INTRODUCTION THE RESEARCH PROBLEM This mini-thesis focus on the story of the Luthuli Detachment 1, an African National Congress (ANC) military unit, who on 31 July 1967 crossed the Zambezi River from the Zambian banks into Rhodesia [now Zimbabwe ], on a long march home to South Africa. This South African ANC detachment was part of a joint operation with the Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU) and their combined military operation became popularly known as the Wankie. 2 The plan that underpinned the Wankie campaign was quite simple. A joint ANC and ZAPU unit, which together consisted of approximately 80 guerrillas, 3 would cross the Zambezi River into Rhodesia. They would later break into two groups, with one group marching onto South Africa and the other group remaining in Rhodesia. The South African-bound group would consist mainly of a column of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) members, that is, the guerrillas from the military wing of the ANC. Their mission was to march through Rhodesia into South Africa where each combatant had specific instructions to assist in the political mobilisation of people in the different regions of the country. These regions included places like Cape Town, Durban, Umtata, Transkei, Johannesburg, the Northern Transvaal, Zeerust, Port Elizabeth and Stutterheim. 4 The Lupane-bound group would be a combined ZPRA 5 (name for the military wing of ZAPU) and a smaller MK force whose mission it was to set up a guerrilla base in the north-east of Rhodesia. This joint overall operation was meant to give added military impetus to both the ANC's and ZAPU's broad strategies for liberation respectively. For the ANC this would achieve the immediate goal of resuscitating the internal struggle by placing trained ANC guerrillas back on South African soil. In the medium-term, the base the ANC would set up with ZAPU at Lupane would signal a future‘ Ho-chi Minh route' to South Africa. 6 It was envisaged that the creation of this guerrilla base would in future make it easier for the ANC to send trained guerrillas through Rhodesia into South Africa. For ZAPU this would mean a new beginning in the political mobilisation of the African people in Rhodesia, and was in keeping with their guerrilla warfare strategy. Meli argues that the joint campaign between the ANC and ZAPU was also the identifying of common interests and aspirations of all those fighting colonialism and imperialism in Africa. 7 The planners of the campaign wanted to avoid unnecessary armed clashes with the Rhodesian security forces. From the very outset therefore, the idea was to march along the western outskirts of the Wankie Game Reserve thereby avoiding contact with civilians, and most importantly confrontation with the Rhodesian security forces. However this was not to be. Although initially unknown to the Rhodesian authorities, 8 the presence of the guerrillas was later detected and a number of armed clashes took place. The Rhodesians called their military campaign against the ANC-ZAPU unit, Operation NICKEL. 9 During the course of the ensuing battles both sides claimed victories. Within several weeks of having crossed the Zambezi River some of the guerrillas were killed or captured by the Rhodesian and Botswana security forces, whilst some would willingly surrender to the Botswana security forces. A few guerrillas found refuge in Zambia or in Swaziland and at least one MK guerrilla managed to reach Durban, South Africa but would later become an askari. 10 The skirmishes between the two opposing forces lasted from 13 August to 4 September 1967. 11 The reported engagements were as follows: The Zambezi valley (west of Kariba) The Wankie game reserve The Hartley/Gatooma area The Tjolotjo area 12 The South African authorities responded by sending paramilitary troops to assist and support the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith with the advancing guerrilla forces. The South African Airforce assistance was called Operation SUPERCHARGE and commenced in August 1967. South Africa's military assistance was given the name Operation CHINAMAN and commenced on 1 September 1967. This was most probably because earlier reports had spoken of two Chinese men and one Chinese woman leading a group of guerrillas, although it was not confirmed at that stage. 13 By the time South Africa entered the fray the skirmishes between the two opposing sides were almost over. Once it became known that South African Police units were operating on Rhodesian soil, ‘a storm of criticism burst', which involved both the British and Zambian governments. 14 The Rhodesian authorities closed Operation NICKEL on 8 September 1967, as they were satisfied that all the guerrillas inside Rhodesia had been accounted for. 15 The South African units remained in Rhodesia in readiness for any future guerrilla strike. The discussion on the Luthuli Detachment and the Wankie campaign is an emotive one and prompts many hitherto unanswered questions. What actually happened between the ANC-ZAPU forces and the Rhodesian-South African security forces? Is the history of the Luthuli Detachment and its combatants indeed one of courage in the face of tremendous odds? How unique is their story in the history of the South African freedom struggle? EXISTING LITERATURE The existing accounts of the Wankie campaign tend to be fragmented and disparate. There is no complete and comprehensive written account of the events that unfolded in Rhodesia. Previous writers undertook their research within some form of limitation or other and were unable to access a wide range of sources. Both the South African and Rhodesian governments to some extent succeeded in blacking out information on the fighting in the Wankie Game Reserve area. The non-availability of primary sources tended to limit and constrain the scope of these previous studies. For example, Barrell in his study on MK uses the statistics released by the South African Police Force (SAPF) for public consumption. Although he believes that they closely accord with independent figures, he concedes that the book he has written remains only a sketch, due to a lack of sources. 16 At the time Lodge wrote Black politics in South Africa since 1945 , he argued that research within South Africa on the ANC and particularly the ANC in exile was thinly documented within the country. 17 Molapo argues that any researcher of ANC history is immediately confronted by the silence, which was imposed by the Apartheid government on the activities of a banned organisation. Civil society was prohibited from accessing ANC publications through a number of repressive measures. He summed this up by saying: It is important to note that it is not easy to write a history of a movement (MK) that was illegal and operating underground for almost three decades. 18 One of the more detailed books, which covers the subject of the Wankie campaign is, The fight for Zimbabwe: the armed conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI by Kees Maxey. The latter briefly examines the ideological differences between ZAPU and ZANU and explains the political developments in Rhodesia particularly around the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), which caused the Zimbabwean nationalist movement to rethink its guerrilla warfare strategy. More than any other writer Maxey focuses on firstly: the military nature of the war in Rhodesia, the identity of the ZAPU guerrillas and their training; secondly, the battles that ensued in August and September 1967 between the ANC-ZAPU and the Rhodesian-South African security forces. Maxey obtained the bulk of the information for his book from the Rhodesian Ministry of Information. He also utilised newspaper clippings from The Rhodesia Herald and Bulawayo Chronicle of 1966, 1967 and 1968. At the time Maxey produced his book there was no reliable detailed study on the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. His book is based on articles written for the Anti-Apartheid News and ‘…was [meant] to counter the view propounded by the Rhodesian propaganda machine that was generally accepted as valid'. 19 He wrote this book mindful of Amilcar Cabral's words: ‘Tell no lies - claim no easy victories'. 20 One of the major weapons that the Rhodesian government [and the South African government] had was its control of the news media. 21 It was important to the Rhodesian authorities that all appear quiet and under control. 22 Reports of armed clashes and subsequent trials were kept to a minimum. Maxey quotes the preliminary to a trial report in the Rhodesia Herald (30.9.71) and the restrictions that were placed on the media as follows: The name, address or any other information likely to reveal the identity of any person concerned or mentioned in the proceedings, should not be published. No name of any political party or organisation mentioned in the proceeding should be published. No place, country or town mentioned in the proceedings should be named. Except for the Press and officials of the Court and other people whose presence was necessary, the proceedings should be held in camera. 23 Furthermore, only European reporters were allowed to these trials for fear that information may spread by word of mouth to Africans. 24 Whilst Maxey attempted as far as possible to reconstruct the war in Rhodesia he was conscious that his book was based primarily on White 25 Rhodesian sources and that the White Rhodesian press constantly underestimated the effectiveness of the Zimbabwean nationalists efforts. 26 He was aware that he was attempting to put together the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle although ‘three-quarters of the pieces are missing'. He therefore noted that there could be ‘gaps, errors and incorrect deductions'. 27 This book is a fairly detailed and useful account of the Wankie campaign, which I drew on extensively. Other secondary works consulted in this study include Vladimir Shubin's, ANC: A view from Moscow , Tom Lodge's, Black politics in South Africa since 1945 , Howard Barrell's, MK: the ANC's armed struggle, Francis Meli's, A history of the ANC: South Africa belongs to us , Martin and Johnson's, The struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga war , Michael Morris', South African terrorism and Al J. Venter's, The Zambezi Salient: Conflict in Southern Africa. I also utilised accounts of the Wankie campaign by five of the Luthuli Detachment members, four of which were published. The works used are, “The Wankie Campaign”, by Chris Hani, “Heroes of our revolution” and “The Battle of Nyatuwe” by Comrade Rodgers an interview with Graham Morodi in The Rift: the exile experience by Hilda Bernstein and From shantytown to forest, the story of Norman Duka by B.C. Richmond. For the fifth account, I utilised my unpublished History Honours essay entitled, The journey to Wankie: the story of a ‘Coloured' MK soldier, James April. 28 THE ARGUMENT OF THIS MINI-THESIS The Wankie campaign signified the beginning of the ANC's armed struggle. Since the inception of MK in December 1961 up until 1963 the ANC had only engaged in acts of sabotage. On 31 July 1967, the ANC for the first time launched an operation with the possibility of militarily engaging the White ruling class in Southern Africa. By writing this mini-thesis I inter alia demonstrate that the members of the Luthuli Detachment were volunteers who participated in the Wankie campaign, because of their commitment to the struggle for freedom in South Africa. Its members made their own history and were masters of their own destiny, albeit under circumstances they themselves did not choose. This is contrary to Lodge's argument about the Rhodesian incursions, including the Wankie campaign. He said they were most probably a ploy by the ANC leadership ‘…intended to remedy the sagging morale created by inactivity and boredom in the camps as well as boosting the ANC's position with the Liberation Committee of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). 29 On a conceptual level one needs to emphasise that guerrillas are not equivalent to the military personnel of a conventional army. The latter has a specific role to play in the defence of a country, whereas the guerrillas of a political movement are inspired by a particular belief to take up arms. The story of the Luthuli Detachment thus needs to be understood in the context of guerrilla warfare which Maxey defined as an ‘…internal political battle fought on a violent front because the peaceful avenues present in a democratic society, have been closed'. 30 In this instance the Luthuli Detachment wished to overthrow Apartheid. They and their ZAPU counterparts were subject to the political discipline of their respective parties and acted on the instructions of the party's high command. This mini-thesis illustrates that the story of the Luthuli Detachment is indeed one of tremendous courage and that it has a unique place in the history of South Africa. Firstly, the Luthuli Detachment guerrillas were pioneers in attempting to carve a geographical route of infiltration into South Africa after the relentless repression of the Nationalist Party (NP) government in the 1960s. Secondly, it was the first time since the 19 th century that armed clashes took place between the White rulers and the black people of the region. 31 The ANC guerrillas inflicted losses and casualties on the enemy and saw the White soldiers running in panic. This was of great psychological and political importance. 32 This study focuses on the period July to September 1967 and attempts to answer the question, what really happened between the ANC-ZAPU and the Rhodesian-South African security forces during this time? Emphasis shall be given to the military aspects of the opposing forces. Did the ANC-ZAPU forces deserve the criticism or the praise they received? How did the joint Rhodesian-South African security forces fare in the face of the insurgents? In the course of this study, I briefly examine the media coverage of the Wankie campaign and the place of the Luthuli Detachment in popular history and memory, with specific reference to the first armed Coloured MK soldiers, namely James April and Basil February who was the first Coloured MK soldier to fall. An initial impression may be that the Wankie campaign failed in its objectives. Some criticised the campaign including the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), who called it ‘an adventure' and perceived the operation as foolhardy amongst other things. 33 Dale T McKinley, criticised the campaign calling it, ‘An ill-conceived attempt by [the] MK leadership to infiltrate armed units into South Africa – the ‘Wankie campaign'…failed dismally.' 34 Whilst James April, a Wankie campaign veteran, says other liberation movements praised the bravery and courage of the joint ANC-ZAPU guerrillas: The bravery of the Wankie guerrillas meant that oppressed people around the world could once again hold their heads high. 35 In the assessment of the Wankie campaign I explain how this event came to mark a turning point for both the ANC and the Rhodesian-South African security forces, as both parties would reassess their strategies. The ANC would do it at the Morogorro Conference in 1969. Likewise the campaign paved the way for South Africa's operations on the border and consolidated existing co-operation between South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonial authorities. It is likely that this triad learnt valuable lessons and this prepared them for the later ‘full scale war on the border'. The ensuing two ANC-ZAPU Rhodesian incursions that followed the Wankie campaign became known as the Sipolilo campaign and fall outside the ambit of this study, although they shall be briefly mentioned in the conclusion. This mini-thesis pieces together the different accounts and stories, so as to provide a more comprehensive picture of the Wankie campaign and is premised on existing knowledge as found in the secondary sources which I have utilised. This information has been complemented with the relevant archival documents that have now come to light in the archives of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), 36 the trial record of James April, a member of the Luthuli Detachment, as well as oral interviews which I conducted. 37 METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE During my research I utilised the archives of the SANDF. This was the first time a member of the public accessed the files pertaining to the Wankie campaign. I also utilised a copy of the trial record of James April who was convicted on three counts of terrorism and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment in May 1971. The evidence presented by the State on the Wankie campaign during the trial is particularly interesting. Other Luthuli Detachment members were also tried and convicted in South Africa however their trial records were not accessed due to time and financial constraints. 38 This mini-thesis has gaps: the files of the South African Security Police could not be accessed partly due to red tape and partly due to the fact that there is no certainty whether these files still exist, and if so, where they are physically located. Neither could I access the files of the Rhodesian security forces in Zimbabwe. The process to acquire permission to utilise the Zimbabwean archives is a long, tedious and expensive one. For the purpose of this study it was not viable to pursue this latter source. Notwithstanding the access to information in South Africa today, the history of the ANC (and other liberation organisations) remains largely under-written, and to a large extent remains in the memories of those who participated in the struggle. 39 An important part of writing the history of South Africa's liberation movement therefore means using oral testimonies. Pioneering projects on oral recollections thus far include Hilda Bernstein's, The Rift: The exile experience 40 the Mayibuye Centre's Oral History Project and the recent establishment of the Road to Democracy Research Project. 41 These are unfortunately not sufficient. Within the context of the Wankie campaign the oral testimonies of the guerrillas are valuable as they lend a different perspective to information found in newspaper reports, court records or other documentation. These testimonies help to reveal the human agency in the conflict, although there are potential problems such as age, fading of memories and bias. In terms of oral testimony I interviewed a Luthuli Detachment member namely James April. I also interviewed Dr Pallo Jordan, MP, and member of the ANC's National Executive Committee, and an observer of the period in which the Wankie campaign took place. Terence February 42 and Marcus Solomon, 43 provided interviews on Basil February. Trevor Oosterwyk, an activist from the Western Cape was interviewed on Basil February and James April. During the Wankie campaign both sides claimed victories. This was in a sense reflected in the publications of the mainstream South African and Rhodesian media, and in the publications of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP ), like Sechaba and The African Communist . In the course of this mini-thesis I briefly examine the South African media's coverage of the Wankie campaign. What exactly was conveyed to the general population about the fighting in Rhodesia? As it is not possible to do a comprehensive study of the media I selected few clippings from the following newspapers The Cape Argus , The Cape Times, and The Star. I also briefly analyse the Luthuli Detachment's place in popular history and memory with specific reference to the Western Cape and the story of James April and Basil February. A point of controversy during the course of the Wankie campaign was the issue of casualties on both sides. In order to ascertain as much accuracy as possible I utilised the ANC's submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in which the names and dates are given of ANC members who died in exile and include the names of the Luthuli Detachment. I accept this information, by and large, as the most accurate available. For the Rhodesian casualties I surfed the World Wide Web and found the Rhodesian Roll of Honour, which includes the names of the Rhodesian soldiers who fell during the country's civil war. Although this is not an official web site, it does provide a basis to measure casualties with, and I accept the information it provides, by and large as accurate. I was unable to access information on the casualties suffered by ZAPU or the South African security forces. This unit was named in honour of Chief Albert Luthuli, President-General of the ANC who died just prior to the detachment's departure for South Africa. As far as possible I constructed a list of all the members of the Luthuli Detachment with the assistance of James April and Edwin Dlamini who were both members of the unit. See Appendix 1. This campaign was most probably modelled on the Cuban campaign of 1959. See K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p.12 I use the term guerrilla, even where sources use terrorist or infiltrator, except with the newspaper clippings. The State vs James Edward April , Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71, 10 -15 May 1971, p.119 This is according to evidence given by state witness and Luthuli Detachment member Morris Mandela C. Hani, “The Wankie Campaign”, @ www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html, p.2 F. Meli, A history of the ANC: South Africa belongs to us ( Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988) p.162. He also says that the ANC-ZAPU alliance was internationalism later known as African unity in action. Some reports claimed that the Rhodesian Intelligence was aware of the imminent crossing. See R. Shay and C. Vermaak, The silent war (Rhodesia, Galaxie Press, 1971) pp.50-51 See Rhodesian D ebriefs BGG 210/3/11/2 Vol.1. Appendix 2 This was Leonard Nkosi, he was the chief of staff of the Luthuli Detachment. Askari is a turncoat. Nkosi became an askari by working for and with the South African Police. From a debriefing session held on Operation NICKEL at Brady Barracks on 26 September 1967. See Rhodesia Debriefs BGG 210/3/11/2 Vol.1. p.2, Appendix 2 See K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) pp. 70-71 This does not include the incident with Basil February, which occurred near Figtree. Situation Report (SITREP) serial number (s.n.) 14, See Appendix 3 M. Morris, South African Terrorism (Cape Town, Howard Timmins, 1971) p.42 Rhodesia Debriefs BGG 210/3/11/2 Vol.1. Situation Report s.n.37, See Appendix 3 H. Barrell, MK: the ANC's armed struggle (London, Penguin books, 1990) p.1 Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986 p.296 R. Molapo, ‘If you get a l-i-t-t-l-e leg of a dove you are satisfied!' Oral testimonies and the politics of armed conflict in South Africa 1961-1988. (Paper presented to the MK conference 1 December 1995, Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape) p.3 London, Rex Collings, 1975, p.1 For example, Judge Kennedy told the media not to identify Leonard Nkosi, a state witness in James April's trial. Instead Kennedy said “…refer to him as Mr X or Mr Y or whatever you wish to call him”. The State vs James Edward April , Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10-15 May 1971, p.75 See K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p.3 I do not use inverted commas for colour denotation in the mini-thesis. N Van Driel, 1990, Honours (History), University of the Western Cape T. Lodge, Black politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986) pp. 299-300 K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p.3 Black is used in the black consciousness context meaning oppressed people F. Meli, A history of the ANC: South Africa belongs to us (Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988) p.162 Although the PAC criticised the ANC, as soon as they learnt of the ANC's presence in Rhodesia, they too sent guerrillas to Rhodesia. These were captured and served sentences with members of the Luthuli Detachment in Botswana in 1967. See SITREP s. n. 41 Quoted in T. Lodge, Black politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986) p.300 Interview with James April (Cape Town, September 1990) The archival documents now fall within the mandate of the SANDF although they pertain to the South African Defence Force (SADF). The National Archives Act of South Africa (Act 43 of 1996) has made access to archival records much easier. The State vs James Edward April , Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 –15 May 1971 For example, see the trial of Daluxola Luthuli and 10 other accused, quoted in Prisoners of Apartheid: a biographical list of political prisoners and banned persons in South Africa (London, IDAF with UN Centre against Apartheid, 1978) p.33 Legislation like The Promotion of Access to Information Act (Act no. 2 of 2000) and The National Archives Act of South Africa (Act 43 of 1996) both passed since 1994 has made access to information easier. The Road to Democracy Project was launched by President Thabo Mbeki on 21 March 2001 in Pretoria |