THE SADF forces: school of thought on the intentions and the outcomes of the battle
The second school of thought maintains that the SADF had only limited objectives, namely, to halt the enemy at Cuito, to prevent its airstrip from being used, and then to retreat. Further action would have undermined negotiations between Cuba, Angola and South Africa, which began in London early in 1988 and continued in May in Brazzaville, Congo, and Cairo, Egypt. By this time, the South African government had already recognised the political change in Russia and the ending of the cold war.
Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of the SADF, stated that the most important battle in the campaign was when the Cubans were defeated at the Lomba River and Cuito Cuanavale was simply part of a mopping up operation after this battle. This view is also supported by Gen. Magnus Malan, South African minister of defence at the time. Following this the SADF’s intention was to prevent the capture of Mavinga and through that prevent assaults on Jamba. This was successfully accomplished. This view is supported by the SADF and several historians such as Fred Bridgeland, W.M. James and others.
In addition both SADF and military analyst’s statistics are mentioned contradicting claims of a victory. Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of the SADF, quoted the following in support of this argument:
| CUBA/FAPLA | SADF | |
| Tanks destroyed: | 94 | 3 |
| Troop carriers destroyed: | 100 | 5 |
| Logistical vehicles destroyed: | 389 | 1 |
| Soldiers killed: | 4 785 | 31 |
The idea of a SADF withdrawal might explain both Fidel Castro and Ronnie Kasrils’ observations that ‘the SADF were far too cautious, missed a remarkable opportunity and failed to seize initiative (at Cuito)’. Although this observation in part contradicts the SADF’s aims it emphasise the limitations to their orders to simply halt the enemy.