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MK in southern Africa

  1. INTRODUCTION: SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS
  2. LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
  3. BOTSWANA
  4. LESOTHO
  5. SWAZILAND
  6. ZIMBABWEAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT
  7. PORTUGUESE COLONIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE
  8. ANGOLA
  9. MOZAMBIQUE
  10. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MK
  11. CONCLUSION
  12. LINKS
  13. SOURCEs

i. Introduction (BACK TO TOP)

From 1961, under the leadership of Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, South Africa was dragged into a new political phase by the National Party. Following British victory in the South African War, the Union of South Africa, bringing together formerly and defeated independent Boer republics and British colonies was forged in 1910 under the British Commonwealth. For the most part during the development of this Union, the government was in the hands of the pro British South Africa Party and United Party, which were led by Prime Minister Louis Botha and later Prime Minister Jan Smuts. The Afrikaner National Party held power at some point (1925-1934), but it was largely managed by entering into a coalition with the Labour Party first and later the Unionist Party and South Africa Party. As a result of these coalitions, the party was not strong enough to unilaterally pursue its domestic and foreign policies.

The growth of Afrikaner nationalism reached its momentum after the Second World War. The Afrikaner people during the first and second world war were split between the pro German and pro-British lobby. The National Party as a representative of the pro-German lobby was displeased with fighting on the side of what they thought of as a British war of imperialism. During both wars, the Afrikaner people and National Party attempted to prevent the Union from supporting the British. But with pro-British government these attempts failed. In 1948, shortly after the war, the Nationalist Party won the national election with a strong majority compared to previous years. The National Party was an overtly racist party committed to a separate development policy that would further entrench legislated segregation of white people and black people (apartheid). In 1961, still in power, the National party withdrew from the commonwealth of nation when it was criticized for its policies of racial discrimination and unilaterally declared independence from Britain.

ii. Liberation Movements (BACK TO TOP)

These political transformations had a tremendous impact on South Africa’s liberation movements. The African National Congress, South African Communist Party, the Indian Congress, and other parties to fight apartheid and find alternative ways of fighting apartheid also matched increasing legislated racial discrimination with an increasing determination. Initially, South African liberation movements were committed to a policy of non-violence and constructive engagement with the government. The increasing use of security forces to brutally suppress resistance and torture resisters convinced the ANC that a military option could succeed were non-violence has failed.

A positive development for the ANC was an increasing tide of Independent African states in the 1960s. Coupled with the growing influence of Pan Africanism and African nationalism in the foreign policy of these states. Most of them were committed to the liberation of Africa as a whole. For a long period the Organisation of African Unity was informed by this commitment. The ANC was supported by most African states and ANC leaders fleeing from the Apartheid state were welcomed to stay in most African states and operate and co-ordinate the liberation struggle from their host countries. Though committed to the principle of supporting liberation movements in African colonies, the efforts of many African countries were limited by their economic weakness and dependence on their former colonial masters. Moreover, aware of their weakness, South Africa adopted what it called a ‘new policy’ to entice African states into closer co-operation and friendly relations with her in return for financial aid, mainly in the form of technical aid.

It was largely neighbouring countries like Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi that were opposed to breaking financial ties with South Africa. Because their economies were defined by there almost dependence on South Africa, before 1960, the British colonial policy towards these states, then British protectorates, was that eventually they would be annexed into South Africa. As a result, there was very little development of these protectorates. By the time they gained independence, Botswana and Lesotho in 1966 and 1968 for Swaziland, the ANC had already accepted the formation of an independent military wing (MK) to fight apartheid in 1961. By 1963, Zambia, under the presidency of Kenneth Kaunda, was the only African country actively opposed to apartheid and it was the only country actively supporting the MK.

These three states supported the liberation movement in South Africa but were opposed to opening their territories to MK operations. This was largely due to fears that the South African government would make “mince meat out of them before breakfast” (pg 27). The government of Botswana did not have a military until 1974, until this year it relied on the presence of the British military contingent in Franscistown.

iii. Botswana (BACK TO TOP)

The government of Botswana gained independence from Britain in 30 September 1966. The first president of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, was acutely aware of his country’s weakness in international politics of the cold war (link to SAHO) and the moral imperative to support South Africa’s liberation from white minority rule. Compared to Lesotho and Swaziland, the government of Botswana was very vocal about its opposition to apartheid. Moreover, her relation with the government of South Africa was conflictual for the most part.

At independence, Botswana was surrounded by two hostile states under minority rule. South Africa was in the south and southern Rhodesia in the east, in 1980, following the Lancaster agreement that brought an end to minority rule, southern Rhodesia became the Republic of Zimbabwe. In the west and north it was bordered by South West Africa mandated to South Africa under the Mandate system introduced by Jan Smuts after the First World War. In the north, it was independent Zambia. But the government of South Africa and Rhodesia disputed claims by the two governments shared a common border where their borderline crisscrossed. South Africa and Rhodesia clamed that it was a pinpoint accurate crossing that provided no room for a construction of a bridge or road without altering the borders of other states (link to map of this region). In short, they claimed that Botswana was completely surrounded by South Africa and Rhodesia.

Considering the above, the economic weakness and lack of a professional military to protect her territorial integrity or deter any attack from these two giants of southern Africa, the government of Botswana’s opposition to Apartheid was vocal only. However, the government of Botswana acted mainly as a refugee area. For the MK, it was a safe passage to Zambia in the North. Botswana consistently prohibited the ANC from launching its military operation against South Africa within her borders or from opening an army base in Botswana.

In 1967, the MK launched the Wankie campaign to establish communication bridges in South Africa and MK headquarters outside South Africa. A detachment with Chris Hani as a commissar attempted to cross Rhodesia to reach South Africa. After, at least, two successful raids on Rhodesian and South African forces the detachment was finally forced to retreat. On their retreat to Zambia they attempted to cross to Zambia via Botswana. On entering Botswana they were arrested and imprisoned to terms of three to five years in jail.

The arrest of this detachment was a result of pressure on the government of Botswana from South Africa, Rhodesia, and the British government. The Botswana para-military that arrested them was under the command of a British commander. The government of Botswana took these measures to avoid reappraisals from the two governments. President Sir Seretse Khama said:

[a]s a consequence of Botswana’s geographical situation, we face unusual and onerous handicaps….Whilst Botswana accepts that we are part of the Southern African economic complex and that the harsh fact of history and geography cannot be obliterated, for obvious reasons, we have to maintain normal friendly with South Africa (Niemann 1993).

iv. Lesotho (BACK TO TOP)

Lesotho gained independence the same year with Botswana. Contrasting Botswana, Lesotho is surrounded by South Africa. Lesotho, according to a newspaper report, was a “caged hawk”. Chief Leabua Jonathan was a close ally of the South African government. Lesotho, together with Malawi, was the only country to abstain from an Organisation of African Unity vote banning the sale of weapons to South Africa. Lesotho’s position was that a better route was constructive dialogue with South Africa not aggression. Nevertheless, Chief Leabua Jonathan was not silent about the policies of South Africa he actually blamed the South African government for violence and acts of Sabotage in the country. However, most of his criticism of South Africa came early in the 1970s and were largely due to a growing discontent about his friendly policy towards South Africa. Lesotho allowed South African refugees were allowed to enter the country and were granted asylum while in the country including a passage out of Lesotho.

v. Swaziland (BACK TO TOP)

The kingdom of Swaziland gained independence in 1968, a year after the Wankie campaign. Swaziland shares a border with South Africa and Mozambique. At the time of independence Mozambique was a Portuguese colony in a state of civil war between Frelimo and the colonial government. Portuguese colony (Mozambique) formed an “unholy alliance” with South Africa and Rhodesia to assist each other in their combat against liberation movements in their respective countries. Sandwiched by Mozambique and South Africa, Swaziland adopted a friendlier policy towards South Africa. President John Vorster referred to King Sobhuza of Swaziland as his friend.The Swaziland government was more stringent on its opposition of the ANC using Swazi territory to launch attacks against South Africa. In some instances King Sobhuza threatened the ANC by pointing out to them he would allow the South African government to send its troops into Swaziland to attack the MK. Nevertheless, the Swazi governement continued to provide the ANC, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) (Link to SAHO PAC), and Mozambican refugees with a safe haven.

vi. Zimbabwean Liberation Movement (BACK TO TOP)

One of the strongest allies of the MK was the Zimbabwean National Union military wing. Strong in a sense that because it had engaged the regime of Ian Smith it was able to provide the MK with grounds to launch attacks against South Africa from Zimbabwean soil. The Wankie campaign was a result of close co-operation between the two liberation movements. Because both the MK and Zimbabwean liberation movement were faced with a common enemy. Common enemy because the South African government supported white minority in Rhodesia and Mozambique because of the racist notion that it is only white rule that can deliver progress and improve the lives of Africans. Zimbabwe liberation movements were greatly influenced by South Africa’s liberation movements, in particular the ANC. Because without prospects of higher education in Rhodesia many leaders of the Zimbabwe liberation movement came to South Africa for education and were influenced by earlier resistance campaign of the 1950. Before adopting the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU), the party was known as the ANC. Both these liberation movements relied on the support of the Zambian government because Mozambique was still under colonial rule until 1975; Malawi under the leadership of Banda was strongly opposed to both these liberation movements to the extent that it was stigmatized as a collaborator, and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland preferred not to allow military operation in their countries for security reasons.

vii. Portuguese Colonies in Southern Africa: Angola and Mozambique (BACK TO TOP)

Angola and Mozambique were the only two colonies in southern Africa colonized by Portugal. The Portuguese government attempted to use education and isolation to maintain a tight control of the population and avoid the road to independence that was opening up after the Second World War. Moreover, the colonial policy at the time considered colonies belonging to Portugal integral part of the metropole. Therefore, there was no need for independence. However, population control is never absolute. From the 1950s, the people of these two colonies were increasingly attempting to free themselves from Portugal. In both colonies a war of liberation was fought and in 1975 both gained independence from Portugal. Both of them shared a border with South Africa. But the Angolan border with South Africa was a result of South Africa’s annexation of Namibia.

viii. Angola (BACK TO TOP)

The war of liberation in Angola was divided between a socialist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and a pro capitalist National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) movement. Initially, the two movements co-operated because of their common enemy but because of cold war politics, the MPLA was backed by the Soviet Union and Unita was backed by South Africa and the United States. For South Africa and the United States, Unita was a front against the spread of communism. Because of this political context, the ANC allied itself with the MPLA. South Africa’s relation with Unita developed only after the MPLA won the independence of Angola in 1975. The MPLA was able to gain power because of Soviet Union backing. Prior to this development, the South African government was an ally of Portugal.As early as February 1968, the MPLA was reporting that South African helicopters in South East Angola had attacked it and South African Troops guarded the hydroelectric power station still under construction. There was growing evidence within the government that Zambia and Angola were providing security for the MK. Government’s solution was to attack and destroy ANC MK bases in Angola and assist the Portuguese government defeat the MPLA and Unita forces. The war in Angola became South Africa’s war to preserve white minority rule.

ix. Mozambique (BACK TO TOP)

The Mozambican history of liberation is similar to that Angola with few exceptions. Firstly, Mozambique shares a common border with South Africa and Zimbabwe (southern Rhodesia). Therefore, Mozambique could be used easily to launch an attack against either South Africa or Rhodesia. Secondly, the people of Mozambique are culturally similar to some of South Africa’s cultural societies, for example the Tsonga, Shangaans, and Shona people. The people of Mozambique had long been closely tied to economic developments in South Africa. They came to work in South Africa as migrant labourers prior to their colonization by the Portuguese. As a result, political developments such as the formation of black party politics and liberation struggle were to a certain extend linked. Frelimo (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique), front for the liberation of Mozambique, adopted socialist principles and maoist guerilla tactics to fight the colonial government. The close alliance they had formed with Tanzania a socialist state guaranteed them that they would have access to weapons. Tanzania also backed the ANC and Julius Nyerere allowed the MK to open military bases and headquarters in Tanzania. To destroy the ANC and MK the South African government together with the Rhodesian forces carried out raids against Frelimo and MK in Tete province. On a number of occasions the MK attempted to use Swaziland as a passage to reach and launch attacks in South Africa. After independence in 1975, the relationship between Frelimo led by Samora Machel now president of Mozambique reached a critical stage for South Africa because now the MK could operate freely on South Africa’s doorsteps. In 19 October 1986, Samora Machel’s plane crushed in South Africa’s Lebombo Mountains killing all on board. South Africa was suspected for causing the crash by changing the beacons and thereby cause Samora’s plane to take a wrong direction.

x. International Support for the MK (BACK TO TOP)

Support for the ANC and the armed struggle was to a certain extent influenced by the prevailing atmosphere of the Cold War. The South African government exploited cold war fears and rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union to secure the support of the United States. South Africa labeled the ANC a rooi gevaar (red danger) and the MK a terrorist organisation aided by the Soviet government. Moreover, the United States considered South Africa a strategic partner in the fight against the spread of communism, in particular the spread of communism in southern Africa. Without the United States support, the ANC looked east to find support. The Soviet intend on increasing its power base in the southern hemisphere gave her support to the ANC. As a result, members of the MK were trained by the Soviet Union in Moscow. Moreover, the ANC began to align itself much closely with the communist ideology. A growing number of ANC members increasingly saw the struggle against apartheid as a class struggle with black people serving as the underclass. Socialism became a promising solution to South Africa’s problem and Africa as a whole. ANC strong backers in Africa, like Ghana, Zambia, and Tanzania had adopted socialism as a governing policy capable of securing the benefits of freedom. It was under this guise, however, not the only guise, that the MK was able to find support internationally.

xi. Conclusion (BACK TO TOP)

The MK was probably an ambitious development in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. The MK was faced with a formidable army backed up by a growing economy. Thought the MK could rely on the support of neighbouring countries, their economic dependence on South Africa was disheartening. It was because of this dependence and lack of military strength that the MK was forced to open its military bases far from South Africa. Their objection to allowing the MK to use their territories to launch attacks against South Africa weakened the MK in the early 1960s until 1980. The MK had to use a very dangerous path (Zimbabwe) to launch its campaigns. This meant that it had to do battle with two equally formidable Rhodesian Army and South African Army.To a large extend these difficulties reflect the difficulties of the 1960s and early 1970s. Because after these period there was a shift in the balance of power with Portuguese colonies gained their independence and provided the MK with a safe haven to open its military bases and launch attacks against South Africa. In 1980 Rhodesia was freed from military rule and it changed its name to Zimbabwe. In the early 1970s southern African countries began to organize themselves into Frontline States opposed to white minority rule in Southern Africa and also to decrease their dependence on South African economy. Developments such as these meant an increased support for the ANC and military operations.

Links: (BACK TO TOP)

Sources: (BACK TO TOP)

Niemann, M. (1993). ‘Diamonds are State’s Best Friend: Botswana’s Foreign Policy in Southern Africa’.

Africa Today, vol 40. No 1.Magubane, B. (1983). ‘Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland: South Africa’s Hostages in Revolt’. (Eds)

Callaghy, T. M. South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence, Praeger: New York.

Urnov, A. (1982). South Africa against Africa, Progress: Moscow.

O’Meara, P. and Carter, G. M. (1982). ‘Interchapter—Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland: The Common Background and Links’. (Eds)

O’Meara, P. and Carter, G.M. Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis (second edition), Indiana University Press: Bloomington.