to rescue UNITA and their want to seize the town of Cuito Cuanavale through the capture of the air force base. It is argued that the actions of the SADF prior to the 23 March 1988 are clear evidence of their determination to break-through to the town. The SADF forces attacked Cuito with the massive 155mm G-5 guns and staged attack after attack led by the crack 61st mechanized battalion, 32 Buffalo battalion, and later 4th SA Infantry group.
On the 23rd March the battle reached a halt. In the words of 32 Batttalion commander, Colonel Jan Breytenbach. He writes: ‘the Unita soldiers did a lot of dying that day’ and ‘the full weight of FAPLA’s defensive fire was brought down on the heads of [SADF] Regiment President Steyn and the already bleeding Unita.’
According to this view, the SADF failed in its intention and was successfully thwarted by the combined Angolan forces. This view is supported by Horace Campbell, Hasu Patel, P Gleijeses, Ronnie Kasrils and others.
You can read Ronnie Kasrils’s article on Cuito Cuanavale here