

# Shaping Democracy in a Future South Africa<sup>1</sup>

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I must say how greatly honoured I feel at being called on to deliver this year's Richard Turner Memorial Lecture. I am delighted to assist in rekindling his memory. Many, it is often mentioned, remember the exact moment when they heard of President John F. Kennedy's assassination. I do too. But just as vividly do I recall my horror at being given the news of Rick Turner's slaying, a political murder as is commonly believed. It was early 1978. I was crouching rather woebegonely at the desk in our room at the University of London residence, whereupon my wife burst through the door and blurted out the shocking facts. I hurried down to the common-room in search of *The Times* which had carried the story. The numbness lingered . . . It reinforced my abhorrence of things South African at that time, largely precipitated by the Angolan invasion, and by my anticipated contribution to it.

Rick Turner would not have counted me among his friends. I was just another Durban undergraduate muddling through his political science classes in the years immediately prior to the banning order. This happened at the beginning of 1973, effectively outlawing him from campus life, and much else besides. Nevertheless, his impact on me — and countless others, I suspect — was quite extraordinary. My abiding impressions remain equally strong today. There are various reasons why.

First and foremost for me, Rick Turner embodied the spirit of 1968. Hippiedom (and surf mania) had hit the Berea, and I was a joyful consumer (and still am, though in muted fashion). Rick's — and everyone called him Rick — outward appearance smacked of flagrant bohemianism: the wild red locks, periodically a ferocious Castro-like beard; utilitarian Woolworths polyesters, functional chocolate brown and lime green; scuffed suedes, or Dr Scholls in the sweltering heat. He marked such a radical departure from the prevailing norm. Most academics stuck to dowdy formalism, looking like retreaded FBI agents. And don't forget the safari ('saf') suits. Turner appeared the rebel incarnate; I loved it.

Secondly, Rick Turner's discursive teaching style, his powerful critical bent and his readiness to challenge received wisdom proved remarkably stimulating. A dominant ethos was captured by the heady combination of Marcuse, marijuana and mini-skirts.

Although admittedly faddish, often downright superficial we were (fuelled by vegetable stew), there was nonetheless a strong streak of social seriousness among the students within Turner's orbit. The Vietnam war impinged greatly on our minds; so did Allende's shortlived experiment with socialism in Chile. Nixon's administration was crumbling in the wake of *The Pentagon Papers*; Britain under Edward Heath was at loggerheads with the trade unions, especially the coal miners. Students on King George V Avenue cultivated a European mentality, yet at the same time they willingly delved into the bowels of South African politics. The rugged Vorster era was then with us. How to make sense of the greyness, the bleakness? People flocked to hear Turner, who eschewed pronouncing, but instead dissected events, intent as he was on leaving his audience to wrestle for themselves with the mental components he identified.

Finally, what really struck home was Turner's intellectual rigour. It was this which initially propelled me towards the sanctity of academic life. I admired his structured lecturing habits, especially his determination to pursue any perspective ruthlessly to its logical limits without copping out. He encouraged students to stretch their minds in a way I seldom encountered at university. Reading there was aplenty; the more eclectic the better, he urged. And a political education extended daringly to literature, plays and films. Periodicals which Rick then pushed our way, *The New Statesman*, *Encounter*, *The Economist*, thereafter have remained part of my stock reading. Being led to the frontier of ideas was extraordinarily fulfilling; to me it typified the essence of academe. His imparting that is a lifetime gift for which I am eternally grateful. In spirit, Rick Turner has always remained my intellectual exemplar.<sup>2</sup>

### Thinking about Participatory Democracy

One book prescribed for a section of the second-year undergraduate course focusing on political sociology, taught by Rick Turner, was Carole Pateman's newly minted *Participation and Democratic Theory*.<sup>3</sup> Obviously this fine piece of work left its imprint on Turner, for it looms large in the background of his own contribution, *The Eye of the Needle*, sub-titled 'An Essay on Participatory Democracy', composed and published that same year, 1972.<sup>4</sup> It seems fitting, therefore, for me to take the Pateman text as my launch-vehicle. The purpose is primarily illustrative, in order to arrive at a general set of remarks. Thereafter, I shall apply these more fully in the South African context.

Precisely, what illustrative purposes? The word 'shaping', which sets this article in motion, was chosen deliberately because of the ambiguity it invokes. The active and the passive intermingle — one

shapes whilst simultaneously being shaped by ... Consider participatory democracy here. Integral to Pateman's account is a chapter on 'Workers' Self-Management in Yugoslavia'. What initially intrigued me was the prospects for market socialism inspired by the Yugoslavia of Tito. This was fundamentally different from the USSR's bureaucratic authoritarian model being implemented by Brezhnev.<sup>5</sup> Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle* disabused me of any vestiges of optimism I might have entertained about that Communist Party's potted road to socialism.<sup>6</sup>

Carole Pateman exposed the connections between market socialism and participatory democracy. The key is workers' control. Every enterprise managed by its workforce, in an inclusive and collective style, would supposedly enhance economic performance nationwide, whilst also spreading democratic practices on a much wider scale than occurred in capitalist societies. Thereby a democratic culture would eventuate, permeating all significant societal institutions. The upshot would be a truly democratic *society*, not just democratically elected government. Yugoslavia was far from this idyllic state, but self-management was well ensconced there by the 1970s, the only case of its kind. Whither, then, participatory democracy?

Let me isolate two lines of reasoning, which are by no means mutually exclusive. The one advances the proposition that workers' control is morally desirable as an end in itself. Guild socialists and syndicalists immediately prior to World War I mooted as much. G.D.H. Cole was to the fore, together with kindred Fabians, including the Webbs, Sidney and Beatrice, apart from Bertrand Russell.<sup>7</sup> Workers, G.D.H. Cole avers, are legitimately entitled to orchestrate the affairs of the enterprises employing them: through their investment of time, effort and skill, employers and employees regardless have a genuinely vested interest in getting a fair return on their output. Furthermore, there are instrumental benefits, too, since inculcating participatory skills at the workplace will help nurture experienced democrats, to the betterment of the citizen body in general. Practice makes perfect is clearly the underlying theme. Moral realism, if you like, informs us that workers' control, the key to a properly democratic society, is an optimal, yet attainable, goal. We should strive to realize it, so the argument runs.

The second kind of reasoning produces the selfsame conclusion. Here, however, the route is inductive, whereas the prior one principally utilized deductive methods. Reflect on the slogan, 'WORKERS' CONTROL: LOVE IT — YOU'RE GETTING IT ANYWAY.' That's the copy that could be extracted from this second approach. Emile Durkheim, the renowned French

sociologist, beavering away in tandem with the guild socialists, is a main protagonist here.<sup>8</sup> There is a logical inevitability to workers' self-management, Durkheim stresses. It stems from the dominance of industrialism sweeping across the northern hemisphere. The locus has shifted irreversibly: the factory typically has replaced the home as the major sphere of endeavour. In these circumstances, one should expect corporative democracy to emerge, with the firm ultimately supplanting the domicile as the constituency, the unit of representation. For this to be feasible, all aspects of the enterprise will have to be governed democratically. In other words, democracy *at* the workplace is intermeshed with democracy *within* the firm. Besides, says Durkheim, workers' participation should be embraced enthusiastically — for much the same convictions espoused by G.D.H. Cole — with the further pragmatic observation that the nascent labour movement could hardly be anything other than disruptive in industrial society were democracy denied behind factory walls. Thus the purported rise of participatory democracy is determined primarily by empirical investigation, then subsequently advocated on moral grounds.

Neither approach I have sketched is wholly satisfactory. Why? Rigid arguments from first principles as in the case of the deductive mode can all too easily become doctrinaire, smacking of fundamentalism. This happens when an originally historical view lapses into a historicism: changed circumstances are wished away, the principles are transformed into fixed belief. On the other hand, the trouble with inductive reasoning if taken to extremes is that it is thoroughly deterministic. Here morality does not infuse choice. Instead, 'what is' becomes 'what ought to be'. By definition, reality is optimal. Dedicated inductive thinking does not allow us to raise our heads and scan the horizon in search of oases. Why be plagued by mirages? Yet need we?

No. Surely in political life the wise course would be to embrace inductive and deductive reasoning simultaneously. And explicitly. For, as I have attempted to illustrate, when dealing with specific issues confronting society, the deductivist bolsters his claim by resorting finally to implicit inductive deliberations. Likewise the inductivist grasps for deductions in order to clinch an argument. Neither approach alone is good enough if one is seriously trying to round off any political analysis. We have to move *consciously* backwards and forwards between inductive and deductive claims, beginning it matters not where, though testing all the while as the analysis builds.

We shape political conditions exactly as they shape us. Synoptic planning, assuming endless possibilities, is foolhardy unless we take cognizance of historical trends. A broad comparative perspective is essential. The alternative strategy, making

incremental adjustments, has to be guided by imaginative thinking, otherwise who knows the best route forward. When considering political change, the question of what is morally desirable and the question of what is really feasible are inseparable. Dismissing the one and concentrating solely on the other yields fatally flawed reasoning. Current South African political discourse demonstrates this to a worrying extent, which is surprising for a society normally predisposed towards social engineering.

### **Two Images of Democracy in South Africa**

Over the past few years, the struggle for countrywide political power in South Africa has been underwritten by two competing images of democracy. I carefully say 'image' thus alluding to their shadowy, fluid, ill-defined character. One image encapsulates the Charterists, whose inspiration is the Freedom Charter of 1955, which lies at the heart of the African National Congress's political stance. It was also the rallying force behind the United Democratic Front during the 1980s. The other is what I call the 'Governing Image', that projected by the Nationalist administration in office.

What about further contenders, you might properly ask. The Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, the Pan-African Congress, the Inkatha Freedom Party, to list the most obvious, are secondary players on the national stage. While hardly insignificant, their roles are increasingly reactive in nature. Neither do they write the script nor do they set the pace of the ongoing drama. The locus of power revolves around the National Party in government and the most prominent voice of the unenfranchised, the ANC. Accordingly, my emphasis will be on the images of democracy just they project.

Giving identity to the Charterist Image is a participatory ethic, for the aim is an inclusive, active polity with the ANC at the helm. Hope is held out for a clearcut goal. By comparison, the Governing Image stems from an administration after four unbroken decades in charge adapting to concerted pressure for the eradication of all vestiges of apartheid. Therefore, the ethic at work here is managerial, since the Governing Image represents a series of approximations to a near past when apartheid was the lodestar.

Both images are out of kilter. Charterists, by adhering grimly to deductive reasoning from first principles, at the moment face the rude necessity of refashioning their ideas in the light of practical conditions which over the years have barely made an impression on their conceptions of governance. Deductive analysis goes by fault in the Governing Image, where pragmatic deliberations hold sway, given the leadership's inductive efforts to lend coherence to a future built on the collapse of apartheid as an ideology. To date,

then, the Governing Image is morally bankrupt. Seeking heaven on earth, the National Party cultivated the unpromised land instead. Now it asks, 'What on earth . . .?' Let me explicate these assertions. I'll be fairly brief.<sup>9</sup>

### The Charterist Image

'The people shall govern.' This terse sentiment associated with the UDF especially, but the ANC too, gets to the nub of the Charterist position. As a slogan it conveys an ambiguous quality: a promise to the faithful, a threat to opponents. More pertinent here, however, is the very idea itself. There is no starker means of articulating a preference for direct democracy. The people governing themselves amounts to self-government. On what grounds?

Underpinning direct democracy is the basic notion of equality: all human beings *qua* human beings are entitled to equal respect. And such equality should flow as a matter of course to embrace major societal arrangements, particularly processes of governance. This implies an inclusive *demos*. All members of society — the citizenry — should have the right to participate, barring minors and maybe institutionalized state mental patients. And all citizens should participate as equals on equal terms. No-one's opinion should formally count any more or any less than anyone else's. Without these stipulations the necessary conditions for democratic rule cannot be fulfilled. 'One person, one vote' is the extract familiar to most readers, I suspect. That's indeed a true aspect of the Charterist Image; nevertheless, it's just a single aspect. We should bear that in mind.

In the South African context, though, rights *to* citizenship, let alone rights *of* citizenship, hitherto have been denied to the vast majority who live under its internationally recognized jurisdiction. Naturally, therefore, actual membership of society is not blithely assumed by Charterists. Hence the more complex notion of 'one person, one vote, one country', which they commonly espouse nowadays. Put differently, the South African citizenry should enjoy equal political rights. It is the right to participate *as* South Africans which is obviously at issue here. For the call is to reunite what has been cast asunder, to reverse the alienation of territory whereby South Africa would be the preserve of whites, with this rump surrounded by a host of putatively homogeneous states, each a bastion of ethnic homogeneity. A unified South Africa would extirpate the grandiose design of apartheid.

To combat any tendencies towards fragmentation, Charterism entails not only a unified state but also a unitary one. Common statehood would best nurture common nationhood, create a South Africa proper and develop a South African citizenry. Thus

sovereignty must be undivided, with central government expressing the will of all South Africans. A 'People's Assembly' must logically embody the people, one infers.

Irrespective of the devices used, direct democracy cannot be sustained on a national scale. The impracticalities are legion. Accordingly, the Charterist Image, without conceding any principle whatsoever, conceives of the next best application. This is indirect democracy, moreover, an indirect *representative* democracy. Instead of every citizen governing all the time, as a direct democracy demands, representatives regularly elected by the citizenry to office do so in the interests of society as a whole. In order to ensure that the spirit of direct democracy prevails, basic equality among South African citizens cannot be compromised, and the links between rulers and the ruled must be based strictly on representativeness and accountability. Governors must act out the preferences of the citizenry; they should be bound to be answerable to the people for their public activities.

If the Charterist Image as I have rendered it is to be regarded as a programme of intent, then various policy guidelines follow. The subscribing organizations have long recognized this. Consider the following three key features alone, simply to gain an inkling of the mammoth obstacles in translating the image into social fact.

In the first place, basic equality is far from realization. The greater South African territory is fragmented with putative 'independence' conferred on four areas, thus also affecting entitlements to common citizenship; the polity is highly exclusive; and civil and political rights have long been assigned by governments on a differential basis, leaving most individuals not totally rightless but certainly inferior in status. Remedying these social injustices challenges the labour of a lifetime. Secondly, treating citizens as equals in the political arena depends on curtailing the disparities in wealth between them. The image of direct democracy, remember, still the Charterist beacon, conjures up a community of equals. Although the goal is unattainable in contemporary society, nevertheless a democratic society cannot remain properly democratic once actual political equality erodes. How to proceed? This is a tall order, trying to provide for healthy life after birth in a democratic order. Finally, since basic equality appears indispensable to the Charterist Image, should not society wield collective control over its precious assets and resources? The spectre of nationalized enterprises looms large in debate nowadays, yet this is merely a highly emotive and narrow response to this far wider and more telling question whose political connotations warrant cool investigation away from the hustings. The objectives of common ownership and collective control by the citizenry admit varied means. Quite. The crucial point to grasp,

however, is that once Charterists wholly abandon the principle of commonality in orchestrating the South African economy their image of democracy will be severely distorted. Hard choices would then have to be thrashed out.

As I have indicated, the Charterist Image leads to key policy guidelines delineating the optimal nature of democracy for a future South Africa. Were such a course followed in practice, one could predict what patterns of governance could reasonably be anticipated to emerge. Essentially three sources feed into this simulation exercise: a logical extrapolation of elements inherent in the Charterist Image; South Africa's character of political rule which any new regime would inherit; and trends detectable in comparable Third World societies.<sup>10</sup> Here's what one may conclude.

A strong, centralized state would emerge, with a powerful democratic presence, capable of both formulating and overseeing ambitious developmental policies which would serve as the facilitating instruments of social justice. There is an overwhelming tendency globally towards inexorable growth in the state apparatus of industrialized societies, including advanced Third World societies. This happens irrespective of any particular government's resolve to shrink the state sector. The Reagan administration is a prime indicator, as indeed is the period of British Thatcherism.<sup>11</sup> Charterist rule, then, may transform the character of the South African state, but would probably not reduce its scope, because this would be neither desirable nor feasible.

Considerable latitude would be granted the upper echelons of the political executive, at the expense of any popular assembly. A complex public policy programme which requires constant management yields this particular profile. The combined demands of economic policy and foreign policy have accentuated such a tendency. As commonly occurs in these circumstances, corporatist decision-making evolves, where the government reaches consensus on central issues with organized labour and business.

A painful dilemma can be foreseen. Democracy depends on social justice; yet the practical implementation of a system of social justice undermines the very character of democracy it was designed to promote. Of course, a balance can be struck, but only if the participatory impulse is weakened. Regional and local government can be deployed consciously as bridging structures, widening the extent of the citizenry's role in public affairs. Frequently, this panacea delivers less than was originally hoped, since centripetal forces, primarily political and financial, unleashed by the leading executive bodies cause the central government to become ever dominant over its subordinate counterparts.

In such a scenario, citizens feel progressively alienated from the

political mainstream. Frustration, apathy, cynicism can very readily take root. And the legitimacy of the existing order can be further undermined once the sacrifices turn out to be worthless, if, in other words, the government cannot fulfil its brief. There is nothing more perilous to a rejuvenated society than if all that is supposedly real is just so much verbiage. Subsequently, state and civil society could drift apart.

From my sketch, I come to the rather sobering prognosis that the Charterist Image will recede into the distance should the attempt be made to inject the participatory ethos into the veins of governance. Should the problem be unravelled in advance, then an acceptable compromise can be attained which militates against neither social justice nor democracy. This can only transpire when the language of politics reflects a proper realization of what contemporary political rule involves. And this realization is only now dawning on a few in the vanguard of Charterism.

### **The Governing Image**

If Charterists are perhaps soft-hearted to a fault, the Governing Image overcorrects this by projecting unrelenting hard-headedness. Until very recently, the message has been 'The National Party Shall Govern a White South Africa'.<sup>12</sup> Curiously, the doctrine of apartheid began to shed its pedigree at the precise moment when a major objective hove in view. Transkei's so-called independence in the mid-1970s signalled a victory for Nationalist social engineering, sloughing off part of South African territory for the sake of racial purity. Yet, a little earlier, a bold retreat had already been sounded with blacks being authorized to fill job categories from which they were previously outlawed. So what of the 'White South Africa'?

The vision of classic apartheid has become increasingly tenuous over the past two decades. Lapses from orthodoxy prompted splits in National Party ranks, giving rise to the *Herstigte Nasionale Party* in 1969, and the *Conservative Party* thirteen years thereafter. With the idea of apartheid losing relevance to latterday Nationalists, the notion of simply remaining in political office so as to protect essential interests has seemed the pre-eminent strategy. In pragmatic fashion, apartheid has been watered down to ever weaker doses of neopapartheid, although the cloak of authoritarianism has never been lifted, but, in fact, descended with a vengeance during the four to five years of states of emergency that saw out the 1980s.

The current trajectory of the Governing Image was cast in the debates of 1983. At that stage, the electorate delivered its verdict on the mooted new constitutional setup. The irredentist Dr

Treurnicht was absolutely right when he warned before the referendum that widening the basis of participation in government, which the schema proposed, would fan the fires for still further rights. Patently unwieldy from the start, the government saddled itself with a foredoomed arrangement, yet passed it off under the guise of 'democratization'. The enthusiasm for fostering bantustans waned markedly. Instead, the administration tinkered with provisions for blacks in urban regions, but could not devise forms of local government acceptable to the residents. Peering through the welter of proposals and counterproposals that sloshed about thick and fast, all one can discern is the managerial ethic at work — the resolute grip on power and the never ending quest to control the processes of change. And the dominant motive? Control for its own sake, no more imaginative than that. The government lacked will and leadership under most of P.W. Botha's tenure.

Considerable impetus to the governing elite has been imparted by the arrival of President de Klerk. At his bidding, South Africa's political climate altered dramatically in 1990. Proscribed political organizations regained legal standing, some political prisoners were freed, notably Nelson Mandela, of course, and the fabric of apartheid is being shredded. In these circumstances, one has to reappraise the currency of the Governing Image.

As I have already intimated, the Governing Image has been dynamic, subject to refocusing at unpredictable intervals. By comparison, the Charterist position seems fixed in stone. It has taken De Klerk's unprecedented leadership for Nationalists to accept that apartheid, of whatever ilk, is irredeemable. Apartheid, as a doctrine and as a mode of governance, has suffered a logical implosion. Many factors, both internal and external have precipitated this, piling up the contradictions, yet apartheid was always going to founder when it could no longer sustain the weight of its inherent demerits.

Operating pragmatically, however, the De Klerk government is trying valiantly to refocus the Governing Image once more. The managerial impulse dictates the rhythm of business throughout the highest ranks of officialdom. A holding strategy is being conducted. It is negative in nature, for the De Klerk administration's *modus operandi* aims at modest incremental adjustment to the political order. The delicate task, in its eyes, requires constructing a more participatory and competitive model of political rule than hitherto, whilst preserving as much autonomy as possible for the white citizenry. The reform process has gone far enough when the measures introduced endow the new dispensation with legitimacy. This will be conferred by South Africans as a whole, and by the international community at large.

The reasoning here is the converse of the Charterists. According to Charterist logic, the issue of legitimacy comes first: 'in order for legitimacy, perform steps a, b, c . . .' In terms of the Governing Image, 'perform steps a, b, c . . . *only insofar* as they are required to bring about legitimacy'. The government, therefore, cannot predict exactly how high it will have to raise the stakes to remain still the orchestrator of the game. Surely De Klerk's National Party will do its utmost not to forsake political power entirely. To avoid this, the government shows signs of being prepared to relinquish the monopoly of control it has exercised for forty odd years.

Will the Governing Image prevail? Let me highlight two variables in the equation. To begin with, formidable resources buttress the Governing Image, thus sustaining its power of credibility. The National Party has the confidence and might of staying at the helm ever since 1948, accustomed to shaping South Africa's policy profile. This longevity alone has inbuilt advantages. Hence secondly, Nationalists have at their disposal an imposing state apparatus, which for policy purposes is effectively their creation. The resources of party and state, together with the National Party's own severe hierarchical form and dictatorial style of command, as well as the might of the state executive, add up to quite a package. It is in the same league as, for example, the Soviet Union's Communist Party, or better still, the ruling Liberal Democrats in Japan. The package enables the Nationalist government to refocus the Governing Image, thereby mastering the flow of political change in Pretoria without being consumed by opposing currents.

One cannot claim, however, that the government trundles along unchallenged, nor that it will always be placed to direct programmes of reform, nor indeed that the Governing Image is destined to remain firmamental. The great imponderable in political life is the unintended consequence: and this buffets the pragmatist far more than the ideologue, for the latter plods on no matter what. Through President de Klerk's supremely pragmatic style of leadership the South African government has been capable of shepherding the course of political change from on high, and always from the front so far. The government has assumed the role of trend-setter and pace-setter.

What is noticeable, though, is that the concessions wrung out of Nationalist administrations over the previous fifteen years or thereabouts have become ever more substantial, ever more fundamental. The pace from one concession to the next is also quickening all the while. If a concession produces an unanticipated result, it can yield yet a further unexpected concession. The present South African constitution is a case in point, as I indicated earlier. But there may come a moment when the forces let loose

consequent upon opening up the polity will topple the governors. The British in India, in Nigeria experienced this; so did Brazil's military rulers a decade ago; and Mikhail Gorbachev is imperilled by the selfsame difficulty right now. Therefore, the Governing Image could crumble. It may lack the allure to hold the opposition at bay. Or its focus may become so blurred that it blends indistinguishably with other, formerly rival images.

The strength of the Governing Image lies in the resources, both party and state, it presently enjoys. But the Image itself is increasingly elusive; its essential is barely discernible. Charterists start out with a very clear understanding of what they mean by democracy — the closest possible approximation to self-government. For South Africa's rulers, by contrast, democracy is construed as the least permissible competitive struggle over the means to political authority. From this perspective, Charterists are maximalists, Governors minimalists. By just reacting to prevailing circumstances and adjusting accordingly, the Governing Image is at the total mercy of a managerial impulse. The preoccupation with inductive reasoning is so complete that the Governing Image has not replaced the pure ideology of apartheid with any alternative moral vision. Incremental political change, pragmatic renderings of events, an obsession with political power — these are all strategic considerations. But whither the Governing Image eventually? We cannot tell. Nor can the De Klerk government. This may prove a mixed blessing.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Although to my reckoning, the Charterist and the Governing Images of democracy alike are flawed, I see no grounds for despondency on this score alone. Quite the contrary. South Africa seems in the midst of a transitional phase, where one political order is slowly giving birth to a new form. Confusion and contradiction abound. This is unsurprising, and far from unusual if one examines the general history of social change. By being forced to sharpen their thinking as the political game alters and the bids are upped, Charterists will, one would imagine, devote considerably more attention to the problems of governance, just as the search for the true identity of the Governing Image will properly be on in ruling circles.

At the moment the two Images do not overlap. They may never. What is more important is that each is examined self-critically in order to encourage a measure of intersection. Contact between the images is imperative; the conversion of either to the other is a relative, perhaps unwarranted luxury.

Take heart, too, in the significant role the state plays in

Charterists' and Governors' conceptions of the South African polity. Both agree on the necessity for a strong and well-articulated state. This really is indispensable. Without a resilient institutional framework, South African society will not be able to withstand the rigours of a concerted period of social transition. Without a state apparatus directing resources, and without considerable state capacity, democracy and development cannot advance hand in hand. I fully realize these assertions are contentious, but I wish to voice such thoughts, rather than gliding silently over them. I am *planning on a detailed explanation elsewhere*.

If ever there is a time in South Africa for political scientists to put their shoulder to the wheel this undeniably is it. Many of us have limped along in the shadow of Leviathan, often at a comfortable distance away, brandishing our arguments in mute defiance. This is no longer enough — and it probably never was. Here Rick Turner's courage, wisdom and integrity are sorely missed. This surely should have been his hour.

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#### NOTES

1. This article is a fairly faithful rendering of the Richard Turner Memorial Lecture I presented at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg on 30 May 1990. The pattern of reasoning remains identical, but certain points which had to be discarded as the minutes flew by have now been reintroduced; and I have also sought to disentangle the rather muzzy concluding remarks that spilled out of my mouth at the death. I have, however, resisted the temptation to upgrade the content in any way. There has been no pressing need to do so, I believe. The manner in which the South African political scene has unfolded these past six months has, if anything, perhaps reinforced whatever integrity my account may possess.
2. Two qualifications at this juncture. The first is that, rather ruefully, I should keep the record straight. As an undergraduate, I observed Rick Turner's example more in the breach than the contrary. I did read with gusto, but was never the budding undergraduate in the orthodox sense. Still, as I wound my way on the postgraduate trail moving from university to university, so Turner's beacon shone ever brightly the further Durban receded into the distance.  
The other point worth emphasising is that Rick Turner waved no magic wand. His efforts, understandably, are romanticized today. Yet even he had his fair share of consumers sliding out mid-stream in his lectures. And students evading assignments, in time-honoured fashion. I vividly recall him one early morning storming out of a seminar because our group was woefully unprepared, not even having identified the reading, let alone cobbled together a presentation.  
And in striving for hedonism, not a few students found Rick Turner the person daunting and forbiddingly ascetic. Thus I make no pretence at *knowing* him in the round; I can only speak for what I drew from him as a student.
3. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. I still have the dog-eared hardback, with the price-sticker — R3,45! Some students, I well remember, struck, they smirked, a fervent blow against capitalism, by 'liberating' copies from the local bookseller. Such a tactic was integral to the revolutionary riposte. Excesses of youth are cloaked in multiple guises. Shortcomings too.
4. SPRO-CAS 2. Johannesburg, Special Programme for Christian Action in Society, 1972.

5. The literature on market socialism has gathered steam steadily over recent decades, but it is rare indeed to come across any interpretation that does not at least pay lip-service to Carole Pateman's pioneering effort. For a recent, splendidly fulsome analytic exercise, see David Miller, *Market, State and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989.
6. Permit a further reminiscence, if you will — it's that kind of piece thus far. I ploughed through *The First Circle* in April 1972 whilst lying flat on my back, virtually immobile, in hospital recovering from a motor accident. The book depressed me so much I pleaded to be transferred from the private ward where I then was to a general one. Ward and cell had merged chillingly in my imagination.

Months later, of course, *The Gulag Archipelago*, Solzhenitsyn's stupendous chronicle, started to roll off the English-language presses. And the Soviet Union even now, but now more than ever, is still looking for mechanisms to cope with the legacies of Stalin's dictatorship.

7. See, for example, G.D.H. Cole, 'Conflicting Social Obligations', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society XX* (1914–1915), pp. 140–159; *Guild Socialism Restated*, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1980; and *Self-Government in Industry*, 1972. More convincing advocacy for self-management has come latterly from Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989.
8. The best source is probably the lectures published posthumously as *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. Durkheim's *The Division of Labour in Society*, New York, The Free Press, 1933, is an indispensable companion volume if one is attempting to tease out the full argument I have just sketched.
9. This was not the occasion to flesh out complete explanations. That task is still in the formative stages. For instance, subsequent to the lecture, I developed the next section for presentation at a conference hosted by the University of Transkei in September. This will be published as 'The Charterist Image of Democracy in the South African Context' in a collection edited by James Chipasula, provisionally entitled *Democracy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. It has also appeared under the heading 'Charterists and Democracy in South Africa', *Reality* 22(6) (1990), pp. 5–11.
10. This is an enormous undertaking. I have undertaken a few preliminary skirmishes in print. Apart from the previously cited 'Charterists and Democracy in South Africa', I might mention several others: 'Soldiers and the Struggle Towards Democracy in South America', *UNISA Latin American Report* 4(1) (1988), pp. 92–94; 'The Scope for Democracy in South America', *UNISA Latin American Report* 4(2) (1988), pp. 4–12; 'Comparing Patterns of Governance in Argentina, Brazil and South Africa', *UNISA Latin American Report* 6(1) (1990), pp. 4–17; 'South Africa on the South American Road to Democracy', *South Africa International* 21(3) (1991), pp. 173–181; 'Transition to Democracy: South America and South Africa', *UNISA Latin American Report* 7(1) (1991).

See especially, however, three outstanding examples of scholarship which are highly relevant: Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Joel S. Migdal, *Strong States and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988; and Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 4 Volumes, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1989.

11. The empirical material is voluminous. To mention but a few studies, consult: Charles Lewis Taylor (ed.), *Why Governments Grow*, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1983; Aaron Wildavsky, 'The Logic of Public Sector Growth', in Jan-Erik Lane (ed.), *State and Market*, London, Sage, 1985, pp. 231–270; Marshall W. Meyer, 'The Growth of Public and Private Bureaucrats', *Theory and Society* 16 (1987), pp. 215–237.
12. My interpretation of governmental manoeuvres over the past year has been conveyed in two essays, 'The Battle for Tuynhuys and All That', *Reality* 21(6) (1989), pp. 6–9, and 'Still No Easy Walk to Freedom', *Reality* 22(4) (1990), pp. 3–5.