

THE AFRIKANER BROEDERBOND 1927-1948:
CLASS VANGUARD OF AFRIKANER NATIONALISM*

by

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We repeat the view we expressed a year ago - namely that the Broederbond is an arrogant, self-chosen elite, operating by stealth and intrigue, its early cultural aspirations swamped by its neo-Fascist ideas on race and colour. It is a cancerous growth in the living body of South Africa and as such its influence is deadly. (1)

The Bond is a service organisation intended to serve the Afrikaner. Its sphere of operations is the work of the Afrikaner people as a separate historical, Protestant-Christian, language and cultural community. The activities with which the Bond occupied itself from time to time are determined by the needs of the Afrikaner people at that historical moment. (2)

A secret society with the professed aim of the "promotion of all the interests of the Afrikaner nation" (3), the Afrikaner Broederbond (hereafter the AB or Bond) has long been the bogeyman of South African politics. Its operations are attacked as detailed and lurid conspiracies, and defended as the innocent, if confidential actions of public-spirited men. In the process, though much authoritative data on the Bond exists, its nature, functions and role have been thoroughly mystified. At the outset it must be stated that the AB has exerted a profound influence at all levels of South African politics. This paper attempts the beginnings of a demystification of the Bond's operations and an assessment of its role up till 1948. Given its secret nature, this is necessarily sketchy and schematic. Yet such an assessment requires more than an examination of conflicting claims about the Broederbond; it demands situating the Bond within the broader context of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa.

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As a political, social and ideological phenomenon, Afrikaner nationalism has itself been persistently mystified by both its academic proponents and opponents. One group has sought to create political/cultural mythology (4), the other - ogres. (5) Many non-Afrikaner historians have failed to read, or at least take seriously, what Afrikaners write about themselves - how Afrikaner ideologues and commentators have sought to interpret the world for the volk - relying instead on the hackneyed interpretations of the political opponents of Afrikaner nationalism. (6) Ironically, this has produced a mirror image of its ideological assumptions. Almost without exception, studies of Afrikaner nationalism have accepted the social categories inherent in the ideology: they have failed to query the ideological premise that ethnic/racial/cultural categories constitute the natural and sole units of social action in South Africa, where social classes "are not meaningful social realities". (7) Explanation remains rooted in ideas and ideology, themselves aspects of social action but hardly its explanation. By taking as given precisely that which requires explanation - the primacy of ethnic/racial/cultural categories - Afrikaner nationalism is presented as a monolithic political, social and ideological phenomenon, and is explained in a highly circular fashion either as the product of culture itself or as the collective psychology of a culturally pre-defined group, "Afrikanerdom". I know of no attempt to explore the generation, development and acquisition of the cultural values of Afrikaner nationalism, nor the interaction in the process of idea-creation between leaders and masses. These critical questions cannot merely be taken as given or self-explanatory. (8) This is no mere carping. If these questions are explored, Afrikaner nationalism soon ceases to be a monolithic response by an undifferentiated "Afrikanerdom", but emerges as the often surprisingly flexible reaction of specific class forces to the pressures of capitalist development. Through the location of Afrikaans-speakers in the material world of the South African social formation in all its historical phases of development, different patterns of relation to the means of production are immediately apparent. The exploration of their effects illuminates the gradual development, and careful cultivation by specific groups, of an ideological and political matrix which could apparently articulate and co-ordinate their varying responses to the pressures of capitalist development.

It is suggested, then, that only through an infusion of the categories of social class and the notion of class struggle can Afrikaner nationalism be demystified and the acquisition and operation of ideologies fully grasped. (9) It is in this context that a study of the AB as a class organization is critical, not only in the de-conspiratorialization of the Bond itself but, given its leading role, as a demystification of Afrikaner nationalism as well. It will be argued that during the period under review the AB was a purely petty bourgeois organization, rooted in the northern provinces of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and concerned with the particular effects of the trajectory of capitalist development on the Afrikaans-speaking fraction of the petty bourgeoisie. Once these were eased through the mobilization of support from other Afrikaans-speaking class forces and the use of State power, the nature of the AB changed. Itself wracked with conflict between these competing class forces, it lost its vanguard position. (10)

I

The Bond grew out of a grouping calling itself Jong Suid Afrika (Young South Africa), formed early in 1918. In June of that year it changed its name to the Afrikaner Broederbond (literally, the Afrikaner Brotherhood). It was a time of political crisis and depression - "Afrikanerdom was burning in hellfire". The 1913 split in the South African Party produced confusion and bitterness among Afrikaners, particularly in the northern provinces. This was compounded by the violent suppression of the Rebellie, the execution of Joupie Fourie and the imprisonment of its leaders by the Botha government. Agriculture was depressed, the influenza epidemic raged, and the squeeze on land and effects of the Rebellie drove increasing numbers of rural whites into the cities, compounding the problem of "poor whiteism". All writings on the Bond stress the significance of this period, when "politically and economically the Afrikaner

had been reduced to a slave in the land of his birth". (11) These conditions generated many organized responses. In the Free State, General Hertzog had formed the Nationalist Party, followed by the formation of similar parties in the Transvaal and the Cape. The Helpmekaar (Mutual Aid) organization was conceived to pay the fines of the imprisoned leaders of the Rebellie, and its mobilization of the savings of Afrikaans-speakers was partly to inspire the formation of the two future insurance giants, Santam and Sanlam. The growth of the co-operative movement similarly dates from this period. In the Cape, the cultural nationalism of the language movement was given political and economic muscle. In three full years a handful of Cape Town and Stellenbosch professional men formed Die Nasionale Pers (National Press), the Cape Nationalist Party, and Santam and Sanlam. (12) But the Western Cape was little affected by the economic and political crises which wracked the northern provinces. The well-off, educated Afrikaners who formed these groups were in a very different position from those in the north. The bitter words of a contemporary verkrampste survey of the formation of the AB echo the recurring conflict between the wealthier south and the north in nationalist politics: "compared with the acute distress raging in the Northern Province, there was little need south of the Hex River." (13)

This important point highlights what were, in effect, the different class bases of the nationalist movement in the Cape, on the one hand, and the Transvaal and the Free State, on the other - the effects of which persist in the Nationalist Party today. These variations relate in the main to the differential nature of the "rural community" which formed the backbone of nationalist support - the nature of farming operations, their relationship with the colonial state in the emergence of commercial agriculture, the size and location of markets, etc.; to the position of the petty bourgeoisie vis-à-vis capital in general and the colonial state in particular; and to the relationship between the Afrikaans-speaking petty bourgeoisie and these differentiated rural groups. Compounded by differing colonial experiences and the widely divergent economic and political effects of the Anglo-Boer war on the Afrikaans-speaking populations of the north and south, these differences produced an economically, politically and culturally divided "Afrikanerdom" at union in 1910. The federation of the various provincial parties in the uneasy alliance of the South African Party fostered an illusion of unity which was shattered in 1913 on the issue of the relationship with imperialism. The Afrikaner Broederbond was born into, and self-consciously as a result of, these divisions. It was always an urban, petty bourgeois, northern-dominated grouping, reflecting in itself too the differential relationship with fractions of capital between the northern and southern petty bourgeoisie. Given the key interpretative role of this class in all the provinces, some of these differences must be examined briefly in an attempt to explain why the petty bourgeois response should have been specifically Afrikaner nationalist and why there were important variations in content and orientation between the provincial movements.

The answers to these questions lie in the nature of the economic and political incorporation of the Afrikaans-speaking petty bourgeoisie in the broad South African social formation. Within the imperialist colonial states a clear cultural oppression operated against Afrikaans speakers. Long before the war ended the independence of the Republics, so generating of fierce cultural response, the language movement of the Cape had inspired a strong cultural nationalism. (14) More importantly, in an essentially peripheral economy dominated by the ideology of imperialist interest, for those Afrikaners unprepared to accept cultural assimilation and who possessed a modicum of training rendering them unsuitable for manual labour, employment opportunities were limited. Law, the Church, education and the lower levels of the state bureaucracy were the only real avenues available. (15) English was the language of the economy. Even within these occupations, opportunities for advancement were limited and Afrikaans speakers discriminated against. Thus, for the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, economic opportunities were limited, both by class position and language. Yet these occupations placed the petty bourgeois individual in a unique position from which to experience and at the same time to mediate the effects of imperialism for virtually all Afrikaans speakers. He interpreted its law for farmers and workers, taught its curriculum to their children, implemented its policies and, as a cleric, was particularly responsible for the interpretation of the entire experience - its explanation in cosmic and symbolic terms - to a confused volk. Thus,

in a sense, the experience of imperialism was synthesized in the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. Nor did the structure of South African capitalism in its imperialist phase provide the culturally aware Afrikaner fraction of the petty bourgeoisie with any real potential allies within the dominant capitalist class, except perhaps in the Cape. Such alliances would involve total cultural assimilation and, more important, an acceptance of the long-term dominance of the interests of imperialist mining and finance capital. Many Afrikaners did make such alliances. Given the nature of the emergence of commercial agriculture after the Anglo-Boer war, specific fractions of agricultural capital, particularly in the eastern and western Transvaal, increasingly identified their interests with imperialism after the 1913 Land Act. Botha and Smuts personified this alliance. But the petty bourgeoisie did not have this independent basis on which to act. By nature a dependent class, alliances had to be sought elsewhere.

In the Cape, conditions were less traumatic, and the potential alliance clear. The long established and prosperous commercial agriculture of the western Cape and Boland provided a viable basis for political and economic alliance - and the possibilities of independent accumulation. Drawing on the tradition and experience of the Afrikaner Bond, the formation of the Cape Nationalist Party, Die Nasionale Pers, and Santam and Sanlam, had been seen very clearly in these terms. In June 1915 in De Aar, a "Nationalist Party" was established by General Hertzog's leading Cape Parliamentary supporter, the English-speaking Professor H. E. S. Fremantle. The Fremantle Party was based amongst the poorer farmers of the northern Cape, and enjoyed Hertzog's blessing, "a development which Advocate Hennie Van Zyl, W. A. Hofmeyr and their friends were not prepared to tolerate". (16) Mobilizing support from western Cape and Boland farmers, a group of Cape Town and Stellenbosch professional men formed their own Nationalist Party in the same month, and, after Hofmeyr had refused the preferred leadership, invited Dr Malan to leave his pulpit, lead the Party and edit its recently established mouthpiece, Die Burger. In September, the alliance of Cape Town petty bourgeoisie and wealthy farmers took over the Fremantle Party, made the Professor their Vice-Chairman, and assigned him to political oblivion. In terms of their vision, the Cape Party, Die Nasionale Pers and Santam and Sanlam were to be financed by the rural bourgeoisie, run by the urban petty bourgeoisie, and grow through the mobilization of the full spectrum of rural support. This strategy ultimately provided an independent basis of accumulation, producing a financial capital in the south which dominates the Afrikaner nationalism of the Cape.

In the north, and the Transvaal particularly, no such potentially viable economic alliances were available. The petty bourgeoisie was politically more isolated and required to interpret an economically much more hostile world for the great bulk of Afrikaans speakers who had never known the prosperity of the Cape. The political struggle of the northern petty bourgeoisie was thus built on an alliance not with a strong fraction of capital, as in the Cape, but with poorer farmers and (potentially - it took a long time to develop) a class fraction which grew out of this group, Afrikaner workers. This could only be anti-imperialist in tone. Yet the pre-1934 ideological content of Afrikaner nationalism in the north was dominated by rural interests - the problems of "poor whiteism" seen in rural terms, requiring a return to the land. It is precisely this ideologically isolated position, reflecting the total economic dependence of the northern petty bourgeoisie, which made the Broederbond so vital. From the outset it expressed its concern with urban issues. It saw the problems of poor whiteism and the position of Afrikaners generally as an urban rather than rural phenomenon. Its solutions were never to be sought simply at the level of politics, but in the ownership structure of the industrial economy, by challenging the nature of South African capitalism itself. This orientation gave it the vanguard role after 1927, and, even in the days of the Hertzog Party, differentiated it from the broader concerns of the nationalist establishment.

Thus the politics of the "Afrikanerdom" into which the infant AB was born in 1918 reflected the class cleavages between Afrikaans speakers. In this bitter climate, fourteen railwaymen, theologians and policemen formed "an organisation in which Afrikaners could find each other in the midst of great confusion and disunity and be able to work together for the survival of the Afrikaner people in South Africa and

the promotion of its interests". (17) According to its then secretary, in its early years "it was little more than a semi-religious organisation", with little purpose or direction. (18) In December 1919 a loyalty oath was introduced and the following year a constitution finally adopted. (19) Real expansion began in 1921. In May of that year, it took up the question of Afrikaans schools (20), an interest which attracted "a large number of teachers". They infused a new life into the Bond, one source claiming for it a membership of 2,000 in 1924. (21) The Oelofse Report dates its expansion from August 1921 with the formation of a new branch in Krugersdorp. On the 26th of that month a majority of the meeting held in the Carlton Hotel decided the Bond would become a secret organization. Henceforth it began to concern itself with policy issues, dealing with matters such as "the native question, immigration, profiteering, home language education and library affairs". (22) However, dissension crept in over the Nationalist/Labour Party Pact. The Bond's effectiveness was undermined by an acrimonious split 1923-5, and there are suggestions of a "purge", though this may refer to 1927. After reconciliation in 1925, another period of "consolidation and expansion" commenced, culminating in the critical 1927 decision "to take an active part in the life of the community, leaving no avenue neglected". (23) From this moment, the AB began to assume for itself a vanguard role within Afrikaner nationalism and extend its parameters beyond the loose federation of Provincial Nationalist Parties.

II

Designed to ensure secrecy and control, the organizational structure of the AB has changed little since the 1920s. The basic organizational unit is the division of between five and fifty members, meeting monthly. The organization's highest authority is the Bondsraad, a congress of divisional delegates convened at the beginning of each July. A twelve-member Uitvoerende Raad (UR - executive council), christened "the twelve apostles", presided over daily affairs. Membership is restricted to financially sound, white, Afrikaans-speaking, Protestant males, over age 25, of "unimpeachable character", who actively accept South Africa as their sole homeland, containing a separate Afrikaner nation with its own language and culture. To this long list of restrictions is added a complicated and careful selection process. Membership is by invitation only - nobody can apply to join the Bond. Names of prospective members, who must be known to at least half the members of the division, are circulated among the divisions and the UR. A system of blackballing "maintains quality". It is this very tight selection process - the old-boy network to end them all - which produces charges of elitism and, according to one former member, "enormous resentment amongst ordinary Afrikaners". Approved candidates become members of the division nearest their homes. Exceptions are the "los" or "vrygestelde broers" (exempted brothers), who, "because of circumstances outside his control", cannot devote the requisite time to divisional meetings. In practice, Los broers are members in high public office whose contribution is in terms of direct influence rather than activity. (24)

In the thirties and forties, the Afrikaans urban population was overwhelmingly working class. Divisional membership is constitutionally required to reflect the occupational spectrum of the local Afrikaner community, giving the Bond the "right" to speak in its name. In practice, membership was, and is, confined largely to the professions. A stiff annual fee (£12.10.0.) and a system of regular financial levies, together with the strict requirement that prospective members be financially sound, ruled out working class membership in any but token numbers. Workers were never involved in the organization. It was felt that "there was no specific need for workers in the Broederbond". (25) Analysis of membership throughout its 57-year history highlights both its petty bourgeois nature and the subtle shifts in dominance by various groups. Teachers, academics, clergymen and civil servants have always provided the backbone of the Bond - over 50 per cent of its 2,528 members in 1944, and still 35 per cent of 9,413 members in 1972. Other perennially large occupational groupings are farmers, politicians, lawyers, journalists and assorted "businessmen". In the thirties, the early influence of teachers was overshadowed by the ideological dominance of academics, particularly those of Potchefstroom University. Reflecting the AB's concern with economic issues, the forties saw a strong influx of businessmen. Their proportional membership rose from virtually nil in the thirties to 15 per cent by 1972, with a disproportionate influence within the Bond. From the forties to roughly the mid-sixties, no one group equalled the ideological dominance of the academics during the thirties. (26)

Built on "a Christian-national foundation", with its motto "Be strong", the Bond's constitutional aims are three-fold: "to effect an healthy and progressive unity between all Afrikaners who strive for the welfare of the Afrikaner nation; the stimulation of Afrikaner national consciousness and the inculcation of love for its language, religion, tradition, country and people; and the promotion of all the interests of the Afrikaner nation." Clause 6 of the constitution excludes party politics from the organization, containing a seven-fold guide to individual political action. This includes full constitutional sovereignty; combatting all inferior treatment of Afrikaners and Afrikaans in the civil service; ending the foreign exploitation of South Africa's population and resources through nationally controlled intensive industrialization; segregation of all "non-whites" under white "guardianship"; rehabilitation of the rural areas and full "civilized" white employment; "nationalization" of finance and the planned co-ordination of the economy; and the Christian-national "Afrikanerization" of public life and education with "freedom for self-development for all groups, "provided it does not constitute a danger to the state". (27) These aims clearly cover a broad spectrum of interest. A critical question is what exactly constitutes "the Afrikaner nation" and its "interests". Who are the "ons" (us) of nationalist rhetoric? What was it about "ons" which enabled the interests of farmers, workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and capitalists to be depicted as those of "the Afrikaner nation", and how have these interests changed? After 1927 the Broederbond entrusted itself with the largely successful identification, interpretation, guardianship and promotion of these interests. Its analysis and solutions to the problems of "Afrikanerdom" were those of an economically deprived and excluded petty bourgeoisie. The structure of South African capitalism was identified as the source of this discrimination and the Bond set out "to capture the foreign [capitalist] system and transform and adapt it to our national character". (28) The Afrikaner nationalism it espoused was similarly a petty bourgeois response which could co-ordinate the interests of various Afrikaans-speaking class forces against the "imperialist" hegemonic and dominant classes.

Beyond these broad aims, how does the Broederbond function? It must be clearly understood that for most of its life the AB was a policy-making, co-ordinating body. It determined the fields of action and their parameters for the volk, without itself directly implementing policy. Its own description of the process of policy formation is illuminating. Monthly divisional meetings consider "everything to do with Afrikaners in its particular area, especially economic life". Policy proposals are first discussed within a division, presumed to be representative of the local community. Individual members "exercise their professional expertise" on the problem. Proposals are then referred to other divisions and examined "with due regard for local conditions and requirements". If widely supported, a "more searching enquiry is instituted" by UR-appointed "experts". When the "fully worked-out" scheme is accepted by the Bondsraad, "it follows it must have been fully discussed". If its realization "is not dependent on state action", the scheme "is laid before the people" for ratification, not by the Bond (it has no public existence), "but by those people who have the greatest interest in it". In practice, this meant convening a Volkskongres (people's national congress) by one of the AB's front organizations. These occurred regularly during the thirties and forties when it was mobilizing support for its policies. Finally, "if state action is essential for the implementation of the scheme, the matter is submitted to the government body concerned for consideration and the necessary steps, or to the nation for consideration in public. Should the project meet with approval, it is then taken further by the proper authorities". (29) Since all South Africa's prime ministers after 1948 and most of their cabinets have belonged to the Bond, it generally has little problem in gaining the ear of "the proper authorities". Recalling his 20-year membership, one now antagonistic former divisional chairman insisted the process was "extremely democratic". Complaints were "thoroughly and frankly aired", and through this "democratic procedure" the Bond generated "a very powerful sense of fellowship, solidarity and commitment - if one can use the phrase of the Broederbond, a feeling of intense comradeship". As the old-boy network par excellence, it established "ongoing machinery to handle everything". When entering a new field, e.g. trade unionism in 1936, "it always establishes a public front". (30) Since 1929, its major policy implementing body has been the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations - FAK), described by military intelligence as the AB's "pasteboard stalking horse". (31)

A picture emerges of an immense formal and informal network of influence at all social levels. For much of its existence the AB dominated the institutional, ideological and financial life of Afrikaner nationalism. Its influence ranges through cultural organization, the Afrikaans churches, the Nationalist Party, professional groupings and the spectrum of Afrikaans business undertakings to all levels of state power itself - from the State President through the state bureaucracy, civil and military. A military intelligence chart of its influence during the war suggested that, beyond its formal and informal connections, a system of Waaksaamheid (vigilance) committees functioned to keep an eye on and foster "Afrikaner interests" in all fields. This was repeatedly denied. However, 1973 the Sunday Times published detailed lists of the members of these committees, staffed by the Bond's intellectual elite and deputed "to keep a close watch on every public body and every important sector of public life ... notice any backsliding, lack of enthusiasm or deviation from policy". (32) It is an overstatement to suggest, however, that the Bond "runs" South Africa - is its secret government. This devalues the role of the Party itself, which is no simple AB front in politics, and has often been in conflict with it. But certainly its influence has been profound, its "advice" always listened to, and, when unanimous, regularly followed.

Its decisive interventions at all policy levels apart, the Bond has furthered its members' interests in other ways. While its various public utterances and apologists depict a dedicated, selfless band of public-spirited men working unrewarded in the service of their volk, much evidence suggests the material compensations of membership go beyond mere influence. The Botha Commission reproduces an AB document labelled Helpmekaar (help each other), listing numerous occupational vacancies in ten towns, naming the Broers to be contacted. Curiously, it then dismissed the claim that the AB fosters "jobs for pals". Military intelligence reports and the long-running Sunday Times campaign against the Bond cite similar documents. Moodie quotes "a former chairman" of the AB saying it has now degenerated into "jobs for pals". (33) At the least, this old-boy network has protected its members' interests very effectively. It is widely accepted amongst Afrikaners that membership is extremely useful careerwise, and almost as widely resented by nationalist non-members. (34) Be this as it may, through its network of influence, for much of the period under review, the Bond controlled two key areas of Afrikaner nationalism - ideology and finance:

The AB's tremendous influence must be attributed to the fact that its policy is based on two fundamental principles, namely to gain control of the minds of Afrikanerdom through control of its educational institutions and to control its actions by gaining a tight grip on its purse strings. (35)

For much of the twenties the AB functioned in semi-Masonic fashion, almost exclusively in cultural fields. Two traumatic events in the twenties and thirties decisively altered its role and led to the adoption of a vanguard position. The first was the 1926 Balfour Declaration on the sovereignty of the Dominions. Returning from the Imperial conference, the nationalist Prime Minister, General Hertzog, announced the constitutional aims of the his Party were now largely satisfied and it would abandon its republican demands. The many horrified republicans grouped themselves round men like Dr N. J. van der Merwe, who established a formal republican ginger group (Republikeinsebond) within the party in 1930, after consultation with the Potchefstroom academics who then dominated the AB. (36) Certainly it would appear that the formation of an AB clique within the Transvaal party was inspired by Hertzog's declaration and the decision that he was no longer to be fully trusted. Thereafter, the AB became in a sense an alternative to the Party itself, attracting men like those of Potchefstroom. Though this could only be proved with access to AB archives, I would argue Hertzog's announcement prompted the 1927 decision to "expand activities and take an active part in the life of the community, leaving no avenue neglected". (37) Its self-conscious assumption of the vanguard mantle of Afrikaner nationalism certainly dates from this period.

The prime achievement of the Bond in the late twenties was its establishment of a cultural front in December 1929 - the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (FAK). Established to "combat cultural chaos", the FAK was the Bond's answer to the "need for central coordination" of cultural action, through which it controlled and

politicized the cultural debates of the thirties.

"It [the formation of the FAK] had only one great meaning. Afrikaners should grasp each other by the hand; the F.A.K. should bring the hands together; and those hands should never let each other go." (38)

The Bond always insisted it merely "inspired" the FAK's formation, whereafter the organization developed its own dynamic. The FAK did embark on a wide range of activities. By 1937 almost 300 cultural bodies, church councils, youth and student associations, charitable, scientific and educational groups had affiliated to it. Yet it was without doubt the AB's front - paternity was often acknowledged. With few token exceptions both shared the same executive councils and officials, who publicly implemented privately determined policy. In effect, the AB's routine cultural work was now openly undertaken by the FAK, freeing the Bond to concentrate on policy.

"We find the A.B. is slowly handing over the cultural work itself to our much bigger son, the F.A.K. ... [but] national culture and the welfare of the nation will only flourish if the South African people break all foreign political bonds. After the cultural and economic needs, the A.B. will have to devote its attention to the political needs of our people." (39)

Of the disenchanted petty bourgeois Republicans the Bond attracted in the late twenties, most important were the Gereformeerde academics of Potchefstroom. They brought to it a developed, rigorously conservative, Calvinist Weltanschauung - the skeletal framework for an ideological redefinition of Afrikaner nationalism which they heavily influenced in the thirties. These academics gave the AB a new vigour and self-consciously operated as its ideologues. In the confused days of Coalition and Fusion, their influence kept much of the Afrikaner intelligentsia out of the United Party and provided some ideological credibility to the very weak Gesuiwerde (purified) Nationalist Party in the northern provinces. (40) Between the formation of the FAK and Coalition in 1933, they set out to strengthen the Bond organizationally as well. The Republikeinsebond was one result, though other schemes, such as an approach to the "Royal Order of Scotland" appear rather ludicrous. And the Bond moved slowly out of its Transvaal exclusivism. In 1931 the first OFS branch was established in Bloemfontein, followed shortly by another in Cape Town. (41)

Whatever the Republicans' mistrust of Hertzog, given his immense political stature, they were unable to move out of the Nationalist Party into an open challenge until he himself precipitated the break. The Coalition crisis of 1933 and split in the Nationalist Party with Fusion in 1934 were the second of the catalysts which finally gave the AB ideological predominance in the north. Of the 74 Nationalist MPs elected in 1933, only 19 joined the Cape leader, Dr D. F. Malan, in refusing to follow Hertzog into fusion with Smuts' South African Party to form the United Party (UP). Of these, 14 were Cape representatives. Only one of the Transvaal's 32 Nationalist MPs and four of 15 in the OFS remained aloof. The result was to shift the weight of Nationalist ideological and political leadership in the north towards extra-parliamentary sources. An extra-parliamentary tradition developed to contribute to the vicious split between the parliamentary Nationalist Party and the various extra-parliamentary groups (particularly the Ossewa Brandwag) during the war. The Potchefstroom academics thus exercised an inordinate leadership, soon complemented by the slightly different emphases of returning students such as Drs Diedrichs, Meyer and Verwoerd.

Fusion marked two related developments in Afrikaner Nationalism. Firstly, it changed its class basis - more particularly, the relationship between rural and petty bourgeois elements in the north. Under Hertzog, rural interests dominated the concerns of Afrikaner nationalism. The petty bourgeoisie were relegated to a supportive position. Given the nature of its economic concerns, heavily dependent on the state and discriminated against by "imperialism", the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie was left isolated in the north. Almost without exception, northern commercial agriculture supported the UP. Rural support for the Gesuiwerdes, such as it was, came from poorer farmers or professional groups in the platteland towns. In its isolation, the petty

bourgeoisie was reduced to articulating the interests of "the small man". This gave the northern Gesuiwerde party, and the Afrikaner nationalism which developed a very different class character to its Hertzogite predecessor, an almost exclusively petty bourgeois grouping. (42)

In the Cape, however, the petty bourgeoisie was still in political and economic alliance with commercial agriculture, and operating in a different political tradition. Fourteen Cape MPs remained in the Gesuiwerde party, and more importantly, thanks largely to the efforts of W. A. Hofmeyr and F. C. Erasmus, most of the branch organizations as well. Cape Nationalists thus enjoyed strong parliamentary representation. Their leader, Dr Malan, was now national leader of the Gesuiwerdes, the only really prominent member of the Hertzog party to stay out of Fusion. His stature was thus even greater. The Cape Gesuiwerde party was in effect almost identical to its Hertzogite predecessor, personally, ideologically, and organizationally. Unlike the north, neither a strong extra-Parliamentary tradition developed nor had the class basis of organized Cape Afrikaner nationalism changed much with fusion. This had important long-term effects. The prestige of Dr Malan and the numerical predominance of Cape MPs gave the Cape Party and the interests it represented a national preponderance much resented in the north. Secondly, though Malan himself undoubtedly changed his position on many important issues (e.g. Republicanism) and made concessions to the developing northern rhetoric, the AB-directed ideological redefinition did not go nearly so far in the Cape - it did not need to. Operating in a different class and ideological nexus, the relatively few Cape AB activists were less wrapped in the ideological mysticism of the north.

A second related result of fusion was the emergence of a new generation of ideological and political leaders, again predominantly in the north. These younger men had not fought in the Anglo-Boer war and had lived most of their lives in a unified South Africa. Given a chance at leadership and an influence they would otherwise have had to wait long for, they brought to Afrikaner nationalism new vigour, ideas and perspectives. To the influence of the young Potchefstroom academics was soon added that of men like the famous four doctors, N. Diedrichs, P. J. Meyer, H. F. Verwoerd, and A. Hertzog - all newly returned from overseas study, and, Diedrichs and Meyer in particular, heavily influenced by European Fascism. With the Potchefstroom academics they led the post-fusion ideological redefinition of Afrikaner nationalism.

Soon after Coalition, a new journal, Koers (Directions), appeared from Potchefstroom. Its first editorial expounds its self-conscious ideological role:

"Indeed, in our country and throughout the entire world, there exists the greatest confusion on religious, moral, educational, social, political and economic issues. However weak and impotent it may be in many respects, with the help and mercy of God, Koers will try to give direction in all these areas." (43)

During the thirties, Koers was effectively the theoretical journal of a major faction of the Bond. It raised all the contemporary issues, answering them in policy terms. The analysis of coalition in its first issue shows clearly the environment it sought to interpret, and the economic motivation underlying AB nationalism:

"General Hertzog has achieved what neither Gen. Botha nor Gen. Smuts could do. He has reconciled the great majority of Afrikaners with the idea of the British Empire.... When, with Sovereignty [reference to the 1926 Balfour Declaration and 1931 Statute of Westminster], Gen. Hertzog also accepted cooperative imperialism, in in practice the differences between the two large parties on this issue fell away.... It is therefore certain that under the new regime less emphasis will be placed on sovereignty than on mutual cooperation within the Empire.

"Once again Imperialism will stride triumphant through the land. Under present international conditions, cooperative Imperialism will mainly, though not exclusively, take the form of economic collaboration. Our monetary system, our commercial and banking policy, our industrial sector will remain Imperialist oriented and grow increasingly so. In the place of the old political subjugation we now enter a period of economic dependence. And the golden chains so forged are much stronger and more dangerous than the old [political] chains because they are more difficult to recognise, and once forged, are not easily discarded. The apparatus of this collaboration is already largely extant, particularly in the banking and commercial sectors. Only a government fully committed to South Africa's economic independence could escape this octopus grip. What will happen under a government sympathetic [to imperialism] is impossible to predict." (44)

In this environment of perceived economic domination, the AB strove to interpret the world and formulate counter-policy for its petty bourgeois membership. It recognized political power was the key to an inversion of this process. Yet the petty bourgeoisie was isolated. Allies had to be found. These consisted potentially of two major groups - the poorer farmers, and, secondly, Afrikaans-speaking workers, who had been created by the many pressures on the former. But their support could not simply be appropriated. Poorer farmers tended to follow the lead of wealthier land-owners, and Afrikaner workers displayed an unhealthy attraction for class organizations. Given the existence of a large group of poor whites, a real danger existed that they could be mobilized in class terms, thereby undermining any potential mass base for Afrikaner nationalism. An obsession with the dangers of class division and class mobilization is a major theme of nationalist ideologues of this period. These groups had to be saved for the volk and mobilized in cultural terms. Yet underlying all these problems was the almost complete exclusion of Afrikaans-speakers from control in any sector of the economy bar farming. By 1938/9 Afrikaner-controlled enterprises contributed just 8% to total turnover in commerce, 3% of industrial output, 1% of mining, and 5% of finance. (45) If the basis of imperialist domination was economic, as Koers argued, the mere capture of state power would not end it. That was the discredited Hertzog panacea. Rather, Afrikaners would have to move into positions of economic control. The petty bourgeoisie would have to transform itself into a bourgeoisie on the savings of Afrikaner workers and farmers - the proven Cape formula. This, too, was the message of Koers. Thus, throughout the thirties, the AB directed its attention to these inter-related problems, operating in three broad areas: the ideological redefinition of Afrikanerdom and its nationalism - kultuurpolitiek; the organization of Afrikaner workers into separate trade unions; and the establishment and promotion of Afrikaner business interests.

The pre- and post-fusion ideological definitions differed at two levels - the delimitation of "Afrikanerdom" and the nationalism which resulted. The Hertzog conceptions which thoroughly dominated the Nationalist Party, were obliquely concerned with class. All white South Africans, English- and Afrikaans-speaking, who subscribed to the Hertzog definitions were the constituents of "Afrikanerdom". Its three great ideals were sovereign independence; absolute equality of language rights between English and Afrikaans; and limited economic nationalism - summed up in the "South Africa First" motto. (46) The 1925 Language and Flag Acts, the 1932 Status Act, and the achievements of the Pact government largely fulfilled these ideals, and, as Koers recognized, Hertzog could rejoin with Smuts. The "Afrikanerdom" the Hertzog Party sought to mobilize was never seen purely in terms of a rigidly culturally defined volk. So far as the Party concentrated on "cultural" issues, it was in the context of language rights. It implicitly accepted the class divisions within "white" South Africa as the basis of political action, was generally content to leave Afrikaans-speaking workers to the Labour Party, and made little attempt to attack their mobilization and organization in class terms. (47)

This ideological "looseness" and acceptance of "foreign" notions of class division were held responsible for Hertzog's "sell-out" to imperialism. If not to be repeated, the concepts Afrikanerdom, Afrikaner nationalism, the question of class in politics and the nature of politics itself required extensive redefinition. English-speakers could be excluded as "foreign elements", involving a definition of what was peculiarly "Afrikaans" about Afrikaners - an intensive analysis of kultuur in its widest sense, interpreted in terms of the "Afrikaner" past. The parameters of culture established, they had then to be translated into specifically political ideology - given a content which could appeal to the interest of all "Afrikaners". Thus the thirties saw an intense and wide-ranging debate amongst the AB intellectuals on kultuur, volk, politics, economics, history, religion, etc., as they sought to reinterpret the experience of imperialism and translate it into ideological forms.

Within this debate, at least three major streams of influence, each with many permutations, can be identified. Through Koers and the individual writings of men such as Professors J. C. Van Rooy (AB Chairman), L. J. du Plessis, H. G. Stoker and C. Coetzee, the Potchefstroom academics elaborated a rigidly Calvinist Weltanschauung, drawing heavily on the doctrine of "soweriniteit in eie kring" (sovereignty in each sphere) of the Dutch theologian/politician Abraham Kuyper. Through Koers they kept up a running commentary on every aspect of social life. Heavily influenced by National Socialism, other newly returned academics outside Potchefstroom developed a more secular nationalism. Elaborated amongst others by men such as Drs N. Diedrichs, P. J. Meyer and G. Cronje, it received its most explicit statement in Diedrichs' Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing, published in 1936. This group, too, found a regular organ in Wapenskou, journal of the Afrikaans-Nasionale Studentebond (Afrikaans National Students' Union). A modified form of the "neo-Fichtean" view was propagated by Dr Verwoerd as editor of Die Transvaler after 1937 - and led to a lasting split with the first chairman of his board, W. A. Hofmeyr. A third, less co-ordinated source of influence was another group of Calvinist theologian/politicians, those of the NGK. Altogether more pragmatic in tone and the application of dogma, they exerted a profound political influence, predominantly through the Nasionale Pers newspapers and the Gesuiwerde party itself. This "liberal-nationalist" influence emanated from men such as Dr Malan himself, Dr J. D. ("Vader") Kestell, and Rev. W. Nicol. (48)

Despite the many differences within and between these groups, sufficient common ground existed to enable the ideological debate to take place within agreed parameters. Four broad areas of agreement emerged: the relationship between culture and nationalism; the dangers of class divisions; the need for the economic mobilization of Afrikaners; and Republicanism. All groups agreed nations are products of Divine Will, each with an allotted task, distinguished from each other by culture in its broadest sense. Culture is thus to be developed for itself. Hence the Bond's assertion:

"The Afrikaner Broederbond is born out of the deep conviction that the Afrikaner nation has been planted in this country by the Hand of God, destined to survive as a separate nation with its own calling." (49)

During the thirties, this divinely created Afrikaner nation was politically divided, culturally disunited and wracked by severe class divisions. Afrikaner workers had little contact with the volk, displayed scant interest in its culture, and behaved economically and politically in class terms. The huge "poor white problem" was the most glaring manifestation of this division. Rapid "denationalization" of urban Afrikaners, particularly poor whites, disturbed all ideologues. They agreed on the major theme of the period, the overriding need for unity (volkseenheid) and more particularly the need to win workers to Afrikaner Nationalism. In the words of Dr Diedrichs:

"If the worker is drawn away from our nation, we may as well write Ichabod on the door of our temple." (50)

Hankering after the "unity" of the Great Trek and the Republics, in terms of whose mythology all were farmers and united against external enemies, class divisions were seen as the product of "foreign" capitalism. While Afrikaners had suffered under capitalism, the solution lay in improving their position in the industrial economy, to take control of South African capitalism itself and develop a volkskapitalisme.

"And meanwhile the adjustment process [to foreign capitalism] was destroying our volk by alienating from it its economic leaders through denationalisation and rendering its producing masses useless to it through proletarianisation. But in the awakening of self-consciousness the volk has realised this too and the new economic national movement sets itself the goal of reversing this process: to prevent the further destruction of the Afrikaner volk in an attempt to adjust to a foreign capitalist system; but to mobilise the volk to capture this foreign system and transform and adapt it to our national character." (51)

And, finally, this transformation of kultuur, classes and the economy was to be encapsulated in a Republic, freed from British political domination, "independent" of the golden chains Koers so regularly warned of. On this, too, there was unanimity - though Malan's conversion was belated, and, some would argue, hesitant. The Bond's vision of Republican nirvana received its apotheosis in the controversial Draft Republican Constitution published "for discussion" in 1942. (52)

This common ideological ground incorporated a consensus on the role of the individual in national endeavour, and the relationship between political power and the economic struggle. Entrepreneurship was seen as the highest form of creative activity, provided the entrepreneur gave "service" in return for the just reward of profit, Calvinism in this sense representing the purest form of the Protestant Ethic, capitalist ideology in its pre-monopoly form. This interplay between wins and diens (profit and service - to the community) both in politics and economics, was the major concern of the early issues of the two "economic" journals, Inspan (official FAK organ - hence AB) and Volkshandel (organ of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut - Chambers of Commerce - another offspring of the AB. Despite their initial and symbolic anti-capitalist rhetoric, both clearly represent an attempt to create a capitalist ideology in keeping with Calvinist prescriptions. Here, too, the ideological vanguard role of the Bond is evident. Through these journals it took upon itself no less a task than "the economic re-education" of Afrikaans-speakers - the reformulation of attitudes to economic participation in an urban industrial economy. Inspan was directed towards the broad masses, reflecting the mobilizational role of the Reddingsdaadbond (literally Union for the Act of Rescue), whilst Volkshandel grappled with the problems of the entrepreneur himself. (53) Their early issues contain two major themes. Firstly, the relationship between individual effort and reward is constantly explored, invoking a schema with a correct place in the hierarchy for all, and echoing many of the themes of European and American puritanism. Workers must work in return for a fair wage. The common good lies in common effort allowing those with ability to rise to their natural level. Secondly, the function of the state is examined at length. Though some differences between ideological streams are evident here, all agree the state exists to provide a "just" framework for the mediation of individual effort. This has many aspects. The state should provide the infrastructure for development in South Africa, ensure the services needed by entrepreneurs. Its South African nature is critical. The state is the prime agent of economic struggle against imperialism, guaranteeing not only the profits and labour needs of the entrepreneur but employment for all members of the polity (i.e. excluding Blacks). In this vision the state is very clearly the instrument of the petty bourgeois attack on monopoly control of the economy by "imperialist" interests and the means for the transformation of its class position. Political power then becomes the sine qua non of the success of the economic struggle. The two are indivisible as the transformation of economic consciousness aimed at by the Bond is, in effect, a transformation of political consciousness - a redefinition of nationalism itself.

The debates within the AB during the thirties were essentially elitist - small groups of intellectuals talking to each other in complex language. The volk itself displayed little interest. Yet this elitism is central to the process of ideological production. Ideologies are forged by class forces seeking wider support. (54) The fiercely intellectual debates 1932-8 thus achieved two major objectives. In an era of extreme ideological division, they indicated the common ground outlined above, facilitating action on these issues. Secondly, with reference to mass action, the Kultuurpolitiek of the thirties erected an apparently tight yet sufficient flexible ideological structure through which to legitimize mass action. It succeeded in the redefinition of the value structure of a broad cultural system. This not only placed the supporters of the Hertzog definition on the defensive (55) but provided an ideological framework for the interpretation and mediation of the urban experience of capitalism. Only after these issues had been aired was the Bond able to move from its intellectual base into the arena of mass mobilization.

Yet, even before this was attempted, the Bond's Afrikaner opponents recognized the danger this ideological redefinition posed to their position. In a famous speech to his Smithfield constituents in November 1935, Prime Minister Hertzog launched a powerful attack on the AB in precisely these terms. Accusing the Bond of anti-English racialism, he asserted (incorrectly) that it and the Gesuiwerde Nationalist Party were one and the same body operating at different levels. This speech caused much consternation, earning Hertzog the final implacable enmity of the AB. (56)

Prior to 1936, whilst the FAK was working well, the Bond's cultural activities were largely limited. It had not established the matrix of "alternative" cultural organizations which appeared in the late thirties and forties. The means of politicizing kultuur, making its appeal immediate to the great mass of Afrikaners, had not been found. The first faltering mobilization attempts were begun in 1936 (see below), but it was the cultural orgy of the celebration of the Voortrekker Centenary, the Euufees and Tweede Trek, which politicized the cultural symbols of Afrikanerdom, enabling the AB to begin to work with mass support. The Tweede Trek appeared to bridge the severe class divisions between Afrikaans-speakers, eliciting a massive demand for volkseenheid. (57) Another significant result of the Euufees was the birth of the Ossewa Brandwag. Initially a purely cultural organization, it had attracted 3-400,000 members by 1941. The Potchefstroom academics flocked to the OB, which thrived on the extra-Parliamentary tradition of the north. Its increasingly political stance finally brought it into fatal conflict with the Nationalist Party. Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd single-mindedly set out to destroy the organization between 1941 and 1944 and re-establish the hegemony of the Party in nationalist politics. The intense conflict between them occasioned much conflict within the Broederbond after the failure of its reconciliation attempts. (58)

One final event was further to politicize kultuur and enable the AB to transform its Nationalist vision into ideological hegemony. In September 1939 the United Party split on South Africa's participation in what was seen as an "imperialist war". General Hertzog and 37 of its MPs left the UP to form the Volksparty. The AB hastily convened another gathering at Monument Koppie. Amidst great emotion, Hertzog and Malan appeared together as the spokesmen of an apparently reunited volk. In January 1940, they formed the Herenigde (reunited) Nationale of Volksparty (HNP/V) under Hertzog. This uneasy alliance split almost immediately on the Principles of the Party. When the Bond forced the issue at the Free State Party Congress in November, Hertzog withdrew and resigned from politics. His followers in the HNP/V soon split into the Afrikaner Party or the National Socialist Nuwe Orde. But Hereniging meant the HNP/V could claim to be the sole spokesman of a "re-united" Afrikanerdom. The petty bourgeoisie was no longer politically isolated. The AB could make much of the issue of cultural unity and mobilize across class divisions in these terms.

During the forties, the cultural assaults of the Bond covered every facet of organized social life. Though political disunity soon resurfaced, kultuurpolitiek

no longer divided Afrikaners along class or party political lines. The AB interpretations had been legitimized. Apart from the crucial issues of trade unionism and the economic struggle, during the war it concentrated on education, pressing for home language tuition coupled with an emphasis on its own (largely Kuyperian) Christian National Education programme. Largely in response to these attacks, Smuts banned civil servants from membership of the Bond in December 1944, occasioning some 500 resignations. A former AB chairman claimed that, with the economic struggle, the Bond's attacks on the educational system were the major spurs to the HNP/V's 1948 electoral victory. (59)

Whilst Kultuurpolitiek provided an ideological framework within which to forge volkseenheid, political power grows out of class interests and class action, not "pretty speeches and large cultural gatherings", as Albert Hertzog recognized. (60) Two critical AB movements during the forties gave the general cultural movement a specific class content, facilitating the politicization of class cleavages in cultural terms. These were the assault on the trade unions and the economic movement. The first captured working class support, the second made clear the economic basis and petty bourgeois content of Afrikaner nationalism. The Bond's first entry into trade unionism was the formation in 1934 of a railway workers' union, the Spoorbond, by Henning Klopper, an AB founder. Spoorbond offered an example both of "non-confrontational" trade unionism and the mobilization of the savings of its members. Three years after inception, it established a savings bank. Though later bankrupted, Spoorbondkas initiated the first Afrikaans building society, later to emerge as the now massive Saambou.

More important than Spoorbond were the post-1936 organizations. Following the 1936 Bondersraad and FAK congress, the Afrikaanse Nasionale Kultuurraad (National Cultural Council) was formed to give direction to the full spectrum of cultural organizations with the basic aim of organizing Afrikaner workers. This move met with some resistance in the Cape and amongst railway workers. But in October of that year, Drs. A. Hertzog (the General's son), N. Diedrichs, and P. J. Meyer, together with F. de Wet, manager of Volkskas, the bank founded by the AB, formed Die Nasionale Raad van Trusteë (National Council of Trustees - NRT), to provide financial backing for Afrikaner trade unions. Its aim was quite explicit - to smash the ideology of class amongst Afrikaner workers and bring them into the bosom of the volk. The NRT operated in fertile ground. Entrenched by the gains of the Pact government, the Labour Party and the South African Trades and Labour Council (T & LC) still exhibited the artisanal exclusivism of craft unions. In the crisis of the thirties they strongly opposed measures to ease white unemployment which might relax the apprenticeship system. Yet both leaned heavily on the support of Afrikaans-speaking workers, who, given the pattern of proletarianization in South Africa, generally occupied less skilled positions. The NRT decided to attack the Labour Party hold over Afrikaner workers through the T & LC's largest single affiliate, the strategic Mine Workers' Union. The only non-craft mining union, with a predominantly Afrikaans-speaking membership in an industry critical to the economy and the racial division of labour, by the mid-thirties the Mine Workers' Union leadership was thoroughly corrupt and in a cosy arrangement with the Chamber of Mines. In a long, bitter, twelve-year campaign, the NRT group finally gained control - though its leadership soon appeared no less corrupt than the old. (61)

The trade union struggle was not without cost within the AB, where as early as 1942 discontent with the NRT's progress was being expressed. (62) In 1942, Meyer resigned to start a Labour Front for the Ossewa Brandwag. The following year, the HNP/V formed its own labour organization in response, Die Blanke Werkerse Beskermingsbond (literally, the White Workers Protection Society). Competition between these groups occasioned much conflict within the AB. The broad attack on trade unionism concentrated on the least skilled workers in the mining, textile, building and steel industries. The skilful manipulation of their very real grievances, together with the extensive cultural mobilization through the Bond's Reddingsdaadbond - i.e. changing the ideological context of trade unionism - had the desired effect. Though by no means all Afrikaner workers supported these organizations, sufficient were ideologically weaned from the bureaucratic

Labour Party and T & LC structure to break their power. Following two long strikes on the mines in 1946 and 1947 - against the Mine Workers' Union - and a huge building workers' strike - against state training schemes for African bricklayers - the NRT group finally won control of the Mine Workers' Union, and immediately disaffiliated from the T & LC. The political fruits of this victory were soon plucked. In the 1948 election, the HNP/V won six mining constituencies for the first time, sufficient to put it in power with a majority of five.

This struggle for the soul of white trade unionism occurred in a crucial phase of South Africa's labour history, when the relationship between the black proletariat and the capitalist state emerged at the political centre. During the war, a powerful, militant African trade union movement developed to question effectively entrenched capital/labour relationships. (63) The wartime movement of Africans into skilled positions also highlighted the relationship between white workers and the state, particularly the less skilled. The AB attack on trade unions was explicitly cast in terms of a recognition of the dangers of class mobilization in such a climate. Its primary aim was to break the power of ideologies of class - to mobilize workers in terms of their class interests cast in cultural and racial ideologies. In the words of the official NRT history:

As the so-called guardian of the workers, over a period of time the Labour Party developed into a mighty force in South African politics.... This bond between the worker and the Labour Party had to be broken, only then would the struggle to Dr Hertzog and his small band of activists acquire any meaning or significance. This was their major message. (64)

The activities of the various trade union bodies both occasioned conflict between the political organizations of Afrikaner nationalism during the war and again highlighted the divisions between the petty bourgeoisie of the north and south. One incident neatly sums this up. Despite strenuous attempts by the Bond and the FAK to raise money for the NRT, it became clear that the large sums needed could be obtained only from wealthy Cape farmers - it had initially been funded by a £10,000 donation from the widow of the Stellenbosch farmer who first financed Nasionale Pers and Santam, Mrs Jannie Marais. Here the NRT entered reserved territory, the preserve of the Cape petty bourgeoisie. Though resistant to the Nasionale Kultuurraad, in principle the managers of the political and economic organizations of Cape nationalism had little quarrel with the NRT's aims. But when it began to compete for the same sources of finance, open warfare ensued. In 1938, Dr Hertzog approached his maternal uncle, a wealthy Stellenbosch farmer, Pieter Neethling, to set up a trust fund for the NRT. Neethling was a founder and director of Santam, and a long and vicious fight developed between its chairman, W. A. Hofmeyr, and the NRT - won inevitably by Santam, which allowed the Raad only specific interest for use. (65) This incident caused much ill feeling in the north, which festered as the full import of southern economic power grew more obvious in the economic movement of the forties.

Of the AB activities, the economic movement had the greatest long-term significance. The Bond's concern with economic issues was long paramount. Again, Koers first gave coherence to many of its debates. In a seminal article, "The Economic Reorganization of our National Life", Professor L. J. du Plessis argued that Afrikaners had suffered enormously under capitalism, ranging from the conquest of the Republics to the poor white problem. Yet, the cause was not inherent in capitalism itself. Their struggle should not be directed against capitalism, as socialists argued, but the structure of South African capitalism, more particularly control of finance and credit-capital itself. Afrikaners should be mobilized to take control of South African capitalism - develop a system of Volkskapitalisme (National/People's capitalism). (66)

Meyer and Diedrichs, too, wrote heavily on economic issues in the thirties. In 1934, largely on the initiative of J. J. Bosman, the Broederbond itself established a co-operative bank in Pretoria, with Professor du Plessis as chairman and most of the UR as directors. In 1941, Volkskas was registered as a commercial bank and lost its co-operative form. (67) In the same year the AB also established a retail outlet, Uniewinkels. It, too, later lost its co-operative form. Yet these northern operations were limited in scale, unable to generate wider economic activity.

In the Cape, AB initiatives were not needed. Santam and Sanlam were thriving. Sanlam's actuary and manager, M. S. Louw, had long planned an expansion out of insurance. As he told the Ekonomiese Volkskongres:

To be successful we must utilise the techniques of capitalism as they are applied in the ... goldmining industry. A finance company should be started to function in industry and commerce like the so-called finance houses of Johannesburg. (68)

Louw's vision was to mobilize the savings of Afrikaner farmers and workers in a central investment company, moving into industry and commerce. But Sanlam did not possess the resources for such mobilization on a national scale. According to his biographer, Louw discussed this problem with FAK leaders (i.e. the AB), and in 1937 it established a commission of enquiry into the economic conditions of Afrikaners. Its report argued the Euufees would create the necessary climate for an Ekonomiese Volkskongres (people's economic congress) in 1939, with the prime function of approving Louw's scheme. (69) A Committee of prominent Cape Broers, Louw, Dr T. E. Dönges (AB vice-chairman during the war) and Dr C. G. W. Schumann, was appointed to draft proposals for the investment company. On their advice, Sanlam agreed to underwrite the share-issue. Again, this early southern dominance is interesting. Though long concerned with economic issues, the northern petty bourgeoisie could not summon the expertise to initiate such a major undertaking - and was forced to rely on Sanlam for capital, planning and staff.

The Euufees did generate popular enthusiasm for an economic movement. In a powerful speech before the waggons in Bloemfontein, Dr J. D. (Vader) Kestell proposed the establishment of a massive, central, reddingsdaad fund to rescue the volk from poverty. His theme, 'n volk red homself (a nation rescues itself), became the motto of the economic movement, though the £150,000 eventually collected in the reddingsdaadfonds fell short of Dr Kestell's multi-million pound vision. The first Ekonomiese Volkskongres was convened in October 1939 after the Bond had ratified its proposals. At least eighteen of the twenty-two-man Kongres committee were Broers. The strategy enunciated was threefold: to co-ordinate and tap Afrikaner resources in savings and consumption; thereby to foster finance capital, filtering control of the means of production downwards; and, through control of the state, to extend the network of infrastructural public corporations. Clearly class mobilization threatened the whole basis of this strategy. Thus the cultural and political struggle were seen as critical elements of the economic struggle, and the organizational network which developed lent itself to both. (70)

Three broad organizations grew out of the Kongres. Federale Volksbeleggings (FVB) was established as the official investment company. The sale of FVB shares occasioned much conflict with other entrepreneurs trying to raise capital from the volk, jealous of its official status. Sanlam had ultimately to take up a large percentage of the shares it had underwritten, giving it effective control of the company. An Ekonomiese Instituut of the FAK was also formed to co-ordinate policy for the economic movement. The Instituut was the AB economic policy-making body, establishing, thirdly, the Reddingsdaadbond (RDB) under Dr Diedrichs, designed to mobilize mass support through a wide range of economic and cultural activities, and

"re-educate" the Afrikaner economically. By 1946 the RDB had 64,771 members in 381 branches, though its membership fell off rapidly after the war. (71) Within the Bond, pressure developed for an organization specifically for Afrikaner businessmen. After an "investigation" by the Ekonomiese Instituut (i.e. AB), the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut was formed by the RDB in 1942. The growth of this purely bourgeoisie organization was to alter the role of the Ekonomiese Instituut, which lost its broad policy-making function to the Handelsinstituut. After 1942 policy was formulated by this specifically capitalist grouping rather than just within the AB itself. Though also dominated by many AB members, the Handelsinstituut was never a simple Bond front like the FAK. As a specifically class organization, it fostered the interests of that class rather than the volk. Heavily influenced by the power of southern groups, the Handelsinstituut developed a real autonomy, independent of the wider concerns of the Bond. This at times brought its capitalists into open conflict with the AB and the HNP/V, particularly on labour issues.

During the forties, the policy of the AB co-ordinated economic movement was to assist the formation of as many Afrikaner enterprises in as many fields as possible. In numerical terms, this was highly successful. The number of Afrikaner-owned manufacturing establishments rose from 1,293 to 3,385, 1939-49, with a turnover increase from £6m to £43.6m. The number of commercial undertakings rose from 2,428 to 9,585, turnover increasing from £28m to £203.7m. Financial undertakings, too, increased from 40 to 68, the value of administered funds rising from £27m to £74.4m. Yet many of these were small and under-capitalized, floundering in the fifties. Afrikaner trading concerns particularly were hard hit by the falling rate of profit in retailing. (72) The problem of small undertakings was recognized by both the Handelsinstituut and the AB. At a second Ekonomiese Volkskongres in October 1950, it was claimed that the reddingswerk of the first has been achieved. A subtle shift in emphasis occurred. No longer was the stress on the frenetic establishment of new undertakings, but on consolidating existing ones, particularly financial institutions whose capital could ensure healthy growth. The second Kongres marked an important shift in the ideology of Afrikaner capital - a movement away from the petty bourgeois competitive ethic towards an acceptance of monopoly and its underlying class relations. It marked the opening of a real division between a new bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, which gathered force in the nationalist politics of the fifties and sixties. And, because it was again in the Cape that the majority of the more successful undertakings established themselves, these class divisions continued to take the form of regionalism. (73)

Thus, the threefold attack of AB activity - ideological redefinition, the trade union assault and the economic movement - developed its own dynamic during the war, partly taking it out of the Bond's control. The war itself marked a shift in South African politics. Rapid changes in the structure of production brought the contradictions of South African capitalism bubbling to the political surface. Intensified political struggle centred on a confrontation between capital and the state, faced by an increasingly organized and militant black proletariat. Such a profound division clearly brought into political question the entire ideological and political structure of a system of exploitation based on the racial division of labour. The 1948 election was fought on this issue. These developments touched the position of all classes in the social structure, clearly affecting the material interests of the groups the Bond was trying to mobilize. Farmers were pressurized by acute labour problems, white workers threatened by black proletarian militancy. The operations of the Broederbond profoundly altered the ideological framework and class nature of Afrikaner nationalism. In a fundamental sense they shaped a class alliance offering apparent solutions to the political crisis of South African capitalism, and a distinct alternative to the monopoly interests represented in the United Party. Each of the three areas of operation outlined above were fundamental to the shaping of this alliance and critical to the slim electoral victory of 1948.

Though the AB was the shadow behind this new Afrikaner nationalism, it cannot really be said the Bond "did" anything at all. It did not act organizationally, but rather decided what should be done - formulated policy which other mandated organizations or individuals implemented. Though it was the guiding force which brought Afrikaner nationalism to power, its internal and external relations were stormy, reflecting the class divisions within nationalism. It is important, too, not to underestimate the independent role of the Party. The HNP/V was no mere Broederbond front, but the central organization of the Afrikaner nationalism the Bond tried to co-ordinate. In it were represented all the class forces of that nationalism, whilst the AB only ever represented bourgeois and petty bourgeois groups. Ironically, the party was to end up dominating the Bond. Under Malan and Strijdom, an important, formal independence was maintained between the two organizations. But, for a variety of reasons to do with the class conflict within the party, Verwoerd began a process which undermined the Bond's independence, allowing Vorster to convert it into a "support organ" of the party itself - a party now dominated by the capitalists over most of whose birth the Broederbond had so anxiously hovered. (74)

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Notes

- (1) Rand Daily Mail, 3.3.65.
- (2) Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Secret Organisations (RP 20/1965), paras 36-7 (hereafter the Botha Commission). The Commission received the "full co-operation" of the Bond. The then AB Chairman recommended its report as "the truth" and "full story" on the Bond. Interview 10.6.75.
- (3) AB Constitution, clause 4c, quoted in Die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk en die Afrikaner Broederbond, submitted to the General Synod 23/4/64, Chapter III, Section 15 (hereafter the Oelofse Report). This, too, quotes from many voluntarily given official AB documents. Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this paper are mine.
- (4) The work of many Afrikaner historians falls into this category. One prominent author has expressed his belief in Divine appointment for this task. See "Voorwoord" to G. D. Schultz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Deel I, 1652-1806 (Johannesburg, 1967).
- (5) Again, much "English" writing on Afrikaner nationalism seems little more than disguised Boer-bashing, based on conspiracy theories: e.g. W. H. Vatcher, Jr., White Laager (London, 1965).
- (6) Some honourable exceptions are M. Roberts and A. E. G. Trollip, The South African Opposition 1939-1945 (Cape Town, 1945), and T. Dunbar Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom (Berkeley, 1975).
- (7) P. Van den Berghe, South Africa: a Study in Conflict (Univ. Calif. Press, 1967), p. 267. Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Harmondsworth, 1967), does introduce the concept of class, but simply imposes it on racial/cultural categories without an explication of the relationship, producing a conspiracy view of Afrikaner nationalism. Moodie, op. cit., partly explores the relationship through an examination of the generation of ideology within the cultural context of the "civil religion" of "Afrikanerdom". Yet the explanation remains at the level of ideas. The acquisition and transmission of "civil religion" and the reception of ideology by mass groups after formulation by an elite remain unexplored beyond assuming that action in cultural terms is self-evident.

- (8) One recent paper has gone so far as to argue historians must accept the categories and concepts handed on by sociologists and economists, themselves playing no role in the formulation of their analytical tools: N. Garson, "Race Relations and Class Conflict as Factors in South African History in the Twentieth Century", University of the Witwatersrand, September 1974. Moodie, op. cit., and Irving Hexham ("Dutch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism", Collected Seminar Papers, Vol. I, Centre for Southern African Studies, York University, 1975, pp. 8-25) explore the development of Afrikaner nationalist ideology, but both have been heavily concerned with the theological inputs of Calvinism and tend to take ideology at its face value.
- (9) But of T. Dunbar Moodie, "The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism as an Immanent Critique of Marx's Theory of Social Class", African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 27 October 1975.
- (10) In my use of terms such as "Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie" or "Afrikaner capital", it is not their ethnic character which is determinant. They are defined, first, not by the fact of being "Afrikaner" but by their specific relationship to the means of production. The "Afrikaner" character may, in distinct historical epochs, separate our specific class fractions at the political level, precisely because of the nature of the intervention of the political instance in South African history. My use of class analysis in no way suggests that "Afrikaners" constituted a separate class, but that for specific historical reasons, Afrikaans-speaking fractions of various classes came to have their interests articulated under one apparently supra-class, nationalist rubric.
- (11) For the description of the Bond's formation, see Rapport 24.9.72; Oelofse Report, pp. 7-8.
- (12) See the Biography of their first chairman by N. J. le Roux, W. A. Hofmeyr: Sy Werk en Waarde (Cape Town, 1953), 125; E. P. du Plessis, 'n Volk Staan Op (Cape Town, 1964), 57; and the Cape Party's official history, Die Nasionale Party: Sy Opkoms en Oorwinning - Kaapland se Aandeel, 35-45.
- (13) Veg, November 1968.
- (14) See T. R. H. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond (Cape Town, 1966).
- (15) S. Pauw, Die Beroepsarbeid van die Afrikaner in die Stad (Stellenbosch, 1946), 217-242.
- (16) Le Roux, op. cit., 91. See also Van Rooyen, loc. cit.
- (17) Botha Commission, para 32.
- (18) L. J. du Plessis, The Star, 12.10.48. This is not the Professor L. J. du Plessis, a leading Broer for 30 years. Ironically, the first person to address the Bond was J. H. Hofmeyr. Unfortunately the subject of the address is not known. Interview with founder member, L. E. B. Van Niekerk, Rand Daily Mail, 24.1.64.
- (19) Oelofse Report, 7.
- (20) Undated Military Intelligence Report (from internal evidence, 1944), "Die Afrikaner Broederbond", Section V, para 4, i & ii: Witwatersrand University Archives, A.1, Hofmeyr Papers, file Ce (hereafter the Hofmeyr Papers).
- (21) "Who governs South Africa: the People vs. the Broederbond", Hofmeyr Papers.
- (22) Oelofse, op. cit., 8; du Plessis, op. cit.; "Die Afrikaner Broederbond", Section V, i & ii, Hofmeyr Papers.
- (23) Discussion of the "four purges" in AB history, Sunday Times, 5.11.72; "Die Afrikaner Broederbond", Section V, paras 6, 7 & 8, Hofmeyr Papers.
- (24) Oelofse Report, Chapter III, Section 17, paras 11-56, on organizational structure. On selection procedure, ibid., Section 16, paras 2-9. On Vrygestelde Broers, Section 17, para 36e. The quoted former member, who wishes to remain anonymous, was interviewed in June 1975.
- (25) Interview, June 1975. This former 20-year member had been chairman of his division.

- (26) Military intelligence Report, 29.3.1944, Section V, Hofmeyr Papers; AB Secretary, I. M. Lombard, Die Transvaler, 14.12.44, 20.12.44, 30.12.44 & 3.1.45; on the 1972 breakdown, Sunday Times, 28.1.73, quoting allegedly official documents whose veracity was unchallenged. By 1972, Broers in most of these occupational groups were in very influential positions, not necessarily conveyed by the arbitrary categories. For example, the 1,691 "educationalists" broke down into 24 University and College Rectors, 171 professors, 176 lecturers, 468 headmasters and 121 school inspectors. The 210 politicians comprised the State President, the Prime Minister, 19 Cabinet and Deputy Ministers, 79 MPs, 28 Senators, 69 MPCs, and 13 Party organizers. The editor of the Herstigste Nasionale Party organ, Die Afrikaner, claimed the influx of businessmen "changed" and "weakened" the AB. Interview with B. M. Schoeman, 30.6.75. On the shift in occupational dominance and the increasing bourgeois control of the Bond, see B. M. Schoeman, Vorster se 1000 Dae (Pretoria, 1974), and Veg, loc. cit. This view is corroborated in J. P. H. Serfontein, Die Verkrampte Aanslag (Pretoria, 1970). The former AB chairman, Dr P. J. Meyer, agreed that the Bond had "moved with the times" and was now largely controlled by businessmen. Interview, 10.6.75.
- (27) Clauses 2-4, AB constitution, Oelofse Report, Chapter III, Section 15; AB Secretary in Die Transvaler, 3.1.45.
- (28) Professor L. J. Du Plessis, Koers, Vol. II, No. 1. August 1934.
- (29) Quoted Botha Commission, para 39.
- (30) Interview, June 1975.
- (31) "Die Afrikaner Broederbond", Section V, para 15, Hofmeyr Papers.
- (32) Undated Military Intelligence Chart (probably 1943), Hofmeyr papers. Sunday Times, 28.1.73. These committees include: Non-white affairs; planning; youth; the press; economic affairs; agriculture; Africa; religion; international affairs; relations with the English; sport; and technical and natural sciences.
- (33) Botha Commission, para 62; AB Omsendbrief, 4/43/44, para 9, Hofmeyr Papers; Sunday Times, 26.5.63; Moodie, op. cit., p. 102.
- (34) The Sunday Times in fact inspired the formation of an anti-AB Nasionalistebond based on this resentment. See, for example, 15.12.63.
- (35) Military Intelligence Report, dated 29.3.44, Section VI, Hofmeyr Papers.
- (36) G. D. Scholtz, Dr Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe (Johannesburg, 1944).
- (37) "Die Afrikaner Broederbond", Section V, para 8.
- (38) Article by AB Secretary acknowledging paternity of FAK, Die Transvaler, 30.3.44, and AB and FAK chairman, Professor H. B. Thom im, Referate van die Jubileum Kongres van die FAK (Johannesburg, 1959), 9. Moodie, op. cit., draws a useful distinction between the Bond's kultuurpolitiek and the partypolitiek of the period.
- (39) AB Chairman to 1932 Bondsraad, quoted by General Hertzog, Rand Daily Mail, 8.11.35.
- (40) Irving Hexham, op. cit., in fact argues that the Gereformeerde influence was paramount in the formulation of Afrikaner nationalism. This, I think, overstates the case and certainly overemphasizes the "ideological". The University of Potchefstroom for Christian Higher Education is officially Gereformeerde, the Gereformeerde Kerk being the most rigidly conservative of the three major Afrikaner Calvinist churches. The others are the large Nederduitsch Gereformeerde Kerk (hereafter NGK) and the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk.
- (41) See letter from the Secretary of the "Royal Order of Scotland" to J. H. Hofmeyr, dated 17.8.48, and "Die Afrikaner Broederbond", Section V, paras 9 & 10, both in the Hofmeyr Papers.

- (42) Of the 5 northern Gesuwerde MPs, two represented urban constituencies. Three were lawyers, one a theologian, and the single farmer was Chairman of the Free State Chambers of Commerce. See, for example, W. de Klerk, Puritans in Africa (London, 1975), Chapters 4 and 9.
- (43) Koers, Vol I, No 1, August 1933.
- (44) Ibid.
- (45) Volkshandel, XI, 7, September 1950.
- (46) For example, Hertzog's Smithfield Speech, November 1935, English version, Rand Daily Mail, 8.11.35, and Fourteen Principles of the OMS Nationalist Party, Van Rooyen, op. cit. Hertzog finally retired from politics on the issue of who were "Afrikaners".
- (47) On the NP attitude towards the organization of Afrikaner workers by the Labour Party, see the official Die Nasionale Boek (Johannesburg, 1931), 101-116.
- (48) For a detailed analysis of the differences in and between these groups, see Moodie, op. cit., Chapters 2, 4 & 6.
- (49) Statement by the AB Chairman and Secretary, Die Transvaler, 14.12.44.
- (50) Die Oosterlig, 8.11.37. I am grateful to Professor Moodie for this quotation.
- (51) Professor L. J. du Plessis at the Ekonomiese Volkskongres, quoted by E. P. du Plessis, op. cit., 104.
- (52) Die Burger, 23.1.42. The child of the Bond's eemidskomitee, designed to reconcile the Ossewa Brandwag and the Party under the chairmanship of Professor L. J. du Plessis, the Draft attracted strong hostility from Cape interests. Southern republicanism did not rest on the Krugerite tradition of the north but on pragmatic anti-imperialism. The OB's premature publication of the Draft in fact provided the spur to the final rift with the Party.
- (53) See the editorials in the first issue of each, Inspan October 1941, Volkshandel March 1940.
- (54) On this point, with reference to another group of South African petty bourgeois ideologists, see Belinda Bozzoli, "The Origins, Development and Ideology of Local Manufacturing in South Africa", Jnl. of Southern African Studies, I, 2, April 1975, 194-5.
- (55) For example, A. C. Gilliers' reaction to the Ekonomiese Volkskongres, Hertzogisme in die Handel (Stellenbosch, 1941).
- (56) English version, Rand Daily Mail, 8.11.35. Since Hertzog's official rehabilitation, some Nationalist historians have claimed he withdrew his allegations against the Bond. For example, G. D. Scholtz on the AB, Die Transvaler, 23.10.72.
- (57) AB elements in fact pressurized Malan to form a new Party in the spirit of the Tees, Moodie, op. cit., 186-9.
- (58) OB membership claimed by Dr Malan, House of Assembly Debates 1940-1, Column 2195. On the HNP/V-OB division, see Roberts & Trollip, op. cit., and Moodie, op. cit.
- (59) CNO Beleid by the FAK's Instituut vir Christelik-Nasionale Onderwys (Johannesburg, 1948); Interview with Dr P. J. Meyer, 10.6.75; AB resignations, The Star, 21.3.45.
- (60) L. Naude, Dr A. Hertzog. Die Nasionale Party en die Mynwerkers (Pretoria, 1969), 13.
- (61) On the significance of the choice of the Mine Workers' Union, see D. O'Meara, "White Trade Unionism, Political Power and Afrikaner Nationalism", South African Labour Bulletin, Vol I, No 10, April 1975.
- (62) Professor L. J. du Plessis's dissatisfaction is quoted by L. Naude, op. cit., 101. In 1944 the AB withdrew its subsidy for the Read.
- (63) D. O'Meara, "The 1946 African Mine Workers' Strike and the Political Economy of South Africa", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol XIII, No 2, July 1975, 146-73.

- (64) Naude, op. cit., 257-8.
- (65) For a description of this incident, ibid., 109-114.
- (66) Vol II, No 1, August 1934.
- (67) This had apparently always been envisaged, "though not announced at the time". The co-operative form was initially adopted "to gain the co-operation of the Afrikaner masses", and the board was very sensitive to the charge of having misled the public, Volkshandel, VIII, 4, June 1947. For the Bond's acknowledgement of paternity, see Die Transvaler, 30.12.44.
- (68) Quoted E. P. du Plessis, op. cit., 114.
- (69) See W. J. Bezuidenhout, Dr Tinie Louw: 'n Kykie in die Ekonomiese Geskiedenis van die Afrikaner (Johannesburg, 1968), 63-4.
- (70) See E. P. du Plessis, op. cit., Chapter VII.
- (71) Inspan, V, 4, January 1946.
- (72) Handelsinstituut survey, Volkshandel, XI, 7, September 1950. On the effect of declining retail profit rates, see L. J. Potgieter, "Die Ekonomie van die Afrikaner en sy Aandeel in die Sakelewe", unpublished M.Comm., Potchefstroom University, 1954, 26-44.
- (73) See Kongres issues of Volkshandel, Vol XI, Nos 7 & 8, September and October 1950, and Inspan, Vol I, Nos 11 & 12, August and September 1950, and Vol X, No 1, October 1950.
- (74) See B. M. Schoeman, op. cit., and J. P. H. Serfontein, op. cit.