

CHAPTER 7

**FURTHER CONTRADICTIONS DOWN MASHU WAY :
WAGES, SHANTYTOWN SOCIETY AND THE BUILDING OF KWA MASHU**

A Housing Policy for Kwa Mashu

Kwa Mashu township, named after Sir Marshall Campbell, the first Director of Natal Estates,¹ was developed on an extensive portion of the 6343 acre area known as Richmond and Zeekoe Vallei Farms. This area comprised nearly all the land bordered by the Mgeni River, the road from Sea Cow Lake through Effingham and Duff's Road and extending to the Inanda Village, and the South African Native Trust administered areas of the Inanda Mission Reserve, Dalmeny and Released Area 33. By far the largest part of Richmond and Zeekoe Vallei Farms comprised sugar cane plantations owned and cultivated by the Natal Estates sugar company. The remainder of the land was either owned by smaller sugar companies or Indian market gardeners and independent sugar farmers.²

In December 1952 the City Council adopted a resolution in favour of acquiring all the land in both the Richmond and Zeekoe Vallei Farms and the adjoining area of Newlands for the development of various forms of African housing.³ With the City Council having finally accepted responsibility for the provision of urban African accommodation, municipal officials were instructed by the City Council to develop a basic planning outline as quickly as possible. Initial municipal plans were based on achieving a series of inter-related goals.

New African residential areas had to be built in such a way that the critical health and sanitation conditions for long prevalent in the existing shantytowns would not recur. A broad plan for African housing had to be compatible with the existing and future areas of major industrial and commercial activity. The townships also had to be located as close as possible to areas adjoining the city controlled by the South African Native Trust. Such a policy accorded well with both the government's desire that African urban residential areas

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1. The name Kwa Mashu was adopted by the City Council in 1957. Prior to this all correspondence concerning the proposed schemes in the area referred to the project as either "Duff's Road" or "Richmond and Zeekoe Vallei Farms". Whilst the City Council had conducted a public competition to select a suitable name for the new township, "Kwa Mashu" was not amongst the list of those most favoured by the selection committee. It is entirely conceivable that the name was chosen as a means of repairing the ill-feelings which existed between the municipality and its most important neighbouring sugar company.
 2. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Report of the Union Government Department of Native Affairs Departmental committee re Land for African Settlement, February 1946, Annexure B and "Durban Housing Survey", p 407. See Map no ? Ibid and City and Water Engineers Department, "Duff's Road Native Township", Plan No S T 1525 A, 17 October 1957.
 3. City Council minutes, 19 December 1952.

could, at a later stage, be excised from the city and incorporated into African reserve areas, and long-standing municipal aversion to permanent African residential accommodation in the city. Thus although Kwa Mashu was to be situated within Durban's boundaries, their continuing residence and political status within the city was by no means assured.

Municipal officials were reluctant to consider the relocation of all shack dwellers into one massive township. It was thus necessary to co-ordinate municipal development of formal African housing on the Richmond and Zeekoe Vallei Farms with the contemporaneous development, by the government, of further African housing to the south of the city on the Umlazi Mission Reserve. With the gradual availability of formal housing in both areas, Africans living in shantytown and backyard accommodation in the city, and legally entitled to residence in the city, would be relocated to one of the townships in accordance with the site of their employment.

All those Africans employed in areas north of an "imaginary line"⁴ extending along Old Fort Road to the Berea ridge would be resettled to Kwa Mashu. Africans employed south of this dividing-line would be relocated to formal housing on the Umlazi Mission Reserve.⁵ Thus two new African residential areas would be built in a manner which aligned the provision of housing to the existing spatial pattern of African urban employment. Bourquin recalls the basic motivation: "the feeling that we should not put all our eggs in one basket, and develop everything to the south, but to provide a counterbalance to the north ... and also to meet the needs of the industrial areas to the north- Greenwood Park, Effingham and those parts".⁶

The municipality desired to plan Kwa Mashu in ways which would ensure both the destruction of shack life and the creation of a permanently urbanized African working class living in single-site, nuclear family residence. Such housing would complement attempts to enhance the process of differentiation within the urban African proletariat. Heavily influenced by British New Town planning principles,⁷ the City Council envisaged that the township would eventually consist of eleven Neighbourhood Units, each consisting of four villages of four hundred nuclear family houses. The houses would be owned by the tenant, but the land would remain rented to the tenant under non-freehold title. No hostel accommodation would be provided. Each Neighbourhood Unit would be self-contained, with its own community centre, shops, schools, recreational facilities and professional office space. A single "spinal road" would run through the township and all Neighbourhood Units would be connected to this road by one arterial road. There would be no other direct road system connecting the various Neighbourhood Units together. A railway line would be developed

4. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 30 July 1949 and vol 2; Personal Memorandum, S B Bourquin-Councillor A L Barns, "The Duff's Road Area", 21 October 1952.

5. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 10 September 1980.

6. *Ibid.*

7. For general details see F J Osborn and A Whittick, *The New Towns. The Answer to Megapolis*, (London, 1963) and L Rodwin, *The British New Towns*, (Harvard, 1956).

alongside the spinal road and two stations built. All Neighbourhood Units would be within three-quarters of a mile of a railway station.⁸

The City Council also wanted to acquire the whole area of both the Richmond and Zeekoe Vallei Farms and Newlands. In addition to the municipality planning a formal African housing township covering only a small area of this land, municipal acquisition and ownership of the remaining land was central to the overall success of the initial development plan. In terms of an agreement reached between the Department of Native Affairs and the City Council, once the City Council had taken ownership of all this land, the government would resettle Africans living under freehold tenure on the Umlazi Mission Reserve into this municipal-owned land and commence the development of formal housing on the Umlazi Mission Reserve.⁹

This latter aspect of the initial policy guideline for the development of housing to the north of the city was absolutely central to the success of the whole scheme and the changed influx control policy. Apart from owning a township, the City Council would also be the owner of a vast area of already partially settled peri-urban land. This land formed a significant portion of one of the seven reserves which were intended to supply Durban's future African labour needs. In so far as they were able to, the municipality was determined to ensure that all residents of the area, whether already resident or resettled from the Umlazi Mission Reserve, would not rapidly be reduced to the level of a peri-urban proletariat. In an effort to control proletarianization, the municipality desired to bolster rural production in the area. Within the city the municipality wanted its own rural migratory 'reserve': the area could contain "a number of more or less independent" African rural villages providing for settlement "in gradation from rural and tribal to urban and detribalized".¹⁰ Explaining the benefits of this new policy, Bourquin noted that "Native life in individual villages separated from one another by wide green belts will certainly be more conducive to healthy and peaceful development and will be more readily administered than a large unbroken city area".¹¹

These policy guidelines were accepted by the government and the City Council, both of whom expressed optimism that development would proceed rapidly.¹² The City Council anticipated that certain aspects of the development work on the project would begin in April 1954.¹³ However, as a result of certain major difficulties which arose during the course of further discussions over the implementation and implications

8. For the basic plan intended for Kwa Mashu see the following: MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 9 March 1953, Manager, MNAD-Department of Education, 28 April 1953, City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 12 January 1953, City and Water Engineer "Duff's Road", undated and Native Administration Committee Minutes, 27 January 1954.

9. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Report of meeting between City Council deputation and the Department of Native Affairs, in Pretoria, 14 September 1953 and *Natal Mercury*, 14 June 1955.

10. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; City and Water Engineer - Town Clerk, 28 August 1950 and Personal Memorandum, S B Bourquin-Councillor A L Barns, "Duff's Road Area", 21 October 1952.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*, Report of a meeting between a City Council deputation and the Department of Native Affairs, 14 September 1953.

13. *Ibid.*, City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 9 March 1953.

of certain detailed plans for the area, essential aspects of the original planning outline were substantially altered. The main difficulties concerned finance, the acquisition of the required land, the housing and residential facilities envisaged, and the ability of prospective African residents to afford the rents.

During the 1950s, as part of the government's policy of restructuring the basis of African urban life, the Department of Native Affairs substantially modified the policy for financing urban African housing.¹⁴ The essential features of this policy involved changing the powers and functions of various state and provincial institutions concerned with the allocation of capital for housing, the progressive elimination of all sub-economic housing schemes, the accumulation of additional housing capital, and attempts to reduce both the standard of African housing provided and the costs of such accommodation.

In terms of existing legislation, capital loans for African urban housing were allocated to local authorities by the government through the National Housing and Planning Commission.¹⁵ During the course of the loan period all capital loan and interest charges were paid directly back to the Union Treasury. In order to limit its financial obligations the government instituted a self-accumulating system for capital allocated for urban African housing. Capital for urban African housing would be allocated by the National Housing and Planning Commission to a newly established Bantu Housing Board. The capital available to this board would consist of gradually diminishing capital loans at low interest rates from the government, and all annual capital loan and interest redemption charges paid back by local authorities having housing loans allocated from the Bantu Housing Board. Under this system all capital loan and redemption charges were not to be paid back to the Treasury, but credited to the Bantu Housing Board who would then be responsible for re-circulating this finance for the purposes of new urban African housing schemes.¹⁶

In terms of this policy, the government expressly prohibited any local authority from financing urban African housing development through loans raised on the open market and thereby diverting scarce capital resources into African housing. All requests for funds required for urban African housing had to be directed to the Bantu Housing Board.¹⁷ While the government acknowledged that the immediate shortage of urban African housing would require massive capital outlays from the Treasury, the Department of Native Affairs hoped that eventually the Bantu Housing Board would be in a position to finance urban African housing schemes without direct financial aid from the government. While this policy was only formally introduced in the Housing Act of 1957, the desire to restrict government funding of urban African housing projects was discussed with urban local authorities during the early 1950s. The Department of Native Affairs realized that it would be impossible to both eventually restrict direct financing of urban African housing and maintain the self-balancing

14. Wilkinson, "Adequate Shelter", *passim*.

15. In Natal, these funds were allocated from the Bantu Housing Board to local authorities via the Natal Housing Board. See Broome Commission; evidence of the City Council, 10 December 1947 and interview with Mr S Bourquin, 8 September 1980.

16. Morris, *Housing*, p 34.

17. MNAD; H2/CM, vol 1; Manager, MNAD "Draft", 12 January 1953.

and rotating principles of capital administered by the Bantu Housing Board unless other substantial modifications were made in urban African housing policy.

Central to the changes was the Department of Native Affairs' insistence that all new urban African housing be developed as site-and-service schemes. This would thus lower the standard and costs of such housing. While the principles of site-and-service housing had been discussed for many years, it was only during the 1950s that the policy became explicitly advocated.¹⁸ In terms of this policy individual African families would be allocated a site provided with basic sanitation and water facilities. At the corner of each site the tenant would either erect a temporary dwelling or be provided with such accommodation by the local authority. The value of such a dwelling, if financed in any way through the Native Revenue Account, was not to exceed £35. For renting the site the tenant would pay an economic rental calculated over a five year period.¹⁹ As the scheme progressed African families would be encouraged to erect more substantial dwellings without any financial assistance whatsoever. "Such houses", Verwoerd maintained, "could, from a small start, ... be enlarged from year to year into complete family homes, as the ability of the family to pay for them improves."²⁰ Formal housing would only be provided for Africans if sufficient housing capital was available and tenants were able to afford economic rentals. When full standard service facilities were provided the costs of such development would be borne solely by the tenants.²¹

In 1951 the government introduced measures designed to standardize the types of facilities provided in urban African housing schemes. All housing provided by the local authority had to conform to maximum standards laid down by the Department of Native Affairs. Any structural improvements, such as guttering and plastering, would have to be provided for and paid for by the tenants. Furthermore in order to reduce the cost of housing development, local authorities were empowered, in terms of the Natives Building Workers Act of 1951, to train and employ African building labour utilized in African housing development at lower rates of pay than those laid down for private industry.²²

As a further means to lower the standard and cost of urban African facilities, in October 1951 the government suspended the availability of loans for sub-economic housing and insisted that all existing development of housing using such funds be finalized by the 31 December 1951.²³ Whilst it was to prove

18. For details of Union Government housing policy see Wilkinson, "Adequate Shelter", Kenney, *Architect of Apartheid*, and T R H Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History*, (Johannesburg, 1977), p 269.

19. Morris, *Housing*, p 29.

20. Kenney, *Architect of Apartheid*.

21. See MNAD, KMHP, vol 2; Secretary for Native Affairs-Town Clerk, 7 December 1955.

22. SAIRR, Natal Regional Branch, File: Townships- Kwa Mashu, Natal Chamber of Industry, "Housing for the Urban African Population, 26 September 1960. For further details see Wilkinson "Adequate Shelter" and J W Cowden *Holmes' Local Government Finance in South Africa*, (Durban, 1969), p 30.

23. Mayors Minute, 1951-1952.

impossible to effect such drastic and immediate changes, the amounts of capital allocated for sub-economic housing schemes were reduced substantially.²⁴ In 1954, in a further attempt to undermine the principle of sub-economic housing, the Department of Native Affairs adjusted the wage-rental formula whereby African tenants were eligible to pay only sub-economic rentals. The number of tenants who were required to pay the full economic rentals on land and housing increased.²⁵

As a further means to secure sufficient capital for African housing the 1952 Native Services Levy Act obliged all employers of urban labour to pay towards the costs of developing housing facilities. Despite strong initial resistance from employers, the benefits of the Act were to be accepted by both the City Council and a majority of local employers. In 1954, municipal officials calculated that over the following 20 years, the municipality would gain approximately £5,400,000 through employer contributions in terms of the Act.²⁶ Such funds, which were to be deposited in a separate sub-account of the Native Revenue Account and administered by a Native Services Levy Fund Committee under the direction of the Minister of Native Affairs, were to be utilized in financing the provision of services to African residential areas. The fund could provide finances for the development of individual pit privy sanitation, communal water standpipes, minimum street lighting, and basic untarred roadways, but only if such a housing scheme adhered to site-and-service principles. The cost of providing improved services during the course of upgrading site-and-service schemes to formal African housing would be provided for in terms of economic loans from the Native Services Levy Fund.²⁷ With the promulgation, in 1957, of the Native Services Transport Levy Act, employers of African labour were also required to provide financial assistance towards the cost of developing transport services to and from African residential areas.²⁸

During the course of the government formulating this new housing policy, the Department of Native Affairs and the municipality were engaged in a series of negotiations over how the stipulations contained in the 1937 Native Revenue Account agreement could be altered. Municipal officials believed that certain conditions in the agreement placed an unfair financial burden on the municipality. Verwoerd desired to modify the agreement so that it would comply with new housing policy. In terms of the new agreement, which took effect on the 1 August 1957,²⁹ three main changes were decided upon. Firstly, the City Council had always objected to the manner in which the municipality had to either allocate municipal funds or cover the acquisition of land for African housing through open market capital loans. Municipal officials believed that because of the high capital costs of such land acquisition, an increased financial burden was placed on both the Native Revenue

24. MNAD;H/Gen, vol 2; City Treasurer and Acting Manager, MNAD "Rentals:Native Housing Accommodation", 16 October 1951.

25. *Ibid.*

26. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Inter-Departmental Meeting re:Duff's Road, minutes, 13 January 1954.

27. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Secretary for Native Affairs-Town Clerk, 2 February 1953.

28. Cowden *Local Government Finance*, p 28-29.

29. Mayors Minute, 1956-1957.

Account and African tenants in formal housing schemes.³⁰ Verwoerd agreed to alter this stipulation. Verwoerd wanted to prevent any capital other than that available to the Bantu Housing Board being used in providing urban African facilities and accepted the need to maintain both the self-accounting status of the Native Revenue Account and keep this Account solvent. In terms of the new agreement, whilst the City Council was still permitted to own any land required for African urban facilities, special loans at low interest rates would be made available through the National Housing and Planning Commission to the City Council for land purchases. Secondly, as both the municipality and the government desired to maintain the solvency of the Native Revenue Account, the municipality would not be permitted to charge the Account a land rental. The land rental, which would still be based on the market valuation of the land, not the significantly lower municipal valuation roll estimates, would be included in the fully economic site rents payable by each tenant.³¹ Thirdly, in terms of the new agreement, the City Council was also permitted to levy further charges for the provision of refuse removal and the consumption of water. These charges would be incorporated into the individual site rents.³² When site-and-service schemes were upgraded into formal housing schemes, the municipality would install water meters in each site. Even though the municipality's other ratepayers did not pay any extra amount for water consumption,³³ the City Council gained government approval for the policy.

While the revised housing policy developed during the 1950s was different from previous state policy, its successful implementation was constrained by two factors. There was insufficient capital for the development of formal housing accommodation. All future African housing projects would have to be based on site-and-service principles. In addition, whilst the government was intent on preventing the continuation of sub-economic African housing, upheld the self-accounting principles of the Native Revenue Account and, in the case of Durban, agreed to altering the 1937 agreement on terms financially favourable to the municipality, these stipulations were achieved through placing additional financial burdens on the individual African tenants themselves. As a result of these constraining features all negotiations over the details of the development of Kwa Mashu would present intractable problems to the government, the municipality and local manufacturing and commercial interests.

Contradictory Forces and Altered Planning

When the idea of the municipality acquiring land to the north of the city had first been raised, municipal officials agreed that the greatest obstacle to municipal acquisition would be the attitude of Natal Estates.³⁴

30. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 2; City Treasurer-Town Clerk, 12 January 1956.

31. *Ibid.*, vol 1; Secretary for Native Affairs-Town Clerk, 13 January 1954 and Mayors Minutes, 1956-1957.

32. *Daily News*, 21 June 1956 and interview with Mr S Bourquin, 10 September 1980.

33. *Ibid.*

34. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 8 October 1952.

Initially the company was an unwilling seller,³⁵ but then realizing that the land could possibly be expropriated, accepted that "some sacrifice ... might eventually become inevitable", and agreed to discuss the matter with the City Council³⁶. But the Natal Estates' bargaining position during these negotiations was strong. The company had access, through certain City Councillors, to all the confidential municipal documents dealing with municipal strategy for the land purchase.³⁷ As a result the company was aware that the City Council required the land urgently, and that expropriation could only be achieved through recourse to the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, in terms of which the land would then not be owned by the municipality. Whilst Natal Estates were aware that their financial claim for selling the land included many items which would be disallowed if the land was expropriated, they were however also aware that the City Council did not desire to expropriate the land. Natal Estates were thus in a far more powerful a position than was the municipality. Bourquin recalls the negotiations in the following way:

But ...although the discussions were always on a friendly basis, I mean there were no ill feelings - there was no animosity between the parties, the Natal Estates, being experienced and hard-bitten businessmen did not make it an easy matter for the Durban City Council to achieve its object. So the negotiations went on over a long period of time. They threatened to break down occasionally, not because of animosity, but simply because one could not agree on what was reasonable.³⁸

Negotiations between the municipality and Natal Estates commenced in December 1952, immediately after the City Council had eventually agreed to accept responsibility for providing new African housing in the city. In addition to the Natal Estates claim being based on certain technical data concerning the market value of the land and buildings, the value of the cane and the effect which the loss of these cane plantations would have on production costs at the Mount Edgecombe sugar mill, Natal Estates maintained that the land should be valued in accordance with certain additional considerations.³⁹ Natal Estates continually expressed their determination to place an additional value on the land because of its proximity to the city and its suitability for African urban housing.⁴⁰ In replying to Councillor Barns' request that the company provide the municipality with the relevant technical material, Halsey, the Finance Manager of Natal Estates remarked:

35. *Ibid.*, minutes of the meeting between the City Council and Natal Estates, 29 January 1953.

36. Natal Estates Archive; File: Duff's Road; Natal Estates-Town Clerk, 22 June 1955.

37. See for example Natal Estates Archive; File: Duff's Road- Land Acquisition; Memorandum, Halsey (General Manager)- Allsop (Business Manager), undated. At various times during the negotiations Mr R Butcher, then vice- chairman of Natal Estates and Mr D Panovka, a director of Natal Estates, were members of the City Council.

38. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 8 September 1980.

39. Natal Estates Archive; File: Duff's Road; Natal Estates - Town Clerk, 17 January 1952 and 20 July 1955; File: Richmond-Zeekoe Valley; Sugar Production Estimates, 1953- 1954, 1954-1955, 1955-1956 and 1956-1957 and Basis for Evaluation, undated and MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Minutes of the Meeting between the Special Committee re Native Housing and Natal Estates, 30 January 1953.

40. *Ibid.*, vol 2; Natal Estates-Town Clerk, 20 July 1955..

We shall have no objection at all. Our Accounts Department will be perfectly willing to give you that information. We are working as two partners, we are working together; but when it comes to negotiating the price, that will be another thing altogether. But in arriving at the information, I am perfectly willing that each side put its cards on the table. I do not for a moment suppose we will agree, but that is inevitable.⁴¹

Natal Estates were determined to draw the negotiations out in order to finally settle on a selling price advantageous to the company.

The City Council thus became reluctant to acquire all of the land in Richmond and Zeekoe Vallei Farms and Newlands. The purchase price would have been too high. Instead the City Council wanted to acquire only the land necessary for the provision of African township housing. The Newlands area and the remaining area of Richmond and Zeekoe Vallei Farms should be declared an "undated" area administered by the South African Native Affairs Commission for eventual African occupation.⁴² As a result of the difficulties encountered in the initial negotiations with Natal Estates, there were also attempts by various City Councillors, including the Mayor, to halt all development plans for housing to the north of the city. Many councillors wanted to renegotiate the municipal acquisition of land on the Umlazi Mission Reserve.⁴³ Verwoerd had once again to inform the City Council that the government would only consider providing housing on the Umlazi Mission Reserve once the municipality developed an African housing scheme to the north of the city.⁴⁴ The Department of Native Affairs, in spite of Verwoerd's initial reluctance,⁴⁵ eventually gave the City Council authority to acquire only the land required for Kwa Mashu.⁴⁶

The changes in the basic plan for the area contradicted the initial plan to resettle Africans living on the Umlazi Mission Reserve on to municipal land to the north of the city and thereby facilitate government development of African housing on the Umlazi Mission Reserve. Furthermore with the policy change the municipality became involved in further time-consuming negotiations over the precise area which the municipality required. Also the government insisted that the township still be situated close to the African reserve areas of Inanda, Dalmeny and Released Area 33. The municipality was required to purchase not only the land for African housing, but a further 120 acres of candeland for the development of an "umbilical cord"

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41. Natal Estates Archive; File: Duff's Road Land Acquisition; Minutes of Meeting between the Municipal Sub Committee re Land For Native Housing and Natal Estates, 29 January 1953.
 42. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Report of the Municipal Heads of Department to Special Committee re Native Housing, 27 January 1954; Native Administration Committee Minutes, 27 January 1954 and City Council Minutes, 29 January 1954.
 43. Natal Mercury, 30 October 1954.
 44. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 2; circular to City Councillors, Strictly Confidential, 28 May 1956.
 45. Ibid, vol 1; Secretary for Native Affairs-Town Clerk, 30 November 1953 and Town Clerk - Native Administration Committee, 22 April 1954.
 46. Ibid, vol 2; minutes of a Meeting between the City Council and the Department of Native Affairs, 12 September 1955.

road which would connect the township to the city and a further 480 acres for the buffer areas required by the Groups Areas Act.⁴⁷ It was only after the precise area required by the municipality was assessed at 2941 acres that negotiations with Natal Estates could proceed.⁴⁸

In October 1955, Natal Estates submitted a claim of £500,000 for the sale of their land to the municipality.⁴⁹ During the course of further negotiations it became evident that many city councillors were attempting to acquire the land over a long period of time and were reluctant to utilize the land for African housing.⁵⁰ After further discussions over technical details and the government threatening to expropriate the land required on behalf of the City Council,⁵¹ the City Council and Natal Estates eventually agreed to a price of £350,000 plus an additional £10,000 for that part of the sugar cane crop which could not be harvested before municipal development commenced.⁵²

However at Verwoerd's insistence, the municipality was required to purchase all the land immediately and then only lease back to Natal Estates those sections which would not be required during the first stages of housing development.⁵³ In addition, in order to compel the City Council to develop African housing in the area and ensure that such an African residential area could be later excised from the city and incorporated into the African reserves areas, the Department of Native Affairs insisted that the final terms of sale included no clauses which would disallow the South African Native Trust or any other body from acquiring the African township and incorporating the area within the African reserve areas which lay to the north of the township.⁵⁴

While the development of the township proceeded on land purchased from Natal Estates, the municipality commenced negotiations over the purchase of the remaining areas of required land with the other land owners in the area. While negotiations with the smaller sugar companies proceeded smoothly, municipal attempts to acquire land from Indian market gardeners, sugar cane farmers and some of those Indians living in the Duff's Road Indian Village which bordered the township, were strongly opposed. Opposition was based on a total rejection not only of the principles of land expropriation,⁵⁵ but also of the means by which the municipality intended to acquire the land. The City Council desired to acquire the land without providing

47. Ibid, vol 1; Secretary for Native Affairs-Town Clerk, 14 March 1955, City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 7 May 1955, Natal Mercury, 4 June 1954, 30 October 1954, 22 April 1955 and 10 October 1955 and KCAV; interview with Mr S Bourquin, 18 October 1979.

48. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 7 May 1955.

49. Ibid, vol 2; Town Clerk - Special Committee re Native Housing, 7 December 1955.

50. Ibid, Secretary for Native Affairs - Town Clerk, 6 September 1955.

51. Natal Mercury, 9 May 1955.

52. Ibid, 10 September 1956.

53. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 3; City Valuator and Estates Manager-Town Clerk, 18 July 1958.

54. Ibid, Town Clerk-Secretary for Native Affairs, 25 September 1956, Daily News, 14 September 1956 and Natal Mercury, 17 and 27 September 1956. Emphasis added.

55. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 2; Duff's Road Indian Association-Town Clerk, 22 November 1955.

existing owners and tenants with suitable alternative accommodation. Municipal bye-laws prevented such action, and there were strong objections from Indian residents and the Natal Housing Board. So the City Council proceeded to alter the bye-laws. The land was expropriated under the Groups Areas Act, without any alternative accommodation being provided.⁵⁶ Commenting on City Council policy, Councillor Charles Williamson remarked:

Would we have treated Europeans in the same way as we have treated the Indians at Clairwood, Cato Manor and now Duff's Road. Certainly we would not... and the only place to which they can go with any reasonable degree of security so far as the Group Areas Act is concerned is Reservoir Hills, where they will have to pay between £300 and £400 for a quarter of an acre.⁵⁷

Protests were ignored and the municipality commenced with the expropriation of Indian-owned land during July 1958.⁵⁸ The government had assured the City Council that a special allocation of £550,000 from the National Housing Commission would be made available to the municipality for required land purchases.⁵⁹ However, the eventual cost of all the land required for Kwa Mashu came to £900,000.⁶⁰ While the government agreed to allocate extra funds the high cost of the land was to place an extremely heavy burden on the individual African tenants who would be settled in the new housing scheme.

The municipality was also engaged in complex and often heated discussions with the government and local employers over the suitability of certain housing plans for Kwa Mashu. All parties accepted that Africans should be resettled on land on the outskirts of the city and that Kwa Mashu, being located next to African reserve areas which bordered the city, was a suitable location for African housing development. However, while agreeing on the spatial suitability of the land, contradictions arose over the differing objectives of the major parties, the nature and suitability of particular housing plans, the planning timetable, the financial costs of particular housing developments, and African tenants' ability to afford the cost of this new accommodation.

While the government's new housing policy implied an increasing involvement by the central state in African housing, the actual responsibility for the development of housing remained with the local urban authority.⁶¹ Verwoerd viewed the task of the Department of Native Affairs as being essentially concerned with curbing the availability of housing funds and compelling local authorities to develop site-and-service schemes. Within the Department of Native Affairs Verwoerd assumed near total control of the decision-making process

56. *Ibid.*, Duff's Road Indian Association-Town Clerk 14 July 1956, Natal Housing Board-Town Clerk, 30 November 1956, City Council minutes, 8 December 1956.

57. *Natal Mercury*, 7 November 1956.

58. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 8; Special Committee re Native Housing Agenda, 25 July 1958.

59. *Ibid.*, vol 3; City Treasurer-Town Clerk, 12 January 1956.

60. *Natal Mercury*, 5 September 1956.

61. The only exceptions were the Union Government development of Meadowlands and then Umlazi during the 1960s.

for the approval of housing plans.⁶² Having little knowledge of the principles of town planning,⁶³ being more concerned with the African housing shortage in the Johannesburg area,⁶⁴ and unfamiliar with the topographical features prevailing in the Durban area,⁶⁵ Verwoerd remained dogmatic that Kwa Mashu could be developed as a site-and-service scheme.⁶⁶ Furthermore, Verwoerd did not see the African housing shortage in Durban as necessitating close co-operation between the municipality and the government through the collaborating committees that the City Council continually requested;⁶⁷ nor did he believe that the Department of Native Affairs or the National Housing and Planning Commission should become involved in the basic planning of Kwa Mashu.⁶⁸

While the City Council believed that the principles of site-and-service scheme development were sound, they were opposed to the development of site-and-service housing in Kwa Mashu.⁶⁹ Once the City Council had accepted municipal responsibility for the provision of African housing, the City Council soon recognized that formal housing would have to be provided. Furthermore, the municipality recognized that such formal accommodation would have to be provided for prospective tenants as Africans would not be able to either erect or contract for the erection of dwellings which met the required standards.⁷⁰ Representatives of major local industrial and commercial interests concurred with the City Council. Employers of African labour wanted the shantytowns destroyed. The local building industry, in particular, opposed any policy which might prevent the expansion of local industry through industry's involvement in the building of African formal accommodation. In any site-and-service scheme, the range of housing commodities which would have to be either produced or supplied by local industry and commerce, was far smaller than those facilities which were required for the construction of formal housing.⁷¹

Throughout the negotiations over the planning of Kwa Mashu, municipal officials pointed out that the land on which Kwa Mashu was to be situated was unsuitable for the successful application of site-and-service principles. The hilly terrain and clay soil,⁷² could not provide any natural drainage, particularly during the

62. See for example MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Native Commissioner-Town Clerk, 20 May 1955 and vol 5; Secretary for Native Affairs- Town Clerk, 1 July 1957.

63. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 10 July 1980.

64. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 8; Town Clerk - Special Committee re Native Housing, 13 October 1958.

65. *Ibid.* Secretary for Native Affairs - Town clerk, 18 October 1958.

66. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 8 September 1980.

67. City Council minutes, 27 January 1954 and MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Town Clerk - Native Administration Committee, 22 April 1954.

68. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 8 September 1980.

69. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 6; City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 4 January 1958 and interview with Mr S Bourquin 8 September 1980.

70. MNAD; H2/CM vol 1; City and Water Engineer- Town Clerk, 26 August 1949.

71. Hendler, "The making of Soweto", p 11.

72. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 2; City and Water Engineer - Secretary for Native Affairs, 18 August 1955.

summer rainfall period. As a result any African residential development in the area would have to be provided with full drainage and a tarred road network. In order to prevent the outbreak of diseases, full standard water-borne sanitation and ablution facilities would also be required.⁷³

Municipal officials' second objection to site-and-service development in Kwa Mashu was based on their first-hand knowledge of the inadequacies evident in some of the site-and-service schemes being developed in other parts of the country. By 1956

municipal officials had undertaken an extensive tour around various African housing schemes in both the Union and Southern Rhodesia.⁷⁴ On the tour municipal officials inspected the municipality of Benoni's Daveyton scheme, which was the first housing project to be developed in accordance with the site-and-service principles of the Department of Native Affairs. Commenting on the Daveyton scheme, Bourquin recalls:

... it was reasonably successful up to a point, but it broke down again on account of the failure of the responsible authority to secure sufficient funds to replace the temporary houses with permanent houses. Or to insist on the site owners or holders replacing their shack with a substantial house which again depended upon funds because they would have expected monies to have been made available.⁷⁵

After this tour of inspection it became clear to the municipality that site-and-service schemes could only operate effectively for a short period of time and that they should be rapidly transformed into more formal residential areas.

However the municipality also became increasingly aware that the government was reluctant to provide any financial assistance for the upgrading of site-and-service schemes.⁷⁶ While the Department of Native Affairs maintained that it was relatively easy for a local authority to ensure that site-and-service schemes could be developed "in an orderly and tidy manner ... so that temporary rooms are neatly and methodically erected so that they are not facing in all directions or are indiscriminately jumbled together",⁷⁷ municipal officials believed that site-and-service schemes would rapidly become further shantytown areas.⁷⁸ Both the City Council and local employers desired not so much the relocation of shantytowns, as their complete eradication.

Furthermore municipal officials pointed out that the costs of eventually building a formal house on a site in any way already occupied would be more than the maximum house cost stipulated by the government. And yet the government however was reluctant to provide housing capital for the development of formal

73. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Indepartmental Sub Committee re Duff's Road Minutes, 13 January 1954.

74. Municipality of Durban; "Report of the Proposed Organization to Deal with Native Housing under the Special Committee for Native Housing", City and Water Engineer, July 1955.

75. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 8 September 1980.

76. *Ibid.*

77. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 4; Department of Native Affairs memorandum "Site-and-Service Schemes", 21 January 1957.

78. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 10 July 1980.

economic African housing, even for schemes which had been initially developed on site-and-service principles. The Department of Native Affairs maintained that the improving of accommodation in site-and-service schemes should be undertaken by the tenants themselves. The government would only consider providing funds for the erection of formal houses for Africans if housing capital was available, all sites were already occupied, and tenants were capable of paying economic rentals. However, even if these stipulations were met, formal houses would only be erected on every second or third site.⁷⁹ Eiselen believed that such a policy would "give a favourable impression to the scheme" and encourage other tenants to improve their own housing without the use of housing capital.⁸⁰

Under extreme pressure from the City Council, local employers and the Manager of the municipal Native Administration Department, the Department of Native Affairs eventually agreed to the immediate development of formal housing in Kwa Mashu.⁸¹ The often acrimonious discussions between the municipality and the Department of Native Affairs over the housing plan for Kwa Mashu were significant. Both sides viewed the main problems of African housing in differing ways. For the Department of Native Affairs, the primary goal was to resettle urban Africans as rapidly as possible into areas on the outskirts of the city, restrict the provision of formal economic housing for Africans and make Africans responsible for upgrading their own accommodation. Against this view, the main concern of both the municipality and local employers was to resettle African shack dwellers into housing which would ensure that Kwa Mashu society would be fundamentally different to that of shantytown areas. Nevertheless, whilst all parties to the discussions agreed to the immediate provision of formal accommodation in Kwa Mashu, the decision to build formal housing at Kwa Mashu exacerbated the fundamental contradiction between the costs of those facilities, the self accounting status of the Native Revenue Account, government insistence on the need to provide formal housing on an economic basis and the wages of prospective tenants.

While the municipality had initially intended all eleven Neighbourhood Units in Kwa Mashu to be developed for single-site, single tenant nuclear family accommodation, the government insisted that a Neighbourhood Unit be developed as a cemetery and two Neighbourhood Units be used for male migrant housing.⁸² As a result, the costs of the planned family housing increased slightly through fewer homes being planned. The costs of each dwelling were further increased through the municipality becoming increasingly aware that Africans were reluctant to consider home-ownership schemes⁸³ and could also not afford the cash downpayment required for home-ownership.⁸⁴ Because less housing was being provided and tenants who were renting houses did not pay deposits, the economic charges for the scheme increased.⁸⁵

79. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 4; City and Water Engineer - Town Clerk, 1 April 1957.

80. *Ibid.*, Department of Native Affairs memorandum "Site and Service Schemes", 21 January 1957.

81. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 6; Secretary for Native Affairs-Town Clerk, 2 April 1958.

82. MNAD; H/Gen, vol 2; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 9 November 1957.

83. SAIRR, Natal Region; File:Kwa Mashu; notes of a talk by the Manager, MNAD, given on the 15 September 1959.

84. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 4; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 30 September 1957.

85. MNAD;H/Gen, vol 2; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 9 November 1957.

It rapidly became aware that the majority of Africans living in the Mkhumbane area would be unable to pay the required rents in Kwa Mashu. This crisis provoked increasing frustration amongst many city councillors, some of whom asserted that the municipality should refuse to provide any formal African accommodation and that the government should provide housing on the Umlazi Mission Reserve.⁸⁶ Bourquin, by then manager of the municipal Native Administration Department called a halt to all planning for Kwa Mashu until detailed income surveys were conducted.⁸⁷

In 1950, local employers of African labour had been relatively optimistic about the clear correlation between economic growth, the new pass laws and labour bureau system, rising wages amongst an increasingly semi-skilled, permanently urbanized African working class, and the provision of new economic housing for Africans in the city. However, by the late 1950s it became clearly apparent that the, in some cases restructured, conditions of African employment in the city had neither substantially assisted local economic growth nor produced a permanently urbanized African working class capable of affording the basic cost of life in Kwa Mashu. However, by the late 1950s it became clearly apparent that the manner in which the inter-connections between capitalist economic growth, African labour supply and state intervention had developed were skewed in ways which had not substantially increased social differentiation within the African proletariat nor produced a permanently urbanized African working class capable of affording the basic costs of life in Kwa Mashu.

The new influx controls had been applied in ways which had responded to and gave legislative effect to the often marked existing and continuing wage differentials between hostel dwellers and those resident in formal townships. However, amongst those who now had the legal privilege of permanent urban residence, there had been little change in the nature of their employment within the capitalist economy.

During the 1950s an increasing number of workers became employed in semi-skilled capacities. While many of these workers were either Indian, or to a lesser extent 'Coloured', there were also many Africans who became employed in semi-skilled position.⁸⁸ However, this growing use of semi-skilled labour aggravated unemployment among Africans.⁸⁹ Furthermore, while the literacy rate amongst adult African workers in the city was still extremely low, Africans were continually complaining about the difficulties which their school-leaving children experienced in finding suitable employment.⁹⁰ These trends were confirmed by various municipal statistics.⁹¹

86. *Ibid.*, vol 5; City and Water Engineer - town clerk, 29 November 1957 and *Natal Mercury*, 10 April 1958.

87. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 6; City Treasurer and Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 8 February 1958 and *Daily News*, 14 January 1957.

88. Katzen, *Industry*, p71.

89. For similar analysis see Davies *White Labour*.

90. *Ilanga lase Natal*.

91. MNAD; H/Gen, vol 2; Income Surveys, 1960 and Bourquin Papers, vol 5, address given by Mr S Bourquin of urban African literacy to the annual conference of the Institute for Administrators of Non-European Affairs, 1961.

Furthermore, throughout the 1950s the nominal wages of African unskilled labour rose only slightly. In 1956 a municipal survey estimated that the vast majority of African unskilled workers living in either Lamont or Chesterville earned a monthly wage of between £10 and £15 a month. The majority of the remaining men in these areas earned less than £10 a month.⁹² These wages, which were in accordance with the various Wage Determination rates for unskilled African labour in the Durban area,⁹³ were not peculiar to either of these two residential areas. In 1957, the municipality found that 39% of industrial employers paid their African labour less than £10 a month, with 60% paying between £10 and £15 a month.⁹⁴

Wages increases had been kept to a minimum through various means. The labour bureau had operated effectively to curtail the practice of 'job hopping'. Contemporaneously, the wide range of wages which various earlier Wage Determinations had laid down for African unskilled labour had been substantially reduced.⁹⁵ Furthermore Africans became all too aware of the increasingly large reserve army of labour resident in the city. As a consequence African employee turnover within the industrial and commercial sectors began to decline.⁹⁶ Kunene recalls that he got his first job with Dunlop, as a floor sweeper, in 1955: 'you just stay there and then you get another job, but always in Dunlops. I became a machine boy in the Sports Section and then a cutter in the tyre section - with the aeroplane tyres'.⁹⁷

Throughout the later 1940s and 1950s, both the state and capital were extremely aware that local economic forces were remarkably quick to respond to any reduction in the African population resident in the city and either seeking work or unemployed. However, by the late 1950s it was acknowledged that the problem of African unemployment in Durban had grown substantially.

By the late 1950s, the unemployment level of African men living in the various residential townships had increased significantly. In 1951 municipal surveys in Chesterville, Lamont and Lamont Extension had revealed little unemployment.⁹⁸ However by June 1960, it was evident that from the same sample unemployment had increased markedly. The later survey of Chesterville revealed that nearly 30% of African male residents might be unemployed.⁹⁹ With a view to reducing the African city population, during the late 1950s the municipality and the police embarked on massive pass raids which resulted in many Africans being either endorsed out of the city or leaving before being arrested and evicted. In addition, in terms of new pass

92. MNAD;H/Gen, vol 2; Income survey:Chesterville and Lamont, 1956.

93. *Ibid.* Wage Rate:Labourers, undated.

94. *Ibid.* Department of Economics, University of Natal, memorandum Wage Increases:Bantu workers Resident in the Shack Areas of Cato Manor, Durban,9 February 1960.

95. KCM, Reel 16 A, 2:XC9:45/10; South African Congress of Trade Unions memorandum submitted to the Wage Board, 26 June 1959.

96. Interview with Mr T Roche, 22 April 1982.

97. Interview with Mr M O D Kunene, 5 May 1985.

98. MNAD; H/Gen, vol 1; Income Surveys, 1951.

99. *Ibid.*, vol 2; Income Surveys, 1960.

law regulations, African males living in the seven reserves close to Durban were only permitted to enter Durban if there was a labour shortage and on condition that they returned to the reserves on expiry of their contract. However while employers did make growing use of African migrant labour originating in these seven reserves, the increasing unemployment rate in the formal townships was not simply due to employers preference for migrant labour.¹⁰⁰ During the late 1950s industrial expansion in the Durban area had been slow, and consequently there had been little real increase in work opportunities available for Africans legally permanently resident in the city.

The problem was severely compounded by the evident conditions in the Mkhumbane shack areas. Most of the inhabitants of the area were employed in the lowest categories of unskilled labour. In late 1958 a municipal survey of shack areas outside the Cato Manor Emergency Camp reported that half of the African men in the area earned between £5 and £10 a month, and a quarter between £10 and £12 a month. All of those surveyed were legally entitled to live in the city, with over half being legally married. In spite of the remaining men not being legally married but living in what the survey referred to as "marriages of convenience",¹⁰¹ all couples and dependants were to be moved into the single-site, single-nuclear family part of Kwa Mashu. The majority of the couples in the area had more than one child or other dependant.¹⁰²

In 1951, the Department of Economics at the University of Natal had estimated that the minimum cost of food and other domestic requirements for an African family of five living in the Durban area was approximately £10 to £12 per family per month. This estimate did not include the costs of rent, taxes, transport or schooling.¹⁰³ In 1958, the Union Department of Public Health recommended that as a result of inflation, the monthly food requirements of an African family of five in Durban had risen from £14 to £17 a month.¹⁰⁴

In summary, although the costs of African labour had been kept down and some measure of increased social differentiation ensured, this rebounded on attempts to break up shantytowns and relocate and transform African urban residence. This crisis over the ability of Africans living in the shack areas in the city to afford the costs of accommodation planned for Kwa Mashu came at the same time as the local economy suffered from the recession which affected all the major industrial and commercial centres throughout the country.¹⁰⁵ Local employers of African labour expressed concern over the employers' ability to raise African wages with the local economy being "stagnant" and industrial and commercial enterprises experiencing "considerable decreases in profit" margins.¹⁰⁶ Contrary to the ideas of local employers during the early 1950s during the later 1950s, representatives of local industry cautioned that it was incorrect to believe that a rapid

100. Posel, "The Nature of Apartheid", p10.

101. *Ibid.*, Memorandum for Manager: Socio-Economic Survey, undated.

102. *Ibid.*

103. O Horwood, "Urban African Employment", p 317, and Burrows, "Native Incomes", p 176.

104. Maasdorp and Humphreys, *From Shantytown to Township*, p 28.

105. Tichman.

106. Natal Chamber of Industry, Annual Report, 1958-1959.

and dramatic increase in African wages would boost local economic growth through providing the African urban population with greater spending power. The chairman of the Natal Chamber of Industry noted that such a view "put the cart before the horse". African wages should only increase gradually and only after industrial profits had increased.¹⁰⁷

It was during this crisis that both the state and capital realized that they had both failed to create the new African working class. Such a permanently urbanized workforce would have to be created through the very fact of removal to Kwa Mashu. Although all parties at various confidential discussions convened to discuss the crisis accepted that the actual removal to Kwa Mashu would, on the whole, only occur, by necessity, through the use of direct state co-ercion, the particular characteristics of the labour force resident in Mkhumbane and the housing facilities being planned for Kwa Mashu required more fundamental policy re-appraisal.¹⁰⁸

Statistics revealed that only about 24% of Africans in the Cato Manor Farm shantytowns had a formal income in excess of the minimum subsistence requirement. Bourquin noted that:

... it would appear that while the average householder could afford combined rentals up to say £2.5.0 per month, any increase beyond that limit must be regarded as imposing a severe or even unbearable burden on the majority of them, leaving them with insufficient earnings to pay for food, transport and other necessities of life. Ability to pay will have to be an essential qualification for admission to the housing scheme, and in the absence of eligible applicants in sufficient numbers, many houses might actually stand empty. It would be inevitable that losses incurred in this direction would sooner or later have to be borne by the ratepayers of the City.¹⁰⁹

The problem was further compounded by the fact that in terms of government housing policy, Kwa Mashu would have to be developed as an economic housing scheme. However all African men eligible for relocation into single-site, single-nuclear family accommodation, but having a monthly salary of less than £15 qualified for sub-economic housing.¹¹⁰ As Bourquin commented,

On completion of the Duff's Road (Kwa Mashu) scheme, it is expected that Durban will have, in addition to its existing 4,000 sub-economic houses in Lamont and Chesterville, another 12,000 economic units at Kwa Mashu. This means that of the total housing available, 25% will be sub-economic and 75% will be economic. These percentages are an almost complete reversal of the actual requirements ... whereby 80% of the population are in the sub-economic group and only 20% in the economic group.

In recent discussions with ...the Department of Native Affairs ... the fact emerged that there is no intention to make further sub-economic funds available. Financial and administrative considerations make it ... imperative to house people within their income limits. This aspect

107. *Ibid.*

108. See for example MNAD; H\Gen, vol 2; minutes of a meeting between the Durban City Council and the Department of Bantu Administration, 13 July 1959.

109. MNAD; H\Gen, vol 2; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 9 November 1957.

110. *Ibid.* City Treasurer's Department, confidential memorandum Rentals:Native Housing Accommodation.

will have a drastic effect on the further planning of the Duff's Road scheme in which rentals are perforce higher than the average in the Union, whereas the income of the average Native worker is possibly slightly lower than that of other larger urban areas.¹¹¹

During the course of discussions to resolve this problem, municipal officials and representatives of major employers raised the possibility of enforcing rent payments by threatening defaulters with eviction. The idea was immediately rejected as it went against the whole purpose of providing accommodation in Kwa Mashu: to relocate Africans living in shantytowns and ensure that a settled urban African working class was accommodated in totally different housing from that available in shantytowns. Bourquin commented,

It is reasonable to expect that people will rather default with rent payments than starve or go naked. (sic) The collection of rents would become futile or at best an invidious task ... Ejectments as such would serve no purpose as they would not induce a person to pay if he had nothing to pay with, nor would it solve the problem as it would be impossible to fill the vacancies in this manner with satisfactory tenants.¹¹²

Municipal officials and local employers also suggested that when estimating the finances available to a prospective African male tenant, any income earned by such a person's wife should be added to the African man's wages.¹¹³ A further suggestion was that the plans for housing in Kwa Mashu should be altered to permit a tenant to sub-let a room.¹¹⁴ These ideas were also summarily discounted as they went against the basic principle of providing a form of housing in Kwa Mashu which would effectively prevent the re-emergence of conditions of life prevalent in shantytowns. Municipal officials believed that any form of sub-renting would perpetuate shack conditions,¹¹⁵ while Bourquin attacked the idea of allowing non-formal income to be included in the financial assessment of future tenants:

It might be argued that if the average Native tenant is given a house he will somehow pay for it by inducing his wife or children to supplement the family income. There are of course instances where this is done, but in so many other cases it leads to illicit practices... that it would be most unwise to base a financial policy on the prospect of contributions towards rent from the various members of the family.¹¹⁶

Both the municipality and local employers also requested the government to alter the financial loan and redemption period for the scheme from 30 years to "forty or even fifty years", but with no success.¹¹⁷

111. *Ibid.*, Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 9 November 1957.

112. *Ibid.*

113. Natal Chamber of Industry, Annual Report, 1952-1953.

114. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 7; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 6 November 1958 and Township Manager, Kwa Mashu-Manager, MNAD, 25 November 1958.

115. *Ibid.*

116. MNAD; H/Gen, vol 2; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 9 November 1957.

117. Natal Chamber of Industry, Annual Report, 1957-1958.

Nevertheless the imperatives of capital accumulation during the 1950s required the provision of suitable housing for the future growth of an increasingly differentiated urban proletariat: male hostels and housing for those permanently urbanized African workers and their families. Local employers were steadfast in their insistence that a fully stabilized African working class could only be accommodated in housing that would ensure that the social relations current in shantytowns would not be recreated in new townships.

Both the government and the municipality accepted such a policy. However, the very success of measures to regulate the character of African labour in the city prevented those African workers who were legal permanent residents in the city from paying for new housing. Whilst the municipality, local employers and the government agreed on the suitability of the spatial location of Kwa Mashu as a site for relocating African shack dwellers, the nature of the terrain and the commitment to provide only formal housing in the area raised considerable problems, with neither the municipality nor the government having the financial resources to subsidize African housing. In spite of employers being compelled to indirectly subsidize the costs of new African housing, the financial costs of purchasing the required land and building an economic housing scheme in the area raised the costs of African life in the area to levels above the financial means of the majority of prospective tenants.

Local employers and municipal officials acknowledged the financial difficulties which would face those being moved into Kwa Mashu. In 1959 the Chairman of the Natal Chamber of Industries noted that even after certain wage increases, the costs of housing in Kwa Mashu "place some Natives in a worse financial position ... than that in which they were before (their relocation to Kwa Mashu)".¹¹⁸ In addition, whilst municipal officials asserted that only formal housing should be built in Kwa Mashu, they accepted that the low wages paid to African workers "lent weight to the Union Government's proposal to resettle people on a site-and-service scheme or some modification of it".¹¹⁹

These discussions occurred against a backdrop of increasing organized African resistance to any removal from Cato Manor Farm, the 'Pound a Day Campaign' was jointly by the South African Congress of Trade Unions and the African National Congress, and increasingly militant and widespread African political activity in the Durban area. As a result of this widespread political discontent, the municipality,¹²⁰ local employers¹²¹ and the government¹²² realized the urgent need to destroy shack society and relocate shack dwellers into formal housing; and they saw that such a policy would, by and large, have to be achieved forcibly. To all parties involved in the discussions over housing in Kwa Mashu, the political mobilization of Africans in the city was in many ways final confirmation that formal housing should be built as soon as possible.

118. *Ibid.* 1958-1959.

119. MNAD;H/Gen, vol 2; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 9 November 1957.

120. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 8; Town Clerk-Special Committee re Native Housing, 13 October 1958.

121. Natal Chamber of Industry, Annual Report, 1958-1959.

122. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 8; Town Clerk-Special Committee re Native Housing, 13 October 1958.

This political militancy, however constrained even further the ability of either the municipality, local employers or the government to effect any drastic change in the housing plans for Kwa Mashu. It did however serve as the context in which many, including Bourquin, who realized the "fairness" behind the African National Congress' call for wage increase,¹²³ were to call on all employers of African labour to raise wages. This call included the municipality, which was one of the "worst employers" of African labour.¹²⁴ Such a policy was supported by most municipal officials and local employers, who after they had bitterly attacked the municipality,¹²⁵ they accepted that in order for development in Kwa Mashu to proceed, wage increases were of critical importance. From 1959 onwards, employers began to grant increased wages to African workers. Whilst these increases were at first insubstantial,¹²⁶ both employers and the municipality concurred that Africans should rapidly be able to afford the cost of living in Kwa Mashu.¹²⁷

However, the ability of Africans to afford the rent in Kwa Mashu was not simply to be resolved through wage increases. During the course of further negotiations between local industry and commerce, the municipality and the government, all parties agreed on a new housing plan for Kwa Mashu. The plan was essentially aimed at reducing the cost, size and quality of housing, and at minimizing the provision of facilities other than housing.

According to the new plan, four types of permanent, nuclear-family houses were to be built. Africans wealthy enough and willing to enter into individual contracts for the erection of houses, according to standards laid down by the municipality, would be allocated a 4,500 square-foot site for a site rental and rate repayment cost of £3.19.9 a month.¹²⁸ For the erection of such houses, financial loans to the value of £250 would be available from the Native Revenue Account.¹²⁹ Secondly, four-roomed detached bungalows, the ubiquitous 51/ houses, would be built on 2,800 square-foot sites. These could be purchased for a £2 deposit and a payment of £3.1.10 a month, or rented for £3.6.3 per month. Thirdly, a four roomed semi-detached house on a 2,450 square-foot site could be rented for £3.2.0 per month, or purchased for a deposit of £2 and a monthly payment of £2.17.4.¹³⁰ Both the municipality and local employers accepted that such housing "would cater only for the better income group of African workers (ie those earning approximately £15 per month or more)".¹³¹

For those earning less, the plans provided for the erection of two-roomed formal housing, log cabins and a site-and-service scheme development. The two-roomed houses, the infamous K2D dwellings, which were

123. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 7 July 1988.

124. *Ibid.*, 8 September 1980.

125. *Ibid.*

126. MNAD:H/Gen, vol 2; Native Wage increases, undated.

127. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 10 September 1980.

128. SAIRR, Natal Region; File Townships: Kwa Mashu, Natal Chamber of Industry, "Housing for the Urban African Population", 26 September 1960.

129. *Ibid.*

130. *Ibid.*

131. MNAD:H/Gen, vol 2; Housing Plan for Kwa Mashu, June 1959.

to be built mainly along the main spinal road through Kwa Mashu, could be rented for £2.16.5. per month, or purchased for a slightly lower monthly payment and an initial deposit of £2. These houses were to be constructed in such a way that tenants could extend the dwelling unit relatively easily.¹³² For renting the single-roomed log cabin, which was situated on a 1,400 square foot site, the tenant would pay £1.13.0 per month. Those people building their own accommodation in the site-and-service scheme would pay a monthly site rental of £1.19.9. In the log cabin scheme, water and sanitation facilities were shared between two cabins, while in the site-and-service scheme full water-borne sanitation and water facilities were provided on each site.¹³³

One of the main purposes of both the log cabin and site-and-service schemes was to enable the municipality to remove all people from the shantytowns as soon as possible but in a way which provided homes for those unable to pay the rents required in formal housing: the "extremely poor and homeless".¹³⁴ The log cabins and site-and-service schemes would also serve as the first relocation area for those Africans who, while eligible and able to pay for single-site, single-tenant nuclear family accommodation, were not yet married. Such African men and women and their children would be settled in this area and then given a short period of time to "formalize their relationship", at which time they would be removed to formal housing.¹³⁵ If such a couple failed to become legally married, the male would be resettled in the hostel area and the woman evicted from the city.¹³⁶ The pressure on conforming to the single-site, single-tenant, nuclear-family structure desired was immense.

The layout plan for male hostel accommodation envisaged the construction of single-storey cottages accommodating either 16 or 32 men in large dormitories. All the "inmates"¹³⁷ would be provided with a steel bed and locker.¹³⁸ Every alternate dormitory would be provided with either ablution or washing facilities. No hot water would be available.¹³⁹ Full standard lighting would be provided in each dormitory. Reflecting on the reasons for building single-storey dormitories, Drew, a former superintendent of the Kwa Mashu hostel, commented:

If one looks at it from a maintenance point of view, the old triple-storey you can get more on the land, its easier to keep clean, you have not got the grass ... but then again you must look at it from the social point of view. You have thousands of men on top of one another. They, where they come from, are used to a bit of space around them. Secondly you must look at it from a security angle. If you had a riot, if you have a mass in one block ... whereas if you have open space one can deploy any police and people to curb it.¹⁴⁰

132. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 7 July 1988.

133. MNAD:H/Gen, vol 2; Housing Plan for Kwa Mashu, June 1959.

134. *Ibid.*

135. Interview with Mr T Roche, 22 April 1982.

136. *Ibid.*

137. Interview with Mr R F Drew, 16 January 1981.

138. MNAD: H2/KM, vol 5; City and Water Engineer-town clerk, 27 July 1957.

139. *Ibid.*

140. Interview with Mr R F Drew, 16 January 1981.

The hostel area was to be provided with a beerhall, shops and a sports field.¹⁴¹ The whole hostel area would be cordoned off from the rest of the township by a six-foot "manproof fence". Two guarded gateways would provide the only means of entrance and exit.¹⁴² Drew comments:

One had to be careful that any foreign element did not sneak into their place, such as females or homosexuality or things like that. You know, you just had to try and maintain a stable community there. Because after all, if they were undisciplined it would affect the married side of the township and again it could affect the employers.¹⁴³

After having noted the control problems which had arisen in planners single storey dormitory hostels in the Johannesburg area, revised the proposed hostel layout. Some sixteen single-storey dormitories were to be provided for renting by employers desiring to house their own unskilled labour. But the majority of the 'cottage' dormitories were modified into a number of two-roomed, four-bedded flatlets.¹⁴⁴ One of the two rooms would be fitted with two bunks, while the other served as a kitchen. The municipality felt that this modification could permit a greater degree of control over cleanliness and discipline,¹⁴⁵ and believed that Africans would prefer flatlets as 'boys could choose their own messmates'.¹⁴⁶ Drew recalls the flatlets in the following way:

Inside ... you come to a room with a concrete table and two benches adequate for four people and to the right of this you would get four food lockers for pots and primuses. Then one would go into ... the next room and you would find four bed-bunks. Each bunk had a locker so that they could store stuff in them.¹⁴⁷

The hostels would accommodate 25,000 people, who would pay an economic rental of £1 a month. Employers could rent accommodation to ensure that their workers were properly housed and then deduct such rent from the workers' wages.¹⁴⁸

As a result of sustained pressure from both the Chamber of Industries and the Master Builders Association,¹⁴⁹ the construction of all housing in Kwa Mashu was to be undertaken jointly by the municipality

141. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 5; City and Water Engineer - Town Clerk, 27 July 1957.

142. *Ibid.*

143. Interview with Mr R F Drew, 16 January 1981.

144. *Ibid.*

145. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 7; City and Water Engineer - Town Clerk, 23 July 1958.

146. *Ibid.*

147. Interview with Mr R F Drew, 16 January 1981.

148. *Ibid.*

149. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 4; Town Clerk - Special Committee re Native Housing, 18 February 1957; Laing and Roberts - Town Clerk, 14 May 1957, City and Water Engineer - Town Clerk, 15 May 1957 and vol 7; Master Builders and Allied Trades Association - Town Clerk, 6 October 1958.

and private building companies. Local industrialists and the Master Builders Association had consistently objected to the way in which the Native Building Workers Act prevented private companies from being engaged in township construction projects. Industrialists also maintained that private companies should be permitted to pay lower wages to labour engaged in township construction.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, under a scheme developed by the municipality various private construction companies had already built specimen houses in Kwa Mashu which cost the same as those which could be built by the municipality.¹⁵¹ While the government did not favour the principle of private companies erecting African housing, the Department of Native Affairs consented to the plan in order that the building programme be speeded up.¹⁵² The government assured the City Council that sufficient economic housing funds would be made available.¹⁵³

Community Facilities for Kwa Mashu New Town

From the outset of the planning for Kwa Mashu, both the City Council and various employer organizations¹⁵⁴ maintained that the success of the scheme depended upon the provision of a cheap and quick railway service to the township from the city centre. The City Council desired neither a bus service inside the township, which would have facilitated easy communication between the various distinct Neighbourhood Units but would also have required the development of a tarred road system,¹⁵⁵ nor a bus service between the township and the city.¹⁵⁶ Here municipal reasoning was less a matter of finance and more a concern with simple logistics. When the township was fully occupied, in order to cater for peak-time demand buses would be required to leave Kwa Mashu every six seconds every morning between 6 am and 7 am. Neither the existing bus terminus in the city nor the roads to Kwa Mashu could cater for such traffic.¹⁵⁷

However, as a result of the delays in purchasing the land and developing a suitable layout plan, the South African Railways was reluctant to discuss developing a rail service to the area until the township was occupied.¹⁵⁸ Bourquin recalls the difficulty:

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- 150. Broome Commission; evidence of the Durban Chamber of Commerce and the Natal Chamber of Industry, Durban Chamber of Commerce Annual Reports, *passim* and Natal Chamber of Industry, Annual Reports, *passim*.
 - 151. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 4; City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 6 September 1957.
 - 152. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 10 July 1980.
 - 153. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 7; Minutes of a meeting between the City Council and the Department of Native Affairs, 10 November 1958.
 - 154. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 8 October 1956, *Natal Mercury*, 10 April and 8 December 1953 and KCAV; interview with Mr I K Allan, 10 September 1982.
 - 155. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 17 February 1956.
 - 156. *Ibid.*, City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 12 January 1953.
 - 157. *Ibid.*
 - 158. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Minutes of a meeting between the City Council and the South African Railways, 3 October 1953.

It was appreciated right at the start that the only suitable means of transport was a fast electrified railway service, but obviously the Railways administration was not prepared to put a service in until there were sufficient people to use it. ... the irresistible force and the immovable object. The Railways just would not budge and would not build in advance or in anticipation. They are again businessmen, and they wanted to establish the necessity before they would establish a service.¹⁵⁹

Finally in 1958, after houses had been built and occupied, the South African Railways and the City Council agreed on the provision of a railway service.¹⁶⁰

The development required the construction of an electrified double-spur line from Duff's Road station into Kwa Mashu and the building of two stations in the township. The existing rail link between Duff's Road and the city stations of Umgeni Road, Berea Road and Rosburgh would also have to be doubled and electrified. Furthermore, the facilities at these three central stations would have to be vastly enlarged. As it was anticipated that all the residents of Kwa Mashu would be employed in the central and northern areas of the city, no direct rail link between Kwa Mashu and the southern industrial areas was planned.¹⁶¹ South African Railways predicted that all development work would be complete by March 1962.¹⁶²

However, as a result of the increasing pace of construction and resettlement in Kwa Mashu, the municipality predicted that the existing rail and bus services in the Kwa Mashu area would be inadequate to meet the required demand by June 1960.¹⁶³ Whilst South African Railways requested that the building and resettlement programme be slowed down so as to fit in with the development of new rail services,¹⁶⁴ the municipality, local employer organizations and the Department of Native Affairs were intent upon hastening the relocation of African shack dwellers into housing in Kwa Mashu. By late 1958, 13,000 houses had been constructed, 750 of which were already occupied.¹⁶⁵ Hostel accommodation was already available, and work on the site-and-service scheme was nearly complete.¹⁶⁶ In addition, in order to reduce the costs of formal housing, the building programme was stepped up, with an average of nine houses being completed each day.¹⁶⁷

159. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 9 September 1980.

160. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 6; minutes of a meeting between the City Council, the Natal Chamber of Industry, the Durban Chamber of Commerce and the South African Railways.

161. *Ibid.*

162. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 8; Secretary for the Department of Bantu Administration and Development-Town Clerk, 8 January 1959.

163. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 8; minutes of a meeting between the City Council Transport Sub-Committee and the City Council, 13 November 1958.

164. *Ibid.*

165. *Daily News*, 28 November 1958.

166. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 8; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 5 May 1959.

167. *Ibid.*, minutes of a meeting between the City Council Transport Sub-Committee and the City Council, 13 November 1958.

The City Council was compelled to negotiate for the provision of bus transport to and from Kwa Mashu. However the City Council neither desired that the existing small-scale Indian-owned bus companies operating between the Inanda Mission Reserve and the city be allowed to extend their operations, nor considered the provision of a municipal bus system to the area.¹⁶⁸ Thus the Public Utility Bus Transport Company (PUTCO) was contracted to provide the required transport system. PUTCO was however not permitted to operate a bus service inside Kwa Mashu, and would only be permitted to transport passengers on routes not already covered by the municipal transport system.¹⁶⁹ Bourquin remarks:

Agreement was reached that PUTCO not try to get the additional services such as Lamont and Chesterville and even Clermont which had already been developed by the municipal Transport Department. ... and they were also restricted as to the bus route which they must follow. For instance it was expected of them to bring their Kwa Mashu passengers to the Central Bus Rank in Victoria Street. PUTCO was not allowed to provide a through service to the Mobeni industrial area. So people would have to change their buses at Victoria Street; into municipal buses and then carry on. Now this of course added to the costs of transportation because there were two services involved.¹⁷⁰

The only exception to this rule, was that PUTCO was permitted to transport African toggl labour, who had been resettled in the Kwa Mashu hostels from the Point Road barracks¹⁷¹ directly through the city to the harbour area.¹⁷²

South African Railways refused to consider subsidizing the costs of transport from the commencement of settlement in Kwa Mashu.¹⁷³ South African Railways maintained that until daily demand for rail transport exceeded 16,000 passengers on the Kwa Mashu route, passengers would have to pay economic fares. These charges were £1.2.0. for a monthly return ticket between Kwa Mashu and the city stations.¹⁷⁴ The fare charged by PUTCO was 9 pence per single return journey and £1.9.0 per monthly return ticket.¹⁷⁵ In addition, Africans living in Kwa Mashu but employed to the south of the city would have to pay for further transport from central bus and rail termini to their places of work. It was estimated that for those Africans resettled in Kwa Mashu, transport costs would be 70% higher than the costs of transport between Cato Manor Farm and the city centre and industrial areas.¹⁷⁶

168. *Ibid.*

169. *Ibid.*

170. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 9 September 1980.

171. Interview with Mr R G Willson, 10 November 1980.

172. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 9 September 1980.

173. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; minutes of a meeting between the City Council and the South African Railways, 30 October 1953.

174. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 13 May 1954 and vol 8; Minutes of a meeting between the City Council Transport Sub-Committee and the City Council, 13 November 1958.

175. MNAD; H/Gen, vol 2; Comparative Costs of Native Housing, undated.

176. *Ibid.*

The City Council had initially envisaged the construction of one secondary and four primary schools in each of the family Neighbourhood Units.¹⁷⁷ However, as the Kwa Mashu scheme progressed the City Council declined to erect these schools, preferring to concentrate on the building of houses. The City Council also requested that the government permit a reduction in the number of schools and reduce the land area of each school in order to hasten the development of housing and achieve a higher population density in the area.¹⁷⁸ Bourquin explains:

One of our main difficulties was to secure sufficient annual capital funds for our own projects. While there was a shortage in capital, it was out of the question to consider the provision of schemes other than those falling into our own immediate sphere of activity. If there were sufficient funds to meet all our own requirements, consideration could be given to the erection of schools.¹⁷⁹

However, in accordance with the National Party's formulation of a Union-wide "Bantu Education" system, the Department of Native Affairs revised the City Council's plans for schools in Kwa Mashu. The areas intended for schools were enlarged, while the capital costs of building schools were included in the overall development programme.¹⁸⁰ To assist in the financing of schools, African tenants would pay an additional school levy of two shillings per month per family over and above the costs of housing. This levy would be included in the site rental and housing bill.¹⁸¹ These proposals were resisted, unsuccessfully by the City and Water Engineer. The City and Water Engineer explained municipal objections:

The effect of this is to make the provision of schools (in Kwa Mashu) equal to that for any other race [sic]. In fact, since the Government requires that the loans for constructing each Neighbourhood Unit must include the costs of the schools, the Native community will be better served in this respect than other races.¹⁸²

Municipal plans for other residential facilities were as paltry as their schooling policy. The basic concerns of municipal policy were to reduce financial costs, to localize each residential area, and to prevent the reappearance of those informal trading and redistributive bonds which had characterized shack life. Traders in the township would require access to capital resources beyond the means of the majority of tenants. A community centre, around which numerous trading premises were situated, was built in a central locale in each of the eight Neighbourhood Units developed as single-site, single-tenant housing. No trading, either from houses, in open air or on other unlicensed premises, would be permitted.¹⁸³ Municipal outlets for the sale of

177. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 1; Manager, MNAD-Department of Education, 28 April 1953.

178. *Ibid.*, City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 12 January 1953.

179. *Ibid.*

180. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 2; City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 27 February 1956.

181. MNAD; H/Gen, vol 2; Housing at Kwa Mashu, undated.

182. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 2; City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 27 February 1956.

183. *Ibid.*, vol 6; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 14 February 1958.

sorghum beer would be provided at each community centre. No home-brew permits would be issued.¹⁸⁴ Sites would be made available for registered church groups,¹⁸⁵ welfare organizations,¹⁸⁶ professional persons, the South African Police and the Department of Justice.¹⁸⁷ The township was to have no brewery, bakery, bank, abattoir, Fire Station, or independent African building contractors.¹⁸⁸ The postal facilities which existed at the Duff's Road railway station were considered adequate.¹⁸⁹ Despite various negotiations over the building of a hospital on land adjoining the township, the only health facility which would eventually be provided was a small polyclinic, comprising a pre- and post-natal clinic and a small outpatients facility. The nearest hospital was King Edward VIII Hospital to the south of the city.¹⁹⁰

Conclusion

By 1954 the municipality, major local employers and the government had reached a basic consensus over the particular African labour needs of the city and the manner in which the new pass laws and labour bureau system should be structured and operated. However, a similar agreement was for long to elude the various parties when they came to discuss the question of African housing. In agreeing to policies which would ensure employers adequate supplies of both permanently urbanized workers and a continued but regulated supply of migrant labour, there were very few who believed that shack settlements would not have to be destroyed. The shantytowns which grew during the later 1940s constituted a considerable threat to existing power structures in the city.

By around 1950, concerns long expressed by both municipal officials and many employers over the municipality's inability to control the Cato Manor Farm shantytowns, the appalling health and sanitation conditions in the shack settlement, and the politically explosive character of the area, were becoming more pronounced. The killings, pillaging and burning of property which occurred during the January 1949 Riots, and the typhoid epidemic which swept through the shacklands in the summer of 1950 were final confirmation that the problems of shantytown growth would have to be urgently addressed. In 1950, the Durban Chamber of Commerce noted, somewhat contritely, that as a result of the 1949 Riots the Chamber accepted that 'as leaders'

184. *Ibid.*, vol 5; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 25 November 1957.

185. SAIRR, Natal Region; File Townships:Kwa Mashu, notes of a talk given by the Manager, MNAD, on the 15 September 1959.

186. MNAD; H2/KM, vol 4; District Representative, Department of Public Works-Manager, MNAD, 15 June 1957.

187. *Ibid.*, vol 6; Manager, MNAD-City and Water Engineer, 14 February 1958.

188. *Ibid.*, Secretary for Native Affairs-Town Clerk, 10 March 1958 and Manager, MNAD-City and Water Engineer, 14 February 1958.

189. *Ibid.*, vol 8; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 11 April 1959.

190. Interview with Dr C Nupen, 7 July 1980.

they had failed to fully confront problems of housing, transport and civic amenities for urban Africans.¹⁹¹ Such comments were common in the municipality.¹⁹² However, whilst these motives became marshalled together in a way which revealed a new determination to finally resolve the housing issue, they were to be subsumed beneath the attempts by the municipality and major industrial and commercial concerns to both boost economic development in the city and transform the African proletariats' role in the urban labour process. When concerns over shantytowns are expressed in a manner which relates such concerns to the need to provide new housing, the spatial and financial implications of such housing require that such proposals be directly integrated into policies designed to increase the level of capital accumulation in the city.

Shantytowns undermined both attempts to create conditions whereby a section of the African proletariat could be stabilized as a permanently urbanized working class, and efforts to control African entry into the city. While negotiations over the African role in the urban economy and over influx control and labour bureaus proceeded, the problems presented by the shantytowns became increasingly apparent. As early as 1947 the Natal Employers Association asserted that it would be impossible to either partially do away with migrant labour or increase economic growth "until we have proper townships"¹⁹³

The attitudes of both municipal officials and major employers towards shantytowns reflected many concerns: such areas were inadequately provided with basic infrastructural amenities, were in various ways unregulated by either municipal or police power, and/or exerted a detrimental effect on labour productivity. Shantytowns provided for a residential life that in key ways prevented a process of differentiation from developing among the African proletariat. Residents seemed also able to avoid the rigours of total subjection to full, permanent, wage employment. Shantytown societies like that of Mkhumbane were based on complex communal shack ownership, tenancy and even domestic household structures, and comprised a myriad of ever-changing dwellings within chaotic road and pathway networks. Such a social structure is able to reduce the efficacy of any municipal attempt to assert control, alleviate health conditions or prevent further squatting. It also provides the police with a prohibitively difficult task. Such societies are also inimical to the interests of employers who desire to institutionalize the process of class differentiation within the urban proletariat.

In Durban from the late 1940s there was clearly a level of differentiation within the African labour force evident both at the 'factory floor' level and reflected in differences between hostel and formal family residential areas, but no such differentiation was evident in particular shantytown communities. As various municipal officials noted, Mkhumbane contained "a cross-section of the population: layabouts, the won't works, sotsis, criminals",¹⁹⁴ with "a labourer living next to a lawyer next to a policeman next to a parson,"¹⁹⁵ and

191. Durban Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, 1948-1949.

192. Mayors Minute, 1949-1950.

193. Broome Commission, Evidence of the Natal Employers Association.

194. Interview with Mr D McCulloch, 12 April 1981.

195. Interview with Mr S B Bourquin, 8 September 1980.

"everybody just hunking down in one big happy family".¹⁹⁶ As Havemann commented, the mere relocation of shacks would serve little purpose: "the sheer removal of the same people to another place can hardly change their character".¹⁹⁷

All parties were in basic accord over certain general principles which related to the question of housing: the need to improve the quality of housing available for Africans legally resident in Durban, whether as permanent urban residents or as migrants, the need to provide better transport, health, education and recreational facilities for Africans, and the need to both destroy existing shack settlements and to control further shantytown growth. Nevertheless, the manner in which the direct and indirect implications of particular housing plans clashed with the interests of representatives of local industrial and manufacturing capital, the municipality and the government served to make negotiation time consuming, complex and acrimonious.

It was to prove difficult to both effect relocation and change the essential characteristics of urban residential life in the Cato Manor Farm shantytowns. The government, municipality and organizations representing major industrial and commercial interests could discuss ways in which new influx control and labour bureau mechanism would operate and try to regulate their operation. Such a flexibility could not sustain itself when matters of housing facilities were discussed. The provision of housing involves a far much more rigid set of criteria based on particular spatial and housing plans.

Such plans incorporate certain implications, which, when such plans are accepted, effectively constrain any consenting party from making any major or substantial alterations. The history of the development of Kwa Mashu involved drawn-out, often acrimonious discussions over particular spatial and residential plans. The main areas of controversy and difficulty concerned the spatial location of the housing scheme, the types of residential facilities to be built, who was to build such facilities, the development costs, the financial liability of various parties, the relationship between such costs, African urban labour and wages, and the political status of such a township.

By the end of 1953, the only outcome of these negotiations was that the municipality had been given the authority to either purchase or expropriate land for what became known as the Cato Manor Emergency Camp. The Camp, situated in the Mkhumbane area, was from the outset intended only as a short-term means of controlling the African shantytown population living in the most densely populated shack area of Cato Manor Farm. Under the scheme, which was to continue operating up until 1964, certain basic road, water, drainage and street-lighting projects were initiated by the municipality, which also built a beerhall and a series of trading premises to be let to African entrepreneurs. The municipality also tried to control rackrenting, encourage individual ownership of shacks and introduce single-site, single-family residence, with occupants paying the municipality rent for the land and then building shacks according to various basic plans already designed and approved by the municipality. An advisory body, the Cato Manor Welfare and Development Board, was

196. Interview with Mr R G Willson, 23 January 1980.

197. MNAD; H2/CM, vol 1, Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 14 July 1949.

formed to be the sole body whereby residents could elect leaders to represent them in discussions with the municipality.

By 1958, after more than a decade of continual and often stormy negotiation, the municipality was finally in a position to begin the process of destroying the Mkhumbane shacklands and relocating some of these shantytown inhabitants to newly built houses and single male hostels in the ever expanding Kwa Mashu township. Located on an extensive tract of land on the Richmond and Zeekoe Vallei Farms and approximately twenty kilometres north of the centre of Durban, Kwa Mashu was seen as being one of the two "labour lungs" of Durban¹⁹⁸. The second such "lung" was the development, by the government, from the early 1960s, of the massive Umlazi township situated on the Umlazi Mission Reserve, which lay approximately ten kilometres to the south of the city. Kwa Mashu and Umlazi, both of which were deliberately located either on or adjoining land under the authority of the South African Native Trust, would be the main residential areas for Durban's African labour force, both permanently urbanized and migrant.

State intervention in the African housing market did manage to alleviate and indeed counteract some of the immediate problems raised by the rampant growth of shantytowns in South African cities during the 1940s. Furthermore, state officials may well have believed that they had, as they so often maintained, "solved" the urban African housing "problem".¹⁹⁹ Such language was common in municipal and government circles. Durban municipal officials have often stressed that the building and settlement of Kwa Mashu was their "greatest victory".²⁰⁰

The townships and hostels built during the late 1950s and 1960s might have refashioned key aspects of the lives of the proletariat and altered relations between capital, the state and African labour. But the housing programmes merely recast, and in many cases exacerbated, contradictions in a fundamentally class-based society. The contradictions inherent in the very building of Kwa Mashu were to alter significantly the overall nature of the scheme, cause lengthy delays in the building programme, result in the eventual provision of unsatisfactory and inadequate facilities, and provide a source of renewed tension between township residents, local employers, the municipality and the government.

198. Interview with Mr C N Shum, 20 June 1986.

199. Wilkinson, "Adequate Shelter", p 10.

200. All new employers of the now defunct Port Natal Administration Board were shown a slide and tape presentation of the building of Kwa Mashu as part of their induction training.