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THE COLLAPSE OF RHODESIA

Population Demographics and the Politics of Race

Josiah Brownell
In memory of my father, Edmund B. Brownell
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# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Rhodesian Central Statistical Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTT</td>
<td>Demographic Transition Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPAR</td>
<td>Family Planning Association of Rhodesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>PV</td>
<td>Protected Village</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Rhodesian Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTL</td>
<td>Tribal Trust Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Family Planning Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The Hidden War of Numbers in Rhodesia

In the final decades of white rule in Rhodesia, the settler state fought and lost two parallel wars. One of these wars was always more voluble and violent, visible, and bloody. This war would escalate into an increasingly deadly civil conflict, with guerrillas and counter-insurgency forces clashing inside and outside Rhodesia, and have far-reaching regional and international political significance. This was the better known of the two wars, and the one to attract the attention of most historians studying the last years of settler rule. This more conspicuous war was also the only one retrospectively acknowledged by the participants on both sides of the conflict, and the only one that has seeped into the shared memories of Rhodesians and Zimbabweans alike. The story of this war has been recounted many times.

But there was another war in Rhodesia being fought alongside this more visible war: a war of numbers. In some respects this was a hidden war, and instead of the settler state and African guerrillas fighting over hills and villages, isolated farms, and rural roads, this was a contest over racial birth rates and death rates, immigration and emigration patterns, racial boundaries and head counting. Victory in this war would be determined not by the number of combat deaths reported in newspapers nor captured territory on maps, but by trends and growth rates in statistical reports and censuses. This war of numbers was perhaps more important, and certainly no less political, than the louder and bloodier war, even as its political nature was somewhat obscured by an apolitical, coded language. Because of this coded language and the political incentives of the participants on both sides of this conflict to downplay this parallel war, historians have looked past the numbers war to the more striking images beyond, as though those more violent dramas
represented the entire story of Rhodesia’s collapse. Yet it was the settler state’s defeat in this war of numbers that sapped the morale of, and had profound psychological effects on, white society; heaped unbearable economic and ecological pressures on the state; further undermined the white regime’s international and domestic legitimacy; and rendered the military conflict unwinnable. The role this parallel war played in the collapse of the regime was therefore pivotal, despite the historical silence.

The war of numbers was contested on many levels. Political decisions behind the war came from as far afield as Salisbury, Lusaka, London, the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, and from scattered guerrilla camps in Mozambique and Zambia. The sites of conflict were also diverse, and included border ports of entry and departure in Rhodesia and abroad; family planning clinics; newspapers, radios and television sets in Rhodesia; the parliament floors in London and Salisbury; the criminal courts of Britain and elsewhere; and, perhaps most importantly, relationships within both white and African families in Rhodesia. The geographical diversity of the decision centres and the variety of these sites of conflict reflect the geographical and conceptual breadth of this parallel struggle.

Although the war had great geographical and conceptual breadth, the trajectory of this struggle was primarily dictated by two simple demographic trends: the rapid growth of the African population, and the transience of the white population. By the late 1960s the highest policymakers of the settler state had begun to formulate a broad population strategy in an attempt to counter these trends, with the goal of increasing white numbers and decreasing African numbers. As envisioned by its proponents, this population strategy was to be comprehensive in scale, but in the context of white Rhodesia’s fragile demography it was out of necessity pared down, and was even then only fitfully and unevenly implemented. As a consequence, these population policies were largely ineffective. Defensively, African nationalists inside and outside Rhodesia, and guerrillas in the field, also engaged in this demographic struggle, though mostly in the propaganda realm and in reaction to state initiatives. Despite the asymmetry of interest and initiative in demographic engineering, the population trends of decreasing white birth rates, continued white transience, and a growing African population were all moving in a direction that weakened the settler state. This left Rhodesia’s white population, after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, as one of the most demographically fragile ruling ethnic castes in any polity anywhere in the world.

In waging the population war, the settler state faced conflicts and contradictions between its short-term and long-term policy goals which were
never reconciled, and which would ultimately prove fatal. While there was widespread agreement among whites in Rhodesia that the racial ratio ‘imbalance’ between whites and Africans needed to be addressed, there was no consensus within the white electorate on the scale and nature of the various population proposals designed to address them. Debates over population policy generated divisions between long-time residents and newer arrivals, older and younger citizens, and rural and urban dwellers. These debates also created conflicts among the different ministries of the settler state, which at various times translated into heated fights within the ruling right-wing Rhodesian Front party, and often divided the Rhodesian Cabinet. One inherent problem was that all such proposals to radically alter or reverse Rhodesia’s racial ratios required significant sacrifices on the part of the settler community, and the bulk of Rhodesia’s whites were unwilling to make any sacrifice that adversely affected their standards of living. Whenever such sacrifices were demanded, whites fled the country. As a consequence of its peculiar demography, the state had to reverse, slow down, or mitigate the problem of widening racial ratios or else the white settler state would die, and yet the solutions to these problems were also fatal to the white settler state as it then existed. Rhodesia’s population problems were like those of a patient whose condition was such that both the underlying problem and the procedures to cure the problem were likely to kill the patient.

At no time in its ninety-year history could the settler state ever attain a sizable or stable white population, despite its sometimes aggressive efforts to secure these demographic goals. As it was, whites in the territory never accounted for more than 5 per cent of the total population, and hovered over 5 per cent for only the nine years from 1955 to 1964, peaking in 1961 at 5.7 per cent, and falling thereafter until the end of white rule in 1980, when their actual numbers were most likely less than 3 per cent of the total population. In absolute terms, the white population of Rhodesia peaked at only 277,000: a number that is interestingly well under one half of the total number of black Africans living in England today. Moreover, consistently high levels of population turnover through immigration and emigration throughout its short history reveal a white Rhodesia that always relied upon a perilous demographic juggling act, and exposes a transient white population with only shallow national loyalties. In this context, the political, economic, psychological, and military effects of the rapidly expanding African population were doubly compounded. If he could have been roused from his grave and made to witness the limited extent of white settlement of his colony seventy years after its founding, Rhodesia’s eponymous founder, Cecil Rhodes, would no doubt have repeated his famous meditation: ‘So
little done, so much to do’. In the event, there was little time with which to do it.

As it was, the state’s definitions of victory in the war of numbers evolved over time towards progressively more humble demographic goals. Chronologically, what constituted a victory evolved from a goal of a white majority in Rhodesia along the lines of Australia, to that of a racial composition closer to that of South Africa, to stabilising then-current ratios, and finally to merely slowing the widening of the racial population numbers. Under each of these definitions of victory, white Rhodesia lost the war of numbers.

In contrast to the prevailing orthodoxies on the subject of the fall of white Rhodesia, this book argues that it was the Rhodesian state’s defeat in the war of numbers, and the numerous and surprisingly varied consequences which flowed from this failure, that were directly responsible for the settler state’s political downfall. More than any battle, bombing, election result, coup, or diplomatic manoeuvre, it was this defeat that was dispositive. None the less, it would be misleading to regard the more conspicuous war of liberation and the hidden war of population numbers as being wholly distinct from one another, as they were inseparably commingled. These two complementary wars interacted and overlapped with each other in complex ways, and neither can be understood in isolation of the other. Nor can the full story behind Rhodesia’s collapse be relayed without an understanding of both.

The Course of the Visible War

Some parts of the story of the collapse of the breakaway Rhodesian regime are well known, even to those with only a casual interest in the subject. The settlement negotiations, international political manoeuvrings, and the diplomatic implications of the Rhodesian rebellion have been described by many authors in both academic studies and in more accessible narratives. In addition, the military aspects of the Rhodesian conflict have been examined in detail by a variety of authors, both participants and analysts. Neither well-known narrative will be recounted here in detail, though a broad overview is presented below to provide a skeletal context to the war of numbers that ran alongside these more eye-catching events.

The colony of Rhodesia, with its small but politically strident settler population, had presented an impossible political and diplomatic dilemma for imperial Britain for many years. With the unravelling of the Central African Federation, of which Rhodesia was the dominant member territory, Britain and her colony of Rhodesia began a contentious series of on-again, off-again constitutional negotiations with the aim of bringing about the settler state’s legal independence. For reasons that will be detailed in another section, no
agreement could be reached. On 11 November, 1965, Ian Smith’s white-dominated settler government declared Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain, ending the stalemate. Immediately following this illegal declaration, Britain’s Labour government under Harold Wilson began to implement what would become a gradually escalating series of sanctions intended to end the rebellion. In 1966 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed selective mandatory sanctions, and in 1968 the UNSC passed comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, both on Britain’s prompting. More extensive measures, including the use of force, were repeatedly called for by many members of the United Nations, but all such calls were rejected by Britain. Even those sanctions that were put in place were openly and notoriously violated by Rhodesia’s allies, South Africa and Portugal, and the regime was able, at least in the short and medium term, to circumvent the effective enforcement of these economic sanctions and remain afloat economically. In the long term, the more damaging and effective of these efforts to isolate the regime internationally was the unanimous rejection of any formal or de facto recognition of the illegal regime, even on the part of Portugal and South Africa.

On the settlement front, Wilson initially refused to ‘legalise the swag of an illegal action’ by negotiating with the rebel regime. His government’s policy soon changed, and the British subsequently hosted two high profile settlement talks on Royal Navy ships – the HMS Tiger talks in 1966 and the HMS Fearless talks in 1968 – neither of which ended the rebellion. There was then no movement on independence negotiations until the election of Edward Heath’s Conservative government in Britain in 1970. Shortly thereafter there was an Anglo-Rhodesian agreement on independence terms in 1971, which was very favourable to white settlers. This settlement ultimately foundered in May 1972 when the proposed independence constitution failed to pass the test of acceptability to Rhodesia’s African population as was required by Britain in the agreement.

In the winter of 1972 African guerrillas attacked a white farm in the Centenary district of north-eastern Rhodesia, marking the beginning of the military war. This first phase of the guerrilla war soon took on the form of similar hit-and-run attacks on isolated white farms or state installations in the rural areas. Initially, these attacks were confined to the northern border regions and were rather easily contained by the regime. This all changed with the Lisbon coup in 1974 and the rise to power of FRELIMO in Portugal’s former colony of Mozambique in 1975, which turned Rhodesia’s containable police action into a full scale guerrilla war. Afterwards, the Rhodesian regime was bordered on three sides by hostile countries, with only a
small swathe of land along the Limpopo River in the south of the country touching its lone ally, South Africa.

With the fall of Portuguese Africa, South Africa became convinced that the war in Rhodesia was hopeless and would inevitably result, were it to continue, in a victory for African guerrillas hostile to South Africa. For different reasons, Zambia was also anxious for an end to the fighting. Together this unlikely pairing applied pressure on their respective allies to return to the settlement table. The resulting talks between Rhodesian officials and African nationalists occurred on a railway car in the middle of the Victoria Falls Bridge in 1975, but a mutually agreed upon settlement could still not be obtained.

The United States’ Cold War interests in the region were activated after the Soviet-backed Cuban intervention in the former Portuguese colony of Angola, and the Rhodesian conflict then took on a broader significance. In 1976, on the initiative of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the United States and South Africa jointly pressured Rhodesia back to the negotiating table, bluntly informing Ian Smith that Rhodesia was going to soon lose the war, and could expect no outside support in his continuance of it. As part of this process, Smith was persuaded to deliver a speech to Rhodesians in September 1976 conceding that under this new settlement plan Rhodesia would be headed for majority rule. Even so, in the resulting Geneva talks of 1976 no agreement was reached. Following this, further Anglo-American initiatives likewise ended with no progress towards legal independence.

All the while, the war continued. Militating against what could have been a more comprehensive guerrilla military victory in the war, the two nationalist groups, ZANU and ZAPU, and their respective guerrilla armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA, remained as hostile to each other as each was to the Rhodesian Security Forces. Assassinations of high ranking nationalists and top guerrilla leaders and violent reprisals between the groups prevented any meaningful cooperation, despite periodic attempts to unite. These divisions between the nationalist groups provided much needed breathing space for the white regime.

After the failure of the Geneva talks, the settler regime began negotiating with African moderates inside Rhodesia in an effort to pursue an ‘internal settlement’. These protracted negotiations finally resulted in the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution which purportedly established African majority rule in 1979. In spite of its outward appearance, all significant reins of power remained in white hands even with the ascendance to the premiership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, an African. Even with this window dressing, the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution did not bring international
Introduction

7

recognition to the settler state, or result in a dropping of international sanctions, or end the war.

Indeed, the final phase of the war proved to be the bloodiest. As guerrillas began to operate out of camps all along Rhodesia’s borders, this widened the geographical scope of the conflict significantly. Guerrillas were able to successfully proselytise to greater numbers of African peasants, and recruitment for the guerrilla armies swelled to the point that new recruits at times overwhelmed the camps’ resources. By the late 1970s guerrillas began to mine more and more rural roads, rendering it dangerous to travel to large parts of the country without a military escort. Guerrillas also began to infiltrate the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) and the state’s Protected Villages (PVs) with greater ease.

In addition to these rural successes, guerrillas conducted several high profile acts of political terror in urban areas which further unsettled the white population. These acts of terror included shooting down two civilian airliners, bombing a Woolworth’s department store and a popular nightclub, and setting ablaze an enormous oil storage facility outside Salisbury. In 1976, in an attempt to reverse the deteriorating situation within Rhodesia, the regime began conducting deep raids into neighbouring African countries to attack guerrilla staging areas. But these controversial raids only heaped further criticism on the regime internationally, without ever delivering a fatal blow to the guerrillas. With the war escalating in intensity and beginning for the first time to press on white urban areas, the regime was forced to negotiate for a final time in the Lancaster House talks at the end of 1979, where a constitution for an independent Zimbabwe was finally created.

This broad outline of the collapse of the Rhodesian regime has been recounted many times with varying shifts in emphasis and focus. As with nearly all previous accounts, the thumbnail sketch above ignores the role of racial population factors and thereby leaves vital parts of the story untold. This book aims to relay this hidden story.

Racial Numbers and the Nature of the Settler State

The story of Rhodesia’s war of numbers provides insights into the fundamental nature of both white settler society and the settler state which are missed in more orthodox narratives. To the minority settler state, racial composition had always been of existential importance, both in terms of the state’s legal status under imperial and international law and its practical viability in postcolonial Africa. In its short history as a British dependency from 1890 to 1980 Rhodesia flowed through many imperial classifications: it was a protectorate, a chartered company concession, a colony under
responsible government, a territory within an imperial federation, then a self-governing quasi-dominion, and finally an illegal secessionist regime. Rhodesia was a category unto itself, albeit an ever-evolving one. In a 1949 Colonial Office memorandum on how best to describe to the British public the structure of the Commonwealth, it was written that it should be said that the Commonwealth comprised: ‘(a) The States which are fully sovereign and independent Members of the Commonwealth, i.e. the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, (b) Southern Rhodesia, and (c) Colonial Territories’.13 The difficulty that long existed in classifying and rationalising Rhodesia within the imperial system was largely because it was always a settler colony with too few settlers.

In keeping with its ambiguous status within the Empire, Rhodesia was allowed to progress towards greater entrustments of power along the same Durham path first blazed by the old dominions of white settlement,14 but only to the extent that Britain retained ultimate legal sovereignty. In 1960, with the doomed Central African Federation crumbling, Rhodesia’s territorial Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, pushed for a constitutional conference which would further expand Rhodesia’s independence from Britain. After negotiations, the Whitehead government and the British agreed on the 1961 Rhodesian constitution: a compromise which allowed for the possibility of future African majority rule and other minor concessions to the indigenous majority, in exchange for a severance of most, but not all, of the remaining tethers of control Britain had over the settler state.

Under the 1961 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the rebellion, Rhodesia had awkwardly straddled the imperial classifications of dependent colony and independent dominion, without fitting exactly into either one.15 Externally, Rhodesia had no international personality of its own, although it had been granted increasing entrustments of power with respect to external affairs from 1923 onwards.16 These responsibilities included membership in some international and Commonwealth organisations,17 as well as some latitude in making agreements regarding trade and purely local matters with neighbouring countries.18 Rhodesia inherited a representative on the staff of the British Ambassador to the United States, and an Accredited Diplomatic Representative in the Republic of South Africa.19 Rhodesian Prime Ministers also regularly attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meetings, even as the rest of the attendees were fully independent states. Importantly though, Rhodesian Prime Ministers did not attend these Commonwealth Conferences as a matter of right, but on special invitation.20
Before the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Britain treated Rhodesia as a quasi-dominion which added to this constitutional confusion. Rhodesian affairs were the responsibility of the British Dominions Office and later the Commonwealth Relations Office, rather than the Colonial Office. Rhodesia was the only colony which had a High Commission in London, a diplomatic mission status normally afforded only to independent members of the Commonwealth. Rhodesia enjoyed certain conventions agreed to by the British government that reinforced this quasi-dominion status, including the convention not to station troops inside of Rhodesia without consent and the convention that the British Parliament would not legislate internally for Rhodesia. Most scholars who have attempted to place where exactly Rhodesia was on the Durham path to independence under the 1961 Constitution argue that it was similar to the legal positions of the old dominions immediately prior to the enactment of the Statute of Westminster.

This proximity to independence engendered frustration among white settlers, who felt the British condemned them to linger in a sort of imperial purgatory. A pervasive myth formed among the Rhodesian right-wing that the British had promised independence to Rhodesia – a promise that the British duplicitously reneged on. This myth spread among a receptive population, as the constant British rejections of dominion status eroded the settlers’ trust of British motives, and the settler concessions in the 1961 Constitution soon began to be viewed by many whites in Rhodesia as a monumental bait-and-switch. Indeed, the last Rhodesian High Commissioner in London, Brigadier Alexander Skeen, asserted that the referendum which approved the 1961 Constitution was premised upon a ‘misunderstanding that it would grant Southern Rhodesia its complete independence should the Federation break up’. On the eve of the collapse of the Federation the recently elected Rhodesian Prime Minister, Winston Field, a member of the Rhodesian Front party, claimed that he received a verbal assurance from the British Foreign Secretary, Rab Butler, that ‘Rhodesia [would] receive its independence concurrently with the date on which either Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland is allowed to secede [from the Central African Federation], whichever is the earlier’. This alleged verbal assurance followed a British rejection of his written precondition letter demanding an identical promise. Field’s successor in office, Ian Smith, also claimed to have heard this verbal assurance, and one apocryphal account describes Smith wagging his finger at Foreign Secretary Butler and saying, ‘Now, Mr. First Secretary of State, don’t you go back on your word on this.’ Unsurprisingly, British remembrances differ, as the former British Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home,
recounted in 1966: ‘the misunderstanding in Rhodesia … was certainly widespread. But that no pledge was given, I am equally sure. It probably arose from everyone trying to be too polite to each other.’26 In the event, Britain never granted independence under the 1961 Constitution after the Federation collapsed, an action that would have required an Imperial Act of Parliament similar to the Statute of Westminster which granted independence to the old dominions.27 Thus the Rhodesian state remained tantalisingly close to completing the Durham path to full dominionhood without being allowed to do so.

It is quite obviously true that had whites in Rhodesia been able to establish themselves as a majority of the Rhodesian population Britain would have granted dominion status to the settler state.28 Even barring that unrealistic counterfactual, if whites in Rhodesia had formed a more sizable percentage of the population than actually existed, there is little doubt that the settler state’s de facto viability would have been greatly enhanced. Yet far from being able to expand the percentage of whites in Rhodesia, the settler state witnessed the opposite. These demographic and historical trends were all on a collision course with white settlers’ futile hopes that Rhodesia be granted dominionhood by Britain as an independent member of the Commonwealth, irrespective of any mythical assurances made by ‘perfidious Albion’.29

Rhodesia’s racial population sizes and its legal status interacted in other complicated ways. While the size of its settler population was a factor that determined the legal status of Rhodesia within the British imperial system, the converse was also true: that the legal status of Rhodesia in part determined the size of the settler population. This conundrum was candidly admitted to the British by Ian Smith on several occasions prior to independence. A month prior to UDI, he told Harold Wilson that independence for Rhodesia ‘was a matter of life and death for Europeans in Rhodesia since the only alternative they saw to independence was their eventual departure’.30 During the dying days of the rebellion in 1979, this inversion was expressed in another way in the form of a top secret ‘Total National Strategy Directive’, outlining the long-term strategy for the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia state. As expressed in this comprehensive strategic plan, the prime objective of the state was to ‘retain the confidence of whites … in order to prevent an exodus’.31 In this light, the rebellion might be seen as having been less about entrenching white rule so as to safeguard the legitimate interests of the settler population than about the maintenance of the settler population to safeguard the interests of illegitimate white rule.

Rhodesia’s constitutional status mattered in other ways. For the white inhabitants of the Empire, the imperial classifications of dominion or
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dependent colony were not merely constitutional but were also self-conceptual. Settlers in Rhodesia viewed themselves as out of the same mould as Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, and South Africans. White Rhodesians saw these established settler societies as, like them, the descendants of brave pioneers who, through pluck and grit, created white countries from what was conceived of as wilderness and barbarism. And, in fact, many of these settlers were the very same people drifting from one end of the British Empire to the other, as there was a significant amount of inter-dominion migration. But while white Rhodesia may have superficially resembled these former dominions in their pioneer myths, political institutions, social manners, sporting culture, and in their general settler ethos, unlike these other societies, the political power of Rhodesia’s settler state was in the 1960s still compromised by a imperial constitutional tether, and it rested precariously atop a massive and growing indigenous population.

Among these established settler societies, Rhodesia was most comparable to South Africa, which was also a minority regime in southern Africa presiding over an expanding African population. But even in this comparison, important distinctions existed. South Africa’s white settlers were far more numerous than were Rhodesia’s, both relative to their country’s respective African populations and in absolute numbers. White South Africans were also typically more rooted to the country than were white Rhodesians. Most importantly, South African settlers had been granted irrevocable political independence by the British in 1931. The South African state thereby had the political freedom to create a racialised state structure to firmly entrench white rule for the long term, whereas Rhodesia’s application for dominion status was postmarked several decades too late, after the irrepressible political momentum in Britain and the wider international community turned away from the concepts of colonial trusteeship and inherent racial superiority upon which the principle of minority settler rule rested.

While white Rhodesia was less secure demographically and politically than South Africa, the settler state did prove more durable than settler rule in Kenya. Kenyan whites numbered less than white Rhodesians both absolutely and relatively, and the colony never enjoyed the same degree of self-governance as did Rhodesia. Even so, African politicians feared that Kenya would eventually develop a settler government under a constitutional arrangement similar to Rhodesia’s, or possibly even South Africa’s. Indeed, after World War II many white Kenyans looked south to Rhodesia and South Africa as more stable models of white rule in Africa. Yet despite settler pressures for greater devolution of power, Kenya remained a Crown Colony, with a locally elected, settler-dominated Legislative Council but
with executive authority resting in a Governor appointed from London. Corresponding in time and theme with the creation of the Central African Federation, of which Rhodesia was the dominant member, Britain had initially planned to position Kenya as the power centre of a proposed East African Federation. Because of the strength of African opposition to the Federation idea inside and outside Kenya, and against the backdrop of the violent Mau Mau uprising within Kenya, the British realised the Kenyan settlers could only maintain their power if buttressed by continued British military support. Britain’s new Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, appointed in 1959, was determined to remove British rule in Kenya over the protests of the settler minority. Accordingly, Kenya was sent down the constitutional path towards African majority rule, finally attaining full independence in 1963. Settlers in Kenya cried ‘Betrayal!’ but the path of settler self-government in Kenya was precluded decades before.38 Though Kenyan settlers were able to postpone, complicate, and harry this progress towards majority rule, they could not ultimately reverse it.

Demographically, Kenyan settlers were in a much weaker position than Rhodesian settlers. Kenya’s white population was outnumbered 130 to 1 by Africans on the cusp of independence,39 while white Rhodesians at the same time were outnumbered by roughly 18 to 1.40 As a leading Kenyan settler tellingly wrote to Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Central African Federation, in a country of millions of militant Africans, ‘60,000 Europeans aren’t a firm base for self-government.’41 After independence, white Kenyans were left to either stay and live under African rule or emigrate. One tenth of the white population left in 1961 alone, and more followed, a process that was facilitated by the British and World Bank-funded grants to buy out whites and resettle Africans on their lands.42 Many of these disaffected white Kenyans made their way south to white-ruled Rhodesia or further on to apartheid South Africa. If South Africa then represented the apotheosis of white political viability in southern Africa, and Kenya the failure of white political power to take hold in eastern Africa, then Rhodesia stood in the geographical, political, and demographic middle ground between the two.

As close as Rhodesia might have been to full independence in the early 1960s, it was politically impossible for the British to promulgate an analogous Statute of Westminster granting full independence to Rhodesia. Even with the 1961 Constitution’s limited concessions to the African majority and the eventuality of African rule, Britain demanded more settler concessions, while the ruling Rhodesian Front Government viewed the 1961 Constitution as the outer limit of their willingness to compromise.43 From the British perspective, while independence for Rhodesia under the 1961
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Constitution was not a viable option, neither was summarily granting independence under majority rule. All significant authority in Rhodesia, including the police and the armed forces, was under white territorial control, not British control, which limited Britain’s unilateral options. Some British politicians viewed the example of British settlers in Kenya being bought out and uprooted as a possible last exit off the Durham path that Rhodesian settlers could be forced down. But for the British, the Rhodesian settler problem would prove much more intractable than the Kenyan settler problem. The stalemate meant that Rhodesia could neither be forced to exit the Durham path and be handed over to African majority rule as with Kenya, nor be pushed forward along it to full settler independence as with South Africa, nor be driven backwards towards more imperial control. As such, Rhodesia remained, as Ian Smith famously said, ‘drifting in this constitutional twilight’.

While the Rhodesian state needed independence under settler rule to hold on to its white population, it could never achieve legal independence under white rule from Britain because its white population was too small. So in dramatic fashion, the small settler community bypassed this Catch-22 and attempted to take dominion status for themselves. The settler state’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain on 11 November 1965 occurred within the context of a growing insecurity among whites in Rhodesia. In 1964 Rhodesia’s two former Federal partners quickly gained their independence from Britain as the African-rulled states of Zambia and Malawi, leaving the fate of white-ruled Rhodesia undecided. By 1965 only Rhodesia and the former High Commission territories of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland remained under British rule in sub-Saharan Africa, with the latter three all gaining independence under African rule within three years. Whites in Rhodesia were all too aware of their anomalous and precarious status in post-colonial Africa, and with a rapidly emigrating population and the looming fear of being handed over to majority African rule by Britain, Prime Minister Ian Smith’s government finally declared UDI as it had long threatened to do.

This fledgling illegal regime was dominated by a shrinking settler minority, was born into an overwhelmingly African-rulled continent that was hostile to its survival, and was welcomed into an international state system that proclaimed its very existence a threat to world peace; that racial population numbers mattered in this political environment would seem to be, despite the historical silence on the matter, obvious. That the settler state would then aggressively try to engineer its racial demographics to address this existential problem is, at least in retrospect, predictable. And that its
failure to do so effectively would fatally weaken the regime would seem to be logical. As will be detailed throughout this book, all three of these inferences proved quite true.

The War of Numbers and the Nature of Rhodesia’s Racial Divisions

The war of numbers focused exclusively on the white and African populations, oversimplifying Rhodesia’s complex racial and ethnic composition. Legally, Rhodesia recognised four racial categories: white, Asian, Coloured, and African, though these rigid legal divisions belied what was in fact a diverse spectrum of peoples with ambiguous and inconsistent racial distinctions. All those who were accepted as being white faced no legal barriers in Rhodesia, despite the often isolating social barriers some non-British whites faced. In Rhodesia, the social stratification of ‘white’ ethnicities placed British-born Rhodesians, or those descended directly from Britain, atop the hierarchy, followed by those of northern and western European descent who assimilated into the mainstream of Rhodesian society. Below them, were the largely self-segregated Afrikaner population, and then the southern and eastern Europeans, particularly Greeks, Portuguese, and Jews. Lower in the social hierarchy were those whose position in white Rhodesian society was less clear, such as Turks, Arabs, and Persians, who all inconsistently passed for whites.

Rhodesia’s population policies in the war of numbers reflected the shifting relative worth of different ethnic populations of whites towards more inclusivity. Since its founding in the late nineteenth century, Rhodesia had sought to restrict the immigration of non-British whites to maintain the British character of the colony, a policy intending most directly to address the fear of a large Afrikaner population. This pro-British bias in immigration continued until the mid-1960s. With the rise to power of Ian Smith, these former ethnic barriers to white immigration were jettisoned, and the Rhodesian Front’s definition of desirable populations expanded to include southern Europeans and Afrikaners. Under Smith, the Minister of Immigration post was even held by two Afrikaners, which in itself reflected a broader ethnic view of white Rhodesia. Even with this softening of white ethnic biases, there were never any corresponding efforts to expand immigration selectivity further to include the non-white populations who were politically and economically allied to the white state.

The middle racial categories of Asians and Coloureds were for the most part ignored in this demographic conflict. The small Asian community, whose population peaked at just below 11,000, faced legal barriers in terms of occupational and residential segregation, as well as other pettier forms of
discrimination. Nevertheless, Asians were largely supportive of the white regime and enjoyed legal rights not afforded to Africans or to those who in southern African parlance were termed ‘Coloureds’. The Coloured population was actually a diverse composite of mixed-race peoples, lighter-skinned Africans from outside Rhodesia, dark-skinned Indians from Goa, natives from St Helena, and even some assimilated indigenous Africans. This diverse group’s numbers had risen to nearly 24,000 at the time of independence. Coloureds faced greater legal barriers than did Asians, but still were relatively privileged in a legal sense compared against indigenous Africans, who were on the bottom of Rhodesia’s social and legal hierarchy and were constrained by a wide variety of legal and social barriers. The Rhodesian state did not preferentially differentiate among the indigenous African tribal and ethnic groups, as legally all were collapsed in the larger indigenous category, referred to as ‘African’.

The racial war of numbers overlapped perfectly along the primary racial divisions of whites and Africans, even as the more visible war did not overlap cleanly with race. The Rhodesian settler state included large numbers of African functionaries, and it was buttressed by many African sympathisers and collaborators. Indeed, Africans filled most of the lower positions in the Rhodesian state, including, crucially, the Rhodesian Security Forces. These African functionaries were not a monolithic group and they did not all choose to serve the state out of the same motivations and in furtherance of the same goals. Nevertheless, they were fundamental to the workings of the state. Some Africans who did not directly serve the state supported it, benefited from its continuance, and actively defended it. Many more than this number could be described neither as firm supporters of the state nor of the nationalists, but were instead constantly calculating which alliances and associations benefited them and could advance their interests at any time, blurring lines between state collaborators and state antagonists. These nuanced divisions among Africans have led some scholars to conclude that the military conflict was best characterised as a ‘black civil war’. While perhaps overstating the case, there is some truth in this. So the more conspicuous war did not pit the exclusively white state against African nationalists, but instead a white-controlled multi-racial state and its allies against African nationalists and their allies, with many apolitical, or nonpolitical, or politically fluid Africans in the middle. However, even as the visible war was more racially blurred than is often supposed, the war of numbers certainly was not. Glossing over the complex and subtle political divisions in other contexts, the population war of numbers did overlap perfectly along racial lines: skin colour was decisive. Rhodesia’s war of numbers was a racial war.
Racial coalescence after UDI had a profound influence on the formation of white Rhodesian identity, a process complicated by continued white transience. The psychological anxieties and pressures brought on by the growing numerical disparities within Rhodesia, the consolidation of African political power in the continent, and the near universal condemnation of the white settler regime in the international community created a triple besiegement for white Rhodesians.62 This triple siege mentality interacted with white transience in interesting ways. It had the effect of weakening ethnic divisions within white society, forcing a coalescence of the white community within Rhodesia.63 Yet the constant population shuffle meant that this racial unity and the adoption of Rhodesian racial mores, was necessarily inculcated to, and adopted by, new immigrants quickly.64 This acculturation process was therefore deep but brief, similar to the acculturation of undergraduate students into the life of the university. As will be argued, while these feelings of white solidarity and a common defiance might well have engendered a bond among whites within Rhodesia and created a location for sentimentality afterwards, they did not for most constitute a true national feeling. None the less, the anxieties forged by the triple besiegement were internalised and absorbed by the whites in Rhodesia, if only during their short residence. In the last decades of settler rule, demographic anxieties not only permeated Rhodesian politics but also defined what it meant to be a white Rhodesian, however brittle and ephemeral this identity may have been.65

**The Hidden Ubiquity of Population Pressures**

Anxieties over racial demographics permeated Rhodesia’s political atmosphere during the final decades of white rule, and served as a unifier for all sorts of superficially dissimilar political phenomena.66 These anxieties innervated nearly every level and department of the settler state, and influenced almost the entire range of state policy. Connections between political phenomena and the demographic motivations behind them, or demographic causes driving them, were public knowledge at the time and obvious to contemporaries in Rhodesia.

During the last decades of settler rule, racial demographics were a dominant theme in white Rhodesian public discourses. Politicians and policymakers, the national media, and African nationalists explicitly linked a large proportion of Rhodesia’s political activity with their demographic impetuses. In the public realm a great deal of political phenomena were also blamed upon the impact of demographic changes. In other areas of state activity, the linkages between demographic motivations and public policy were so obvious at the time as to often go publicly unstated. Still other
policies were motivated by racial demographics, but their linkages were purposefully obscured by policymakers – efforts that were at the time rarely a complete success. Population anxieties were thereby an open influence throughout Rhodesian politics clouding most political and administrative considerations.

Racial population numbers were talked about by white bureaucrats, politicians, the media, academics, and laymen with increasing frequency from the 1960s onwards. One reason it was talked about with more frequency was that Rhodesia's longstanding, abstract population fears became concretised after the 1962 and 1969 censuses. As a result, population numbers and statistical trends moved from demographic esoterica to widespread public knowledge. Moreover, population talk increased as a result of Rhodesia's illegal independence, which left the small white population isolated in a country in which they were a minuscule and shrinking minority. As a result of the nation-building process after UDI, fears of the frailty of the settler power base began to be expressed in population terms. The increase in talk also reflected an increase in the political, economic, military, and social ramifications of these widening ratios beyond any psychological impact these numbers had on whites.

While population ‘problems’ were often discussed and debated in the public domain, they were nearly always cloaked in a more polished language of economics and development, as opposed to the more raw language of racial domination. Population numbers were openly discussed in the public domain as being extremely important, but it was not because the alleged ‘imbalances’ were racial per se, but because the racial imbalances were said to have disastrous economic effects on all races. Oddly enough, this cloaking was less effective in obscuring the role of racial demographics at the time than it has been subsequently. As will be discussed, even these more palatable rationales quite obviously all contained racist assumptions – dichotomies in which the white population was equated with the positive attributes of economic growth, enterprise, and general national well-being, and the African population was equated with economic burdens, a drain on the Treasury, political demagoguery, and a national problem to be solved. Even so, the state argued publicly that these population policies were not ‘political’ in their origins, meaning that they were not malevolent attempts to reconfigure the racial ratios out of concerns of bolstering white power, but were instead rational efforts to ensure growth and prosperity for all Rhodansians, white and African.

This cloak was easily brushed aside to reveal the uglier motives of the settler state, and it is unlikely that this cloaking fooled many contemporary
Rhodesians, white or African. It was certainly not convincing for African parliamentarians who consistently identified the racist political reasoning behind such policies; nor to African nationalists, whose propaganda often exposed the state’s racist motives (even while also identifying what can be termed ‘false-positives’); nor did this cloak even prevent the more impolitic of Rhodesian Front backbenchers from directly arguing for the baser racial ends that underlay the state’s population policies. However unconvincing this cloaking might have been to people at the time, these state efforts to downplay the importance and the ubiquity of demographic motivations as political power concerns has successfully caused the majority of historians and analysts to look clear past the influence of population matters in Rhodesian history.

Notwithstanding the profound importance of the population war, there have been incentives on both sides of the Rhodesian conflict to retrospectively downplay or disregard the role of population matters in the collapse of the settler regime. Emphasising the importance of population issues muddies the clean narratives that both Zimbabwean nationalists and Rhodesian apologists have constructed in the years following independence. For nationalist and ‘patriotic’ Zimbabwean historians and commentators, the narrative of the liberation war was one of triumph won through blood and sacrifice against a formidable enemy and its imperialist allies.68 Theirs is a story of heroes and villains. National liberation was something that was forcibly taken, and did not come about as the result of thoughtless, faceless demographic trends. Any narrative that assigns great weight to population trends lessens the roles of those whom these writers seek to celebrate or vilify. Similarly, Rhodesian apologists portray the narrative of Zimbabwean independence also as a heroic struggle, albeit one in which the roles of hero and villain are reversed. The Rhodesian narrative takes the form of a tragedy. Theirs describes a futile struggle of Rhodesians against foreign and domestic Communists, a struggle in which the heroic but ultimately naïve Rhodesians were betrayed during the climactic battle by their own pusillanimous kith and kin. This betrayal narrative was being formulated even as the regime was still collapsing,69 and has since become the predominant narrative among white Rhodesians in the diaspora. The most famous example of this genre was written by Ian Smith himself in his memoir Bitter Harvest: The Great Betrayal.70 As with the nationalists’ accounts, the Rhodesian narrative also downplayed the significance of demographic factors, as emphasising the impact of population trends could seem to reduce the role of historical actors to mere flotsam on the indomitable tides of demography.71
The collective amnesia concerning the population war that afflicted the politicians, nationalists and policymakers who actively took part in it, only became symptomatic after independence in 1980. Prior to this synergistic forgetting, the Rhodesian state, international bureaucrats, diplomats and politicians, African nationalists and guerrillas, and lay people inside and outside Rhodesia, all acknowledged the primacy of population matters in the fate of the white regime. Former Prime Minister Ian Smith clearly exemplified this pattern by the sharp differences in his statements and writings concerning the role of population matters during white rule and since independence. Throughout his tenure in office, Smith publicly and privately positioned population matters as central to the fate of the white regime. His rise to the premiership in 1964 was in part made possible by the inability of his predecessor, Winston Field, to reverse the negative migration flows. His most dramatic achievements while in office, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the Republican Constitution, were both expressly inspired by population pressures: the former to convince whites to stay in Rhodesia, and the latter to limit the impact of African population growth. In the mid-1970s Smith declared in a series of speeches that his greatest achievement to that point had been to bring about positive white migration flows. Contemporaneously with these self-congratulatory appraisals of his rule in the mid-1970s, Smith’s cabinet ministers and government officials frantically schemed over how best to increase the white population, slow the African growth rate, and mitigate the adverse effects of widening racial ratios. As the war escalated in the later 1970s, and white emigration continued to drain the already limited white conscript reserves, a lack of white manpower was consistently cited by state officials, and by Smith himself, as being the greatest military problem faced by the state. While the strategies to alter and mitigate the effects of population numbers dominated so much of his government’s energies, and were openly acknowledged by Smith as representing the most formidable challenge to the regime, after independence Smith’s population amnesia set in. In his memoir, written many years after independence, Smith deemphasises the significant role played by population issues in the last decades of settler rule, and ignores the causal relationships between population pressures and the most important political events in Rhodesia during his time in office. Following this same pattern of forgetting, popular memories of the conflict among Rhodesians of the diaspora likewise contain blanks in places where population matters played a major role. Similarly, the nationalist and ‘patriotic’ histories of Zimbabwe omit population references in their politicised war narratives. As a result, this parallel war has been conveniently forgotten by all sides.
The Historiography of Demographic Engineering

Population matters have not been sufficiently addressed, analysed, periodised, or properly contextualised in Rhodesian history. When racial demographics have been addressed by historians, it is most often as naked numbers inserted into the text, with little explanation as to their significance. These population trends have been tracked over time, but always as a subplot outside the narrative, and rarely incorporated into the main analysis. As little scholarship as there has been on the significance of population matters generally, there is even less on the ubiquity of white population anxieties, how these pressures shaped white society, or the efforts of both the settler state and African nationalists to engineer racial demographics. A small number of studies have analysed different aspects of this engineering, but no single work has linked all the many components of this multifaceted population struggle into a coherent whole within the Rhodesian context. When addressed at all, the demographic struggle has typically been positioned as a by-product of the military conflict, and efforts to re-configure population numbers as merely an adjunct to the shooting war. Nor indeed has the outcome of this demographic struggle ever been presented as a primary cause of the fall of the settler state. As a result of the synergistic forgetting by the participants and the lack of subsequent historical analysis, Rhodesia’s war of numbers remains barely visible behind the more conspicuous narratives of Rhodesia’s collapse.

The phenomenon of competitive demography has been analysed in the comparative literature of other regions and in other time periods. The population anxieties of Rhodesian whites in the 1960s and 1970s can find parallels in inter-war Europe. Historians of this period have described how national population anxieties were often expressed through the use of anthropomorphic analogies to the vitality of the national body, how demography was a science closely linked to politics, and how the state formed population policies to address these concerns; all of which were remarkably similar to ideas and policies that emerged some forty years later in Rhodesia. Milica Bookman has analysed more recent inter-ethnic population struggles in Europe since the Cold War. Bookman describes the courses of these ‘wars of numbers’ and demonstrates how population size often translates into political and economic power, and the incentives this equation creates for engineering demography.

In the African context, several authors have described the significance of competitive demography. Omari Kokole focuses upon inter-ethnic competition and population policies within post-colonial African states. In these zero-sum competitions which Kokole surveys, such as Rwanda, Burundi,
and Sudan, fertility was a powerful political weapon, and there were thus politicised initiatives to encourage high birth rates in order to garner more power at the expense of ethnic rivals. In a study on apartheid South Africa, Madi Gray describes white fears of being overwhelmed by African numbers.\textsuperscript{76} Gray characterises South Africa as a dual state, in which a developed nation existed side-by-side with a developing one, and traces how the two nations experienced drastically different demographic trajectories, and the implications this had for settler power. A more thoroughgoing analysis of South Africa’s population policies was written by Barbara Brown in 1990.\textsuperscript{77} Brown’s article describes a comprehensive policy of population control by the South African state very similar to that of Rhodesia’s, in a context that was in many ways a close fit, including the state’s efforts to lower African fertility through family planning and massively increase white immigration to narrow widening racial ratios. Also in the South African context, Deborah Posel analyses the relationship between the apartheid state’s collection of demographic statistical data and the exercise of state power.\textsuperscript{78} This connection between counting and control in South Africa can find distinct parallels in the Rhodesian state’s obsession with demographic data beginning in the early 1960s. All of these studies inside and outside Africa highlight certain anxieties and exertions that resemble different aspects of Rhodesia’s war of numbers. But for all the usefulness of comparisons and the identification of commonalities of experience in a wider context, there were unique qualities to Rhodesia’s demographic struggle that superficial comparisons with other regions and societies, even apartheid South Africa, do not adequately address.

Demographic engineering in the Rhodesian context has received little attention, however. Lovemore Zinyama has written on the migration trends of whites in and out of Rhodesia, and the push and pull factors influencing them.\textsuperscript{79} Likewise, Alois Mlambo has analysed the state’s immigration policies from its founding to the end of the Federation, and in so doing convincingly argues that white immigration was always politically vital to the Rhodesian state.\textsuperscript{80} George Kay’s work touches upon the pressures that African population growth brought to bear upon the state, and parses through the discourses concerning family planning and ‘overpopulation’.\textsuperscript{81} Kay also analyses the demand-side competition for immigrants and how this migration market influenced Rhodesia’s policies. All of these works examine different aspects of the war of numbers without combining these pieces into a larger whole.

Three works do conceptually combine more aspects of these broader strategies to manipulate racial demographics, and move closer towards
properly contextualising the significance of racial demographics. These are: Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock’s *Rhodsians Never Die: The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia*, Martin Meredith’s *The Past is Another Country*, and Amy Kaler’s *Running After Pills: Politics, Gender and Contraception in Colonial Zimbabwe*. Both Godwin and Hancock’s and Meredith’s books address the political, psychological, economic, and military significance of the shifting racial demographics in the 1970s, and touch upon state efforts to manipulate these demographics through immigration promotion and emigration restrictions. Importantly, though, both cast these demographic policies as an adjunct to the war effort, and therefore do not properly periodise or contextualise this population war. Amy Kaler’s book is a thorough examination of the battles over African fertility in Rhodesia, and the political, psychological, and economic effects of the African population growth on the settler state. Focusing on the ideological, strategic, and tactical background to the competing efforts of both the state and the nationalists to engineer African fertility, Kaler’s work is alone in revealing the nationalists’ interests and efforts in the population realm. But while Kaler’s work adroitly analyses the struggle over African population growth, she does not piece this important part of the war of numbers together with the other corresponding efforts of this wider conflict. Thus, even these three more comprehensive works fail to combine all such efforts of both the settler state and African nationalists into a conceptual whole, encompassing the counting and registering of population numbers, migration trends, differential fertility trends, and the efforts to mitigate the effects of unwanted growth. Therefore, no prior work has filled in the entire picture of the war of numbers. As a result, there is still a hidden story running throughout the last decades of settler rule that has been conveniently forgotten, incompletely constructed, disarranged or deemphasised, if not ignored completely, in the current literature.

**Chapter Overview**

This book is divided into five thematic chapters preceded by an introductory chapter and followed by a concluding chapter. Each chapter is thematically self-contained, but together they form the coherent story of Rhodesia’s war of numbers.

Chapter 2, ‘The Rationalisation of Racial Population Imbalances’, details the importance of the two population censuses of 1962 and 1969. While population numbers were abstractly and conceptually recognised by white settlers to be linked to Rhodesia’s long-term viability and constitutional status as a settler state from at least the late 1950s, exact population figures
were unknown until the 1962 census. The knowledge of these numbers, once revealed, had profound effects on white society and the state. The findings of this first census, and the one that followed it in 1969, concretised popular anxieties among whites about the widening population ratios in Rhodesia, and provided the impetus for a variety of state efforts to reconfigure these racial populations as a means of maintaining settler control. Also detailed in this chapter are the multiple ways in which the state attempted to control, manipulate, and deploy this new demographic information for political purposes.

Chapter 3, ‘The African Population Explosion’, examines the impact of Rhodesia’s African population explosion. From the whites’ perspective, the most shocking revelation to emerge from the 1962 census concerned the size of Rhodesia’s African population. The census revealed an African population 20 per cent higher than previous estimates, and roughly 17 times the total white population. This African population ‘explosion’ fed into whites’ longstanding fears regarding African sexual practices and their more recent insecurities concerning their political future in postcolonial Africa. This information also meshed with the then increasingly popular neo-Malthusian theory of an impending population apocalypse in the Third World. These fears prompted more active efforts on the part of the state to slow African population growth so as to maintain political stability, stave off economic calamity, and permanently secure white privilege.

Chapter 4, ‘White Emigration’, traces the phenomenon of white emigration from Rhodesia. Although high rates of white emigration were a longstanding phenomenon in Rhodesia, white immigration numbers normally masked the outflow such that an illusion of population continuity remained. However, with the precipitous drop in immigration numbers in the early 1960s, these emigration numbers became more obvious. This in itself was objectively damaging to the settler state, but the knowledge of this population drain and its subjective effects on white morale and confidence in the future of white rule compounded the damage. This chapter also details the impact that continued white emigration and limited white manpower reserves had on the military conflict, and describes the efforts of foreign governments to manipulate Rhodesian migration patterns.

Chapter 5, ‘Rhodesia’s Immigration Policy’, outlines the evolution of Rhodesia’s immigration policies. An integral part of Smith’s population agenda consisted of lowering the selectivity requirements for white immigrants to Rhodesia in order to draw bigger yields. The loosening of Rhodesia’s selectivity standards included changes in the economic, educational, and ethnic criteria that previous Rhodesian governments had had
in place. Following these changes, there was a significant population shift in the years after UDI that was distinct from the longstanding Rhodesian population turnover, as there were marked differences between those who left and those who came to replace them. The conflicts that emerged over these immigration policies reveal many of the larger contradictions inherent in the state's population policies.

Chapter 6, ‘African Agency in the War of Numbers’, analyses the scope of African nationalist agency in the population war. State failures in the population war were in part the fruit of nationalist successes. While the state’s family planning efforts in African communities increased in scale in the 1970s, they were met by increasing resistance from the African population. The traditional pronatalism of African males and the embedded peasant suspicion of the settler state’s motives were tapped into by the guerrillas and combined to frustrate state efforts at promoting family planning. In addition, the demographic vulnerabilities of the white population were successfully exploited by the nationalists and guerrillas. With the escalation of the military war, guerrillas began to attack white settler farms and commit high-profile acts of political terror in part to force emigration and discourage new immigration. This new level of violence, both real and perceived, had some effect on white migration patterns. As will be explained in this chapter, the military conflict also had an interesting impact on white fertility patterns.

The final chapter serves as a post mortem on the settler regime in Rhodesia. Here some of the broader philosophical and logical inconsistencies in the settler state’s waging of the war of numbers are scrutinised. This chapter also looks at the wider significance of this hidden war and considers what it tells us about the nature of white society and the settler state in Rhodesia. This book concludes with a discussion about how Rhodesia’s war of numbers should be viewed in comparative terms, and the extent to which Rhodesia’s fate was unique or whether it could serve as an explanatory model for other settler societies.
A vague anxiety of being ‘swamped’ by indigenous numbers had long rested in the back of the minds of white settlers across Africa. But while an overwhelming disparity in racial numbers was for whites always as self-evident as it was unsettling, the perceived significance of these racial imbalances varied over time and space. Colonial military superiority on the spot; the potential accessibility of additional metropolitan resources; technological and communication advantages; effective divide-and-rule policies; and a trust in the political apathy and/or cowed ambitions of the African populations, all at times militated against these numerical disparities translating into insurmountable political vulnerabilities. From the early 1960s, however, these anxieties became more clearly focused for settler communities across Africa, Rhodesia in particular, and the political implications of these racial population numbers became much more serious.2 The reasons behind this shift in white attitudes in Rhodesia from abstract and vague to concrete and specific anxieties were threefold: the momentum of decolonisation on the continent; the rise of African nationalism within Rhodesia; and more specific population information that for the first time enumerated racial population trends in accurate detail.

From the early 1960s, the Rhodesian state attempted to discover the contours of Rhodesia’s demography by identifying, counting, registering, and tracking the racial populations.3 The population numbers, when first discovered, shocked Rhodesia’s white community and spurred the state to
focus its energies on addressing these racial population ‘imbalances.’ However, these numbers came to be deployed in different ways and for different purposes by the state. The numbers could at times be weapons to use against political enemies; they could provide a pretext for actions that were long desired; they could be evidence of success to boost popularity; and at other times they could be hidden away or obscured as signs of failure. As such, the counting of people and control over these statistics were very important political issues in Rhodesia. This chapter will track the state’s attempts to rationalise, regulate, manipulate, and control these numbers and the demographic factors driving them, and examine the accompanying change in Rhodesian white settler attitudes to racial populations from abstract anxieties to concrete fears.

The Impact of the 1962 Census

From the founding of the colony in the nineteenth century, whites in Rhodesia knew as a truism that they were grossly outnumbered, but they did not know the exact extent of the population disparity. Nor was this disparity seen as presenting an insurmountable obstacle to the long-term viability of white Rhodesia. White settlers’ knowledge of these numbers and their perceptions of the numbers’ significance would both change after the 1962 census: the first immediately, and the second rapidly thereafter.

The timing of the first comprehensive census in 1962 corresponded with the beginning of the disintegration of the Central African Federation, and was part of a larger wave of population research across much of British Africa.4 Within only eighteen months of the census, Rhodesia’s two former Federation partners would both become fully independent African countries, with Rhodesia’s political fate left uncertain. It was the ambition of the census to gather accurate demographic information on the cusp of the Federation’s dissolution, most vitally on the different territories’ vast African populations, the exact contours of which were a mystery for both the Federal and territorial governments.

The first phase of the census began in September of 1961 and concerned only the white, Asian, and Coloured populations. The scale of this first phase would be dwarfed by the much more massive African phase. As well, the nature of the information sought in the two phases differed, in telling ways. The non-African phase of the census took one week, with 1,200 enumerators dispersing throughout the Federation with forms asking non-Africans their name, address, age, income, size of house, number of cars, and their distance to work.5 Prior to the census, the estimate for the white population of the whole Federation was 312,000, up from 250,000 whites
in the 1956 Federal census.\textsuperscript{6} When the actual census reported, only 303,940 whites were discovered in the Federation, a difference of roughly 8,000.\textsuperscript{7} In the territory of Rhodesia, only 220,610 whites were counted.\textsuperscript{8} The press did not linger long on the discrepancy between the pre-census estimates and the actual numbers, but instead triumphantly reported that there were significant white gains during the five year intercensal period.\textsuperscript{9}

The second phase of the census was the first of its kind conducted in Rhodesia, as it was extended to include all the Africans in the colony, a group whose numbers had previously only been counted using wildly inaccurate sampling methods.\textsuperscript{10} The African population, and especially the rural African population, was the great unknown in Rhodesian politics before 1962: hidden, massive, and remote. Rural Africans were largely beyond the state’s writ, and earlier attempts to regulate the rural population in a more interventionist fashion were all met with intense resistance. It was to penetrate this hidden world and map its demographic contours that the second phase of the census was undertaken.

The African phase of the 1962 census was unimaginatively named ‘Operation Big Count.’ In the territory of Rhodesia, the second phase was to be conducted over 15 days from the end of April to early May, and involve 3,000 enumerators hired by the Central Statistical Office who would be sent out on bicycles and on foot to determine the age, sex, territory of birth, education, physical disabilities, and employment of the African population.\textsuperscript{11} The number of enumerators – 3,000 – was chosen to allow for an approximate ratio of one enumerator per 1,000 Africans, as the pre-census estimate for the African population of the territory was 3,000,000. Half a million handbills and 80,000 booklets in the Shona and Ndebele languages were to be distributed to explain the state’s purpose behind the census. During this phase, the enumerators did not ask the number of cars each African owned or the number of storeys on their houses as they had asked of the non-African population during phase one, a reflection of the glaring economic gap between the groups.

A month before the enumerators were to begin their work, ZAPU’s then Publicity Chief, Robert Mugabe, announced that ZAPU would instruct its followers to ignore the census and not cooperate with the settler government’s enumerators.\textsuperscript{12} From the nationalists’ perspective, the state’s collection of censal knowledge translated into greater power and control, and any state action that sought to bring the African population under greater state regulation was to be opposed. As the nationalists appreciated immediately, the avowedly apolitical census was political indeed, and the counting was thus hindered by this consistent opposition.
The Central Statistical Office’s Director of Statistics, Dr F.T. Russell, seemed genuinely puzzled by ZAPU’s politically motivated opposition to what he and many others considered a purely apolitical, technical and administrative task, especially one that was intended, as he was at pains to point out, to aid in the provision of state services to Africans. Despite official bemusement, the enumerators were met with a great degree of organised opposition as they conducted their work. In the Mufakose Township near Salisbury, enumerators were physically threatened and many resigned, and similar obstructions occurred in sections of the Harare, Mrewa, and Sipolile districts. In addition to verbal threats and intimidation, a number of enumerators were reportedly assaulted. In districts where enumerators had resigned, Dr Russell expressed that the government’s policy was to return to these ‘trouble spots’ with larger teams of enumerators. Awakening to the extent of the resistance, the government instituted a ‘Get Tough’ policy, directed towards the ‘ringleaders’ of the censual opposition, who would be prosecuted under the ‘obstruction’ provisions of the Federal Census and Statistics Act. After a little more than a week into the census, already 13 arrests and convictions were handed out under the Census Act: convictions that could have resulted in a fine of up to £50 or 6 months imprisonment. Notwithstanding the state’s insistence that ‘irresponsible and ignorant elements’ would not delay the census work, by 10 May, a day after the Director had hoped to finish, only a quarter of the colony had been covered. The nationalists’ decision to sabotage the 1962 census did not come from out of the blue but was consistent with ZAPU’s overall policy of ‘non-cooperation and sabotage’ of all state initiatives in rural areas at that time. These sabotage efforts targeted most specifically the intrusions of the Land Husbandry Act, including the enormously unpopular cattle de-stocking policies and the digging of contour ridges. But nationalist efforts moved beyond these specific state interferences into attacking all visible state property and administrative arms in the rural areas, including cattle dips, and any structure containing the taint of colonial interference in ‘traditional’ rural life. In Matabeleland, for instance, state development programmes had a long history of being thwarted by this sort of widespread non-cooperation, and it was in this receptive environment where nationalist efforts to sabotage the census emerged. These censual disruptions were an early expression of ‘cultural nationalism’ on the part of African nationalists, who tapped into and used pre-existing peasant resentment of colonial interference in rural life for political advantage. In this light, the ambitious administrative outreach of the 1962 census was an obvious target for nationalist disruptions, even as these disruptions seemed to take the state by surprise.
Even with these hindrances, within the first two weeks of Operation Big Count the CSO began to realise that African numbers were likely to far exceed their pre-census estimates of 3 million.21 Enumerators attributed this anticipated discrepancy to ‘remoteness’ and higher than expected birth rates.22 In late June 1962, early CSO estimates claimed that the African population was nearer to 3,610,000 Africans, 20 per cent higher than previous estimates,23 and later revisions increased this number again to 3,616,600.24 In analysing these figures, the CSO revised their assumptions made in 1954 that African population growth averaged 3 per cent per annum and retrospectively altered their population estimates to account for an estimated growth rate of 3.5 per cent annually.25 The contemporaneous census of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) likewise discovered there had been a vast undercounting of the African population.26

Higher population numbers and faster than expected growth were instantly interpreted by Rhodesian settlers as a many-headed problem. A Rhodesia Herald editorial concerning the census asserted that the newly discovered African population growth was a testament to the quality of the Federation’s health services, and went on to argue that this unintended by-product of the Federation’s own successes created significant challenges for the white state. These challenges included greater strains on the economy and increasing land pressures. In addition, the editorial worried that African nationalists, in particular ZAPU’s Joshua Nkomo, would find the larger African population and wider racial population ratios a source of political strength, and would intensify their calls to scrap the 1961 constitution for immediate majority rule.27 Not long after the spring census appeared, the first letters demanding that the state address this ‘imbalance’ appeared in the Herald, including calls both for mass white immigration and for state-sponsored family planning in African communities.28 One letter from November 1962 laid out the case for the latter affirmatively: ‘[the Federation’s] population problems are so great, so important, and so immediate, that only state supported programmes, inspired by private initiative, can attack them on the scale required’.29

Exacerbating these post-census fears in Rhodesia, several contemporaneous reports were published in the Western media that began to ignite what would later rage into the global neo-Malthusian population paranoia of the 1970s. One such report, issued by the Population Reference Bureau proclaimed that a new ‘Dark Age’ would soon be upon humanity if world birth rates, in particular Africa’s world-leading birth rates, were not soon reduced.30 These neo-Malthusian ideas found a receptive audience in post-census Rhodesia, as these Western fears of a global crisis were
seemingly being experienced in microcosm within Rhodesia. The title of a *Herald* editorial running in October 1963, fatalistically wondered if their fellow Rhodesians had to ‘Prepare to Meet Our Doom?’ Another *Herald* editorial from September 1964 expressed relief that Rhodesia’s population problems were finally receiving the public attention they deserved. Situating the significance of population pressures, the editorial stated that ‘most public arguments on other topics are like a domestic quarrel in a farmhouse, while outside the fields on which the prosperity of the farmhouse depends are being eroded’.

Population analyses following the 1962 census at first centred on the static size of the African population and its size discrepancy from what was previously estimated, but it was not long before future growth predictions added to these population fears. Predictions as to the speed of the African population doubling would later become almost a bettor’s sport throughout the post-census period, although unlike horses, it was one with supposed apocalyptic consequences. One of the first such predictions to come out was issued by the CSO in June 1964, which estimated that the current African population – then cited as 3.5 million – would double to 7 million by 1982, a mere 18 years from then. In the spring of 1965, the Rhodesian Freedom from Hunger Campaign claimed that the African population would be trebled to over 12 million by the year 2000. Soon after this last prediction, a former MP and Cabinet Minister stated that Africans would number 16 million by 2000, quadrupling instead of trebling. Most public estimates regarding African population growth in the mid-1960s settled on the figure of the African population doubling every 20 years. After the findings of the 1969 census demonstrated that official estimates for African population growth were still far too low, this prediction sport continued: in 1970 the government’s Chief Town Planning Officer predicted 20 million by 2000, and in a full-page article entitled ‘Rhodesia’s Birth Bomb’ in the summer of 1971 the *Herald* predicted 25 million by 2000. With the population fears sparked by these two censuses, white Rhodesians began to feel like Count Mirabeau was speaking to them when he famously warned the white colonists of St Domingue that they ‘slept on the edge of Vesuvius’.

**Counting, Controlling, and Regulating the African Population**

After the 1962 census, the Rhodesian state experienced a ‘mania for measurement’ similar to that which Deborah Posel analysed in apartheid South Africa. Posel describes how in South Africa the apartheid state’s ambitious ‘modernisation’ and centralisation projects required a greater degree of information about South Africa’s racial populations. This evolved into
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a state obsession with counting and classifying the country’s racial populations. Yet these efforts were not merely a means to an end. As she notes: “The state exercised some power in the mere fact of being able to impose and routinise activities of counting.”40 However, the corollary to this was the exposure of the lack of power where information could not be obtained with any accuracy. In Rhodesia, as in South Africa, these efforts to count and classify, and thereby control, the non-white populations exposed the limits of the state’s knowledge and power. In counting and measuring the African population, Rhodesia was, like South Africa, often imagining power where in fact little power existed.

Soon after the census, several measures were proposed by the government to obtain more accurate information about the African population so as to better track their demographics. Additional measures were introduced that aimed to control the movement of Africans. These were intended both to limit African immigration into Rhodesia, and to restrict the influx of Africans into the urban areas. In 1962 a bill was presented that sought to mandate registration for all African births and deaths. This law was intended to bring all Africans into line with what was already required of Rhodesia’s other racial groups. This initiative was contemporaneous with the introduction of a bill that would eliminate African migratory labour in Rhodesia. Another bill was proposed in 1964 that would issue mandatory identity cards to control the African influx into the cities, and still another sought to regulate the cross-border migrations of Africans. As it was, all of these initiatives met with great opposition due to their logistical difficulties, if not their intent, and all were either abandoned or significantly watered down before becoming law.

As the state attempted to rationalise the population problem after the 1962 census, officials began to delineate more precisely which aspects of Rhodesia’s demography were knowable and which unknowable, and to extrapolate from this what were the boundaries of state control. During the debates over the Births and Deaths Registration Bill, the idea of introducing mandatory registration of all African births and deaths, as was for the other races, was put forward but rejected as unfeasible.41 The resultant Act mandated only that Africans in certain urban areas had to register this information, and that in other regions the registration of births and deaths was voluntary. It is significant that only urban Africans were designated as being within the reach of the new birth registration law. Urban Africans were deemed worthy of being counted because they were more a part of the formal and visible economic and political life of Rhodesia; and, crucially, they were easier to count than rural Africans, who were thought to be an
uncountable mass. Despite their inclusion in the watered down birth registration law, urban Africans still widely ignored the registration requirements, rendering useless the information obtained from those few who did report.\textsuperscript{42}

Before 1964 there were no mechanisms in place to monitor Africans crossing in and out of Rhodesia, and legislation was introduced in April 1964 to remedy this.\textsuperscript{43} The Departure from Southern Rhodesia Bill as introduced aimed to regulate the flow of African citizens in and out of Rhodesia, funnelling them through assigned points of entry and exit, and requiring travellers to carry appropriate travel documentation. Failure to comply with these proposed requirements would have constituted a criminal offence. In introducing the bill, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Jack Howman, had falsely assumed that the vast majority of border crossings were already through designated points of entry and exit, a proposition ridiculed by other MPs, in particular the former Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead. Whitehead asserted that every five miles or so there were footpaths connecting Rhodesia and Mozambique, and the same was true across the Limpopo during the dry season, concluding that ‘unless you are going to build a Berlin Wall or something of that kind you will not stop this ancient custom of people crossing’. The number of people using these ancient crossings he estimated to be in excess of one million annually.\textsuperscript{44}

In its amended final form, people crossing the borders were not funnelled through a few staffed points of entry and exit; instead, pre-existing unstaffed border crossing points were retrospectively designated as points of entry and exit, and the permit requirement would remain a law more honoured in the breach than in the observance.\textsuperscript{45} In truth, it must have been recognised that the administrative resources of the state could never handle the actual observance of the law and the state would become overwhelmed if there was widespread compliance. If this law did not regulate border crossings in any meaningful way, from the state’s perspective it at least provided a ready cause for prosecution of guerrillas returning from abroad, who, like everybody else, failed to gain the requisite permit. The Departure Act was amended in 1966 to cover aliens as well as citizens, but yet again a legal framework was established without any corresponding administrative or enforcement mechanisms, and it was essentially state play-acting.\textsuperscript{46} The cross-border migrations of Africans in and out of Rhodesia that were the subject of these laws continued to remain in the realm of the unknowable, despite legislation imagining control.

After UDI, there was a renewed interest and a greater boldness in reconstituting Rhodesia’s population numbers, including the manipulation of African migratory labour patterns. In December 1965 Smith stated that he
intended to replace alien African labour in Rhodesia with indigenous African labour and repatriate alien Africans. This move to reorganise African labour had long been called for by right-wing Rhodesian politicians, first, as a way to slow the African growth rate by limiting what are in the United States pejoratively referred to as ‘anchor babies’, the offspring of alien males and indigenous females, and, second, as a strategy to lower indigenous African unemployment in the urban areas by forcing Africans to take up jobs in the rural areas. Both of these goals would serve to relieve pressure from white society, as high growth rates were a strain on white resources, and urban African unemployment spurred calls to loosen the state’s racial job reservation policies.

Despite the bold plan, Smith’s attempt to force indigenous Africans to take up rural employment to replace those aliens who would leave immediately met with resistance from the business community, and was soon abandoned. This abandonment was a reflection of the lack of interest that rural employment held for Rhodesian Africans, at least at the wages then offered by employers. It was also a realisation that if alien labour left there would be either no replacement at all, or that a comprehensive wage increase would be necessary to attract indigenous labourers. Such wage increases, with the consequent rises in business overhead costs and reductions in profits, would have been unacceptable to Rhodesia’s white business community. The compromise labour policy that was finally introduced in 1966 created Closed Labour Areas in urban regions, areas where previously employed alien labour would be allowed to stay but where new alien labour could not be introduced and would instead be channelled into the rural areas. As to the application of the Closed Labour Areas applying solely to urban areas, and even there with exemptions, the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, Ian McLean, stated with resignation: ‘I would willingly re-apply the Order to the rural areas if I could be satisfied that Rhodesian Africans would genuinely seek and stay in employment in the rural areas, but regrettably at this point of time they are not prepared to do so to the extent required by the agricultural and mining industries …’

Influx control legislation that sought to limit the movement of Rhodesian Africans into urban areas was another priority of the Rhodesian Front. Yet, despite its popularity among the RF’s rank-and-file, influx control legislation could never overcome the daunting logistical barriers to its effective implementation. In the mid-1960s a debate in Parliament raged over a bill mandating the issuance of identity cards as a way to track African movements, but the bill was ultimately abandoned as impractical. The identification and regulation of aliens within Rhodesia was attempted through
The Aliens Act of 1966. This Act amended an earlier 1954 law regulating aliens by creating new bureaucratic procedures to identify and locate aliens within Rhodesia. But, as with other attempts to regulate internal African migrations, the actual administrative means to do so effectively was beyond the practical reach of the state.49

The issue of urban influx was reopened in the autumn of 1968 with a report given by the Director of the Salisbury Municipality’s African Administration, R.C. Briggs. In his fiery and paranoid report, Briggs warned if the urban influx of Africans continued unabated, Salisbury would soon be witness to more overcrowding, worsening unemployment, a breakdown in African family life, more drinking, a spike in violent crime, civil strife, and an alarming rise in sexual crimes.50 Briggs called for more accessible birth control to be provided for poor Africans in the cities as a method to reduce unemployment, in addition to a policy proposal euphemistically calling for indigenous Africans to be ‘drafted’ to work in rural work camps away from urban areas.51 The national government responded favourably to Briggs’ concerns, if not his recommendations, and legislation was again formulated to regulate the drift of Africans into urban areas.52 In 1968, a government committee was created to re-investigate the problem of urban influx, but by 1970 it had rendered no policy recommendations.53 As part of Smith’s end-of-the-year message in 1968, he admonished employed Africans in the city to ‘work hard and not risk losing [your urban jobs] through laziness or indifference … to those who have no employment I would say leave the towns and go into the country where there is ample work available.’54 But the pull of the cities that had rendered ineffective all earlier attempts to replace alien African labour in the rural areas with indigenous labour did not suddenly fall away, despite Smith’s schoolmarm advice.

As the urban African population continued to grow, Rhodesian Front politicians began plans to develop the Tribal Trust Lands to allow for a greater ability to absorb and attract indigenous African numbers and relieve the influx into the white cities.55 The RF Congress of October 1971 approved resolutions to reverse the influx of Africans into urban areas and to create African townships in the Tribal Trust Lands intended to serve as a contrary urban pull for Africans.56 These policies and other decentralisation efforts would come to be called separate development or ‘provincialism’, and were essentially moves toward apartheid-style racial homelands. While always a popular idea among the Rhodesian right, provincialism in its full form was never adopted because of the practical obstacles to its implementation.57 The idea’s popularity reflected the appeal for whites of disclaiming
responsibility for growing African numbers, and a desire among white politicians that Africans should be forced to shoulder the costs of their own rapid growth, instead of burdening the largely urban white population. Even with its appeal, provincialism would remain an unfulfilled fantasy of the Rhodesian right-wing. No parallel urban areas ever emerged in the TTLs and the urban influx continued.

As perceived by the RF’s rank-and-file, the influx problem did not go away, and they continued to demand action. In May 1973 another bill mandating African identification cards was introduced. These cards would distinguish aliens from indigenous Africans and the bill was presented as an effort to more effectively enforce the Closed Labour Areas Act, but this half measure was hardly enough to satisfy hardliners convinced of the horrors of urban influx and the effects of a large alien population. To address these continued complaints, an amendment to the Foreign Migratory Labour Act was passed in 1976 making the punishments for violations of the Closed Labour Areas harsher. A more ambitious population identification plan was introduced in 1976 that sought to create identification cards for all Rhodesians over a period of five years. These cards, which citizens would be required to carry at all times, would be backed up by a centralised and computerised documentation system, with instant data recapture, which would include fingerprints and photographs. Since the regime collapsed within three years of its passage, the five-year implementation of this Act was never completed. Despite the deafening clamour from the right-wing, all such proposals to track internal African migrations were ultimately defeated because they would have presented overwhelming logistical problems for the state and would have been prohibitively expensive to implement. These failures of the state to effectively track the African population and regulate their movements inside and outside Rhodesia all exposed limitations as to the state’s knowledge of and control over this population, indigenous or alien, rural or urban.

**Proposed Solutions to the Population Problem**

The population ‘imbalance’ discovered in the 1962 census quickly began to manifest itself in ways that harmed the settler state beyond any mere psychological damage done to white settlers. Most immediately, it affected the state’s racialised education and employment structures, though it would later threaten the entire political structure. African school-leavers were entering the labour market at unprecedented rates and were finding that there were no slots in the economy to fit into. With white paramountcy in the economy sacrosanct, educated Africans merely added to the unemployed
population, or emigrated. This led several Rhodesian Front backbenchers to call for a lower percentage of secondary degrees to be awarded so as to limit educated Africans’ urban unemployment. A report was presented to the Cabinet during the autumn of 1968 by the Minister of Social Welfare and Labour arguing that to fully address the problem of Africans falling into urban unemployment ‘the important thing should be to divert the aspirations of [African] school children from white collar jobs … [though teachers] found it difficult to put this across when dealing with future employment prospects’.61 More numbers also meant more schools and teachers and greater expenses, which exacerbated state spending pressures. In 1967 one RF backbencher even argued that if education was to continue to be provided for all at current costs, then African parents should have to agree to use birth control as a quid pro quo.62 In 1965 Smith’s government decided to peg education spending at 2 per cent of the GNP, regardless of African population numbers. While this policy had no anti-natalist effect on the growing African population, a Select Committee on Education Report from 1969 found instead that it had created a growing funding gap in African education that was leading to a deterioration of African education standards and a rise in illiteracy.63

The widening racial ratios of the mid-1960s strained the state’s racial economic divisions at the seams. A government Select Committee on Education from May 1967 concluded that, barring massive white immigration, many job categories formerly the preserve of whites would have to become integrated, as Africans pushed against the racial job reservations and the dearth of qualified whites deepened.64 Contemporary economists and politicians feared this growing unemployment and all the related problems of a massive, disaffected, unemployed urban African population. The state’s conundrum was that further integration, the resultant filling of employment openings with Africans, and the generalised weakening of white preserve that would inevitably follow, would lower the attractiveness of Rhodesia to those white immigrants deemed necessary to save white Rhodesia. It also threatened to cause current white residents to flee. In response to these pressures the RF government after UDI actually strengthened the de facto job reservation through the fixing of wages for certain jobs, effectively sealing off white jobs even if there were no whites to fill them.65 The creation of false demand for skilled white labour was explicitly both a protection to current white residents and an economic incentive for potential immigrants, and any negative effects that accrued to the African population were viewed to be largely a result of their own irresponsible fertility rates and unwillingness to take up rural employment.66
After the census reported, white public discourses concerning African population growth all assumed that the growth of the African population portended economic disaster unless a rebalancing of the racial populations could be achieved. This idea of rebalancing the population ratios reflected the belief that the white and African populations should be linked to one another in terms of an ideal ratio corresponding to the labour needs of white employers and unemployment rates of Africans, and to ensure that a large enough tax base (of whites) could meet the increasing demand for state services (for Africans). A *Herald* editorial from February 1964, following a year of enormous net migration losses of whites, explicitly connected racial population trends with the labour market, and again took for granted the white/employer African/labourer dichotomy. The editorial juxtaposed the high African birth rates with the slumping white birth rates and queried how this racial-come-economic imbalance could ever be remedied, asking rhetorically: ‘Is any problem more pressing today than that of population trends?’\textsuperscript{67} Though the slumping white birth rates were at various times bemoaned by public figures, it was widely recognised that it would be through white immigration and African family planning, not white pro-natalism or African out-migration, that the state could best hope to favourably rebalance the racial populations.\textsuperscript{68}

Within months of the census in 1962 federal economic planners began to call for an increase in white immigration to Rhodesia in an effort to employ these ‘surplus’ Africans who had been discovered in the census. In a published report by the Ministry of Home Affairs, it was asserted that Rhodesia’s immigration policy should aim for 12,000 white immigrants for the 1962/63 year, and increase by 1,000 every year thereafter, so that by 1969/70 there would be an annual white influx of 20,000.\textsuperscript{69} It was argued that only immigration at or around this level could ensure that ideal racial/economic ratios could be achieved in the light of the recent census numbers.

A specific target ratio for Africans per European was proposed by Professor Jan Sadie, from Stellenbosch University, when he conducted a wide-ranging government-sponsored survey of Rhodesia’s economy in 1967.\textsuperscript{70} In his report, he stated that on average every European employed 7.4 Africans.\textsuperscript{71} Stemming from this ratio, Sadie concluded, and subsequent governments concurred, that white population growth must provide at least so many whites as to create employment for Africans as they entered the job market. Sadie concluded that this pegging of white immigration to African natural increase meant that Rhodesia should aim for at least 12,000 immigrants a year.\textsuperscript{72} It is also significant that the Sadie Report attached equal importance
to African family planning as another means to redress the racial imbalance. Sadie’s findings and the demographic solutions sections of his report were affirmed by the government and set out a blueprint for the state’s population policies to follow.

**The Casus Belli for the War of Numbers: the 1969 Census**

Already a year prior to the findings of the 1969 census, and before the resumption of the publication of the monthly digests, there had been another wave of population panic, in the summer of 1968. The panic was precipitated by the budget for the fiscal year prepared by the Minister of the Treasury, John Wrathall, and the concurrent debate regarding the Sadie Report on the linkages between racial ratios and economic growth. Wrathall’s lengthy budget statement encapsulated much of the thinking of the RF government concerning the racial population contest: the explicit linkage between economic growth and African population growth, the need for greater white immigration to soak up African unemployment, the frustration over the continued need for alien African labour when Rhodesian Africans were unemployed in the cities, and finally the need for intensive family planning to stem African growth. The reasons behind the government’s focus on African population growth were reiterated by the Secretary of Health, Dr Mark Webster, who declared African growth rates ‘frightening’ and the promotion of family planning a health priority. Later in the year the Minister of Health, Ian McLean, as reported in the *Herald*, proposed ‘strong, even harsh, economic and other disincentives to unrealistic and irresponsible population growth, as well as postulating attractive and similar incentives for the opposite view’. Notwithstanding his cabinet whipping up public anxieties over African population growth to a fever pitch, Ian Smith, in a television interview in September 1968, presented a calmer and more measured face to the issue. In the interview, he claimed he did not think the African birth rate would unduly worry him for about 6 to 10 years. It is unclear to what extent his statement was an effort to present a tough pose on the eve of the HMS *Fearless* settlement talks the following month, or whether he was genuinely less concerned about these population pressures than his cabinet officials. It might also have been the case that it was his government’s intention to begin seasoning public opinion for the racial population control measures that many in the settler regime were already envisioning, even before the findings of the 1969 census.

The next full population census after 1962 was again scheduled for two phases, and was to begin in the spring of 1969. The first phase was scheduled in the spring to cover the white, Asian, and Coloured populations, and
the second phase set for the summer would include an enumeration of all Africans in the territory.  

On 23 May 1969 the front page of the *Herald* published the results of the first phase of the census, counting whites, Asians, and Coloureds. The census reported that whites numbered 228,040, 15,000 fewer than previously estimated. Days earlier, after the census reported its findings but before it went public, the Rhodesian cabinet debated how best to approach this ‘matter of political consequence’, the publication of which ‘might have serious effects on public morale’. The cabinet concluded that the difference between their estimates and the census figures could be attributed to an undercounting of white emigration around the time of UDI, and that a public statement, ‘should highlight the fact that since then there had been a satisfactory and substantial increase indicating that the country had recovered well’. The statement eventually released by the government attributed this under-estimation of the white population to many Rhodesians being away on holiday, the fact that the Federation never recorded inter-territorial migrations, and unrecorded losses up to the middle of 1964. None of these reasons, even combined with others, was wholly satisfying, and they were much more a product of political finger-pointing than real statistical conjecture. Most specifically, periodising the majority of the losses as occurring before the middle of 1964 obviously absolved Smith, who came to power in April 1964, from any blame for these out-migrations. In spite of Smith’s attempts at obfuscation, after the full reporting of the census political opponents attacked the RF government for allowing the population ratios to drift from 17.5 to 1 in 1962 to 22 to 1 in 1969. That the parsing of demographic statistics created so much political heat indicates the degree to which population numbers, and even the esoterica of demography, could carry deep political significance in post-UDI Rhodesia.

As noted above, the political impact of the 1969 census numbers harmed the Smith government in some respects, but those same numbers were also used by the Smith government to further longstanding political objectives. A new republican constitution, which would purportedly sever ties with the Crown and which limited African political representation to a distant parity, was long a political priority of many in the RF. The White Paper proposals for a new constitution were published on 22 May 1969, conveniently a day before publication of the findings of the non-African phase one of the census, yet only two days after the cabinet had discussed the census’ findings. Smith’s government thus seemed to understand immediately that the population fears produced by this census report could be channelled towards its own political ends.
The RF’s campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote in favour of the new constitution began in early June. The franchise requirements under the 1961/65 constitutions were a combination of educational attainment and income levels which while facially non-racial certainly created a disparate impact on racial voting power. In the ‘Yes’ campaign, the RF relied heavily on African population trends in an attempt to prove that if the current constitution remained in force Africans would soon dominate the voting rolls. The RF’s referendum campaign disingenuously cited as evidence for their predictions the rise in the number of Africans coming through the education system, a function obviously of the general population increase. On the basis of education evidence alone, the Minister of Education, A.P. Smith, cited a potential African voting strength of 80,000 by 1975, a spectre intended to mobilise support for the capping of African political power in the proposed constitution. A week later, Ian Smith predicted that 550,000 Africans could qualify by 1977, and the Minister of Information, Immigration, and Tourism, P.K. Van der Byl, estimated 586,073 by 1976. However, as a Herald editorial explained, the RF’s campaign of using attained education levels alone to predict voting eligibility, and not calculating that few Africans would also meet the requisite income requirements, especially considering the racial job reservation barriers limiting African advancement, was dishonest and even ridiculous. This RF population rhetoric was augmented by print advertisements; one, for example, stated: ‘Irresponsible government leads to chaos and anarchy. Need we remind you of events in the Congo, Nigeria, Ghana, Zanzibar – of the proposed land grab in Zambia? If you are thinking of a future – think of the need for responsible government.’

Adding more details to this ‘Parade of Horribles’, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Jack Howman, described on television the raping of white women, including nuns, in the Congo, and suggested that a ‘No’ vote on the constitution would allow for Rhodesia to lapse into that sort of chaos.

Phase two of the 1969 census did not experience the same violence as did phase two of the 1962 census, a result of Smith’s policy of cracking down on all nationalist activity, and the use of the state’s extensive emergency powers. It was scheduled to take three weeks and, using the same expected ratio of 1,000 Africans per enumerator as did the 1962 census, 4,500 enumerators fanned out into the countryside, as the official estimate for the African population prior to the census count was 4.5 million. On 19 June 1969, the day before the constitutional referendum, the preliminary reports of phase two were published by the RF government, in which the Director of the Census and Statistics reported that Rhodesian Africans numbered 4,818,000, over 300,000 more than was previously estimated.
The Rhodesian Front’s propaganda campaign behind the ‘Yes’ vote, which relied heavily upon images of the chaos of independent Africa, was given a tremendous boost by the timed release of the phase two findings of the census detailing the African population.

In total, the 1969 census revealed a total net increase of only 7,000 whites since the last census in 1962, compared against a net increase of 980,000 Africans. Whites’ fears of African numbers swamping Rhodesia into Congo-style chaos were certainly heightened by the early release of the African census numbers. Whether the publication of the preliminary census report was intentionally timed to bolster the referendum campaign remains a matter for speculation, but the fact that the White Paper proposals were published a day before phase one reported and that the referendum was held the very next day after phase two reported certainly points towards the timing of these releases not being simply coincidental. As it was, the new constitution was passed by referendum by an overwhelming margin of the electorate, probably due in large part to the RF’s orchestrated fanning of white anxieties regarding the expanding racial population differentials.

The 1969 census statistics had immediate political consequences beyond the constitutional referendum campaign. After phase one of the census had been published, but before phase two was made public, a committee was secretly set up to investigate a broad policy of African population control, and to make recommendations on how best to slow African growth. The formation of this secret committee immediately after the preliminary phase two census figures became known to those in government almost certainly points to it being motivated by the results of the African population census. Four months after phase two reported, the Rhodesian Front Congress of October 1969 unanimously passed a resolution that white immigration should be as ‘unselective as possible’ and that more jobs should be reserved for whites in Rhodesia, obvious efforts to increase white numbers solely for political purposes. As will be discussed below, mass immigration was a policy long in the making, but the adverse population numbers reported from the 1969 census provided the right impetus for its serious re-introduction.

**Control over the Numbers**

As population numbers were matters of such political importance, the settler state was always very careful in controlling and distributing demographic information. There was a cessation of the publication of all state-issued statistical information in the mid-1960s that was consistent with the general censorship policy immediately following UDI. Choosing to include
statistical information that related solely to population demographics in the censorship blackout might at first glance seem odd when the purported purpose of the post-UDI censorship was to protect Rhodesia’s sanctions-busting and to guard against Rhodesia’s enemies gathering vital economic measurements. However, the ban served further hidden purposes, which were to quell any public panic regarding the possibility of a white exodus from Rhodesia after UDI, and to deny international opponents of the regime from receiving any potential propaganda material. A follow-up to the 1962 census was initially scheduled for October 1966, but in keeping with the information blackout, it was cancelled with no official explanation given.92 The government’s statistical information blackout finally ended in April 1967, with the quarterly publication of new state-issued population statistics, probably made possible by the surprisingly positive white migration numbers since UDI, which the RF government would certainly have wanted to make known.93 It was not until August 1969, though, that the monthly digest of statistics was again published in its full form.

The 1969 census was the last of its kind for Rhodesia, though the less accurate monthly statistics continued through the 1970s. The abstract population anxieties that had long festered beneath the surface broke out into the public sphere as very specific fears in the 1970s. It is likely that the next census would have been scheduled for some time in the mid-1970s, but there were by then more pressing uses for state funds and energies, and there was an obvious security situation which would have seriously affected the enumerators’ safety. It is also quite clear that after the war escalated and white numbers began to decline the Smith regime had little interest in creating a body of statistical information that would dishearten political supporters and give faith to its enemies, and, as with the proposed 1966 census, the probable adverse findings of any mid-1970s census convinced the government to quash the idea. In 1978, with the drain of whites leaving Rhodesia becoming a near flood, Smith’s government debated banning again the publication of migration figures, as during the period after UDI, but decided that another ban would in fact exacerbate whites’ population anxieties, not soothe them.94 Accordingly, the adverse reports continued to appear prominently in the national newspapers, and were probably also prominent in settlers’ minds.

**Conclusion**

The policy proposals and administrative actions described in this chapter were all presented by the settler state as being apolitical, yet they were all intensely political. How this information was collected and presented to
the public, in particular the censual information, was a matter of political strategy, not mechanical bureaucratic calculations. From these new sets of information, white Rhodesians began to view population numbers very differently than they had done prior to the publication of the two censuses, a conceptual change that would come to have a dramatic impact on the fate of the regime.

Despite the state’s interest in rationalising Rhodesia’s racial demographics, the hidden African population remained a frightening mystery that was beyond its regulatory grasp. State efforts to regulate the massive African population through the registration of births and deaths, funnelling them through assigned points of entry and exit, identifying them as indigenous or alien, reversing migration flows, and keeping them out of urban areas largely met with failure. These political failures were born from the state’s administrative limitations and forced a dichotomous split of the African population between those populations which were known, regulated, and visible and unknown, unregulated, and invisible. This conceptual split was in some ways analogous to what Frederick Cooper describes as the difference between the legal city and the real city, ‘a distinction between the regulated, controlled space of planners’ imagination’ versus the more chaotic ‘lived realities’ of most Africans. Politically, and not merely conceptually, dividing the African population in this way could have relieved some pressure on the state, and this desire was expressed by the right-wing of the RF through their fantasy of separate development. As the guerrilla war escalated the state again tried to assert administrative control of rural Africans, but these efforts also met with failure, as by then the state’s regulatory power was that much more constricted. Regulating the African population in a way that had never occurred in the past exposed the superficiality of the settler state’s control outside urban areas.

The population numbers discovered in the 1962 and 1969 censuses and published in the various intercensal statistical reports were used in many different ways depending on political strategy and expediency. Adverse numbers were at times hidden or obscured from public view by the state, as during the post-UDI statistical blackout and the tortured explanations for the discrepancy between white population estimates before the 1969 phase one census and the actual findings of the census. By the same logic, the 1966 and mid-1970s censuses were both cancelled, probably due to their potentially damaging findings. Numbers could also be used as additional evidence to push through pre-existing plans and provide rhetorical fuel, as with the timed releases of both phases of the 1969 census which bolstered the government’s plan to push through a new constitution limiting African
political power. As will be discussed below, African population estimates and future predictions were employed during the 1970s to draw support for the government’s expanding family planning initiatives and mass immigration policy. Population numbers that were deemed to be positive, such as the white migration gains after UDI, were widely trumpeted by the government as evidence of their successes. The reintroduction of the published CSO reports in 1967 came out of this instinct, as the state then saw the positive numbers following UDI as a justification, a defence, and a reassurance of the Rhodesian Front’s leadership. In the mid-1970s Smith claimed that the post-UDI net migration gains were his greatest accomplishment, as they ‘saved’ Rhodesia.96 From the mid-1970s onwards, as more negative trends emerged, the significance of these same figures was publicly downplayed by the state for obvious reasons.

All sides of the political contest, including those with an interest in Rhodesian politics internationally, understood the significance of population numbers and the relationship between racial population trends and the fate of the regime. This created a unique situation in which reading Rhodesian demographics became a highly statistical form of soothsaying, as broader political and economic trends were analysed and interpreted from the statistics of racial migration, fertility, and mortality rates, thereby reducing complex political and social phenomena to simple arithmetic.
Rhodesia’s African population grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, but this population growth was not anomalous in either the regional or global context. The African population ‘explosion’ in Rhodesia roughly paralleled other population growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa, and to a broader degree, population growth rates throughout the developing world. These broader developing world growth rates would later initiate a global population panic in the 1970s. When Rhodesia’s local population trends were discovered in the early 1960s, they likewise caused a panic and added a desperate urgency to the state’s population policies. From the state’s perspective, the problems that emanated from African population growth were not merely paranoiac or irrational, or a localised expression of a growing global hysteria. This growth brought intense, and ultimately fatal, pressures on the settler state, which included a drain on the treasury due to increased social spending on education and housing, a growing urban influx that strained the infrastructure and threatened white preserve, swelling urban unemployment numbers, rural food shortages, and more overcrowding and environmental degradation in the African Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). As a result, several public figures and politicians located African population growth as the biggest problem facing the regime, even compared against the escalation of the military war. This chapter will contextualise white Rhodesian ideas regarding African population growth, examine the demographic theories behind this African population explosion, look at the pressures that this growth applied to the settler state, and describe state efforts to slow down this rapid growth.
In discussing African population growth, this chapter will explore a long-standing tension between two broad philosophies that was never resolved in the Rhodesian politics of population control, concerning the proper relationship between the white state and the African population. A tension existed between a desire to draw Africans closer to white society, so as to better understand, regulate, and control them; and a competing impulse to push Africans away from white society, to protect white preserve, hoist off the perceived burdens of rule, and disclaim white responsibility for their fate. Both of these philosophies had old histories in European colonial thought, and had in various forms and instances been described as the doctrinal conflicts between reform, modernisation, assimilation, and inclusion versus relativism, preservation, segregation, and exclusion. These were competing visions over white responsibilities, duties, and goals in governing subject populations.

Although these two broad philosophies were logically in conflict with one another, to white politicians and the white electorate in Rhodesia both were attractive in some respects, and unattractive in others. Pulling Africans closer to white society, through a loosening of residential segregation, softening of economic restrictions on African advancement, and an opening up of political and social spaces within white society, would allow for greater regulation and the easier acquisition of demographic information. More importantly, it was known that pulling Africans closer to white society, and thereby fulfilling the socioeconomic preconditions to fertility transitions, was empirically proven to lower African birth rates. Yet this also inevitably meant a weakening of white preserve, a result that would probably have negative effects on the state’s simultaneous efforts to attract white immigrants to Rhodesia and limit the flow of white emigrants from Rhodesia. Pulling Africans closer was also an acceptance on the part of white society of the burdens associated with African population growth. Pushing Africans away, through the continuation of rigid job reservation policies, enforced residential segregation, policies to stem the urban influx, and the promulgation of separate development policies, was an appealing option for many, in particular the right wing of the RF, precisely because it did protect white preserve. But in protecting white preserve as sacrosanct and conceding responsibility over the African population, the state acknowledged that it had little power or control outside traditionally white areas, either spatially, economically, or conceptually. This pushing away was also known to correlate with higher birth rates, even as this strategy sought to cut white society off from the burdens emanating from this growth.
In practice, this resulted in the logical incoherence of trying to do both simultaneously. The RF governments oscillated between these two extremes of inclusion and exclusion, at times pulling Africans closer, and at others pushing them away, never fully reconciling the logical inconsistency between these contrary approaches. This tension played itself out clearly in the debates over the state’s population control policies explored in this chapter.

**Wealthy Populations, Poor Populations, and Neo-Malthusianism**

Rhodesia’s two major racial populations experienced drastically different fertility rates in the 1960s and 1970s. The birth rates for the white population began to drop rapidly from the early 1960s. As will be described in Chapter 6, this drop was much steeper than other comparable populations around the globe, yet white Rhodesia’s drop in fertility roughly followed the general fertility trends of other affluent societies in its downward slope. In contrast, the African Rhodesian birth rate remained very high, despite a drop in mortality rates. This resulted in a very high rate of growth for the African population; a growth rate that roughly corresponded with other sub-Saharan African populations, though at a rate even higher than most comparable populations. These two populations in Rhodesia both followed the two contrary global trends of affluent/poor, First World/Third World fertility rates, yet importantly, both of these contrary global trends existed in microcosm within the same territory, and both occurred as exaggerated exemplars of these global trends. In Rhodesia this divergence would have dramatic economic, social, and political consequences.

The two contrary population trends in Rhodesia were explained by contemporary commentators, both academic and lay, by the different stages that the white and African populations were in under the demographic transition theory (DTT). This linear transition terminology originates from the birth of demography as a science. Early demographic scientists, in particular Warren Thompson and later Frank Notestein, analysed European population numbers during the past several hundred years, in an attempt to explain both the sharp population rise during the industrial revolution, and the levelling off of growth rates thereafter. The demographic transition theory that emerged from these and other studies divided fertility patterns into distinct historical stages that corresponded with levels of economic and sociological development. The classic version of the theory posits that in pre-industrial societies high birth rates match high death rates so that population levels remain steady. Following this first stage, improvements in health and wellbeing as a result of agricultural, industrial, and medical
advances, lead to a drop in death rates, with birth rates remaining high. This stage of high birth rates and low death rates creates a spike in population, as experienced in many European countries during the industrial revolution. Following this is the demographic transition stage, which describes a drop in birth rates, as various factors such as consumption patterns, access to contraception, and family wealth flows change, resulting in slower growth. In the last stage of the classic theory, birth rates stabilise and correspond with low death rates such that the overall population again reaches equilibrium. Within Rhodesia, it was widely asserted that the white population had already experienced the demographic transition of stage three and had reached the equilibrium of stage four. The African population was considered to be in stage two, the growth stage, and had yet to experience the fertility transition.

Globally, the demographic transition theory leapt from academia to governments, NGOs, and eventually the wider lay public with remarkable speed. The reason behind this leap from demographic esoterica to public knowledge lay with growing fears in the West following World War II of the effects of rapid population growth in the developing world, both because of its short-term potential for political instability and revolution, and its long-term potential to overrun world resources. Policymakers in the West began to view themselves as Hostess Quickly to the developing world’s Falstaff, who threatened to eat them out of house and home. These population fears found their theoretical footing in the rise of neo-Malthusianism, which laid out the alleged incompatibility between population growth rates and the resources needed to sustain human life. As Betsey Hartmann argues though, it was not a generalised fear of all babies that fuelled the West’s neo-Malthusianism, but instead the specific fears of the wealthy countries regarding the political and economic effects of the growing poor masses that led policymakers to make the reduction of population growth rates a foreign policy priority.

World birth rates soon came to be seen in the United States as a national security issue. For example, then Republican congressmen and future US President, George H.W. Bush, wrote in 1973: ‘Success in the population field, under United Nations leadership, may, in turn, determine whether we can resolve successfully the other great questions of peace, prosperity, and individual rights that face the world.’ These realpolitik views about population growth dovetailed with feminist motivations to empower women through the control of their own reproduction. Yet as Michelle Goldberg frankly states, ‘America’s international commitment to birth control was intended to fight communism, not to liberate women.’ Nonetheless,
The African Population Explosion

despite the often antagonistic politics among different supporters of family planning promotion and their diverse motivations for supporting its spread, in the short term this alliance created an almost irresistible momentum for worldwide population control policies.

Demographic transition theory was the explanatory model for how Europe came to reduce its fertility rates; however, this European pattern inevitably became universalised as an ideal, and developing world peoples were widely seen to be floundering in the pre-transitional phase. This was what neo-Malthusians believed would continue until either a demographic transition occurred or, barring that, a global catastrophe. The DTT predictably took on normative and prescriptive elements, as a model to be followed, as opposed to merely a model to explain past behaviour. And it was the nexus between the DTT and neo-Malthusianism that explains the interest of the United Nations, NGOs, and the United States government in promoting birth control as a catalyst to push the developing world into the final demographic transition stage before it was too late.

To combat world population growth, the United States prompted the creation of the United Nation Population Fund (UNFPA) in 1969 as a central resource for family planning programs around the world. At its founding, the USA agreed to give $7.5 million, in 1970 24 countries combined to pledge over $15 million, and in 1971 46 countries pledged a total of nearly $30 million.10 Domestically, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the USA poured large amounts of money into promoting family planning in the developing world. The speed with which this ‘crisis’ was diagnosed, and Western governments’ willingness to throw large sums of money towards solving it, was almost unprecedented. As the neo-Malthusian momentum continued, 1974 was declared World Population Year, and a World Population Conference was hosted that same year by the United Nations in Bucharest. That population growth was a problem that needed to be solved with family planning was seemingly accepted by all in the West by the early 1970s, except for the Catholic Church and Marxists – bedfellows no less odd than the supporters of these programs.

Widespread popular fears in the West over population growth gathered steam in the early 1970s. A major reason for the timing of these public fears was the publication of the bestselling book by Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb.11 The Population Bomb was based on the neo-Malthusian premise of population growth outstripping resources, and it quickly entered into the public consciousness and became a well-known frame of reference for lay people, even if the science behind it was at the time challenged by many
The Collapse of Rhodesia

scholars. Shortly thereafter, the Club of Rome promulgated the influential book by Donella Meadows, Jurgen Randers, and Dennis Meadows, *The Limits to Growth*, which offered a computerised model backing the neo-Malthusian thesis. Contributing to these spreading population fears were frequent statistics published in the popular press by various environmental and population control groups throughout the 1970s describing frightening, biblical catastrophes if world population growth rates continued at their current pace, the next report always more shocking than the one that preceded it. So dominant were these ideas in the public mind that the truth or falsity of the neo-Malthusian premise of arithmetic growth of resources and geometric growth of population was not seriously questioned by most lay people, even as this theory was contested in scientific circles.

The population pressures of the 1970s had an even more biting urgency for whites in Rhodesia. While these neo-Malthusian horrors may have seemed distant and abstract to most people in the West, combining easily with the West’s simultaneous fascination with disaster movies in the 1970s, to white Rhodesians population growth was a disaster movie that appeared to be occurring, quite literally, within their own backyards. Table 3.1 shows the pace of Rhodesia’s African population growth and the widening racial population ratios.

**Historicising White Population Anxieties in Rhodesia**

Political interference in indigenous population and fertility matters has an old history in Rhodesia, as well in all of Africa, and indeed in the entire colonial experience. The Rhodesian colonial regime had long had concerns about the growth and configuration of the African population, yet during the colony’s early days the primary concern was that the African population was not growing fast enough to meet the colony’s labour needs. As Diana Jeater has found, Rhodesians also had an interest in African sexual practices that they considered deviant, immoral, and/or irresponsible, though they vacillated over who or what were the causes of these deviances. Thus, while these anxieties over African sexual matters were old, they did not always correspond with the perception of African ‘over’-population. As the British Central African Federation experiment came to a close in the early 1960s, white settlers in Rhodesia began a process of taking stock of the racial populations in their territory, and, as outlined in Chapter 2, the resulting 1962 census concretised earlier colonial anxieties regarding African sexual practices and fertility. This revealed growth of the African population was immediately recognised to pose a threat to the future stability of the settler state, and therefore these old fears had found a new focus.
Table 3.1  African population growth and racial ratios in Rhodesia, 1960–79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>African population (to nearest 100k)</th>
<th>Population ratio (White:African)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
<td>1:16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3,700,000</td>
<td>1:16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3,800,000</td>
<td>1:17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3,900,000</td>
<td>1:18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4,100,000</td>
<td>1:19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4,200,000</td>
<td>1:20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4,400,000</td>
<td>1:20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
<td>1:21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>1:21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4,800,000</td>
<td>1:21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>1:21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5,200,000</td>
<td>1:20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5,400,000</td>
<td>1:20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>1:20.7</td>
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<td>1:25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6,800,000</td>
<td>1:28.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1  Statistics derived from the CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics and Rhodesian Secretary of Health Reports.

Prior to the collapse of the Federation, the relative sizes of the white and African populations were of administrative interest, but did not appear to present a threat to the stability of white power in Rhodesia. As discussed in Chapter 2, accurate estimates of the size of the African population were unknown before the 1962 census. Even after the 1962 census, there was insufficient political will behind any comprehensive efforts to reduce the size of the African population before the rise of Ian Smith in 1964, and even thereafter such efforts were uneven and inconsistent before 1968.\(^\text{19}\) This was despite rumours to the contrary that buzzed around the African population in colonial Rhodesia from at least the 1940s that white society long connived to sterilise the African population to reduce their numbers.\(^\text{20}\)
These rumours of surreptitious sterilisations, despite being untrue, resonated among the African population of Rhodesia until independence, and these rumours were tapped into and used as vehicles for the nationalists’ pronatalist agenda. In the late 1960s, however, several factors coalesced to make family planning an increasing priority for the Rhodesian Front government. These factors included a new jolt of demographic information concerning African growth rates in 1969; continued high rates of white emigration that reinforced whites’ political insecurity; a new interest in the political and economic effects of a growing dependent population; the growing neo-Malthusian hysteria in the wider Western world; and a greater political boldness of the Rhodesian right wing after UDI.

The newly discovered ‘overpopulation’ problem was a distributive and allocative problem more than an absolute scarcity problem. These problems associated with rapid population growth were all exacerbated by the unwillingness of the white regime to more equitably distribute the benefits and burdens of power. While some of these problems had long plagued the state, the assignment of their causation rapidly shifted to the newly discovered rate of African population growth. While certainly administrative, economic, and political, as will be discussed in later chapters, these strains also had a moral component, as this population growth challenged the long-standing, albeit ambivalently and inconsistently applied, colonial efforts to fulfil their ‘burden’ of modernising the African population. African population growth was regarded as ‘overpopulation’ only because it outstripped the resources the white regime was willing to devote to that population. In matters of education spending, health spending, housing, and employment opportunities, this African growth overcrowded the limited space the white regime had allocated. Thus African population growth exerted weight on the spatial and theoretical divisions of the territory, as the regime sought desperately, but unsuccessfully, to keep Africans in their proper place conceptually and physically.

Rather than re-draw the conceptual and physical spaces allocated to the races in light of this growth, the state tried to keep Africans stuffed in the state’s pre-existing racial structure. Specifically, this meant limiting African economic and political advancement, and keeping Africans from drifting into the urban areas. Although the state attempted to constrict urban opportunities, Africans continued to come to the cities. Salisbury’s African population had increased an enormous 5 per cent from 1967 to 1968, and in total numbered 236,000, roughly 10,000 more than the entire white population of Rhodesia at that time. African males in wage labour employment declined as a percentage of the total African male population from...
78 per cent in 1956 to 58 per cent in 1968, even though in absolute numbers it increased over this same period, which created the large unemployed urban population so dreaded by the white state. Likewise, in the fields of education and health the state limited spending to a set percentage of GNP, regardless of the actual needs of the African population. This arbitrary pegging of spending to total GNP had deleterious effects on the quality of African education in Rhodesia. The white regime was concerned that increased pressures building on the African side of the legalistic and conceptual wall would soon burst over into the white side, sweeping away privilege and white preserve. African population growth thus exposed the limits and contradictions of the colonial burden, and this was the true meaning of 'racial swamping.'

The linearity of the demographic transition theory’s progressive stages easily jibed with white Rhodesian perceptions of the backwardness of the African population relative to the white population. These two developmental stages of the white and African populations were referred to as post-transitional and pre-transitional, respectively, and mirrored white attitudes about the more general linear progress of the two races. Since the African population’s pre-transitional birth rates were seen to threaten the settler state, it was not surprising that the state attempted to force the African population into the next transition stage.

Subsequent Rhodesian efforts to impose top-down, science-based approaches to address the ‘problem’ of African fertility in the 1960s and 1970s were in line with older colonial interventions in indigenous life throughout the postwar British Empire generally, and in Rhodesia in particular. From as early as the 1940s, there was a ‘technocratic turn’ in official thinking throughout the British Empire with an emphasis on researching, designing, and applying scientific solutions to colonial problems. Nor were the settler state’s policies outside the norm for Africa during the 1960s and 1970s, as this technocratic trend in Africa continued long into the postcolonial era. So while the technocratic impulse itself was not new, this older impulse was redirected towards what was considered to be a new problem.

The state's attribution of the causes behind the African population growth necessarily influenced their strategy to stem this growth. Whites regarded this population growth as partially a reflection of the success of the settler state's modernising efforts in the realms of maternal and child health. Self-congratulation, however, meshed uneasily with their efforts to clip this troublesome by-product. One Herald editorial shortly after the 1962 census even showed an obvious degree of circumspection about the wisdom of ever guiding Africans into stage two of the demographic transition: ‘Without
these improved services [provided by the Federal government] life expectancy and infant mortality would be at levels which would have hindered the rapid growth of the African population,’ the editorial explained, before continuing on to analyse the political, economic, and administrative problems resulting from this rapid growth. More explicitly, the head of obstetrics and gynaecology at the University College of Rhodesia, Dr R. H. Philpott, said in a public address advocating immediate efforts to remedy the population problem:

In one generation the world’s population multiplied out of all proportion to food supplies, and the benefactor, the philanthropist, the physician, and the peacemaker faced the starving multitudes of their own creation … Those of the technologically advanced nations of the world have brought their new knowledge to the developing nations and are therefore in part responsible for the population explosion.

White intellectuals conjectured that the cultural clash of modernisation had a warping effect on African culture, and had corrupted the African population’s traditional equilibrium, creating a new pathology that was manifesting itself in irresponsible, and ultimately self-destructive, growth rates. Amy Kaler, citing Dr Philpott and others, described how white Rhodesian intellectuals viewed African growth as a result of the ‘benevolent, albeit fallible’ dispensation of Rhodesia’s colonial burden. To white intellectuals, this fallibility was exemplified by the unintended effects of only partially modernising the African population, and pushing them into the second stage of the DTT, without inculcating the concomitant responsibility that could guide them into the next transition stage. To many whites, it was perhaps better a job not done at all than a job half done, and as the population problem was purported to be the white man’s creation, it must of necessity be solved by white men.

Efforts to forcibly push the African population into the next demographic transition stage and the African populations’ resistance to these intrusions engendered frustration within the settler state. African aversion to white efforts to control their fertility was conceived by white Rhodesia as the same sort of intractability that had stifled other efforts at modernisation, in particular cattle de-stocking and immunisation campaigns. Expressing this exasperation, a regional chairman of the RF raged in 1974 that, ‘[Africans] cannot look for improvement – can never hope to achieve good living standards even in the absence of sanctions – while they indulge in their abysmal fecundity.’ The Minister of Finance, John Wrathall, expressed this same point in a Budget Speech from 1971:
The African people should have no illusions about the future. If they wish to attain a reasonable standard of life for their children, free from the frustration of thwarted aspirations and free from the misery of poverty, the realities of the situation demand a concerted effort to limit population growth …

This was in line with the older paternalist strain of the ‘white man’s burden’ but it also jibed with more blatantly self-serving motivations to reconfigure African birth rates, which both suggested efforts to pull Africans closer to white society. Be that as it was, African reluctance to recognise the alleged modernising benefits of reducing their birth rates – in terms of female empowerment, more disposable income for consumer spending, and less scarcity generally – reinforced ideas in some sectors of the white community of the hopelessness of ever civilising the African population.

It was out of this belief of the futility of ever fully ‘modernising’ Africans, one with an equally old colonial pedigree, that right-wing Rhodesians sought to cut white society off from the burdens and responsibilities of the massive and seemingly unresponsive African population. The Minister of the Public Service stated this frustration over the asymmetrical distribution of burdens when he stated in Parliament:

We cannot have the European continuing to be wholly responsible for the development of Rhodesia, as has been the position for many generations … Africans in increasing numbers [need] to come forward to help in shouldering the immense burden of developing and improving Rhodesia.

However, no one in the RF government argued for greater African advancement in the white economy; what was proposed instead was a hoisting off of the economic burdens of population growth onto the Africans themselves. The Cabinet debated how best to effectuate this distribution of the burdens of population growth, and a Cabinet memorandum from 1970 concluded that Africans needed to, ‘make a fair and realistic contribution towards the cost of social services they enjoy and [the government should charge] Africans accordingly’. Describing the Rhodesian Front’s policy of provincialisation, a Herald editorial from 1972 stated:

In essence, the scheme outlined means that the least developed parts of Rhodesia would no longer be the direct concern of the Rhodesian government … Rhodesia’s central government and its Civil Service
would then, of course, be free to concentrate entirely on the white half of Rhodesia.  

If the African population refused to be responsible in their fertility rates, so these arguments went, then the state and white settlers should not have to subsidise their irresponsibility. This latter view represented the view that Africans ought to be pushed away from white society.

Rhodesia was though by no means the only postcolonial state aggressively attempting to lower its national birth rates during this time of worldwide population fears. More coercive methods than the Rhodesian state would ever (or could ever) employ were used in both India and China contemporaneously with Rhodesia’s population control efforts. Beginning in 1975, for example, there were widespread compulsory sterilisations in India under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. This mass sterilisation campaign was organised by Gandhi’s son, Sanjay Gandhi, who used the power of the state to bribe, intimidate, or physically force millions of men into unwanted vasectomies. China infamously used authoritarian means through which to meet state birth rate goals, including the implementation of the controversial ‘one-child’ policy. Goldberg makes the argument that the UNFPA was complicit in this ‘reproductive totalitarianism’. Indeed, Indira Gandhi and Qian Xinzhong, the architect of the one-child policy, were the recipients of the first United Nations Population Awards in 1983. It was not its having an aggressive population reduction policy which made Rhodesia unique. Indeed, its policies never rose to the same levels of coercion as other policies around the world, though it was likely more out of the state’s inability to do so than out of any moral qualms. It was instead that Rhodesia’s population policies were wholly conceived by the minority race and were intended to apply only to the indigenous race which made them so controversial.

The Origins of the State’s Population Policy
Before 1968 state efforts to control African population growth were uneven and desultory. The Family Planning Association of Rhodesia (FPAR), which would later be the primary medium for the state’s family planning policy agenda, was formed in 1964, but it did not initially have a connection with the state. In her book Running After Pills, Amy Kaler analyses the Rhodesian state’s efforts to promote family planning in Rhodesia and the complex relationship between the state and FPAR. As Kaler describes, the state’s family
planning policy relied heavily on FPAR, which while ostensibly an independent nongovernmental organisation, increasingly relied on state revenue to operate. Even so, the RF government’s support for FPAR was neither immediate, nor without reservations. This mirrored the wariness of many FPAR workers of colluding with the RF regime.

The Rhodesian Front was cautious in its entry into the field of family planning. In the spring of 1966, a private member’s bill from a RF backbencher was introduced calling for a wide-ranging effort to reduce the African birth rate, but after a lengthy and heated debate, the mover, Mr Owen-Smith, withdrew the motion.⁴¹ In October 1966, the Rhodesian Cabinet for the first time agreed to ‘the principle of family planning’ and contributed a nominal sum to FPAR.⁴² Several months later, in the Committee of Supply Votes, the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, Ian McLean, included a supplementary increase of £2,000 for family planning.⁴³ This was also a nominal sum in terms of the overall budget – tourism promotion, for instance, received £113,000 from that same budget⁴⁴ – but this amount did signal a growing ambition on the part of the state to enter into family planning, even if Owen-Smith, the mover of the 1966 motion, retorted that the figure would be better set at £100,000.⁴⁵ Three months after the supplementary vote, a Cabinet Meeting discussed further increasing family planning funding as a method to thin the backlog of African school-leavers entering the labour market every year. At the same meeting, direct state propaganda was proposed and rejected, and it was decided that more money should be allocated to FPAR via the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour.⁴⁶

From its earliest origins in Rhodesia, family planning was seen by the state as a component of a wider package of policies to address African population growth. As described earlier, Smith pegged African education to the country’s GNP as a way to cap the financial impact of this growth. African schoolchildren were also diverted from pursuing white-collar urban jobs and encouraged to move to the rural areas. In an effort to relieve African unemployment, the Cabinet agreed to investigate the possibility that an agreement could be reached for South Africa to employ black Rhodesians for mine work, which would partially mitigate adverse migration flows and alleviate unemployment.⁴⁷ It is significant that these early population initiatives were already conceived in terms of allocative and distributive imbalances in the workforce, and conducted through the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour, though eventually this responsibility for family planning would shift to the Ministry of Health.

Throughout the post-Federation period, white Rhodesians experienced periodic waves of panic concerning the growth of the African population.⁴⁸
Often these waves were precipitated by censual information, but they were also occasionally a product of deliberate fear-mongering on the part of the government. A wave of population panic among the white public, and a new energy behind demographic engineering policies arose in the summer of 1968. This panic was precipitated by Minister of the Treasury John Wrathall’s budget for the fiscal year, and the debate regarding the Sadie Report on the linkages between racial ratios and economic growth one month later. Wrathall’s lengthy Budget Statement in July focused extensively on the detrimental economic effects of the growing African population, and the urgent need for a reduction in African growth rates, echoing the main conclusions of the Sadie Report. Regarding the relationship between African population growth and total economic growth, Wrathall stated:

[African family limitation] is a delicate subject with moral and political overtones. The facts, however, are easy to understand. For an economy to grow it needs capital, skills, opportunities, markets, and not least, the entrepreneurs to exploit the opportunities. The lack of all or some of these elements limits the growth rate which can be achieved. It will not be easy for the Rhodesian economy to grow in real terms over a long period at a rate exceeding the present population growth rate of 3.5% per annum. During the last 10 years the average annual growth rate in real terms has been of the order of only 2.5%.

The racialised assumptions embedded in Wrathall’s speech publicly laid out the direction of the state’s population policies of limiting what was considered to be unproductive, burdensome growth (Africans) and attracting capitalised and entrepreneurial growth (whites), in the characteristically cloaked language of pseudo-economics. This budget statement and the 1968 budget’s priorities represented the firmest determination on the part of the state to enter into family planning promotion, even if it was primarily through the medium of FPAR. This decision to boost funding to FPAR in 1968 was consistent with the Cabinet’s decision that spring to funnel family planning money through the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour, but it was a significant escalation of this policy. Thereafter, the Rhodesian Front government began to enter into family planning funding with greater deliberateness, as evidenced by the percentage of FPAR’s operating revenue provided by the state rising from 12 per cent in 1965, to 51 per cent in 1974, to 98 per cent in 1979. This increased financial commitment to family planning reflected a greater political commitment and will to slowing
the growth of the African population, a political will that would be further stiffened by the publication of the results of the 1969 census.

Coming right on the heels of Wrathall’s budget statement was the delayed debate over the controversial government-sponsored report on long-term economic planning by Dr Jan L. Sadie. The essence of the Sadie Report, and the sections affirmed by the government, dealt with the detrimental economic effects of the population imbalance between whites and Africans in Rhodesia, and the urgent need to re-balance this ratio. Sadie’s Report was explicitly premised on the idea that Africans were incapable of endogenous economic growth, and therefore it was vital for Rhodesia’s economic future to match the African population growth with overall economic growth. That growth, according to Sadie, could only originate with whites. Sadie calculated that on average every economically active white person created employment for 7.4 Africans, which meant that 5,400 whites needed to enter the labour force every year to accommodate the annual cohort of 40,000 Africans who entered into the labour market.53 The government concurred with Sadie’s recommendations that both ends of this ratio – rapid African growth and negligible white growth – needed to be attacked, with family planning addressing the former and increased immigration the latter.

The Sadie Report was tabled in Parliament in October 1967, but was not debated until August 1968. The delay was explained by Finance Minister Wrathall as an attempt to have the Report widely read and commented upon by various persons inside and outside government,54 yet the content of the Report and the timing of the debate so soon after the controversial budget strongly suggest that the delay was quite likely a deliberate effort of the RF government to build support for its newly created demographic reconfiguration policies. As was stated in the resulting debate, the gist of the Sadie Report was nothing new, and it was even referred to as ‘stating little more than has been obvious to men involved in commercial and industrial affairs for many years’, but it provided an academic gloss and a respectable language to cloak balder political motivations, and lent the credence of apolitical economics to an issue that the right wing had long supported.55 Sadie’s Report can therefore be viewed in many ways as the theoretical blueprint for the RF government’s massive intervention into demographic engineering, a blueprint for a war in need of a casus belli.

In the 1970s, the state’s population efforts increased significantly in scale. The reasons behind this redoubling of effort are several, but most importantly it was the publication of the 1969 census numbers which had an immediate and dramatic effect on white society generally, and especially on
white policymakers. Six days before the publication of the phase two census numbers, the Minister of Health and Social Welfare presented a memorandum to the Cabinet recommending

that a Cabinet Committee, or a committee of Senior Officials, be set up to examine the problem [of African population growth] and … make recommendations as to the responsibilities of various Ministries in this regard with a view to mounting a positive and collective attack on the [population] problem as part of overall government policy.\textsuperscript{56}

In an oral amplification of his memorandum a month later, after the census results were published, the Minister stated that the Cabinet should render the terms of reference for the proposed population committee rather broad, as it should ‘also examine incentives for increasing the population in certain racial groups as opposed to disincentives for controlling the population of other groups’.\textsuperscript{57} The Cabinet ultimately decided, however, that the bolstering of the white population ‘would have to be handled in a different way and should be the subject of a completely separate action’, lest these two contrary population policies ‘lead to political difficulties’.\textsuperscript{58}

The first standing Committee on Population Problems was formed on the Minister’s advice, albeit with narrower terms of reference than he had requested. The Committee had representatives from the Ministries of Local Government and Housing, Finance, Health, Education, and Internal Affairs, and reported its unanimous findings in November 1970.\textsuperscript{59} This initial report on population problems laid out the government’s current population control policies, the state of scientific and demographic theory in the field, and in the final section delivered recommendations. The findings of the report shed light on what the state actually knew about Rhodesia’s African population and contemporary fertility transition theories, and reveal that at the very outset the state was aware of some very uncomfortable contradictions in its population policies.

One internal contradiction that the report discovered was that the state’s urban influx policies ran counter to the state’s policies aimed at lowering African birth rates, as it was reported that urban birth rates ran on average about 5 per cent lower than rural African birth rates. These contradictory policies could be reconciled, the report stated, by encouraging the development of urban centres in the TTLs, and drawing more Africans into the cash economy but away from white urban areas. This urbanity/fertility correlation and the desirability of creating African urban areas was accounted for in the following way by the Minister of Health a year later: ‘The alternative [to
economic development in the TTLs] was a continual drift of Africans into European areas, which, although it might lead to a decline in the African birth rate in these areas, was in itself undesirable.60

Consistent with contemporary scholarship at the time, the report also commented on the connection between standards of living, education levels, and fertility rates, and that these preconditions also needed to be met in addition to the simple distribution of contraceptives. This was the very same preconditions idea that the head of FPAR derided publically as a ‘dangerous dogma’.61 As Kaler notes, there were obvious ‘silences’ in Rhodesia’s family planning policies regarding the socioeconomic preconditions for demographic transitions.62 Yet these silences were only public silences and did not reflect the state’s ignorance of this scholarship. There was instead a rational realisation that altering these fundamental preconditions, even to address a problem as significant as African growth rates, would fatally damage white preserve. As Kaler argues in the context of FPAR’s public strategy, ‘if such changes had been undertaken on a large enough scale to produce an appreciable national effect, they would have threatened the racial inequalities on which Rhodesia’s political and economic structures were founded …’.63 And so this same reasoning also permeated the thinking of the highest levels of Rhodesian state. It was out of this political calculation that these public silences regarding precondition theory were created. These silences were broken by a few errant voices, however. Some outspoken African MPs who were familiar with precondition theory argued forcefully that the Smith government was putting ‘the cart before the horse’ in trying to impose family planning without first addressing socioeconomic preconditions.64 Yet these isolated voices were effectively marginalised, and the creation of these socioeconomic preconditions, perhaps the best established method to induce a demographic transition, was privately considered, consciously ignored, and publicly disreputed. Thereafter, the state publicly defended its family planning policy as a method to bring about these socioeconomic preconditions – that the cart would indeed pull the horse behind it.65

In the recommendations section, the 1970 Report of the Committee on Population Problems explored various ways in which the African birth rate could be lowered in light of the general findings of the first section. The first recommendations focused on forcing the African population to internalise the costs of population growth to create anti-natalist incentives. One such method of cost internalisation for larger families was through the expansion of prosecutions of criminal neglect for parents of underfed children. The Report also advocated changing the system of grants to African Councils to provide incentives ‘to change [the] present system from the taxation of
adult males to the taxation of the total number in the family’. Similarly, the Report noted that the subsidisation by central government of social services is inconsistent with a policy aimed at reducing the birth rate because it insulates the people from the true cost of having large families, especially where a number of the services subsidised are for the benefit of children.

Below-cost hospital charges for Africans were among those subsidies found to create incentives counter to government policy, as did state subsidised primary education. The Report recommended a gendered approach to the state’s population policies. In an effort to better engineer African incentives, the Committee suggested activating the consumerist desires of African women. The Report recommended that more attention be given to stimulating the material wants of tribal Africans, particularly the women, whom, it is believed, would respond more readily to such action than would men. The Committee has in mind the expansion of extension activities for women’s clubs and of the promotion of sales of consumer goods.

In this same vein of redirecting the consumer impulses of African women towards anti-natalist ends, the Report explicitly stated: ‘the desire for emancipation among African women [should] be exploited to the fullest extent by the ministries of Internal Affairs, Health, and Local Government and Housing in their efforts to improve the standards of living of families, especially women and children’. In an oral amplification of the Report, the Minister of Health reiterated the importance of targeting government propaganda towards African women, and the greater introduction of Africans into the cash economy. The cash economy, as opposed to the informal economy, was a system whereby the family wealth flows made children an economic burden rather than an asset. Explaining in more detail the reasons behind this gendered approach to family planning, the Minister of Health later stated:

while African women showed interest in family planning the same could not be said of African males who, once they achieved a measure of material success, hankered after the pleasures of subsistence level tribal living which included several wives and large families.
In addition to the cost internalisation and wealth flow redirection strategies, the report also called for more intensive propaganda, including small family propaganda in school curricula, and for increases in the funds for the distribution of contraceptives. In his amplification, the Minister of Health expressed that the Report considered other anti-natal incentives and disincentives, but these were ‘played down somewhat to avoid an accusation of ruthlessness. There were, of course, many other disincentives available to government [than those discussed in the Report], but [these types] of action[s] would undoubtedly lead to criticism, especially overseas. Other topics that were introduced in the Report, for which it was concluded further discussion was needed, were the legalisation of abortion and voluntary sterilisation. The Cabinet approved the Minister’s request for the creation of a second standing committee of senior officials to re-analyse the government’s options in the area of population control.

The Failure of the State’s Population Policy

The ‘dangerous dogma’ of the necessity of preconditions before a fertility transition, was recognised by state officials to be on a collision course with the impatient demands of the right-wing RF members. African economic advancement lowered birth rates, but challenged white preserve; higher education levels resulted in lower fertility, but also increased employment frustrations for under-employed Africans; urbanity correlated with lower fertility, but whites were anxious to keep Africans out of white areas. Crucially, all of these same modernisation efforts that created fertility transition preconditions were vehemently opposed by the very same elements within the RF that pushed hardest for a reduction in African birth rates. This presented significant practical and philosophical problems for the white regime.

The science behind precondition theory was never challenged, but the state immediately sought to cram the square pegs of precondition theory into the round holes of a racialised economic and political system. Greater urbanisation had to mean new urban areas in African regions. Economic development and increases in wage labour employment had to be concentrated away from white areas, and education would have to be focused on vocational and agricultural training, so as not to threaten the spatial or economic preserve of whites. It was reasoned that standards of living would not have to be increased on a relative racial scale, nor even necessarily on an absolute family-wide scale, but instead wealth could be effectively redistributed within African families with women gaining more economic power vis-à-vis men, which could achieve the same anti-natal effect. Similarly, the supposed latent consumerist hunger of African women could be fed
by more retail stores and consumer goods available in the TTLs, spending
temptations that, it was hoped, would prove more attractive than spending
money on more children, but would keep Africans out of white areas. It was
in these ways that fertility precondition theory was awkwardly paired with
institutionalised racial inequalities as a strategy to simultaneously modern-
ise and exclude. While this reconciliation appeared in Cabinet meetings
and party congresses to be at least apparently logical, if not also redundant
and expensive, there would never in Rhodesia be the full public support
needed to implement these separate development policies, and this parallel-
ism would remain only as plans on paper. Godwin and Hancock argue that
by late 1971 or early 1972 provincialism was finally dead as a realistic policy
option for the Rhodesian Front.73 However its appeal never died.

In July 1971, arising from the recommendations of the first meeting of
the new standing committee, the Rhodesian state’s second such committee,
each Ministry was called upon to submit memoranda outlining what role
they each could play in a state-wide effort to lower African birth rates.74
The resulting memoranda, notwithstanding the excitement that popula-
tion issues elicited in the wider public especially among the rank and file of
the RF, were generally equivocal and conservative, and were much more an
expression of prototypical bureaucratic caution than an all-in approach to
an existential problem facing the regime. As evidenced by the weak commit-
ments expressed in these memoranda, the different government Ministries
were unevenly committed to a wide-ranging attack on the population prob-
lem, even following the 1969 census uproar, and these memoranda were
duly taken into consideration by the standing committee.

To a certain extent, the population panic was manufactured by the RF,
and was certainly inflamed by the RF, in the late 1960s, but as in the story of
Dr Frankenstein, the monster began to turn against its creator. Even as the
second standing committee on population began its work and the various
Ministries equivocated over their prospective duties in the population con-
trol area, the RF rank and file clamoured for more activist policies to address
the population problem. This groundswell from the party base concerned
the chair of the standing committee, the Minister of Health. In particular,
several resolutions were introduced in the RF’s National Congress in 1971
calling for drastic population control policies that he considered worrying.75
Among the radical proposals burbling up from the lower reaches of the
party, were calls for compulsory birth control for Africans or, barring out-
right coercion, the establishment of some form of quid pro quo for using
birth control or being sterilised in exchange for receiving government serv-
ices.76 Significantly, these views did not only emanate from the sans-culottes
of the RF, as exerting some degree of coercion in African fertility matters was at times suggested even by Cabinet-level officials. Expressing an obvious frustration, the Minister explained that despite these urgent calls there was no immediate, overnight solution to this problem of high African birth rates, involving as it did much larger socioeconomic conditions. In his statement to the Cabinet, the Minister explored some of the options considered by the committee, including legalising abortion and increased provisions for both male and female sterilisation, ‘particularly [for] women with large families seeking social welfare assistance’, but he asserted that there was no straightforward answer to the complex problem.77 Candidly admitting to the Cabinet why the African birth rate was as yet apparently unaffected by state initiatives, he said ‘[it was] borne out by evidence from all over the world that family planning as such did not control the size of the population; it only enhanced the standard of living although it was an integral part of a population control plan as a whole’.78 In the spring of 1971, the Secretary of Health conveyed this same frustration with the state’s population control efforts this way: ‘the Ministry of Health could provide the water but could neither lead or drive the horse to the water nor make it drink’.79

The Full Report of the second Committee on Population Problems that was presented to the Cabinet in October 1971 called for a strong state commitment to attack the population problem. Among other things, it recommended that a new ‘broadly-based, high-powered’ permanent Population Council be formed. Inevitably, the prospect of such a powerful new body quickly excited ministerial jealousies. In the Cabinet discussion that followed, it was stated that such a body outside the government would in essence be a ““super” Ministry’ capable of ‘laying down policy which involved a large number of individual Ministries’.80 After debate, the Cabinet agreed that any new population committee’s functioning would be hampered by ‘the many differences in the views of individual ministries and it appeared that it might be difficult to get this committee to function satisfactorily due to an apparent reluctance on the part of some ministries to become fully involved’.81

And so the Population Council idea perished.

After rejecting the bold recommendations from the second committee, in the autumn of 1971 the Cabinet decided to create … a third committee. Concluding that a committee again needed to ‘examine the whole spectrum of population control and not limit it to the pure aspect of family planning’, the Cabinet called on a new committee to take a fresh look at the problem, and ‘examine the problem in the broadest aspect of population control and to prepare an overall plan for the consideration of government’.82 The
Cabinet decided to appoint a third standing population committee: a committee that was eventually elevated to the status of a Cabinet Committee with the Minister of Health serving as chair.83 The Cabinet simultaneously expanded the third Committee’s terms of reference, and in the same instance limited its powers to implement any conclusions they reached. In so doing, the Cabinet tacitly acknowledged that the state’s broader population control proposals, beyond mere propaganda and contraceptive distribution, all contained insurmountable political, economic, and logistical problems.

At the same time as the Cabinet was bickering internally over the scope of its population control policies, the state’s sole reliance on contraceptive distribution and propaganda in lieu of more holistic approaches was reinforced by the continual degradation of the state’s ability to administer effectively in the rural areas after the escalation of the war in the mid 1970s. This meant that the state’s more ambitious exclusionary policies of separate development and the intensive economic development of parallel tribal economies were obviously impossible to implement, even as these policies had been realistically abandoned even before the war escalated. Any grandiose scheme like separate development would have taken time and money but also would require unfettered state access to the tribal areas, which from the mid 1970s was less and less frequent and much more dangerous. When the Minister of Health finally presented the third standing committee report in 1974, it was conceded that state action should remain concentrated primarily on supporting FPAR, as the broader-based initiatives to slow African population growth were increasingly unfeasible.84 In this way, contraceptive distribution and propaganda became, partially by default, the sole solutions to a problem in which state officials knew very well required broader action. Therefore the state’s population control policies were doomed to underperform, in spite of the political steam vented by rank-and-file Rhodesian Front party members. The state’s population control policy then plodded on with the implicit understanding that despite the importance of the population boom only ineffective remedies remained on the table. Figure 3.1 compares the various population goals proposed by whites with the actual rates of racial population growth.

**Measuring the State’s Success**

There is some evidence that the state’s population control policies through FPAR did have some limited effect on African fertility in the short term, even though it was far from reaching the demographic goals hoped for by the proposers. By 1974 W.M. Castle and K.E. Sapire reported that 20 per cent of urban African women and 2.7 per cent of rural African women were
Figure 3.1 Population rates and state population goals

Notes
* Statistics for the actual white and African numbers are derived from the Rhodesian CSO Monthly Digests.
** Immigration Minister Harry Reedman never offered an exact date for when his goal of racial population parity would be achieved.
*** The Sadie Report was never explicit about either the final white population rate or the African rate, only that the two should be locked in a stable ratio.

reliably using birth control. Kaler also notes the FPAR’s Salisbury Municipal Clinics increase in the distribution of birth control pills from 43,254 in 1973 to 49,889 in 1979, and more significantly in Depo-Provera shots from 13,279 to 45,336. In 1976 the head of FPAR had asserted that from 1970 to 1976 Rhodesia’s growth rate had dropped from 3.8 per cent to 3.4 per cent, and that FPAR had by 1976 prevented 25,000 births – an interesting,
if curious, statistic to say the least. But as impressive as these gains may seem, the results showed that the effectiveness was mostly localised in the urban areas, and as Castle and Sapire argue, urban areas correlated more strongly with African fertility reduction than did socioeconomic class. It was in the rural areas where the vast majority of Africans lived, and it was in those areas in which, as Chapter 6 describes, the state’s policies were met with the greatest resistance. Yet even in the rural areas, the number of FPAR fieldworkers expanded from under 50 in 1969, to around 150 in 1976, to nearly 250 in 1979. While these efforts, even as they expanded, were not nearly enough to even scratch the racial ratios, they did reflect some degree of administrative effectiveness in promoting birth control, and importantly they did lay the groundwork for Zimbabwe’s successful long-term reduction in fertility rates discussed in Chapter 6.

Ironically, the war did offer advantages to some of the state’s population control efforts, even as it limited others. The war provided captive audiences (literally) for family planning promotion through the state’s Protective Village (PV) scheme begun 1976. Kaler claims that within the PVs the state’s family planning efforts had much greater success. By the later stages of the war, however, even measurable shifts in African fertility garnered a much lower level of interest for the white public than it would have prior to the escalation of the war, as more immediate concerns took precedence. Total African population numbers continued to expand in the 1970s by hundreds of thousands a year, even after the RF government stepped up support for FPAR, and the racial population imbalance therefore grew more and more lopsided. As explained in Chapter 6, there is some evidence that the early introduction of family planning into Rhodesia did begin to yield results sometime in the 1980s, but this was certainly a cold comfort for ex-Rhodesian policymakers and the armchair neo-Malthusians of southern Africa, for whom the overriding purpose behind such policies had already expired.

Conclusion

Francis Bacon wrote in 1620 that ‘Nature to be commanded, must be obeyed’. That this old aphorism was ignored by Rhodesian policymakers in the construction of their population control policies reflects the irreconcilable conflicts between different goals of the settler state. The state disregarded the established precondition theories of fertility reduction as a dangerous dogma, not out of an academic disagreement with those theories, but because the implementation of those theories would undermine the very existence of the white settler state and destroy exactly what UDI was intended to preserve: white privilege. A comprehensive population policy
that would have resulted in demonstrable fertility change would have also required extensive coordination among different parts of the government. Yet the mechanics of such coordination met with bureaucratic resistance, as the super-Ministry proposal of the Population Council was rejected out of petty ministerial jealousies over the power of the proposed entity. As a further obstacle in creating an effective population strategy, the state was reluctant to ask for material sacrifices from the white taxpayers to fund any massively conceived population policy, however popular this policy might have been as an abstract notion. All of these were brakes on the ability of any comprehensive policy to adequately address the population problem.

These brakes prevented the implementation of any real solution, and reveal a broader truth about the nature of the Rhodesian state. This was that however large a problem was and however much it threatened the existence of the settler state, and none did so more than the African population ‘explosion’, the solution to that problem could never call for much sacrifice on the part of the white populace. It was feared by policymakers that when called upon to make material sacrifices many white Rhodesians would merely drift away just as they drifted in – fears that would prove well-founded, as Chapter 4 describes. As a result of these self-imposed limitations, the state merely redoubled its efforts in two aspects of fertility reduction – family planning provisions and propaganda – and hoped against hope that these two prongs alone would prove sufficient.
Two of the more politically significant demographic discoveries from the 1962 and 1969 censuses were the small size and frailty of the white population. Whites had long known about their relatively small numbers, at least abstractly, but this frailty, as indicated by the consistently high rates of migration in and out of Rhodesia, was a new revelation for most whites in Rhodesia. That Rhodesia had experienced positive migration flows for much of its history, with immigration outpacing emigration, obscured the scale and consistency of emigration and created an illusion of demographic stability and continuity within the settler population. Anxieties about white emigration were thereafter never far from the minds of Rhodesian state officials and provided an important backdrop for some of Rhodesia’s most important political events, even as these fears waxed and waned among the general white populace. White emigration also attracted interest outside Rhodesia, as this vulnerability came to be recognised. There was a range of attempts to engineer white emigration on the part of those with particular interests in the fate of the country, though the goals of doing so and policies themselves differed according to whether the proposers were hostile or sympathetic towards the settler regime. These population concerns, and the varied efforts to address them, reflected the reality that the white population had very little continuity over time, and that consequently white Rhodesian loyalty and national identity were weaker than had been supposed.

In 1976, the then Rhodesian Minister of Immigration, Elias Broomberg, informed the Rhodesian Parliament:
We have a section in our Immigration Promotion Department which sends a letter to every emigrant who is leaving the country … saying we understand that he is leaving and in a very tactful way asking, ‘why’ and if we can help, and if there is a chance of hi[m] changing his mind … [M]any of them appreciate it. They say: ‘We cannot believe anybody is taking the interest in the fact we are leaving.’ They think this would not happen in any other country.3

The intending emigrants were quite right that this would not have happened in any other country, yet evidently it still did not convince many of them to unpack and stay. These peculiar letters are revealing of Rhodesia’s unique demographic history: they show the odd symmetry between white immigration and white emigration, the settler state’s anxiety regarding the small size of the white population, as well as highlighting Rhodesian whites’ transient culture and the desperation with which Rhodesia sought to bolster its white population.

This chapter explains the transience of white Rhodesians in terms of five inter-related factors. First, settlers had a long history of drifting in and out of Rhodesia and other British territories in eastern and southern Africa without ever acquiring any significant loyalty to Rhodesia in particular. Second, countries sending white immigrants to Rhodesia rarely either expelled them or imposed constraints on return, so that returning home was always a viable option. Third, with increasing restrictions on political opposition after UDI, white residents tended to emigrate when Rhodesia failed to meet their expectations rather than voice their grievances. Fourth, the economic and political power of South Africa was attractive to Rhodesian whites and destabilised the settler population in Rhodesia, especially after UDI. Finally, the emphasis in Rhodesian immigration promotion propaganda on the material benefits of Rhodesia’s way of life created an implied contract with new immigrants based upon the promise of easy living and material gain in return for settlement, such that any decline in material standards tended to provoke departure. All of these factors contributed to the profound lack of rootedness in Rhodesia for most whites, a vulnerability that would come to have an enormous impact on the fate of the settler regime after it severed its imperial connections.

White Demography Reconsidered

Positive white migration flows were critical to Rhodesia’s survival, and the rates of the outward flow of whites from Rhodesia had great political and social significance. From 1955 to 1979, a total of 255,692 immigrants arrived in Rhodesia, but over the same period 246,047 emigrants left.4 This
rate of turnover is especially noteworthy when compared against the total white population, which during this same period averaged only 228,583. An annual average of 4.1 per cent of Rhodesia’s total white population emigrated each year over the 24 years from 1955 to 1979, and an average of 4.6 per cent entered every year. This would be the percentage equivalent of the entire cities of Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, and Manchester being completely replaced by new people every year in the UK.  

South Africa, by comparison, never had a turnover problem as perilous as Rhodesia’s, even though it did experience periodic outmigration. Between 1965 and 1983, for example, a total of 240,033 South African whites left the country, averaging over 12,000 a year. Their highest annual total for emigration in those years was just over 25,000 in 1977, shortly after the Soweto riots, which was slightly more than 0.5 per cent of the total white population. In those same years though, 760,703 immigrants arrived, averaging over 40,000 a year. Typically, South African immigration outpaced emigration by the tens of thousands. Importantly though, even in their highest immigration year – 1975’s 50,337 immigrants – immigration did not form a large percentage of their total white population, which was then over four million. South Africa’s demography was thereby much less susceptible to the vagaries of the inflows or outflows of a few thousand whites than was Rhodesia’s.  

Rhodesia’s population turnover was surprisingly consistent over its history. Nonetheless, historians of Rhodesia have tended to downplay the significance of white emigration, either by ignoring it or wrongly periodising it, and have failed to appreciate its central importance in the political, social, economic, and psychological fabric of Rhodesia. Although this turnover was widely known following the 1962 census and was recognised to be a great weakness, this characteristic transience had long preceded the census. As Alois Mlambo points out, of the 700 or so members of the pioneer column only 15 were still in Rhodesia by 1924. Even state officials in less guarded moments acknowledged the long history of emigration from Rhodesia. In 1970 the Minister of Immigration conceded that

[emigration] has been part and parcel of a pattern of life in Rhodesia since the beginning of time … How many of the great heroes of the past, Selous, Rhodes, Jameson, any one you like to think of, how many actually died in this country? In the end practically none of them.  

Intuitively it makes sense that when times were good, whites stayed on in Rhodesia and more arrived, and when times were bad, they left and few arrived. But this only ever happened within a certain numerical range, with
neither immigration to, nor emigration from, the settler colony going above or below certain base and peak levels. The six years of 1955 to 1960 (inclusive) were generally good years for whites in Rhodesia, which was then part of the Central African Federation, as white dominance seemed inviolable and the economy prospered. The average annual immigration intake during these years was 13,666. This same six-year period also averaged 7,666 emigrants. Following this period were five years of constitutional uncertainty and dramatic change, as the Federation split apart, Zambia and Malawi gained independence, and Rhodesia’s future as a white settler state looked doomed. In the five-year period from 1961 to 1965, Rhodesia averaged only 8,225 immigrants annually, and lost 12,912 emigrants, an average net annual loss of 4,687. The following period, from 1966 to 1972, represented the good years after UDI, when Rhodesia had seemingly defied the world and managed not only to survive but apparently to thrive. But even during these seven years, when immigration averaged 11,395, emigration still ran at an average of 6,285 a year. Despite this old trend of high emigration, historians generally begin to treat emigration as a factor only during the last seven years of settler rule, from 1973 to 1979, considering it a by-product of the war. During the war, Rhodesia lost an average of 13,070 emigrants a year, but perhaps more surprisingly it still gained an average of 7,542 immigrants during this same period, thus losing an average annual net of 5,528.

Yearly immigration during this 24-year period fluctuated between a low of roughly 3,500 and a high of 19,000, averaging 10,207 immigrants a year, while emigration fluctuated between a low of 5,000 and a high of 18,000, averaging 9,983 a year. These figures show an inverse relationship between immigration and emigration, but not as dramatic as intuition would indicate. Migration was only partially elastic to long-term political and economic changes, with people flitting back and forth across the border all the time outside of any political or economic trends then occurring.

In comparison to other global migrations, Rhodesian migration trends were particularly responsive to the vagaries of personal advantage. A *Rhodesia Herald* editorial commented on white movements in and around southern Africa: ‘There is so much of it – so much heated packing up and dashing about, accompanied so often by high-flown rationalisation – that it is a phenomenon in its own right.’ This dashing about was not new. Before the 1960s, eastern and southern Africa had a sizable population of migratory whites who floated freely from one African territory to another depending upon job opportunities and political conditions. Migrations to and from Rhodesia were private economic decisions, but were not prodded on by empty stomachs. Most immigrants did not initially come to Rhodesia
fleeing political or religious persecution, and most who left Rhodesia likewise did not do so out of any dire hardship but simply because other places looked comparatively better. According to some scholars, Rhodesian immigrants were, by and large, members of what some scholars have referred to as the ‘migratory elite’, and were not the proverbial tired, poor, huddled masses, yearning to breathe free.

Most migrants who arrived in Rhodesia only personally invested in Rhodesia for the short term, and were not overly concerned with the long-term prospects for the country as a whole so long as their personal situation was secure. Conversely, during times of general prosperity, if a resident was not themselves prospering, the ease of leaving made emigration a viable economic option. This short-term bias explains why Rhodesian migration was only imperfectly elastic when it came to responding to national trends.

The common border Rhodesia shared with its southern neighbour, South Africa, the power dynamic between the two, and their similar ideology after UDI, affected migration patterns in several important ways. On one hand, after UDI South Africa provided the largest source of immigrants to Rhodesia. South Africa also provided the easiest access route and initial stopping point for immigrants from elsewhere, as it openly flouted UN sanctions and provided legal cover for immigrants to circumvent their home countries’ domestic legislation by ostensibly immigrating to South Africa, then secretly crossing the Limpopo River. The presence of the powerful South African state directly bordering on Rhodesia no doubt also served as a psychological comfort for intending immigrants, lessening their fears about

\[\text{Table 4.1 Averaged white migration to and from Rhodesia (1955–79)}\]

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<tr>
<td>Immigration (annual average)</td>
<td>13,666</td>
<td>8,225</td>
<td>11,395</td>
<td>7,542</td>
<td>10,207</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emigration</td>
<td>7,666</td>
<td>12,912</td>
<td>6,285</td>
<td>13,070</td>
<td>9,983</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net migration (annual average)</td>
<td>+6,000</td>
<td>−4,687</td>
<td>+5,110</td>
<td>−5,528</td>
<td>+224</td>
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<tr>
<td>White population</td>
<td>194,500</td>
<td>216,000</td>
<td>233,000</td>
<td>270,833</td>
<td>228,583</td>
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Note
Figures are from the Monthly Digest of Statistics, CSO. Prior to the dissolution of the Federation, numbers are estimates as Southern Rhodesia did not keep separate statistics.
committing their future to the political uncertainty of Rhodesia. However, these same characteristics rendered South Africa an easy and attractive emigration option from Rhodesia, and there was always a fear of whites ebbing back across the Limpopo.20

The profound lack of white rootedness had the effect of lowering the social costs of leaving Rhodesia, as residents tended to maintain ties to other countries. It was not without reason that Rhodesia’s large-scale immigration drives described in Chapter 5, of which the Settlers ’74 campaign was the best known, tried to exploit these connections by urging residents to recommend Rhodesia to their friends and relatives back home.21 Rhodesia lacked both strong retention factors and strong push factors, while migrants’ source countries also rarely exerted harsh push factors or blocked migrants’ return. This had the effect of reducing differences that might encourage migration to Rhodesia, yet it also reduced the transaction costs of moving such that emigration was always a viable option. Southern Africa, and Rhodesia in particular, can therefore be seen as close to the neo-classical economic model of a perfectly efficient migration market, inhabited by informed, quality-conscious, non-loyal consumers, who responded quickly to product variations, unburdened by irrational attachments.

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty among White Rhodesians

Albert O. Hirschman’s theory of ‘exit, voice, and loyalty’22 has served as a useful model in other work on emigration.23 Hirschman argues that when organisations do not meet expectations, members have two general modes of action: exit and voice. Voice entails vocalising grievances to the organisation’s leadership in the hope of provoking change. Exit, in contrast, describes the silent decision to leave in response to a decline in quality. Under Hirschman’s theory, the suppression of one mode of action renders the other more attractive. In Rhodesia, voice was more costly than exit, and furthermore was perceived to be ineffective, especially after UDI. As a result, Rhodesians typically did not utilise their political voice, or indeed were silenced if they did so. Former prime minister Garfield Todd and his daughter were detained for speaking out against the regime and its policies in 1972,24 as were numerous other dissidents. As Hirschman notes, organisations will often even encourage or force dissenters to exit, and from the time of UDI onwards Rhodesia increasingly deported political dissenters. This politicised population turnover had a selective effect. It acted to reinforce the Rhodesian Front’s ideology, as disgruntled residents simply left and were replaced by new residents.25 Institutionally, the quelling of voice protected the state from troublesome critics but also reinforced the tendency
among settlers to emigrate when Rhodesia did not meet expectations rather than attempting to influence its course.26

In an effort to stop whites leaving, the Rhodesian state imposed restrictions on emigration while also trying to quell political voice. Hirschman’s analysis of the behaviour of members in organisations that impose high prices for exit posits that in such cases the ‘threat of exit’ as an effective form of voice is eliminated, yet the final exit occurs at the same level of dissatisfaction or deterioration as with organisations with no exit price. This was certainly true with Rhodesia, as dissatisfied Rhodesians remained outwardly loyal, never threatening exit, until the very day they silently left. For example, a Scottish automobile worker in Rhodesia was quoted in an interview in 1977 as saying: ‘Yes, we’re taking the Chicken Run, but nobody wants to admit it publicly. If the word gets out, the revenue office will be breathing down your neck to see if you’re fiddling some extra cash out.’27 The state’s efforts to stem exit therefore proved only partially effective, and its combination with the restrictions on voice produced a two-faced citizenry who displayed public contentedness, while experiencing private dissatisfaction and secretly planning to exit.28

Hirschman defines his third major concept, loyalty, as tending to hold exit at bay and activate voice.29 Loyalty describes a deep attachment to the organisation, and when present ‘exit abruptly changes character: the applauded rational behaviour of the alert consumer shifting to a better buy becomes disgraceful defection, desertion, and treason’.30 Loyalists thereby suffer an internalised penalty for exit, whereas non-loyalists do not. Were Rhodesians loyal as defined by Hirschman? There are several indications that typically they were not. There was a great deal of hedging one’s bets in Rhodesia. Many people looked to stay in Rhodesia as long as they could prosper, all the while preparing for the eventuality that on short notice they could exit. A large percentage of the white population never became citizens, far fewer than qualified, even after the state sought to streamline white citizenship and make it easier to obtain in 1967.31 Many in Rhodesia, even long-time residents, failed to register on the voting rolls.32 There were even greater numbers who could have obtained Rhodesian passports, dual or otherwise, but refused to do so.33 Even during the good years of UDI, British passport offices were periodically mobbed with ostensible Rhodesians applying for British passports.34 Furthermore, when call-ups began in earnest, many men quickly opted for evasion and/or emigration to avoid military service. Independently, any one of these indicators does not necessarily mean national loyalty was weak, yet taken together they are clear manifestations of a weak loyalty to Rhodesia for most whites.35
The consistently high levels of white turnover further reinforce this conclusion of a general lack of white loyalty to Rhodesia. A surprisingly small percentage of white adults were born in Rhodesia, or lived there most of their lives, and at no time did the Rhodesian-born whites outnumber the foreign-born. With the notable exception of a small core of lifers – a group including Ian Smith, who was the first prime minister to be born in Rhodesia – for most whites Rhodesia was simply a chapter in their lives both preceded and followed by longer stays elsewhere. Most whites were not in Rhodesia long enough to establish the level of loyalty discussed by Hirschman. Even if many had strong emotional and nostalgic ties, these were not strong enough to prevent, postpone, or even significantly complicate exit for most whites when Rhodesia failed to meet their expectations.

Any argument questioning the strength of white Rhodesian loyalty must account for the incredible intransigence of the popularly elected Rhodesian Front governments in the face of strong pressures to capitulate to majority rule. How did this intransigence jibe with white transience? Rhodesia’s bell-curve-like rise and fall of its white population from the 1950s through the 1980s occurred almost entirely in the urban areas, with the white rural population remaining consistently low but more stable, and there appears to have been some correlation between urbanity and transience, and rurality and rootedness. But significantly, the short-term interests of transients and non-transients regarding race were not in conflict, as there was a genuine consensus of white opinion on certain important racial matters. However, this did not necessarily mean that transients and non-transients were equally willing to suffer the consequences if these risky political gambles came due. Indeed, this asymmetry of transience also reflected an asymmetry of cost internalisation that seemed to have the effect of stiffening, not weakening, white resistance and defiance. The easy alternative of exit for migrants prevented what Hirschman referred to as the ‘raise hell’ scenario of locked-in members vocally responding to changes in quality or policy direction. As it was, these short-term migrants had strong incentives to support state policies that protected white privilege in the short term, even as they could potentially mean greater risk in the long term. As will be discussed below, though the state tried to more equitably divide the burdens of this intransigence, these policies proved extremely unpopular and not surprisingly contributed to greater emigration. This complex inter-play between exit, voice, and cost internalisation was recognised by British officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as they approached the problem of how best to foment internal opposition to Smith’s government – a strategy premised on whites staying in Rhodesia to internalise costs, and hopefully raise hell. For these
reasons, the strength of white political support for the Rhodesian Front’s policies specifically, and the cause of white Rhodesia more broadly, does not lead in a straight line to the conclusion that Rhodesian loyalty was strongly felt among the broader white population.

**White Transience Explored**

Rhodesia’s white population was always especially susceptible to stresses that could induce emigration. One reason for this stemmed from the nature of their entry into Rhodesia. As described in Chapter 5, Rhodesia’s four main selling points to potential immigrants, as set out in the promotional literature, were its warm, sunny climate; the freedom to start a new life without the constraints of dour post-war Europe; the anachronistic imperial lifestyle evoked by Rhodesian publicity; and, importantly, an inflated material standard of living for whites.\(^4\) The implied contract formed in the recruitment of immigrants was that if they settled in Rhodesia they would prosper.\(^5\) This marketing strategy inflated migration numbers in the short term, but it also inadvertently contributed to the transient culture in Rhodesia.

Some commentators acknowledged the connection between white Rhodesian transience and the inducements offered to immigrants. Pat Bashford, leader of the opposition Centre Party, said in 1976 that residents were in Rhodesia for the lifestyle Rhodesia offered them, and ‘[w]hen that begins to deteriorate, they will take themselves elsewhere and who is to blame them?’\(^6\) It was no secret at the time that there was a large population of residents who were essentially ‘Good-time Charlies’. An editorial from 1976, which acknowledged the ‘disturbing’ emigration figures, also claimed emigration was occurring primarily among ‘people who have not put down roots in Rhodesia … Those of longer standing tend to adopt the attitude that, whatever Rhodesia’s present imperfections or even dangers, every other country has problems; which one is better?’\(^7\) Rhodesia’s marketing strategy influenced the sorts of immigrants attracted, and while these appeals were effective in inflating migration statistics and boosting the Smith government in the short term, the immigrants’ lack of commitment to Rhodesia reduced their long-term value to the regime, especially as the material quality of life began to decline for almost all whites in the 1970s.

**The Economic Effects of White Emigration**

Rhodesia’s high rates of emigration had detrimental economic effects, many of which long preceded the war. From the early 1960s until the end of minority rule there was a net loss of skilled and professional workers: a ‘brain drain’.\(^8\) This occurred despite net migration gains in the good years
of UDI from 1966 to 1972; and the corollary to the brain drain in an era of total net migration gains was the influx of unskilled and semi-skilled whites. This was partly a result of the skills barriers to white immigration being gradually phased out under Smith’s premiership. A practical effect of this policy was an increased difficulty in assimilating new immigrants. The population exchange was such that the newer immigrants could not slot into the skilled openings reserved for whites at the top of the economic pyramid but instead often challenged Africans for access to lower skilled jobs. As will be argued in Chapter 5, despite the efforts by the Rhodesian state to promote mass immigration, there was simply no room for large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled whites in Rhodesia’s racialised economy.

Rhodesia’s racialised economy when combined with increased white emigration created greater racial tensions. African school-leavers in Rhodesia were compressed by racial job reservation which left the vast majority under-employed or unemployed, despite shortages in many positions reserved for whites. During the war, state officials grew concerned with the competition between the economy and the military for white male manpower, and were adamant that this attenuation should not advantage Africans. By the late 1970s entire shopping complexes went vacant in Bulawayo and Salisbury. In addition, many one-man businesses went bankrupt and some businesses reported that at any one time one half of their staff could be away performing military service. As the call-ups pulled greater numbers of whites from their employment the state instituted a domestic volunteer service to fill in for called-up men as well as a scheme to temporarily employ white South Africans. In 1975 the Director of the Centre for Inter-Racial Studies of the University of Rhodesia declared that the frustrated aspirations of African school-leavers were the single most important problem concerning Rhodesia’s race relations, and plugging white employment gaps with both aged and foreign whites must have been particularly galling to skilled unemployed Africans.

A further by-product of the state’s refusal to relax racial economic divisions was that white emigration reduced the tax base just as African demands for social services and other state expenditure were increasing. As described in Chapter 3, the expanding African population was viewed as an enormous economic burden by the state, yet ironically, maintaining white privilege necessitated that Africans be prevented from rising economically and thus sharing in the shouldering of this burden. As a result of whites leaving and Africans being unable to fill their positions in the economy the state was faced with a massive public spending problem.
White Emigration and the Military Conflict

A lack of white manpower greatly damaged military operations, particularly from the mid 1970s. Because of the enormous racial numbers differentials in Rhodesia, the security forces were forced to rely heavily on African soldiers, a practice the state was never completely comfortable with. There remained important racial divisions within the Rhodesian security forces which limited the total number of troops that could be fielded. Namely, there could only be so many African troops as there were whites to train them and lead them, and these desirable ratios between white trainers and officers and African troops could not be overstretched lest they were seen to create a security risk. The small number of whites available for military duty thus dictated the number of African soldiers within the security forces.

An excerpt from the ‘Secret National Manpower Plan’ from 1977 is indicative of this relationship between white and African numbers in the security forces: ‘Although the Army is attempting to increase African soldier strength by a further 800 this year, it will not be an easy exercise due to the lack of essential regular European leadership …’. In the late 1970s, even as the potential for African recruitment to the Security Forces was high and the need for more soldiers was glaring, the embarrassingly low numbers of whites left the African population an under-utilised resource for the state.

As a method to gauge the progress of the war, the military paid close attention to ‘kill ratios’ between Rhodesian security forces and African guerrillas. While these kill ratios did not perfectly overlap with race, as the Rhodesian security forces had a large percentage of Africans, they did in the early stages of the war provide a comfort to white Rhodesians that they were winning the war and that the daunting racial imbalances could be overcome. The morale of the security forces and the general white population was boosted by ‘acceptable’ kill ratios of about one security force soldier killed for every ten guerrillas killed. In early 1976 this kill ratio was roughly one to twelve, and this was boasted publically as evidence of state success.

However, by the early spring of that year, when kill ratios dropped to one to five, the Army downplayed the significance of these ratios. In May 1976, Army second-in-command General Hicks stated: ‘I emphasise that the tendency to gauge our military success or failure in operations on the number of kills and captures is wrong and misleading.’ As with the state’s handling of statistics more generally, these numbers were obviously significant when they were positive, and just as obviously irrelevant when they were negative. Beyond the mere psychological comfort (or discomfort) provided by these kill ratios, they did serve as a crude but easily understood indicator of the long-term prospects of white rule. From the mid 1970s Rhodesia’s white
population was outnumbered by Africans by roughly 21:1, and this would steadily increase. In a white population particularly tuned-in to statistics and ratios, the psychological effects of widening racial ratios combined with narrowing kill ratios in the war appeared unsustainable. Irrespective of how inaccurately the military forces mapped over racial divisions, as explained above, the total number of security forces was still capped by the low numbers of whites, while African guerrilla forces were constrained by no such limit. The rapidly increasing African population, which could have served as an almost boundless well for both the security forces and the guerrillas, increasingly tended to join the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. Martin Meredith claims that ZANLA recruitment was steadily around 1,000 a month by mid 1977, and that ZIPRA recruits filled up to two daily chartered flights from the border areas with Botswana to train in Zambia. Meanwhile, the number of available whites remained dismally low throughout the war, and their service in the military was notoriously unreliable, which affected both white soldier numbers and African security force numbers.

Low white manpower levels were identified by many Rhodesians as the greatest military problem facing the regime. Wing Commander Gaunt stated bluntly in Parliament where he placed manpower issues in the priority of Rhodesia’s military problems in 1977: ‘There is no doubt in my mind that the single and most inhibiting factor of this war is the shortage of manpower …’. Many agreed with his assessment, most notably Prime Minister Ian Smith. Throughout the war, the state was always bedevilled by the low call-up yields. For example, a full half of the 3,000 eligible men called up in 1973 evaded conscription, and in 1976 3,000 eligible men never even registered for the call-up. Before the February 1978 call-up, the Army stated that its minimum call-up requirement was 1,046. After the actual call-up, only 570 reported for Army duty, 476 short of their minimum stated requirement. Despite their own pressing needs, all other security force branches were likewise reduced for that period. This sort of intra-military scrambling over limited white recruits characterised the Rhodesian call-up system.

To remedy the manpower situation, the call-up system was constantly tinkered with over the war years, and was a perennial target for attack from those both inside and outside government. Exemptions, deferments, age limits, sex biases, and even medical categories were reconsidered to pull in more soldiers. As early as 1973, the Minister of Defence Jack Howman, in announcing a re-examination of medical categories, slammed those draft-dodging white Rhodesians whom he described as ‘gun-shy sportsmen, athletes fit enough to play games, but not fit enough for military service’.
Draft-dodging was viewed as such a problem that the military police were given powers to stop Rhodesian males of military age and require that they prove they had registered for military service.\textsuperscript{70} One Rhodesian Front back-bencher even suggested that all white males should be required to wear dog tags around their necks at all times after they register for call-ups.\textsuperscript{71} Despite the incessant tree-shaking for more men, the problem underlying Rhodesia’s various call-up systems was a simple lack of continuous access to a stable supply of white manpower.\textsuperscript{72}

A related issue was how to guard against the reduction of this finite pool through emigration. Military and civilian bureaucrats regularly strategised how best to avoid pushing more Rhodesians to the point of emigration, while at the same time meeting escalating military demands on manpower. Emigration was seldom absent from the weekly Manpower Committee Meetings of the mid to late 1970s.\textsuperscript{73} In order to bypass this conundrum of how to increase service commitments without inducing emigration, it was decided to obscure the exact terms of service.\textsuperscript{74} Yet the creeping call-up commitments corresponded with increasing emigration of the primary call-up age group, as commitments could only be hidden so much. With each cohort that emigrated, the commitments of those who stayed increased, and the various call-up rules all had the perverse effect of increasing obligations on those who did report for duty. The Manpower Committee noted in 1977:

> Experience had shown that few men in the under 38 age group actually served for 190 days during a 12 month period and that it was those men who did in fact come somewhere near to this figure that were leaving the country.\textsuperscript{75}

This created a self-sustaining cycle of increased service demands, increased white emigration, and a worsening military situation. After a flood of internal memoranda, the conclusion was reached that the failures of the call-up were not a matter of administrative incompetence, nepotism, or shirking youth, but simply reflected the reality that increasing manpower demands could not be met by Rhodesia’s small and shrinking white population, and efforts to squeeze the white population further would prove counter-productive.\textsuperscript{76}

Rural emigration drained the border regions of whites and greatly extended the territory accessible to the guerrillas. Those farmers who remained were under that much more of a threat, and demanded greater military protection lest they too emigrate. For example, an internal memorandum from the Thrasher Zone of operations, which was along Rhodesia’s eastern border with Mozambique, dated April 1978, read:
In February 1976 there were a total of 31 occupied farms in the Mayo Farming area. As at the 1st April, 1978, the number of occupied farms has dropped to 19 ... 11 of the 19 farmers have stated categorically that unless the security position improves, and by this they mean the presence of a permanent security force in the area, they will vacate their farms before the advent of the next rainy season ... This will of course leave the remaining 8 farmers in an almost untenable position and there is every likelihood of their also leaving the area.

The report concluded with a request to permanently maintain a sizable force in the area. This of course would have meant that another area would be left vulnerable to attack.

Low white manpower in the military directly dictated strategic and tactical capabilities. Most broadly, demographic constraints forced the state to rely upon smaller special forces types of operation rather than the large-scale operations necessary to clear and hold territory. More specifically, manpower shortages undermined the late-developed strategy of security forces permanently holding the Tribal Trust Lands rather than merely entering them reactively. This policy was declared unfeasible by the commanders of several operational theatres due to manpower constraints. A commander of the Thrasher Zone said, ‘Again, force levels were inadequate. Do we sacrifice the economic targets in the Eastern Highlands (Tea and Forestry) – because this is what will have to be done.’ The Commander of Tangent Zone said the new policy would require pulling troops from Bulawayo, leaving it fully exposed. Emigration also undermined the Protective Village (PV) programme, which was modelled on the counter-insurgency strategies in Malaya and Vietnam. As each call-up cohort shrank, the PV programme was continually passed over for priority to other services, and understaffing thus undercut a major strategic initiative. A top secret internal strategic directive from July 1979 concluded:

Even if the best possible employment of troops evolves, our deployment levels in any given area will remain totally inadequate. Therefore, to undertake meaningful high-density offensive operations in one area will inevitably cause reductions in the other areas [in] which we are already over-stretched ... This leaves us little option but to take high risks in three or four areas to help resolve problems in other areas, taken one at a time.

This deteriorating security situation, largely as a result of white manpower constraints, finally forced the regime to capitulate.
Losing people was an extremely sensitive issue for white Rhodesians, and it had significant political and psychological consequences in addition to the military and economic effects noted above. The Rhodesian press regularly analysed migration statistics: who was coming, who was going, and why. The political effects of these migration figures led the state to ban their publication at various times, in particular in the period immediately following UDI. In the autumn of 1978 the government debated again banning the publication of migration figures but concluded that this would have the opposite effect intended, by exacerbating the public’s population anxieties.82

The small size and narrow geographical distribution of the white population meant white migration could not be easily hidden. These white migration patterns provided the momentum behind many of Rhodesia’s most dramatic political events. Smith was able to carry out an internal coup within the Rhodesian Front in April 1964, for example, partly because of the public disappointment over Winston Field’s inability to stem white emigration, or more aptly, his failure to obscure emigration with immigration.83 In his first press conference after being asked to form a new government following Field’s dismissal, Smith said his first task was to deal with the restoration of confidence to get the economy moving and stop the white exodus.84

Neither was the demographic pressure of white flight hidden from the British. During independence negotiations at 10 Downing Street in September 1964, Smith candidly told Alec Douglas Home and Duncan Sandys that Rhodesia ‘had got to have her independence; otherwise, the territory would continue to run downhill economically and the European in Southern Rhodesia would end up by writing it off completely’.85 A year later, on 7 October 1965, Smith made the point more bluntly to Harold Wilson that independence for Rhodesia ‘was a matter of life and death for Europeans in Rhodesia since the only alternative they saw to independence was their eventual departure’.86 The following day, he again framed independence as a necessary means to keep whites in Rhodesia: ‘If they did not obtain independence, [Europeans] would have to leave Rhodesia.’87 These were candid admissions, and ones that fundamentally undermined Smith’s moral claim to white independence: that Rhodesia was by right a white man’s country and that white Rhodesians had no other place to go. Under his own admission, were independence not granted by the British, or taken by Smith himself, whites would simply pack up their cars and leave. This was hardly a compelling moral claim, but it was at least honest.
Britain never granted legal independence even after these pleas, so Smith took it illegally. The role of white flight in this decision to seize illegal independence was open and obvious at the time. Asked a decade later what he thought was his greatest achievement in office, Smith responded:

I would say that UDI was part of it, but I think the greatest achievement – and I am happy to have played my part in it – was restoring to Rhodesians the confidence in their own country which we found they had lost when we came to power … We found that Rhodesians were leaving because they had no more confidence in the political future of their country … I believe this government has succeeded in changing that. We first of all had to stem the tide of people leaving. Then we turned the tide, and I am happy to say we regained more than we lost … I believe this more than anything else is the greatest achievement that the RF government can claim. I believe we saved Rhodesia.88

According to Smith, the demographic turnaround from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s indicated the overall success of the settler state. UDI was considered a factor in this success, but only in so far as it helped to restore confidence in white rule such that the white population would stay and even grow. In a September 1975 interview, Smith again cast UDI as primarily an effort to stabilise the white population and to secure the future of white Rhodesia, and attributed the Rhodesian Front under his leadership as saving Rhodesia by convincing whites to stay put.89 Yet, as previously detailed, stable white population levels did not mean that whites were staying put but that new residents were arriving, in a manner characteristic of Rhodesia’s long-standing population shuffle.

In the settlement talks Rhodesian Front politicians consistently asserted that whites in Rhodesia were there to stay, and that they had nowhere else to go. But this was very publicly undermined by the increase in emigration that occurred soon after Smith’s triumphant interviews in the mid 1970s, which was again exposed by falling immigration. Rhodesians clearly had somewhere else to go, and were going there at a fast pace. As Frank Clements observed as early as 1969: ‘For all that has been made of the claim, it is not and never was true for the majority of white Rhodesians that they have “no other home” … [W]hite Rhodesians in the final analysis more closely resemble expatriates than patriots.’90 Clements claimed that white Rhodesians, because of their transience and lack of loyalty, had more in common with the white communities of India or West Africa rather than those of the former white dominions with which Rhodesia so self-consciously sought to
associate itself. This inherent frailty of white Rhodesia could be hidden or obscured during good times, but not when things turned bad as they did after the mid 1970s.

As the white population decreased after the mid 1970s it was accompanied by a feeling of decline and decay which was a distinct change from the past, even from the period marking the end of the Federation. An editorial in the *Herald* from June 1976 distinguished these two phases:

> Although European emigration from Rhodesia in recent months in no way matches the exodus of the early 1960s, the growing number of departures is disturbing … It is inevitable in present circumstances that many people should want to leave: they see no prospect of the political or security situation improving. Some, no doubt, believe it will even deteriorate – and nobody can guarantee that this will not happen.

In 1978 former prime minister Roy Welensky reflected the fears of many when he said that Rhodesian emigration was the ‘haemorrhage that will bleed us to death.’ The newly exposed emigration was making these prophecies of decline self-fulfilling.

While white retention rates had long been considered an indicator of the overall well-being of the settler regime, this was turned on its head in the final months before independence. Retaining the white population came to be the central purpose of the internal settlement regime, and halting emigration became an end in itself. Shortly before the creation of the short-lived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the Combined Operation Headquarters issued a top secret ‘Total National Strategy Directive’, outlining the long-term strategy for the new government. As expressed in this comprehensive plan, the prime objective of the security forces and every ministry was to ‘retain the confidence of whites … in order to prevent an exodus’. Indeed, this was the only goal common to all the separate ministerial reports. When seen in this light, the raison d’être of the end of the post-UDI experiment was perhaps less about maintaining white rule to safeguard the interests of the settler population than about maintaining the settler population to safeguard white rule.

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**Engineering Emigration**

Given the perception that migration was so closely connected to the political fortunes of Rhodesia, it is not surprising that efforts were made by both proponents and opponents of the settler regime to engineer white
emigration. Rhodesian legislation aiming to halt white emigration in the
1960s took the form of erecting obstacles that were regarded simply as a
nuisance by residents, such as making it illegal to emigrate with a vehicle
that still had payments left on it.95 By the mid 1970s, however, restric-
tions included a dramatic drop in the allowances that emigrants were
allowed to take out of the country.96 Strict exchange controls also made it
very difficult to obtain foreign currency, making preparations for foreign
travel or departure that much more difficult. In 1975 the onus of proving
compliance with exchange controls was shifted from the government to
emigrants themselves.97 These restrictions were greatly resented by many
Rhodesians, but efforts to combat them were hampered by the fact that
those most affected had little political clout. Why would the state defer to
the interests of whites intending to leave the state? Nevertheless, the rules
were widely circumvented by emigrants officially leaving the country for
reasons other than emigration and/or by sneaking out assets.98 For exam-
ple, in the late 1970s precious stones in Salisbury were sold for three to
four times their actual value because they could be easily sneaked out.99
An emigrant from Rhodesia in the 1970s said the restrictions ‘turned just
about everybody into crooks’.100 The creative avoidance of emigration
restrictions came to form a part of a diaspora myth among ex-Rhodesians
across the globe, who oddly evoke patriotic pride by displaying their inge-
nuity in evading not only international economic sanctions but also their
own domestic restrictions.101

The increased call-ups for national service meant that a large percent-
age of emigrants were of conscription age. In response, the government
restricted foreign travel for young men and limited foreign schooling, and
the Defence Act was amended to make it an offence for a man to leave
Rhodesia after having received call-up papers. It was hoped that this and
other measures would encourage South Africa to extradite offenders back to
Rhodesia.102 In 1975 Ian Smith sent a personal note to South Africa’s Prime
Minister, John Vorster, asking for help with Rhodesia’s emigration problem,
stating:

I believe that I should put you in the picture regarding the deteriorat-
ing security situation here, the most serious aspect of which is our
shortage of manpower. A major factor is the continuing emigration –
mostly to South Africa – of young men of military age, many of
whom are trained soldiers. This has seriously reduced our effective
potential force level …103
Smith went on to ask for South African aid in stopping the flow. Thereafter, though South Africa publicly denied any secret deal with Rhodesia to deny residency to Rhodesian men with military commitments, some such men were nonetheless sent back to Rhodesia for technical immigration violations. Rhodesia’s restrictions on emigration were later extended to include any non-African aged 18–25 who had not yet completed national service. Later in 1976, the National Service Act was amended again to restrict even the departure of 16-year-old boys. In the last gasp of settler rule, Prime Minister Muzorewa proposed that emigrating Rhodesians should pay a fine of RH$20,000 if they wished to re-enter Rhodesia at a later date, though this was not enacted.

These restrictions made many Rhodesians feel like prisoners. The Herald likened the Defence Amendment Act to the ‘Berlin Wall’, and accused the government of ‘lowering the portcullis to keep civilian soldiers in against their will’. An African MP caused an uproar in Parliament by supporting greater emigration restrictions precisely because they would cause more whites to leave. The Herald agreed in July 1976 that increased restrictions could actually have the effect of dislodging whites by making them feel trapped and lowering their morale. The restrictions also adversely effected immigration drives. But the immediate need for manpower outweighed other long-term considerations, and the state even reduced the so-called ‘grace’ period in which new immigrants were free from military service obligations, from five years to two years.

Legal sanctions were bolstered by social sanctions within Rhodesia, as prospective emigrants were accused of cowardice and disloyalty. State officials described emigrants as casualties of the psychological war. In a series of speeches given in the embattled Centenary area of north-eastern Rhodesia in 1975, a cabinet minister referred to those who fled Rhodesia when times were difficult as ‘Rainbow boys’. By the summer of 1976 Smith personally pleaded with whites to ‘Stay on’. Further measures were taken to convince whites to stay in Rhodesia through the desperate letter campaign discussed earlier, which was conducted by the Department of Immigration. Based on Benjamin Franklin’s dictum that an emigrant saved was an immigrant earned, white residents intending to leave received mailings of literature as if they were prospective immigrants. In addition, media advertisements unrelentingly promoted the benefits of life in Rhodesia concluding that ‘Once you are a Rhodesian, no other land will do’. One wonders though to what extent those who protested the loudest against emigrants were actually underneath grumbling ‘There but for the Grace of Ian Smith go I’.
White Rhodesian demographics were viewed with equal interest in the international arena. The link between the fate of the illegal regime in Rhodesia and the racial composition of that territory was not lost on the United Nations. In 1968 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 253. Article 13 of this resolution read:

[The UN Security Council] Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take all possible measures to prevent activities by their nationals and persons in their territories promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to Southern Rhodesia, with a view to stopping such emigration.118

This unprecedented clause restricting emigration to a targeted territory was a clear acknowledgement that Rhodesia’s prime vulnerability was its reliance on a demographic juggling act. Because of constant emigration, new white immigrants were crucial to the state’s survival. As Chapter 5 explains, Resolution 253, and Britain’s domestic enabling legislation, had their intended effect on the ability of the regime to replenish white numbers lost through emigration.119 This resolution, and its effect on the regime, also reveals the hollowness of the white Rhodesian we’ll-go-it-alone bravado, as they could never truly go it alone lest their white population dry up completely.

African nationalists likewise appreciated the significance of white demography. In February 1972 Bishop Abel Muzorewa explained the ANC’s opposition to the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposal to the UN Security Council, and urged member states to enforce UN Resolution 253 discouraging white immigration to Rhodesia, on the grounds that continued immigration only bolstered the regime.120 Muzorewa argued that Africans would be willing to forego the monetary aid included in the settlement package, as it would be better spent paying for the repatriation of whites unwilling to live under majority rule. His ‘golden parachute’ proposal for whites, while never implemented, was reconsidered in different forms over the next eight years, most intriguingly by Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere in 1979.121

African leaders appreciated fully the manpower weaknesses suffered by the state, and interpreted high white emigration rates as positive indicators. Inducing emigration was also part of ZANU and ZANLA guerrillas’ military strategy, as Herbert Chitepo explained in 1973:

The strategic aim [of the guerrillas] … is to attenuate the enemy forces by causing their deployment over the whole country. The subsequent
mobilisation of large numbers of civilians from industry, business, and agriculture would cause serious economic problems. This would have a psychologically devastating effect on the morale of whites, most of whom had come to Zimbabwe lured by the prospect of the easy privileged life promised by the regime.\textsuperscript{122}

ZAPU’s political newspaper, the \textit{Zimbabwe Review}, argued, ‘In Zimbabwe, white settlers are seriously affected by the liberation war and are leaving the country in large numbers. This affects the manpower reservoir on which the Smith regime depends for its fascist army.’\textsuperscript{123} By instilling fear in the white populace, ZANLA guerrillas sought to force an exodus that would further thin white resources, and to this end they were quite successful, especially in the border regions. One white farmer put the targeting of the border areas this way:

\begin{quote}
People in Salisbury don’t really know what the terrorist war is like. They regard it as they did the war in Vietnam – it’s remote and doesn’t touch them. What they don’t seem to realise is that we are standing between them and urban terrorism.\textsuperscript{124}
\end{quote}

Writing about the eastern border regions near Mozambique, David Caute describes the fear and siege mentality of white settlers living there, who had sandbags piled up against bedroom walls to provide some level of protection against the constant threat of guerrilla attacks.\textsuperscript{125}

The British also paid close attention to Rhodesian demographics. White numbers were discussed and analysed on the floor of Parliament, within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in Cabinet meetings.\textsuperscript{126} Prior to, and immediately after UDI, the British government thought that Rhodesia was headed irreversibly towards majority rule. In preparing for such a scenario, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office debated how best to handle the inevitable white exodus from an African-ruled Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{127} Prime Minister Harold Wilson called upon his diplomats to see if Australia would be prepared to offer assisted passage for white Rhodesians in the same way as they did to skilled British citizens.\textsuperscript{128} There were also feasibility studies on various schemes for compensating whites if they sought to escape African rule. Foreign and Commonwealth Office analysts researched French compensation packages for Algerian colonists, and earlier British schemes for the buy-out of white Kenyans.\textsuperscript{129} But how to best facilitate white emigration without inadvertently providing a safety net to intransigent white residents was in practice a tricky line to negotiate.\textsuperscript{130}
The Collapse of Rhodesia

After UDI seemed a semi-permanent state of affairs, the primary focus turned away from humanitarian evacuations in the event of majority rule, and towards clandestine measures for inducing emigration as a means to bringing about majority rule.Over the course of the 1970s British officials contemplated several strategies to lure whites from Rhodesia, with the aim of weakening the regime. One such scheme was floated by the Ambassador to South Africa, Sir Arthur Snelling, in October 1972, immediately after the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement was quashed, but prior to the escalation of the war. Snelling called on Britain to buy out young, skilled Rhodesian whites to force Smith to negotiate. His proposal sparked a flurry of activity in the FCO, but was eventually rejected as being too expensive, too difficult to conduct given that Rhodesia appeared secure, and because it could have the unintended effect of draining the very whites most likely to be amenable to a political settlement. Moreover, it was argued that any emigrants who were bought out would simply be replaced, given that Rhodesia was ‘apparently prepared to accept any number of Afrikaners and Mediterranean immigrants’. The conclusion was reached, therefore, that ‘some scheme to help whites out of Rhodesia (for good) may eventually be needed, but this will be when Rhodesia already looks like [it is] becoming a black country’. Though not named as such, this reasoning was based largely on the Hirschmanian idea of encouraging internal voices of resistance within Rhodesia, instead of enticing those people away who might ‘raise hell’.

In 1974 this buy-out idea was reintroduced in the FCO, as some of the earlier barriers to induced emigration seemed to have disappeared. Most importantly, by 1974 white Rhodesians’ sense of security was severely compromised by the escalation of the war and the Lisbon coup, which opened up Rhodesia’s entire border with Mozambique to hostile forces, and the regime found greater difficulty in replacing the emigrants who left with new immigrants. Furthermore, Harold Wilson returned to power in February 1974, and was determined to bring an end to the Rhodesian problem that had plagued his first term. These factors combined to make feasible a new effort to bring down the regime through emigration inducements. Once again, it was agreed that a covert buy-out plan presented insurmountable logistical problems. Instead, a secret propaganda campaign should be formulated by the Information Research Department of the FCO for distribution to the press inside and outside of Africa communicating to whites in Rhodesia that ‘the future looks black [for them]’. It is difficult to trace the
effects of this propaganda on actual emigration numbers, as the targeted recipients themselves would not have known the source. Nevertheless, this campaign clearly displays the importance the British attached to white Rhodesian demography.

Rhodesian population matters remained front and centre for Western politicians and diplomats throughout the settlement dramas and until the conclusion of the war. Initially, Western policy-makers thought that the best strategy was to encourage the exodus of whites in order to force the settler state back to the negotiating table. Snelling’s buy-out plan and the IRD’s propaganda campaign fit into this mode of thinking. In addition, in early 1976, the US government and then the British High Commission in Lusaka issued statements instructing their citizens to leave Rhodesia for their own safety, both of which were dismissed by the Rhodesian state as efforts at ‘psychological warfare’.¹³⁷

Events in Angola in the summer of 1976 added a new urgency to the Rhodesian problem in the eyes of Western diplomats and politicians, and the continued defiance of the minority regime took on a broader significance. Although the changes in the region meant white Rhodesians could be more easily induced to leave, their presence began to be viewed as essential to the political and economic survival of a free Zimbabwe. Supporting this argument was the view that whites would be more willing to surrender if they were assured of a future for them under African rule. There was also concern that enough dissenters remain in Rhodesia to put internal pressure on the regime. This reasoning underpinned the delicate policy of essentially paying whites to stay on in a free Zimbabwe, and Henry Kissinger crafted a proposal that included an incentive plan aimed at keeping whites in the country.¹³⁸ A 1976 draft of Kissinger’s settlement proposals circulated to the Rhodesians stated: ‘It is central to the long-term success of the move to majority government to provide reasonable assurances to the White minority that it has a future in Zimbabwe.’ Furthermore, these assurances should ‘maximize incentives for Europeans to stay rather than leave immediately’.¹³⁹ Shortly after the Kissinger plan became known, Australia, also acting as one of Job’s Comforters, publicly offered to open their doors to any white Rhodesians who wanted to leave, either before or after majority rule, an offer that was not well received by Rhodesians. Although the Kissinger initiative ultimately failed at the Geneva Peace talks, the idea of being bribed into accepting African rule was not as indignantly dismissed by Rhodesians in the mid 1970s as it had been immediately after UDI, a testament to Rhodesia’s deteriorating political confidence.¹⁴⁰
At different times Western politicians had proposed to pay white residents to leave, offered to pay them to stay, or suggested giving residents the choice. Yet these seemingly contradictory policies can be reconciled by understanding the shifting significance of whites in Rhodesia and the timing of their exit. It was always taken for granted that the size of the white population directly correlated with the success of whichever government was in power. The West was fearful both of the continuation of the embarrassing settler regime and of a dilapidated Zimbabwe ripe for communist intervention, and saw a sizable white population as a bulwark against communism and an assurance of stability. But most immediately, the regime had to be weakened enough to negotiate its own surrender. The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 that finally ended the war sought to reassure white anxiety and win acceptance for the Agreement by entrenching existing property rights and providing for the possibility of a new fund to finance land redistribution. With the settler regime fully defeated, the earlier concerns over white demography were transformed into a new and perhaps stickier issue of post-independence land reform.

Conclusion
Former prime minister Godfrey Huggins once described white society in Rhodesia as a white island in a black sea. This evocation of white isolation and racial numerical disparity was apt in some respects, yet it also created a false image of constancy and solidity. Unlike a firmly grounded island, white society in Rhodesia was always shifting and shuffling. This characteristic transience was not of grave concern to the early settler governments, as Rhodesia was then an extension of the wider British imperial system. As British imperial policy regarding African decolonisation changed in the late 1950s, however, Rhodesian governments began to read more significance into white demography. Population issues came to be regarded as closely connected to the fate of the minority-ruled Rhodesian settler state, existing as it did in an increasingly African-ruled continent. Winston Field’s inability to reverse migration losses provided part of the impetus for his replacement by Ian Smith in 1964, and UDI was, in large part, an effort to stabilise the white population. Smith’s early years in power were publicly lauded as a success because he was perceived to have restored white settlers’ confidence, turning net migration losses into net gains. As Smith’s first decade in power came to a close, however, migration gains reverted to losses, and new information on the widening gap between white and African demographic trends invoked older fears of whites being ‘swamped’ by Africans, while also introducing new uncertainty about the viability
of white Rhodesia in post-colonial Africa. Although the Rhodesian state tried to discourage white emigration, some of its policies were counterproductive and actually reinforced whites’ culture of transience. The war, by exacerbating pre-existing strains and creating unbearable new pressures, exposed the vulnerability of white society. White Rhodesia is perhaps best thought of not as a firm island but as a floating mat of thick vegetation, which might have appeared in calmer waters to be a grounded land mass, yet which was seen during stormier weather to loosen and break apart rather easily.
The most crucial competition in Rhodesia’s war of numbers was between the Africans’ rate of natural increase and the whites’ rate of net migration. It was immigration which was tasked with refilling Rhodesia’s population at a rate faster than the constant emigration drain from the bottom and fast enough to supplement the sluggish white birth rate. Despite this great reliance on white immigration to mask emigration, increase the white population, and keep pace with African natural increase, the Rhodesian state suffered from numerous legal, political, economic, and logistical barriers to their effective promotion and absorption of white immigration.

Immigration was the Rhodesian white population’s greatest source of growth. Within white population growth, immigration formed a massive percentage compared against the whites’ rate of natural increase. Even when compared with other so-called ‘immigrant-hungry’ populations, Rhodesia’s reliance on immigration stood apart. For example, from 1955 through 1972 net migration gains in Rhodesia accounted for over 60 per cent of total white population growth, and this figure includes five years of net migration losses. In comparison, Australia’s net migration gains for the same years accounted for only 35 per cent of its total population growth. In South Africa from 1960 to 1970, immigration accounted for only 32 per cent of total white population growth. Rhodesia’s reliance on migration was further reinforced by the precipitous drop in white birth rates through the 1960s and 1970s, again at a rate divergent from other similarly situated settler states.
In addition to its significant practical value to the state, positive white population growth was also of immeasurable psychological importance for white Rhodesians. As John Stone observed in the South African context: ‘Small shifts in numbers take on an actual as well as symbolic importance which can no way be related to their absolute size.’ The same was certainly true with Rhodesia. It was widely stated at the time that white immigration was a ‘barometer’ for the political fortune of Rhodesia. The two-time Minister of Immigration, P. K. Van der Byl, for example, described immigration as ‘a delicate barometer of Rhodesia’s self-confidence, and whenever this was less positive the barometer reacted immediately’. Echoing this metaphor on the floor of the British Parliament, MP Bruce George stated in 1975 that ‘Immigration to and emigration from Rhodesia provides a good barometer of the morale of the population.’ Correctly reading the white migration trends for a month, quarter, or year could reflect, it was felt, the general well-being of the country. The perception of stability and confidence provided by these whites ‘voting-with-their-feet’ in turn created more stability and more confidence in Rhodesia. Another snowball effect was that, with more immigrants, Rhodesia’s overseas networks grew exponentially, which provided for more potential immigrants, as it was usually those with pre-existing connections who tended to immigrate and stay. Positive immigration bolstered the idea that a white-ruled Rhodesia was permanent and secure, and strengthened Ian Smith’s hand in negotiations during his innumerable settlement talks. Immigration exuded vitality. In the very same ways, however, falling immigration numbers had the opposite effect: it conveyed national illness and decay. Rhodesia would experience this reverse snowball effect from the mid 1970s onwards. A high rate of immigration in Rhodesia was consequently an end in itself: not merely was it indicative of well-being, but it was a cause of well-being, and instead of comparing immigration to a barometer which measured the climate, perhaps it would be more apt to compare it to a thermostat which changed the climate.

The Migration Market
The Rhodesian state did not formulate its immigration policy in a vacuum. White Rhodesians, inside and outside government, were all too aware of the global and regional migration markets in which they were vying for immigrants. On the north side of the Strand in London, between the imposing South Africa House on the western end of the Strand and the equally massive Australia House on its eastern end, stood Rhodesia House, a narrow, and rather unimpressive five-story building. This was the symbol of the Rhodesian state in London, and the main clearing house for potential
immigrants to Rhodesia, where the London-based staff would process and vet immigrants. After UDI, Rhodesia House’s legal status was highly ambiguous; its staff was allowed to perform some, but not all, of the functions formerly afforded to them; most importantly, they could not handle any immigration matters, either promotion or vetting.\textsuperscript{11} By the late 1960s Rhodesia House was the site of frequent anti-apartheid and anti-UDI protests, sit-ins, and even violent damage. On several occasions youths shimmed up the flag pole and replaced the Rhodesian flag with the Union Jack. In the summer of 1969, following the passage of the referendum on the Rhodesian republican constitution, Britain ordered Rhodesia House to be closed for good and emptied of all staff. Even so, the building continued to be a site of protests and political demonstrations throughout the 1970s and became a sort of totem for the anti-UDI and anti-apartheid movements. Both the Rhodesian and international media followed these stories about the fate of Rhodesia House with great interest.\textsuperscript{12} Not five hundred yards in either direction from the besieged and eventually abandoned Rhodesia House, Australia House, New Zealand House, and South Africa House were welcoming record numbers of British emigrants.

Rhodesia House was not simply a symbol of the regime’s immigration difficulties but also a reflection of Rhodesia’s isolation and international pariah status. This difficulty in breaking out of isolation and the negative perception of Rhodesia greatly harmed the state’s immigration efforts. Even so, white Rhodesia was still keenly, possibly even masochistically, interested in the progress of their migration competitors. In this vein, the \textit{Rhodesia Herald} regularly reported on the immigration numbers attracted by the former white dominions and regional rivals like Zambia, and it is clear that Rhodesians were fully aware of the strong competition for skilled immigrants and readily understood their limitations in these global and regional markets.

There were two major populations from which Rhodesia sought to attract immigrants: whites already in Africa, and whites from outside Africa. Regionally, Africa had a population of migratory whites who freely floated from one African country to another depending upon job opportunities and political conditions.\textsuperscript{13} Most of these whites were of British origin, but their loyalty was neither to any one African country, nor to Britain as it then existed. Jan Morris humorously described this wider itinerant population inside and outside of Africa as being imperial bums, those loiterers, beachcombers and scavengers who roamed the Empire from end to end … and the same rogue Briton might turn up in Queensland and Borneo, Egypt and Rhodesia,
wherever the presence of the Empire gave him some nominal protec-
tion and privilege.14

Those itinerant whites already in Africa were much more responsive to both positive and negative trends in Rhodesia, with some moving in to the territory during good times and off to better opportunities during bad times, if not perhaps to Borneo, then more likely to South Africa or Zambia or further north. As greater Africanisation of the civil service and other jobs occurred among many of the African colonies to the north of Rhodesia, especially after political independence came, more and more white settlers were emptied into this itinerant population.

No population better exemplified the transition from an ‘immigrant hungry’ settler community to a supply-side immigrant pool than Kenya – from the hunters to the hunted. Before independence in 1963 colonial Kenya had suffered even greater disadvantages in the migration market than did Rhodesia. Even in light of these disadvantages, settlers in Kenya were determined to make that colony a ‘white man’s country’, and they pushed hard for the colonial government to promote immigration.15 Various land settlement schemes were initiated to bring in whites, and in the late 1940s and early 1950s Kenya averaged 2,500 immigrants coming in annually.16 From the end of World War II to the mid 1950s, Kenya’s white population rose from 17,900 to 55,700.17 Yet just as Kenya’s white numbers were steadily rising, the Mau Mau Emergency began in 1952, raising serious fears about Kenya’s stability. Because of these fears many whites began carrying guns in holsters strapped to their hips for protection, and on the isolated farms across the colony nearly all whites slept with guns near their beds.18 Kenya would then discover the axiom sooner than Rhodesia: that all things being equal, few people prefer to move to a war zone. Yet as late as 1958 advertisements still appeared in British newspapers encouraging Britons to settle in East Africa.19

In response to the Mau Mau Emergency, both its outbreak and its brutal repression, the British Colonial Office decided that independence under majority rule needed to be hastened. On British prompting, the armed forces and the civil service began to be Africanised at a faster rate, which led to greater white flight. One policeman who collected his lump-sum compensation payments and was leaving Kenya wrote the following poem:

Farewell and adieu to you, Kenya coppers,
Farewell and adieu to you lads left behind,
For we’ve opted to go, under ‘limited lumpers’,


Rhodesia and other settler communities tried vigorously to attract these Kenyan whites. South Africa, for instance, even waived customs duties on Kenyan immigrants’ furniture, cars, farm machinery, and other items, and offered incentives for them to purchase South African farms. As discussed below, Rhodesia offered assisted passage schemes and other incentives designed to attract these and other whites leaving African countries in the wake of decolonisation.

Even with South Africa’s magnetic draw on white migrants, Rhodesia was much more successful in attracting immigrants from the pool of migratory African whites, especially in re-attracting one-time residents, than from outside Africa. But this was always a slippery population to hold onto. A Herald editorial from 1968 emphasised the transience of this white African population:

In the wider-visioned days of the ’40s and ’50s the drain of Europeans from one part of Africa to another was not a prime target of Immigration Ministers. It was recognised that these migrants moved as jobs offered and would soon try their luck over yet another of the many horizons offering … In the event, ‘white’ Africa has drawn back to the Zambezi and suitable horizons are scarce; much effort is now being made by individual countries to attract as many as possible of the Europeans leaving the remaining white pockets of the ‘black’ continent.

The editorial went on to ask why Rhodesia should not now try to attract and retain these people. Indeed, this article chimed with what some white Rhodesians saw as the opportunity that was presented by the decolonisation of colonies with large settler communities to the north of them, such as the Congo, Kenya, Zambia, and so on, if Rhodesia could collect these displaced whites. Potentially, these former colonies’ losses could have been Rhodesia’s gain.

However, in attracting these migrants, Rhodesia was at an enormous disadvantage to its powerful southern neighbour. Internally, South Africa was much more secure than Rhodesia politically, economically, and demographically, and it was also legally independent and recognised as a state in the international community. As the power centre of southern Africa, it served as a way station and final destination for many of the whites in this
displaced migratory population. When Kenya and Zambia became independent in the early 1960s, those territories’ whites made up the bulk of South Africa’s immigration numbers, and South Africa would later collect most of the whites fleeing from Rhodesia when the war intensified in the 1970s. South Africa averaged net inflows of 30,000 whites annually, a large number of those arriving from Africa. In contrast, Rhodesia never grossed more than 15,000 in white immigration in any one year. From 1946 to 1982 South Africa attracted a total of 1,029,546 immigrants, dwarfing Rhodesia’s intake. South Africa thus served as the primary collecting bin for disaffected whites in Africa, who when shaken from their imperial residences tumbled down to the bottom of the continent, even as Rhodesia tried to snatch them as they fell past.

South Africa was also by far both the greatest source of immigrants to, and emigrants from, Rhodesia. As such, it was always a great concern among many Rhodesians that South Africans not ‘poach’ whites from Rhodesia, even while Rhodesia attempted to poach whites from African countries to the north. In the more self-assured days of the Federation, Rhodesians resisted the temptation to poach Kenyan whites out of concern to not weaken a fellow British dependency. This brotherly regard for fellow members of the Commonwealth soon faded, however, as Rhodesia became more desperate for white immigrants. Ironically, it was out of this same brotherly regard that Rhodesia pleaded with the white dominions to leave their whites alone. To assuage Rhodesian fears of poaching, representatives of South Africa, and even of Australia, periodically reassured the Rhodesian state that there would be no government efforts to ‘poach’ their whites. Nonetheless, the southern pull on Rhodesia remained strong.

In the case of white immigrants from outside Africa, Rhodesia was a much less attractive destination than the former white dominions. Interest in moving overseas ran high in Britain, and British migration to the former dominions was robust from the mid 1960s to the early 1970s. This was ruefully realised to be the case by Rhodesians at the time, as migration patterns were regularly tracked in the popular press. A British poll conducted in 1966 asked Britons, ‘Have you ever seriously considered going to settle in another country?’ Of the respondents, 30 per cent answered ‘Yes’. Of that 30 per cent, 42 per cent said they had considered Australia, 27 per cent New Zealand, 24 per cent Canada, 6 per cent the USA, 5 per cent South Africa, and only 2 per cent considered Rhodesia.

In the global migration market Rhodesia was poorly positioned to take advantage of British migration trends. During these very active years of British emigration of the late 1960s and early 1970s Rhodesia suffered from
self-inflicted wounds which inhibited the state’s ability to attract and hold onto migrants. These wounds all came from Smith’s decision to declare UDI at the end of 1965, when British immigration was beginning to flow in at a swift pace. Paradoxically, Rhodesia needed UDI to hold current residents and what attractiveness Rhodesia did possess for new migrants was intimately connected to the country’s racist political and economic structure that UDI solidified. Yet these racial structures represented an ideology that was very controversial in most of the immigrant supply countries, particularly Britain, and these same policies also rendered Rhodesia’s long-term future uncertain. International sanctions and Rhodesia’s negative international image after UDI also severely hampered large-scale immigration from Europe, even while the economic crises of the mid 1970s increased the general attractiveness of emigration as an option for many Europeans. Even among those people overseas interested in Rhodesia as a destination, many were confused by, if not fully dissuaded by, the complex and shadowy process of moving to an illegal regime, in which emigration was subject to international sanctions and often prohibited by domestic enabling legislation in the country of origin. As a result of the difficulties in attracting large numbers of Europeans, Rhodesia’s immigration policy was forced to rely heavily upon whites in Africa, a population which was both fickle and not very large.

The politically uncertain future of Rhodesia after its illegal declaration was identified to be a hindrance to Rhodesia’s success in the migration market long before the escalation of the military war. Ironically, it had been argued by Rhodesian Front politicians in and out of government before UDI that only by declaring illegal independence could the state boost Rhodesia’s flagging immigration numbers. A Herald editorial from 1967, commenting on the recent drive for skilled immigrants, stated:

[The Minister of Immigration] particularly wants the professional men and women – doctors and nurses, teachers and engineers – as well as technicians and artisans and men with capital. So does every country in the world, South Africa included. Rhodesia would stand a better chance of attracting money and new brain – even of re-capturing the brain drained from her during the past few years – if she were politically acceptable to the main sources of the trained men she must have. Given a constitutional settlement there is a chance of attracting the skills which the Minister affirms are essential.

This exposes the central dilemma in the state’s immigration policy: that Rhodesia could neither conform to world opinion and be ‘politically acceptable’
by surrendering white supremacy and repudiating UDI and with it their primary economic appeal, nor could they protect white privilege and remain a pariah state indefinitely, especially as Rhodesia’s peculiar demographic juggling act relied upon a steady flow of new immigrants to replace those leaving.

Rhodesia’s four main selling points to potential immigrants inside and outside Africa were its warm and sunny climate; the freedom to start a new life without the constraints of dour, socialist, post-war Britain; an anachronistic imperial lifestyle; and relatedly, an inflated material standard of living for whites. In fact, Britain’s weather did appear to be a major consideration in emigrants’ calculations of whether to leave, a sentiment that no one who has lived on that island for an extended period can condemn. An Australian official was quoted in 1964 as saying that their emigration drop that season ‘was entirely due to the better winter England has just experienced’. Other anecdotal evidence from Rhodesia confirms the importance of weather as a factor in moving. When asked why she was emigrating from Britain to Rhodesia, the 89-year-old Theresa Mahoney was quoted as saying: ‘To Hell with Wilson and Damn the Weather!’ But this first selling point of its sunny climate was just as easily made by Australia and South Africa, both of which also enjoyed long beautiful coastlines, while Rhodesia was landlocked. The reaction to various frustrations over life in post-war Britain expressed by Ms Mahoney was certainly another strong force driving out-migrations, but this impulse too did not uniquely advantage Rhodesia.

It was the last two related selling points, of being the last haven for anachronistic imperial values and promising an inflated standard of living for whites, which proved the most effective recruiting themes for Rhodesia. Only by promising a privileged status and significant material benefits for whites as compared against their countries of origin could Rhodesia remain at all competitive in the migration market. One example of this emphasis on material betterment was a large advertisement featured in a Dublin newspaper, as reported by the Herald. The advertisement’s text, which ran alongside a half-empty pint glass of beer read:

The 10,000 Irish in Rhodesia will be drowning the Shamrock tomorrow. Granted they have no Croke Park but they have just the weather to give them a powerful thirst. If you want a spacious home, good wages, reasonable taxation, first-class school, expert medical attention, help for the missus in the house and a bright sunny future for all. If you want assisted passages for yourself and your family if you qualify, and a two year special concession, where a family with two children can earn up to £1748 (£200 Sterling) tax-free, come out and have a pint.
Another advertisement from *The Spectator* magazine posted by the Rhodesian Department of Immigration Promotion in 1973 described Rhodesia as an imperial idyll out of time:

Rhodesia. It isn’t easy to find that haven to escape to any more. Most of the world’s idyllic retreats are getting a little tarnished – and prices aren’t what they were once, to say nothing of taxes. But there is one last retreat where Britain’s way of life is still treasured and life has a special tempo of its own. Where endless sunny days and peaceful ways let one forget the problems of life elsewhere. Rhodesia. A land of leisurely pursuits and sophisticated facilities; of outstanding service and good neighborliness; where money still goes a lot further and taxes are low. There are spacious homes, domestic help, modern health amenities, fast communications and uncrowded cities. The arts are catered for and sport is second to none, no matter what you fancy. Rhodesia is dedicated to preserving a way of life we all cherish. We would like you to be a part of it.41

Another example of this marketing style, which emphasises more explicitly the material benefits whites could expect in Rhodesia, can be found in the following 1970 advertisement, placed in the American-based *Newsweek* magazine:

Promote Yourself. Why wait for promotion? Promote yourself out of the rat race and into your kind of future. Then go to the top, fast in Rhodesia. You’ll get higher wages, lower taxes; more take home pay that goes further in a country where almost everything costs less. On top of this you’ll enjoy one of the world’s highest standards of living in a booming, stable country. And a sun-filled, outdoors way of life. Move now, before the rush. Rhodesia offers a chance to move up in your field; to take greater responsibility and be well paid for it. The rapidly expanding economy means plenty of room for top talent in almost every field. And there are incentives for immigrants: Assisted passages, substantial tax abatements in your first two financial years; lower cost of living because of cheaper food and lower rents; excellent medical services, good schools, a wide variety of entertainment and sport – and almost 12 months a year of sunshine! Go Places in Rhodesia.42

With this style of immigration promotion, the state was at times accused of over-selling Rhodesia to prospective immigrants. There is some evidence that this over-selling and the deflated expectations of new immigrants
occurred in the early 1970s, when many newcomers left soon after arrival and publicly aired their disappointment in the Rhodesian press. The connection between these methods of promotion and the resultant disappointment followed by emigration was identified by several African MPs. In 1976 one opposition MP pointed out that, ‘because of the bright picture which is being painted of Rhodesia, which is exaggerated, when these people come into the country they do not find this brightness and they are bound to fly by night’. Another opposition MP argued that these promotional materials highlighted the desperation of the state, especially when compared against other demand-side nations’ literature. This flow of disappointed immigrants back to the supply-side countries was known to be very damaging to Rhodesia’s image abroad, especially to prospective immigrants. This further weakened their competitiveness in the migration market, especially since the state relied a great deal on word-of-mouth propaganda because its official propaganda in those countries was blocked by sanctions regulations. Despite this problem, however, the state still needed to convince immigrants go to Rhodesia instead of other destinations, and the risk of over-selling was thought to be worth taking.

The obsessive competition with the former white dominions for immigrants at times made Rhodesian officials adopt a compensatory bravado. For example, in 1970 Immigration Minister P.K. Van der Byl speciously claimed that Rhodesia’s intake actually surpassed Australia’s, though not in total numbers but only as a percentage of the total white population, which, considering Rhodesia’s total white population of 230,000, was hardly impressive. This bravado masked the state’s and white settler society’s deep anxieties about Rhodesia’s relative attractiveness in the migration market; a hopeful rejoinder often heard in explaining away emigration losses was that emigrating residents would before long realise the grass was not greener abroad and return. One returning emigrant described her stay in Britain and why she returned in an article in the Herald in 1979, saying: ‘It’s not funny when you’re paying £15 a week for a poky little room to be told by the Pakistani landlord that he’s going to ration your bathwater.’ On the basis of this and several other personal stories, this article and others preceding it optimistically suggested that many former residents were returning, ‘preferring to brave the uncertainties of a country at war than accept the way of life overseas’. In the event, the numbers did not support these anecdotal observations, and while returning residents always formed a significant percentage of total immigrants, and their horror stories of the outside world were widely repeated as evidence to stay put, it was never the case that most emigrants eventually returned.
Rhodesia's immigration woes were worsened by the escalation of the war in the winter of 1972. As explained in Chapter 4, immigrants still arrived in Rhodesia after the war escalated, but the perception abroad of Rhodesia as a potentially dangerous place did affect immigration yields. As Anthony Lake writes about the regime's immigration promotion: 'It [was] not enough for the regime to demonstrate that white Rhodesians can survive; it must demonstrate that white Rhodesians can survive comfortably as well …' The promotional work to reverse these perceptions of Rhodesia met with several barriers, including a foreign press interested primarily in the more headline-grabbing aspects of the guerrilla war and a system of sanctions regulations which precluded direct Rhodesian publicity abroad. The foreign press was roundly vilified by Rhodesian state officials as being biased in their reporting on the military conflict and the extent of the violence in Rhodesia. In response to how these negative associations overseas effected immigration, Ian Smith said that ‘it is amazing how people, including our friends from South Africa, are led to believe that it is dangerous to cross the border’. As a result, migrants looking for a comfortable destination most often looked elsewhere, and those who left most often never returned.

**Discourses Concerning Immigration**

The Rhodesian state viewed white immigration as crucial to the balancing of the country’s political and economic structure, even as there were significant disagreements within the white electorate, the RF, and state officials regarding the scale and nature of any immigration policy. Since the founding of the colony whites in Rhodesia had created racialised economic dichotomies to justify, maintain, and strengthen their hegemony over the African populace. Onto the white/African population dynamic had been grafted immutable pseudo-economic dualities set in opposition to one another, reflecting perceived divisions such as skilled/unskilled, capitalised/non-capitalised, entrepreneurial/non-entrepreneurial, and tax payers/social welfare drainers, which overlapped perfectly with race. The 1967 Sadie Report reworded these older biases into a more palatable language that was used to justify and defend the state’s racist immigration policy.

These pseudo-economic dualities provided a gloss for ostensibly non-racial defences of Rhodesia’s population policies, including white immigration. The Sadie Report concluded:

… economic development is fundamentally a function of the religious, social, and cultural values of a society and the psychological traits of its members, which together constitute a way of life. A study
of the Bantu peoples of Africa reveals the absence at this stage of most of those elements which are conducive to economic growth as an endogenous process … the professional and technical men and those skills and experience which are prerequisites to the employment of workers in the lower echelons of the skilled hierarchy, [cannot] simply be imparted to an economically under-developed people by way of a crash programme of education and instruction.\textsuperscript{52}

With the help of this new pseudo-economic language, the long-standing promotion of immigration to increase the white population was presented by the state as being apolitical, administrative, and bureaucratic – an exercise in cool-headed economics, rather than hot-headed bigotry. This rhetorical tightrope walk between blatant racism and economic development was succinctly expressed by a Rhodesian Front backbencher in 1969: ‘Immigration is vital to this country. It is vital that we close the population gap between the African on one side and the European on the other. I am not being racial in this. I am dealing with it from the point of view of the development of the country. The Europeans who come here develop the country and as they develop the country so employment opportunities occur for all races, not only for the European or the African.’\textsuperscript{53}

Immigration was additionally rationalised as a tremendous bargain vis-à-vis the endogenous training and schooling of Rhodesian whites. This was an argument offered during many of the budget debates over immigration. The Minister of Immigration, Harry Reedman, argued in 1965:

The cost of learning is high anywhere, but to bring in people who have learned various skills and techniques at the cost of other nations is clearly an advantage. We save instantly on their education and subsistence and accrue a stock-in-trade of their aggregate skills and take in these new assets on a ‘free on board’ basis. I would say, what a valuable consignment.\textsuperscript{54}

It was argued that immigration, even when calculating assisted passages and the settling-down costs for the state, was far cheaper than paying for the unproductive and expensive years of childhood and schooling, as was necessary with Rhodesian-born whites.\textsuperscript{55} Immigration was also seen as an inexpensive way to provide for an influx of foreign capital, and the amount of capital declared by recent immigrants was often set against the costs of assisted passages and presented as a great profit for Rhodesia. These two premises combined in immigration discourses to present
white immigrants as ready-made assets to the economy. As a result of these assumptions of racialised skills and potentialities, the state’s immigration policy was always defended as the simple, and on the surface non-political, syllogism: the economy needed skills and capital, only white people had the necessary skills and capital, and therefore the state’s policy was to attract only whites.

The stated premise of the racialised division of skills and potentialities upon which Rhodesia’s immigration policy rested was certainly not borne out in the evidence, either inside Rhodesia or outside, a reality regularly exposed by African MPs. Accordingly, government officials were often forced in Parliamentary debates to articulate tortured defences for the non-racist character of the government’s immigration policy. These exchanges played out in an oft-repeated rhetorical fencing match. Some officials were more adept and subtle in masking the policy’s racist character than others and the pseudo-economic cloak occasionally slipped revealing the baser racial motivations behind their policies. On one such occasion, an African MP asked the acting Immigration Minister whether, if it was skills and capital that Rhodesia was in such desperate need of, the government would consider importing skilled Africans from outside Rhodesia to fill openings, to which the acting Minister bluntly replied: ‘I would have thought [the questioner] had enough brains to realise the [government’s] position.’ A year prior, the Minister of Immigration replied to a similar question about bringing in skilled Africans to fill in critical openings in the economy by saying that attracting African immigrants, skilled or unskilled, would be ‘a case of bringing coals to Newcastle’. Yet these rare instances of candour remained the exception, and state officials uniformly denied any surreptitious racial motives in immigration, at least in public.

But behind closed doors, in Cabinet meetings and RF party gatherings, away from public glare, state officials contradicted their impassioned assertions of non-discrimination, and explicitly crafted an immigration policy based upon bringing in whites for political, not economic, reasons, with the goal of re-balancing racial ratios. In late October 1969, after the publication of both phases of the census, a resolution was carried unanimously at the Rhodesian Front Congress to make immigration less selective and to ensure that more jobs should be created for whites. Rhodesian Front Congresses had in the past always been very secretive and closed to the press, but this one was unique in that it was relatively well reported. The explicit policy of mass unselective immigration was carried unanimously, in sharp distinction to the government’s publicly stated immigration policy. Immigration Minister P.K. Van der Byl’s published address to the RF Congress
regarding this resolution provided an interesting and rare public look into the real thinking behind the government’s immigration policy. In his speech he claimed that his ministry ceaselessly received requests from industrialists to allow in Coloured skilled labour from South Africa: requests that he always turned down. Instead, he proposed allowing in unskilled whites and training them in skills once in Rhodesia, a proposition obviously contradicting both the government’s assertion that it was skills not race that was the guiding principle, and negating the bargain of importing ready-skilled immigrants over training indigenous residents. Indicating the direction of the RF’s immigration vision, he said he thought it ‘utterly deplorable’ that there was still a tendency to discriminate against non-British immigrants. He added that the government rejected the idea that Rhodesia must remain ‘as a preserve for the English way of life’. Instead, he called for an immigration policy that would be ‘as unselective as possible [for whites]’, denying residence only to ‘rogues, scalawags, and criminals’.59 This public glimpse of the secret official thinking of the government on immigration resulted in heated debates in Parliament, where Opposition MPs quoted Van der Byl’s words back to him, and the hostile response to his speech no doubt counselled future RF congresses to be held, as previous ones had been, behind closed doors.

Throughout the post-UDI period, and even after the anomalous 1969 RF Congress, the government continued to speak in ‘two tongues’ regarding immigration.60 To support their claim of the exclusively economic nature of immigration, state officials continued to assert that their policy was ‘selective’ in terms of targeting only individuals who would aid Rhodesia’s development. In this discourse on immigration, selectivity was contrasted with mass, ‘unselective’ immigration: the former being apolitical and economic and the latter being political and racial. Despite the government’s consistently stated policy of selective immigration, the primary, and arguably the sole, criterion for this selectiveness in immigration was race. Under what criteria except purely race could immigration officials justify the all-whites-but-scalawags policy? Indeed, in 1964 the Cabinet explicitly laid out the policy that the first requirement for immigrants was that they must be white.61 Also out of public view, it was reiterated that the policy for non-white immigration was that they would only ever be allowed in on exceptional circumstances of the entry being ‘in the national interest’ or for ‘humanitarian concerns’.62

The true character of Rhodesia’s immigration policies were heated topics of debate in Parliament, with thrusts and parries that were repeated every time immigration votes were up for Supply Committee debates.
One common line of attack on the state’s immigration policies was the de-linking of skills and capital with skin colour through the use of counter-examples. These efforts on the part of African MPs to de-link race from skills and capital entailed identifying both unskilled and poor white immigrants allowed in and also skilled and capitalised non-whites denied access. The purpose of this de-linking was to pierce the transparent economic rationales offered by the state, and reveal the racist character of its immigration policies. Responding to these critiques, state officials nearly always retorted with boilerplate non-answers that obfuscated the state’s true motives. The most salient thrusts and parries in Parliament regarding immigration were repeated throughout the post-UDI period, and are presented here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposition charge</th>
<th>Government response</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 The state’s immigration policy is racist and politically motivated.</td>
<td>The policy is non-racial and economically motivated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 The state is allowing in unskilled whites, who compete with Africans for jobs.</td>
<td>New immigrants create jobs for all Rhodesians, white and African.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 The state is allowing in poor whites, especially through the assisted passage schemes.</td>
<td>Immigrants are a net financial boon, even when calculating assisted passages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 The state is denying residence to skilled and wealthy non-whites.</td>
<td>The state has an interest in protecting indigenous jobs in Rhodesia by keeping non-white foreigners out. The state accepts hundreds of thousands of foreign migrants for work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 The state should educate the Rhodesian labour force to create new skills.</td>
<td>Education takes too long to address current needs, and immigration is cheaper in any case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 The state is allowing in whites with dubious moral character.</td>
<td>The state responds to criminality when it occurs, and most immigrants are hard-working people of good moral character.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite any emotional satisfaction derived from these periodic repartees, African MPs had little power to alter these policies. Nor indeed did the
occasional forced exposure of the state’s racist motivations, as with Van der Byl’s impolitic public statements from 1969, shock the wider white Rhodesian public, who no doubt already assumed and largely supported the underlying racial motivations. Perhaps a more interesting question was why state officials bothered to expend the energy in hiding their motivations and cloaking the connections between the various population policies at all? The answer likely was that the intended audiences for these rhetorical charades were the wider international community and the African population.

In a broad sense, this act of speaking with ‘two tongues’ can be explained as an attempted reconciliation of the two conflicting policy goals pursued by Smith after UDI: bolstering white power in Rhodesia and simultaneously winning international recognition. Though UDI removed some of the liberal constraints hampering Rhodesia’s racial policies, the goal of a negotiated settlement also militated against the state acting in an unconscionably racist fashion that would either preclude Britain from reaching a settlement with the regime or make it politically unwise for other foreign countries to recognise the legality of UDI. Another targeted audience was also Africans in Rhodesia. As another vital component in the population war, the state was, while pushing for white immigrants on the one hand, also desperately trying to cultivate enough trust among the African population to persuade them to practise family planning on the other.

The state’s policy of promoting family planning relied upon a degree of trust and cooperation that the state carefully nurtured in that policy sphere. The exposure of blatantly racist attempts to bolster the white population through immigration could jeopardise this policy of slowing African growth rates, and RF politicians always tried to publicly de-link and de-politicise the two policies, but without much success. Though public linkages between the state’s various population policies were usually assiduously avoided, this discursive cloak was occasionally lifted. In a rare example of candour in Parliament the Immigration Minister P.K. Van der Byl posed this odd rhetorical to an African MP who had criticised Rhodesia’s unselective, open-door immigration policy of the early 1970s:

If the African population was to slow down its rate of increase then it would be quite possible that we would require fewer immigrants to provide job opportunities. I am prepared to come to an understanding with hon. Member on the cross benches in this – that if the African population is prepared to reduce its rate of increase by 1% then I am prepared to forcibly drop the European potential immigration by 2%. Are they prepared to accept that or not? I think this is a very generous
offer and will solve all these difficulties [regarding the unselectivity of white immigration policy].

Needless to say, this preposterous offer was never taken up, and, as he and other policymakers discovered, these sorts of flippant remarks actually set back government policy.

This was because what was spoken by officials in Parliament and in other public statements had an effect on African perceptions of state intentions. In the family planning context, a former Family Planning Association of Rhodesia (FPAR) supervisor for Midlands described how many Africans identified the political and racist motivations of the RF’s population policies by reading, or hearing about, what was said in Parliament:

The thing that was hammering us was then there were some whites who could talk in Parliament, that ‘Oh those Africans are so many’. In Parliament! ‘These Africans are so many, they don’t even know what family planning is.’ That alone was barrier for us. Some educated people in the rural areas, they knew [what was said in Parliament]. They said, ‘You are talking of this [the benefits of family planning] but why are they saying that?’ … They said, ‘Ah no, there is something behind it.’

Echoing this same problem in the promotion of family planning, a nurse working in an FPAR clinic said:

They [local men] were saying that this is a white man’s tool to put down the number of Africans … And then the white regime that was there would come out and say there are too many Africans, let’s use family planning … It was also because of the negative press releases from the white regime, like there are too many Africans, we must cut down the number of Africans so far then family planning was to cut down the number of Africans which was all wrong …

Regarding the incongruence of immigration and family planning specifically, an article from ZAPU’s Zimbabwe Review from 1970 stated:

Whilst the settlers are, on the one hand, fielding this birth control campaign among Africans on the excuse of a population strained economy, they are, on the other, advertising for increased immigration from Europe … Who can fail to realise the whole trick in the circumstances?
Because of these tensions between public statements and (not-so) secret motivations, the state was compelled to strengthen white numbers and lower African numbers to retain power, but could never be publicly heard to be doing either out of racist motivations, lest these initiatives fail because of non-cooperation, or jeopardise the regime’s chances of achieving legality in the international community. This was the rationale behind the ‘two tongues’, but it also gives a window into a larger incongruence of long-term and short-term policy goals that runs throughout the post-UDI period.

**Economic Aspects of Immigration**

The two-tier economy, buttressed by the abundance of cheap African labour, meant that many whites could enjoy a privileged lifestyle in Rhodesia which they could probably not enjoy anywhere else on earth. Jan Morris wrote of the British living in India during the Raj that the ‘scale of things was often grotesquely swollen’, and so too with white Rhodesians. Even artisans and craftsmen could afford domestic servants, and possibly a free-standing house with a pool, and a car. There was one car for every four whites in Rhodesia in 1952, which was equivalent to the United States’ ratio in 1977. A survey from 1970 found that 97 per cent of whites had refrigerators, one sixth had pools, and one fifth had hi-fi sets. This material gap between standards of living in supply-side countries and Rhodesia was obviously greater for the less skilled and less qualified whites that slipped in. This was a fundamental tension that would constantly plague Rhodesia’s racial immigration policies: those individuals who would gain the most through immigration to Rhodesia, and who would obviously be the most keen to commit themselves to immigrating to Rhodesia, were the same individuals who could not be easily absorbed. On the other side of the coin, those highly skilled and professional whites who looked to gain the least compared to their material standing in other countries were the ones who were unsuccessfully sought after by Rhodesian immigration officials.

From as early as the mid 1960s, there were shortages in the skilled and professional sectors of the economy. Two factors contributed to this serious dearth of skilled and qualified workers in Rhodesia. One was the short-term expansion of the economy – largely a result of the industrial diversification immediately following international sanctions – and the other was the qualitative skills turnover following UDI that drained more and more skilled whites from Rhodesia and replaced them with unskilled whites. Consistent with the discourse on racialised skills, white immigration was to be the primary method of adding more skills to Rhodesia rather than endogenous training and education, as there were not enough white youths in Rhodesia.
to train in all the necessary skills, and the large African population was officially considered un-trainable. Because of the de facto job reservation that existed in Rhodesia, when vacancies were created in the skilled or professional positions these jobs often remained open until whites could be found to fill them.

The domestic education system did not produce the right number of white graduates in the required variety of skills needed to fill all the existing positions. To remedy these deficiencies, the apprenticeship programme was revamped several times in an effort to ensure that enough whites came through the education system, yet none of the plans worked sufficiently well. A Herald editorial from 1967 reported on the findings of the Select Committee on Education, which concluded that there was nowhere near the number of whites necessary to fill all the skilled positions, and even with mass immigration the Committee foresaw greater job integration as necessary.\textsuperscript{78} Even in light of this Report, the Smith government, instead of filling these positions with non-whites, relied solely upon immigration to import these skills, and even made moves to harden job reservation for whites. Consequently, troubling gaps opened up and remained in many areas of the economy, especially in the professional and engineering fields, which immigration was unable to fully satisfy. Even so, Smith’s government was pulled by contrary pressures, one economic and the other political, and any serious effort to soften white preserve to address skill deficiencies would have meant political suicide for Smith, net migration losses, and probably an end to the UDI experiment.

White society was not uniform in its beliefs regarding job reservation, however. The commercial, business, and industrial employers felt most keenly the squeeze on their bottom lines of having positions remain unfilled when a massive untapped pool of cheap labour longed to work. Many employers wanted to hire Africans to fill white jobs, even if it meant that several Africans would be required to fulfil each component part of what was formerly one white job. This idea was known as ‘job fragmentation’, and it was bitterly opposed by the white labour unions, who advocated instead what they called ‘the rate for the job’, which locked certain jobs into a set wage for one worker. This union policy, later taken up as the RF’s official policy, was ostensibly non-racial but was in practice and intention another form of job reservation for whites, as the rate set for any job was high enough to preclude an African from charging that amount. The President of the Association of Mineworkers was reported to have stated in 1969: ‘The greatest fear of the white workman in Rhodesia today was that his job would sooner or later be done by an African for less pay, resulting
in his having to leave the country …’ He continued: ‘We are fighting to maintain wages and conditions and we intend that the white workman will not be booted out of the country to make way for “cheaper labour”’. That statement reflected the nub of the issue from the white labourers’ perspective, and this threat of a white exodus in the wake of job fragmentation was taken seriously by Smith’s government and stiffened its resolve in stopping fragmentation, even if it resulted in greater economic troubles. Nonetheless, out of necessity job fragmentation did still occur in some sectors, notably in the Rhodesian Railways and the building industry to the extent that these areas became increasingly Africanised.

Africans’ economic aspirations were thwarted at two levels by the Rhodesian political and economic system. At the peaks of the economic pyramid there were the vacancies that remained open but reserved for white immigrants, even though more and more Africans were obtaining the qualifications and skills necessary to fill these positions. Consequently, African school-leavers with advanced degrees filled the unemployment queues in the cities vying for the limited opportunities available to them, while the state vigorously solicited white immigrants to fill open positions in the economy. In addition to the sacrosanct white job reservation at the top, the post-UDI immigrants took up unskilled or semi-skilled positions that had previously been the sole preserve of Africans. The introduction of these new less-skilled immigrants, particularly the Portuguese, angered African politicians. But it should be noted that these new immigrants’ skills and qualifications were not only derided by Africans but also by long-standing white residents.

By the mid 1970s it was clear that Rhodesia was suffering a net loss in skills due to migration. However, the extent of any ‘brain drain’ was hotly contested in and out of Parliament. The persistence of these skills gaps added to the frustrations of the rising African educated classes. In addition, the new immigrants not only failed to redress the skills shortage but challenged Africans for their positions, piling a further layer of racial tension to Rhodesia’s race relations, without solving any of the regime’s economic problems. But in immigration, politics trumped economics.

**The Formation and Evolution of the State’s Immigration Policy**

The immigration policies of the RF governments reflected various efforts to negotiate the conflicting pressures of domestic politics, economic need, other demographic re-balancing policies, and the overriding desire of the Party’s right-wing to bring in ‘more white faces’. While there was a general consensus in the RF that there needed to be more white faces, how to
Rhodesia’s Immigration Policy

achieve this without threatening unemployed whites in Rhodesia, appearing blatantly racist and thereby derailing other demographic policy goals, or upsetting the social and economic structure of Rhodesia, was a complex and subtle task.

The Rhodesian Front, under Winston Field, won the 1962 election in Rhodesia on the platform that concessions to African nationalism and multiracialism had gone too far, and under their rule would progress no further. Rhodesia was to be secured in white hands in perpetuity, even if this meant illegally cutting their ties with Britain. Though population anxieties had long been present among the Rhodesian right-wing – even Field himself had at one time forcefully argued for the creation of a white peasant class – once in power, Field did very little to positively re-balance racial ratios, even after the 1962 census revealed the contours of the racial population gap. Field’s immigration policy remained highly selective, exactly as had been those of his predecessor, Edgar Whitehead.

Field kept in place the capital requirements, the pro-British bias, and the guiding principle of selective immigration that there be ‘No direct competition with people already in the country’. Immigration therefore required job openings to fill as a prerequisite, and coming to Rhodesia on spec was discouraged. Field’s immigration policy aimed to keep white unemployment numbers down and to not create a sub-class of poor whites. Too many immigrants too fast would have resulted in an employment bottleneck, Field and others argued, as not all the new immigrants could fit within Rhodesia’s economic structure. It was also feared that as less skilled immigrants arrived they would blur the colony’s important racial divisions, economically and sexually. This conservative policy, while economically sound, could never redress Rhodesia’s lopsided racial ratios. As a result of this inactivity on the demographic front, dissatisfied Rhodesian Front backbenchers regularly challenged the minister in charge of immigration to defend Field’s restrictive immigration policy in light of the perceived need for more whites. The Herald’s opinion page also reflected wider signs of public discontent, that despite the RF’s election, Rhodesia was still bleeding whites through emigration and there seemed to be no plan to replace them. This all combined to create a pervasive sense of frustration over the unfulfilled promises that surrounded Field’s tenure. An internal RF coup in April of 1964 removed Field from the premiership in favour of the man whom the right-wing believed would declare UDI, plug the emigration leak, and permanently secure white rule: Ian Smith.

In many respects, the policy differences between Smith and Field were greater than those between Whitehead and Field, and certainly this was
true in the realm of immigration. As early as 1961, when he was still an independent MP from Gwanda, Smith asked the Federal Minister for Home Affairs, who was in charge of immigration, what was being done to reverse the trend of immigration numbers dropping and emigration numbers rising. In that same Parliamentary debate, Smith urged the recruitment of West and East Germans and white Kenyans, foreshadowing his vision of mass immigration even before the Federation dissolved and long before UDI. Upon assuming the premiership three years later in April 1964, Smith immediately created a new Cabinet position of Minister of Immigration, the first such post in Rhodesia’s history. The first Minister of Immigration, Roads, and Tourism was Harry Reedman, a businessman with a long history of interest in immigration issues. The creation of the post, and the appointment of Reedman to fill it, indicated that immigration was a strong priority, and reflected the urgency with which the public had begun to view population issues.

Reedman had long believed in mass white immigration and a dramatic widening of the selectivity net to allow in more whites, regardless of their skills set. An attaché from the British High Commission in Salisbury wrote of Reedman’s reputation: ‘Mr. Reedman is renowned for his grandiose visions, bordering on the grotesque, of large-scale immigration into Rhodesia.’ Even before entering the Cabinet, Reedman conceived of Rhodesia’s future immigration policy as resembling those of Australia and pre-war America, and explicitly targeted racial population parity as the ultimate goal of his immigration policy. To justify this mass immigration, Reedman made the absurd assertion that whites must come to defend Rhodesia from the Chinese, who would soon come to Africa in large numbers to settle. Reedman was prone to making such outlandish claims and was awful at the management of the public’s expectations, and as a result did much to discredit mass immigration as a viable policy goal. Once in the Cabinet, Reedman pushed hard for approval of an ambitious, albeit impossibly vague, mass immigration scheme, but after debate the full Cabinet did not approve of the magnitude or design of the scheme advocated by Reedman. While rejecting Reedman’s particular plan, however, the Cabinet did agree as early as July 1964 that ‘[it was] essential to have a bold immigration policy, as the African population would double itself in 20 years and the [racial] ratio should be reduced’.

Thus, by July 1964, only three months after Smith’s rise to the premiership, his Cabinet had already accepted mass immigration as a policy principle. But mass immigration as a principle was not the same thing as planning for mass immigration, and as his Cabinet decided to drop
selectivity requirements and form a new Immigration Promotion Department, it went ahead without any plans to absorb a large influx.99 Stating this new policy, the Cabinet agreed 'that the doors should be opened wide immediately to everyone of European stock, subject to health requirements and police records … [and that] all selection should be removed which would militate against mass immigration'.100 Expressly linking white immigration to African natural increase, the Cabinet continued that ‘the target must be to reduce the present ratio of 16:1 Africans to Europeans to 5:1, and as soon as possible’.101 No fuller explanation was offered in the meeting for the target ratio of 5:1; however, it was most likely that it was the goal of a ratio more similar to that of South Africa’s at the time, which was very nearly 5:1. The South African ratio of 5:1 as a goal would certainly make sense, as the South African state was in 1964 politically secure and seemingly inviolable, a situation envied by Rhodesian settlers. These first Cabinet meetings under the new Smith government unequivocally refuted subsequent government denials of racial goals behind the state’s immigration policies, as mass unselective white immigration was explicitly intended to match, if not overtake, African natural increase, indicating a sharp break from past Rhodesian governments in terms of immigration policy. But while the more conservative approach of need-based immigration was rejected, the problems associated with large-scale immigration in a racialised state were never confronted.

Reedman was replaced as Immigration Minister by Jack Howman in July 1965. Howman was initially welcomed by the Herald as a more moderate and sober-minded choice for the position, which was then combined with the Ministries of Information and Tourism.102 Howman, who was in Winston Field’s Cabinet and resigned after the promotion of Smith to the premiership, was always more moderate in his political stances than the dogmatic right-wing members of the Rhodesian Front. He significantly reduced the inflated expectations regarding immigration brought about by Reedman with a much more pragmatic approach, and reset Rhodesia’s policy away from the goal of racial parity. On taking up his ministerial post in the politically uncertain months in the build-up to UDI, Howman, while maintaining the lax selectivity standards brought in by Reedman, agreed with the Finance Minister that immigration promotion efforts would be temporarily suspended and assisted passages phased out until more opportune moments arose.103 But even as promotion efforts eased, immigration during 1965 was surprisingly robust, indicating a recovery from the post-Federation doldrums. This was despite the rhetoric from pro-UDI Rhodesians that immigration numbers would swell only after independence, as it was argued that political certainty was more important to potential immigrants
than international legality. Thus, even though it was one part of the larger package of justifications for UDI, 1965 was a very good year for immigration and it was much harmed by UDI in the short term.104

In July 1967, after an extended cessation of promotion activities before and after UDI, a new immigration drive was launched, by re-instituting an assisted passage scheme and advertising in overseas publications, and by asking Rhodesians to forward on propaganda literature to their contacts abroad.105 At the same time, and in seemingly contradictory fashion, Howman argued for a reinstatement of earlier selectivity requirements even as he called for this new influx. He argued that Rhodesia already had a large reservoir of unskilled labour, and that, ‘in any case, uncontrolled immigration could lead to the growth of a “white trash” element and ultimately generate embarrassing problems in regards to [racial] segregation’.106 The Cabinet rejected Howman’s call for greater selectivity, and he was forced to maintain the lax entry standards for whites instituted during Reedman’s term.107 In a Cabinet shuffle in 1968, Howman took up a different ministerial portfolio and was replaced by P.K. Van der Byl.

Van der Byl was an Afrikaner, which was in itself quite significant in the post of Minister of Immigration, as it was a clear signal of Smith’s new vision of a white Rhodesia not riven by the age-old rivalry between the British and the Afrikaners. Indeed, much of Rhodesia’s early immigration policy was explicitly designed to exclude Afrikaners from immigrating to Rhodesia. His promotion also reflected a renewed interest in the desirability and feasibility of a more robust immigration policy. His first term in office was the high-water mark of post-UDI Rhodesia, and this general success was both reflected by, and spurred on by, immigration successes. During his tenure, Van der Byl expanded the scope of Rhodesia’s incentive programmes to entice new immigrants. Internationally, this was very much a ‘sellers’ market’, with demand for skilled immigrants exceeding supply, and demand-side countries vying for immigrants through offering competing incentives. Rhodesia’s assisted passages programme of tax money paying for the travel fare of new migrants from their country of origin to Rhodesia, was the most widely known of these incentives and it mirrored similar assisted passage programmes by Australia and South Africa. As was argued in Parliament, ‘Study throughout the world indicates that unless you provide assistance to immigrants you cannot get these immigrants. Australia does it, New Zealand does it, South Africa does it and if we are to get the immigrants we need we must [do so as well].’108 Tax incentives, state-subsidised housing, and postponement of immigrants’ military service were all also introduced.
Van der Byl organised more unorthodox immigration drives as well. He mailed unsolicited literature to selected localities abroad, asked Rhodesians to send out literature to friends and relatives abroad, and even once appealed to Rhodesians to open up their homes to allow new immigrants to stay with them until they settled in. In another campaign, in 1969, he initiated an immigration contest in which citizens sought to attract the most positive immigration responses from their foreign contacts: first prize was a free weekend holiday in Rhodesia, second was a new refrigerator, and third was a new record player. The most famous of all Rhodesia immigration campaigns, though, was the massively conceived but ill-fated Settler ‘74 campaign, which again asked Rhodesians to draw on their foreign contacts in an effort envisioned to attract hundreds of thousands of whites. In forms mailed to residents and in large cut-out advertisements in Rhodesian newspapers in January 1974, current residents were informed of the benefits of large-scale immigration: “They will enjoy a much better life out here, and they’ll ensure YOUR future. So do them, and yourself, a favour.” But already by February 1974 the government had retreated from its earlier rhetoric of a million potential immigrant names, and set a more measured and decidedly less ambitious tone. In the end, the Settler ‘74 campaign was an enormous failure; the original goal of 100,000 immigrants was soon reduced to 10,000. By May 1974 only 4,200 names of potential immigrants had been received, and the campaign was soon abandoned altogether.

In spite of Van der Byl’s creative energies, the Rhodesian state faced tremendous legal barriers to immigration promotion that hindered large-scale immigration. The United Nations imposed mandatory selective sanctions in 1966 and mandatory comprehensive sanctions in 1968. The 1968 sanctions included a section on emigration to Rhodesia, and it was followed in Britain by domestic legislation forbidding the solicitation or encouragement of emigration to Rhodesia from Britain. Rhodesia’s informal, decentralised, and outsourced methods of immigration promotion were necessary after these restrictions, as this British legislation closed off access to the mainstream media. In 1970, Van der Byl described this difficulty in promoting abroad:

Immigration promotion is subject to UN mandatory sanctions and it is subject to a special Order-in-Council of the British government. It is second only to one or two of our commodities as regards the degree of difficulty which sanctions have inflicted on us. The fact of the matter is that we are very limited indeed as to the avenues in which
we can promote immigration, because it is forbidden in practically every country in the world for us to place newspaper advertisements, which were the main source of immigration promotion in the past. But nonetheless we do find – and I am not going to go into any detail on this – we do find ways of doing it from time to time.\textsuperscript{118}

Even these clandestine methods began to be stamped out with increasing seriousness by British officials in the 1970s. In Britain in 1974, \textit{The Economist} and \textit{The Spectator} magazines were both prosecuted for placing immigration advertisements in violation of this Order and were fined.\textsuperscript{119} Blocked from these wider circulation outlets, Rhodesia also targeted regional newspapers and page-turning special-interest periodicals such as \textit{Accountancy Age}, \textit{Bridge Magazine}, and \textit{The Ophthalmic Optician}.\textsuperscript{120} The British Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP) was initially unwilling to prosecute these ‘small fish’ violations because of the undeserved publicity they would bring, but by 1974 the British Foreign Office urged them to proceed, arguing that any publicity in this matter would be good for Britain’s image.\textsuperscript{121} The British government also limited the amount of money allowed to people openly emigrating to Rhodesia to a paltry sum.\textsuperscript{122} There were, of course, strategies to avoid this monetary restriction, which included claiming a different country as their final destination – usually South Africa – then moving on from there to Rhodesia. Nonetheless, despite this large loophole, many who might have normally been interested in Rhodesia were certainly turned off from taking part in such cloak-and-dagger activities.

Rhodesia’s immigration promotion efforts suffered from its international pariah status. It became a symbol to many inside Britain and the West of obdurate white settler colonialism. The social stigma of emigrating to Rhodesia was also significant in the years after UDI, as emigration was viewed by many to be a political act, and as such emigrants were deemed to be viable targets for condemnation. In 1974 the UK Council of Churches decided to launch a concerted effort to discourage emigration to southern Africa, Rhodesia included.\textsuperscript{123} Those that did make it to Rhodesia thus had to make a concerted effort to stealthily evade Britain’s monetary controls, withstand social stigma, and settle in an illegal entity with an unclear political future – hardly as smooth a transition as cruising to Perth or Wellington.

For others, though, post-UDI Rhodesia became a defiant, gallant symbol. To them, it was a nation upholding the fading British values of pride and strength, unwilling to be cowed by World Communism, the Afro-Asian Bloc, or an appeasing Britain. For these imperial sentimentalists of the right Rhodesia’s defiance was a positive mark influencing their emigration
decisions. In 1974, one prospective immigrant to Rhodesia stated his reason for choosing Rhodesia as being, ‘I see Rhodesia as the last bastion of the British Empire.’ Post-UDI Rhodesia became a political position that people were either ‘for’ or ‘against’. And Smith himself was for many years a very popular figure in Britain, drawing supportive crowds, as well as hostile crowds, whenever he arrived. Yet, with the real barriers to migration, the political sympathy and support for Rhodesia among certain circles did not necessarily lead to immigration. It was one thing to toast ‘Old Smithy’s’ defiance in a London pub, but it was quite another thing to pack up and move there.

When Van der Byl left the immigration post in 1974, he was replaced by Wickus de Kock, another Afrikaner. During this period, net migration yields were temporarily inflated by the influx of Portuguese fleeing from Mozambique and Angola during 1975 and 1976. Behind this temporary success, though, the reality of a more ominous figure on the spreadsheet was growing, which was the rate of emigration. Emigration had been slowly increasing since the intensification of the guerrilla war in 1972 and rose steadily as the war progressed. Though the upward blip of Portuguese refugees in the mid 1970s partially obscured this fact, Rhodesia’s population was leaking at an even faster rate than normal. As was discussed in Chapter 4, demands from the military conflict put pressure on immigration as well as emigration. The grace period during which new immigrants were free from military service was reduced from five to two years in 1975. Even the existence of this reduced grace period aroused some resentment among current residents, and balancing the conflicting demands of current residents with potential immigrants and the military conflict proved an insuperable task. Embarrassingly for the Smith government, De Kock, the man whose job it was to convince people to move to Rhodesia, himself emigrated in 1977.

Following Ian Smith’s speech in September 1976 which acknowledged the inevitability of majority rule, Rhodesia’s immigration policy shifted conceptually from building a white population capable of maintaining white minority rule to building a population capable of securing white privilege in an African majority-ruled state. These were the years of the patching and plugging of holes in the population dyke. When Van der Byl took over the ministerial post again in the fall of 1977, both he and Rhodesia were on the political tumble. Though large budgets were still voted in for immigration, and particularly for assisted passages, few were interested in immigrating to a war-torn Rhodesia in the late 1970s. The money voted for immigration had increased consistently from the mid 1960s until the mid 1970s,
peaking in 1976 at R$822,000. Significantly, however, the amounts voted were all spent until 1975, but the largest sum, which was voted in 1976, corresponded with a drop in interest in immigration to Rhodesia generally, and specifically with the drying up of the Portuguese influx. Consequently, only half of the 1976 immigration budget was actually spent. Subsequent sums voted for immigration spending were always more aspirational than realistic, and unspent money was carried over year after year, before dropping off completely in the last two years of settler rule, reflecting the vastly reduced potential for immigration to Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{128}

The Rhodesian government acknowledged after the first year of Smith's premiership and the dismissal of Reedman that racial parity was an unrealistic goal for white immigration. It was still explicitly hoped, however, that immigration could serve to narrow the racial ratios closer to that of the South African state, and after the retrenchment around the time of UDI the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed relatively large immigration yields. The numbers of immigrants during this period were widely touted, but who these immigrants were, what skills they possessed, and where they arrived from was purposely hidden from public scrutiny. The targeted South African ratio was also soon abandoned as unrealistic, and immigration was tasked only to peg the white population to keep pace with African natural increase so as to hold current ratios; even this humbler goal could not be achieved, however, and African growth rates continued to widen racial ratios. And in the final years of white rule, immigration served only as a partial cover to mask white emigration.

**Analysing the Post-UDI Immigration Yields**

Despite the (not so) secret policy of unselective immigration in force since the first months of Smith's premiership, Van der Byl and later ministers still publicly claimed to pursue selective immigration, and never overtly sought mass immigration after Reedman.\textsuperscript{129} Mass unselective immigration was very unpopular among most Africans who paid attention to parliamentary politics, and also to many sections of the white community. The state thus had incentives never to publicly advocate a mass unselective immigration policy, even as officials quietly pursued that policy. To reconcile the public and secret policies, selectivity was always very loosely interpreted. Describing what were Rhodesia's selectivity criteria in 1965, for instance, Howman said: ‘First of all, that he has white skin. I think that is accepted … Secondly, he must be free from active tuberculosis … Thirdly, he must not be a criminal; fourthly, he must not be a communist … Then we go to the next criteria of whether or not he needs help and he is fitted and able to take work
Rhodesia’s Immigration Policy

Table 5.1 Annual immigration and emigration of Rhodesian whites (1960–79)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Emigrants</th>
<th>Net</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>14,472</td>
<td>−11,184</td>
</tr>
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Notes
1 Figures are from the Monthly Digest of Statistics, CSO.
2 Migration figures prior to the dissolution of the Federation are only estimates. These were from the CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics, December 1972.
3 The 1979 figure was averaged from the six months for which information could be found from the CSO Monthly Migration Digests and estimated out to appear as a full twelve-month period. The available months of January, March, April, July, September, and October averaged 274 immigrants and 1206 emigrants a month.
These were hardly restrictive standards by any definition, and obfuscating or deflecting scrutiny as to the specifics of immigration yields under these lax standards was always a difficult verbal game for many officials. During the budget debates in Parliament, the various Rhodesian Front Immigration Ministers consistently deflected specific questions about the skills and backgrounds of the new immigrants by framing immigration specifics as vital national security secrets hidden due to their sanctions implications. All that were ever revealed of these new immigrants were their numbers.

There was much controversy as to the skills of the immigrants who did arrive. Employment agencies found it difficult to find work for the new immigrants. One agency official complained the RF government was too unselective: “This often created a system where some unqualified people expected to find a vacancy above their station in life.” Toeing the official line, state officials always maintained that the immigrants coming in possessed new skills which were greatly needed in Rhodesia, and thus contested charges of any brain drain. But it was not only Africans and employment agents, however, who questioned the economic and social implications of this turnover, as the lower economic class of many of the new immigrants was a difference noted by older residents with unambiguous disdain. One white resident stated in reference to the government’s policy: ‘Are we so hard up for white skins that we have to let in Europe’s riff-raff?’

Some qualitative distinctions between emigrants leaving and immigrants arriving were harder to conceal. One characteristic noted by author Frank Clements was that there was a general population transfer of so-called liberals out of the country and more conservative or apolitical types coming in. Ethnically, there was also a shift away from the distinct pro-British bias that earlier characterised Rhodesian immigration in favour of more Afrikaners and southern Europeans, particularly Portuguese, a reflection of affirmative state policies to extend the scope of acceptable whites after UDI to include non-English speakers. Portuguese immigrants became a conspicuous element in white Rhodesia, especially after the Lisbon coup, and despite efforts on the part of the state to welcome non-British whites into white society there was significant residual xenophobia. To combat this resistance to non-British immigrants, state officials regularly pleaded with Rhodesians to welcome in these new residents. In keeping with the vision of a broader white Rhodesia, immigration promotional literature in the 1970s was printed in six other European languages as well as English. In the early 1970s there were even plans to consider the implementation of crash courses in English for new arrivals. It is interesting to note that it
was often the African MPs who were the ones who protested most strongly against the non-British character of Rhodesian immigration after UDI.140 The Portuguese, for instance, were derogatorily referred to as ‘fish fryers’ by many African MPs because of the large numbers who worked at fish-and-chip shops in the cities.141 But the precise degree of increase of non-British immigrants after UDI is difficult to determine, even as it was certainly significant.142

Even while a broader pan-European vision of white Rhodesia was being promoted, this wider scope of desirable immigrants was never extended to include Asians or Coloureds. The long-standing official state policy was to admit non-whites only if it was in the national interest or out of humanitarian concerns, and this never changed even during acute skills shortages.143 Indeed, in 1969, despite the fact that capital influx was a major justification for white immigration and the need for foreign exchange was pressing, Van der Byl declared that the idea of bringing in rich Indians to Rhodesia was ‘ridiculous’.144

Post-UDI Rhodesia received more than its share of white kooks, criminals,145 racists, and misfits.146 Especially in the later 1970s, an odd amalgam of the disaffected, the opportunistic, and the radical showed up in Rhodesia. Time reported that large numbers of ‘carpet-baggers’ and ‘bargain hunters seeking a cheap way to live in a style they could not afford anywhere else’ were trickling in to Rhodesia. One recent arrival in 1977, who was slotted into an iron mine supervisor position, said: ‘It’s easy work. The niggers dig all the holes. You just stand over them.’ The same article also reported embryonic chapters of both the John Birch Society and the American Nazi Party had sprouted up.147 Consistent with these observations, the Herald regularly reported immigrants being deported for omitting prior convictions on their immigration forms, and the heavy publicity some of these deportations were picked up in parliamentary debates.148

One reason Rhodesia let in so many dubious characters after UDI was that because of sanctions regulations, the source countries did not supply Rhodesia with background information on immigrants, and the state did not have officials in the source countries to vet potential immigrants. For example, Rhodesia House in London, before being shut completely in 1969, was disallowed from promoting immigration or from vetting immigrants. So who they actually received from their immigration drives was in many ways a mystery. In 1977 Van der Byl stated that

the screening is done to the best of our ability and one must absolutely accept that because of the situation in which we find ourselves
in this country there is a certain lack of cooperation, shall we say, between ourselves and other countries from which people coming into this country emanate, this is very often fraught with a considerable amount of difficulty. Therefore it does happen that people do get into this country who are highly undesirable and if whose proclivities were known before their arrival, would certainly not be let in.\textsuperscript{149}

As it was, Rhodesia was forced to net them all and any sorting had to be done after arrival.

**Tensions and Contradictions in Rhodesia’s White Migration Policies**

The nature of white migration patterns to and from Rhodesia precluded effective planning. Mass immigration was met with resistance even within some governmental bureaucracies, in particular those tasked with accommodating these new influxes, such as local government administration, housing, and education departments. By the early 1970s, at the peak of the immigration influx, the Rhodesian economy was straining under the proportionately high rate of white immigration. Affordable, decent housing in particular was in short supply for new residents. This led to bottlenecks wherein many new arrivals left before being effectively slotted into the Rhodesian economy\textsuperscript{150} – precisely the problem that former prime minister Winston Field sought to avoid. The state undertook various initiatives to rapidly expand the urban infrastructure to support more whites by supplying furnished flats in high-density housing units and guaranteeing state loans to new immigrants for settling-in costs.\textsuperscript{151} Nevertheless, this housing shortage was never solved adequately, partly because of the inherent problems in future planning with such high rates of turnover in Rhodesia. Overbuilding in expectation of large yields led to waste, neglect, and embarrassment; and building too slowly created disillusionment among the new immigrants, many of whom came flushed with inflated expectations of life in Rhodesia. As it was, the rushed accommodations disappointed many new immigrants, and this ebbing away of migrants was never contained.\textsuperscript{152}

Smith’s government rushed ahead with mass white immigration because of its crucial short-term political and morale benefits, but the long-term problems associated with these relatively massive influxes were never addressed adequately. In actuality, they could never have been addressed adequately. What spending there was on new immigrants also often provoked bitter responses from current residents who felt neglected in favour of newer arrivals.\textsuperscript{153} More broadly, extensive planning of the scale first
proposed by Reedman and others would have resulted in a radically different Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{154} It would have demanded, among other things, significant capital outlays from the tax coffers, which would have meant sacrifices on the part of current white residents, the same residents who already chafed at the special treatment afforded new immigrants. As the Cabinet recognised as early as the mid 1960s, the sacrifices required for mass immigration would have eaten into the standard of living cherished by whites, which would have predictably resulted in greater emigration. The state’s solution to this dilemma was to continue immigration promotion and ignore the more politically sticky necessities of economic planning and spending that should have accompanied such policies.

There were continuous battles behind the scenes within Smith’s government as to the wisdom of continued mass immigration. Mass immigration piled on other strains to the Rhodesian economy, increasing the demands on schools and housing, and damaging Rhodesia’s balance of payments through the draining of foreign currency reserves and the exporting of remittances.\textsuperscript{155} These economic burdens rose to the point of provoking a Cabinet debate in 1971 on the overall cost-benefit merits of mass immigration. Though ultimately deciding that the political benefits of maintaining a favourable racial balance outweighed the significant costs of immigration, these burdens, and the ministerial push-back as a result of them, never fully disappeared.\textsuperscript{156} Indeed, several months after the first debate over the wisdom of mass immigration, another Cabinet memorandum was distributed by the Minister of Local Government and Housing outlining the problems associated with high immigration yields. The memorandum criticised the high rate of immigration as a percentage of the overall white population – 4 per cent as opposed to the purported optimal target of 1 per cent – which overburdened housing and other services. In summation, the Minister argued that the mass immigration intended to save Rhodesia could ironically ‘destroy the ideal conditions under which we lived in this country’. Acknowledging the difficulties that immigration presented, the full Cabinet agreed that ‘normally the rate of 1 per cent increase was the optimum figure, but the position in Rhodesia was somewhat different since in many parts of the world the same sense of urgency did not prevail’. Rhodesia was viewed not to have the luxury of a more rational rate of influx, since the state needed as many white faces as possible, as quickly as possible. With this decision the Cabinet again prioritised the political and psychological benefits of immigration over the economic and social burdens, reasoning that ‘[immigration] was fundamental and of cardinal importance to the survival of the European in this part of the world’.\textsuperscript{157}
Conclusion

In Rhodesia's population race between white immigration and African natural increase, the former was perhaps destined to lose in the long run. Because of the unpredictability of economic trends and the myriad other factors that play into migration decisions, perhaps migration is inherently ill adapted to match the more constant pace of natural increase. Comparatively, differential fertility rates seem to always outpace competitive migration. The white fertility transition had long been firmly entrenched in Rhodesia, and historically all political efforts to cajole or pressure women in post-fertility transition societies into having higher numbers of children have failed, and in Rhodesia, the white rate of natural increase actually declined throughout the 1960s and 1970s. White immigration, as the main source of white population growth, increased the population at an arithmetical rate, by adding additional people — people who, for whatever reason, tended not to have many children in Rhodesia. The African natural increase, however, was geometric in its growth. As a result, Rhodesia's Sisyphean efforts to attract large numbers of immigrants could only temporarily alter the population demographics, as these immigration numbers were quickly eaten into by the relentless rate of Africans' natural increase. Any efforts to compete with African population growth were described by one newspaper article as 'spitting against the wind'.

Immigration was seen as the last best hope, the panacea to cure all Rhodesia's ills. It would increase the overall white population and narrow racial ratios. When it was robust, it played a vital role in sustaining white morale as a reassurance of the strength and stability of white Rhodesia. At the very least, it was expected to mask the consistent outflow of emigrants leaving Rhodesia. It was the failure of immigration policy to fulfil even this more limited role in the mid 1970s that precipitated the end of white Rhodesia. The knowledge of this population decline created feelings among the whites of a national rot that was eating into Rhodesia's internal and international legitimacy, and just as positive immigration represented a symbolic affirmation of Rhodesia, negative net migration indicated its disaffirmation and artificiality. Perhaps most importantly, as the war intensified the white population decline meant that even greater pressure was put on the small population, who by the late 1970s were fully stretched between their military and economic commitments. The circle was thereby closed, so that with greater demands being made upon the population there was more emigration, which in turn created even greater demands on those who remained, thus rendered Rhodesia less attractive to potential immigrants, and so on. This circle would become more and more constricting, until the final collapse of white rule.
As argued in earlier chapters, the consequences of widening racial ratios in Rhodesia combined to play a major role in the ultimate collapse of the white settler regime. These racial ratios were directly related to the political fate of the white regime, and not merely as a proxy for decline or as a correlative factor but as a causal factor. Earlier chapters outlined the attitudes and actions of the white population and the settler state in this population contest, and this chapter explores the extent to which African nationalists participated in this population contest. Three main questions need to be answered when analysing the agency of African nationalists in Rhodesia’s war of numbers:

1. To what extent did the African population as a whole view these disparate racial population factors holistically?
2. To what extent did African nationalists have control and influence over the various factors that determined population trends?
3. To what extent were these factors purposefully influenced in order to bring about specific political goals?

The answers to these questions have implications regarding the degree to which African nationalists produced the dramatic demographic changes that contributed to independence in 1980, and the degree to which this parallel war of population numbers was guided not by conscious political agency but instead by forces having little to do with liberation politics.
White and African Perspectives on Population Matters

Rhodesia’s racial population ratios were the combined result of several components: white and African rates of natural increase, white and African migration patterns, and methods of population enumeration. The extent to which Africans viewed the diverse population components that made up these racial ratios holistically, as part of a wider racial population contest, varied across regions, generations, and education levels. Different sections of the African population were widely divergent in their knowledge of these trends, their interest in engineering them for political goals, and in their capacity to influence them.

As argued in Chapter 2, from the early 1960s the white population began to see that population numbers were vitally important and their diverse components were linked together. Generally, whites viewed population matters holistically, with fertility, mortality, and migration factors conceptualised as constituent parts of a zero-sum racial population contest. Most whites observed these widening racial ratios with a sense of dread, as they fed into older colonial fears of racial swamping and mixed with newer post-UDI fears of the settler regime’s viability in a post-colonial Africa. This holistic approach was certainly shared with, and indeed promoted by, the post-UDI state, and its racial population policies reflected this. Despite their characteristic transience, whites in Rhodesia generally supported the state’s broad population goals, and, as argued in Chapter 4, this transience likely solidified white political unity even as there little actual population continuity. Kaler argues that there was a consensus in the white community on three general points concerning the African population problem: first, that African fertility patterns were a problem; second, that this problem was a danger to African well-being and the stability of the white state; and third, that whites had a responsibility to intervene to ameliorate this problem. Adding to Kaler’s points, there was also a consensus among whites concerning the goals of stopping white emigration and of stabilising or turning back the racial ratios.

However, the specific methods to achieve these diverse policy goals, as well as the end goal of such policies, divided the white public, as described in previous chapters. There was no white consensus concerning the scale or character of white immigration (Chapter 5); there was similar disagreement as to the shape and extent of African population control policies (Chapter 3); and there were conflicts over state policies intended to remedy labour imbalances and stem the urban influx (Chapter 2). Nonetheless, there remained a high degree of political unity among whites regarding the holistic view of population matters, a desire to ameliorate the effects
of widening ratios, and the general goal of stabilising or reversing racial ratio trends.

In population matters, as with other political issues, Africans were less unified than whites. This is partly due to the perceived need for solidarity among whites in the face of overwhelming numbers, but other factors specific to Rhodesia at the time also contributed to a diversity of views, actions, and interest levels among the African population. One of the several complications in this inquiry into the role of Africans in Rhodesia’s war of numbers is that it is impossible to speak of the African population as a monolithic mass, pursuing the same political goals for the same purposes. There were significant cleavages within the African population between tribal, ethnic, and regional groups, urban and rural communities, men and women, as well as older and younger generations. While some sections of the African population were very active in liberation politics, many others were markedely uninterested in, or indeed suspicious of or opposed to, the liberation movement, and the degree of political support nationalists received from the general African population is still a matter of debate.⁵ Whereas Terence Ranger traces the historical antecedents to the nationalist movement by emphasising the formation of a ‘peasant consciousness’ that rendered rural Africans a receptive audience to guerrilla appeals, Norma Kriger emphasises the coercive character of guerrilla–peasant relations.⁴ Gann and Henriksen explore the deep divisions within African society regarding the war, and describe how the guerrilla war was also ‘a black civil war’ in which ‘many more Africans died at the hands of bush fighters than did Europeans’, and where the guerrilla fighters were opposed not just by the Rhodesian white forces, but also by ‘traditional chiefs and headmen … an entire army of black functionaries, telegraphists, detectives, court interpreters and policemen … African “master farmers”, building contractors and transport operators [who] had obtained a modest, and sometimes considerable, degree of prosperity’ who ‘distrusted the guerrilla’s promises’.⁵ Though the nationalists and guerrillas described their African opponents as ‘sell-outs’, this facile labelling does not account for the deep divisions with the African population regarding support for the nationalist cause. There were heated and occasionally violent clashes between the nationalist factions themselves, and ZAPU and ZANU, as was common with many liberation movements, were arguably as hostile towards one another as against the Rhodesian state, a situation exploited with some success by the white regime. Even within the different nationalist groups there were, as Kriger describes, ‘struggles within the struggle’. Kriger highlights the generational, gendered, and economic conflicts within the nationalist movements, and likewise, Kaler expands on
the gendered divisions within the guerrilla camps. As a result, any search for uniform African views regarding the population war, or politics generally, is illusory.

Nonetheless, despite these significant divisions, several general conclusions can be drawn as to African views and African actions concerning population matters. The spectrum of African political interest from apathy to activism roughly correlated with the conceptualisation of racial population factors holistically, and with efforts to influence these factors to further political ends. Most African political leaders, both in and outside Parliament, fully appreciated the significance of racial population matters in the fate of the white regime. As will be discussed below, nationalist politicians and guerrilla leaders attempted to engineer population numbers to achieve political goals, and African MPs regularly attacked the state’s population policies in Parliament and attempted to uncloak their racist character. For those less politically minded and for those whom support for the nationalists was decidedly less warm, the linkage between population and politics was most likely less clear. For the great bulk of black Rhodesians, who were overwhelmingly in rural areas, broad population matters did not terribly concern them, as generally the perception of the linkage between the disaggregated components that made up these population trends was weak, and the desire to engineer racial population numbers for political purposes was by and large nonexistent.

An obvious question arises here: why would matters of such deep political importance as population ratios not concern the bulk of the African population, especially as a war for national liberation was being waged? One major reason reiterates the argument made by Lann and Henriksen that there was a lack of any consensus within African society about the direction of any political change from the white-ruled status quo, or even, indeed, whether such change was desirable. But several other factors also contributed to this lower level of interest concerning the zero-sum population contest among the African population, even among those who sympathised with the liberation movement. One explanation was that the vast majority of Africans lived in rural areas, and the movement of a few thousand whites in and out of the cities would not have been noticeable, or have had much of a direct impact on their lives. Whites, on the other hand, who were overwhelmingly urban, would have been much more intimately aware even of subtle shifts in white migration patterns. For a large percentage of Africans, especially those in the TTLs, whites were a distant and seldom seen urban community. Furthermore, some of these population factors such as African fertility and mortality levels carried a great deal of independent significance
irrespective of liberation politics, and were not readily equated with other components that did not. As will be discussed below, fertility issues had a deep cultural and economic importance, and any linkage to white migration was likely an irrelevant abstraction to most rural Africans.

Precise population information would generally not have been readily available among rural Africans, especially those living in more remote areas, which would have militated against their tracking these factors with any precision even if they were so inclined. In contrast, whites were regularly confronted with population figures in the popular media. Moreover, because Africans were not in control of state administration, the direct correlation between racial population figures and the practical effects of these numbers – as they pertained to housing, education, health, other social spending, tax revenues, electoral roles, employment opportunities, and the like – would not have been as explicitly addressed as it was among the white electorate. Because whites were in control of state administration, diverse population trends were necessarily disaggregated and analysed as part of state business, and that population issues became political issues was a natural result of this.

In this important racial population contest that was so closely connected with Africans’ political liberation, it is important to note that by the early 1960s, when these trends were coming to be seen as significant by most of the white population, all were moving in a direction that harmed the white regime and aided the nationalist cause. This crucial population contest was thus being ‘won’ by African nationalists without requiring much effort on the part of the winning side. It was this reality, more than any other factor, that informed African nationalist views regarding population issues. Since Rhodesia’s racial population trends were moving in the direction which African nationalists wanted, there was no great need for nationalists to mobilise the populace towards this goal. The sheer fact of winning without trying in this sphere of activity would obviously counsel nationalists to expend their limited energies elsewhere. For these reasons, population matters were by and large not conceptualised holistically, they did not generate the same degree of interest, and certainly not the same degree of urgency, among most Africans as they did among the white population. Yet to the frustration of the settler state and the delight of the nationalists, the African population steadily widened the population gap.

**The Politicisation of ‘Natural’ Growth Rates**

That Africans might be having more children to achieve political ends was a sensitive issue to white Rhodesians. Some high-level state officials
certainly saw in the high African fertility rate a concerted effort to weaken the state. As the Minister of Health callously declared in 1972, “[African politicians] seem quite happy to see people starve as long as they can step on their backs or over dead bodies to get into power.” Many lower-level RF politicians and members of the rank-and-file certainly agreed with the Minister’s accusation that nationalists were cynically promoting higher growth rates as a method of weakening the white regime. For instance, a letter from the Sabi Valley Branch Secretary of the RF to the Secretary of Health from 1973 stated, ‘In fact we [the Sabi Valley Branch] would go further and say that they [the Africans] are using the population explosion as a weapon against the future of the Europeans in this country.” The extent to which whites actually believed this, and were not merely using it as an expression of frustration, or more cynically, using the intentionality accusation to propose more draconian birth control measures, is unclear.

Regardless of the sincerity of these white accusations, African nationalists took up this claim that growth rates were indeed a political weapon consciously employed by the African people. In a letter to the editor from 4 June 1971, Ernest Mpofu wrote:

though Africans are politically silent that does not mean they are pleased with the present political atmosphere in this country … We, the silent majority, are not happily silent. We are instead busily producing more and more babies. That is our only weapon. We hope to flood this country with the black population by a huge percentage during the next decade or two. Nature is on our side. While the government is busy screaming for more and more immigrants, we are busy sending our pregnant women to the nearest clinic to give birth to future voices.

Guerrillas in the field likewise picked up this rhetoric of the weaponisation of African wombs. Two African women interviewed by Kaler recounted the guerrilla’s political speeches to villagers:

They [the guerrillas] opposed family planning, they wanted us to have children who will fight in the war.

They encouraged us to have many children, they say [the children will be] tomorrow’s warriors and ministers [in government].
In an article entitled ‘Other Fronts in the Struggle’, ZAPU’s Zimbabwe Review explicitly declared that a population war was occurring and African birth rates were a key militarised front:

Next to the insecurity the enemy fears from the gutting red-hot barrels of guns is the preponderantly engulfing population increase of the Zimbabweans … There are eighteen Zimbabweans to one settler racist … They see the power of the Zimbabwean population and the armed struggle ending their dreams of a permanent paradise of economic monopoly and fictitious class of a so-called privileged race. It is as though a rock is about to fall on them – and indeed it is – hence their frantic abuse of the idea of family planning among Africans … One of the urgent needs of Zimbabweans is a greater rate of population increase necessitated not only by demanding space but also by the dictates of the armed liberation struggle.14

Once again, as with white politicians, it is questionable to what degree African guerrillas truly believed the high growth rates were a result of liberation politics.

Ascribing political motivations to the already occurring high fertility rates offered obvious advantages to the guerrillas, as it presented at least the illusion of greater control. As it was, it was doubtful that many women avoided using birth control to bolster the guerrilla armies or to drop a ‘rock’ on the white enemy. These private decisions to have more children were much more likely the results of intra-familial negotiations, representing local social pressures, such as the possible return of lobola (bride price, or dowry) from the wife’s family or the fear of husbands taking additional wives if more children were not forthcoming, rather than the desire to further liberation politics. Yet the idea of African fertility being a political weapon was continually employed by both sides of the population contest. Right-wing white politicians used the claim of politicised fertility to advocate more drastic population control policies, while African nationalists made the claim to project greater power. It mattered little that the claim was untrue.

The Nexus between Population and Land

Land scarcity in Rhodesia was historically the most emotive and most pressing grievance of the African peasants, and it was closely linked to African population growth. As argued in Chapter 3, the economic and political pressures that were intensified by African ‘overpopulation’ always reflected a distributive and allocative problem rather than an absolute scarcity problem.
Structural racial inequalities thoroughly permeated the social, economic, and political spheres in Rhodesia, but it was the inequitable racial division of land which symbolically represented all such inequalities. It was white encroachment on African lands that served as the impetuses for the Ndebele rebellion in 1893 and the 1896–7 rebellion by the Shona and Ndebele. And it was because of these rebellions that the British colonists first decided to create African Reserve lands that would be off limits to white purchasers. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 locked into place the racialised division of land in Rhodesia. This Act was updated and replaced by the Land Tenure Act in 1969, which re-divided the land in Rhodesia, allotting 47 per cent of the total land area for exclusive white usage, and 53 per cent for exclusive African usage.15 The roughly equal division of land on paper was grossly unequal in regards to the quality of the land, and in terms of the population densities on their respective lands. The white population in white-assigned rural areas averaged one person per square mile, whereas Africans in the African rural areas averaged 45.8 persons per square mile, and in the Tribal Trust Lands this population density was much higher.16 In stark contrast to the densely populated African lands, much of the white lands were unoccupied, which amounted to almost one tenth of the total white land area in 1961.17 These divergent population densities on white and African lands were exacerbated by the contrary demographic trends of whites and Africans occurring through the 1960s and 1970s. Land issues and population issues were thus inextricably intertwined.

Tapping into African peasants’ pre-existing grievances over land scarcity was the most effective method of guerrilla propaganda. It also was the primary vehicle for African guerrillas’ appeals to cultural nationalism, as the discourse between guerrillas and African peasants was filtered and translated through the language of land metaphors. Land issues served as a flexible metaphor to broader themes of whites’ dispossession of African traditions, of African manhood, and the nation’s overall well-being, and could be analogised to other grievances to garner wider support for the guerrilla movement. By combining white immigration with land dispossession, guerrilla propagandists had little further work to do to link white emigration with land repossession. A popular Chimurenga song, ‘Maruza Vapambi Pfumi’, encapsulated this linkage:

They come to Zimbabwe from Germany, America, Britain, fleeing from hunger in their own lands, seeing it was a black land, full of milk and honey. Our land, we the black people … It was not long before we saw them moving into our land of Zimbabwe. These oppressors
were arrogant people, people with long trousers, who thought only of themselves and cared nothing for the Zimbabwean people, who were the rightful owners of the land ... So we showed the people of Zimbabwe that when the oppressor is seen acting in such a manner it is time for him to go home; where his troubles are many and the women are lazy ...\textsuperscript{18}

Promises were made by guerrillas to peasants at political meetings to win support, and often these promises centred on repossessing lost lands by forcibly removing the whites. This meant both the more abstract political repossession of Zimbabwe, and the concrete sense of physically removing whites and repossessing their lands. Kriger quotes Africans from the Mutoko region recounting ZANLA political promises to African villagers:

Parents, you can’t live like this in the mountains. You must go and live in the valleys on the white farms ... Whites have everything: cars, enough to eat, nice houses. You have nothing ... The chief enemy was the white man. If he were driven off the land, there’d be enough land for everyone and people could plough and live where they liked.\textsuperscript{19}

Population density provided the linkage between land and population, and as African overpopulation in rural areas intensified these land grievances, it also provided more willing populations for guerrilla support.

Politicised Africans realised that the state’s fear of African overpopulation was a political rather than a purely demographic construct. Since so much of the land was reserved for whites, and only sparsely occupied, the scarcity problems in the African areas were intensified by high growth rates, but this scarcity problem only arose because Rhodesia’s racialised political and economic structure constrained Africans within narrower and narrower physical and conceptual spaces. An article in ZAPU’s political organ, the \textit{Zimbabwe Review}, entitled ‘Land: Rhodesia’s Powder Keg’, stated:

Four million are allotted less than 42 per cent of the land whilst 6 percent of the population has exclusive rights over 58 percent of Rhodesian soil ... Thus in fact, the bulk of the African population lives in and cultivates 21 million acres or 22 percent of the land surface ... Population increase from 1931 had resulted in serious overcrowding in the African Reserves, the land formally allocated to every family had further to be subdivided into yet smaller plots. Every household
was allocated a maximum of six acres, and livestock had to be drastically reduced since grazing land had become scarce ... Under the guise of land consolidation, the African people were systematically dispossessed of rich land and driven to arid areas to give room to the new overlords – the white settlers.²⁰

ZANU’s political organ, the Zimbabwe News, identified the essentially distributive nature of African overpopulation problem in this 1968 article entitled ‘Battle Cry: Forward with the War of the Peoples’ Liberation – Chimurenga’:

Confronted with the 4½ million peasants and workers in Zimbabwe, the ¼ million white settlers acknowledge that fact that they are a negligible minority ... In most cases the European farms are just lying idle because, either the owners have no interest in developing them, or are now too rich to farm them, whereas Africans are packed like sardines in the so-called reserves where subsistence agriculture alone cannot support a reasonable standard of life.²¹

An article from the Zimbabwe Review entitled ‘Genocide Economics in Rhodesia’ echoed this same point: ‘there is plenty of land in Zimbabwe: only that the greater and better part of it has been greedily appropriated by the white minority therein; and a lot of this white-grabbed land is just lying idle’.²² The Zimbabwe Review succinctly argued that family planning was actually an effort by the settler state to conform the African population to their reduced economic role in Rhodesia:

After depriving the African people of their cattle, thus putting an economic squeeze on the Africans, the settlers are now seeking to trim and tie down the size of African families to that squeeze ... An African family which surrenders itself to be trimmed to the economy of the settlers is not helping itself at all but is contributing to the fortunes of the settlers ...²³

In an editorial addressing the Sadie Report’s recommendations to reconfigure Rhodesia’s population, the Zimbabwe Review queried:

Rhodesia is three times the size of England. England with its small land area carries a population of more than 50 million people. Zimbabwe with its large land area carries a small population of 4.5 million.
In short, whilst Rhodesia is about three times the size of England, England’s population is twelve times the population of Zimbabwe. So what is family planning for?24

African nationalists obviously had their own ideas of what state’s population policy was really for, and it had little to do with the state’s purported rationale of the amelioration of African suffering in the rural areas. As the preceding examples illustrate, politicised Africans understood the fundamentally allocative nature of African ‘over’-population. Following from this, the state’s motives in confronting this problem had more to do with preserving the racialised political and economic structure than ameliorating African suffering. The nationalists actively sought to communicate their views on the population struggle to the African people and nationalist sympathisers through their propaganda campaigns.

**Nationalist Propaganda**

African nationalists’ influence on the disaggregated factors that made up Rhodesia’s demography was uneven, yet through different forms of propaganda they attempted to synthesise these diverse phenomena into a comprehensive and easily understandable population policy, claiming a greater degree of control than they actually possessed. Regardless of their respective causality in each of these factors, nationalists propagandised about racial population issues consistently through the 1960s and 1970s. The forms taken by nationalist propaganda can be divided between what can be characterised as political terror, or ‘propaganda of the deed’;25 direct verbal propaganda; and print media in partisan periodicals. It would be misleading to describe these forms as being wholly distinct and separate, as it was often in combination that these forms relayed their population message; for example, harassing or intimidating family planning workers, railing against their work in *pungwes* (night-time mass meetings), and reinforcing this message in print. This section will deal primarily with the nationalists’ print media, as the other methods are discussed in other parts of this chapter.

The periodicals analysed here are ZANU’s *Zimbabwe News* and ZAPU’s *Zimbabwe Review*, which in style, ideology, and subject matter differed very little, despite the antagonistic relationship between the two nationalist forces issuing these periodicals.26 These periodicals were produced outside Rhodesia, mostly in Zambia, Tanzania, or outside Africa, and distributed as far afield as London to sympathetic organisations and movements, expatriates, exiles, and guerrillas in the field. The style in which they were
written, combined with their distribution, suggest these periodicals were not intended to win converts or convince the apostate of the righteousness and prospects of the nationalist cause. It was clearly to hearten and re-energise the flock, and inform sympathetic audiences of the rationales behind their various policies, that this print propaganda was produced.

Nationalist print media addressed population issues in different ways, depending upon the components being discussed. Print propaganda regarding population matters focused on five primary themes:

1. the previously discussed nexus between population pressures and land scarcity;
2. portraying the wide racial population ratios and the large African population as a source of power;
3. trumping the high white emigration rates as evidence of broader nationalist successes in the political and military spheres;
4. articulating their opposition to the state’s immigration policies; and
5. articulating their resistance to the state’s family planning efforts.

The relative population numbers of whites and Africans were often cited as evidence of African strength and white weakness, sometimes explicitly, other times implicitly. For instance, the *Zimbabwe Review* cited the African population figure of 4 million three times in one weekly edition,²⁷ five times in another,²⁸ and seven times in still another,²⁹ and in many of these same editions the figure of 200,000 whites is also repeated. An excerpt from a *Zimbabwe Review* article from 1964 exemplified this repetitive impact of African population numbers:

Let there be no doubt about the irrevocable decision of the 4 million African peoples of Zimbabwe that they and they alone are the unchallengeable owners and rulers of Zimbabwe and that it is their dedicated and irrevocable decision to take over the reins of government NOW. The white settlers, colonist inhabitants and all their progeny, now or after, living in Zimbabwe do so by grace, wishes and above all by their degree of cooperation and submission to the will of the 4 million African people as expressed by their chosen African majority government in Zimbabwe. Hence the recent arrogant declaration by settler PM Ian Smith that he cannot visualise in his lifetime an African government in Southern Rhodesia, is to us and the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia a kind of fairy tale best suited to retell to his mother.³⁰
The rhetorical thrust of this constant repetition is the strength of African numbers and the weakness of the regime as exemplified by white numbers. One *Zimbabwe Review* article specifically stated: ‘Today there are twenty-five Zimbabweans to one white person in our country. It’s this which makes fascist Smith tremble into barbarous mischief.’

Nationalist propaganda in both the ZANU and ZAPU newsletters took great interest in the whites leaving Rhodesia. Emigration figures were reported in nationalist periodicals often with commentary directly linking these movements with nationalist activity. As with the display of population numbers generally, emigration figures were on other occasions displayed alone, or with little comment. Commentary accompanying other figures emphasised the transience and lack of rootedness of the white population. With these observations, the propagandists exposed the nub of the settlers’ greatest vulnerability. The straightforward message conveyed was that of the inevitability of the nationalist victory, and of a more immediate positive momentum moving in the direction of white capitulation.

Such propaganda confronted the state’s immigration policies on their merits, and challenged the state’s purported motives behind these policies. One way in which this was done was to expose the incongruence of the state’s family planning promotion and its simultaneous mass immigration policy. As detailed in Chapter 5, it was this incongruence that explained the regime’s efforts to obscure the racist nature of its immigration policy so as to not spoil its simultaneous family planning initiatives. This specific rhetoric about white hypocrisy not surprisingly peaked around the time of the Settler ’74 Campaign. The *Zimbabwe Review* queried: ‘Could the whole contradiction of imposing birth control among Africans in Rhodesia on the one hand and pressing for immigrants (a million) from Europe on the other, be likened to a single family which whilst taking birth control pills on the one hand, advertises for the collection of children for adoption on the other?’ An example of the kind of state language concerning immigration which was seized upon as being inconsistent with other statements on family planning can be found in a Rhodesian immigration promotion pamphlet from July 1965: ‘The ‘new’ Rhodesia offers opportunities not bettered by any other country … by world standards Rhodesia is starved of population.’ Nationalists took on the issue of white immigration into a supposedly population-starved land and how this coincided with neo-Malthusianism in Rhodesia by pointing out that if the problem were merely too many humans in Rhodesia vying for resources, as suggested by the state’s family planning propaganda, then it would make little sense to import more white humans into Rhodesia.
Added to these attacks on the nature of white immigration were threats made against the immigrants themselves, as they were accused of being witting or unwitting tools of the regime. In this regard, immigration was equated with mercenary recruitment, and immigrants were deemed mercenaries regardless of their age, gender, or their intentions on moving to Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{35} The back cover of a *Zimbabwe News* from 1974 had the following words printed in bold letters below news clippings of war violence: ‘Are you prepared to immigrate to & die in Rhodesia??’\textsuperscript{36} Another article warned: ‘Future Rhodesia immigrants are warned to note that our liberation bullets have no mercy on reinforcements from Europe or elsewhere.’\textsuperscript{37} An article from *Zimbabwe Review* in 1973 characterised the nature of white immigration after UDI as a vulnerability to be exploited by guerrilla forces:

Immigrants are fortune seekers. They have left their countries for new ones in order to make quick-money and enjoy their cheaply acquired riches. In guerrilla-infested land, a land of landmines and of a people that [have] resolved to rout once and forever its oppressors, immigrants find the situation far [from] being ideal and they leave.\textsuperscript{38}

In targeting immigration, nationalist organs also signalled their appreciation of the importance of immigration to the settler regime, not just militarily – as so-called mercenaries – but also economically, politically, and psychologically. The dissemination of angry rhetoric aimed at newcomers and the state that promoted their migration was therefore a political education to other nationalists and sympathisers about why the arrival of a handful of whites in Salisbury and Bulawayo mattered at all in the context of the wider liberation war.

The most successful themes of nationalist propaganda were those that fitted in with pre-existing African inclinations, such as the consistent theme of malevolent white intentions, which found a receptive audience among many Africans. In print media, nationalists attacked most vociferously the state’s family planning efforts, which fitted in with an older theme of bad white medicine. Searching for racist thinking behind the regime’s population policies was easy hunting for nationalist propagandists, and these grounded suspicions were often bolstered by rumours and untruths. In this vein, propaganda tapped into the fear of white medicine, in particular that which was distributed by the state, and fed into older (yet untrue)\textsuperscript{39} rumours about the state surreptitiously sterilising African women.\textsuperscript{40}
In addition to the bad medicine theme, nationalists employed other rhetorical themes to spread their message about family planning. Amy Kaler divides nationalist rhetoric concerning family planning into three frames:

1. a plan to secretly annihilate the African population;
2. an example of white desperation; and
3. white disregard for sexual morality or decency.41

This rhetorical strategy was in part successful because the nationalists’ pro-natalism was consistent with long-standing African practices such as bride-wealth and vertical family-based social security for elder relations. The pre-existing economic and cultural incentives to have more babies were supplemented by nationalist propaganda offering newer political rationales to older motivations. Combined with the aforementioned assertions, nationalist propaganda highlighted the racialised nature of state family planning efforts and how efforts to reduce the African population coincided with the RF’s policy of mass white immigration. As will be discussed below, it was the cultural nationalist preservation of patriarchal tradition that proved the most successful theme, especially in appealing to African males.

Who were the audience for this print propaganda, with what purpose, and what effect did it have on the actual population numbers? Most obviously, this form of propaganda targeted literate nationalist supporters. Because the faithful outside Rhodesia, and perhaps some limited clandestine readers within Rhodesia, were clearly the nationalists’ intended audience, it is likely that only a few whites in Rhodesia outside the security forces ever came across these periodicals. It is even probable that those Rhodesians who did find copies did not take their assertions or threats too seriously. Similarly, it is even more unlikely that any of these materials ever found their way into the hands of potential immigrants to Rhodesia overseas, either in Britain, South Africa, or elsewhere. This must surely have been known to be the case by the producers of these materials. As for potential white immigrants and emigrants, and also for potential African practitioners of family planning, this nationalist propaganda was not so much intended to speak directly to them and influence their behaviour as to justify and explain to sympathisers why nationalist policies were what they were. This print propaganda in itself did not intimidate white residents into emigrating, scare off potential immigrants from coming, or dissuade women from using birth control. It did, however, articulate an appreciation of the connection between population issues and the fate of the regime, as well as create at least the illusion of a more activist and holistic African nationalist population strategy than
Actually existed. To what extent nationalists’ actions, as opposed to mere words, affected population patterns will be explored below.

**African Influence on White Migration Patterns**

African guerrilla activity had both direct and indirect effects on white migration patterns, and it was on these components that the nationalists exerted the most control in the wider war of numbers. Through the increasing drain on morale that call-ups generated and the use of political terror, African guerrillas sought to make life in Rhodesia unbearable for whites and thereby to induce higher emigration rates. These same tactics also served to create an image of Rhodesia as a dangerous and unpredictable destination for potential immigrants in their source countries. Perhaps surprisingly, the nationalists were more successful in drying up white immigration than in directly inducing emigration. This was partly, perhaps, a reflection of information disparities between current residents and potential immigrants. However, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, these two factors of white migration were closely linked. In this way, African nationalists were able to apply pressure on the white population shuffle, with important demographic and political consequences.

Ironically, the activities with the most dramatic demographic results were those in which the nationalists’ specific intent was diffused among several goals, demographic engineering perhaps the least among them. This applies particularly to the guerrillas’ military and terroristic activities during the war. Within this sphere, nationalist activity can be divided between action aimed directly at lowering the white settlers’ sense of security and the indirect, morale-sapping by-products of the war pertaining to the compounding military and civilian demands on the white population. Although many direct and indirect effects stemmed from the war, they emanated from only a few categories of action. ZANLA military strategy in the war was two-fold: to attenuate white manpower resources to the point that holding on to power proved too much of a strain on the small white population; and to create an atmosphere of terror and insecurity. Both of these prongs had demographic components. The attenuation of white manpower resources was only an effective strategy because of the relative sizes of the white and African populations. Likewise, the terror strategy was especially effective because of the white population’s constant population shuffle, and its need for new migrants to replace those leaving. Nonetheless, the demographic results of these actions were probably only a secondary consideration for the nationalist leaders. Of primary importance was the demoralisation of the white populace such that whites
would surrender power. But again, as discussed in Chapter 4, white morale was intimately related to migration figures, and these two factors moved in tandem. The tactical applications of ZANLA’s strategy were of the following types:

1. attacks on settler farms, directed at African farm workers and white farmers;
2. an increasing presence in the TTLs to recruit more guerrillas, punish informers and state collaborators, and hold *pungwes*;
3. extensive mining of rural roads and attacks on moving vehicles, both military and nonmilitary; and
4. what can be described best as ‘propaganda of the deed’: high profile terrorist acts on non-military targets, such as downing two Viscount civilian airliners, the 1977 bombing of a Woolworth store, the fire-bombing of the Pink Panther restaurant, and blowing up an enormous fuel storage facility outside of Salisbury in December 1978.

A complication in determining the causation between guerrilla activity and migration patterns is that it is impossible to accurately discern the truthful reasons why emigrants decided to leave Rhodesia, or why potential immigrants decided not to come. Whites from the rural border areas more explicitly cited security fears than did most emigrants, as their degree of risk was more immediate and palpable than the vast majority of whites, who were primarily urban dwellers. High rates of emigration from the rural border areas greatly expanded the scope of guerrilla activity and extended the territory accessible to the guerrillas. Those farmers who remained on the ‘sharp end’ were under that much more of a threat, and demanded greater military protection from the state lest they too emigrate, creating a snowball effect in some areas.43

While whites on the ‘sharp end’ of the guerrilla war explicitly cited security concerns for their departures, urban whites, who formed the overwhelming majority of the population, typically did not. A 1976 government survey of known intending emigrants asked: ‘Why are you leaving?’ In reporting the results, the Minister of Immigration indicated that within this pool of known emigrants, the majority of respondents replied that it was because of a lack of job opportunities in Rhodesia, while many others were pensioners wishing to retire by the sea, and others were leaving simply because they were getting married abroad and staying. He concluded: ‘[t]here are a hundred and one excuses but a very small proportion say they are leaving because of the constant call-ups or they do
not see any future in Rhodesia’.\textsuperscript{44} One of the weaknesses of this survey is that there were obvious reasons why emigrants would have tended to not be completely truthful in their given reasons for leaving, the most obvious being to avoid charges of cowardice. More importantly though, there was a selective bias in the respondent pool in that it only captured those emigrants who made themselves known to the state, which by 1976 was an ever shrinking proportion of total emigrants. Even so, this survey is consistent with a more recent survey of emigrants conducted in the early 1990s, in which only 5 per cent of the ex-Rhodesian respondents indicated that they left due to the war.\textsuperscript{45} But this latter survey suffers from an even greater selective bias, as the pool was collected from among members of diasporal Rhodesian associations and was conducted many years after the move, both factors that would presumably skew towards retrospectively discounting the significance of fear in their decision making. It is therefore very likely that the direct effects of the war, in particular the fear of physical violence, played a much more significant role in white emigration during the war years than was admitted to by emigrants themselves, at the time of departure or in the years since, particularly among whites from the border areas. Yet as explained in Chapter 4, the phenomenon of high rates of white emigration was as old as the colony and long preceded the shooting war.

The association of Rhodesia with white insecurity and continuous white call-ups played a major role in dissuading potential immigrants from choosing Rhodesia as a destination, as argued in Chapter 5. Both the direct and indirect effects of the war had a greater impact on lowering immigration numbers into Rhodesia than on raising emigration numbers from Rhodesia. White residents of Rhodesia, even factoring in their characteristic transience, would need greater prodding to leave than a potential immigrant would need to be discouraged from migrating to Rhodesia. Added to this inertia effect, was that foreign media coverage of the Rhodesian war portrayed the war in a much more negative light than did Rhodesia’s own coverage. While the white Rhodesian press reported overly optimistic appraisals until the very end of the war, the foreign press prematurely predicted the demise of the white regime, which would have had a chilling effect on Rhodesian recruitment. In fact, Rhodesian immigration officials openly conceded that negative foreign press coverage affected Rhodesia’s immigration yields.\textsuperscript{46} Nonetheless, while immigration did drop during the war years, surprisingly significant numbers still entered the country, at least partly mitigating the political and demographic effects of nationalist activity.\textsuperscript{47}
African Influence on the Rate of White Natural Increase

The war had both direct and indirect effects on white rates of natural growth, but surprisingly the war had had its greatest effect not on white death rates but on white fertility. One problem that complicates the study of Rhodesian demographic behaviour is that because of persistent white transience it is like trying to hit a moving target. Nevertheless, approximately 1,000–1,500 whites, both civilians and security force members, died from war-related causes.48 This is out of a total of 16,974 registered white deaths from 1972 through to 1979,49 and works out to approximately 7 per cent of white deaths during the war years being directly attributable to the war. In contrast, during the war years 113,889 Africans died, of which approximately 19,000 were from war-related causes – 16 per cent of all deaths.50 Annual white mortality charts throughout the 1970s consistently had ischemic heart disease as by far the greatest killer of whites, followed by cancer, lung cancer in particular.51 Another major cause of white deaths was motor vehicle accidents.52 These were all mortalities typical of other affluent communities around the world. In addition, despite a gradual rise in the 1970s, white Rhodesian death rates were always significantly lower than in Britain throughout the war years: from 1972 to 1979 the average death rates were 8 per thousand and 11.8 per thousand respectively.53 The war, and by extension the guerrillas who waged it, did have some mild effect on white mortality, but oddly enough not nearly as much as did white tobacco farmers through the cigarettes they produced, nor even as much as white bar-owners for over-serving automobile drivers.

The escalation of the guerrilla war had a greater effect on white fertility. White Rhodesian birth rates in the 1950s were comparatively high for a wealthy society, but were roughly consistent with other contemporary settler communities, such as South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, all of which were higher than the UK and other European nations.54 Even against these other settler communities, Rhodesia had the highest birth rates in 1950. All wealthy societies, including white Rhodesia, experienced a decline in birth rates from the 1950s to the late 1970s. Sloping downwards at different pitches, the gap between Britain’s consistently low birth rate and the higher rates of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and America’s white population tightened somewhat, yet Britain’s always remained the lowest, even by the late 1970s. Rhodesia followed this same general movement, but at a much steeper slope than all comparative Western societies.

As the graph in Figure 6.1 indicates, the decline of white Rhodesia’s fertility was not smooth but resembled a series of step-like drops and plateaus. These steps corresponded neatly with other historical and political trends
in Rhodesia, particularly the boom and bust years of net migrations discussed in Chapter 4. Consistent with Rhodesia’s then robust economy and high political confidence, white birth rates remained about 25 per thousand throughout the 1950s. In comparison, Britain’s birth rates during this time hovered between 15 and 17, on average around 30 per cent lower than Rhodesians. Beginning in 1960, and coinciding with the disintegration of the Federation and greater white political insecurity, Rhodesia’s birth rate plummeted during this first step down. Before levelling off again in 1966, Rhodesia’s crude birth rate fell nearly 36 per cent from 26.3 in 1960 to 16.9 in 1966, when it briefly dipped below Britain’s for the first time. From 1966 the birth rate flattened out, and even rose slightly as Britain’s continued to fall. Rhodesia’s plateau during these years was consistent with South Africa’s, Australia’s, and New Zealand’s patterns, though notably Rhodesia’s rate was already lower than all three. This levelling occurred alongside the generally optimistic post-UDI mood and lasted until the winter of 1972, when the war escalated, strongly suggesting a correlation. After 1972 the birth rate fell again, and following a small bump in 1974, due probably to the influx of
Portuguese settlers, the birth rate would continue to drop until the end of the war. From 1972 to 1979 the white birth rate fell from 18.1 to 11, a 40 per cent drop. Other comparable birth rates in 1979 were Britain's at 12.9, white America's 14.5, Australia's 15.4, Greece's 15.5, and New Zealand's at 16.6. All in all, Rhodesia had a 59 per cent drop in birth rates in 20 years, far greater than any comparable population anywhere on the globe.

The dramatic and unique demographic changes experienced by Rhodesia in the 1960s and 1970s are all the more notable in light of the transience of the white population. Because such a large percentage of whites were in Rhodesia for so short a time before continuing on to other destinations or returning home, it is even more puzzling that Rhodesia's birth rates were at such variance with both the most common source and destination countries. This disparity could be attributable to a combination of three factors: a migratory selective effect; a deliberate effort of many women in Rhodesia to limit the size of their families or postpone children beyond that which was already being practised in other Western populations; and/or a general, unwanted disruption of marital and sexual relations while in Rhodesia.

Selective migratory effects certainly influenced the composition of Rhodesia's white population in many ways. White migrants were always coming and going, but prior to 1960 whites were having more children in Rhodesia. The kinds of people migrating to and from Rhodesia began to change after Smith's premiership in 1964, as earlier immigration restrictions on capital, skills, and ethnicity were all loosened. The immigrants after the mid 1960s were on average slightly less skilled and poorer, and were very often not British. However, these compositional changes of Rhodesian whites ought not to have influenced birth rates in an adverse way but should instead have tended to have the opposite effect, in line with Vining's paradox, concerning wealth's negative correlation with birth rates. Furthermore, the non-British ethnicities that did appear in greater numbers – in particular Afrikaners, Portuguese, and southern Europeans – all on average had higher birth rates than did those of British descent. These compositional changes would intuitively have lead to a rise in birth rates, not a decline. In any case, any changes that did occur after Smith coming to power in 1964 would obviously not explain the drop in the early 1960s.

It could have been in another respect that a migratory selective effect influenced white fertility. State officials often lamented that emigrants were often younger, economically active adults and young families. This cohort would have been the same which was most affected by the increasing call-up commitments during the war years, and these whites would also make up the same age cohort as those in the most active child-bearing years. In white
Rhodesia’s sensitive demography, the out-migrations of this fertile cohort could have significantly altered overall white fertility rates. Rhodesian migration also influenced birth rates in another respect: through the interaction of Rhodesia’s long-standing transience and political and economic uncertainty. Migrants might well have had a child or children, but perhaps either before or after their stay in Rhodesia. This moves us directly into the second factor, which was the purposeful postponement of child-rearing during insecure times, aided as this was by white women’s easy access to birth control. Postponement could mean either waiting for better times in Rhodesia, or as stated earlier, waiting until leaving Rhodesia to have (more?) children. This break from child-rearing while in Rhodesia, enabled as it was by access to family planning for white women, could have been the product of rational, deliberate decisions by white families, or at the very least, white women.

This reduction of potential family size was not always an act of rational planning by white families or of fertile cohorts leaving. From 1973 the consistent rise of call-up commitments and other strains of living in a country at war took their toll on white families. Some commentators have noted that these combined pressures both physically and psychologically exhausted the white population. Discussing the effects of the war on the white population, Richard Hodder-Williams noted in an interview that ‘By the end of the ’70s [white] people were totally confused … and exhausted … [To most whites, the end of the war] was a release both physically and personally. [They suffered] tremendous psychological problems. Marriages had broken up during this period.’ The end of the war ‘delighted’ them, as it ‘was a release’.59 Consistent with Hodder-William’s observations, alcoholism and suicide rates were both higher in 1970s Rhodesia than in most comparable populations around the globe.60 Divorce rates in Rhodesia were also very high, a result probably related to war-related stresses.61 For example, in 1976 Rhodesians had the third highest divorce rates in the world, with one in four marriages ending in divorce, leading some civic leaders to call for a change in the law to implement mandatory waiting periods before granting divorces.62

Even in relationships that remained intact, wartime separation no doubt disrupted sexual relations, which would also have an effect on fertility. In addition, the loss of the husband’s income forced recalculations of the economics of childbearing. One Herald article from August 1974 described at length the psychological and economic plight of white wives of soldiers:

> A regular soldier on active service spends a month in the bush and 10 days at home. As one wife said:
‘You marry him and then it’s a battle trying to find the time to get to know him …’

[Wife Jean said:]
‘It’s quite hard being on my own. I get very depressed just worrying about him in the bush. I just worry about everything… One month I nearly had to put the baby in a home because I didn’t even have the money for milk tokens. But I borrowed money from my friend for milk and got an advance on my husband’s pay. Then you have to pay it back and in the end you just can’t win. Because of all this I’ve started to work and now get $135 as a clerk. The baby stays with a nanny because I couldn’t get him into a crèche …’

[Wife Deidre said:]
‘I have to work but I’m going to have a baby and I’ll have to stop in the next few months. I dread to think how I’ll manage then … I dread having my baby. It was a mistake.’

[Wife Anne said:]
‘Of course I have to work…You’ll find all Army wives struggle. I couldn’t afford to fall pregnant, much as my husband would like me to …’

[Wife Sandy said, when the husbands return:]
‘You try to put up a cheerful front, you don’t mention the problems of home. They’ve got terrorists to worry about.’

These factors of purposeful postponement, out-migrations of fertile age cohorts, unwanted disruptions in sexual relations, and war-related economic re-calculations, when taken together help to account for Rhodesia’s significant deviation from the fertility levels of comparative societies.

Regardless of the specific mechanisms at work, only the second step down in Rhodesia’s birth trends corresponded with the war, as the first step down in the early 1960s was prior to UDI, and long before the war’s escalation in 1972. This first drop could obviously be better explained by political and economic uncertainty, and transience and its effect on fertility, than by war-related stresses. It would be an especially long stretch to attribute this first fertility drop to intentional nationalist activity, any more than the wider decolonisation trends occurring throughout the continent. If this causality were to be taken seriously, Harold MacMillan would be as responsible for falling white Rhodesian birth rates in the early 1960s as Joshua Nkomo. The second drop during the war years can be more easily traced to guerrilla activity. Affected as the second drop was by the war waged by African
guerrillas, it could be said that African military and political activity were partly responsible for Rhodesia’s odd fertility patterns, and in a limited sense this would be correct. However, it is highly doubtful that even the most politically aware nationalists pretended that this drop in white fertility, such as it was even known, was a result of deliberate nationalist policies intended to effectuate this drop.

**Nationalist Resistance to the State’s Family Planning Initiatives**

Nationalists were the most active in their resistance to the state’s family planning efforts. State efforts in the fertility realm had their antecedents in colonial interferences in African sexuality dating back to the earliest settlement in Rhodesia. Considering the long history of white interference in African sexuality, and African resistance to these interferences, the state’s interest in slowing the African birth rate unsurprisingly aroused deep suspicions among many sections of the African population of Rhodesia. By the mid 1960s, as the state identified African growth rates as a grave threat to the regime, official blame in sexual politics landed on African men and traditional lineage systems and their pro-natalist impact, and family planning advocates portrayed African women as unwilling victims in this foolhardy pursuit of wanting more babies. This focus set state policy against the interests of traditional patriarchies, and African males generally, whose power was largely dependent on controlling female reproduction. This opened up a space for nationalists to forge a politically expedient alliance with important sections of rural society.

The alliance between rural patriarchies protecting male power and nationalists keen to establish themselves as agents of an African authenticity uncorrupted by the white settler state’s debasement was part of nationalists’ strategic ‘cultural nationalism’. The depth of guerrilla commitment to gender equality was not so deep as to bypass the opportunity to create a bond with rural males and traditional rural elites, and this opportunity presented itself quite clearly in the issue of state-sponsored family planning. Kriger writes that in establishing this alliance ZANLA had some difficulty in reconciling its purported ‘goal of liberating women from their double burden of racism and tradition’ with an avoidance of any clash with African custom that would weaken rural support. Kriger concludes that in deciding how far to intervene in African customs that ran contrary to their liberation ideology, ZANU decided to ‘not go very far’. Kaler describes this compromised approach to liberation ideology for the sake of cultural nationalism in this way:

In the realm of marriage and family, cultural nationalism took the form of insisting that both genders conform to gender-specific norms.
of ideal patriarchal behavior. In this respect, the liberation movement did not attempt to change gender hierarchies and actually provided reinforcement to patriarchal values.68

This opposition to family planning was not merely for the sake of rural alliances, however, as it also meshed well with the guerrillas’ other strategic goals, namely the degradation of state administration in the rural areas; the facilitation of the economic, political, and morale strains placed on the state as a result of population growth; and the fulfilment of the long-term goal of bolstering African numbers that could fill military requirements in the future were the war to persist.

In repeated exhortations in *pungwes* and political gatherings, guerrillas warned Africans that family planning was ‘cutting down the nation’. But what did the guerrillas really mean by this? Kaler argues that guerrilla arguments about family planning stripping the nation of future soldiers and future voters were more metaphorical, spiritual, and symbolic than practical, as it would be many years until these hypothetical babies would be of use to the nation politically or militarily.69 However, when viewing these population matters as a whole, it is clear that even newborn babies were of immediate political use to nationalists. More babies meant more scarcity and therefore more demands on resources, social services, and especially land, that the state was loath to (re)distribute. More babies also meant new citizens on behalf of whom claims could be made. Their contribution to Rhodesia’s overall racial demographics also had dramatic effects on both white and African nationalist morale, as discussed in earlier chapters. It is also not clear that African guerrillas, even in the later 1970s, knew that independence was as close as it turned out to be, especially as there were no liberated areas and the white state’s military capacity appeared strong and effective almost until the very collapse. Appeals to produce future soldiers might also have been, therefore, the reflection of a residual doubt that the war would be successfully resolved before these babies’ maturity, and so perhaps the perceived effects of babies on the war should be taken seriously. Finally, more African babies meant the failure of the state programme promoting family planning, and this further meant a major state initiative in the rural areas was failing. As Kriger argues in a broader context, this inability of the state to impose its will or exert influence in this sphere and over this population added to the perception that the nationalists sought to foster, which was of a generalised degradation of state power and a severance of the connections between rural Africans and the settler state.70
This last motivation combined the guerrillas’ antipathy towards family planning with older anti-state and cultural nationalist impetuses. Guerrilla opposition was in this respect not so much against family planning per se as it was against yet another state interference into the lives of rural Africans, and especially into the politically sensitive area of African fertility. The non-cooperation with and sabotage of family planning initiatives was not only consistent with nationalist campaigns against cattle de-stocking and census-taking a decade previously but also with the contemporaneous destruction of cattle dips, the burning of Protected Village huts, attacks on agricultural extension officers, the targeting of African workers on white farms, and the intimidation of those better-off African farmers who marketed their goods through official state channels and were state-certified master farmers. These were all part of a larger effort described by Kriger as the guerrillas’ general antipathy towards any arm of state activity, or any association with white settler society. It was to sever connections, even those perceived to be beneficial, between the state and rural Africans that state services such as schools and cattle dips were attacked, and why even state anti-epidemic campaigns such as that against cholera were frustrated by guerrilla activity. The forced distance between rural Africans and the state de-legitimised the regime and opened up space for guerrilla support. But, as with all such anti-state activity, the driving theme was a return to legitimate, traditional African practices, untainted by colonial interference. It was especially in the realm of family planning that appeals to resist white interference fell on very receptive ears, particularly among African males. And as such, all state interference in rural areas was conflated. As a female family planning worker interviewed by Kaler recounted about the guerrilla strategy:

Just like the digging of contour ridges and dipping of cattle, such talk about family planning was there and regarded as a Western way of reducing the number of blacks so that we have fewer children and they come and take over the land and eventually the land is taken … Like the issue of contour ridges for conservation, to dig contour ridges or to take your cattle to the dip tanks to clean ticks, these were opposed as propaganda for the war … So all these things, these developmental issues that would do down the enemy would be advanced. During the war you use any available propaganda. It’s a question of what ideas people will buy and you advance them.

Guerrillas used a variety of tactics and employed different propaganda themes in their attacks on the state’s population control policies. Family
planning services were met with strong, and in some cases violent, organised resistance. Guerrillas in the field regularly railed against state-sponsored family planning efforts in their pungwes, where family planning was described as both a white scheme to ‘cut down’ the Zimbabwean nation, and as a health threat to the women themselves. In political meetings, guerrillas informed African villagers of the alleged ill intentions behind the state’s family planning programs, and the political justification for their pro-natalism. It was in the promotion and distribution of anti-state rumours regarding reproduction that the guerrillas proved most effective. As discussed earlier, these rumours fitted within a long tradition of African suspicion of white medicine, and this form of propaganda found a receptive audience. This rhetorical frame of the health implications of family planning medicines appealed to rural Africans of both genders, whereas the political rationales of creating future fighters appealed almost exclusively to males.

In a more gender-specific method of propaganda, guerrillas appealed to African male frustration over the regime’s meddling into what many considered to be the exclusive domain of African males. Rural men were generally against family planning because they thought it was intended as a political weapon by the state to reduce African numbers, but also because they believed it allowed African women to be promiscuous, and because children were valuable both in terms of status and in the economics of rural areas. The traditional benefits of having more children were all-important stoppers on state-sponsored initiatives to promote smaller families. More broadly though, Kaler argues that white male interference in African women’s fertility must be viewed in the frame of the wider emasculation of African males. Kaler links male opposition to family planning with the more general emasculation of Rhodesian colonialism. Whether or not the entire colonial experience in Rhodesia can be fairly characterised as attacks on African masculinity matters less than the narrower point that the settler state’s interference in family planning in the last decades of settler rule was certainly an affront to African masculinity. As a guerrilla recruiting tool, this appeal to lost masculinity proved effective, as winning political liberation was tied to winning back their stolen manhood.

In addition to these rhetorical attacks on family planning, family planning workers and their families were directly threatened and intimidated. One former family planning worker described how guerrillas would confront them in the field and ask:

‘Why do you want us to be few? You want us to be few because you want the Rhodesian forces to come and kill us when all our children
will be dead. Because the government doesn’t want us to have many
children, because if the children are many they will go out of the
country and then come back and fight.”

Not all such interactions were just words, however, as in one instance a
family planning worker was nearly executed at a *pungwe* until the crowd
intervened to save the worker. Kaler asserts that in all at least two and
probably five family planning workers were killed as a result of their work.

Though nationalist opposition to family planning was a public political
position from as early as 1957, this did not mean that some did not support
the idea of family planning outside Rhodesia’s peculiar political circum-
stances, that there was not a gender divide among nationalists regarding
these matters, nor even that many female guerrillas did not privately use
family planning services. As outlined above, it was not family planning per
se that the guerrillas opposed so much as the state promoters of this policy.
An elucidation of this delicate position can be found in an interview with a
female family planning worker recounting conversations she had with guer-
rilla commanders in the field: ‘The Comrades just said, “Carry on [with your
job]. There is no government that doesn’t like family planning, when we are
the government we will want it.”’ And as it was, soon after independence
the Zimbabwe government did want family planning. All this displays the
lack of a monolithic approach to family planning among nationalists, every-
where and in all circumstances, despite their unequivocal public positions.

Despite the patriarchal/guerrilla alliance in opposition to family plan-
ning, many African women still used birth control throughout the war
years, often at great risk to themselves. Kaler’s book describes many of the
fascinating lengths that African women would go to hide their pills from
their husbands:

   Some would put them [pills] under the mattress, some would put
them in the mealie-meal. But then these other ones [husbands] would
fish it out. Some would hide them in a pot, when there are many pots
in the house, but this man would sometimes just get the pills when his
wife is not there, he would just search and when she comes he would
say, ‘I have found this, so you are using!’ Maybe the men would be
talking to each other at the beer halls, to give each other ideas where
these women could be keeping their things.”

This gendered divide over family planning existed within the guerrilla
armies as well, and there is even evidence that female guerrillas covertly used
birth control, despite the staunchly pro-natal position of the leadership. A female guerrilla was quoted as saying, ‘Some of the male comrades did not like contraceptives because they thought it was murder, but really it was our duty and we female comrades were ready to defend it.’

How much did the nationalists’ pro-natalist policies affect actual population numbers? If it was nationalist activity in galvanising resistance to family planning which was effective in promoting more African births, or at least in preventing the state’s anti-natalist initiatives, as opposed to traditional rural resistance, then this demographic effect should be visible in African birth rates over time. Thus, shifts in the nationalists’ position on family planning after ZANU came to power could possibly isolate their affect on fertility from other forces.

After independence in 1980, the new Zimbabwean government ended the former state’s family planning efforts and banned the use of Depo Provera. It was not long, however, before the new ZANU government became concerned about the effects of high fertility on the state’s economic and social goals and set about trying to lower Zimbabwe’s birth rate. In 1984 the former Family Planning Association of Rhodesia was reorganised as the Child Spacing Organisation and tasked with the promotion of birth control. Reflecting this policy reversal and the full state sanctioning of family planning activities, Robert Mugabe’s own sister-in-law was placed as the programme director of the Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council in the 1980s, and in 1989 Mugabe received the Population Institute’s International Population Control Award. The nationalists’ political turn on family planning so soon after coming to power was swift and within a few years had shifted from sanguinary hatred of such practices to aggressively promoting the same. If the nationalists were the driving force against the white regime’s family planning policies, then the ZANU state’s reversal should have yielded a dramatic increase in these services and a subsequent drop in fertility. A drop in fertility did begin to occur in the late 1970s and early 1980s which would at first blush seem to support this idea, but as will be analysed below, the causation behind this shift was not as clear as it might first seem.

To isolate causation in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, it is necessary first to examine traditional pro-natalism in the broader African context. As a continent Africa has been the slowest region to embrace birth control. Traditionalist resistance to family planning was a continent-wide phenomenon in 1970s Africa. The few newly independent states in Africa that tried to implement population control policies all met with great opposition from these traditional rural sources. Some demographers argue that African cultural
factors were primarily responsible, as social and religious practices rewarded high fertility and bearing more children reaped real financial and social benefits.90 Even significant changes in what are commonly regarded as the socioeconomic preconditions for fertility transitions mattered less in affecting actual fertility numbers in Africa than did the perception of those factors.91 Thus even as shifts in industrialisation, infant mortality, family wealth flows, consumption patterns, urbanisation, and access to birth control technologies occurred, these objective preconditions took time to work through cultural filters.92

In Rhodesia specifically, there was a great deal of social pressure on rural women to have many children, having nothing to do with liberation politics. These traditional pro-natalist forces in the 1960s and 1970s did not suddenly disappear with the ZANU’s policy change in the early 1980s, just as they did not change with the settler government’s promotion of family planning in the mid 1960s. Traditional pro-natalist forces were not instantly overcome by state policy shifts towards promoting family planning in the regional context either. Kenya, which in 1968 became the first sub-Saharan state to implement a state-sponsored family planning effort, failed to reduce its birth rate, and indeed Kenya’s birth rate actually rose throughout the 1970s, at one point holding the distinction of having the highest natural growth rate anywhere in the world.93 Similarly, Botswana introduced a state-sponsored family planning programme in 1971, only to experience a rise in its Total Fertility Rate from 5.6 children per woman to 7.1 children per woman from 1971 to 1981.94 In Ghana family planning measures introduced in 1970 had yielded no results whatsoever by 1980.95 Kenya, Botswana, and Ghana were all pioneers of family planning and, significantly, all were African-ruled states, yet seemingly their programmes had failed, despite a decade of state promotion, in the face of traditionalist resistance. With the significant exception of South Africa, no sub-Saharan country experienced a drop in birth rates from the 1950s until the end of the 1970s. This was true whether or not the leaders in power were African, and notwithstanding any state programmes to lower the birth rate.

The family planning policies of Rhodesia’s settler state and their results were remarkably similar to those in post-independence Botswana and Kenya.96 All three initiated state-sponsored family planning policies within a three-year span in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and in each country these policies were in varying degrees ineffective at first and birth rates more or less mirrored countries that had no programmes at all. Only later did these pioneer states witness a drop in fertility that saw them pull away from states without such policies.
On fertility matters, Zambia serves as a useful control for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. It was a regional neighbour, also a former British colony, and from the 1960s until the mid 1980s its government was ‘laissez faire’ concerning its fertility rate. Zambia’s birth rates remained close to those of Botswana, Kenya, and Rhodesia until the early 1980s when each country’s birth rate dropped significantly below Zambia’s. This decline continued for all three at a faster pace than Zambia or the sub-Saharan average until the end of the millennium. The divergence of Botswana and Zimbabwe, as well as South Africa, has led one scholar to posit that this region of central and southern Africa had by the early 1990s begun the fertility transition, whereas the rest of Africa had yet to.

Several economic and cultural trends in the early 1980s seem to provide clues as to the timing of Zimbabwe’s fertility drop. Consistent with the ‘dangerous dogma’ of the precondition theories of fertility, after independence Zimbabwe began to experience rising incomes and expectations, and some of the other socioeconomic preconditions which preceded their drop in fertility rates. New financial relationships may also have had some effect on ‘expanding the parameters of manhood to encompass a small family and

![Figure 6.2 African crude birth rates compared (1960–2000)](image)
a wife who goes to the family planning clinic’, as Kaler argues. By the early 1980s, therefore, Zimbabwe appeared to have established some of the preconditions for a fertility drop. Crucially, as a result of the settler government’s aggressive campaigns, most Zimbabwean women had long been aware of family planning practices whether or not they actually made use of them.

Nevertheless, these socioeconomic shifts and the perceptions of these changes were not at all universal and immediate. The ZANU government, after their policy shift towards supporting family planning, still had to confront residual ‘hang-ups’ of men in rural areas, and opposition from traditional peasant leaders concerning family planning. Traditional chiefs remained outspoken in their opposition to family planning into the 1990s, as did others, who all pointed to the foreignness of contraception.

Most significantly, however, this resistance to state-sponsored family planning reflected a broader antagonism between African peasants and any state interference. As Kriger argues regarding post-independence Zimbabwe: ‘Peasant relations with states are characteristically overtly or latently antagonistic. Many peasants wanted, as before, to keep the state from imposing demands on them.’ The political interests of the male peasants and the guerrillas were initially aligned regarding family planning, but after the ZANU policy turn towards supporting family planning, they were in opposition. Regarding peasant/nationalist relations generally, Kriger argues: ‘Guerrilla appeals against whites had raised peasant consciousness and emboldened them without necessarily converting them to nationalists.’ As a result, the traditional male peasant opposition to birth control did not follow lock-step with the ZANU policy turn in the early 1980s.

Despite its arguable tardiness, the rest of Africa did follow the fertility patterns of Zimbabwe and the early family planning pioneer states of Africa, though at a much slower pace. Between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s a growing number of African states became convinced that population growth had harmful economic and social effects. By the mid 1980s, this trend had turned into a majority of states, which began to put into place population policies a decade and a half after Botswana, Kenya, and Rhodesia. Only after these newer policies had time to seep into the cultural frames of these societies did the rest of Africa begin the slow process of lowering birth rates.

That Zimbabwe’s birth rate began to drop around same time as ZANU’s political turn might tempt one to conclude that the temporal overlap must imply causation, but this easy post hoc ergo propter hoc conclusion must be avoided. Just as state support in Botswana, Kenya, and Ghana between
the late 1960s and early 1970s did not yield immediate rural support for family planning in those countries, neither did Zimbabwe’s state sanction in the 1980s guarantee support. As these other countries’ experiences indicate, traditional cultural forces were present and strong even under African governance. What the nationalists did was inherit a family planning programme that had already been working to erode these traditional underpinnings with slow successes for over a decade, much as Kenya’s and Botswana’s had done. The new state also experienced the beginnings of some of the socioeconomic preconditions for fertility. It was thus only in the 1980s that these long-standing programmes began to have real demographic effects, and only then did these activist pioneers pull away from neighbouring countries without such long-standing policies.

Looking comparatively at Zimbabwe’s birth rates, the drop in the 1980s was less a display of nationalist power in both resistance and promotion than an example of the glacial pace of deep social transformations which only coincidentally came to bear fruit (or actually not bear fruit) after the nationalists had taken over the mechanisms of the state. Here, as in other respects, there was a great deal of symmetry between the old and new states, and far from showing great change in the state’s relationship with the peasant populace, family planning policies expose an equal disconnect between the rulers and the ruled, and an equal inability to change African peasant society from the top down.

As the preceding argument outlines, pre-existing traditional obstacles to family planning – pro-natalist husbands, the threat of returned lobola or polygamy, lineage ties, economic security in old age, other familial pressures to have more children – were more of a force militating against family planning usage under the white regime than was the more ephemeral and opportunistic nationalist resistance. This pre-existing resistance was a force tapped into by nationalists but not controlled by them. As a result, nationalist agency in this aspect of the population war was only partial at best.

**Conclusion**

Nationalist agency in the population war was mixed, and varies greatly depending upon which specific factor is analysed. Generally, nationalist control over white population factors was greater than their control over African population factors, paralleling the white regime’s similar scope of agency. As for the white population factors, nationalists did have some control in the shifting demographics. Some of the nationalists’ impacts on these numbers, such as with immigration and emigration rates, were specifically intended, but others, such as the drop in white fertility, were not. One factor
not affected to any significant degree by African guerrillas was, surprisingly, the white death rate. White factors were easier to manipulate due to the small size of the white population, its transience, its connections with the formal economy, and its urbanity.

The African population was always more difficult to manipulate through political means for the exact opposite reasons, and in many respects it was largely beyond the reach of the state. This inability of political actors to control African populations was a continent-wide problem in Africa for governments of all races, and was so even for the Zimbabwean state after 1980. Fortuitously for the nationalists, the tidal demographic trends of skyrocketing African birth rates occurring in the 1970s across Africa and within Rhodesia were politically beneficial to their movement. Nationalists in their propaganda added post hoc political justifications for these tidal changes but did not steer them. A result of this peculiar population situation was that the belligerents on one half of the population war were consistently winning without having to do very much whatsoever, whereas their opponents were forced to expend prodigious amounts of their political, economic, emotional, mental, and physical resources quixotically attempting to counter these trends.
CONCLUSION

Rhodesia’s racial population ‘imbalance’ defined the fundamental character of the post-Federation settler state. It defined the state geographically, in terms of uneven land development and patterns of urbanisation; constitutionally, in its frozen progress along the Durham path, the illegal break with Britain, and the 1969 Constitution; politically, through the popular anxieties regarding African population growth, and the state’s wide-ranging population policies; economically, in its rickety racialised economic structure; and socially, in the siege mentality experienced by white Rhodesians.

That Rhodesia was a settler state with too few settlers, who were by and large unrooted in Rhodesia, challenged the beliefs of white Rhodesians regarding their rightful place in the Commonwealth and the international community. During a period of continent-wide decolonisation under majority rule, the incongruence between white Rhodesia’s self-conception as a settler state and the reality of its lopsided demographics resulted in a constitutional stalemate with Britain, the UDI rebellion, and ultimately a protracted guerilla war. It was white Rhodesia’s desire to reinforce its tenuous claim on this conceptual definition and to bolster its political hold over its territory that led the state to wage the war of population numbers described in this book.

The war of numbers waged by the state and African nationalists was contested on many levels. It involved thousands of different actors inside and outside Rhodesia, some as knowing participants and others unaware of their role. Its sites of contest were truly global in scope, encompassing much of the continent, stretching across the oceans into vast migration networks and the great metropolitan capitals and seats of Western power. This war was primarily political; but it had obvious military and diplomatic components, as well as less obvious but no less important social and cultural aspects. It created gendered divisions within families over the number and spacing of their children, and was at a certain level a contest between pro-natalist
husbands and their anti-natalist wives. The war combined the social and the political, since it was about the demographic choices made by individuals within the context of specific social and economic conditions. Contestants on both sides of the conflict sought to engineer these conditions to change the environments in which individuals made life decisions. In doing so they sought to make children a more or less economically attractive option for families, to create incentives or disincentives for whites to move to or stay in Rhodesia, to transfer economic burdens from the central government to African families so as to shift the costs of African population growth, and to spatially re-configure Rhodesia’s racial boundaries, altering work and residential patterns. The unifying idea behind the war of numbers was thus simple, but since it involved the most fundamental of life’s choices and cleaved along sensitive racial and gender lines, it played out in complex and surprising ways.

There was a remarkable amount of symmetry in the capacities of both the settler state and African nationalists to effectuate demographic change. In spite of their wide-ranging efforts to shape conditions, both contestants in the population struggle were only unevenly effective in manipulating individual decision-making, with the result that their efforts inconsistently yielded the desired demographic outcomes, and often they mistakenly attributed causation to any actual outcomes. Both contestants were unsuccessful in manipulating fertility patterns in the short term, via either the pro-natalist policies targeting their own racial population, or the anti-natalist policies targeting their opponent’s racial population. This was true, even though in the longer term the state’s efforts to lower African fertility yielded results several years after white rule had ended. Both sides were more effective, however, in engineering migration patterns. Various degrees of coercion could be applied more effectively in this realm than in fertility, recalling the Secretary of Health’s admission regarding family planning that ‘[the state] could provide the water but could neither lead or drive the horse to the water nor make it drink’. The state’s failure to control and regulate the rural African population – most obviously through family planning, but also with regard to regulating cross-border African migration, the registration of births and deaths, and effective census-taking – revealed the limits of state power in rural areas and over peasant populations. And yet, as evidenced by the independent Zimbabwean state’s own difficulties in controlling and regulating rural populations, this may indeed reflect a generalised defect or deficiency in the post-colonial African state.

Despite these deficiencies, both the settler state and African nationalists projected and imagined power over populations, regions, and phenomena
that were, in reality, beyond their control. The settler state projected and imagined control over African migrations to and from Rhodesia, while these actual movements were beyond the capacity of the state to regulate effectively. The same was true regarding internal African migrations – keeping rural Africans from drifting into the cities and preventing alien Africans from working in Closed Labour Areas. Both trends were beyond the administration of the state, yet the promulgation of legislation regulating these movements, or retroactively designating the status quo as being within state regulations, projected a degree of control that was nonexistent. In the registration of African births and deaths, and in the general accounting of African demographics, the settler state issued statistics and promulgated regulations, but these attempts at state control were ineffectual and the state’s knowledge of African demography remained, even after the 1969 census, largely guesswork.

African nationalists likewise projected and imagined power over phenomena in which they had little direct agency. Much of the thrust of nationalist print propaganda was an effort to claim responsibility for events that had independent causes. This was particularly the case regarding African fertility. Nationalists claimed that fertility was being employed as a weapon of the liberation war and that African women refused to use birth control so as to turn out warriors for the liberation struggle, when in reality high fertility rates had causes outside liberation politics. The social factors behind high African fertility rates would continue long after independence was attained, even after the Zimbabwean state decided fertility rates should be reduced. Likewise, the nationalists boasted of engineering white migration beyond the extent that they actually influenced these numbers. The war of numbers that was waged inside and outside Rhodesia thus draws out broader themes of the projection and imagination of political power in postcolonial Africa, especially in the rural areas, and the limitations of formal politics to effectuate change and control populations.

Though there was symmetry between nationalist and state agency in what demographic factors could be controlled, the distinct differences in the composition of the white and African populations greatly favoured the nationalists in the population struggle. White residents in Rhodesia were uniquely susceptible to migratory engineering due to their high degree of transience and shallow roots in Rhodesia. Thus nationalist efforts to force Rhodesian residents to emigrate were much easier than had they had to uproot a more settled population. At the same time, the short-term bias of most migrants coming to Rhodesia made it possible for the state to attract a certain amount of immigrants through economic incentives, as the relative
‘liquidity’ of migrants’ personal investment in Rhodesia lowered the risks associated with moving there. It was the relative inability of the state to lower African birth rates in the short term, and the contested nature of white migration, that proved decisive in this parallel war of numbers.

The settler state lost the war of numbers, even as the definitions of what constituted victory changed over time to encompass increasingly less ambitious goals. There was never any publicly articulated and officially sanctioned population goal that the state sought to reach through their diverse population policies, probably because of the old political rule never to set specific goals that might define your own failure. Goals were articulated secretly, however, behind the closed doors of Cabinet debates, in confidential memoranda, departmental meetings, and RF Party Conferences, which did set population end-points. The ultimate goal of a majority white population was expressed by Smith’s first Immigration Minister, Harry Reedman in 1964, but his view was probably not shared by many others inside or outside government as a realistic population goal. In Parliament, Reedman stated emphatically, ‘With tremendous developments ahead, Southern Rhodesia was capable of supporting 40,000,000–50,000,000 people at a high standard of living.’ But after Reedman’s statements were widely mocked in Parliament and in the public press the Smith government distanced itself from the goal of surpassing the African population, and Reedman and his goal of demographic supremacy were pushed into the background. The target of the white population making up ground on the rate of African natural increase was not abandoned, however, and only a few months into Smith’s premiership, the Cabinet set up South Africa’s racial ratio of 5:1 Africans to whites as a viable policy goal. Yet even this goal was never close to being attained, as the racial ratios in Rhodesia widened from 20:1 in 1964, to 21:1 in 1974, to 28.1 in 1979. In 1967, the Sadie Report offered a population goal that was a function of pegging the economically active white population to the entry of Africans into the labour force. This goal meant setting a more favourable ratio, perhaps in the lower teens, but the Report did not realistically envision immigration rolling back African natural increase to any great extent, and certainly not to the South African ratio of 5:1. This was essentially a maintenance goal, and a fitting companion to Smith’s famous words several years earlier regarding African political advancement: ‘So Far and No Further!’ But these racial ratios went much further, and even maintenance soon became an unrealistic objective. After the 1969 census revealed the extent of the widening population gap, the state’s population policy goals were set more towards slowing down these widening differentials, rather than maintaining a constant ratio.
It was a partial admission of defeat in the population war when the Rhodesian Front government began to advocate ‘slice-and-dice’ racial policies to cordon off which areas and populations were the responsibilities of central government, in effect redefining what and where racial ratios mattered. After Smith’s 1976 speech conceding the inevitability of eventual African majority rule, the state’s goals for its population policy shifted conceptually towards the creation of a politically powerful white minority that could still maintain white privilege in an African-ruled state. In the final years of settler rule, racial population policy focused on papering over the flow of white emigration from Rhodesia, and became an exercise in mitigation.

From a policy perspective, the evolution of the state’s goals in the war of numbers did not matter in so far as the state never came close enough to any of them to alter the conduct or urgency of the population war. Yet the shifting definitions of victory did matter in another way, as they revealed something about the self-conception of white settlers in Rhodesia and what these white settlers hoped the Rhodesian state would become. The demographic goals show us how white Rhodesians envisioned their future, and what they saw as the nature of their settler state – whether it would one day be a majority white settler country of the Australian or Canadian mould, a smaller version of apartheid South Africa, a fully partitioned entity, or, failing that, a small but powerful minority under African rule.

Conundrums, Conflicts, and Contradictions within the State’s Population Policies

The state’s failure to achieve even progressively humbler population goals was not inevitable or fixed by immutable demographic laws, but there were inherent paradoxes and contradictions within the state’s population policies that were never resolved or reconciled. The broadest and most significant paradox facing white Rhodesia was that both the underlying population crisis and the prescribed remedies for this were potentially fatal to the state. Most white Rhodesians felt only a weak loyalty to the settler state, and the most comprehensive remedies for Rhodesia’s population problems required a degree of sacrifice that the white population was unwilling to make. These sacrifices would have included a softening of white preserve so as to meet the socioeconomic preconditions for the African fertility transition; more job competition; increased state spending and strains on the urban infrastructure to allow for mass white immigration; and remaining in Rhodesia to serve in the military, spread out the conscription burdens, and ease emigration pressures. Yet the white population was by and large unwilling to suffer any degradation of their inflated standard of living, and when such
degradation did occur whites emigrated in large numbers. Fully aware of the tension between problems and remedies, the state could only combat the existential threat presented by population pressures with half-measures and partial solutions, which neither solved the underlying problems nor satisfied the fickle white populace.

Another fundamental paradox faced by white policymakers concerned the conflicts inherent in making Rhodesia a viable white settler state in post-colonial Africa. For white Rhodesia to survive politically and economically there had to be a continual influx of white immigrants and a greater retention of whites already living in the country. For this to happen, Rhodesia had to maintain its racialised economic and political system locked into place by UDI. Without these racially discriminatory systems in place and the elevated status afforded to whites, Rhodesia could not hope to lure a significant number of white immigrants away from the other demand-side countries, nor could the state expect to retain current residents if there was a softening of these racial preserves. At the same time, however, to secure a permanent future for white Rhodesia economically and politically, the economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation had to be lifted. This was true despite Rhodesia’s defiant and unpredicted economic performance in the years immediately following UDI. Yet the price to be paid for legal independence and the lifting of international sanctions was an end to these very same racially discriminatory policies. To survive as a white settler state in post-colonial Africa, Rhodesia could neither keep the racist structures in place to stabilise white migration, nor jettison these structures to be free from international opprobrium.

A broad incongruence existed between the Rhodesian state’s policies to promote mass immigration and the maintenance of the inflated standards of living for whites already in Rhodesia. The racial economic structure in Rhodesia was such that white privilege relied upon an imposed hierarchy of occupations and the artificially low cost of African labour, both of which were threatened by influxes of lesser-skilled whites who could not slot into the sectors of the economy designated for whites. Rhodesia was in some respects a haven for whites, but the territory’s carrying capacity for whites was limited, as was the willingness of current residents to subsidise the cost of attracting and sustaining new migrants. A chicken-or-egg conundrum existed about which should come first: available jobs and infrastructure capabilities or new influxes of white immigrants. On the one hand, the short-term availability of employment opportunities provided inducements to potential immigrants and avoided conflicts with current white residents, as well as ensuring that the state could absorb the social costs of more whites;
but this policy could never attract sufficient numbers of whites to satisfy the state's politicised demographic goals. On the other hand, there was the purported long-term economic growth potential of new immigration, which supposedly created new opportunities and expanded the economic pie instead of merely re-dividing it. In the event, current residents typically resisted calls for new immigrants when there were no employment opportunities available for them, as this would increase employment competition and potentially flood Rhodesia with white job-seekers. At the same time, residents wanted more white faces. This crux epitomised the white Rhodesian experience after UDI: more immigrants were necessary to maintain white Rhodesia's political viability, yet more whites meant a steady erosion of the privileged status of whites in Rhodesia – the very essence of what the settler state was trying to defend.

Some of the settler state's other migration policies also ran counter to each other. In order to stem the serious problem of white emigration, the state began to impose draconian restrictions on whites leaving the country, but emigration restrictions intended to keep current residents in place simultaneously risked frightening off potential immigrants. Within the competitive migration market, this lack of liquidity must have negatively influenced potential migrants deciding whether or not to move to Rhodesia. Compounding the problem, the state's efforts to promote immigration inadvertently reinforced the culture of transience in Rhodesia. The culture of 'Good-time Charlies' encouraged by the promotion literature reinforced the unwillingness of Rhodesian whites to suffer declines in their standards of living. Yet the immigration officials marketed Rhodesia in that fashion because it was the only way to remain competitive in the migration market. After the war escalated in 1972 another conflict opened up, between the state's military demands and the state's migration goals. As the regime steadily increased the call-up commitments for whites in Rhodesia, this had a predictably negative impact on emigration. Demand for white soldiers eventually forced the regime to reduce the 'grace period' which exempted new immigrants from military service, a policy change which was harmful to further immigration. The state could never find the correct balance between assuaging current residents and attracting new migrants. These conflicts and paradoxes combined to render the Rhodesian state's white migration policies self-contradictory and unworkable.

There were also conflicts involving the state's efforts to combat African population growth. One arose between the preconditions for fertility reduction and the preservation of white privilege, because any systematic change in the African population's educational or economic opportunities or in
urbanisation levels that might reduce fertility would necessarily threaten the white population’s privileged status, with adverse affects on white migration patterns. To side-step this paradox, the Rhodesian state attempted to drop the African birth rate through family planning efforts alone, despite the evidence that expanding economic and educational opportunities and increased urbanisation correlated with lower fertility rates. As with other aspects of Rhodesia’s population policy, this conflict was never resolved.

This narrative repositions population issues as central to an understanding of the collapse of white rule in Rhodesia, and has identified many irreconcilable conflicts within the state’s efforts to remedy these population imbalances, yet this account cannot be accurately characterised as demographic determinism. The collapse of the Rhodesian regime was not inevitable and did not follow from fixed demographic laws. As Peter O’Toole’s Lawrence of Arabia emphatically pronounced in the classic movie of the same name: ‘Nothing is written!’ Demographic trends in Rhodesia were not predestined or racially essentialist, but were subject to change, susceptible to interference, and the result of human agency, both on the individual and political levels. As John Iliffe writes:

Population change is not an autonomous force; it results from other historical processes, above all human volition … it is a sensitive indicator of change, the point at which historical dynamics fuse into an outcome which expresses … the most fundamental circumstances and concerns of ordinary people.

The population trends in Rhodesia were the collective outcome of thousands of human decisions – whether to immigrate to Rhodesia, or to emigrate from Rhodesia, when to marry, the number and spacing of children, and other significant life choices – decisions that were personal but which were influenced by these individuals’ psychological, social, economic, and political environments. The conditions within which these demographic decisions were made were violently contested by African nationalists and the state, and it was in the shaping of the conditions where the war of numbers was waged. As described above, the different components of Rhodesia’s demography were only unevenly affected by the various political actions that were implemented. Some engineering tactics were implemented and proved successful in altering conditions and influencing demographic decision-making. Other actions that could potentially have impacted on demographic numbers were considered and rejected, and still other initiatives were pre-empted or countered by their opponent’s policies. That the
settler state ultimately failed to reverse these demographic trends, and that the nationalists benefited from them, does not lead to the conclusion that this course of events was inevitable and fixed.

The Timing of Rhodesia's Collapse
This book argues that the white-ruled state had, since its founding, rested upon the perilously fragile demography of its white population, and that the military conflict only accelerated the demise of white rule. This raises the question of why Rhodesia collapsed when it did and not at some other time. The answer lies in a combination of factors that ripened together in the late 1970s. As these factors were created or as some matured, they worked on and applied pressure to Rhodesia's pre-existing demographic frailties.

In addition to the military war, four other factors placed unbearable pressure on white Rhodesia. First, white society after UDI viewed the importance of population matters differently than previously. So long as Rhodesia continued to be a part of the larger British imperial system, population matters were only of administrative interest, but after the break-up of the Federation, and especially after UDI, racial demography was linked to independent nation-building. After severing their imperial ties, Rhodesia's white population, who had always been transient, were imagined by the post-UDI state to be permanent. As such, those who were seen as loyal British subjects passing through the colony of Rhodesia before UDI came to be viewed as disloyal Rhodesians after UDI, and as a cause for alarm. Second, white migratory inflows had matched outflows in both number and kind despite the continually high turnover of population before UDI, but thereafter, even when immigration matched emigration in scale, it was different in kind. The mismatch in skills took some time to have its full effect on the Rhodesian economy, but the ‘brain drain’ eventually put heavy strains on the economy, and also exacerbated racial tensions. Third, the extent of the African population ‘explosion’ and the pace of widening ratios only became known following the 1962 and 1969 censuses, which as well as revealing the size of the African population also showed its rate of growth, the fastest in Africa at the time. These factors combined not only to alter objective conditions in the country in the 1970s but also, and perhaps more importantly, to alter the white population's subjective perception of these conditions, with the effect that the escalation of the military war was that much more damaging to the settler state.

Finally, the 1969 census brought a new level of awareness to population issues to the white public's mind. By revealing previously hidden demographic information, the census added a new urgency to efforts to rebalance
Rhodesia’s racial demographics and rig the political system to secure white rule. Population issues in the 1970s became political matters of a deeper significance than they had been in the previous decade, and carried new psychological and social weight. It was within this context of a heightened importance of racial population matters that the military conflict influenced a negative net shift in white migration patterns. But, as with the census, it was the white public’s knowledge of the shift in migration patterns that created the existential panic and presented the forbidding prospect of a full white exodus from Rhodesia. More so than the war, it was the threat of this exodus which precipitated the final collapse of the white settler state.

**Who was the Rhodesian Rebellion For?**

Why did the colonial government of Rhodesia jump down the rabbit hole and into an unknown future by declaring UDI? How was this act justified, and whose interests was it supposed to protect? During the rebellion, justifications for the UDI rebellion from sympathetic whites inside and outside Rhodesia tended towards hyperbole. It was compared to Thermopylae and Lepanto as another dramatic turning point in the history of the West. Supporters claimed it was an act to save Christianity and civilisation in Africa from the forces of anarchy and World Communism. The UDI document itself was written in the high-sounding Jeffersonian language of the Enlightenment, mimicking the American Declaration of Independence. In the immediate aftermath of the rebellion, much more quotidian explanations were given for the rebellion, centring on the merits of Rhodesia’s progress to dominionhood and the supposed duplicity of Harold Wilson’s British Labour government in denying that status. A decidedly less ambitious justification for the rebellion was offered by Ian Smith himself, long after the rebellion had failed: ‘[Through UDI] we gave Rhodesia 15 wonderful years extra … We gave the country 15 exhilarating years … We held the line back.’ Yet none of these purported justifications or explanations answers the question of who the rebellion was really for? This question is even more pertinent in light of the pronounced transience of white Rhodesians and their remarkable rate of population turnover detailed throughout this book. In a country in which white migrants were desperately sought after to bolster racial numbers, where these same whites were often forced to stay when they wanted to leave, and where most whites when there evinced scant loyalty and little willingness to make sacrifices to save the country, the question remains: Who was the rebellion for?

If Rhodesia’s white population, in whose name the rebellion was declared, was at best mildly committed to Rhodesia, then what forces were behind the
act of rebellion and the resultant war? As described briefly in Chapter 4, there was a smaller core of whites within Rhodesia whose commitment to Rhodesia was deeper than the larger transient population. This population tended to be more rural and more rooted than the predominantly urban white population, and their politics tended to be more right-wing. This group included Ian Smith, the only prime minister of Rhodesia who was born in Rhodesia. It was this hard core of whites that had pretentions about white Rhodesia being a permanent white settler state. As Barry Schutz showed, right-wing Rhodesian Front activists who were the most intransigently supportive of permanent white rule tended to be oriented to apartheid South African politics, and indeed a large percentage were born in South Africa.9 On average, Rhodesian Front members lived in Rhodesia longer than did the general white population,10 and as Larry Bowman discovered, Rhodesia Front members had a much higher percentage of members who were born in Rhodesia than the percentage of the general white population: 14 per cent as compared against 5.6 per cent of the general population.11 This hard core were in large part true southern Africans, if not necessarily native to Rhodesia. The Rhodesian-born, and more especially the South African-born, were always more physically and culturally removed from liberal metropolitan influences than would have been newcomers, even those from other parts of the Empire. They would have been steeped in the racial ideology of that peculiar region, and would not have had to ‘learn’ southern Africa’s racial politics. This group had the most at stake in continued white rule, as it was only this small group of whom it could truly be said that they had ‘no other home.’ There was therefore a definite correlation between rootedness and support of permanent white rule.

This still does not explain how a small minority of rooted Rhodesians within a much larger, unrooted white population could steer policy in such a risky direction. As argued in Chapter 4, there are several factors that can explain this phenomenon. First, this hard core had the advantage of staying in Rhodesia while many of their political opponents emigrated. Frank Clements argues that there was a significant exodus of liberals and moderates out of Rhodesia after UDI;12 the other side of this coin was the subsequent inflow of more likeminded whites. Second, this small passionate group also had the organisational advantages inherent to political minorities in a country where many whites were uninterested in politics, and many more were non-voters. They simply cared more. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the transient majority was not opposed to the right-wing agenda as long as it benefited them in the short term. Since they were largely unconcerned about these policies’ long-term riskiness, this transient group had incentives
to support those policies that advantaged them. In combination, these factors explain how the Rhodesian Front was able to garner an enormous percentage of the white vote in parliamentary elections and the various referendums.

The interests of the transient newcomers and more settled white Rhodesians did not always dovetail. After UDI, the state and the small core of whites driving the state’s agenda understood the need to bolster the white population at any cost. If there was any hope for Rhodesia to survive, this small hard core had to wrap itself in a larger white population. As result of this realisation, the state aimed to woo white immigrants by extensive immigration promotion internationally. As described in Chapter 5, the promotion techniques effectively reinforced Rhodesia’s transient culture by emphasising the material and lifestyle benefits of Rhodesian life. Many new immigrants attempted to take advantage of Rhodesia’s material opportunities upon arrival, and emigrated if these opportunities did not pan out. Thus there was a conflict of intentions between the short-term, profit-maximising arrivals aiming to capture Rhodesia’s benefits, and long-term residents aiming to ensure these new residents also absorb the costs of citizenship. This reflected a fundamental disconnect between these groups centring on their different expectations for Rhodesia. The question of who was taking advantage of whom is, however, complex: indeed, they used each other for different purposes, and their relationship was crudely analogous to the romantic conflicts between casual daters and those looking for long-term partners.

As referred to earlier, there was a bizarre inversion in Rhodesian politics in which the white population was seen as necessary to ensure the survival of the white state, rather than vice versa. Attracting transients and keeping the uncommitted in Rhodesia became a state priority after UDI. The state needed to make these expatriates patriots, or, to put it another way, to make these ‘scalawags’ settle down. Meanwhile, the transients saw this as entrapment. A telling analogy was made at the time between Rhodesia’s emigration restrictions and the Berlin Wall. In both instances, the trapped populations were forced to stay within the jurisdiction of the state because the state needed that population for survival. Rhodesia’s example went even further than East Germany, however, because the Rhodesian state needed not only to trap its current population in order to survive but also, of necessity, to attract new immigrants. This inflow was essential to the maintenance of a white Rhodesian population, without which the existing population would have drained away. Quite obviously, in the 1970s even more so than today, few governments could be accurately described as being of the people
and for the people, but with the exception of white Rhodesia at least they all had people. White Rhodesia was perhaps, in the final analysis, a state in desperate search of a nation. It was therefore a small minority within a small minority who sent Rhodesia down the rabbit hole of a fifteen-year rebellion and a long bloody war. This minority was familiar with Enlightenment language but not believers in the language’s meaning; and they pursued independence under white rule not to save Western civilisation, nor to save Christianity. It was merely to secure their own narrow, self-interest, as they had become accustomed to an artificially high standard of living and refused to re-enter a post-colonial reality. And it was their prolonged intransigence which ironically created the conditions for the rise to power of the most militant of the nationalist leaders: Robert Mugabe.

How Unique was Rhodesia’s Fate?
As argued throughout this book, the combined pressures that destroyed the Rhodesian state in the late 1970s would have been appreciably less intense had the white settler population been larger and more rooted. Just as the Kenyan settler, Michael Blundell, wrote that 60,000 whites were not a firm base for self-government in Kenya,13 neither were some 250,000 whites a firm base for independence in Rhodesia, especially compared with growing African numbers. An intriguing counterfactual is the likely length of any extended lifespan of the Rhodesian state had it actually been able significantly to narrow the racial ratios thereby easing these pressures. Had the Rhodesian state achieved its goal of equalling South Africa’s racial ratio of 5:1, for instance, would it have allowed another decade and a half of white minority rule, paralleling South Africa’s demise in the mid 1990s?14 Would the attainment of the even humbler population goal of stabilising ratios have enabled Rhodesia to survive into the 1980s? In the event, the settler state’s lifespan fell in between its two closest analogies, surrendering to African majority rule 16 years after Kenya and 14 years before South Africa. As with all counterfactuals, the answers to these questions are matters of speculation and conjecture, and while there is no mathematical formula that rigidly applies to Rhodesia’s situation, there can be little doubt that there was a direct correlation between racial population ratios and Rhodesia’s political survival.

To what extent were the interwoven connections between racial population issues and the political fate of the settler state unique to Rhodesia? Rhodesia shared many characteristics with other settler states around the world, and the shared traits of settler societies have led some authors to posit a fundamental and distinct global settler ethos, notwithstanding cultural or
regional peculiarities. Irrespective of how true this assertion is of a cross-cultural settler ethos, the peculiarities and differences between settler societies mattered greatly in the political fates of these settler states. Some territories that once had large settler populations are today politically, economically, and demographically still dominated by the race or ethnicity of that settler population, such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. In other territories that once had significant non-indigenous settlement, the descendants of those original settlers are no longer in political control, as in Algeria, South Africa, and of course, Zimbabwe. Other examples occupy various positions within a middle ground, as with the continuing political and demographic struggles between the whites and Melanesians in New Caledonia, and more violently between the Jews and Arabs over the fates of Israel and Palestine. Perhaps the most decisive factor in the complex and distinct fates of all these different settler societies has been the trajectories over time of the settler/indigenous population ratios. While this is most obviously true about crossing the magical majority threshold, even when below this threshold the sizes and trends of these ratios may perhaps function as a political clock for when and how these various settler societies either lost control or consolidated control of the state. Nonetheless, while it is true that Rhodesia’s political fate was inextricably entangled with its racial population ratios, the universal applicability of this hypothetical causal relationship between settler/indigenous racial ratios and the timing and ultimate fate of settler rule cannot be inductively asserted with full confidence without ignoring Albert Einstein’s wise admonition: so far as theories are about reality, they are not certain; so far as they are certain, they are not about reality.

Regardless of any parallels with other settler societies, Rhodesia was always a species unto itself. As an entity that straddled the legal and conceptual definitions of what it was to be a settler state, it defied easy comparisons. Within the British Empire, Rhodesia fell in between the categories of a settler colony on the Durham path to settler independence and a dependent colony destined for eventual indigenous rule, without exactly fitting into either one. Yet the small white population jealously guarded the settler state distinction. Thus the Rhodesian state can be seen as an entity trapped in perpetual adolescence. Four decades after UDI, the Rhodesian state now appears as a peculiar sort of anachronism, an inchoate settler state that battled futilely against the political aspirations of its African majority, against the irresistible tides of world opinion and a growing moral consensus, and, of course, against population numbers.
Chapter 1

1 The phrase, ‘War of Numbers’, used throughout this book has acquired two different meanings over the years. The first instance of it being used as a unified phrase was by Lord Beveridge in an article that featured in the New York Times in 1946, entitled, ‘The War Hitler Won – The War of Numbers’. Beveridge’s usage refers to the demographic competition between Nazi Germany and neighbouring countries over population size. It was used again to describe demographic competitions, primarily those that occurred in the Balkans, which Milica Bookman also refers to as a war of numbers. The most popular instance of the phrase, however, was in a memoir by a former CIA analyst, Samuel Adams, entitled, The War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir, published in 1994. Adams’s usage described the bureaucratic controversy within the United States government over North Vietnamese troop numbers prior to the Tet Offensive. Similarly, Judith Tucker’s article from 1982 again focuses on a controversy over statistics, this time regarding the casualties from the Lebanon War. Both meanings have since generated their own separate lineages. In a sense, this book’s title refers both to a demographic war of racial population numbers, and a war over the significance of these numbers in Rhodesian history. But my usage is primarily intended to convey the meaning of Beveridge’s and Bookman’s usage of the phrase, as a demographic competition between ethnic groups. See: L. Beveridge, ‘The War Hitler Won – The War of Numbers; It increased Germany’s Population relatively to that of her victims, raising a world issue’, New York Times, 18 August 1946; M. Bookman, The Demographic Struggle for Power: The Political Economy of Demographic Engineering in the Modern World (London: Cass Publishing, 1997); S. Adams, The War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir (South Royalton: Steerforth Press, 1994); J. Tucker, ‘The War of Numbers’, The Lebanon War, Middle East Research and Information Project Report, 108/9 (September–October 1982).

2 Over the period of my research, this same political entity was known sequentially as Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia, and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
To take this analogy further, it is quite possibly true that some state officials realised the terminal nature of Rhodesia’s condition at the time, and sought merely to prolong the lifespan for as long as possible. In a 1983 interview, Ian Smith answered a question about UDI by saying, ‘We gave Rhodesia 15 wonderful years extra … We gave the country 15 exhilarating years … We held the line back.’ ‘Ian Douglas Smith, Ex-Leader of Rhodesia, Dies’, New York Times, 20 November 2007.

Statistics were calculated using the Monthly Digest of Statistics issued by the Rhodesian government’s Central Statistical Office.

This peak was in 1975 and 1976, when whites formed around 4 per cent of the total population. Monthly Digest of Statistics, CSO October 1978.


Alois Mlambo discusses this high rate of population turnover as always being a characteristic of white Rhodesia. A. Mlambo, White Immigration into Rhodesia: From Occupation to Federation (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 2002).


12 The nationalists mark the starting date of the Chimurenga (a Shona word for ‘revolutionary struggle’) as that of the failed Sinoia battle in 1966.
14 This path is named after ‘Radical Jack’ Durham’s controversial Report presented in Parliament in 1839, which advocated progression towards self-government for the advanced ‘white’ settler colonies.
15 Presciently, while Labour was in Opposition MP James Callaghan made a speech against the 1961 Constitution, recalling the speech Keir Hardie made against the South Africa Bill in 1909 in which Britain forever surrendered control over South African affairs. He argued that the 1961 Constitution would do the same for Rhodesia: E. Windrich, *Politics of Rhodesian Independence*, p. 30.
17 Ibid., p. 724.
20 On the significance of Commonwealth Conferences in the recognition of independent Commonwealth status, see Palley, *Constitutional History*.
21 Ibid., p. 731.
25 This account was taken from Kenneth Young’s *Rhodesia and Independence* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967), pp. 89–90. Young has been described as having ‘an unashamedly pro-Rhodesian Front bias’, and his work relied heavily on commentary by Smith and other Rhodesian Front members, ‘gossip

28 Embittered Rhodesian settlers regularly lamented that they were treated unfairly by the British precisely because their pioneers did not commit genocide as did the Canadians and Australians. See, for example, ‘Red Indians Were First’, letter from M. Van Liagen, Rhodesia Herald, 25 February 1961; and ‘Tirade Against Settlers’, letter from E. Watter, Rhodesia Herald, 18 April 1962. The 1962 letter was in response to criticisms of white settlers in Africa by the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson. The letter read that Stevenson could have chided the forefathers of whites in Africa ‘for lacking the foresight of his own forefathers, who butchered the Red Indians and thereby saved their descendents the race relations headaches’.
29 The last Rhodesian High Commissioner, Alexander Skeen, once said in reference to Britain’s slipperiness in independence negotiations, it was not for nothing that Britain was called ‘perfidious Albion’: Skeen, Prelude to Independence, p. 144.
32 Jan Morris wrote of the difference between metropolitan Britons and colonials: ‘Among the white settlers everywhere the Englishman had undergone some metamorphosis, making him taller, or broader, or cockier, or coarser, than before.’ J. Morris, Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 226.
34 Rhodesia’s settler population was notably smaller and more transient than any other significant settler population in Africa. The pied-noirs of French Algeria, for instance, numbered 984,000 in 1954, four-fifths of whom were born in Algeria: R. Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 1996).
35 For an excellent comparative work on the Kenyan and Rhodesian settler societies before World War II, see Kennedy, Islands of White.


See Table 3.1, p. 51.


Indeed, the terms for independence negotiated aboard HMS Tiger in 1966, a year after UDI, were more favourable to white settlers than the 1961 Constitution, yet they were still rejected by the Rhodesians. The 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian terms negotiated by the newly elected Conservative Government in Britain were even more generous to white settlers and were accepted by the Rhodesian Government, only to be defeated by the term’s test of acceptability to the African population, which returned a decisive ‘no’ vote in 1972.

This would not necessarily be the case after UDI. The 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian Settlement Proposals that were agreed to by Smith and British Prime Minister Edward Heath used Rhodesia’s 1969 constitution as a starting point, not the more liberal 1961 constitution.

This was true not only because of the strength of settler power in Rhodesia and the lack of viable African replacements, but also because of the strength of the ‘Rhodesia Lobby’ in Britain itself. See P. Murphy, *Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951–1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, during UDI stated this dilemma in Parliament: ‘The Rhodesian Government have not been staffed or controlled by the Colonial Office. Their police forces, armed forces, and administration have all been under the control of the Rhodesian Government. These are the realities which must be borne in mind in any consideration of this difficult problem.’ House of Commons Debates, vol. 713, col. 1558 (London, 1965). The military option of invading Rhodesia to impose African rule was loudly and repeatedly called for by many representatives of the newly independent countries in the so-called Afro-Asian Bloc after the illegal independence was declared, but the military option was explicitly and repeatedly rejected by the British. The quick and public dismissal of the military option has been criticised by some commentators then and since. For an article critical of the dismissal of the military option, see C. Watts, ‘Killing Kith and Kin: The
Viability of British Military Intervention in Rhodesia, 1964–5’, Twenty-first Century British History, 16/4 (2005), pp. 382–415. For an analysis of the logistical problems that the military option posed, see Good, UDI.


Ian Smith’s UDI announcement address, Rhodesia Broadcast Company, 11 November 1965.

For an explanation of the white social hierarchy, see Clements, Rhodesia: A Study of Deterioration.


A. Mlambo, White Immigration.


Monthly Digest of Statistics, CSO.

This is in spite of the bizarre Cabinet decision which concluded that Chinese and Japanese people were, in fact, Europeans. ‘Cabinet agreed that Chinese and Japanese residents should be classed as Europeans and invited all Ministers to note accordingly.’ Smith Papers, Box-023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Chinese and Japanese Residents’, 8 September 1970.

For example, when the Pearce Commission reported on the approval or disapproval of the Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement in 1971, a fairly accurate proxy for the support of the regime, the African population massively voted no, while 97% of the ‘Coloureds’ and 96% of the Asians, along with 98% of the whites, voted yes. ‘Rhodesia-Mzilikaze to Smith’, Africa Institute Bulletin, 15 (1977).

For a good overview of Coloured identity in Rhodesia, see J. Muzondidya, ‘Towards a Historical Understanding of the Making of the Coloured Community in Zimbabwe, 1890–1920’, Identity, Culture, and Politics, 3/2 (December, 2002).

Muzondidya, ‘Coloured Community’.

Monthly Digest of Statistics, CSO.

Additionally, there were some notable white supporters of the nationalist cause who opposed UDI. For an excellent analysis of the politics of white Rhodesia, see P. Godwin and I. Hancock, Rhodesians Never Die: The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia, 1970–1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).


In a recorded oral interview, Hodder-Williams described this triple besiegement without labelling it as such. R. Hodder-Williams interview, Oral Archives, British Empire and Commonwealth Museum (hereafter BECM).

This coalescence of white society in Rhodesia after UDI has been described by several historians, including Barry Schutz, Sue Onslow, Robert Blake, and Colin Leys. See B. Schutz, ‘European Population Patterns, Cultural Persistence, and Political Change in Rhodesia’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 7/1 (1973); S. Onslow, “‘A Scheme of National Importance’: Winston Field and the Italian Settlement Scheme’ (working paper, no date); Blake, A History; C. Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia (London: Clarendon, 1959).


Dane Kennedy succinctly described this same phenomenon when comparing the settler communities of Kenya and Rhodesia. ‘Settler culture, then, was preeminently the expression of the white community’s tenuously held position of predominance in the colonial order.’ Kennedy, Islands of White, p. 189.


As Diana Jeater and Sue Onslow suggest (personal communication, 2009), it might also be that bureaucrats, ministers, and politicians sometimes used talk of population numbers to cover up or explain away governmental, departmental, or personal political failures or inadequacies. It was true that population numbers could easily treated as an omnipresent bogeyman. Therefore population ‘imbalances’ could have served as another way of talking about the limits of state power and a further delineation of the boundaries of white control. None the less, even if population numbers were sometimes talked about as a way to cloak or obscure other problems or weaknesses, the fact that whites so often employed population discourses as their chosen language is itself significant and reflects both the recognisability of this common reference and the intensity of these demographic concerns to their intended audiences.

69 The then Minister of Transport and Power, P.K. Van der Byl, claimed that the British government’s refusal to recognise the internal settlement regime of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constituted a total and utter betrayal. ‘“Betrayal” Claims Van der Byl’, Rhodesia Herald, 19 November 1979.

70 According to Smith, there was not one but many ‘betrayals’, committed by people as diverse as Harold Macmillan, Rab Butler, Harold Wilson, Ted Heath, John Vorster, Pik Botha, Jimmy Carter, and a variety of Rhodesians from Abel Muzorewa to far right-wing Rhodesian Action Party members. The gist of Smith’s argument in the book can be summarised in his own words: ‘what a desperate position for poor Rhodesia. I had no difficulty in dealing with our enemies, but when it came to our friends…!’ Bitter Harvest, p. 200.

71 It should be noted that the argument presented here is not that Rhodesia collapsed due to some form of demographic determinism, that racially essentialist fertility rates killed the regime, or that historical actors were mere flotsam in the war of numbers. As will be argued, human agency played an enormous role in every aspect of this parallel war.

72 Smith, The Great Betrayal.


80 Mlambo, White Immigration.


82 Godwin and Hancock, Rhodesians Never Die; M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia, 1890–1979 (London: Deutsch, 1979); and A. Kaler,
Notes


Chapter 2

1 Smith Papers, Box 022, Cabinet Minutes, 20 May 1969.
2 Dane Kennedy makes the point that in the colony’s early settlement, lingering fears of Africans rising up continued long after the suppression of the Chimurenga. He argues that it was a fear of Africans’ ‘overwhelming numbers’ which solidified white Rhodesian unity prior to World War II: Islands of White: Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1939 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 131.
4 ‘Demographic Research in British Colonial Africa: Grant of £3,565’, April, 1959, CO 121/55/01.
5 ‘Forecast of the Census – 62,000 More Europeans’, Rhodesia Herald, 20 September 1961. The racial economic division in Rhodesia was clear even from some of these questions, such as number of cars and size of house, which were not asked of Africans.
6 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 ‘Census in April of Africans in the Colony’, Rhodesia Herald, 16 February 1962.
12 ‘Census Director is Baffled by ZAPU Ban’, Rhodesia Herald, 27 March 1962.
14 ‘Census on Schedule Despite Opposition’, Rhodesia Herald, 10 May 1962. In an unrelated incident, the Herald reported that one enumerator was even treed by a charging rhino.
16 ‘Southern Rhodesia Census: Keogh is Satisfied with Progress, Aims at 100%’, Rhodesia Herald, 28 April 1962.
17 ‘Census on Schedule Despite Opposition’.
18 Ibid.
22 ‘Southern Rhodesia Census’.
26 The Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) census revealed an African population 37% higher than was estimated. ‘Census Finds One Million Lost Africans’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 21 August 1963.
27 ‘Growth of the Population’, Editorial, *Rhodesia Herald*, 23 June 1962. As the *Herald* had predicted, Nkomo did seize upon these new numbers and reiterated his call that self-government had to mean immediate majority rule. However, one letter writer to the *Herald* made the interesting if specious argument that ‘It is hard to see in view of these facts [regarding the white state’s responsibility for higher African growth rates] how the Africans can claim any moral right to majority government … Had the “settlers” left them to their own devices and to fend for themselves, it is doubtful if today they would have been in the majority anyway.’ ‘Original Numbers Small’, letter from John Bull, *Rhodesia Herald*, 4 July 1962.
28 One early, frequent, and enthusiastic letter-writer in support of mass, unselective white immigration was Harry Reedman, Ian Smith’s choice as his first Immigration Minister.
37 ‘Rhodesia’s Birthday Bomb’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 1 June 1971. As it was, Zimbabwe’s population was nearer to 12 million in 2000. The Zimbabwean Central Statistical Office reported 11,631,657 people in 2002 undifferentiated by race. CSO web site: www.zimstat.co.zw (viewed 13 March 2008).
42 The response to this compulsory registration law in force since 1963 was slow, as only 574 African births were registered in all of 1963. Whether or not this was because of a generalised reluctance to register with any state initiative, a passive form of resistance, or simple oversight is unclear. ‘Africans Neglect to Register Births’, Rhodesia Herald, 18 February 1965.
48 ‘75,600 Decrease in Foreign Workers’, Rhodesia Herald, 1 May 1969. The South African state was able to impose similar labour controls as those which failed in Rhodesia.
51 ‘Birth Control Pills Wanted For Jobless’, Rhodesia Herald, 2 December 1968.
52 ‘Present Laws Cannot Stop Urban Influx’, Rhodesia Herald, 6 December 1968.
54 ‘“Have No Fear”, PM Broadcasts to Africans’, Rhodesia Herald, 1 January 1969.
55 ‘Opening of Tribal Areas May Support 4m Africans’, Rhodesia Herald, 3 June 1967.
57 P. Godwin and I. Hancock claim that by 1971/72 provincialism was abandoned as a realistic option: Rhodesians Never Die: The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia, 1970–1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 59. The closed-door Cabinet debates regarding the Whaley Commission’s constitutional proposals provide a window on the Rhodesian Front’s views of South African apartheid as a potential model for Rhodesia. Regarding ‘partition’ as a possible goal for Rhodesia, the Cabinet concluded that partition ‘appeared extremely attractive at first, particularly when comparisons were made with the success which South Africa was making with their partition policies. But it later appeared from evidence that the position was too complicated in Rhodesia for partition to be a practical proposition.’ Smith Papers, Box 3/001 (SSF), Cabinet
Minutes, ‘Note of Discussion between Cabinet Ministers and Representatives of the Constitutional Commission at Cabinet’, 27 August 1968.


It was an oft repeated claim among RF politicians that there was no real African unemployment in Rhodesia because of the demand for cheap African labour in the rural areas. This assertion of course disregarded the fact that many urban Africans were qualified and trained for urban jobs. Clearly this specious claim also did not apply to white unemployment, as whites would never be expected to fill menial rural jobs, and thus their urban unemployment was taken seriously.


It should be noted, that at least some in Rhodesia recognised the impossibility of white immigration keeping pace with African natural increase, even at a set ratio. See, for example, a full-page advertisement by the politically moderate Centre Group ‘Population Explosion Threatens Rhodesia’, Rhodesia Herald, 31 May 1968.

‘20,000 Immigrants a Year is the Aim’, Rhodesia Herald, 13 November 1962.


‘Growth of Population is “Frightening” Says Health Minister’, Rhodesia Herald, 21 August 1968. Webster cites the African population as 4.5 million, and the growth rate as 3.4 per cent.

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77 ‘Full Census is to be Held Next Year’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 22 March 1968.


79 Smith Papers, Box 022, Cabinet Minutes, 20 May 1969.


81 The 1969 Constitution did not alter the fundamental illegality of the post-UDI regime any more than did the UDI Constitution. Rhodesia legally remained a British dependency under the Crown. Nonetheless, after the referendum vote in June 1969 Britain relieved Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs of his post.


88 ‘Over 4,000 Enumerators in Next Phase of African Census’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 16 April 1969.

89 ‘Number of Africans in Rhodesia Nears 5m’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 19 June 1969.


95 F. Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 120.


Chapter 3


3 As late as 1978, the Minister of Manpower and Social Affairs, Health and Education, Rowan Cronje, declared that population growth was a greater threat than the war or sanctions. ‘Rhodesia’s Public Enemy No. 1’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 20 May 1978.
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5 There are still many active controversies within the demographic discipline regarding various components of the transition theory, including the number and relevance of the developmental stages. Other scholars have also criticised the entire Eurocentric premise of the developmental stages, and question their applicability to the non-Western world. For a recent examination of DTT, see: J. Caldwell, *Demographic Transition Theory* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006).


7 Hartmann, *Reproductive Rights*. This is not to imply that neo-Malthusianism was exclusively or even primarily a racist obsession. For instance, United States civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr was a famous proponent of neo-Malthusian population fears: ‘Unlike plagues of the dark ages or contemporary diseases we do not understand, the modern plague of overpopulation is soluble by means we have discovered and with resources we possess. What is lacking is not sufficient knowledge of the solution but universal consciousness of the gravity of the problem and education of the billions who are its victim.’ Martin Luther King’s speech to Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 5 May, 1966, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C.


9 Ibid., p. 41.

10 Ibid., p. 63.


Notes


19 Kaler likewise concludes that even though African nationalists accused the government of attempting to reduce population numbers long before UDI, there was no evidence of any officially sanctioned efforts to reduce the African population before Smith. Kaler, *Running after Pills*, p. 57.


24 A *Rhodesia Herald* editorial from 1971 expressed the view that the Smith government had already ‘written off’ the subsistence sector of the economy, as an Economic Survey reported that African employment problems were ‘insuperable’ and persistent African growth made development impossible. ‘Is This An Admission of Defeat?’, *Rhodesia Herald*, Editorial, 28 April 1971.


27 This technocratic trend affected many areas of national policy in Africa, most of which coming under the broad umbrella of ‘development.’ The 1960s was dubbed the Development Decade by the United Nations, and technocratic advisers, usually expatriates, set out economic plans for every country in sub-Saharan Africa. As T.Y. Shen noted in 1977, the generally abysmal failure of these policies was not entirely the fault of the technocrats. T.Y. Shen, ‘Macro Development Planning in Tropical Africa: Technocratic and Non-Technocratic Causes of Failure,’ *Journal of Development Studies*, 13/4 (July 1977), pp 413–27.
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31 Ibid., p. 92.
38 Ibid., p. 100.
39 Ibid., p. 100.
40 White Rhodesians regularly complained about what they conceived of as being unfairly singled out for lesser crimes than their African neighbours committed with impunity. This international double standard forms a part of the bedrock base for white Rhodesians’ betrayal myth.
42 Smith papers, Box 020, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Family Planning’, 18 October 1966.
48 For a good overview of white academic discourses in Rhodesia regarding African population growth, see Kaler, ‘Fertility Running Wild’.
Notes

56 Smith Papers, Box-023, Cabinet Memorandum, ‘Population Control’, 13 June 1969.
61 Kaler, Running after Pills, quoting Dodds, p. 43.
63 Ibid., p. 96.
67 Ibid.
68 These hospital fees were eventually raised in the early 1970s creating a raucous outcry among African MPs in Parliament. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 81, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 2 August 1972.
71 Smith Papers, Box-023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 8 December 1970.
72 Smith Papers, Box-023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 8 December 1970.
80 Smith Papers, Box-024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 5 October 1971.
81 Smith Papers, Box-024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 5 October 1971.
Chapter 4

1 The title derives from ‘There’s a Hole in the Bucket’, Rhodesia Herald, Editorial, 13 June 1970.

2 Robert Blake is one of the few authors who does note that high immigration rates hid high emigration rates: A History of Rhodesia (London: Eyre Methuen, 1977).


4 CSO Monthly Digests. The statistics for 1979 are missing the months of February, June, August, November, and December. The reporting seven months were averaged out for the entire year. It should also be noted that some of these emigrants and immigrants were the same individuals being counted twice.

5 This thoroughgoing white transience has obvious implications for conceptions of white Rhodesian identity. Historians are in broad agreement that after UDI most Rhodesian whites who stayed were politically united, if only in the preservation of their economic, political, and social privileges. However, beyond this broad agreement, the historical consensus begins to fray. Good and Kinloch, for example, downplay political and cultural differences, arguing that white Rhodesians were unified and differences superficial, while Godwin and Hancock cast white society as fundamentally divided, with any real unity after UDI being illusory. See K. Good, ‘Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia’, African Affairs, 73/290 (1974), pp. 10–36; G. C. Kinloch, Racial Conflict in Rhodesia: A Socio-Historical Study (Washington: University Press, 1978); P. Godwin and I. Hancock, Rhodesians Never Die: The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia, 1970–1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). More nuanced are Schutz’s and Onslow’s accounts of how the fractured and heterogeneous ethnic divisions of white society began to coalesce under the Rhodesian Front into a broader vision of white Rhodesia. The unifying effect of racial solidarity in the face of overwhelming African numbers is also emphasised by Dane Kennedy and Lord Blake, while Leys discusses the uniting effects of international isolation and sanctions. Kosmin in some ways reconciles these views by arguing that white Rhodesians were simultaneously culturally

The role of white population turnover in these debates is highlighted by both Frank Clements and Alois Mlambo, who argue that it reveals a culture of transience and that Rhodesian identity was only thinly felt. Mlambo convincingly demonstrates that this transience was a consistent feature of the territory, and concludes that whites were only ever shallowly rooted in Rhodesia. This chapter differs in that it extends the timeframe of analysis into the 1970s and the war for independence, as well as looking deeper into the causes and effects of white transience. See F. Clements, Rhodesia: A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society (New York: Praeger, 1969); A. Mlambo, White Immigration into Rhodesia: From Occupation to Federation (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Press, 2002). While some of the Rhodesian state’s efforts to stem white emigration have received attention from historians, they have been treated as an adjunct to the war effort, while nationalist efforts to engineer Rhodesia’s white population numbers have never been analysed sufficiently in the historical literature. Meredith, for example, mentions Broomberg’s emigration letters only in the context of decline stemming from the war: The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia, 1890–1979 (London, Deutsch, 1979), p. 231. Amy Kaler’s work discusses in detail the nationalists’ and state’s competing efforts to engineer African population numbers, but not African efforts to engineer white numbers: Running After Pills: Politics, Gender and Contraception in Colonial Zimbabwe (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003).

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
11 Figures are from the Monthly Digest of Statistics, CSO. Prior to the dissolution of the Federation, numbers are estimates as Southern Rhodesia did not keep separate statistics.
12 Many sources indicate that the actual numbers for white emigration could be as much as twice the officially reported figures. ‘Taking the Chicken Run’,
White emigration has typically been cast as a symptom of decline, fitting it into one of two predominant causal narratives of the collapse of white Rhodesia: the military victory thesis, and the betrayal thesis. Though differing in emphasis, both of these narratives assume that prior to the war the white Rhodesian state was healthy and viable, and that the war was responsible for bringing about a range of changes, including high rates of white emigration, that brought about the regime’s final demise. Little scholarly attention has been paid either to the problems that emanated from the expanding racial ratios before the war, or to the weakness that accrued from not only the small size of the white population but also the deeply rooted transience of whites. For examples of the military victory thesis, see H. Ellert, _The Rhodesian Front War_ (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989); D. Martin and P. Johnson, _The Struggle for Zimbabwe_ (London: Faber, 1981); N. Bhebe, _The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe_ (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1999). For examples of the betrayal thesis, see I. Smith, _The Great Betrayal_ (London: Blake Publishing, 1997); P. Scully, _Exit Rhodesia_ (Ladysmith: Cotswold Press, 1984). For an oral account of this betrayal theory, see D. Chalmers interview, Oral Archives, The British Empire and Commonwealth Museum Archives, Bristol, UK (hereafter BECM). Other work does not fit into these categories, and provides some analysis of population issues. Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock detail wartime pressures, but portray white emigration as primarily a by-product of the war: _Rhodessians Never Die_.

Rhodesian media reported this hoping that more would settle in Rhodesia. See ‘Why Don’t they Come Here?’, Editorial, _Rhodesia Herald_, 21 February 1968.

Blake, _History of Rhodesia_, p. 273.


See Kennedy, _Islands of White_, p. 6.

The original source of Rhodesian immigrants is difficult to assess as only the departure country was listed, which was generally South Africa.

In Eaton’s survey, 49 per cent of respondents emigrated from Rhodesia to South Africa, 29 per cent to the UK, 8 per cent to Australia, 3 per cent to Canada, 3 per cent to US, and 2 per cent to New Zealand. W.G. Eaton, _A Chronicle of Modern Sunlight: The Story of What Happened to the Rhodesians_, (Rohnert Park, CA: InnoVision, 1996), p. 3.

The method was also used in 1967. See ‘100,000 Air Letters Used to Launch Drive for Immigrants’, _Rhodesia Herald_, 29 July 1967.


Notes


24 Godwin and Hancock, *Rhodizens Never Die*, p. 81.

25 Clements claims Rhodesia lurched to the right due to post-UDI population transfers: *Rhodesia: A Study of Deterioration*, p. 243. Among others, Tory MP Harold Soref agreed with this analysis. He claimed in 1972 that ‘among the 20,000 or so British who have emigrated to Rhodesia since UDI is a very high percentage of tradesmen who have stronger views over Rhodesian politics even than Mr. Smith. In fact, a very high percentage of the Rhodesian Front support comes from former Labour supporters and trade unionists from this country who have emigrated to Rhodesia.’ ‘Rhodesia’, HC Deb, 15 June 1972, vol. 838, cols 1756–876.

26 When settlement talks and imminent majority rule incensed the right, they too exited. ‘Taking the Chicken Run’, *Time*, 1 August 1977.

27 Ibid.


33 There were 12,760 dual Rhodesian/UK passports and 23,980 UK-only passports. The FCO speculated that the latter figure was even higher. FCO memoranda of 1972 citing 1969 Census, FCO 36/1294.


36 The claim that Rhodesian identity was weak must account for its persistence. Katja Uusihakala argues that today’s Rhodesian identity only began to form in the diaspora, in ‘Opening Up and Taking the Gap: White Road to and from Rhodesia’ (unpublished paper, n.d.), available at http://www.anthroglobe.info/docs/white_road.pdf. Who is, or was, a ‘Rhodesian’ is difficult to pinpoint, as large numbers passed through the colony and some stayed on after independence. R. Hodder Williams distinguishes ‘Rhodizens’ as unreconstructed loyalists from ‘white Zimbabweans’ who accepted the new order: ‘Some White Responses to Black Rule in Zimbabwe’, (unpublished paper, presented in Harare, October 1982), quoted in A. Smith, ‘Rhodesian Immigrants in South
The Collapse of Rhodesia


The 1969 census revealed that three-quarters of Rhodesia’s white population over the age of 16 were born outside Rhodesia, of whom 59 per cent were born in either South Africa or Britain: ‘59 percent of Whites over 16 Were Born in Britain or SA’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 8 May 1970. Of 1,460 people surveyed in the Rhodesian diaspora in the 1990s, only 36 per cent were born in Rhodesia, 39 per cent went to Rhodesia for jobs, and 22 per cent went as children: Eaton, *Chronicle of Modern Sunlight*. In 1969, only 40 per cent of Rhodesians were born inside of Rhodesia. Among adults it was only 25.5 per cent: Mlambo, *White Immigration*, p. 2.

In 1975, 45 per cent of the white population had been in Rhodesia for under ten years: M. Loney, *Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975).

Shockingly, 80 per cent of white Rhodesians in a survey had not seen Victoria Falls. ‘80pc Have Not Seen the Falls’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 1 May 1974.

Popularly elected only for whites, it should be noted.

Nine out of ten white immigrants from the 1950s onwards took urban employment and half lived in Salisbury: Blake, *History of Rhodesia*, p. 275.

An analogy can be made to some recent arguments made in the United States positing that the US would be decidedly more pacifistic if it reinstituted the military draft.


See Immigration Promotion Department’s adverts in Dublin, ‘New Move to Attract Irish Immigrants’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 19 March 1969.


The Ministry of Labour and employers acknowledged a brain drain, while the Ministry of Immigration and unions denied it, until the findings of a study in 1972. ‘Manpower Fact’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 22 April 1972.


For anecdotal evidence: Mr Samuriwo’s statements to the Committee of Supply, August 1 1969, col. 1063; Mr Rubatika, Committee of Supply, 1 August 1969, col. 1076.
52 Meredith, *The Past is Another Country*, p. 305.
53 Ibid., p. 305.
56 Prior to the Lisbon coup in 1974, the US State Department believed that the minority regime would collapse, not due to the war, but as a result of the African population explosion. ‘US Policy on Rhodesia Stays Firm’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 21 July 1976.
60 Ibid., p. 200.
61 Ibid., p. 201.
64 For an interesting exploration of the call-up system’s many effects on white society, and its implications for Rhodesian civic culture in the 1970s, see White, ‘Civic Virtue, Young Men, and the Family’.
66 BECM 2001/086/007 Manpower Committee Meeting Minutes, 2 February 1978.
67 In a debate over call-up procedures, MP Mr Parkin expressed what many inside and outside government suspected was behind the low call-up yields: ‘There is this visible avoidance of obligation by many weak-kneed males between the ages of 16 and … I believe they are selfish, I believe they are craven …’, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 97, ‘Motion: Registration and Call-Up Procedures’, 12 October 1977.
68 See generally BECM 2001/086/007 weekly Manpower Committee Meetings, 1977.
71 ‘Net Tightens on Manpower’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 30 July 1976. The dog tag proposal was never implemented.
This is to be contrasted with the almost unlimited supply available to African guerrillas. ZANLA recruits, for instance, grew so rapidly that in 1977 the party appealed on Radio Mozambique to aspiring guerrillas to stay in Rhodesia because there were insufficient facilities to house, clothe, train, and feed all the Africans coming into the camps: N. Kriger, *Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 92, citing A. Wilkinson, ‘The Impact of the War’, *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 18/1 (March 1980), p. 116.


BECM 2001/086/007 Manpower Committee Minutes, 5 May 1977.

BECM, Manpower Committee Meeting Minutes, 29 August 1977.

BECM 2001/086/192 Minutes of Meeting, ‘Study the Implications of Phased Mobilisation, Strategy and Tactics’, 17 February 1978. The recruitment of white mercenaries grabbed many headlines and generated much controversy, but it was not extensive enough to significantly alter the course of the war. Michael Raeburn estimated that between 1,500 and 2,000 white foreigners signed short-term contracts with the Rhodesian Security Forces: *We Are Everywhere*, p. 204.


See also Meredith, *The Past is Another Country*, p. 46.


Notes


91 Ibid., p. 93.


95 ‘Emigrants Fail to Pay Car Instalments’, Rhodesia Herald, 29 April 1964.

96 In July 1976, the Rhodesian Minister of Finance reduced emigration allowances from RH$5,000 to RH$1,000.


98 Uusihalaka, ‘Opening Up and Taking the Gap’.

99 ‘Taking the Chicken Run’, Time, 1 August 1977.


103 Smith Papers, Box 4/006(M) ‘Personal Message from Mr. Ian Smith to Mr. John Vorster’, 22 July 1975.


106 Smith Papers, Box-037, Cabinet Minutes, ‘National Service: Restrictions on Travel Outside Rhodesia of Registered Male Residents’, 31 August 1976. Further restrictions were rejected as representing a virtual border closing. Smith Papers, Box-037, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Emigration Control’, 18 May 1976.


109 ‘Bill on Call-ups Accepted’, Rhodesia Herald, 14 November 1974.


See Godwin and Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die*, p. 208.


This hypocrisy was glaringly displayed by one-time cabinet minister Wickus de Kock, who emigrated in 1977. ‘Taking the Chicken Run’, *Time*, 1 August 1977.

UNSC Resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968

This emigration restriction was not without controversy in Britain. The Attorney-General, Sir Elwyn Jones, made it a point to clarify in Parliament that, despite pressure from other UN members, the British ensured that the final clause was not a restriction against emigration per se, but against the solicitation of emigration to Rhodesia. Nonetheless, some Tory MPs still saw this restriction as unduly harsh. See ‘Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order’, HC Deb, 17 June 1968, vol. 766, cols 728–858.


Raeburn, *We Are Everywhere*, p. 201.


The British government dreaded the logistical, political, and moral problems a white Rhodesian influx presented, as it would coincide with restrictions on non-white immigration to Britain. It was unclear how many Rhodesians had the right of abode in Britain – one estimate was 155,000, or three-fifths of the white population. ‘Right of Whites to go to UK’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 27 May 1976.


DO 183/648.
Notes


131 The British government’s efforts to induce white emigration as a means to bring about the collapse of the post-UDI regime have never been discussed in the historical literature. The British government’s population policies regarding Rhodesia challenge the idea that the British government was largely complicit with the white minority regime. For an example of the complicity argument, see Loney, *White Racism and Imperial Response*. For a similar assertion levelled at the American government, see G. Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War against Zimbabwe, 1965–1980* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). Nationalist propaganda also accused the West of complicity: *Zimbabwe News* (ZANU) and *Zimbabwe Review* (ZAPU), 1964–79.


134 Ibid.


141 This balancing of objectives was perceived by nationalists as evidence of complicity, however. See *Zimbabwe Review*, 8 (1977).

Chapter 5

1 The title is taken from a quote by the one-time Rhodesian Minister of Immigration, Harry Reedman, Vol. 58, 22 September 1964, Committee of Supply, col. 648.


5 White Rhodesia experienced a 51 per cent drop in crude birth rates in the years from 1962 to 1979, far greater than any comparable population anywhere on the globe. Statistics derived from Rhodesian Annual Reports of the Secretary of Health, Vital Statistics (Salisbury: Government Publication).


7 ‘Biggest Gain of Immigrants for Ten Years’, Rhodesia Herald, 20 December 1968.


9 The importance of pre-existing links was true for all commonwealth immigrations. A. Richardson, British Immigrants and Australia: A Psycho-Social Inquiry (Canberra: Australia National University Press, 1974).

10 For a more thorough analysis of the legal, political, and symbolic importance of Rhodesia House, see J. Brownell, “‘A Sordid Tussle on the Strand’: Rhodesia House During the UDI Rebellion (1965–1980)’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 38/3 (September, 2010), pp. 471–99.


13 See, for example: ‘Trek South by Kenyan Whites is Expected’, Rhodesia Herald, February 20 1968. ‘A new trek southwards by Whites is being anticipated here in the wake of Kenya’s “Africanization” Policy. While the exodus is unlikely to reach the proportions of the one at the time of independence in 1963[, s]everal thousand Whites are expected to move south before the end of the year.’ In the same article, a British engineer was quoted as saying: ‘I love this country, but I also love a bit of security … I am looking for a job in Malawi, and if I can’t go there it will be South Africa.’


18 Nicholls, Red Strangers, p. 263.
Notes

24 Ibid., p. 22.
25 CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics.
26 *South Africa 1985*.
27 ‘… while the Government would always hold out the hand of friendship to people in Kenya it did not want to try to persuade people to leave there … If they can make a go of it there, they should do so because it is still part of the Commonwealth,’ Sir Malcolm Barrow said. ‘Federation Still Trying to Get Immigrants’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 5 September, 1961. See also, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 12, ‘Motion: Immigrants From Kenya and Tanganyika’, 30 March 1960.
28 See, for example, ‘No Poaching of Emigrants by Australia’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 6 April 1961. The Australian High Commissioner promised that Australia would not attempt to woo Rhodesian whites.
29 Richardson, *British Immigrants*.
31 In a 1966 survey of British emigrants, Australia was preferred to South Africa and Rhodesia because of the African countries’ ‘racial troubles’. See A. Richardson, *British Immigration*, pp. 14–15.
32 British economic woes led to lines outside Australia House, Canada House, and New Zealand House, as Rhodesia House remained unoccupied. ‘Migrant Queues Grow as Crisis Worsens’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 7 February 1974.
34 See, for example, ‘Independence in Needed to Boost Immigration’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 6 March 1965.

38 ‘89 year old Immigrant is Due Tomorrow’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 19 December 1968.
39 As the print advertisements below clearly show, there was an internal inconsistency in contrasting Rhodesia’s free market capitalist structure to Britain’s socialism while simultaneously offering numerous government subsidies and programs to woo immigrants.
40 ‘New Move to Attract Irish Immigrants’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 19 March 1969.
48 For example, one third of all Rhodesian immigrants in 1978 were former residents. See Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 98, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 26 July 1978, col. 850. In 1975 De Kock stated that this figure in 1974 was then one in six. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 89, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 12 February 1975, col. 1273.
53 Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 1 August 1969, col. 1061


Ibid.

This phrase was used by an African MP to describe the variance between Van der Byl’s public and private statements regarding immigration. Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 17 January 1969, col. 294.

Smith Papers, Box 017, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy’, 8 July 1964.


See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 80, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 18 November 1971. This broader claim was clearly untrue, as Rhodesian Cabinet records indicate.

See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 80, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 18 November 1971. This is certainly a questionable claim, and is more likely a flipping of causes and effects, as immigration tended to swell during better economic times with higher employment.

See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 90, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 18 July 1975. The definition of capital as defined by Immigration Ministers was very loose and included moveable assets such as cars, and as a result the economic benefit to Rhodesia of this capital influx was greatly exaggerated, especially when compared against settling down costs, balance of payment issues, and infrastructural strains caused by new immigration.

See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 79, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 21 July 1971. This argument was particularly disingenuous, as non-whites were already barred from the skilled jobs that would have been taken up by these potential immigrants.

See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 90, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 18 July 1975. These migrant workers equated with white immigrants were only in Rhodesia on a temporary basis and had no opportunity to obtain permanent residence, and were, by definition, not immigrants at all.

See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 80, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 18 November 1971. This might have been true in the short run, but the long term costs of importing and retaining foreign-schooled migrants was most likely more than improving Rhodesian training.

See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 97, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 29 September 1977. This might have been true generally, but even Immigration
Ministers on several occasions complained about the lack of effective vetting processes for post-UDI immigrants.

75 Morris, Pax Britannica, p. 222.
81 For anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon, see Mr Samuriwo’s statements to the Committee of Supply, August 1 1969, col. 1063. Samuriwo pointed out that the job of parking meter readers used to be one that was exclusively African, but was then a European job. In a follow-up speech, RF backbencher Mr Pinchen claimed the new Europeans could probably read meters better than their African predecessors. See also Mr Rubatika, Committee of Supply, August 1, 1969, col. 1076: Rubatika claimed beer seller used to be an African job but was then European. He went on to say that new immigrants also threatened African jobs in the building industry and in clerical work.
83 For white politicians talking of immigration goals in terms of bringing in ‘more white faces’, see Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 29 January 1970.
84 S. Onslow, “A Scheme of National Importance”: Winston Field and the Italian Settlement Scheme (working paper, no date).
87 This mirrored the British policy of twenty years previously limiting the rate of Jewish immigration to Palestine to the territory’s ‘economic absorptive capacity’. This restraint on the rate of immigration was enormously unpopular among Palestine’s Jewish population who were more interested in the long-term nation-building benefits of more Jews, rather than the economic absorption of new immigrants. See C. Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars: Counter-insurgency in the Twentieth Century (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), p. 83.


90 Meredith makes the claim that Smith partly came to power to assuage fears over white emigration, to stop the white flight: *The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia, 1890–1979* (London: Deutsch, 1979), p. 46.


92 Ibid.

93 Letter from NAI French, British High Commission, to JN Allen of the Rhodesia Department, 13 January 1965, DO 183/885.

94 Ibid.


96 Oddly enough, some African MPs agreed with Reedman’s assertion of the threat of mass Chinese settlement, but posited that the best way to foreclose this possibility was to continue to have large African families and resist calls for the state’s family planning schemes. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 63, ‘Motion: Family Planning’, 9 March 1966.

97 For instance, Reedman once said that ‘with tremendous developments ahead, Southern Rhodesia was capable of supporting 40,000,000–50,000,000 people at a high standard of living’. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 58, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 22 September 1964, col. 653. For this and other similar statements, Reedman was widely attacked in Parliament and in the press.

98 Smith Papers, Box 017, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy’, 8 July 1964.


101 Ibid.


104 UDI was more extensively invoked as a drastic, but needed measure to stop the outflow.


Van der Byl did not create these direct mailings out of whole cloth, however, as Howman had first introduced them in 1967. See, for example, ‘100,000 Air Letters Used to Launch Drive for Immigrants’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 29 July 1967.

In response to a *Herald* letter-writer asking if Van der Byl himself would open up his own home, he publicly declined, claiming that his home was already used to accommodate visiting VIPs. See: ‘Van der Byl is Unable to House Newcomers’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 17 February 1968.

See ‘More Immigrants — “Greater Prosperity”’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 22 March 1969: ‘George Rudland, Minister without portfolio, handed out prizes to winners of the recent immigration competition. Mr. Rudland presented Dr James Dick, of Salisbury, with the first prize of tickets for a six day Flame Lily Holiday (donated by Air Rhodesia); Mr. and Mrs. Jeff Healey, of Salisbury, with the second prize of a refrigerator (donated by Atlantis Electric Company); and Mr. and Mrs. Ernest McGarry, of Bulawayo, with the third prize of a radiogram (donated by Wholesale Radio Supplies Ltd).’

For the nationalists’ perspective on this campaign see *Zimbabwe Review*, ZAPU’s weekly organ, 12 January 1974. The British government’s FCO speculated in a confidential memorandum that the Settlers ’74 drive was designed to take advantage of the energy crisis in the UK and Western Europe. FCO 36/1766.


‘Settler ’74 “Only if There is Work”’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 18 February 1974.

The scale of the failure of the Settlers ’74 campaign even shocked British officials, who estimated there might be somewhere between 10,000 and 100,000 interested in emigrating. ‘Rhodesia’s Campaign to Attract a Million Immigrants’, telegram from Annenberg, American Embassy in London to State Department, 30 January, 1974. Online Access to Archival Documents (AAD), State Department Central Files, 1973–75, US National Archives.


Ibid.

FCO 36/1716.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See for example ‘Man of 82 can take Only L15 to Rhodesia’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 22 May 1969: ‘The Bank of England has turned down a plea, made on compassionate grounds, to let an 82-year-old man take his savings to Rhodesia. Even the L50 travel allowance has been refused, and he may take only a maximum of L15 “for emergencies”.’


125 Immigration Minister De Kock explained this influx thus: ‘We have had a considerable increase in the numbers of persons of Portuguese extraction from Mozambique, in particular, who come to settle in this country which is attractive to them … May I say without any hesitation that we urge Rhodesians to welcome these people who wish to come and settle in this country …’ Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 90, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 22 July 1975, col. 1142.

126 ‘Call-Up Net Tightens on Immigrants from Today’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 1 August 1975.


128 Rhodesian Estimates of Expenditure Reports, 1965–79.

129 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 62, Committee of Supply Vote, 10 August 1965, col. 71. There were even right-wing efforts to lessen the criminal bars as they pertained to immigration to allow in more white immigrants. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 62, Committee of Supply, 12 August 1965, col. 184.


135 The Cabinet decided as early as 1964 that ‘In general it should be accepted government policy that no persons should be refused entry into the country for purposes of immigration solely on the grounds of a lack of knowledge of English’. Smith Papers, Box 017, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration: Conditions for Entry’, 24 November 1964.

136 Smith Papers, Box 023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Miscegenation, Prostitution and Allied problems’, 24 August 1971.


140 ‘I would like to advise the Minister that we do not want immigration from Greece. We do not want immigration from Greece, and we do not want immigration from Israel. This country has been civilised by English people and our immigration must be fixed from the English speaking people.’ Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 68, Committee of Supply, 31 August 1967, col. 1682.
African MPs were very hostile to the non-British character of white immigration after UDI. One MP, Mr Maposa, said: ‘You see in the cafés at night many areas have become either Portuguese, Greek or whatever you may prefer to call them. These are not the immigrants the Minister says are carefully selected. The number is increasing. At one time I heard there were more than 35,000 Portuguese, most of whom are no better than any African really .’; Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 97, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 29 September 29 1977, col. 295.

In an answer to a suggestion of stationing a linguist at various immigration posts, Van der Byl claimed that ‘still at this stage 80% of our immigrants are in fact English speaking’, and thus concluded that a linguist would not be cost effective. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 84, Committee of Supply, 9 August 1973, col. 1680. The most accurate description of the national breakdown after the post-UDI period was from 1974. The then Minister of Immigration asserted that the origins of the immigrant coming in 1974 were as follows: UK 31%, South Africa 27%, Portugal 11%, Zambia 7%, Australia 3%, Greece 2%, Malawi 1%, Botswana 1%, Italy 1%, USA 1%, Holland 1%, and others 12%. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 89, Committee of Supply, 12 February 1975, col. 1261. However, since immigration officials only recorded the countries of departure not migrants’ nationalities, these numbers must be taken with qualification.


There were even right-wing efforts to lessen the criminal bars as they pertained to immigration to allow in more white immigrants. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 62, Committee of Supply, 12 August 1965, col. 184.

L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of Scientology, briefly set up his headquarters in Rhodesia, and James Earl Ray was believed to be making his way to Rhodesia when he was nabbed in Heathrow airport and extradited to the United States for killing Dr. Martin Luther King. See ‘Rhodesia—US Link in Manhunt: Immigration Query by Luther King Suspect: Government Assurance of Watch is Reported’, Rhodesia Herald, 14 June 1968.


See, for example, ‘Immigrant had 46 Convictions’, Rhodesia Herald, 12 May 1973; and ‘Convicted Immigrant Told to Go’, Rhodesia Herald, 13 October 1973.


Notes


153 See for example, ‘Those Born in Rhodesia Also Need Houses’, *Rhodesia Herald*, letter from M. J. Lawrence, 29 July 1972.


Chapter 6


For example, between 1955 and 1979 immigration averaged only 10,207 annually and emigration 9,983 annually, the vast majority of which occurred within Salisbury, Bulawayo, and Umtali only. Statistics derived from Rhodesian Central Statistical Office Monthly Digest reports.

In December 1974, for example, 81.7 per cent of Rhodesian whites lived in towns. G. H. Tanser, The Guide to Rhodesia (Johannesburg: Winchester Press, 1975), p. 310. From the 1950s the overwhelming majority of white immigrants came to the urban areas.


Independent African countries to the north of Rhodesia did view population matters as political issues of great significance, as would ZANU once it took control of Zimbabwe's state apparatus.


Kaler, Running After Pills, p. 64, citing NAZ B/137/5.


Kaler, Running After Pills, p. 194, quoting from interviews with Mrs Ngavira and Mrs Mhene respectively.


Kriger, Peasant Voices, pp. 52–3.

Ibid., p. 54.


Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, p. 170.

Kriger, Peasant Voices, p. 98.


Or as Mikhail Bakunin wrote in 1870 in his ‘Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis’, ‘from this very moment we must spread our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda’. See M. Bakunin and M. Shatz (ed), Bakunin: Statism and Anarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Editions of both the Zimbabwe News (ZANU) and Zimbabwe Review (ZAPU) are located at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies Archives and Special Collections, Russell Square, London, UK.
Notes

27 Zimbabwe Review, 9, 24 July 1964.
28 Zimbabwe Review, 8, 14 November 1964.
30 Zimbabwe Review, 3, 24 April 1964, my emphasis.
33 For example, ‘Smith’s Million Immigrants’, Zimbabwe Review, 12 January 1974.
39 There was some limited truth to the charge of coercion in the realm of family planning, but not state coercion, as the Herald reported that some employers required proof of birth control pill usage before employing African girls. “Pill or No Jobs” Claim’, Rhodesia Herald, 28 June 1971.
41 Kaler, Running After Pills, p. 187.
42 See, for example, the Chitepo quote in an earlier chapter on ZANU strategy. M. Raeburn, We Are Everywhere: Narratives From Rhodesian Guerrillas (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 201. ZIPRA’s military strategy was based more upon conventional invasion forces, and did not become a military factor until much later in the conflict. See H. Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989).

Statistics derived from Rhodesian Secretary of Health Reports (hereafter SHR), (Government publications, 1953–1979).

Statistics derived from SHR, and Godwin and Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die*, p. 280. Many of these African combat deaths were combatants serving in the government’s security forces.


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Publication). In the graph, the unavailable data – the 1960 New Zealand and
1966 South African rates – were approximated from the nearest data in time.

56 In 1960 the world average birth rate was 35–36. South and East Africa was 45,
Europe was 19, North America and Oceania were 24. S.J. Behrman (ed.), *Fer-
tility and Family Planning: A World View*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan

57 For an analysis of Vining’s paradox, see M. Potts, ‘Sex and the Birth Rate:
Human Biology, Demographic Change, and Access to Fertility-Regulation
1–39.

58 See Godwin and Hancock, *Rhodeians Never Die*, pp. 136, 163.

59 R. Hodder-Williams interview, Oral Archives, BECM.


61 See *Rhodesia Herald* articles on divorce, separation, and war stress: ‘Marriage
No Bliss for Many Rhodesian Couples’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 7 June 1974; ‘Family

62 ‘Rhodesia Divorce Faster than in Reno’, *Rhodesia Herald*, 16 August 1976.


64 Jeater, *Marriage*, p. 35.

65 As Jeater’s *Marriage*, explains, during the colony’s early history the state oscil-
lated between blaming the rural patriarchal system for purported African sexual
deviancies and blaming the absence of these same systems when not present.

66 See generally, N. Kriger, ‘The Zimbabwean War of Liberation: Struggles Within
304–22.


69 Ibid., p. 201.

70 Kriger, *Peasant Voices*.

71 Ibid., p. 106.


73 Kriger, *Peasant Voices*, p. 114.

74 Kaler, *Running After Pills*, p. 211.

75 For an excellent study of African suspicion of white medicine, see L. White,
‘Poisoned Food, Poisoned Uniforms, and Anthrax: Or, How Guerillas Die in
War’, in G. Mitman, M. Murphy, and C. Sellers (eds), *Landscapes of Exposure:
Knowledge and Illness in Modern Environments* (Osiris, 2nd ser., 19) (Chicago:


77 Ibid., pp. 200–1

78 Ibid., p. 180.

79 Ibid., p. 180–1.

80 Ibid., p. 199.
81 Ibid., p. 206.
82 See generally, Kaler, Running After Pills.
83 Ibid., p. 211.
84 Ibid., p. 136, quoting Gloria Tekere.
92 Potts has argued that ideational shifts sometimes initiate fertility transitions in the absence of other preconditions: ‘Sex and the Birth Rate’, p. 16
96 Statistics were derived from UNWPP.
97 Lucas described the Zambian government as ‘laissez faire’ on population matters: ‘Fertility and Family Planning’, p. 152.
99 See generally, Lucas, ‘Fertility and Family Planning’.
100 African crude birth rates compared 1960–2000:

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Abbreviations: R/Z = Rhodesia/Zimbabwe; SSH = Sub-Saharan Africa. Statistics derived from UNWWP; see n. 54 above.

101 Kaler, Running After Pills, p. 222.
103 Ibid., pp. 224–5.
104 Kriger, Peasant Voices, p. 230.
105 Ibid., p. 230.

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4 Lawrence of Arabia (1962).
The Collapse of Rhodesia


10 Ibid., p. 58.

11 Ibid., p. 58.


14 The answer would likely be that while Rhodesia would have survived longer, it still would not have survived as long as did apartheid South Africa, as Rhodesia, unlike South Africa, would have still been burdened with complete international isolation, an active guerrilla war inside the country, and a legacy of white transience that would not have disappeared even had their ratios improved temporarily.

15 See, for example, D. Stasiulis and N. Yuval-Davis (eds), Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Class (London: Sage Publications, 1995).
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