On Saturday, 10 September 1966, the late Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, sixth premier of South Africa, was laid to rest in Pretoria. Everybody was still very deeply affected by the tragic events in the House of Assembly where Dr. Verwoerd while seated was stabbed by Dimitrio Tsafendas, a parliamentary messenger. Dr. Verwoerd died within seconds of being fatally wounded. With these almost unbelievable events still fresh in their minds, senators and members of Parliament began making preparations for the caucus meeting of the National Party on 13 September. A new leader, who would automatically become the seventh premier of South Africa, had to be chosen for the party.

The busiest cabinet member at the time was without a doubt the energetic Minister of Justice, Adv. B. J. Vorster. Because of his numer­ous duties, he was one of the last ministers to leave Cape Town for Pretoria to attend the funeral. On the very afternoon of the murder of Dr. Verwoerd, Adv. Vorster had said to General John Keevy, Commissioner of Police, in the lobby of the House of Assembly - "I don't care what you do, but we must get to the bottom of this matter." 1 It was to Adv. Vorster that Dr. Verwoerd had entrusted the maintenance of internal law and order when he appointed him Minister of Justice when South Africa became a republic.

The exceptionally competent manner in which Adv. Vorster had handled this portfolio at a time when hostile elements were doing everything in their power to bring the young republic to its knees, made a good impression on all sides. Of course there were also the dissidents who at any time with their criticism would place stumbling blocks in the way, trying to discredit the Minister among all population groups. For a considerable time all eyes were on the Republic's purposeful and resolute Minister of Justice. Everyone realized, and also saw for them­selves from time to time, that Adv. Vorster possessed exceptional capa­bilities. Dr. Verwoerd also realized this when he needed a minister who could handle with insight and skill dangerous people and situations whose aim was to undermine national security, and his obvious choice was the Deputy Minister of Education, Arts and Science and of National Welfare and Pensions, Adv. B. J. Vorster. And he was now once again a decided choice for the leadership of the National Party.

During the days preceding the caucus meeting, which would appoint a new leader for the National Party, Adv. Vorster seldom if ever appeared in the lobby of Parliament. In the meantime he went ahead with his duties as Minister of Justice and allowed matters to follow their normal course. With regard to the question of leadership, he never campaigned for himself.

On Tuesday morning, 13 September 1966, the caucus of the National Party of South Africa nominated Adv. Balthazar Johannes Vorster as its new leader. The nomination was unanimous. Adv. Vorster had not sought this office. He accepted office out of a deep sense of duty arising from his love of his country and his people, and as such he was aware that the premiership would be no easy task. Almost superhuman de­mands would be made of him in the years that lay ahead. South Africa is a country with its own and almost unique problems, especially with regard to her many peoples as well as her enemies in the outside world who are always on the watch. The prospect of a peaceful and pleasant term of office for the new prime minister was, of course, out of the question.

Until his election as prime minister, the people of the Republic of South Africa, as well as those abroad only knew the new premier as the controversial Minister of Justice. "There is an old rule of law," said Adv. Vorster on one occasion, "that the security of the State is the supreme law. We inherited it in this form from the Romans and it runs right through our legal system. I make no apology when I come to this House to say that in the position I occupy, I regard the security of the State as priority No. I.” 2 The security of the State and its people was for him in all respects of primary importance. Adv. Vorster therefore did everything in his power to realize these goals. On one occasion a columnist of The Natal Witness, E. B. Stuart, described Adv. Vorster as Minister of Justice as "reputedly unsmiling, dour and perhaps even ruthless, who gave no quarter but equally asked for none." 3 He was often referred to in an unflattering way by hostile adversaries as "Police boss" and "Gestapo head". This, however, did not affect him, because he regarded himself as having been called to institute and administer drastic legislation. 4 From 1961 to 1964 South Africa was faced with her biggest ever internal threat. Adv. Vorster had to deal with stamping out elements that were detrimental to the country and people and whose ultimate goal was the downfall of South Africa and her people. There was the General Law Further Amendment Bill of 1962 5 and the General Law Amendment Bill of 1963 6 which formed the keystone of successful prevention of communist attacks on the Republic. The Rivonia episode 7, during the course of which a communist plot was uncovered, aimed at violently overthrowing the government, was clear proof of the necessity of precautionary measures to stamp out this sort of attack. Violent attacks were made on Adv. Vorster during these times. In the press and by means of pamphlets distributed throughout the country, he was accused of tyranny and cruelty. 8 Nevertheless Adv. Vorster never refused to give the next-of-kin of any person condemned to death or any long-term prisoner a hearing. He listened to their representations at all times and gave them the necessary attention. In this respect perhaps the most distressing interviews were those with Duncan Moodie's 9 parents and John Harris's 10 father. In spite of the painfulness of the situation, Adv. Vorster felt that it was his duty to grant interviews to the next-of-kin of the persons under sentence, if this was what they desired. Further­more, he conducted personal interviews with the parents of students involved in sabotage at the time and even personally interviewed some of the students in prison. 11

Adv. Vorster therefore had to take special precautions to ensure the safety of the state. Time and time again he asked for the approval of Parliament in these matters, the result of which was a barrage of criticism and condemnation on the part of the Opposition. As the responsible minister he had analysed the security situation down to the finest detail. In 1965 he declared that the country would be faced with the third phase of sabotage, namely well-trained saboteurs from aggressive African states. 12 It was therefore imperative that the lives of the public and the safety of the state be protected in the most effective way possible. For this reason he considered necessary the amendment of the Police Act. 13 The essence of the amended measure was that the Police could search without a warrant, any person, place, premises, vehicle or aircraft or any place within a mile of the border between South Africa and a foreign state. At the time, the Rand Daily Mail wrote: "Mr. Vorster's lust for power seems insatiable." 14 and yet, at the end of Adv. Vorster's first year as premier, the same newspaper wrote:

"Also he strikes a note of such friendly informality that, within the short space of a year, he has become perhaps the most widely popular of all our Prime Ministers." 15 The service that Adv. Vorster as Minister of Justice rendered to the Republic of South Africa will only be evaluated rightly much later in historiography.

There is no doubt that Adv. Vorster took over the reins of premier­ship during the most difficult time in the political history of South Africa. Not one of his predecessors had assumed office as prime minister in such circumstances. The preceding years only brought one disillusionment after another — Sharpeville, Rivonia, riots in Langa and at Paarl, and then the shocking assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. The coun­try was plunged into mourning, and the frustrating uncertainty of what the future held for the young Republic naturally resulted in a tense atmosphere on all sides. In addition, Dr. Verwoerd had won the hearts of Afrikaans and English-speaking people alike, and therefore was prominent in the minds of the people. The main question was whether the new prime minister could successfully handle all these problems when he had taken over the reins as it were overnight. The possibility that attacks by subversive groups would increase in intensity in this time of uncertainty could not be ruled out. For the time being Adv. Vorster would also administer the Departments of Police and Prisons.

After assuming office, Adv. Vorster acted with purposefulness, deter­mination and self-confidence. The outside world watched his first moves in his new office with intense interest. "He is determined," wrote The Sunday Times, "on the one hand, to improve relationships between South Africa and foreign countries; and, on the other, to eliminate friction between the population groups in South Africa." 16 Those who were convinced that in the course of time they would be given the opportunity of exposing mistakes and errors of judgment, could only watch with disappointment while the new premier went from strength to strength. "Mr. Vorster has grown in his office," wrote Die Burger. "When he became Prime Minister last year, quite a number of people were surprised at the quiet authority he radiated from the start in those difficult circumstances, the efficiency and self-confidence, coupled with modesty, with which he undertook this weighty task." 17

At the end of his first year as prime minister, friend and foe alike praised him highly for the way in which he had acquitted himself of his extremely difficult, demanding and unenviable task. Not only as a politician, but also as a person, he was beginning to find a special place among all sections of the nation. "Mr. Vorster," wrote The Natal Wit­ness, "has emerged with perhaps an even brighter public image than he had before." 18 The Rand Daily Mail wrote: "Towns, universities and organizations of all kinds hasten to bestow honours upon him. He is sought after endlessly as a speaker, and, of course, he is a regular golfer -just like the chap next door." 19 Without being "soft". Adv. Vorster made an effort to win the goodwill of virtually all sections of the population. "Domestically, Mr. Vorster set himself the task of trying to im­prove relations not only between English and Afrikaans-speaking people but among all the population groups," wrote The Cape Argus. 20

There was no doubt that Adv. Vorster was adhering rigidly to the principles of the National Party. In this regard, The Natal Witness wrote: "The oddest thing about the new image is that it does not result from any change in Nationalist Party principles." 21

The success that Adv. Vorster achieved from the start in his new office and the confidence that he instilled in all quarters, can un­doubtedly be ascribed to the fact that he was a moderate politician who followed the middle road. He was prepared where possible to eliminate points of friction and to consider concessions. 22 South Africa and the outside world had for a long time been engaged in an obstinate battle which had reached a deadlock. This situation was put to good advantage by South Africa's adversaries. It suited them to hold South Africa up as unapproachable. Adv. Vorster quickly showed the outside world that he was a perfectly normal and approachable person, but nevertheless someone who would not easily be caught napping. He always remained tactful and patient even in the face of provocation from the outside world. He was prepared to make adjustments in order to eliminate points of friction. These adjustments certainly did not imply the aban­donment of principles. Adv. Vorster also made it his responsibility to reconcile the two-language groups. 23 Furthermore, he strove continually to promote co-operation on the basis of mutual faith and loyalty, and of equal language rights. He believed that it was the task of the National Party to convince other countries, not only of the sincerity of its stand­point, but also that its policy was the only real practical solution to South Africa's race problem. "He has brought," wrote the Sunday Times, "new hope of internal harmony and international goodwill." 24

Adv. Vorster was only too conscious of the problems that he as prime minister would encounter on the international front. The World Court passed judgement in respect of Liberia and Ethiopia's charge against the Republic's administration of South West Africa, in favour of the Republic. Afro-Asians, however, refused to accept this judgement. As a result of their initiative the General Assembly was on the point of ter­minating South Africa's mandate over South West Africa. In England, the Labour Party, in spite of the Simonstown Agreement, refused to supply South Africa with arms; the USA adopted a similar stand­point. South Africa's neighbours, the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, as well as Rhodesia, were heavily burdened by terrorist attacks. Rhodesia also had to contend with UNO sanctions. The neighbouring African states of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland were on the threshold of gaining their independence and there was uncertainty as to where their sympathies would lie. In these times, Adv. Vorster had no illusions regarding the safety of the Republic and her people when he said on one occasion: "Not only are we pre­pared to take risks for the sake of South Africa's interests, but. . . living dangerously comes naturally to us ... when the interests of South Africa demand it." 25

One of the really difficult issues that Adv. Vorster had to handle was the South West Africa question. When the Afro-Asians came off second best with regard to the World Court decision, they decided to use their voting power in the UNO to convert a legal defeat into a political victory. In October 1966 the General Assembly approved a resolution with a view to annulling South Africa's mandate over South West Africa and in so doing, to place her under direct supervision of the UNO. The almost unanimous attitude in favour of this resolution gave the majority of African states the completely wrong impression in that they now thought that they could use the UNO as a means of forcing South Africa to terminate her administration of South West Africa. 26

This attitude was adopted irrespective of the fact that there was dissension concerning the initial unanimous decision to expel South Africa from South West Africa. France, after expressing her views on the legality of the issue, abstained from voting, the USA and Malawi also abstained from voting because they realized that it would be im­possible to implement such a decision. Mr. Nyasulu, the representative of Malawi at the UNO declared that "the Government of Malawi can­not and will not support any proposals, however idealistic in their aim, which are prima facie incapable of practical implementation." 27 Lord Caradon, Britain's representative, held the same view.

Adv. Vorster declared that the South African Government regarded the decision of the General Assembly as incompatible with International Law. Such action was further completely unconstitutional, seeing that the General Assembly, according to the Constitution of the UNO, does not have the power to make such a decision. According to the South African Government, this decision was unheard of, and the Govern­ment regarded herself as being in no way bound by such a decision. Adv. Vorster declared further, "The question now arises and the public may ask - what is the Government's standpoint and what is it going to do? My answer is 'nothing'. The Republic will continue to administer the territory as it has always done and it will continue to implement what it has planned for the territory." 28

On 21 March 1967, Mr. M. C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administra­tion and Development, read a speech by the Prime Minister at a gather­ing of chiefs, headmen and council members at Oshakati. The Prime Minister made it clear that the South African Government was of the opinion that the people of Ovamboland had reached a stage where they were able to take important steps in the direction of self-government, which could lead to self-determination and ultimately to full indepen­dence. In his address, the Prime Minister pointed out that the right to self-determination was the basis of the South African Government's policy. Each national group must manage its own affairs and the Government would help each group where necessary. Self-government would lead each national unit to complete self-determination, at the same time offering each of determining its own future. Only then could each unit decide whether they would go forward as an independent nation or if they wanted to work together with other nations in one way or another. The choice would be theirs at all times. 29

The UNO still remained the platform from which the Afro-Asian states launched their attacks, and South West Africa was still the favourite bone of contention. On 19 May 1967 the General Assembly insti­tuted the Council of 11. This Council was instituted to administer South West Africa until this territory gained independence, "hopefully" during the course of 1968. The UNO's South West Africa Council insisted of delegates from Chile, Columbia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Guiana. 30 The Secretary-General of the UNO, U Thant, when addressing the Council on 10 August 1967, said that the work of the Council was of utmost significance, because it offered the opportunity of checking increasing racial animosity in Southern Africa. 31

Adv. Vorster made it clear that he would not allow the UNO to make trouble where there was none. Furthermore, he declared that he would not tolerate disturbance of the peace by any committee or organiza­tion. 32 In this way, the Republic made it quite clear that it had no intention of ceding to the UNO its control of South West Africa, which it had administered since 1920. 33 This determined and correct action on the part of the Republic, soon forced the UNO to back down with regard to these specific objections, even though this was only temporary.

The whole South West Africa question was once again brought into the spotlight when it was announced that Dr. Kurt Waldheim, U Thant's successor as Secretary-General, would be arriving in South Africa on 6 March 1972. Dr. Waldheim came to South Africa with a mandate from the Security Council to initiate dialogue with South Africa. 34 Dr. Waldheim's predecessor had declined an invitation from South Africa to ascertain for himself the facts of the state of affairs in South West Africa. 35 The object of the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa and South West and his consultations with the Prime Minister was to initiate dialogue between South Africa and the Secre­tary-General on the thorny problem of South West Africa and to allow negotiations to continue. From South Africa's point of view the visit and discussions were of the utmost importance, for this contrasted sharply with the dead end that had been reached during the term of office of U Thant. From reports following the meeting between the Prime Minister and Dr. Waldheim, it seemed that negotiations would be continued. 36 This did not necessarily mean that discussions would have to take place personally between Adv. Vorster and Dr. Waldheim, but the usual diplomatic channels would be followed. Dr. Waldheim flew directly to New York where he would report to the Security Council. 37 Dr. Waldheim regarded his visit to the Republic as a breakthrough, as the fact that he was in a position to make contact with the Prime Minis­ter, Adv. Vorster, and the Government, was for him a development of special significance. 38

Dr. Waldheim's visit was followed in October 1972 by a visit by Dr. Alfred Escher, special envoy of the Secretary-General. Dr. Escher would help Dr. Waldheim in compiling his report on South West Africa, to be handed to the Security Council of the UNO. 39 Shortly after Dr. Escher's arrival in the Republic, Adv. Vorster and Dr. Escher held discussions in Pretoria, before Dr. Escher, accompanied by Mr. F. R. Todhill of the Department of Foreign Affairs, left for an extended tour of South West Africa. In South West, Dr. Escher, amongst other things, held discus­sions with leaders of the different non-white communities there. At the end of Dr. Escher's visit to South Africa, the Prime Minister declared at a press conference in Pretoria that with regard to South West a written agreement had been reached with Dr. Escher. This agreement was, of course, subject to the approval of the Secretary-General of the UNO and after recommendation would be taken up in the report of the Security Council. Dr. Escher recommended, infer alia, that contact with the Republic be maintained and that negotiations with regard to South West Africa be continued. "The ball is therefore entirely in the Security Council's court as far as that is concerned," said the Prime Minister. 40 Furthermore, Adv. Vorster said without mincing his words that South Africa was prepared to discuss further the South West Africa question and also to play an active role in obtaining a basis for a solution to the problem. 41 Adv. Vorster and Dr. Escher were both of the same opinion: ". . . that experience in self-government was an essential element for eventual self-determination, and bearing in mind circumstances, this could best be achieved on a regional basis. " 42 That negotia­tions in this respect would take a long time was a foregone conclusion, for negotiations of this nature could naturally not show results overnight.

In the meantime, the Afro-Asian states had not been idle. The fact that an agreement had been reached between the South African Govern­ment and the Secretary-General, with regard to South West Africa, was cause for anxiety amongst their members. 43 Their campaign reached a climax at the 1974 session of the UNO. The General Assembly adopted a motion by 91 votes to 22 (there were 19 abstentions) put forward by its Chairman, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the Republic could no longer participate at that session. 44 The motion, which was greeted by lengthy applause, was the result of the Assembly's rejection of the South African Government's credentials on 30 September 1974. The USA, Britain and France strongly opposed this almost unheard-of action and as a result used their power of veto in the Security Council on 30 October to prevent South Africa from being expelled. John Scali, the USA's ambassador to the UNO, told Bouteflika that this decision was a denial of the UNO's Manifesto in subjecting a member country to this unheard-of action. 45 Baron Rudiger von Wehmar of West Germany also declared that the credentials of the South African delegation had satisfied legal requirements and that there were no legal grounds on which South Africa could be expelled. 46

The Prime Minister reacted to these events the following day by re­calling the Republic's ambassador to the UNO. Adv. R. F. (Pik) Botha, to Pretoria for consultations. 47 Adv. Vorster declared that the Government would decide in its own time what further steps to take and he added: "The latest resolution of the General Assembly is another example of illegal action on the part of UNO and an evasion of its own manifesto." 48

In the meantime the Republic continued peacefully to administer South West Africa and to actively help the nations of the territory in the development process leading to self-determination. It was stressed once again that only the inhabitants of South West and no-one else could decide their future. The South African Government stressed once again that no interference from outside would be tolerated. The Prime Minister declared that one of the first priorities regarding South West Africa was for the nations of that territory to be given the opportunity of gaining experience so that they could eventually exercise their right to self-determination. 49 Discussions and consultations would be essential here. "The decision of the Executive of the National Party of South West Africa," wrote Die Suidwester, "that the Whites should take the initiative in the discussions with the other population groups on the future of South West, is a realistic step which can in all respects be justified." 50 The Owambos immediately promised their support in this respect. 51

On 20 May 1975 the Prime Minister reiterated clearly in a speech in Windhoek the future development of South West Africa. 52 Adv. Vorster emphasised that the South African Government recognized the acquisition of international status for South West and that he was not planning to annex a single inch of land in that territory. "We are not occupying the territory, we are here because the people of this territory want us here," said Adv. Vorster. "We are not forcing ourselves on the peoples of the territory and we are in this regard merely taking cognis­ance of the wishes of the peoples of South West Africa and of no one else." 53

Adv. Vorster said further that in essence the South African Govern­ment agreed with the most important aspects of the standpoints of the UNO regarding South West. Also with regard to the Organization of African Unity, South Africa could find no fault with most of their stand­points. However, there was a fundamental difference regarding the roles which were demanded of the UNO and SWAPO. The sincere intentions of the South African Government were clearly illustrated by the Prime Minister's invitation to leaders of the OAU for discussions on South West Africa and negotiations with either the Secretary-General of the UNO, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, or a personal representative of the Secretary-General.

The Security Council's demand that the Republic must summarily vacate South West by 30 May 1975 was rejected unconditionally. The South African Government was quite adamant that no one would dictate to her as far as South West Africa was concerned. At the end of May 1975, Britain declared that South West Africa was certainly no threat to world peace. In addition, the Security Council's extra­ordinary session on South West Africa was conducted in a spirit of negotiation rather than confrontation. 54 The British opinion that Adv. Vorster's South West Africa address deserved closer attention, should be viewed against this background.

On 6 June 1975, the USA, France and Britain made use for the second time of their power of veto, on this occasion to oppose a compulsory arms boycott of South Africa. These three countries declared that certainly did not regard South West Africa as a threat to world peace. This was only the second time in the UNO's history of thirty years that the West had recorded a triple veto. The first was in October the previous year when they similarly blockaded an effort to expel South Africa from the world body. 55 Ten members of the Security Council, including Russia, China and Sweden, voted in favour of the arms em­bargo, while Japan and Italy abstained from voting.

Adv. Vorster's term of office as Prime Minister has also been charact­erized to a great extent by his efforts to establish sound relations with African countries. For this reason, the Prime Minister also reiterated that the Whites in South Africa are of Africa and they will have to determine their future here. 56 The conviction with which Adv. Vorster spoke was a clear indication that he was determined to apply this view in practice. It was in the same spirit that he declared in Parliament on 15 September 1970 that the Republic was prepared to enter into a non-aggression treaty with any Black state in Africa. 57 The discussions that Dr. H. F. Verwoerd had held with Chief Jonathan of Basutoland, were continued by Adv. Vorster after Dr. Verwoerd's demise. In September 1966 Adv. Vorster said in Parliament: "We do not want to harm them; we do not want them; we want nothing from them except the common elementary goodwill that may and should exist between neighbouring states." 58

On 30 September 1966, Bechuanaland became the independent state of Botswana. Sir Seretse Khama, the new prime minister, stated: ". . . we fully appreciate that it is wholly in our interests to preserve neigh­bourly relations with the Republic of South Africa. Our economic links with South Africa are virtually indissoluble. We are tied directly to South Africa - for communications, for markets, for our beef, for labour in the mines, and in many other respects." 59

On 3 October of the same year, Basutoland became the independent state of Lesotho. At his first press conference, Chief Jonathan said that his first meeting with Dr. Verwoerd "marked the beginning, I believe, of a new relationship between our two countries. It is my earnest and sincere hope that Mr. Vorster and I will be able to continue this relationship, and to build on it in the future. I have no reason to think that this could be otherwise. South Africa and Lesotho have much to gain from peaceful co-existence provided this is based on mutual respect for our respective national policies. No country is an island unto itself, and no country can grow and prosper in isolation. Our actions will be based on one platform only - what is best for our country and our people." 60

Adv. Vorster soon declared that he was willing to establish closer ties with African states. In November of that year, the Prime Minister stated that in negotiations with African leaders, he regarded these leaders as heads of state and therefore as equal. 61 Colour would there­fore play no role whatsoever. In January 1967, a meeting took place be­tween Adv. Vorster and Chief Jonathan in Cape Town. This was the first occasion on which a South African prime minister acted as host to the head of an independent African state. A joint communique declared that "the Government will as soon as possible investigate proposals for economic aid and technical assistance to Lesotho". Chief Jonathan in turn reported to Lesotho that all South Africa expected of him was "goodwill and nothing more". He was convinced that his discussions with Dr. Verwoerd and later with Adv. Vorster, had broken down the "race relations curtain" in the south, and that peaceful co­existence could be put into practice. He had found Adv. Vorster "a bit more realistic and practical" than Dr. Verwoerd, who according to him was "a bit difficult, indeed very difficult". 62

Later in January, when the State President opened the South African Parliament, he said that as a result of the successful meeting between the two prime ministers, further meetings of a similar nature would also take place with other African leaders, to the advantage of all parties concerned.

On 6 September 1968, Swaziland, one of the four remaining African states to be ruled by a monarch, King Sobhuza II, became the second-smallest independent state in Africa. Lord Caradon, British Ambassador to the UNO, remarked that the independence of Swaziland marked "the close of a chapter in British history - the end of the British Colonial era in Africa". 63 At the independence celebration in Swaziland, Mr. Sukati, the deputy prime minister, said: "South Africa is most important to us and we realize that without its help and co-operation we would be in a difficult position - independence or no independence". 64

Adv. Vorster stated that his policy of friendship with neighbouring states was no new policy, but rather the extension of the policy of his predecessors. 65 In 1960, Dr. Verwoerd predicted a federation of states in Southern Africa. In this respect he said: "Actually a Commonwealth link could come into being in Africa between more states on the basis that we contemplate here at the Southern tip of the Continent between neighbour and neighbour, the one White and the other Black, a Commonwealth in which no state will lord it over another state. That offers a hope of peace and does away with the danger of the submergence or disappearance of the White man. Permanent common interests can be built up by means of economic links, provided the national groups are emancipated systematically - not in one fell swoop, but gradually as they become ripe for it". 66 And in 1967, Adv. Vorster spoke in the same vein when he stated that "in Southern Africa, my government has committed itself in word and deed to maintaining the closest economic and technological co-operation among all the countries of the region, for their mutual benefit and joint development, while each nation continues to retain its political autonomy, and therefore, the right freely to choose its own political, racial, cultural and economic systems." 67

In 1967, Malawi became the first African state to enter into official diplomatic relations with the Republic. For South Africa, too, this was an event of historical importance. 68 President Banda described himself, as a result of his willingness to strive for co-operation with South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique in the economic sphere, as the "number one unpopular man in Africa". He condemned those who criticised him because he was in favour of co-operation with the so-called colonist, and declared: "My first duty is to look after the interests of four million people . . . Being a good African does not mean cutting your economic throat... I have to be realistic." 69

In August 1968, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. H. Muller, was the first South African minister to pay an official visit to Malawi. On this occasion, Dr. Muller said: "I would certainly welcome visits of this kind by colleagues in South Africa and by ministers of neighbouring territories in general, Malawi in particular, including visits by heads of government." 70 In August, in Algeria the OAU referred to the dangerous friendship that was developing between Malawi and South Africa. Later, the African National Congress made a statement in Dar-es-Salaam, accusing Dr. Banda of being a "catspaw and a springboard of the racialist and colonialist regimes in Southern Africa". 71 Dr. Banda's reaction was that "if we are to be realistic, we cannot be expected to accept indiscriminately and unselectively every point of view adopted by a majority or minority of the members ... at anytime." 72

The diplomatic relationship between South Africa and Malawi has proved to be so successful that in April 1969, Mr. Vorster said that diplomatic relations with other African states "would be entered into whenever it would be in the interests of South Africa to do so. There need be no misunderstanding or illusions about that." 73 Dr. Mulder also expressed the hope that "other African states would follow Malawi's good example and enter into diplomatic relations with us. 74 This was followed by the state visit of Dr. Banda to South Africa in August 1971 and of Mr. J. J. Fouche, the South African State President, to Malawi in March 1972. Mr. Vorster paid a visit to Malawi in May 1970. Without doubt these visits were of immense importance for future developments in Southern Africa as regards a better understanding be­tween the peoples of Southern Africa. 75

In 1971 the South African Minister of Information, Dr. G. P. Mulder, addressed the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chathman House in London. Dr. Mulder spoke on South Africa in a changing African scene. This address was of great significance especially because Dr. Mulder outlined at that early stage the new developments which were taking place in the Republic's attitude towards African states. In emphasising the important role South Africa could play in the African continent he said: "I believe in the future of the African continent. It has the natural resources, it has gold, coal, diamonds, platinum, anti­mony, vanadium, chrome, asbestos, manganese, iron, copper, uranium, oil, it has vast open spaces which can be developed, it has the vegetation, the timber, the water, the climate - but above all, it has the human resources, people. Black and White, who really love Africa and are prepared to play their part in developing this vast pioneering continent. Even if it took many years, Africa may well become the continent of the future." 76

On the 4th February 1974, Mr. Vorster announced in the South African House of Assembly that a general election would be held on the 24th April 1974. Mr. Vorster did not only want a mandate from the electorate to implement in full the policy of the Nationalist Party in the years to come, but he also wanted a free hand in order to deal with any eventuality which might occur in due course and which could endanger the safety of the State. The Nationalist Party was returned to office with the biggest majority 77 ever and in his own constituency the Prime Minister received the highest voting percentage of all candidates in the Republic. The electorate gave Mr. Vorster and his Government a clear mandate enabling him to continue the implementation of his policy.

The short Parliamentary session in the second half of 1974 will always be marked as one of the most interesting and at the same time as one of the most important sessions in South African political history. However, it was during this session that the Prime Minister informed the nation for the first time of his detente efforts with African states. This Mr. Vor­ster did in his Senate speech including the reaction of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia to the detente moves of Mr. Vorster. Mr. Vorster's secret visits to certain African states to negotiate with Heads of State in order to solve common problems in Africa, took the world by complete surprise. With such a venomous propaganda campaign in progress against South Africa at the United Nations it was thought that no African state would dare to enter into friendly talks with the South African Prime Minister. On the 21st September 1974, Mr. Vorster and his party paid a visit to the Ivory Coast as the guests of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. Actually this should not have been a surprise be­cause the President had already made it clear in May 1971 that he was prepared to enter into dialogue with South Africa. 78 He was, apart from Dr. Hastings Banda, the first African statesman to advocate dialogue with South Africa. In spite of vociferous opposition from other African leaders, President Houphouet-Boigny persisted in his approach and in October of that year Ivory Coast Foreign Minister, Dr. Koffi Ndia, paid a secret visit to the South African Prime Minister. Dialogue was pushed into the background in 1972 when preparations said to have been made for President Houphouet-Boigny's visit to South Africa apparently did not materialise. Surprisingly, the Ivory Coast closed its air space to South African aircraft in November 1972. 79 Behind the scenes contact was nevertheless taking place. In September 1974 Mr. Vorster paid a visit to the Ivory Coast where he met President Houphouet-Boigny in person. This visit was, however, kept secret for eight months before Mr. Vorster officially announced the visit. 80 In the week of the 10th February 1975, Mr. Vorster also paid a visit to Liberia where he had talks with President William Tolbert. In an interview with To the Point Dr. Hilgard Muller said: "The fashion of doing everything behind the scenes is gradually changing. Dialogue is coming more into the open, as seen in Mr. Vorster's talks with President William Tolbert of Liberia and President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. These will not be the last instances by any means." 81

On the 1st April, 1975, Mr. Vorster delivered a lecture on "The New Africa", which formed part of the University of Stellenbosch's Autumn School. 82 Mr. Vorster said that bridges had been built into Africa which would remain even if the Dar-es-Salaam talks should go against South Africa. The Prime Minister said that South Africa would remain the keeper of the sea route around the Cape, which was undoubtedly one of the main arteries of the free world. It was certain, Mr. Vorster said, that the Republic would play an important role in the continent due to the fact that it had knowledge and experience of Africa and its needs. He pointed out that the Republic was pre-eminently in the position to help Africa to help itself without binding it politically or economically and without placing it under any obligation. Mr. Vorster made it clear that South Africa wanted to normalise relations in its own interests as well as those of the rest of Africa. "The Republic's offers of friendship," Mr. Vorster continued, "did not come from a position of fear or weakness and South Africa had to be accepted as she is. I do not have one story for Africa and another for the home front." 83

As in the days of Dr. Verwoerd, Mr. Vorster maintained the policy of no interference as regards Rhodesian affairs. "Realpolitik," writes Nolutshungu, "which is the operational correlative of State interest, was particularly evident in South Africa's diplomacy over the Rhodesian UDI. Although South Africa aided Rhodesia, it stopped short of em­broiling itself in major difficulties with Britain, or of formally recog­nizing Rhodesia as an independent State." 84 Mr. Vorster explained that South African police had been sent to Rhodesia to fight terrorists be­cause their activities on the Rhodesian frontiers were also a menace to the Republic and their ultimate goal was South Africa. Mr. Vorster also stated that as soon as the presence of the South African police in Rhodesia was no longer in the interest of the Republic they would be with­drawn without delay. 85 In July 1975 the Rhodesian Minister of Defence,

Mr. P. K. van der Byl, said that the South African police in Rhodesia had been confined to their camp and are no longer playing an actual role in fighting terrorism. 86 Mr. Vorster realised that a peaceful settle­ment of the Rhodesian crisis was of vital importance for detente in Southern Africa. He, therefore, went out of his way to put Rhodesia on a path which might lead to such a peaceful settlement, but without interfering in the internal affairs of Rhodesia. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda is also as active as is Mr. Vorster in trying to achieve a break-through in order to reach a settlement. "They cannot bang the heads of the contending Rhodesian parties together and tell them to settle their differences," writes To the Point. "But it's a safe bet that they sometimes wish they could. For every week's delay provides fresh ammunition to those in the OAU who want no part of detente at any price." 87

In March 1975 the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr. lan Smith, and Senior Cabinet Colleagues flew to Cape Town to confer with Prime Minister Vorster. This visit undoubtedly pointed to the seriousness of the threatening deadlock. Two days of wide-ranging talks on the whole question of peace in Southern Africa followed. No official communique was issued at the end of the talks. Instead, came a neutral statement saying both leaders were convinced the conference table was to be preferred to confrontation. On the 8th and 9th August, 1975, Mr. Vorster had talks again on the Rhodesian crisis with Mr. Smith and three of his Cabinet Ministers and the Cabinet Secretary. 88 A representative of President Kaunda of Zambia was also present. The talks were held at Libertas, the South African Premier's official residence in Pretoria. The major outcome of the Vorster-Smith talks was the agree­ment that a Rhodesian constitutional conference should be held soon. 89 The communique on the talks gave nothing away, referring only to proposals which "if implemented by all parties concerned can lead to a settlement of the issues involved". 90 In an interview in the Sunday Times President Kaunda said that the weekend's negotiations in Pretoria were crucial to the achievement of peace. "The question is whether Mr. Vorster will prevail in persuading Mr. Smith to accept the importance of continued negotiations," he said. "I hope Mr. Vorster succeeds. If not, we are in for a bad time." 91 The role Mr. Vorster is playing as the link in Black-White communications cannot be over-emphasised.

The highlight of detente in Southern Africa was the dramatic meeting of South Africa's Prime Minister, Mr. B. J. Vorster, and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Their participation in the Rhodesian constitutional discussions on the Victoria Falls Bridge and their own talks in Zambia were the greatest news event of the year. The meeting was regarded as of immense importance for peace in Southern Africa, peace to which both statesmen were actively contributing. 92 It was un­doubtedly a difficult decision for President Kaunda to meet Mr. Vorster in person because he knew that a meeting of this kind would certainly result in a storm of severe criticism from other African statesmen. President Idi Amin of Uganda, for instance, launched a severe attack on President Kaunda in which he referred to him as a traitor to the African cause. For Mr. Vorster it was naturally also a difficult decision to go to Zambia. This decision of Mr. Vorster's took everybody by surprise. When Mr. Vorster's visit to Zambia was officially confirmed, a Canadian journalist remarked: "Why, he would not dare." 93 The friendly placards which welcomed Mr. Vorster at the luxurious hotel Musi-o-Tunya where President Kaunda was waiting upon Mr. Vorster, re­vealed the friendly attitude towards the South African Prime Minister. Placards such as: "Vorster you are brave" and "Mr. Vorster, today you have become a great man in Africa" created the atmosphere needed for negotiations of this kind. When President Kaunda met Mr. Vorster on his arrival in the official white Mercedes-Benz of the Zambian President, he said: "Welcome, Mr. Prime Minister" to which Mr. Vorster replied:

"Thank you, Mr. President." A historical meeting indeed.

On his return to South Africa Mr. Vorster said: "It was certainly worthwhile that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, and I went to the Falls, not only in view of the talks between the delegation of the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr. Smith, but also especially for the opportunity which it gave us to have long and penetrating discussions with President Kaunda of Zambia and his Government. With regard to President Kaunda I was impressed with his sincere desire. Just like South Africa's to try and bring peace to Southern Africa. 94

Mr. Laurant Dona-Fologo, Ivory Coast Information Minister, then arrived in South Africa on a ten-day visit to South Africa. "We think," Mr. Dona-Fologo said on his arrival, "we must take advantage of this historic moment to produce a fair and accurate report on South African life - whether the reality is sad or enjoyable. “ 95 Dr. Hilgard Muller was truly correct when he said that "the fashion of doing everything behind the scenes is gradually changing." Mr. Dona-Fologo toured the Repu­blic freely and he met various people from all sections of the South African population. His talks with the Prime Minister lasted two hours.

A beaming Mr. Dona-Fologo refused to answer any questions after his meeting with Mr. Vorster, but nevertheless commented: "You should be able to see from my face that I am more than satisfied and that I had the most interesting conversation with the Prime Minister." 96 Referring to the attitude of President Houphouet-Boigny Mr. Dona-Fologo said:

"Our president has said . . . that as an African, as a Negro, he cannot but condemn racism and apartheid, but he does not think the way to reach understanding between the communities can be one of violence and war." 97

While detente was gaming momentum and results were influent nig the world opinion positively as regards the role South Africa should and must play in Africa, turmoil occurred in a neighbouring territory which would affect South Africa directly. Angola was the richest and largest of the Portuguese possessions in Africa. It was often referred to as "the plum colony". Mining and oil seem to offer a prosperous future for her 6-million people if she could become a stable state. The Angolan Civil War which followed on the independence of this rich and fertile former Portuguese African colony created the first major international flash­point in Africa in the post-colonial period. It resulted in the intervention of foreign troops on African soil. The conflict also resulted in a split of Africa into two camps. "Our involvement," writes the Rand Daily Mail, "is causing a dangerous - and artificial - split among the OAU nations, and could even exacerbate it. Such a split could ignite a race war that could spread like wildfire through Africa." 98

Foreign intervention in African affairs have occurred only twice since Hitler and Mussolini: the abortive Anglo-French landing in the Suez Canal Zone in 1956, which was a Middle East war rather than African; and mercenary intervention in the Congo Civil War in 1960. Although it could be said that the British and French had interests in Suez in 1956, Africa knew no post-World War II precedent for the Cuban and Russian presence in Angola. 99 Apart from the fact that it created a dangerous African and international situation, it also split Africa in two. At the Organisation of African Unity Conference in January 1976, the voting was 23 in favour of recognising the Marxist MPLA forces in Angola, and 23 in favour of a government of national union, involving an end to all foreign intervention. 100

There has been more than one liberation movement since the early days of Angolan nationalism. 101 At the time of the hasty and badly prepared Portuguese departure from Angola the three main groups who had been fighting the Portuguese began fighting one another as brutally as they had fought the troops of the late Dr. Salazar and Dr. Caetano. 102 Of the three movements, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, Dr. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, which was the first of the groups to wage a guerrilla war against Portugal from inside Angola, was eventually the most effective. The MPLA was one of the "holy six" movements sup­ported by such continental militants as Dr. Julius Nyerere and President Sekou Toure in Guinea. 103 Others were SWAPO in South West Africa, ZANU in Rhodesia, PAIGG in Guinea Bissau, FRELIMO in Mozambique and the ANC in South Africa. These movements were all backed heavily by the Russian Government, which used the excuse of fostering world revolution to influence the movement's leaders. 104

President Kaunda's moderates in Zambia claimed that the millions of dollars poured into Angola by the Russians was at the root of Angola's problems. 105 Highly informed diplomatic sources in Lusaka estimated that between November 1974 and November 1975 the Soviet Union supplied arms worth at least 140-million dollars to the MPLA. 106 They claimed that the rest has followed naturally - South Africa's military intervention, the Cuban presence, the arrival of hundreds of mercenaries and soldiers seeking their fortune and looking for adventure. 107

President Kenneth Kaunda made his personal position clear against this background of unrest and uncertainty in Angola. He put it bluntly that the Russians started the arms race and that they had no moral right to do so. "It is dangerous for Africa," President Kaunda said, "to side with one super-power for that is an automatic invitation to the other to get involved. 108 In an interview the President said: "We are a non-aligned nation and we spoke out plainly against the United States on Vietnam now we must be morally and politically courageous and tell the Soviets 'you are wrong'." He added: "Much as we condemn the South African presence in Angola we cheat ourselves if we think that by condemning South Africa we are settling things. The South African presence, too, is an effect of the problem, not the cause." 109 In Africa this was of course a dangerous attitude because it was common know­ledge in a colour-conscious continent that "the wedding of Black nationalist movements to the rule of John Vorster is the kiss of death." 110

Russian involvement in Angola was obviously the basic reason for South Africa's presence in Angola. This was confirmed by UNITA leader, Dr. Jonas Sivimbi, when he declared that the South African presence in Angola was without any doubt a consequence of Russian involvement, not a cause of it. In the Security Council of the United Nations this issue led to a direct clash between the Chinese delegate, Mr. Lai Ya-Li, and the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Jacob Malik. While Mr. Lai condemned "these criminal activities of the South African racist regime," he simultaniously attacked "that superpower which flaunts the banner of a natural ally of a liberation movement for its frenzied intervention of Angola." Mr. Lai concluded: "We resolutely stand for the immediate withdrawal of all the foreign troops, including the South African troops, from Angola." 111

With reference to outside intervention in Angola, Defence Minister P. W. Botha said in the South African Parliament: "Everyone who knows Angola knows that UNITA and FNLA represent the majority of the Angolan people. If peaceful methods had been employed and the people had been allowed to elect their governments without interference South Africa would not have been interested in this matter other than in the role of an observer." 112

In April 1975, South Africa asked the authorities in Luanda to help ensure the safety of workers at the Calueque water scheme, a joint South African - Portuguese undertaking in Southern Angola, 50 km. from the South West African border. 113 In August of the same year in­formation was received that workers at Calueque were being threatened. It was later reported that the workers had fled. On August 9 a small South African unit was sent to Calueque to hold discussions with the occupiers of Calueque. As they arrived the South African troops were fired upon. They returned fire and took over Calueque. South African troops then chased the MPLA - which had come right to the SWA border and had taken over Calueque — northwards into Angola. 114 At about the same time, South Africa was asked by UNITA to assist in holding back the MPLA who had the support of only a third of the Angolan people and occupied less than a third of the country. It seemed as if the MPLA would take over the entire country. 115

The South African decision to become involved further northwards in Angola then followed. The reasons for this were to ensure the continued safety of the workers at Calueque who had refused to continue working on the dam unless they had the protection of the South African troops; and secondly, to prevent an uncontrollable rush of refugees from South­ern Angola into South West Africa which would have made the defence of South West Africa "difficult if not impossible." 116 By 18 September 1975 there were already 1 100 refugees in four camps in South Africa and South West Africa. With its involvement South Africa also tried to prevent the MPLA from providing shelter for militant SWAPO guerrillas on the South West African border. 117 It was also of the utmost importance to prevent Angola from being used as a staging ground for attacks on South West Africa and to protect white and black Angolans from being wiped out by Cuban forces. Lastly the South African Government thought it necessary to bring to the notice of the World and the rest of Africa "that an unwilling people were I pushed into the communist fold at the point of a bayonet". 118

It was clear that African leaders' decisions at the meeting of the Organisation of African Unity at Addis Ababa in the weekend of January 9, 1976, would have far-reaching effects on South Africa. 119 For' nations were represented at the OAU meeting on the Angola crisis. It was clear that not even their combined concern was hardly likely to find a way to end the civil war and to achieve a political solution. 120 I common knowledge that South Africa would be severely criticized for its military involvement in the Angolan conflict. The detente operations which were carefully nurtured by diplomats over two years, had presented South Africa as a strong, but well-disposed and friendly African neighbour. It is understandable why this image could survive the anti-South African propaganda intensified by the presence of the South African soldiers on Angolan soil.

The 20-odd African countries which had up to then recognized the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the MPLA, as the legitimate government since the farcical independence handover by the former Portuguese colonial power on 11 November 1975, were the most vociferous in their condemnation. 121 Even countries like Zaire and Zambia, Angola's nearest neighbours - who most fear the effect of Russian aggression in Southern Africa - could not support the South African presence in Angola because they would then be open to accusation supporting apartheid. 122 The Russians and Cubans who supported MPLA with machinery of war and personnel, and the Chinese and the Americans, who supported the opposing forces of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA, and the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola, UNITA, were also denounced for "foreign intervention from the genuinely non-aligned countries". 123

It was very clear that Angola's civil war forced the Organisation of African Unity to face its most crucial test. 134 The organisation's weekend summit showed that the OAU was split right down the middle on the whole question. All indications were that the OAU would once more prove itself powerless to bring about peace in Angola. The emotional importance of Angola made the civil war there an even greater challenge to it than the Biafran conflict. "Our failure to find a solution here (in Angola)," President Kaunda declared, "confirms that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has no power to shape the destiny of Africa. Power is in the hands of the Super-Powers, to whom we are handing Africa by our failure." 135 One of the most important reasons for this was South Africa's involvement. It gave the conflict a black-white overtone that, to the OAU, is "like a red rag to a bull". 126 This involvement naturally caused some African states to switch support to the MPLA, because it was that movement that the South African forces specifically opposed. "It is all too often true in Africa," writes a reporter, "that those who oppose South Africa are considered to have right on their side." 127 This was of course the reason why both the FNLA and UNITA denied the fact that they were assisted in their struggle against the MPLA by South African troops. They knew that such an association "is the kiss of death in Black Africa". 128

Russia's interference should also have been a cause of anger among the African states. But they argued that Russia was only supplying arms to the MPLA. They pointed out that this had happened before, notably in the Biafran War. It was of significance to them, and it naturally influenced their attitude, that African states eventually succeeded in throwing off Russian involvement once they were on their own feet and consequently had no more need for Soviet arms in such large quantities.

It is only natural that Cuban involvement should also have evoked African anger as it was direct interference from the Cuban side in that they were fighting alongside the MPLA. Strangely this was not the case. What then is the explanation for this illogical conduct? The most probable reason is that Cuba is part of the Third World and therefore not regarded as an "outsider" in the same sense that the United States would be. Most probably the African states felt that, not being a super­power, Cuba did not present a threat of domination in the same way that Europe, Russia or the United States would were they directly involved. 129

It was actually the more emotional South African involvement that really angered most African states. Shortly after the commencement of the conference on Angola a number of leaders launched a fierce attack on South Africa. To many it was a convenient opportunity to unite states which were in fact deeply divided over Angola.

South Africa's involvement in the Angolan Civil War unchained an active debate in the South African Parliament. Sir De Villiers Graaff, the Leader of the Opposition, moved that the House had no confidence in the Government due to the fact that it did not provide adequately for the national security of the country, by failing "to take the public into its confidence, and to motivate it adequately in regard to the Government's actions and objectives in Angola". 130 Sir De Villiers Graaff stated furthermore that if the Republic was more deeply involved than it obviously seemed, then it was surely the Government's first duty to inform the country of the essential circumstances that may have justified such a radical contradiction to the declared policies of the Republic. 131

The Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, reacted to the accusations of Sir De Villiers Graaff. Mr. Botha argued that the Republic of South Africa is situated on the most important sea route. He pointed out that South Africa is an African state and that the Republic as such cannot escape her responsibilities. The Minister revealed that the Owambo Cabinet had requested the South African Government on 9 April 1975 "to safeguard the Angolan border and to take action against terrorists threatening that country" . 132 Mr. Botha quoted the Prime Minister in this respect: "I want to make it clear that the Defence Force and the Police will remain in Owambo as long as the Government of Owambo regards their presence as being essential to the continuation of peaceful development." 133 The Government of Kavango addressed similar re­quests to the South African Government. On these requests the de­ployment of the South African Defence Force units occurred. Naturally police protection was offered where necessary and the training of the future military units of the countries concerned were immediately launched. It is of importance to note that a civil action programme was launched in co-operation with other Government departments in which the co-operation of all Government departments that could possibly be involved, were sought. The sincerity of the South African Government in the whole operation was clearly revealed by this humanitarian con­duct. In spite of all this, terrorist attacks were made from time to time across the border. Shortly before Chief Minister Elifas was murdered, he was to have commenced talks in South West Africa with other national representatives on the future of South West Africa. 134

The Minister stated unemphatically that if there was no awakening the whole history of Angola might yet come to be known as the great-lost opportunity of the free world. He made it very clear that the peoples of Southern Africa can and must stand together so that through non-aggression pacts, and also by collective action, communism may be kept out of Southern Africa. According to the Minister it was of the utmost importance that the West should unite in order to oppose Russian inter­vention in the affairs of Southern Africa.

The Leader of the Progressive Party, Mr. Colin Eglin, accused the Government of failing to take the people of South Africa into their confidence as regards the very essential features of South Africa's involvement in Angola. 135 He stated frankly that he was not asking for "de­tailed logistical or military secrets", but that he was merely pointing out that the Government's conduct provided the basis for destructive rumour-mongering in the country. "It has created the circumstances," Mr. Eglin said, "in which it has been impossible for the Government to rally or to motivate the total South African population behind what they say is a national cause." 136

Foreign Minister Dr. Hilgard Muller replied that the Republic could undoubtedly not be accused of intervention or aggression when steps were being taken to ward off threats of violence. He pointed out that this was precisely one of the objectives of South Africa's actions in regard to Angola. He asked the House to consider very seriously the excessive build-up of arms close to the Republic's borders. To him it was self-evident that the war raging in Angola was not an ordinary civil war. It was quite obviously a war which actually constituted a serious threat to the neighbouring states of that particular country. He stressed the point that it should always be kept in mind that the Russians and the Cubans had for a long time been openly supporting and advocating the use of force against South Africa. 137

Prime Minister B. J. Vorster then joined the debate: "In the course of this week we discussed very delicate matters. We discussed matters which could even be described as very contentious, and I as a parlia­mentarian, in common with you, was very proud of the fact that Par­liament discussed these delicate and contentious matters in the manner it did. I think it redounded greatly to the credit of this Parliament that the discussion was at all times conducted on such a high level." 138

The Prime Minister moved that:

1. "this House expresses its grave concern at the Communist aggression committed in Angola by Russia and Cuba with a view to imposing a Marxist state on the unwilling inhabitants by force of arms;

2. it is obvious to this House that it is a further object of the aggression similarly to subject other territories and states, inter alia South West Africa and South Africa;

3. this House takes note of the steps already taken to halt the aggression;

4. this House directs the Government, in view of these objects and threats, to take all reasonable steps to foil this aggression and to safeguard our country as well as the territories and borders for which we are responsible; and

5. this House in conclusion conveys its sincere thanks and appre­ciation to the Defence Force and all officers and men for the courageous and heroic manner in which they have acquitted themselves of their task in the operational area and expresses its deep sympathy with those who have lost loved ones in the struggle." 139

Mr. Vorster told the House that South Africa's involvement was not an isolated involvement: others were also involved. "I am not going to mention their names," Mr. Vorster said. "It is not for me to do so. Everyone must speak for himself on this matter." 140 He pointed out that Angola would at that stage have been used as a base for attacks on South West Africa, but also possibly on Zaire and Zambia. Communists were engaged in underground activities in both countries. He referred in this respect to Zambia where President Kaunda had declared a state of emergency. 141 President Kaunda was compelled to take these steps because he was threatened even in public by the Soviet Union. Mr. Vorster pointed out that Tanzania, who had recognized the MPLA, would have been forced to co-operate with the Communists, and the final result would have been a Communist belt from Luanda on the Atlantic Ocean, across Africa to Dar-es-Salaam on the Indian Ocean. This would have resulted in cutting Africa in two.

Furthermore the Prime Minister pointed out that if the Republic had not become involved, the defence of South West Africa would have been impeded, if not rendered impossible, by at least 30 000 to 40 000 refugees who would have been driven into South West Africa.

"Our involvement," Mr. Vorster said, "was the effect of Russian and Cuban intervention. If they did not enter Angola, if they did not take part in this affair, if they did not try to subvert the whole of Angola and to suppress its people, South Africa would never have entered Angola at all. We were not involved in the civil war. We had nothing to do with it whatsoever; it was not our affair. I therefore say that we were not a party to the civil war." 142

On April 4,1976, the Government of Israel announced that Mr. B. J. Vorster would soon visit Israel. 143 The United Nations delegates of several countries sharply criticised what they regarded as collaboration between South Africa and Israel. 144 In a Press statement expressing "grave concern", the UN Committee Against Apartheid stated that shortly after the General Assembly's condemnation in December 1975 of the strengthening of relations between the two countries, South Africa raised its Consulate-General in Israel to an Embassy. 145 The Committee urged all Governments to condemn Israel's action in developing closer relations with South Africa. 146 It was also pointed out that Israel has established an Embassy in Pretoria. 147 There had also been other high-level visits to Israel such as that of the Minister of Information, Dr. Connie Mulder, on March 26 and 27. 148

Black Africa, who once rejected Israel, was angered that the Jewish State had turned the tables by hosting the South African Premier. 149 It was without question a risk for the Israeli Prime Minister as well as for the South African Prime Minister to meet each other. Some African states were disappointed because they were hoping to renew good rela­tions with Israel in due course. Israel was once providing technological aid to a great extent to black African states. 150 African countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel as a gesture against "the continued occupation of Arab Lands". 151 It was President Amin of Uganda who launched the campaign against Israel after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 152 The remarks of Black Africa towards Israel in this respect were not appreciative at all: "As far as Africa is concerned Israel is now finished" and "It is a grave miscalculation on Mr. Rabin's part" and "It was only a question of time before many African nations patched things up with Israel" 153 - only to mention a few.

The South African Prime Minister ran an even greater risk as regards his detente operation in Africa. The African states were extremely suspicious. Nevertheless Mr. Rabin and Mr. Vorster reached an agree­ment. On his return to the Republic Mr. Vorster announced in the South African Parliament:

"We have decided (i.e. the Government of Israel and the Govern­ment of South Africa) to establish a Ministerial Joint Committee comprising Ministers of South Africa and Israel. The Committee will meet at least once a year and will make an overall review of the situation of the economic relations between the two countries and will discuss ways and means to expand the economic co­operation and trade between the two countries, such as –

(a) encouragement of investments;

(b) development of trade;

(c) scientific and industrial co-operation; and

(d) joint utilization of South African raw materials and Israeli manpower in joint projects.

A steering group will be established in order to regulate the exchange of information and ideas." 154

Mr. Vorster made it clear that it was his policy to have friendly relations with all non-communistic countries. Referring to the Pact between Israel and South Africa Mr. Vorster said: "I see in this a classic example of co-operation between two countries . . ," 155 While the United Nations moved to wreck the South African-Israeli agreement 156 in South Africa, the Leader of the Progressive Reform Party, Mr. Colin Eglin, said it could be the start of a new international economic and trading bloc operating outside the present-day framework of big-power politics. 157 "I welcome the pact," Mr. Eglin said. "It is an imaginative move based on a common-sense approach to international relation­ships." 158 Mr. Japie Basson, United Party spokesman on foreign affairs, said he was glad to see two countries that in a sense were "brothers in adversity" had become "brothers in joint action". 159 Between them the Republic of South Africa and Israel have the will and also the ability to support economic, technological and development projects of great im­portance to themselves and to a number of African states. Mr. Vorster's visit to Israel can without doubt be described as a new achievement in his foreign policy ventures.

The climax of Mr. Vorster's foreign policy ventures was actually emerging on the horison at that stage. It was announced that the South African Prime Minister would meet the United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, in Hamburg on 23 June 1976. 160 Dr. Hilgard Muller, South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the talks had been arranged during discussions between South Africa's Ambassador in the United States, Mr. Pik Botha, and Dr. Kissinger. 161 This first meeting of a South African Prime Minister and a United States Secretary of State was a significant upgrading of South Africa on the American priority list. It was clear that peace in Southern Africa had assumed priority in world politics. 162 The meeting in Western Germany between the two statesmen pointed in the direction of a notable change in relations between South Africa and the United States and secondly, it resulted in a new approach by the West as regards African affairs. 163 In the widest sense, the talks must be seen as an effort by the United States to regain some of the ground it lost with the Soviet intervention in Angola. This is part of America's global strategy. By sending Dr. Kissinger to talk to Mr. Vorster, President Ford made it very clear, especially to Russia, that the future of Southern Africa is the concern of America and the West. 164

In 1968 the United State Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Joseph Palmer, visited Mr. Vorster in Pretoria while touring Africa. In those days President Johnson did not regard it of national interest to have talks with South Africa. Mr. Palmer in fact reported to a Congress Committee that he was pessimistic about Mr. Vorster's policy towards Africa. In April 1976 the American Secretary of State visited certain African states in person. During his visit he learned from black leaders about the success of Mr. Vorster's Africa policy. He was actually told that Mr. Vorster holds the key to peace in Southern Africa. 165 The new interest and concern of the United States in Africa is due to the fact that Africa has lately become an important axis around which the international struggle for power revolves.

Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster conferred for eight hours in Bodenmais and Grafenau. "The staging of the Vorster-Kissinger talks on West German soil," writes To the Point, "sparked a diplomatic ritual almost as farcical as a Strauss operetta." 166 It was the first time in 30 years that a South African Prime Minister had talked to the Washington Govern­ment at such high level. The talks included consideration of the role South Africa would play in co-operation with the United States in an attempt to steer Rhodesia away from a full-scale war. Diplomatic sources say the two men also reviewed the future of South West Africa. In assessing the over-all scope of the talks, the State Department said that there is "reason for cautious optimism". 167 Mr. Vorster said: "It would be premature to speculate on the results of our talks at this stage." 168 - thus probably the best summary of the historic two day meeting.

Mr. Vorster's talks with Dr. Kissinger were immediately followed by wider diplomatic activity. 169 Mr. William Schaufele, the United States Under-Secretary for African Affairs, was sent to various African leaders to inform them about the discussions. 170 Before Mr. Vorster left Germany, the German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, informed African ambassadors about the exchanges between himself and South Africa's Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, and between Mr. Vorster and the German Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Schmidt. Mr. Vorster's last public appearance in West Germany was at a big news conference at the South African Embassy in Bonn where more than 100 journalists and television teams were present. Dr. Kissinger also informed the British Government about his extensive talks with Mr. Vorster. It was his ultimate aim to search for British assistance for a peace formula for Southern Africa.

The historic meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster was a breakthrough for South Africa and without doubt a further triumph for Mr. Vorster. 171 Mr. Vorster described his talks with Dr. Kissinger as "worthwhile and said that only good could come from them". After the conference he said that he and Dr. Kissinger would "keep in touch either directly or at ambassadorial level". 172 The joint communique on the talks says: "Mr. Vorster agreed to give further thought to Dr. Kissinger's suggestions for avoiding racial war in Southern Africa." 173

During the weekend starting on 27 August 1976, a major step was taken in the international effort to avert war in Southern Africa. In Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, President Machel and top-level representatives of America, Britain and Black Africa gathered for talks on affairs in Southern Africa. The meeting was given urgency by the fast-rising hostility on the Rhodesia-Mozambique border and by the deadline of the United Nations demand for United Nations supervised free elections in South West Africa. 174 This meeting in Maputo was seen as a prelude to a second meeting between Mr. Vorster and Dr. Kissinger.

Black leaders in Southern Africa were watching with keen interest the efforts of Dr. Kissinger to formulate a United States policy for Southern Africa. 175 They were not convinced that Dr. Kissinger was really interested in the black people of Southern Africa. They argued that he had had no interest in African affairs up to Russian and Cuban involvement in Angola. 176 Since then Dr. Kissinger has given a great deal of attention to Southern Africa. His view of Southern Africa was that if the Rhodesian crisis was not solved, a race war could commence which would be used by the Communists to extend their influence in this part of the continent. 177 Rhodesia was not the only trouble spot. In South West Africa SWAPO had turned to Russia for military aid. This could also result in an extension of Communist influence in Southern Africa.

Meanwhile the talks in the Turnhalle in Windhoek on the constitu­tional future of South West Africa were making the desired progress. 178 Even before the negotiations commenced it was clear that this great and important task would not be an easy one. 179 It was also realised that the road to South West African independence would not merely be paved with good intentions. 180 Most important is the fact that all the re­presentatives at the Turnhalle were anxious to contribute in the direc­tion of a solution of the problems of South West Africa in the best interest of its people. The South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) rejected the Turnhalle talks. 181 The stated position is that SWAPO indicated that it would only deal with Pretoria. 182 "The Turn­halle Conference and SWAPO," writes the Sunday Times, "must. . . also find each other and a basis for negotiations if the birth of the new independent state is not to be scarred and aborted by continuing violence." 183

The Constitutional Committee of the SWA Constitutional Conference announced on 18 August that an interim government would be established in South West Africa as soon as a constitutional basis for it had been worked out. 184 The date for independence for the territory had been set for December 31, 1978. 185 The Weekend Post described this announcement as "one of the biggest advances in race relations in South Africa in many years". 186 SWAPO denounced the whole idea of an interim government in South West Africa and declared that it would "pursue its violent policy of liberating' South West Africa." 187

Mr. Vorster left South Africa for Zurich on Friday, 3 September. His delegation included Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Mr. R. F. Botha, South African Ambassador in Washington and at the United Nations. 188 They were to meet Dr. Kissinger and his delegation in the Dolder Hotel to continue their talks in order to avert an increase of violence in Southern Africa. They were to discuss mainly the Rhodesian issue, but it was almost certain that South West Africa would also be on the agen­da. 189 Guerrilla wars in Rhodesia and South West Africa could result in turmoil in Southern Africa from which the Republic of South Africa, with all its riches and its strategic position, would certainly not escape. The crucial Southern Africa talks in Zurich ended on an optimistic note on Monday, 6 September 1976. It was notable that this marked the be­ginning of a new mood of Western solidarity. 190 It was also President Kaunda's belief that successful talks between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster could end "liberation wars" in white-ruled Rhodesia and South West Africa. 191 At the same time he gave the assurance that if the talks failed "then we will continue until victory is attained on the battle-field". 192

During their three days' talks Mr. Vorster extended an invitation to Dr. Kissinger to visit South Africa in order to continue their talks. 193 Dr. Kissinger said that any visit he might make to the Republic would be preceded by a visit to "frontline" Black African states. 194 He also said that a visit to South Africa would depend on the reaction of these Black leaders and naturally on the progress made on negotiations on the pro­blems of the sub-continent. 195

On his return to South Africa Mr. Vorster announced that he would be seeing Mr. lan Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, "as soon as it is possible". 196 When asked by reporters if he would put pressure on Rhodesia, Mr. Vorster said: "I have said time and again the South African Government does not put pressure on anybody, because that is contrary to the basic concepts of our foreign policy." 197 Mr. Vorster stated very clearly that he had no plans whatsoever "now or in the future" to meet representatives of SWAPO. 198 It was then announced in Pretoria that Dr. Kissinger would arrive in South Africa on Friday, 17 September 1976.

Mr. Vorster met Mr. lan Smith in Pretoria on Tuesday, 14 September. At Zurich Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster both held the view that the "most immediately dangerous" of Southern Africa's problems was Rhodesia. They agreed that if the guerrilla war was allowed to go on it was almost inevitable that the Cubans or the Russians would sooner or later become involved. The meeting between Mr. Vorster and Mr. Smith was the prelude to their individual meetings with Dr. Kissinger the following weekend.

In Pretoria Dr. Kissinger met Mr. Vorster and various other leading personalities in South Africa. The latter included Sir De Villiers Graaff, the Leader of the United Party; Mr. Colin Eglin, Leader of the Progressive Reform Party; and the leaders of the Black, Indian and Coloured communities, as well as academics, economists and newspaper editors. 199 And on Sunday, 21 September 1976, the Rhodesian Prime Minister and the United States Secretary of State met in Pretoria for talks on the Rhodesian issue. The meeting between Mr. Smith and Dr. Kissinger was a diplomatic triumph for Mr. Vorster. 200

On his return in Rhodesia Mr. Smith said that his weekend talks, in Pretoria with Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster had brought "concrete results" and that there was "a chance of a settlement". 201 Mr. Smith said: "I don't think there is any doubt as far as the concrete results are concerned." 202 He then met his Cabinet on 22 and 23 September for vital discussions on the Kissinger peace plan proposals. 203 "We've still got a lot of fight, but that doesn't mean to say we want to be stupid. We've got to face up to the realities. I think we are going to be all right," Mr. Smith said. His Cabinet favoured the concrete proposals of the peace plan and it was then approved by the caucus of his party. The caucus was Mr. Smith's biggest hurdle because it was known that the more extreme right-wingers in the party opposed any kind of settlement that would eventually bring about Black majority rule. 204 In Pretoria Prime Minister Vorster said that he believed the proposals put to Mr. Smith at the weekend summit could result in a Rhodesian settlement and that the "ghastly alternative" of violent confrontation in Southern Africa could be avoided. 205

In the meantime Dr. Kissinger left South Africa for the most difficult part of his "shuttle diplomacy". It was now his task to persuade front­line African presidents "to moderate their demands and views" on the Rhodesian crisis. Dr. Kissinger was well aware of the fact that "normal diplomacy does not work in parts of Africa". 206 After two-and-a-half hours of talks with Dr. Kissinger, President Kaunda announced that he and other Black frontline Presidents — the leaders of Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique — would soon meet to decide whether to accept or reject the outcome of the Kissinger peace mission. 207

On Friday night, 24 September 1976, Mr. lan Smith formally announced that Rhodesia would have majority rule within two years. 208 In moving tones the 57-year-old Rhodesian Prime Minister, who made the UDI speech nearly eleven years ago on November 11, 1965, "launched 6 400 000 Rhodesians towards a new destiny". 209 Mr. Smith's address over radio and television thus signalled the official end of this former British colony's rebellion. Whatever the outcome of future negotiations, Rhodesia will never be the same after this an­nouncement.

The Peace Plan devised by the United States and Britain made pro­vision for the following:

* "Majority rule within two years.

* Immediate meeting with African leaders to organise an interim government.

* Interim government of Council of State, half Black and half White, and a Council of Ministers with Whites controlling Defence and Law and Order.

* United Kingdom and Rhodesia will enact enabling legislation for the process to majority rule.

*On the establishment of interim Government sanctions will be lifted and all acts of war, including terrorism, will cease.

* Substantial support will be made available by the international community to provide assurance to Rhodesians about the economic future of the country." 210

The frontline Presidents - Kaunda, Nyerere, Mozambique's Samora Machel, Botswana's Sir Seretse Khama and Angola's Dr. Agostinho Neto - met in Lusaka on Sunday, 26 September, and rejected the pro­posals. 211 They called for a constitutional conference to be heldin Britain in order to determine conditions for a transfer of power to the black majority. 212 "Not Kaunda and Nyerere but Moscow decided 'Lusaka.' Not only the Americans, the British and the South Africans, but also the Russians had been at work. They are not interested in peace through compromise. They want unconditional surrender," writes the editor of To the Point. 213

Prime Minister John Vorster's role as peacemaker in Africa was not a coincidence - not "an accident of history". 214 It was a choice of his when he took up the leadership of the Republic of South Africa. "I set myself two goals," he said, "first, to create better relations between people, Afrikaans and English-speaking, White, Coloured, Indian and Black; second, to do my utmost to normalise relations between South Africa and other countries." 216 This was the driving force over the years which brought Mr. Vorster without doubt to the position of being one of the foremost leaders in Africa. Even Dr. Kissinger reached a point where he could get no further without Mr. Vorster.

---

1 Die Huisgenoot, 21.10.1966. "Die Mantel het op hom geval", pp. 10-3.

2 Cf. The Safety of the State is Priority No. 1. The Anti-Sabotage Act and what it means. INCH, f. 11.7. Cf. also Speech No. 2: General Law Amendment Bill.

3 The Natal Witness, 18.4.1967.

4 Die Huisgenoot, 1.5.1970, pp. 10-3.

5 Assembly Debates, Part IV, 14 May-23 June 1962, cols. 6309, 6058-79

6 Ibid., Part VI, 18 March- 3 May 1963, cols. 4637-46.

7 H. H. W. de Villiers, Rivonia. Operation Mayibuye, Johannesburg, 1964.

8 Cf. inter alia, Tirannie go. This pamphlet was published by the "90-day" Protest Com­mittee, INCH, P. 11.4.

9 Duncan Moodie was sentenced to death in 1962 for murdering his wife.

10 John Harris was executed after throwing a bomb at Johannesburg Station. One woman was killed and numerous people were injured, some very seriously, in the explosion.

11 Die Huisgenoot, 1.5.1970, pp. 10-13.

12 Die Vaderland, 1.6.1965.

13 Assembly Debates, Part XV, 10 May - 18June 1965, col. 7296-304.

14 Rand Daily Mail, 6.6.1965. Leading article.

15 Ibid., 14.9.1967. Leading article.

16 Sunday Times, 4.6.1967. Leading article.

17 Die Burger, 2.6.1967.

18 The Natal Witness, 18.4.1967.

19 Rand Daily Mail, 4.9.1967. Leading Article. Cf. also Landstem, 26.4.1967.

20 The Cape Argus, 9.9.1967; Sunday Times, 4.6.1956. Leading article.

21 The Natal Witness, 18.4.1967; Die Beeld, 14.4.1967.

22 Sunday Times, 4.6.1967. Leading article.

23 Of. Nasionale Eenheid met behoud van Eie Identiteit, INCH, P. 4.87; Dagbreek, 17.9.1967; The Friend, 4.4.1967. Leading article. Cf. Adv. Vorster's address on the occasion of the laying of the foundation-stone of the 1820 Settlers' Monument at Grahamstown on 4 September 1967. Cf. Die Burger, 5.9.1967; Die Volksblad, 5.9.1967; Die Beeld, 3.9.1967.

24 Sunday Times, 4.6.1967.

25 Quoted from G. M. Coda-am, Vorster's Foreign Policy, Pretoria and Cape Town, 1970, p.179.

26 Ibid., p. 23.

27 Ibid.

28 South African Digest, 4.11.1966; Rand Daily Mail, 2.11.1966. Quoted in G. M. Cockram, op. cit., p. 24.

29 G. M. Cockram, op. cit., p. 24.

30 Die Transvaler, 11.8.1967.

31 Ibid.

32 Speech No. 4, at Koffiefontein on 11 August 1967.

33 Die Transvaler, 11.3.1972.

34 Die Burger, 11.3.1972.

35 Suidwester, 6.3.1972.

36 Die Burger, 11.3.1972.

37 Eastern Province Herald, 10.3.1972.

38 Die Suidwes-Afrikaner, 6.10.1972.

39 Ibid-

40 South African Digest, 1.12.1972.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Of course Communist influence played a significant role here.

44 Die Volksblad, 13.11.1974.

45 Ibid. Cf. also To the Point, 22.11.1974.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Cf. the Prime Minister's speech in the Senate on 23.10.1974, Speech No. 16.

50 Die Suidwester, 25.9.1974. Cf. also Die Volksblad, 25.9.1974.

51 The Star, 9.9.1974, reports: "The Black homeland of Owambo will hold a general election from January 13 to 17 in preparation for constitutional negotiations among population groups in South West Africa."

52 PV 132: B.J. Vorster Collection. INCH. Opening address during the Congress of the Afrikaanse Handelinstituut at Windhoek on 20 May 1975, p. 14.

53 Ibid. Cf. also Die Volksblad, 21.5.1975. Cf. also To the Point, 13.6.1975. Editorial.

54 Rapport, 1.6.1975. Cf. also To the Point, 13.6.1975, Editorial.

55 DieVolksblad , 7.6.1975.

56 Cf. Speech No. 6, Extract from a speech in Parliament on 15 September 1970 on the occasion of the Prime Minister's Budget Item.

57 Ibid.

58 Assembly Debates, Part XVII, 29 July - 23 September 1966, col. 2555.

59 G. M. Cockram, op. cit., p. 123.

60 Ibid.

61 S.A. Digest, 18.11.1966. Cf. also Assembly Debates, Part XIX, 20 January - loMarchl967, cols. 412-18. Dr. P. S. van der Merwe moved- "That this House approves of the policy pursued by the Government for friendly coexistence and fruitful co-operation with coun­tries in Africa, with special emphasis on the Republic's ability to contribute to economic and technical development and the raising of the standard of living in Africa."

62 G. M. Cockram, op. cit., p. 124.

63 Ibid., p. 129.

64 Ibid.

65 Assembly Debates, Part XXVI, 17 March - 2 May 1969, col. 4574.

66 Ibid., Part CIV, 7 March- 13 April 1960, col. 3019.

67 Rand Daily Mail, 26.9.1967.

68 Cf. Speech No. 5, Extract from a speech at Heilbron on 16 August 1968.

69 G. M. Cockram, op. cit., p. 136.

70 Ibid., p. 143.

71 Ibid., p. 144.

72 Ibid.

73 Assembly Debates, 23.4.1969, col. 4577-8. As quoted by G. M. Cockram, op. cit., p. 145.

74 See G. M. Cockram, op. cit., p. 145.

75 Sam C. Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa. A Study of ideology and foreign policy, Man­chester, UP, 1975, pp. 206-7.

76 C. P. Mulder, South Africa in a Changing African Seem, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1971, p. 4.

77 The results of the general election of April 1974 were: Nationalist Party 122; United Party 46; Progressive Party 6; Herstigte Nationalist Party o; Democratic Party o.

78 To the Point, 19.9.1975, p. 7. See also Sam C. Nolutshungu, op. cit., p. 274.

79 To the Point, 19.9.1975, p. 7.

80 Ibid.

81 The Friend, 18.2.1975; The Daily News, 17.2.1975; Pretoria News, 17.2.1975.

82 The Cape Argus, 2.4.1975.

83 Ibid.

84 Sam C. Nolutshungu, op. cit., p. 301.

85 See Evening Post, 28.10.1974: "President Kaunda diagnosed the immediate trouble spot when he said in his speech a precondition for peace was the withdrawal of South African police units from Rhodesia estimated to number 2000."

86 The Star, 20.7.1975 and Pretoria News, 22. 7.1975.

87 To the Point, 28.3.1975. Editorial.

88 The Friend, 9.8.1975.

89 The Cape Times, 11.8.1975.

90 The Friend, 12.8.1975.

91 Sunday Times, 10.8.1975.

92 Rand Daily Mail, 20.8.1975.

93 Ibid.

94 The Cape Times, 27.8.1975.

95 To the Point, 19.9.1975. See also South African Digest, 19.9.1975.

96 To the Point, 19.9.1975. See also The Cape Times, 11.9.1975.

97 The Cape Times, 11.9.1975.

98 Rand Daily Mail, 8.1.1976. See also Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, After Angola. The War Over Southern Africa, London, 1976, pp. 28-32.

99 Weekend Argus, 17.1.1976.

100 To the Point, 16.1.1976, p. 7. See also Weekend Argus, 17.1.1976 and World, 12.1.1976.

101 Michael Morris, Armed Conflict in Southern Africa, Cape Town, 1974, pp. 111-47. See also Al.J. Venter, Terroris - 'n Ooggetuie verslag, Kaapstad, 1971, Chapter 7.

102 Hoofstad, 21.1.1976.

103 World, 12.1.1976. See also To the Point, 16.1.1976, p. 9.

104 World, 12.1.1976. See also E.P. Herald, 22.1.1976 and To the Point, 16.1.1976, p. 7.

105 World, 12.1.1976. See also To the Point, 16.1.1976, p. 7 and E.P.Herald, 22.1.1976. See also Legum and Hodges, op. cit., pp. 17-20.

106 Pretoria News, 2.1.1976.

107 World, 12.1.1976 and To the Point, 16.1.1976, p. 7.

108 Legum and Hodges, op. cit., p. 31.

109 World, 12.1.1976.

110 To the Point, 16.1.1976, pp. 7-9.

111 Evening Post, 29.1.1976.

112 Assembly Debates, Part I, 23 January - 30 January 1976, col. 50.

113 To the Point, 6.2.1976, p. 7. See also Assembly Debates, Part I, 23 January - 30 January 1976, col. 46-7.

114 To the Point, 6.2.1976, p. 6.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Hoofstad, 8.1.1976. See also World, 12.1.1976; Die Oosterlig, 1.1976; Rapport, 25.1.1976.

120 Rand Daily Mail, 8.1.1976.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 To the Point, 16.1.1976, p. 7.

125 Quoted by Bridget Bloom in the Financial Times, London, 5. 1.1. 1976"

126 To the Point, 16.1.1976, p. 7.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid., pp. 7-8. See also Legum and Hodges, op. cit; pp. 20-1.

130 Assembly Debates, Part 1, 23 January - 30 January 1976, col. 25.

131 Ibid, col. 28.

132 Ibid., col. 45.

133 Ibid,

134 Die Transvaler, 18.8.1975 and The Cape Times, 18.8.1975.

135 Assembly Debates, Part I, 23 January - 30 January 1976, cols. 100-1.

136 Ibid., col. 101.

137 Ibid., col. 104.

138 Ibid., cols. 346-7.

139 Ibid., col. 356.

140 Ibid., col. 365.

141 Ibid., cols. 365-6.

142 Ibid., col. 368.

143 To the point, 16.4.1976, p. 7.

144 Evening Post, 15.4.1976. See also Die Burger, 15.4.1976 and Die Volksblad, 10.4.1976.

145 The Natal Witness, 8.4.1976. See also The Daily News, 17.4.1976 and Die Burger, 9.4.1971

146 The Natal Witness, 8.4.1976. See also Die Volksblad, 15.4.1976 and Pretoria News, 14.4.1971

147 The Star, 14.4.1976.

148. Ibid. See also The Daily News, 17.4.1976.

149 Daily Dispatch, 12.4.1976. See also Die Burger, 14.4,1976 and The Argus, 14.4.1976.

150 Daily Dispatch, 12.4.1976. See also The Natal Mercury, 12.4.1976.

151 The Natal Mercury, 12.4.1976.

152 To the Point, 16.4.1976, p. 7.

153 Daily Dispatch, 12.4.1976 and The Natal Mercury, 12.4.1976.

154 Assembly Debates, Part XII, 20 April - 23 April 1976, col. 5200.

155 Ibid., col. 5201.

156 Pretoria News, 14.4.1976. See also The Argus, 14.4.1976.

157 The Natal Witness, 14.4.1976. See also Die Suidivester, 14.4.1976.

158 Ibid.

159 The Natal Witness, 14.4.1976.

160 Sake van die Dag-SAUK, 11.6.1976. See also Comment and Opinion, 11.6.1976, p. 1.

161 Comment and Opinion, 11.6.1976,p.1

162 South African Digest, 2.7.1976.

163 To the Point, 2.7.1976, pp. 9-10.

164 Ibid., p. 9.

165 Die Transvaler, 7.6.1976. See also South African Digest, 2.7.1976, p. I.

166 To the Point, 2.7.1976, p. 9. See also Oggendblad, 5.6.1976.

167 To the Point, 2.7.1976, p. 8. See also South African Digest, 2.7.1976, p. 1.

168 To the Point, 2.7.1976, p. 9. See also Comment and Opinion, 2.7.1976.

169 South African Observer, 2.7.1976, p. 1.

170 Comment and Opinion, 2.7.1976, p. I. See also To the Point, 2.7.1976, p. 9.

171 Tempo, 25.6.1976.

172 Comment and Opinion, 2.7.1976, p. 1.

173 Ibid.

174 The Star, 30.8.1976.

175 Daily Dispatch, 2.9.1976.

176 Ibid.

177 Ibid.

178 The Friend, 6.7.1976. See also To the Point, 27.8.1976.

179 Beeld, 5.10.1976.

180 Sunday Times, 22.8.1976.

181 To the Point, 15.10.1976.

182 The Star, 5.10.1976. See also Hoofstad, 4.10.1976.

183 Sunday Times, 22.8.1976.

184 The Natal Witness, 19.8.1976.

185 Ibid.

186 Weekend Post, 21.8.1976. See also Sunday Times, 22.8.1976.

187 World, 23.8.1976.

188 Die Oosterlig, 31.8.1976. See also To the Point, 10.9.1976.

189. Daily Dispatch, 2.9.1976. See an interesting article on this by Stanley Uys. Also an article titled "Zurich: A Study in Diplomacy" by Ken Owen in Pretoria News, 2.9.1976. See also Die Burger, 8.9.1976 and The Star, 2.9.1976.

190 The Citizen, 8.9.1976. See an article titled "The West digs in its heels" by Natie Ferreira.

191 Daily Dispatch, 6.9.1976.

192 Ibid.

193 Sunday Times, 7,9.1976. See also The Natal Witness, 7.9.1976 and Sunday Tribune, 5.10.1976.

194 Cape Times, 7.9.1976 and Daily Dispatch, 6.9.1976.

195 Cape Times, 7.9.1976. See also The Star, 7.9.1976.

196 The Natal Witness, 7.9.1976.

197 Rand Daily Mail, 6.9.1976.

198 The Natal Witness, 7.9.1976.

199 Daily Dispatch, 18.9.1976. See also Ibid., 20.9.1976.

200 To the Point, 10.9.1976.

201 Cape Times, 21.9.1976.

202 Ibid.

203 The Daily News, 22.9.1976.

204 Ibid.

205 The Star, 20.9.1976.

206 To the Point, 1.10.1976.

207 Cape Times, 21.9.1976.

208 The Natal Mercury, 25.9.1976.

209 E.P. Herald, 25.9.1976. See also Daily Dispatch, 27.9.1976.

210 The Natal Mercury, 25.9.1976. See also To the Point, 1.10.1976, pp. 7-10.

211 To the Point, 1.10.1976, p. 7.

212 Ibid.

213 To the Point, 1.10.1976, p. 5.

214 Ibid., 10.9.1976, p. 5.

215 Ibid.

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