Commentary

The ‘Hani Memorandum’ – introduced and annotated

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The ‘Hani Memorandum’, a document produced and signed by Chris Hani and six other members of the African National Congress (ANC)’s armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) early in 1969, following the failure of the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns, is frequently cited but there appears to be no complete copy in a public archive. It has been published only once and that was 30 years ago in an obscure exile journal without identification, date, context, or the names of the signatories – not surprisingly, it seems then to have passed unnoticed. In his book *ANC: A View from Moscow* Vladimir Shubin (1999) provides an accurate summary of the memorandum’s contents, but the copy to which he had access in the Soviet archives seems to have been produced for circulation to the diplomatic community and contained no names and no signatures.

The unavailability of the memorandum has not prevented its continued citation for political purposes and it is still influential 40 years after its production. Speaking at the launch of the Chris Hani Municipality’s Liberation Heritage Route at Hani’s birthplace, Sabalele, near Cofimvaba in the Eastern Cape on April 10, 2008, the 15th anniversary of his death, the ANC’s then recently elected secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, who was also chairman of the South African Communist Party (SACP), made intriguing use of the Hegelian/ Marxian dialectic – thesis, antithesis and synthesis – to link three major conferences in the history of the ANC: Morogoro (1969), Kabwe (1985), and Polokwane (2007). Drawing a parallel between the three, he saw each of them as coming after a period of dissatisfaction with the leadership, if not actual mutiny, as providing an opportunity to confront and to discuss the outstanding issues, and as heralding a period of reform and consolidation.
Mantashe acknowledged that it was the ‘Hani memorandum’, and indeed mutiny, that led directly to the Morogoro Conference. More recently, Terry Bell cited the memorandum in an article in which he argued that the present crisis in the ANC had its roots in its exile history. Zola Skweyiya, then minister of social welfare in South Africa, cited the memorandum in yet another context, referring to the danger of Xhosa or Nguni dominance of the ANC, and looking back to what was sometimes seen as a mutiny of ‘Cape men’.

There are no precise figures, but about 50 MK men with a smaller number of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Political Union) combatants took part in the Wankie campaign, which was launched across the Zambezi from near Livingstone in western Zambia at the end of July 1967. The ANC’s Luthuli Detachment was divided into two main groups – the western group was intended to move through Rhodesia to South Africa. A second group split off from the first in the Wankie Game Reserve and moved eastwards with the intention of establishing bases with ZAPU in northern and central Rhodesia as part of a ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail’ to South Africa. Five months later in December 1967 a second offensive, the Sipolilo campaign, was launched from eastern Zambia – its objectives were not clear-cut. The MK members of this ‘Pyramid Detachment’ suffered heavy casualties – 23 died.

Of the MK members who fought in the Wankie campaign about 25 were killed in action, about a dozen were captured and served long prison terms in Rhodesia or South Africa, and the remainder, including a small group under the leadership of Chris Hani, a political commissar, made a strategic withdrawal into Botswana where they were arrested, charged and imprisoned. A second group of MK and ZAPU men crossed into Botswana a few days later. As a result of pressure from various sources, including the OAU and its liberation committee, and of negotiations with the Zambian government, these men were deported to Zambia in 1968-9 after spending a year or more in prison in Gaborone. It is difficult to be precise about dates because, for security reasons, prisoners who were deported from Botswana by air were given passports under false names – these were different from their MK names - but Hani, who had been arrested in August 1967, probably returned to Lusaka with a few others in the second half of December 1968.

The drafting of the ‘Hani Memorandum’
Although they were given a welcome-home party by Jack and Ray Simons at their house at 250 Zambezi Road, Lusaka, they were shocked by the lack
of any kind of official welcome by the leadership and by its failure to debrief them with a view to learning any lessons that could be drawn from the campaign. Sometime in 1970 Hani – ‘Comrade Chris’ – told an internal commission of enquiry into later incidents in Lusaka that ‘after leaving prison in Botswana he found the movement in a stalemate position. There was no longer any direction, there was general confusion or an unwillingness to discuss the lessons of the revolution’.9

It was in this volatile situation that the document that came to be known as ‘the Hani memorandum’ was produced, probably in January 1969. According to a second memorandum, detailing the background of the first, and produced in March 1969 by Chris Hani and the other signatories, with the help of Jack Simons, indicating their grounds of appeal against expulsion, they had not originally intended to write a memorandum at all. They had delegated three of their number to interview the secretary-general, Duma Nokwe,10 ‘with a view to arranging a discussion with members of the Executive’. Nokwe ‘took up a hostile attitude, maintained that the issues we had raised were trivial, and proposed to interview us individually and not as a group. We considered this procedure to be un-political and refused to comply.’ Nokwe caused particular offence by failing to recognise one member of the delegation, Jackson Mlenze, a Wankie veteran, and the commander of a unit that was intended to reach the Transkei. They, on the other hand, incensed Nokwe by their suggestion, repeated in the memorandum, that Amiran, an Israeli agricultural equipment company, for which his wife, Vuyiswa (Tiny), was then working was a front for Israeli intelligence.11 Nokwe ‘told our representatives to arrange a meeting with members of the Executive’.

The ‘Commissariat’ eventually sanctioned a meeting with the NEC and six members were present when this took place. The delegates had prepared a statement and they were told to have this typed and to provide copies to all members of the executive who were then present. The memorandum, which ‘made a political analysis and attributed all the weaknesses we complained of to political and personal failings of some of our leaders’, was then ‘typed, stencilled and duplicated’ in the ANC office and copies were provided to members of the executive and to ‘selected members of MK’. The latter were ‘cautioned to treat the matter as highly confidential and in no circumstances to disclose its existence to people who did not belong to the organisation.’12

In addition to Hani, who signed as ‘M. T. Hani (Chris)’,13 the six other signatories to the memorandum were Z.R. (Jeqe) Mbengwa,14 Leonard Pitso,15 later a general in the South African National Defence Force,
Ntabenkosi Fipaza (Mbali), Wilmot Hempe, Tamana Gobozi (Mikza), and G. S. Mose (Jackson) Mlenze. Only two of the signatories, Hani and Mlenze, were members of the Luthuli Detachment who had fought in the Wankie campaign and been imprisoned in Botswana. Two others had crossed the Zambezi and entered Rhodesia in connection with the campaign – one of the latter was Fipaza (Mbali) who served as a medical officer, the other may have been Leonard Pitso. The signatories were sometimes referred to as the ‘Cape group’, implying a Xhosa identity, though at least two of them came from other provinces – Mbengwa (Buthelezi) from Natal and Pitso from the Transvaal. According to Walter Msimang (Mavuso), the memorandum did not have widespread support. He says that he was one among many who were suspicious of what he says was the involvement of Tennyson Makiwane in its composition, a suggestion that Makiwane denied. Major-General Gardner Sijake and Alfred Sipetho Willie take a different view. They say that the memorandum had widespread support and that the seven signatories were chosen as representing a much larger group, including themselves.

Chris Hani was staying at the time, at the request of the ANC leadership, in the house of Livingstone Mqotsi, a leading, though by then an ‘expelled’, member, of the Unity Movement – he had clashed with IB Tabata. It was alleged that he too had a hand in the drafting of the memorandum, but he refutes that suggestion and says that he knew nothing about it until a copy was thrust into his hands by Mzwai Piliso, who came to see him one day at midnight, and begged him to use his influence with Hani and ‘the boys’ and persuade them to apologise for it. In his last interview, Hani took personal responsibility for the writing of the memorandum and there is no reason to doubt that he was the primary, though not the sole, author.

The reaction to the ‘Hani Memorandum’
The signatories at their next meeting with the executive, following the production of the memorandum, discovered to their great surprise ‘that members of the Military Headquarters and of the Military Regional administration were present’. They were told that these men had been called in because they had ‘introduced a new factor by circulating copies of the memorandum to members of MK’. They protested that they had been given an assurance that their point of view would be dealt with only by the executive and that the first thing was to discuss the political content of the memorandum. The members of the military present threatened however to ‘deal with’
us for alleged violations of security and the oath. We urged that the alleged violations should be dealt with only after a full discussion of the points we had raised. Having rejected our point of view, the Chairman of the meeting closed the meeting indefinitely.27

In their second memorandum, the signatories went on to say that:

Orders were given for our arrest for alleged treachery. Dungeons were dug at Livingstone for our reception. We would probably have been thrown into these dungeons but for the intervention of a leading comrade. The Acting President [Oliver Tambo] ordered the dungeons to be closed, and convened a meeting of militants to consider our case. Yet the leaders had failed to discuss the memorandum with us, as we had requested and anticipated. The Acting President told the meeting that the memorandum was not our work, but that we were being used as tools by certain persons unnamed. He appealed to the audience not to be hostile towards us; and undertook to deal with the alleged instigators. He appealed for normalisation pending discussions by the National Executive Conference.28

Meanwhile the signatories were suspended from their posts in MK and were prevented from attending meetings. Hani and Mlenze were not even permitted to attend a meeting of the Wankie veterans. Eventually they were arraigned before a tribunal which consisted of five members, two of whom, Joe Matlou29 and Mzwai Piliso, were members of the national executive committee (NEC), and three of whom were members of the military command. It is not clear who all the latter were, but one of them is named as Jack Zeph, a man who, the signatories alleged, had adopted a hostile attitude towards them at an earlier meeting.30 In their appeal document, the signatories say that they never received the charges against them in writing, but that they were charged with drafting and circulating a document without authority, and, secondly, with communicating ‘military information and classified material to unauthorised persons’. They said that they had not been supplied with details of the charges, which they considered ‘vague and embarrassing’. According to a later and perhaps less reliable account by Tennyson Makiwane, they were accused of bypassing the military headquarters, violating their MK oath of secrecy, and of ‘working with the enemy’.31

The signatories protested that they could not get a fair trial from a tribunal that included members of the NEC, which was the main target of their critique, and that at least one member of the regional military headquarters who had shown bias against them. They also protested that they were expected to appear before the tribunal individually though the memorandum had been
produced collectively. They were refused the right to appeal to the NEC over these issues. They also claimed that the witnesses gave their evidence in their absence and that they were not informed of the evidence against them. They do not themselves say so in their appeal, but Tennyson Makiwane said that they refused to appear before the tribunal. They were expelled from the ANC by the tribunal in Lusaka on March, 25, 1969. Their expulsion was confirmed by ANC ‘headquarters’, presumably the NEC, on March 29, 1969. Their appeal was addressed to the ‘National Conference’, the Morogoro Conference, which met on April 25, 1969.32

The signatories’ second memorandum does not tell the whole story and later accounts, including one by Chris Hani himself, suggest that they deliberately downplayed the real drama. The commander-in-chief, Joe Modise, was, together with Duma Nokwe, the main target of the memorandum, and it was certainly he who was most angry about it. According to Hani’s own account, as told to Vladimir Shubin in early 1992, a majority of the members of the tribunal voted for ‘the most severe punishment’, and it was only the determined intervention of Mzwai Piliso, later head of the security department, that ‘averted what would have been a tragedy’. It was widely believed in exile that Hani and the other signatories were sentenced to death, though there is no evidence to confirm this and the balance of probability suggests that they were not. There is no doubt, however, that ‘dungeons’ were dug for their incarceration on an ANC farm near Livingstone and that these were filled in on the instructions of Oliver Tambo. Major-General Gardner Sijake recalls that he and (General) Lambert Moloi found 11 freshly-dug and empty graves on the same Livingstone farm site and suggests that some members of the military leadership had more than the seven signatories marked down for execution – their hit list may have included himself.33

Although the chronology is not entirely clear, there does seem to have been a plot to kill Hani, which may have been separate from the quasi-judicial tribunal. Livingstone Mqotsi says that Hani thanked him for saving his life after he denied entry to his house, where Hani had been staying for several months and where he was at that moment, to a group of MK men who came looking for him at midnight. Ray Simons recalled that Govan ‘Dingo’ Hashe came to tell her at that time that there was a plot to kill Hani. In the absence of Tambo, she summoned Thomas Nkobi, then chief representative of the ANC in Zambia, and warned him of the dire consequences that would follow should anything happen to Hani. There were apparently meetings at the Simons’ house which helped to reduce the tension. Hani himself recalled that
Jack Simons was supportive of the signatories of the memorandum during their period of ‘isolation’. He also mentioned the probably rather more remote support of leading members of the SACP, specifically Yusuf Dadoo and Joe Slovo.34

The general meeting of the ANC membership to which the signatories refer took place at the Joshua Nkomo ZAPU camp west of Lusaka in February 1969. Eyewitness accounts agree that Tambo defused the situation by taking personal responsibility for the failings of the ANC leadership. According to Tennyson Makiwane, and eyewitnesses, Tambo suggested that the signatories were being used ‘as brooms by which the leadership swept its dirt’. According to a much later account by Joe Matthews, it was also at this meeting, to which Joe Modise is said to have come with a pistol in his belt, that Tambo announced that a national consultative conference would take place at Morogoro at the end of April – that was in just over two months time. Tennyson Makiwane says that the idea of a national consultative conference was proposed by Alfred Kgokong (Temba Mqota) and that the decision to hold one was made at a meeting of the NEC in Lusaka.35

**The Morogoro Conference**

There can be no doubt that the calling of the conference at Morogoro was a direct response to the ‘Hani Memorandum’. As a result of their expulsion from the ANC, the signatories were themselves unable to attend and to take part in the political discussion of the issues that they had raised. They were not, however, the only people who were suspended at this time and prevented from attending the meeting. Two members of the NEC, Ambrose Mzimkhulu Makiwane,36 elder ‘brother’ (cousin) of Tennyson Makiwane, and Alfred Kgokong (Temba Mqota), 37 were suspended from the committee, initially for six months, in February or March 1969. According to Tennyson Makiwane, with confirmation from Ambrose Makiwane, these suspensions were related to the memorandum. An attempt was made to implicate both Makiwanes and Kgokong in the drafting of the memorandum, and when that charge failed to stick, Ambrose Makiwane and Kgokong were suspended on the grounds that they had defied orders to remain in Dar es Salaam and had insisted on travelling to Lusaka before a meeting of the NEC in Dar es Salaam at which the memorandum was to be discussed.38 A participant in a meeting with Tambo a few months later was recorded by Tambo himself as saying: ‘We were told Makiwane and Kgokong were involved in Memo’. He was not contradicted.39
Although Hani and his comrades were not able to attend the Morogoro Conference, it seems that as many as half of the 70 delegates who did attend were representatives of MK. The memorandum was not specifically discussed, but their point of view was well represented, and the conference recommended a pardon for the signatories and their reinstatement. As is well known, Tambo resigned during the conference and was unanimously re-elected as deputy president. This vote of confidence, and the conference’s decision to allow him, together with JB Marks and Moses Mabhida, as ‘president-in-council’, to select the members of a new, reduced NEC, considerably strengthened his leadership position. The most conspicuous loser in the reshuffle of the leadership was Duma Nokwe who lost his position as secretary-general to Alfred Nzo and was also removed from the NEC. There was little doubt that he was paying the price for his mishandling of the memorandum issue, as well as for other weaknesses. Joe Modise, on the other hand, retained his title as commander-in-chief, at least for another three years, after which he became, for a while, ‘chief of operations’. The military headquarters was, however, dissolved and he was elevated to membership of the newly constituted Revolutionary Council. Separate regional headquarters, also called staff commands, for Zambia and Tanzania were established under their own chiefs of staff. Although Modise was an ex-officio member of the Lusaka military HQ, he was removed from day-to-day control of MK units in Lusaka – something that may have contributed to later discontent among his supporters.

The other major decision of the conference was to open membership of the ANC in exile to people of all races. This went some way towards resolving the anomaly that while membership of MK had been open to people of all races, the ANC had not taken that step. It also facilitated the political integration of MK into the ANC and brought MK back under the ANC’s control – the apparent independence of MK and the lack of political control over it had been one of the main complaints of Hani and his fellow signatories. The conference did not, however, go so far as to allow non-African membership of the ANC’s national executive committee. As a compromise solution, a Revolutionary Council with open and non-racial membership was established as a nominal sub-committee of the NEC.

In the long run the Morogoro Conference probably strengthened the ANC in exile. Chris Hani himself said that ‘after Morogoro we never looked back’. He said that the ‘Strategy and Tactics’ document that emerged from the conference became ‘the lodestar of the movement’ and that, with the
establishment of the Revolutionary Council there was a shift in emphasis away from international solidarity and towards ‘building [the] ANC inside South Africa’.

Five years later he was himself to be the first member of the exiled NEC to enter South Africa. But in the short term the consequences of the conference were not beneficial. The signatories of the memorandum were reinstated soon after the conference and it was hoped that this would solve the problems of MK in Lusaka. It did not as their reinstatement prompted a reaction from the so-called ‘Transvaal comrades’ – the supporters of Joe Modise. At the same time, the ANC came under pressure from the governments of Zambia and Tanzania to close down their military camps in both countries. The Lusaka Manifesto, to which both countries subscribed in April 1969, indicated a strategic withdrawal from armed confrontation with South Africa – a further consequence of the failure of the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns. The ANC also faced problems in London where the opening of the organisation to ‘non-Africans’ prompted an Africanist backlash.

There is not space here to offer an analysis of the contents of the ‘Hani memorandum’. Readers will be able to do that for themselves. It is, however, a remarkable document and many of the issues that it raised in relation to democratic decision making, accountability, class divisions within the ANC, nepotism, corruption, and draconian discipline, remained live issues throughout the exile period and are still relevant today.

The Memorandum Itself

The ANC in Exile is in a deep crisis as a result of which a rot has set in. From informal discussions with the revolutionary members of M.K. we have inferred that they have lost all confidence in the ANC leadership abroad. This they say openly and in fact show it. Such a situation is very serious and in fact a revolutionary movement has to sit down and analyse such a prevailing state of affairs.

The situation is further aggravated by the fact that accredited members of the Organisation are no longer consulted or no longer participate in policy making decisions of the Organisation – there have been two or three conferences when the leaders met or did not consult or inform the membership of the resolutions. The inference is that we are no longer considered members of the ANC As the leading revolutionary core of the Organisation it is imperative for members of M.K. to participate in all matters affecting the revolutionary struggle in South Africa.

We raise the above points so as to arrest the present trend.
We, as genuine revolutionaries, are moved by the frightening depths reached by the rot in the ANC and the disintegration of M.K. accompanying this rot and manifesting itself in the following way:

1. The ANC Leadership in Exile has created a machinery which has become an end in itself. It is completely divorced from the situation in South Africa. It is not in a position to give an account of the functioning branches inside the country. There has never been an attempt to send the Leadership inside since the Rivonia Arrests. There has been an over-concentration of people in offices – this has become a fully fledged activity in itself, for eg, you get a Director of Youth who maintains no liaison with the home front. There are other departments, such as the Treasury Department which is to all intents and purposes catering for activities outside, and whose functioning is only limited and known to a few people; the Department of the Secretary-General which has not furnished any reports on political activities in the various regions in the country; the Department of Publicity which is giving out propaganda geared only to external consumption. The quality of information is not revolutionary and is out of step with the existing political situation inside the country. Its material hardly gives a deep analysis of the prevalent situation inside. We strongly feel that time has come that the department should make every effort to reach the masses of our people by seeing to it that more and more of its revolutionary propaganda is written in the language of our people.

2. We are disturbed by the careerism of the ANC Leadership Abroad who have, in every sense, become professional politicians rather than professional revolutionaries. We have been forced to draw the conclusion that the payment of salaries to people working in offices is very detrimental to the revolutionary outlook is of those who receive such monies. It is without doubt that such payments corrupt cadres at any level and have the effect of making people perform their duties or fill offices because of money inducement rather than dedication to the cause – they become in effect merely salaried employees of the movement. It is high time that all members and cadres of the ANC, be they in M.K. or not, should receive equal treatment and be judged only on the basis of their dedication and sacrifice to the cause we serve. The principle of thorough selection of cadres should be on the basis of merit and such selection should never be delegated to an individual – this will prevent individuals owing allegiance to those who appoint them rather than to the Revolution.
3. The Leadership of the ANC abroad must be committed to a resolution and programme of going home to lead the struggle there, which resolution and programme must be seen to be implemented. Presently there is a Leadership vacuum as all the leader’s are either locked up in Vorster’s prisons or are in exile. This has deprived the S.A. masses of leadership which is so vital at this crucial moment of our Revolution. A situation where our people, because of this vacuum will be deceived by opportunists of all shades is strongly developing. We feel that the number of leaders attending international conferences and other globetrotting activities should be cut down to a reasonable few and the remainder should work around the clock working on the home front.

4. There are certain symptoms which are very disturbing and dispiriting to genuine revolutionaries. These comprise the opening of mysterious business enterprises which to our knowledge have never been discussed by the leadership of the Organisation. For instance, in Lusaka a furniture industry is being run by the ANC.47 In Livingstone a bone factory whose original purpose was to provide cover for underground work in Botswana is now being used as a purely commercial undertaking. As a result of these enterprises more and more M.K. men are being diverted to them. And some of the people in charge of these enterprises are dubious characters with shady political backgrounds. We are therefore compelled to conclude that there is no serious drive to return home and carry on the struggle. This is disturbing because the very comrade, Thabo More, 48 who is supposed to be planning, directing and leading the struggle in South Africa is fully involved in these enterprises. Now he has assumed complete responsibility for the running of these enterprises in collaboration with others and it is extremely doubtful that with his attention so divided he can do justice to the armed struggle in South Africa which should be his primary and absolute concern. The Leadership of the ANC can’t but be blamed for this state of affairs.

5. An equally disturbing situation is that M.K. is being run completely independently of the Political Organisation. The Political Leadership Abroad is not aware of the activities and plans of M.K. We therefore infer that M.K. is separate from the ANC; that there is conflict between the ANC and M.K.; that the ANC has lost control over M.K.; that there is no co-ordination between the ANC and the M.K. All this has brought about a situation where the ANC is run single-handed by the Commander-in-Chief who appoints and dismisses arbitrarily – as a result there is a
tendency among members of the Headquarters to owe allegiance to the individual who appoints and dismisses them and it takes a genuine revolutionary to challenge him. We are compelled to blame the National Executive for this anomalous situation.

6. The Security Department is internally directed. It is doing nothing against the enemy. It has achieved nothing of military importance. The failure of the so-called Security Department has been shown by its inability to furnish the Organisation with the fate of our most dedicated comrades in Zimbabwe. Or how is it possible that so many comrades have been able to desert so successfully? In the prosecution of its internally directed activities the Security Department has become notorious. Those who serve in it have the central task of suppressing and persecuting dedicated cadres of M.K. who have nothing to lose by participating in the struggle except their chains.

There is no Security Dept in our Organisation. For instance the arrest of Msomi and Matthews was inevitable as the fact of their presence in South Africa was common knowledge; as well as of comrades bound for home.49 This situation is tantamount to betrayal of comrades.

In Morogoro Joseph Cotton,50 Shadrack Tladi51 and Boy Otto52 are openly flirting with the Peace Corps an international known C.I.A. Front, a counter-revolutionary and espionage organisation. The first two handle vital information as they are connected with the Radio transmission service relaying Organisation material. Boy Otto is moving between Zambia and Tanzania transporting M.K. personnel and war material. Most disturbing is that a comrade raised this matter with the Secretary-General and Chief of Security of the ANC, Duma Nokwe, who agreed that the matter of the above comrades flirting with the Peace Corps was true and that it should be furnished in writing, but no action was taken. This is very disturbing and discouraging to serious revolutionaries who know fully well that these three comrades are close to the leading figures of the ANC and M.K. For instance, Joseph Cotton is the son of Moses Kotane the Treasurer-General of the ANC and General Secretary of the S.A.C.P.53 Shadrack Tladi is relative of Thabo More who is C-in-C of M.K. and member of the National Executive of the ANC Abroad. This has made us and many other comrades conclude that there is nepotism in the ANC.

An equally perturbing fact is that Mrs V. Nokwe, the wife of the Secretary-General and Chief of Security of the ANC, Comrade D. Nokwe is presently working for Amiran Israel, an internationally known Israeli
Intelligence Organisation operating under the cover of an Import-Export firm. This Amiran-Israel is a co-ordinating centre for Israeli Intelligence Services (Shinbet) in Southern Africa, Central Africa including Congo Brazzaville and Congo Kinshasa. Israel is a nest of imperialism which is actively sabotaging the National Liberation. Presently it has colonised parts of Arab territories and is maintaining close links with the most reactionary and fascist governments, such as South Africa and the revanchist Federal Government of Germany. We demand an explanation for this anomalous situation and we demand that we should cut links with the counter-revolutionary organisation forthwith and should there be any other links with the Israel, the ANC should sever them in the interests of our Revolution.

7. The tragedy of the Zimbabwe campaigns is the fact that we have been unable to analyse our operations so as to be able to assess and draw lessons that would make it possible for us to formulate a correct strategy and tactics vis-à-vis the enemy.

8. It is a cause for serious concern that comrades who have come back from the battle front have not been accorded a comradely reception and the fact that there has been no re-appraisal of their combat experience.

We are shocked by the criminal neglect of our most dedicated comrades who have either fallen in battle, sentenced to death or serving long term imprisonment in Zimbabwe. These men are heroes who have performed their revolutionary tasks gallantly without flinching. How can we possibly keep quiet [about?] these valorous sons of South Africa? Is this not an indication of callousness and irresponsibility on the part of the leadership? The behaviour of the Secretary-General and Chief of Security of the ANC D. Nokwe and his attitude towards Comrade J. Mlenze, when we petitioned for a meeting, disturbed us greatly. For him to have said he did not know, did not recognise Mlenze is a height of indifference and cynicism and we are really very worried about it. Here is a comrade from the battle front, a Commander of a unit, and a Security Chief of a vital region, namely Transkei accorded this type of snub.

9. We are perturbed by the fact that certain members of M.K. are receiving payments from the External Mission, eg the C-in-c and the C.P.O. who as a matter of fact are getting allowances and the fact that the C-in-C has a posh and militarily irrelevant car at his disposal. The fact that these soldiers are paid has a very demoralising effect on the other revolutionaries.
10. Individual leaders keep cars and run them and this coupled with the fact that they receive salaries alias allowances is in every way building them up as a middle class in our revolutionary organisation and in M.K.

11. A strange and alarming trend is developing whereby secret trials and secret executions have been carried out. We are not against the execution and liquidation of traitors but we are against the veil of secrecy. We are having in mind the trials of Zola Zembe, Wellington Mbata, Phalanyane and Bopela.

It is a shame that we should have been witnesses to the emergence of extremely reactionary methods of punishment in M.K. There have been instances when offenders in M.K. have been dumped in dugouts filled with several drums of water without blankets or any other protective material for periods of up to about 22 days. The cases in point are those of Daphne Zwane, Tallman Ndlovu, Bob Zulu, Erends and Joseph Ndlovu. This type of punishment, among others, is, from any angle, criminal and inhuman, and must have been designed to break the physical and moral integrity of victims.

12. The ANC is the vanguard of the revolutionary struggle in South Africa and it is strange that its leaders have not been obliged to take the M.K. oath. We strongly feel that there is no difference between the leaders of the ANC and men of M.K. who are obliged to take the oath, for such an oath might have dealt with J. Radebe’s desertion and will definitely deal with any other leader harbouring right wing designs of sabotaging our revolution.

13. The development of the Revolution has necessitated a renewal and rejuvenation of those who are leading it. We must guard against the fossilization of the leadership as this is likely to hinder the progressive development of the Revolution. There has been a tendency to appoint people to the National Executive outside. We would like to know what is the yardstick for these appointments. After proper consultation with all the members of the ANC a method should be found of changing leadership and the fact that there have been no conferences involving all our members at home should not be used as an excuse for not renewing the leadership. We should not depend on mandates given at national conferences 10 or more years ago. We have been forced to conclude that a few individuals are monopolising posts in the Organisation. This has brought about a situation where members of the Planning Council are also members of the National Executive.
14. It is very alarming that double standards as regards to health of the members of the Organisation are maintained. Whenever leaders are sick arrangements are made for them to receive excellent medical attention without delay but this sort of concern is hardly shown to the rank and file of the movement. We maintain that all of us are important in so far as the Revolution is concerned and should thus be accorded the same treatment.

15. We consider the youth in M.K. as the most revolutionary. We strongly feel that we should be consulted on matters affecting the youth. For instance we must be informed about the revolutionary International Youth gatherings and we should be given priority in the sending of delegates. The farce of the Bulgaria ANC Youth delegation should never be repeated and those responsible should acknowledge the mistake they made. The Youth of South Africa is not located in London or in any European capital. We therefore take particular exception to the appointment of certain students as leaders of the ANC Youth. Thabo Mbeki who went to London on a scholarship sponsored by NUSAS is a leader of ANC bogus Youth Organisation.\(^6\)

We are convinced that the ANC leadership in Exile is according better treatment and attention to the students. This attitude and practice has had a disastrous effect of diverting many would-be revolutionaries into the academic field. We feel that it is high time that the M.K. personnel which is in fact the core of our Revolution should be given the best treatment by virtue of having volunteered with their lives to give the supreme sacrifice for the Revolution.

Another disturbing symptom is the glaring practice of nepotism where the leadership uses its position to promote their kith and kin and put them in positions where they will not be in any physical confrontation with the enemy. The sending of virtually all the sons of the leaders to universities in Europe is a sign that these people are being groomed for leadership positions after the M.K. cadres have overthrown the fascists. We have no doubt that these people will just wait in Europe and just come home when everything has been made secure and comfortable for them playing the typical role of the Bandas and others. As opposed to the treatment of the students, we find complete indifference and apathy to the heroes and martyrs of our Revolution who have fallen in South Africa and Zimbabwe. We have in mind the gallant sons of our country, who without doubt lay their lives in the struggle against imperialism. These
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include among many Patric (sic) Mosedi one time President of the ANC.Y.L. and former treason trialist, Benson Ntsele the tireless Commissar, the young cream of our country Sparks Moloi, Chris Mampuru, James Masimini and Andries Motsepe. We have not forgotten those who have defiantly and stubbornly refused to be frightened by the hangman’s noose in Rhodesia following the heroic example set by our murdered martyrs Vuyisile Mini, Zinakile Mkhaba, Diliza Khayingo, W. Bongco and others. These comrades are the dedicated Alfred Mninzi known to many of us as James Harmanus, Tamane known as Zami, the son of that great revolutionary and women’s leader Dora Tamane, the young Rhodes Msuthu Ngamlana known to us as Charles Mhambi and Tula Bophela.

16. We call for a full definition of the ANC-Z.A.P.U. alliance, its form and content.

We demand that a serious and genuine effort should be made towards the intensification of ways and means of going home. This should be one actively involving the most dedicated members of M.K. and it should be on the basis of a correct strategy.

In conclusion all these problems must be resolved by a conference between the ANC Leadership and members of M.K. and not just handpicked individuals.

Signatories
M.T. Hani (Chris), W. Hempe, Z.R. Mbengwa (Jeqe), Tamana Gobozi (Mikza), Leonard Pitso, G. S. Mose (Mlenze), Ntabenkosi Fipaza (Mbali)

Notes
1. I am very grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for an award that has made possible the work that I am currently doing in South Africa and Zambia on the history of the ANC in exile in Zambia under the direction of Professor William Beinart at the African Studies Centre, Oxford University. I am also grateful to Rhodes University for the award of a Hugh Le May Visiting Fellowship which facilitated work in the ANC Archives at Fort Hare University. I am also very grateful to Mosa Maamoe, the archivist there, for his unfailing help with this project, and to the staffs of the department of manuscripts and archives at Cape Town University Library, and of the National Archives of Zambia, for their help. I acknowledge the help of Alfred Sipetho Willie and major-general Gardner ‘Sandi’ Sijake, both MK veterans, in the identification of MK members. I have also used the list of ANC members who died in exile, which is available on the ANC website, for this purpose.
2. It was published in *Ikwezi (a Journal of South African and Southern African Political Analysis)*, June 1978: 3-6, 73-5 under the title ‘The Bankrupt, Corrupt, Degenerate Leadership of the ANC of South Africa’.


4. Author’s notes of Mantashe’s speech at Sabalele and Queenstown on 10 April 2008. The speech was in isiXhosa and English and I am grateful to Vuyani Mqingwana for the translation of an isiXhosa word for ‘mutiny’. I am also grateful to Jeff Peires for the invitation to attend.


8. National Archives of Zambia, FA1/114, ‘Relations with Botswana’. A number of ZAPU, ANC and PAC prisoners were cleared for transit to Zambia between 13 and 27 December 1968.

9. Simons Papers, University of Cape Town, interview with Ray Simons by ‘M. V.’ [male voice], 25 November 1997; ‘Conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry into the incidents at Roma Township’, as quoted in ANC (African Nationalists) *In Defence of the African Image and Heritage* (Dar Es Salaam, February 1976), p 35. There does not appear to be a copy of the original report in the ANC archives at Fort Hare. Only three copies were originally produced and the chairman John Pule Motshabi believed that the report, which may have been critical of Joe Modise, was deliberately suppressed.

10. Duma Nokwe (1927-78), advocate and ANC activist, Treason Trial, 1956, left South Africa with Moses Kotane in 1963. ANC secretary-general, and head of departments of information and publicity, and security, but removed from these positions and from the national executive committee, (NEC) at Morogoro Conference in 1969. Later reinstated to NEC and appointed deputy secretary-general.
11. Vuyiswa Nokwe (circa 1930-2008), Fort Hare science graduate, 1951, married Duma Nokwe in 1955. She left South Africa in 1964. After working for Amiran in an unspecified capacity, she worked as a secondary school teacher in Zambia until 1991. There was until 1973 an Israeli embassy in Zambia. After that date Amiran continued to function and was widely regarded as an Israeli embassy in all but name. There is little reason to doubt that it did have links with Israeli intelligence.


13. Martin Thembisile Hani, also known as Chris Nkosana or Skosana (1942-93). Born Sabalele, Cofimvaba, Transkei, Fort Hare (Rhodes University) graduate in classics, left South Africa in 1962, while under a sentence of eighteen months imprisonment. A political commissar during the Wankie campaign – imprisoned in Botswana, 1967-8. Expelled from the ANC in March 1969. Reinstated to the ANC in May/June 1969 and soon afterwards to the commissariat, though he soon resigned from that position. He eventually became chief-of-staff of MK and general secretary of the SACP.

14. Z. R. (Jeqe) Mbengwa – MK name of Jeqe Buthelezi. He came from Natal and was in the intelligence department. He did not fight in Wankie campaign but was a member of the military headquarters with an intelligence role. He was expelled from the ANC in March 1969 and reinstated with Chris Hani in May/June 1969. He was alleged by Oliver Tambo to be under the influence of Ambrose Makiwane and to be the leader of a breakaway faction of MK in 1970. He was expelled from the ANC for the second time, with about thirty others, in Lusaka in September 1970.

15. Goitsimolimo Leonard (also known as Bruce) Pitso. Came from Transvaal. May be Fort Hare (Rhodes University) graduate. He did not serve in the Wankie campaign. He was expelled from the ANC in March 1969 and reinstated in May/June 1969. Later a Major-General in the South African National Defence Force and South African ambassador to Vietnam.

16. Ntabenkosi Fipaza, MK name of Wilson Mbali. Was a male nurse and served as a medical officer, entering Rhodesia in that capacity. He was expelled from the ANC in March 1969 and reinstated in May/June 1969. He was expelled from the ANC for a second time in September 1970 with Jeqe Buthelezi and about thirty others who defied orders to move from Lusaka to a bush camp.
17. Wilmot Hempe did not fight in the Wankie campaign, but was a member of the political commissariat. He was expelled from the ANC in March 1969 and reinstated in May/June 1969. He was then reappointed to the commissariat, but resigned after pressure from the ‘Transvaal comrades’.

18. Tamana Gobozi (Mikza) – also known as Alfred Khombisa – expelled from ANC in March 1969 and reinstated in May/June 1969.

19. G.S. Mose (Jackson) Mlenze, a veteran of the Wankie campaign, and a member of the political commissariat. He was imprisoned in Botswana with Chris Hani, 1967-8. He was expelled from the ANC in March 1969 and reinstated in May/June 1969. He was also appointed to the Lusaka military headquarters soon afterwards, but resigned after protests from the ‘Transvaal comrades’. He entered South Africa on a military mission with Gardner Sijake and others in June 1972. He was arrested and was a state witness in the trial of Alexander Moumbaris and five others in 1973.

20. Tennyson Xola Makiwane (1933-80), treason trialist, journalist, and NEC member. He was ANC chief representative in Zambia, 1965-8. Opposed the opening of the ANC to members of all races at Morogoro Conference in 1969. He was dropped from the NEC in that year and was expelled from the ANC as one of eight ANC (African Nationalists) in 1975. He was assassinated in Umtata, probably by a member of the ANC, in 1980.


24. Mzwandile (Mzwai) Piliso (1923-96), then a member of the NEC, later head of the security department, 1979-86.

25. Author’s interview with Livingstone Mqotsi, East London, 25 May 2008; for the allegation that the memorandum was instigated by Mqotsi see interview with Ray Simons, 25 November 1997, as above.

26. Transcript of interview with Chris Hani by Wolfie Kodesh, 1 April 1993, Mayibuye Archives, University of Western Cape.
27. Undated, unsigned and untitled draft of addendum to ‘Grounds of appeal...in the matter of expulsion from the African National Congress of South Africa’, Simons papers, University of Cape Town.

28. ‘Grounds of appeal and addendum thereto’.

29. Jonas Dinous Matlou (1920-?), treason trialist, member of the NEC, expelled from the ANC with seven other ANC (African Nationalists) in 1975.


32. ‘Grounds of appeal and addendum thereto’.


34. Notes of author’s interviews with Ray Simons and information from Johan Simons; notes of author’s interview with Livingstone Mqotsi, East London, 25 May 2008; transcript of Wolfie Kodesh’s taped interview with Chris Hani, Mayibuye Centre, Cape Town. In her interview with ‘M.V’, 25, 27 November 1997, as above, Ray Simons suggests that these events took place in February 1969, in which case the plot was contemporaneous with the first tribunal.


36. Ambrose Mzimkhulu Makiwane (1921-circa 2005), Fort Hare graduate, member of the NEC. He was suspended from the NEC in March 1969 and never reinstated. He was expelled from the ANC as one of the eight ANC (African Nationalists) in 1975. He was readmitted to the ANC in the late 1980s and died at Cala in the Transkei.

37. Alfred Kgokong (Temba Mqota) (1928-?), head of ANC department of information and publicity, London, member of the NEC, suspended in March 1969. Expelled from the ANC in 1975 as one of the eight ANC (African Nationalists). He was readmitted to the ANC in the late 1980s.


39. Tambo Papers, Box 4, undated and untitled notebook, ‘Comrade Modisane’, f. 32. (The foliation is my own).

40. J. B. Marks (1903-72), a very senior and highly respected member of the ANC and the SACP. He became chairman of the SACP in 1969 and died in Moscow in 1972.
41. Moses Mabhida (1923-86), senior member of the ANC, SACP and SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions), at this time was chief political commissar of MK and was based at Morogoro. He later became general secretary of the SACP.

42. ANC Archives, Lusaka 2/3/3, untitled manuscript notes of discussions at Morogoro Conference, 28 April to 1 May 1969, ff. 1-16.

43. Tambo Papers, Box 31, ‘Statement on the relationship between the ANC (South Africa) and M. K.’, no signature and no date. From internal evidence the date must be 1971 and the author is Tambo.

44. Mayibuye Centre, Cape Town, transcript of Wolfie Kodesh’s interview with Chris Hani, 1 April 1993.


46. I am very grateful to Livingstone Mqotsi for supplying me with a copy of the Memorandum. I found a second copy of the Memorandum in the unsorted section of the Simons papers. There are no differences in the text but there are slight differences in the style of the signatures.

47. The Star Furniture Company remained an ANC business in Lusaka until the end of the exile era.


49. Probably Zwelinjavi Matthews and Otto Bafana Msomi – the nature of the incident in which they were involved is unknown to the author.

50. Joseph Cotton, MK name of a son of Moses Kotane, see below.

51. Shadrack Tladi, MK name of a relative of Thabo More (Joe Modise).

52. Boy Otto, MK name, real identity unknown – he was in Lusaka under this name in 1970.

53. Moses Kotane (1905-78), long-serving general secretary of the Communist Party of South Africa and of the South African Communist Party (SACP), and treasurer-general of the ANC.

54. Zola Zembe (1928-present), MK name of Archie Sibeko, MK commander and South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) activist, author with Joyce Leeson of Freedom in Our Lifetime (2000). The reference is to his trial by a tribunal at the instigation of Tennyson Makiwane for an alleged breach of security in Lusaka in 1968.
55. Wellington Mbata came from the Transvaal. The nature of the case in which he was involved is not known, but he was one of about thirty members of the ANC and MK who were expelled in Lusaka in September 1970 for allegedly defying orders to move from town to a bush camp. See also notes on Jeque Buthelezi and Wilson Mbali below.

56. Johannes Phalanyane, the MK name of Jack Ramusi – according to Tennyson Makiwane (The ‘bogus letter of expulsion’) this was a murder case.

57. Presumably Solomon Bophela, also known as Mkholiso Mukali, an MK member who returned to South Africa from Tanzania in 1965-6 and, after returning to Zambia, was detained by the ANC in Lusaka with the help of ZAPU in October 1967. He was tried as an alleged spy and sentenced to death by an ANC tribunal in Lilanda township, Lusaka. He was taken to Livingstone but escaped with several bullet wounds from a botched execution. He was handed over by villagers to the Zambian police who kept him under armed guard in Livingstone Hospital. He was later returned to South Africa. See file in National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka, MHA1/6/33.

58. Daphne Zwane, one of very few women in MK, was, after an alleged clash with Joe Modise, imprisoned in a ‘dugout’ filled with water for twenty-two days at Kaluwa Camp near Lusaka early in 1969. Alfred Sipetho Willie says that he was responsible for her release. She later married Zolile Nqose, an MK commander, and died in London. This case seems to have been one of the immediate triggers for the writing of the memorandum. (Notes of author’s interviews with Alfred Sipetho Willie (MK name, Alfred Mfamana), Cape Town, 2008).

59. Tallman Ndlovu is believed to have left the ANC in Tanzania and may have been granted political asylum in Sweden. (Information from Alfred Sipetho Willie, as above.)

60. Bob Zulu, a member of the Lusaka-based military headquarters, was killed with Flag Boshielo and two others while crossing the Caprivi Strip in an ill-fated attempt to ‘go home’ in August 1970.

61. Erends was in the Tanzanian camps but his full identity is unknown.

62. Joseph Spoe Ndlovu was killed in an unknown battle during the Wankie campaign in 1967.

63. A reference to James Jobe Hadebe, chief representative of the ANC in East Africa and a member of the NEC, who resigned from the ANC’s ‘external mission’ in December 1967.

64. The word ‘bogus’ has been inserted in the same hand in both copies of the Memorandum to which I have had access. Thabo Mbeki (1942-present), after studying at Sussex University, 1962-6, on a scholarship provided by SACHED (South African Committee for Higher Education), which was set up by the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Mbeki was was secretary of the African Students Association inside South Africa before going into exile.
and involved in the establishment of the ANC Youth and Students Section, a non-racial organisation, in Europe in the later 1960s.

65. Patrick Mosedi (or Molawa), former president of the ANC Youth League, was killed in action during the Sipolilo campaign on 18 March 1968.

66. Benson Ntsele was killed in action during the Sipolilo campaign on 21 March 1968.

67. Sparks Moloi was killed in action during the second battle of the Wankie campaign on 21 August 1968.

68. Christopher Mampuru was killed in action during the first battle of the Wankie campaign on 13 August 1967.

69. James Masimini or Masimeni was killed in action during the first battle of the Sipolilo campaign on 13 March 1968.

70. Andries Motsepe was killed in action during the first battle of the Wankie campaign on 13 August 1968.

71. Vuyisile Mini (1920-64), singer, actor, composer of songs, trade unionist and early member of MK in Port Elizabeth, was executed in 1964. For an account of his life see ‘Vuyisile Mini’, *Dawn, Journal of Mkhonto we Sizwe*, 25th anniversary number, no date [1986], p.19.

72. Zinakile Mkhaba (1929-64) was executed with Mini in 1964.

73. Diliza Khayingo (Wilson Khayinga) (1926-64) was also executed with Mini in 1964.


75. Alfred Mninzi (James Harmanus) left South Africa in 1962. He was captured during the first battle of the Wankie campaign in August 1967. He was sentenced to death in Rhodesia, reprieved, and released in 1980. He died after his return to South Africa.

76. Bothwell (also known as Bottle) Tamana, son of Dora Tamana, was captured during the Wankie campaign, sentenced to death in Rhodesia, reprieved, and released in 1980. He died in exile in 1984.

77. Rhodes Msuthu Ngamlana (Charles Mhambi) was killed in action in the third battle of the Wankie campaign on 22 August 1967. It is probable that the authors of the memorandum were unaware of his death.

78. Thula Bopela (correct spelling) was captured during the Sipolilo campaign, sentenced to death in Rhodesia, reprieved, and released in 1980. He is the co-author, with DalUXolo Luthuli, of *Umkhonto weSizwe: fighting for a divided people* (Alberton: Galago, 2005).
References


