

CHAPTER 9

**MKHUMBANE, KWA MUHLE AND THE SHADOW OF KWA MASHU :
THE CATO MAJOR EMERGENCY CAMP, 1953-1960**

Kwa Muhle Comes to Mkhumbane

By late 1952, it became increasingly apparent to Mkhumbane residents that the municipality was finally determined to exert a more effective measure of control over the shantytowns: the "Whites" wanted "to win Mkhumbane back."¹ Despite shack residents' efforts to "liberate" the area during the 1949 Riots, Mkhumbane was still a contested space. Some residents welcomed the idea of the municipality establishing authority over the area. Charles Mbutho, who had moved into the shantytown in the early 1950s maintained that "it was good that the City Council came. We wanted them to give us better houses and fix up all the dirty people and places there. It was too filthy."²

Other residents were more sceptical of municipal policy; the idea of the municipality gaining increasing control over Mkhumbane aroused panic and anger. As soon as the municipality announced its plans for the area, municipal officials noted the increasing hostility of Mkhumbane residents, it was reported that "a meeting is to be held at Cato Manor on Tuesday which according to my information, is likely to complete the process and re-establish the undesirable element ..." ³ The municipality mistook opinion in the shantytowns. The Mkhumbane residents were all opposed to any policy which threatened African claims to permanent residence in Mkhumbane. Where there were differences between residents was over the means whereby such permanence could be achieved.

In November 1953, councillor Nicholson, the chairman of the municipal Native Administration Department, formally announced City Council plans for the Mkhumbane area at a public meeting in Mkhumbane, attended by over 2000 residents. Much to the dismay of many present, Nicholson promised that "although it has taken a long time to come to a final decision, the City Council has at no time forgotten you." Not only did Nicholson indirectly criticize shack residents by saying that the municipality desired the "rehabilitation of Cato Manor" and would "assist residents to develop their sense of responsibility", but he also revealed to residents the true nature of municipal policy. Nicholson maintained that the municipality wanted to give residents "a certain measure of security, through the development of a temporary housing scheme in the area. Furthermore, the municipality would acquire the land and thus confer no land ownership rights on

-
1. Interview with Mr M O D Kunene, 7 July 1985.
 2. Interview with Mr C D S Mbutho, 3 March 1981.
 3. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 3; Acting Town Clerk-Dr W M Eiselen, 5 June 1952.

African residents. Finally, the municipality intended to destroy the basis of shack society through "protect[ing] the Natives against exploitation by unscrupulous shack farmers."⁴

Although finally managing to relocate the African shantytown dwellers from Cato Manor Farm to formal housing elsewhere in the city, the municipality was never fully able to achieve its stated aims through developing the Emergency Camp. However, the fact of municipal intervention in shantytown life served to alter the nature of shack society. The main effects of municipal policy towards the Emergency Camp were to increase the population living in the area, cause a dramatic decline in the residential quality of life, attempt to stabilize the operations of a section of the existing African trading class, and introduce increasingly burdensome administrative controls over the population.

With the municipality being granted permission to develop temporary African housing in the Cato Manor Emergency Camp, it gained legal sanction to demolish shantytowns located outside the Emergency Camp and relocate shack dwellers into the Camp.⁵ By the middle of 1954, all African shack areas situated on the Bluff had been cleared. During the later 1950s, the municipality began destroying certain shantytown areas outside of the Emergency Camp area.⁶ The residents of all these shack areas were relocated inside the Camp. The municipality viewed the Emergency Camp as not only introducing controls over the existing population, but also as a dumping-ground, or "transit camp", into which it could temporarily relocate squatters.⁷

Just prior to the outbreak of the 1949 riots, municipal officials estimated that there could be approximately 24,000 Africans living in the Cato Manor Farm shantytowns.⁸ In the same period, municipal officials estimated that there were 4,040 African "families" living in the Mkhumbane area of Cato Manor Farm.⁹ While municipal inspectors would continually point out how the African population of the Cato Manor Farm area had increased immediately after the 1949 Riots,¹⁰ reliable estimates of the African population increase in the area only became available through the ongoing shack survey and the registration of sites under the municipal Cato Manor Emergency Camp. In December 1952 the municipality estimated that there were 42,000 Africans living in the shack areas both in the Mkhumbane area and within close proximity to Mkhumbane.

In 1953, Mr 'Tings' Robson, then Chief Superintendent of Locations, estimated that the African population of Cato Manor Farm was 40,000 persons.¹¹ Colin Shum, the first Superintendent of Shack Areas

4. *Natal Mercury*, 25 August 1952.

5. The powers were acquired in 1951 in terms of section 8 of the Durban Extended Powers Ordinance, Natal Provincial Ordinance 21 of 1949.

6. MNAD;CM/Gen, vol 5; Further Report of the Development Sub-Committee of the Cato Manor Temporary Native Housing Scheme, 28 April 1954.

7. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; Acting Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 10 March 1953 and vol 7; Secretary for Native Affairs-Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 23 April 1956.

8. MNAD;Housing/Gen, vol 1; Manager, MNAD 'Native Housing Policy', November 1948.

9. MNAD, H 2/CM, vol 1; Chief Superintendant-Manager, MNAD, 2 March 1950.

10. MNAD,H 2/CM, vol 1; City Valuator and Estates Manager, undated.

11. Memorandum by Senior Superintendant, Locations, undated and unreferenced with title page missing. I am grateful to Mr D McCullough for providing this information.

and thus responsible for the shack surveys, and from 1953 to 1955 the first Superintendent of the Cato Manor Emergency Camp, estimates that the total number of Africans living in shantytowns in Cato Manor Farm was "probably in the region of between 40,000 and 50,000 by 1953".¹²

During the later 1950s, many people, including shantytown residents themselves¹³, estimated that the population was in excess of 70,000 persons. In 1959, Dr English, the Chief Medical Officer of Health estimated that there were upwards of 80,000 Africans living in Cato Manor Farm, while "over weekends, the population may increase to 90,000 or 100,000. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner claims it is 120,000. Whatever it is, it is a town the size of Pietermaritzburg."¹⁴

While the ratio of African women to men in the shantytowns increased during the 1950s, there are no really reliable estimates.¹⁵ In 1953, municipal officials investigating one particular shack area in Mkhumbane found that the ratio of adult males to adult females was 1,1 men to every woman, but stressed that it was questionable whether such figures could reliably pertain to the whole area.¹⁶ Colin Shum recalls "that by the time I left the (municipal Native Administration Department in 1958) there were a lot more families in the community than when we started the shack survey."¹⁷ This estimate would thus appear to have been broadly in line with the official estimate that by 1960 the African male-female ratio for Durban was 1,5 men to every woman.¹⁸

Essential Services and Municipal Policy

With regard to development projects in the Emergency Camp, the municipality was reluctant to allocate funds from the Borough Fund or any other municipal account to finance those aspects of the annual development works for which the municipality was liable. During the first year of development work in the

-
12. Interview with Mr C N Shum, 22 June 1985.
 13. Ilanga lase Natal, 16 February 1957. This resident was Mr J J Shabalala.
 14. MNAD; Personal File, Mananger, MNAD; Notes on the meeting by a Durban City Council Deputation with the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Pretoria, 3 August 1959.
 15. Such information was available to the municipality from the shack survey files on each shack in the Cato Manor Farm area. The vast majority of these files were however burnt by residents during the course of the 1959 Beerhall Riots. A new but partial set of documentation was acquired during the very process of shack removals to Kwa Mashu and Umlazi. The author managed to trace these latter files to a storeroom in the P N A B offices in Lamontville. It is significant that as of 1983 these files were kept in a storeroom in Lamont, one of only two remaining African townships where residents still qualified for permanent city rights. The files were used to verify any claims to residence in Lamont or the other relevant township of Chesterville.
 16. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; Supervisor Shack Area "Survey of Shack Families: Incomes and Other Considerations", 2 February 1953.
 17. Interview with Mr C N Shum, 20 June 1985.
 18. Maasdorp and Humphreys, From Shantytown to Township, p 10.

Camp, the total costs of all anticipated development was £10,000. In spite of the fact that the Native Revenue Account was only liable to provide £5,000 of this amount, the municipality refused to allow the Borough Fund to allocate the remaining £5,000. Instead, the required £5,000 was transferred from the Native Revenue Account to the Borough Fund to finance municipal projects in Mkhumbane.¹⁹ As a result of this policy, municipal Native Administration Department officials realized that essential projects for the Emergency Camp would be delayed through the Native Revenue Account being unable to bear the immediate costs of development. In spite of Havemann requesting that all future costs in respect of road works could be equally shared as agreed upon", the policy remained.²⁰ While funds transferred from the Native Revenue Account would eventually be repaid, this policy had the direct effect of slowing down the development of facilities in the area, even though municipal officials were then relocating even more people into the Emergency Camp area.

Whilst these problems merely resulted in various development projects being delayed, a more fundamental problem resulted from the municipality's refusal to abide by the 1937 Agreement. During the course of the development of the Emergency Camp, the municipality was negotiating with the government over how the 1937 Agreement could be altered to the benefit of the municipality. As a result of these negotiations, which were only concluded in 1957, municipal officials steadfastly refused to provide any free refuse removal services, or pay the costs of water and electricity consumption in the Emergency Camp.²¹ Although municipal officials had constantly expressed concern about the worsening health and sanitation conditions in the African shantytowns, the municipality would not provide services which were specified in the development plan for the Emergency Camp and which were specifically intended to improve basic health and sanitation conditions in the shack area.

Only 62 toilet blocks were provided in the Emergency Camp, that was eventually to house over 100,000 persons.²² Although it had been envisaged that all dwellings would be within a 200-metre radius of municipal toilet blocks, many residents lived as far as 500 metres away from such facilities.²³ In other areas, such as the Manasa and Draaihoek region, no municipal toilets had been erected by the beginning of 1958.²⁴

In terms of the initial development plans, the municipality was required to develop a water-borne sewerage system in the Emergency Camp. However, as it was intended that the land would eventually be set aside for White residential development, the municipality provided water-borne sewerage facilities which would

19. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; Acting City and Water Engineer-Manager, MNAD, 3 January 1953 and Native Administration Committee minutes, 10 January 1953.

20. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; Manager, MNAD-City and Water Engineer, 17 June 1953.

21. See for example MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; Manager, MNAD- City Treasurer, 13 January 1953, Acting Medical Officer of Health- Acting Manager, MNAD, 13 January 1953 and City and Water Engineer-Acting Manager, MNAD, 4 February 1953.

22. Native Administration Committee agenda, 11 February 1955.

23. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 7; Superintendent, Cato Manor Emergency Camp-Manager, MNAD, 30 March 1957.

24. City Medical Officer of Health, Annual Report, July 1953.

be suitable for the intended White suburban housing. This sewerage system was inadequate for the African population living in the Emergency Camp. The City and Water Engineer admitted as such: "the size of lot to be used for the permanent scheme is six times that of the present...the quantity of sewerage per site should therefore be one sixth of that expected later when permanent development takes place."²⁵ As a result of the increasing population in the Camp, the City and Water Engineer noted that "it is obvious that the sanitary blocks themselves will have to deal with two or three times the population for which they were designed."²⁶ As a result, not only were the municipal toilets always dirty, but also continually "backwashing" with effluent not being correctly channelled through the piping mains.²⁷ By the late 1950s many of the toilet blocks were unusable, while work gangs were constantly attempting to repair blocked sewerage pipes.²⁸

Not only were toilet blocks, which were divided into different sections for men and women, in many cases far distant from homes and structurally inadequate. The blocks were also not provided with any form of lighting, and the toilet cubicles had no doors.²⁹ Mrs Phewa recalls:

We had a toilet building next to us in Dabulamanzi. There were no doors in the toilets and so it seemed to us as if we were just pigs in a little shed. We all had to sit there while all people walked in and out. That was the way they treated us. And all the tsotsis that would hang around outside. It was too terrible. You could not even go there in the nighttime because it was too dark and there were no lights.³⁰

Thus, as Marshia Mtandi explains, parents would often refuse to allow their children to utilize the municipal toilet facilities:

Our parents would tell all of us that we could not go near the toilets. This was the place where you could get sick and if you needed to relieve yourself in the night then you had to tell her that you were just going outside. Never to the toilets.³¹

Numerous requests from the municipal Native Administration Department that the municipality assist in providing doors for the toilet cubicles failed. As a result, the Native Revenue Account bore the costs of building brick partitions down the middle of some toilet blocks.³² In a similar fashion the municipality rejected repeated

25. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; City and Water Engineer-Manager, MNAD, 12 June 1953.

26. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; City and Water Engineer-Manager, MNAD, 18 May 1953.

27. Interview with Mr T Roche, 22 April 1982.

28. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 7; Acting City Engineer-Chief Medical Officer of Health, 8 October 1958.

29. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; Manager, MNAD-City Electrical Engineer, 25 August 1953, City Electrical Engineer-City and Water Engineer, 25 August 1953 and handwritten memorandum to Manager, MNAD summarizing information recieved from City and Water Engineer, 2 September 1953.

30. Interview with Mrs T Phewa, 7 July 1986.

31. Interview with Miss M Mtandi, 30 November 1986.

32. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 6; Acting Manager, MNAD-City Engineer, 5 December 1955.

request for the toilet blocks to be fitted with electric lighting.³³ By 1958, lighting was eventually supplied to some toilet blocks, but only as a result of the municipal Native Administration Department agreeing to the Native Revenue Account bearing the costs of both connecting such blocks to the existing electricity supply and being debited for the estimated amount of electricity consumed.³⁴

During the course of initial discussions between municipal officials over the type of sanitary facilities which should be provided in the Camp, various officials had criticized the continuation of any pit privy sewerage system.³⁵ Municipal officials realized that pit privy latrines were unsuited to a high density population living in poorly drained land. During the high rainfall summer months, pit privy latrines would also "overflow or the excrement would start seeping through the hilly lands."³⁶ However, due to municipal resistance to providing further toilet blocks, the pit privy latrine system was to continue.³⁷ In order to lessen the health dangers posed by pit privies, the municipal Native Administration Department, financed by funds from the Native Revenue Account, began to "drill deeper pits" for some residents pit privies.³⁸

Prior to the development of the Emergency Camp, the only tarred roadway through the Mkhumbane area was Booth Road, which ran from the Bellair Road to Chesterville. In terms of the initial layout of the Emergency Camp, the municipality was required to upgrade certain of the existing dirt roads and tracks in the Camp by either tarring or hardening the road surfaces and developing effective drainage facilities. However, during the course of the development of the Emergency Camp, the only substantial road work undertaken by the municipality was the development of what now became known as Denis Shepstone Road, which extended from Booth Road up, through one of the most densely populated shack sprawls, to Ridgeview Road.³⁹ Denis Shepstone Road was widened, tarred and provided with storm-water drainage. By the end of 1956, the only other road development undertaken by the municipality had been the hardening or tarring of few other roads in specific areas of the Camp.⁴⁰ No other road improvement projects were ever done, in spite of

33. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; City Electrical Engineer-City and Water Engineer, 25 August 1953 and vol 6; City Valuator and Estates Manager, undated and vol 7; Manager, MNAD-City Engineer, 21 December 1956.

34. Interview with Mr D McCullouch, 3 April 1982.

35. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 7; City Medical Officer of Health-City Engineer, 21 January 1958 and vol 7; C N Shum-S Bourquin, 1 October 1956 162 and interview with Mr C N Shum, 22 June 1985. See for example MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; City Medical Officer of Health-Manager, MNAD, 24 October 1953.

36. Interview with Mr T Roche, 22 April 1982 and MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 3; Assistant City and Water Engineer-Town Clerk, 7 January 1952 and Memorandum for Inter-Departmental Committee :Cato Manor: Miscellaneous Matters, 7 January 1952.

37. MNAD; Cato Manor Welfare and Development Board minutes, 31 August 1953.

38. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; City Medical Officer of Health, Annual Report, July 1953, vol 7; Manager, MNAD-City Medical Officer of Health and City and Water Engineer, 31 August 1953 and Cato Manor Welfare and Development Board minutes, *passim*.

39. *Ibid.*

40. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 7; Superintendant Loquet-Manager, MNAD, 1 March 1957.

numerous complaints from both residents and municipal officials as to the appalling road conditions in the Camp.⁴¹

As a result of so few roads being either tarred or hardened, the municipality callously refused to consider requests that the municipality provide a refuse removal service throughout the Emergency Camp. In this instance the municipality stuck rigidly to the terms of the 1937 Agreement, whereby the municipality was only obliged to provide a free refuse removal service for housing adjacent to tarred or hardened roads.⁴² However, up until 1957, the City and Water Engineer also refused to sanction a municipal refuse service to those areas where tarred or hardened roads had been provided.⁴³

The Native Administration Department thus purchased drums which were placed alongside roadways, and encouraged residents to carry their own household waste to these drums, which were then emptied by the Native Administration Department.⁴⁴ The cost of the service was borne by the Native Revenue Account. After the termination of the 1937 Agreement in 1957, the municipality operated a refuse removal service through parts of the Emergency Camp and debited the cost of the service to the Native Revenue Account.⁴⁵ For the duration of the Emergency Camp's existence the burden of operating a refuse removal service lay with the staff of the Emergency Camp, who had neither the personnel nor resources to fulfil a task that should have been undertaken by the municipality. Debris and rotting waste matter was continually strewn in ever-increasing piles throughout the Emergency Camp; as residents and municipal officials noted, this constituted a grave health threat to residents of the Emergency Camp.⁴⁶

Despite statements to the contrary, the municipality's attitude towards the shack settlements of Mkhumbane only embraced a desire to improve the standards of basic facilities in the area, if the costs of such services would be borne by the Native Revenue Account. At no time during the existence of the Emergency Camp would the municipality accept their legal responsibilities, as set out in both the 1937 Agreement and the layout and development plan for the Emergency Camp, to provide the basic facilities so crucial to the social stability of the shantytown residents. The basic facilities which were provided by the municipality were both

-
- 41. Cato Manor Welfare and Development Board-Manager, MNAD, 16 October 1956 and interview with Mr C N Shum, 22 June 1985.
 - 42. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 7; remarks written by Mr Bourquin in the margin of Supertintendant Loquet-Manager, MNAD, 1 March 1957.
 - 43. See for example MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; City and Water Engineer- Manager, MNAD, 18 September 1953, Memorandum by MNAD staff- Manager, MNAD, 8 October 1953 and vol 5; City and Water Engineer- Manager, MNAD, 6 November 1953.
 - 44. Interviews with Mr C N Shum, 22 June 1985.
 - 45. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 7; Deputy Manager, MNAD-City Engineer, 23 April 1957.
 - 46. Interviews with Mr C Khumalo, 21 April 1985, Mr C D S Mbutho, 19 April 1985 and T Roche, 23 April 1982. As Tom Roche recalls a certain municipal inspector, probing for illicit underground liquor "factories", walked into and was submerged in an ex-pit privy hole. Much to the mirth of both shack residents and other municipal officials, the person had to be hauled out: no-one went near him. We used a rope."

paltry and, in many cases, only provided after substantial delays. Municipal policy towards the provision of infrastructural facilities in the Emergency Camp merely served to create an increasingly more unsuitable residential environment.

In terms of the initial municipal plan, the municipality was to purchase the land area, develop essential services and demarcate new housing sites. Persons then either already living in shack clusters in the Mkhumbane area or in other shantytowns would be relocated into single-site, single-shack housing on these sites. The municipality desired to limit the size of all new shacks to less than four rooms, prohibit all lodging and sub-renting and ensure that there would be no more than five or six persons living on each site.⁴⁷

Shack houses would have to be built by the tenants according to house plans designed by the municipality.⁴⁸ For those tenants who required financial assistance, loans of £35 from the Native Revenue Account were made available.⁴⁹ In order to allow tenants time to either themselves erect such temporary housing or arrange for the houses to be built, the municipality erected a transit camp within the Emergency Camp. Persons removed from existing shack settlements would be allowed to rent rooms in this transit camp for up to one month.⁵⁰ This transit camp, which was situated in the area known as Shumville, was known as Kwa Tickey, named after the daily rental charged to tenants.⁵¹

Alongside the appearance of single-site, single-tenant housing built and other more fragile shanties, vast communal shack clusters were to remain in existence for the duration of the Emergency Camp operations. The municipality was never fully able to transform the existing pattern of shack cluster construction or confront and change the existing complex shack ownership and tenancy relations.⁵² Stephen Selby remembers:

When we started there at Mkhumbane, we wanted to get all the residents out of their shacks, break down the shacks and then make the residents build smaller shacks with each family having their own place. Their own site. But this was very difficult. In the end I think we just gave up. You could not do this. It was really impossible. It only happened when the Mkhumbane people went to Kwa Mashu and Umlazi.⁵³

Shack residents could not simply relocate their homes as few owned accommodation. Furthermore, neither shack owners nor tenants built the shacks.⁵⁴ To make matters even more complex, the shack designs made it difficult to reconstruct existing shacks in accordance with municipal policy.

47. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; Memorandum re Instructions from the Manager for the use of all vacant sites ready for occupation in the Emergency Camp, 27 May 1953 and Manager, MNAD-City and Water Engineer, 4 June 1953.

48. MNAD; H 14, vol 2; questions asked by Manager regarding plans for shacks- Cato Manor Emergency Camp, 18 November 1953.

49. MNAD; H 12/L CM; Havemann- Chief Superintendant, Supervisor Shack Areas and Superintendant Umlazi Glebe, 17 June 1953.

50. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 3; Acting Manager, MNAD-Councillor Robinson, 20 November 1952.

51. Interview with Mr S Selby, 12 August 1980.

52. Interview with Mr C N Shum, 22 June 1985.

53. Interview with Mr S Selby, 12 August 1980.

54. MNAD; H/Gen vol 1; Supervisor Shack Areas-Acting Manager, MNAD, 19 August 1952.

It was difficult for the municipality to establish sole ownership of any particular shack with a view to demolition and rebuilding in accordance with municipal plans.⁵⁵ Moreover, many owners were absentee shacklords or operated through an agent, with the result that tenants were unable to name the owner.⁵⁶ Furthermore, as a result of the manner in which the ownership of certain shacks had become such a contested issue during the period from the January 1949 Riots onwards, municipal investigations of shack ownership often caused increasing tension. Stephen Selby recalls that "when we would go around to a particular shack and say 'This land is now owned by the City Council, who owns this place?', there would be a furious fight between the people because they all said they owned this room or that place."⁵⁷

Even after shack ownership was established, the municipality was never fully able to eradicate shacklordism. When the municipality assumed ownership of any particular piece of land, shacks had to be sold to existing tenants and rebuilt so as to conform to the single-site, single-dwelling principle. Only if such procedures were satisfactorily undertaken would the shacks be registered as legal structures. If shack owners refused to comply with municipal directives, the municipality would demolish the shacks without paying the owner any compensation.⁵⁸ However, although the municipality considered that owners of illegal shacks had no legal right to claim such property, it was in fact possible and legal for owners to demolish their own shacks, thereby leaving tenants homeless.⁵⁹ As the Acting Manager of the municipal Native Administration Department pointed out:

It is necessary to recognize however, that shack renting, being a lucrative business, and often the sole means of support, will be tardily relinquished, and that the rights of shack owners, unfettered for almost a generation, have become entrenched by custom and judgements in the Native Commissioners' court. There are many cases on record where applications by native shackowners for the ejectment of Native tenants, no doubt for excellent grounds, have been upheld. It appears that these judgements, even though they do not confer on shackownership any legal status, must inevitably have had the effect of strengthening the customary rights of shackowners which have become so generally accepted that tenants do not appear to have ever seriously contested them.⁶⁰

It was thus impossible to relocate persons either into or within the confines of the Emergency Camp without "pulling down shacks about their ears." Colin Shum continued:

If the position ...were such that each family owned a shack or at least a portion of a shack ... ejected persons would have materials with which to build small temporary shelters pending

-
- 55. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 3; Supervisor Shack Areas-Chief Superintendent, 4 October 1952 and vol 4; Memorandum to Manager, MNAD, 27 August 1953.
 - 56. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; Deputy Manager, MNAD-City and Water Engineer, 21 October 1953.
 - 57. Interview with Mr S Selby, 12 August 1980.
 - 58. Inter-Departmental Committee re Cato Manor, agenda, 22 January 1953.
 - 59. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; Memorandum: Superintendent Shack Survey re interview with Legal Advisor, 26 August 1953 and Deputy Manager, MNAD-City and Water Engineer, 21 October 1953.
 - 60. MNAD, H 2/CM, vol 4; Acting Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 18 December 1952.

the completion of their more permanent homes. The actual position is that very few families in Cato Manor have a ready supply of materials.⁶¹

The problem was compounded by the fact that most residents in Mkhumbane did not build the shacks which they either owned or rented. Stephen Selby recalls that

Most people would have to find one of the local builders. There were quite a few around. Even some Coloured who were proper builders although they did not have their [artisan] tickets. Then there would be lots of discussion about what to build and how to build. But no, most of the people did not build their own homes. How could they, they were working most of the time but all of the time they needed somewhere to live.⁶²

The complexity of the situation is well illustrated in the negotiations between the municipality and a local Indian landowner, Mr Bux. On his land, Bux owned shacks which accommodated between 150 and 200 Africans. During the course of his land being expropriated by the municipality Bux claimed £700 compensation from the municipality for the loss of his shack material. Initially the municipality refused to agree to any compensation, but later realized that Bux, like other shacklords, "has a hold over the Corporation." Through the municipality refusing to pay compensation, Bux threatened to demolish his shacks and evict his tenants, assuring the municipality that such action "will probably cause a riot." As a result, Bux's land was only expropriated when the municipality had sufficient alternative accommodation into which Bux's tenants could be relocated.⁶³

The municipality did, through the expropriation of Indian-owned land, eradicate all forms of Indian shacklordism. African shacklordism in the Emergency Camp was to remain, however. Ashmon Nene, then an owner of shacks in Two Sticks and Mjafete, recalls:

Two Sticks was okay, those were always the same. but in Mjafete, that was where Kwa Muhle had taken all the shacks down and bulldozed the land for new places. There I sold my shacks to the people who were living there. Then they paid rent to the [City] Council. I had nothing to do with them then. But I still had my place in Two Sticks. That they never took from me.⁶⁴

African shacklordism continued. In addition, however, two other forms of housing were to be provided by the municipality. While both utilized the same building materials and construction techniques evident in existing wood and iron buildings, only some of these newly erected dwellings would improve the standard of housing in the Emergency Camp.

61. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 3; Supervisor Shack Areas-Chief Superintendant, 4 October 1952.

62. Interview with Mr S Selby, 12 August 1980.

63. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 4; City Valuator and Estates Manager- Manager, MNAD, 5 August 1953, City Valuator and Estates Manager- Manager, MNAD, 19 August 1953, Memorandum, C N Shum-Manager, MNAD, 28 August 1953 with additions dated 31 August and 12 November 1953 and City Council minutes 14 September 1953.

64. Interview with Mr A Nene, 26 January 1984.

By January 1958, there were 5,400 "families" living in the Emergency Camp in accommodation that had been erected under municipal "supervision".⁶⁵ Some of these houses were erected in accordance with municipal plans. The most popular of these designs, which were all intended for wood and iron housing, were the 'box', 'L' and 'U'-shaped houses. Nicholas Matiwane recalls:

It was too wonderful. I was living near Tatham Road [outside of the Emergency Camp, but in Cato Manor Farm] but we were taken by the municipality to Mkhumbane. There we were shown which was our site. It was in Cabazini, near to the Beerhall. Now when we built our house we could choose between certain designs. We built the 'U' shaped house. It was such that we could even put a chimney in one room. The whole of Cabazini looked like this.⁶⁶

Such dwellings were erected by African "building contractors" already operating in the shantytowns. With the municipality desiring to ensure that new dwellings be erected as quickly as possible, it established a list of contractors and directed them to various sites.⁶⁷

Some houses were of relatively sturdy construction, erected on sites in easy reach of water and sanitation facilities provided by the municipality. But many other persons were relocated to land which had not been provided with any facilities. Due to the municipality wishing to demolish African shack settlements in the Bluff area, the slow pace of municipal development in the Emergency Camp, and the paucity of services eventually provided, many people were relocated to unserviced sites in the Emergency Camp. Despite this, residents living in these areas were still required to pay rental to the municipality.⁶⁸

Furthermore, the vast majority of shack dwellers relocated to such sites refused to improve the standards of their own dwellings by taking loans from the Native Revenue Account. As the Emergency Camp was a temporary development, such houses could not be permanently owned or sold by residents.⁶⁹ Residents opposed the home loan scheme once it became general knowledge that the municipality was not to pay any compensation for the destruction of homes when residents were relocated to permanent housing.⁷⁰ By 1957, the home loan scheme had "virtually been abandoned."⁷¹

During the operation of the Emergency Camp many of the new dwellings erected in the area were fragile and unhealthy.⁷² Stephen Selby recalls that "when people would come to live in Mkhumbane, the

65. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 7; Houses required to meet immediate requirements as at January 1958.

66. Interview with Mr N Matiwane, 7 July 1985.

67. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 3; Supervisor Shack Areas-Acting Manager, MNAD, 19 August 1952.

68. Interview with Mr C Khumalo, 19 July 1985. Although municipal officials recognized that this was illegal, the practise seems to have been continued in all cases other than those where residents sought no legal advice.

69. Interview with Messrs T Phewa and T Shabalala, 31 June 1985.

70. Interview with Ms E Law, 2 April 1980.

71. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 7; Deputy Manager, MNAD-Secretary, Natal Housing Board, 23 April 1957.

72. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 7; Houses required to meet immediate requirements as at January 1958.

Emergency Camp, they built places that were truly worrying. They were worse than before. They did not have the money to pay for good homes and they did not want to take a loan from us.⁷³ Mrs Constance Matiwane, who lived in the Cabazini area, recalls that her son, who was relocated from a shantytown near the "harbour", lived in a "terrible place here at Mkhumbane."⁷⁴

During the development of the Emergency Camp, the municipality had in effect created a residential area with a higher density of residents than that which had existed in the area prior to the development of the Emergency Camp. In spite of the basic facilities in the area being inadequate, the municipality persisted in moving as many shack dwellers there as possible. While certain municipal officials complained that this policy would lead to the breakdown of health and sanitation conditions, people were continually being moved into the Emergency Camp.⁷⁵ As Colin Shum recalls, "as far as I remember we just laughed the protests aside and just kept packing people in. That is what we had to do. Get everybody inside the Camp."⁷⁶

For the duration of the temporary housing scheme, a monthly rental of £1 per site was charged. This site rental was charged irrespective of whether or not the area had been demarcated or provided with either infrastructural services or those other services which the municipality was obliged to provide in terms of the 1937 Agreement. This site rental was way above the economic rental costs of the scheme.⁷⁷ Despite objections to such a high ground rental and the failure of the municipality to provide essential services, the ground rental remained at £1 a month. Residents who had borrowed finance from the Native Revenue Account in order to erect their homes paid an additional charge. Until around 1955, residents who took in lodgers paid an additional amount.

For shackowners the position was even more invidious. In many cases shackowners found, to their "greatest surprise", that they were virtually having to pay either a very substantial amount or all their profits, derived from renting shacks, to the municipality⁷⁸ - this in spite of the fact that the municipality, whilst being the landowner, had not provided any essential services on the land. As Colin Shum remarked: "it appeared to many, and well justified it was too, that the City Council was throwing the Indians out and then doing precisely the same thing all over again."⁷⁹ Take the case of Saul Manqele, who, whilst residing in the Emergency Camp, also owned an additional two shacks which comprised a combined total of six rooms. For these two shacks, Manqele paid both a monthly ground rent of £1 a month per shack and then five shillings a month per sub-let

73. Interview with Mr S Selby, 12 August 1980.

74. Interview with Mrs C Matiwane, 13 July 1983.

75. MNAD, H 2/CM, vol 4; City and Water Engineer-Manager, MNAD, 18 May 1953.

76. Interview with Mr C N Shum, 20 June 1985.

77. See for example, Native Administration Committee agenda 15 August 1952.

78. MNAD; H 2/CM, vol 5; Manager, MNAD-Town Clerk, 4 November 1953.

79. Interview with Mr C N Shum, 22 June 1985 and MNAD; H2/CM, vol 4; Chief Superintendent-Manager, MNAD, 4 March 1953.

shack room. This worked out at a total monthly charge of £5.⁸⁰ The municipality later abandoned the idea of charging lodgers' fees.

Administrative Action and Residents' Changing Circumstances

With regard to the administration of the Emergency Camp during the earlier 1950s, the municipality had little experience in such matters and gave the municipal officials working in the area a large amount of leeway. By the early 1950s the municipality had only just commenced the massive task of restructuring the personnel and administrative functions of the Native Administration Department and was thus as reliant on the 'men on the spot' as the municipality had been during the 1940s. As Japhta Mnguni recalls, after councillor Nicholson had announced municipal plans for the area, "he left and Mr Shum and Selby Ntombela were left drawing up plans."⁸¹

Through his earlier work in the area Shum had managed to gain the confidence of many residents, many of whom felt that it was possible to work with municipal officials: "it seemed as if the day was dawning."⁸² Shum encouraged shacklordism as he became aware of the legal and administrative difficulties of eradicating rackrenting.⁸³ Similarly, along with the continuing shack survey, whereby a very detailed set of information on all persons either relocated within or resettled to the Emergency Camp, was acquired came the "awarding" of permanent city rights.⁸⁴ Colin Shum remembers the process in the following way:

I think that most of the blokes in the shacks had been working in Durban for a long time. But anyway, and this was something that Havemann was very good on - we gave it [permanent urban residence] to most. I think that by the time I left Cato Manor in 1955 by far the greater amount of men had section 10 [1 a, b, c, d].⁸⁵

As Stephen Selby remembers, "we just handed it out. Who were we to tell whether people were telling the truth. You could not anyway. There had been no documents for a long time."⁸⁶ Despite the fact that labour had been employed during the war years on an often chaotic basis with little documentation been kept by the municipality, the reason for handing out permanent city residence rights was more fundamental. During the

80. MNAD, H 2/CM, vol 5; Mr S Manqele-Town Clerk, 31 August 1953. See also Mr G Sithole-The City Council [sic], 28 July 1953. Not only are these two letters virtually identical, but the hand of a lawyer is particularly evident. At this time Mr R Arenstein conducted "many battles behalf of shacklords". See interview with Mr R Arenstein, 18 June 1987.

81. KCAV; interview with Mr J Mnguni, 15 September 1980. In this interview Japhta Mnguni mistakenly refers to the mayor, councillor Osborn as giving the speech in Mkhumbane.

82. *Ibid.*

83. Shum Papers; Supervisor Shack Areas- Acting Manager, MNAD, 10 August 1952.

84. Interview with Mr M O D Kunene, 5 May 1985.

85. Interviews with Mr C N Shum, 22 June 1985 and Mr H Strachan, 10 June 1982.

86. Interview with Mr S Selby, 19 August 1980.

early 1950s there was little surplus labour resident in the city and all municipal attempts to reduce the urban African population had resulted in labour shortages. Durban's economy could simply not do without the stabilization of African labour, and by the early 1950s both the municipality and employers realized that this necessitated giving workers permanent residence in the city. This was what both the municipality and local employers had briefly during the later 1940s attempted to block. However, with the development of the Emergency Camp, permanent residence in the city was allowed, but under conditions which did not give Africans in Mkhumbane the legal right to own land in the city. Forms of shacklordism however continued.

In addition to allowing shacklordism to continue and assisting residents in gaining permanent urban rights, local municipal officials allocated housing sites, controlled the process whereby African shack builders erected shacks, and collected rents. The municipality was also engaged in "shack clearance" in Mkhumbane, with Peter Cooke from the City and Water Engineer's Department in charge of shack destruction. However, while shacks were destroyed "no-one was ever left homeless", and Cooke himself became well liked amongst residents.⁸⁷ Shum also negotiated with the police for residents to purchase, at a nominal charge, weekly brewing permits. These permits allowed residents to brew sufficient sorghum beer for consumption only by themselves and their direct dependants. In spite of residents' resentment that the beer was only for "family use", could not be sold and that only sorghum beer could be brewed, women would queue from 5 a.m. every week on Wednesday and Thursday mornings when the permits were issued. Despite complaints, residents "could see that the law was sympathetic."⁸⁸

During the mid-1950s, the nature of administrative controls in the Emergency Camp changed substantially. Not only were the new officials in charge of the Emergency Camp often officious,⁸⁹ but the newly re-organized municipal Native Administration Department became ever more eager to expel all Africans not legally entitled to live permanently in the city. In 1955, the municipality again resumed attempts to compel all African women in the city to register with the municipality. In spite of enormous resistance, the municipality successfully instituted a system whereby women were given "certificates of privilege."⁹⁰

Under this system, all women who desired to be employed in the newly burgeoning female domestic service market, and those women who "wish to benefit from the protection and services of the Native Administration Department", could seek such documentation. With employment for African women being so rare and their legal position so tenuous, this administrative device placed the onus on African women to register to gain increased security in the city. In terms of this policy, the municipality could only restrict African

-
87. Interview with Mr C N Shum, 22 June 1985. See also MNAD; H2/CM., vol 4; Deputy City and Water Engineer-Manager, MNAD, 8 October 1953 and Cato Manor Superintendents-Manager, MNAD, 21 October 1953. Amongst the shack residents, Mr Cooke's nickname referred to his habit of continually scratching his groin.
88. Interview with Mr C N Shum, 22 June 1985 and KCAV; interview with Mr J Mnguni, 19 September 1980. See also MNAD; N 15; *passim*.
89. See, for example, *Ilanga lase Natal*, 7 April 1956.
90. *Ibid*, 8 October 1955.

women's access to formal employment and could neither evict women from the city nor ensure that the only women living in the city would be those legally married to men having permanent urban rights. The municipality would only be capable of achieving these aims with the removal to Kwa Mashu and Umlazi. However, municipal officials believed the policy of providing 'certificates of privilege was a "step in the right direction."⁹¹

By 1958 however, the municipality also began to co-operate with the police in conducting pass raids in the Emergency Camp.⁹² Alongside the police came the ubiquitous 'blackjacks', who, under municipal White officials, often conducted their own "screening surveys."⁹³ By the late 1950s, the municipality was trying to restrict the number of "families" eligible for accommodation in the new townships. As a result, many apparently "unattached African women - mainly Mpondo" were "thrown out of Durban."⁹⁴ Moreover, with the declining rate of African employment in commerce and industry, the municipality was in a position to reduce the reserve army of labour resident.⁹⁵ During the late 1950s the various pass raids into the Emergency Camp resulted in many shantytown residents being evicted from the city.

As was recognized and indeed welcomed by African traders in Mkhumbane, one of the main principles of apartheid legislation was that "us Africans should be allowed to trade amongst our own people."⁹⁶ Amimosity between aspirant African traders and Indian shopkeepers increased steadily after the riots of January 1949 when Indians began to re-open their trading ventures. Stephen Selby, then resident in Mkhumbane recalls that "you could just feel the people getting angry when some of the Indians started doing business again. People felt that it was not right because it was now their land. They had taken it."⁹⁷

After the January 1949 Riots municipal officials had accepted that one of the main issues causing bitter resentment amongst Africans living in the Cato Manor Farm shantytowns was that Indian-owned shops proliferated in the area while African shackshops were prosecuted for illegal trading.⁹⁸ As a direct result of this recognition of the power of African traders in the area, and fearing renewed incidences of rioting, immediately after the January 1949 Riots both the municipality and various provincial authorities such as the Local Road Transportation Board had been engaged in attempts to legalize some African entrepreneurial ventures in Mkhumbane.⁹⁹ As a result, African-owned bus companies were granted road carrier certificates to

91. Ibid, 27 October 1955.

92. Ibid, 7 June 1958.

93. Interview with Mr S Selby, 19 August 1980.

94. See PNAB photographic collection.

95. Ilanga lase Natal, 19 April 1958 and 26 April 1958.

96. Interview with Mr B Mnqadi, 29 October 1986.

97. Interview with Mr S Selby, 19 August 1980.

98. MNAD;CM/Trading, passim.

99. Interview with Mr R Arenstein, 22 August 1988 and MNAD; NT 7/28 vol 1; passim.

operate on routes between Mkhumbane, Warwick Avenue and Sydney Road.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, the municipality "turned a blind eye to all those people who had taken over Indian shops after the Riots" and, for a brief while, ceased prosecutions for illegal shackshop trading.¹⁰¹

It was however only with the development of the Emergency Camp that the municipality was finally empowered to assist in the creation of a legal, licenced African trading class in the shacklands. Having the power of licencing authority in the city and with the Emergency Camp regulations specifically allowing for legal African traders, the growth of the legal African trading class began.

Soon after the initial expropriations of Indian-owned land in the area began, the municipality commenced negotiations with Indian shopkeepers for the expropriation of their premises. The amounts of compensation involved were substantial, with many of the shops being highly profitable ventures; the municipality experienced considerable delays in acquiring these properties.¹⁰² However, by the late 1950s, only six Indian general dealer stores remained in the Emergency Camp. All the other Indian-owned shops had been acquired by the municipality and renovated.¹⁰³ During the course of developing the Emergency Camp, the municipality also built trading stalls for Africans resident in the Camp around the newly erected Cato Manor beerhall and erected further trading premises.

By the late 1950s, licenced African entrepreneurs operated eleven general dealers stores, 2 butcheries, 2 hairdressers or barber shops, three tailor and dressmaker establishments, and some tinker, cobbler and carpenter ventures in the Emergency Camp.¹⁰⁴ All these shops had to conform to local licencing bye-laws. Japhta Mnguni recalls:

These shops were very different to the shackshops. We were proper businessmen. All these [shack] shops had to have was a little room next to the bed or some place to put things. Then you could sell from your house. But when the municipality came we had to go into buildings with windows and lights and then they said how much shelving we must have. Those were proper shops.¹⁰⁵

For example, the annual operating costs borne by Mdingi Ngcobo's Dumisani Supply Stores were just over £296. His main annual overheads were rental, wages, electricity, packaging, bank charges, repairs, and annual depreciation charges for his fridge, scales and show case.¹⁰⁶

All trading premises intended for African occupation by African entrepreneurs in the Emergency Camp were owned by the municipality who rented premises to selected African traders. These rentals were

100. Ilanga lase Natal, 4 June 1949.

101. Interview with Mr T Roche, 23 April 1982.

102. See MNAD; CM/Trading, *passim*.

103. Ibid and City and Water Engineer's Department, Housing Section, Plan no 21430, sheet B 3: Cato Manor no 812.

104. MNAD; Cope Trading Report, 1955.

105. Interview with Mr J Mnguni, 20 July 1985.

106. MNAD; Cope Trading Report, Annexure C. See also MNAD; N28/28.

based on the economic costs of erecting the buildings and installing electricity plus further monthly charges for water and electricity useage.¹⁰⁷ Such financial overheads were vastly greater than those direct and indirect costs borne by shackshop owners. Bryant Mnqadi recalls:

When we moved into our shop we had to pay rent and watch out for inspectors who would see that we were only keeping this stuff and not this. Everything was more expensive to be there than the shackshop. Even if you lost all the things to be sold in the shackshop when the police came around, it was never as much as you had to pay to be in the shops.¹⁰⁸

As landowner, licencing authority and in control of the developing of the Emergency Camp, the municipality was solely responsible for allocating trading licenses. On the whole, when deciding on the suitability of applicants, the main criteria were that the applicant have trading experience, sufficient capital reserves, and that "he must be of good character".¹⁰⁹ In many cases this latter requirement was sufficient.¹¹⁰ The municipality monitored the way in which licenses operated their ventures and in some cases withdrew and reallocated licences when it became evident that traders were incapable of running their businesses.¹¹¹ In the same way as the African shackshop traders had justified, to both the municipality and Mkhumbane residents, their desire for trading rights because they wanted to "help us African people develop",¹¹² so the municipality justified their control over African legal traders by saying that such traders should "be of real service to their own people."¹¹³ The images of a radical populism, a desire for profit and an acceptance of existing authority became both legitimized and interrelated to the benefit of both the municipality and legal traders.

Most of the African stores made lucrative profits. As a municipal inspector remarked of six of the African general dealers in the Emergency Camp: the ventures "are well stocked and are rapidly outgrowing their small shops."¹¹⁴ While the value of stock carried by these shops rarely if ever exceeded £400 at any one time, sales were extremely high as were profits. On average, Mdingi Ngcobo made around £900 a year in profit.¹¹⁵

The success and "canniness" of the majority of licenced African traders in Mkhumbane would impress and "amaze" municipal officials.¹¹⁶ In analysing the rapid growth of these African traders, one municipal official quoted the anthropologist J E M White:

-
- 107. MNAD; CM/Trading, *passim*.
 - 108. Interview with Mr B Mnqadi, 29 October 1986.
 - 109. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 6 November 1980.
 - 110. Interview with Mr C N Shum and MNAD; N 9/App. See for example KCAV; interview with Mr J Mnguni, 19 July 1979.
 - 111. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 10 September 1980.
 - 112. Interview with Mr C D S Mbutho, 21 April 1985.
 - 113. MNAD; Cope Trading Report.
 - 114. *Ibid.*
 - 115. *Ibid.* Annexure C.
 - 116. Interview with Ms E Law, 2 April 1982.

Take a Central African Pygmy ... give him the same education as an Oxford graduate and he could do better than the graduate. This is not because Pygmies are by nature more intelligent than Oxford graduates but that man to man, some Pygmies are relatively brighter than some Oxford graduates.¹¹⁷

Indeed, for the legal African traders, the opportunities provided by the municipality would provide many of them with their chance to "prove to the White man that we could do it. We had our own leaders of the city." Although having earlier opposed existing structures of power in the city and municipal attempts to control Mkhumbane, and now being both dependent upon municipal authority and being required to finance higher overheads than those borne by shackshop traders, such traders considered the "investment" worthwhile. Japtha Mnguni continues:

Without that shop, which was at 'New Look' we would not have been here in Kwa Mashu like this. All this started when we went with the City Council. This is our present for doing those things in Mkhumbane.¹¹⁸

In the same way as the municipality saw to the growth of a legally operating African trading class in the Emergency Camp, it also attempted to provide institutional channels for "discussions" between residents' elected representatives and municipal officials.¹¹⁹ As in all other South African cities, it was these channels of communication which established authority in the city accepted as the virtually exclusive voice of urban Africans.¹²⁰

The operation of the Nogondayo ceased, and the Cato Manor Welfare and Development Board was established. As the Emergency Camp was not a formal permanent township or location the Cato Manor Welfare and Development Board was not permitted to discuss matters under the auspices of the Joint Locations Advisory Board. The Nogondayo had developed through residents, particularly shack leaders, wishing to entrench their residence in Mkhumbane. The purpose of the Cato Manor Welfare and Development Board was to allow for the emergence of local leaders who would disseminate municipal policy among residents and discuss the "various problems which arose with the development of the Emergency Camp".¹²¹ The municipality believed that it was not the function of the Cato Manor Welfare and Development board to discuss broad policy matters, including those related to the future of Mkhumbane or the Emergency Camp: "their

117. MNAD; Cope Trading Report.

118. Interview with Mr J Mnguni, 20 July 1985.

119. Interview with Mrs R Shabane, 18 November 1986.

120. See for example Director of Bantu Administration, Durban, Personal file: Notes on the meeting by a Durban City Council Deputation with the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Pretoria, 3 August 1959. See also interviews with Ms D Nyembe, 10 July 1985, Ms R Shabane, 18 November 1986, Mr S S L Mtolo, 10 June 1984 and Mr A Nene, 26 January 1984 243. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 5 September 1980.

121. *Ibid.*

function was to look after the concerns of the residents of the Emergency Camp. They were not involved in discussions over Kwa Mashu. That was not their concern. Their constituents were the Emergency Camp residents.¹²²

Conclusion

With the development of the Emergency Camp, the municipality had responded to shantytown residents' demands for better residential facilities and freehold rights in the Mkhumbane area, by expropriating the land and developing a temporary African housing scheme. The basic tenet of municipal policy was to ensure that the temporary residents of the Emergency Camp were "disciplined".¹²³ The Emergency Camp was utilized as the temporary dumping-ground for many of the shantytown residents of the city. It was thus possible to "peg" the growth of new shantytowns in other areas of the city and avoid resultant land devaluations. It was also possible to gather into one area most of those African workers, families and others who were not housed in formal accommodation. In relocation shack dwellers into the Emergency Camp area the municipality not only cleared other shack areas in the city, but used the very task of relocation to sift the African labour force in Durban. The provision of new shack housing came to be one of the ways through which the municipality introduced the new pass and labour bureau legislation. But this was not all.

Through powers vested in all urban authorities, the municipality was not only empowered to acquire ownership of the land and control the shack population. Having acquired ownership, the municipality was able to directly affect the fortunes of both ordinary residents and others having a great degree of control over material and social facilities in the shacklands. This was clearly understood by shackleaders, shacklords, other entrepreneurs and ordinary residents. In the later 1940s, the African shack dwellers of Cato Manor Farm had operated outside of municipal control, had established a residential settlement in defiance of the municipality and had actively participated in a city-wide struggle against established civic power. With the development of the Emergency Camp, many within the shantytowns, the very changed situation was clear to all. Many would seek strategic advantages in co-operating with the municipality. While shacklords managed to resist municipal attempts to restructure the nature of housing provision in Mkhumbane and residents refused to accept any notion of purchasing temporary housing on land owned by the municipality, shackleaders and other entrepreneurs came to be closely identified with the municipality. However, such persons' relationship to both the municipality and the other residents of the shacklands was to be inherently contradictory.

By 1958 the Emergency Camp was overcrowded and riddled with disease. Long before the 1958 Cato Manor Beerhall Riots and the general political crisis which developed during the late 1950s, municipal activities in the African shantytowns of Cato Manor Farm had resulted in a residential quality of life which was worse than that which prevailed in the area prior to the advent of direct municipal authority. Even though the

122. Interview with Mr S Bourquin, 5 September 1980.

123. Interview with Mr S S L Mtolo, 10 June 1984.

municipality had greater control and couched its concern for the area in terms of the appalling health conditions, it consistently exacerbated living conditions in the shacklands.

The nature of municipal intervention also assisted in the residents becoming increasingly politicized. This was to occur in ways which neither the state nor capital could fully handle. During the 1950s, with the increasing authority of the municipality in the shantytowns, the changing class composition of the shack settlements, and the transformation of health and general material conditions of life in the area, many of the essential structures of life in the area changed. As the structures of life in the shantytowns changed, so the perspectives, aims and aspirations of shack residents altered in various contradictory ways. These changes were compounded by the influence which much broader forces exerted in the shantytowns: the manner in which both the state and capital were engaged in transforming the nature of African labour and residence in the city and the growth of more structured and mass-based African political and trade union organization. During the late 1950s and early 1960s the struggle for Mkhumbane would be rejoined but in a changed context.