

Min. Retelling of notes of the summit (1.4.2)

Angola docs (3)

TOP SECRET

1/28/2

2) At least up to the 1st of Jan in
work of 15/1/85, en 15/1/85 (UNITA)
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Copy no 4. of 6..

ST/310/4/KASSALA/2/3

MINUTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN DR CHESTER CROCKER AND DR SAVIMBI IN CAPE TOWN ON 11 FEBRUARY 1985

PRESENT

1. SADF (as observers)

- a. Lt Gen P.W. van der Westhuizen.
- b. Brig C.J. van Tonder.
- c. Col M. Oelschig.

2. UNITA

- a. Dr J.M. Savimbi.
- b. Brig M. N'Zau Puna.
- c. Lt Col Jacinto.

3. USA

- a. Dr Chester Crocker.
- b. Ambassador H. Nickel.
- c. Mr Robert Galbard.
- d. Mr E. Pecous.
- e. Mr P. Eicher.

DISCUSSION

4. Both leaders expressed their pleasure at the meeting. Crocker introduced a new member of his team, Peter Eicher, who is on the State Departments section of International Organisations. He then invited dr Savimbi to lead off the discussion.

5. Dr Savimbi replied that he preferred for Crocker to start but that he would like to clear up a misunderstanding. Jerry Chitunda had informed from Washington that he had seen Crocker before his departure for the RSA. Crocker had said that the purpose of his visit was to convey the MPLA counter-proposals to the RSA Government and that he would not be seeing UNITA. He however told his South African friends that he would be available to speak with dr Crocker if this was requested. That is why he was present.

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6. Jerry Chitunda in Washington reports on all meetings he has and Savimbi is kept informed of all developments. The situation in Angola remains very much the same with UNITA in an extremely favourable position. Dr Savimbi wished, however, to make two important observations :

- a. Firstly. UNITA remains sceptical about MPLA's intention to withdraw the Cubans and to send them back. The MPLA should make efforts at solving their major problem, that of negotiating with UNITA. MPLA should not be so touchy about negotiating with UNITA as this is bound to happen sooner or later. UNITA wants to take Luanda and will succeed in doing so in spite of the Cuban presence. The recent UNITA Congress decided to take Luanda and the leaders and forces have been sent to accomplish this. UNITA prefers, however, to prevent bloodshed and are prepared to talk to the MPLA at any time. UNITA has not changed its position, but the MPLA are closing themselves in by adopting an impossible position.
- b. Interrupting, dr Crocker asked if this burning issue of discussions or negotiations was a positive development. Is there a sign of response in the ranks of the MPLA?

7. Dr Savimbi replied, saying that there are two distinct lines of thought within the MPLA. The hard liners are still insisting on a military solution and are preparing for new offensives aimed at destroying UNITA. They will not succeed. The moderates say NO. We have information that this matter was discussed extensively during their recent congress at the end of which there was still no conclusion. The positive development is that the MPLA are talking openly about negotiations with UNITA.

8. Bob Galbard stated that this analysis corresponded with that of the USA. There is no clear "winner" amongst the various groups within the MPLA and Dos Santos is biding his time, waiting for the dominant faction to emerge.

9. Continuing, and raising his second point, dr Savimbi said :

- a. Castro wants to get out of Angola. His problem is how and when.
- b. UNITA is simply asking that their role in the Angolan situation should be clearly stated and placed on the table.
- c. UNITA is, theoretically, in the same position as SWAPO but in reality they are far more. UNITA has its own liberated territory which is defended, developed and organised.

11. d. UNITA is a valid and relevant factor and must be recognised.
- e. Savimbi is seriously concerned by the tendency of the negotiating parties (USA and RSA) to be extremely cautious in their dealings with the MPLA. Nothing is said or done which could "jeopardise" the talks and all sorts of accommodations and compromises are being made to satisfy the MPLA.
- f. This state of affairs is leading to serious concern and frustration in the ranks of UNITA and is also having a detrimental effect on certain African friends of UNITA.
- g. The tendency of being so careful with the MPLA in fact constitutes a retreat.
- h. The UNITA leadership appreciates dr Crocker's meeting with them and will always be prepared to meet. UNITA is not a pro-Western movement, it is pro-Angolan. They consider themselves to be friends of the USA but do not wish to model themselves after the USA. UNITA is a friend of the US but wants to do what they can for Angola and Angolans.
- j. Therefore, UNITA is waiting for a sign from the Americans. Who is it that the USA supports, the MPLA or UNITA? The situation is changing rapidly, especially since UNITA has began operating in and around Luanda, in Cuanza-Norte and Uige. Things are changing and talks with the MPLA will take place soon.
- k. Dr Savimbi very clearly said to dr Crocker "We are not asking for your recognition. We are telling you that non-recognition could become a problem".
10. Concluding his observations dr Savimbi said :
- a. UNITA thinks that dr Crocker is doing his best and that his aims are good.
- b. What UNITA does not understand is how they (the USA) are going to approach and solve the problem of UNITA.
- c. Getting the Cubans out of Angola is a very good idea, but how does the USA intend dealing with the problem of UNITA? UNITA wants to assist in solving the problem.
- d. There are many pressing problems around the globe - here in Africa. The Eritrean problem, for example, will continue for a very long time. The one place where the US can be assured of victory is in Angola.

11. Dr Crocker replied as follows :

- a. He agreed on the analysis of the situation in Angola.
- b. The MPLA is having tremendous difficulty in taking decisions. They must be faced with unavoidable decisions and we must shape their choices.
- c. The US shares UNITA's view that negotiation is essential. The "how" is the problem.
- d. Dos Santos is clearly the leader of the MPLA and has the power to take decisions. He must be convinced to negotiate with UNITA.
- e. The USA is a global power and as such must consider how all the pieces, on a global scale, fit together. The Soviet interests must also be taken into consideration.
- f. The Soviets in Angola are on the defensive, thanks to our common efforts (RSA, USA, UNITA). The Soviets can provide the MPLA with more hardware, but the MPLA need more than that.
- g. The Soviets are not talking about a military solution in Angola but neither do they have a clear policy. At present their leadership is weak, but this could change drastically in the short term. We must therefore take the opportunities which are presented to us.
- h. 1985 is the year to force the pace.
- j. Regarding Castro. Once he had accepted that President Reagan was the recognised leader of the USA he began sending out signals of easing Cuban relations with the USA. He is now "feeling the heat" in Central America and in Africa. His latest statements and declarations are signs that he is preparing the ground for withdrawal from Angola.

12. k. Castro, by publicly speaking about the Cuban role in Angola and possible withdrawal of his forces is "seeking to get on our train". He is now accepting that there can be no military solution and wants to become part of the negotiating process. The USA is not encouraging this. Castro will only seek to complicate matters. The writing is, however on the wall, and there will have to be negotiations to solve the problem of Angola.
- l. The Zaïre Factor. The MPLA, in their latest proposals, appear to have divided Angola into two parts,

- North and South. By doing this they "recognise" that the South is in UNITA's hands, but it is clear that they are extremely concerned about the security situation in the North, the reason for the retention of the Cubans in this part of the country. There is also growing concern for their security from Zaïre. The Soviets tried to complicate the issue by declaring that the USA and RSA are planning a combined attack on Angola from Zaïre. When this report reached Mobutu he expelled the Russian Ambassador to Kinshasa. Instead of deviding Angola and Zaïre, the Soviets have merely succeeded in bringing them together.
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policy.
- m. Mobutu is UNITA's best friend in Africa. He is presently in a very strong position and can follow two courses viz :
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achieved.
- i. Government to government relations with Angola.
15. Dr Savimbi interrupted Brig Puna with the following observations
- ii. Open support for UNITA.
- n. Mobutu is now in an excellent position to play a more prominent regional role, and should be helped and encouraged. The fact that Zaïre is in such a fortunate position, is due to all our combined efforts and especially to UNITA's strong position in North-Eastern Angola.
- b. as its differences with the RSA e.g. on the recent release of Talvo but discussions are always
- p. How does dr Savimbi think Zaïre and Mobutu should be used?
- c. All UNITA wants to say is that the door should not be
- q. The position regarding negotiations on Cuban troop withdrawal, is at an extremely delicate stage. The RSA considers the MPLA proposals for withdrawal as a "war plan" and not a "peace plan", and vice versa. However, we must think of ways and means to persuade the MPLA to accept an accelerated movement of Cubans in line with RSA thinking.
16. Puna
- a. with Angola is controlled by UNITA, yet Kaunda maintains his relations with MPLA
- r. The question of exactly when to introduce UNITA as a factor is not an easy question to answer.
- b. Most African governments in the area are legal, elected
12. Brig Puna then made the following observations :
- a. UNITA is suspicious of US motives in Africa.
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out.
- b. The US should merely put itself into the shoes of UNITA and determine how they would react to pressure from their people to prove that they are not being betrayed by the US.
- c. What proof does UNITA have that the US is indeed a friend? How does one convince the people of this if there is no proof?

d. UNITA has nothing against Dr Crocker as a person and have great respect and appreciation for his efforts. One should however take note of the lessons of history which show that peoples have in the past been deserted by their allies and friends.

13. Dr Crocker asked whether UNITA had problems in understanding the US policies regarding Southern Africa and UNITA or whether the problem lay in explaining the US position and policies to UNITA supporters. In any event the US was attempting to solve several problems within the framework of their Southern Africa policy.

14. Puna replied, saying that in general "public opinion" in Angola does not understand USA goals and how they are to be achieved.

15. Dr Savimbi interrupted brig Puna with the following observations :

- a. The RSA in no way prescribes to UNITA how to run the war or what to do. There are no South Africans "advising" Savimbi or "suggesting" to UNITA how to deal with the situation in Angola.
- b. UNITA has its differences with the RSA e.g. on the recent release of Toivo but discussions are always frank and open.
- c. All UNITA wants to say is that the door should not be shut on them without warning. UNITA needs some sign to indicate that there is no intention of shutting the door.

16. Puna continued, saying :

- a. Zambia's entire border with Angola is controlled by UNITA, yet Kaunda maintains his relations with MPLA while ignoring UNITA.
- b. Most African governments in the area are legal, elected by their people. Who elected the MPLA? They are an illegal government in Angola, but the world pretends that they are legal.

17. Dr Crocker explained that the US position is very difficult. The MPLA accuse the USA of every possible sin. They do this because they know they are being forced into a box. On the other hand, there are also conflicting reports about UNITA's position and the US sometimes has the impression that UNITA is less confident of victory than they claim to be. Whatever the case, UNITA will be far better off with the Cubans leaving or out.

The leaders of UNITA are finding it extremely difficult

18. Dr Savimbi assured dr Crocker that UNITA was presently in an extremely favourable position and went on to explain the extent of popular support for UNITA in the Northern Provinces of Cuanza Norte, Bengo and Uige. He then went on to describe how UNITA would approach the problem of national reconciliation viz :

- a. Opportunists and bandits would be removed.
- b. There will be a debate on the future of Angola, involving all the traditional and natural groupings in the country. The MPLA thought that Luanda was Angola. They are wrong. If anyone disregards the rest of Angola and the natural forces within the country they will not win.
- c. As UNITA has expanded into the Northern areas of Angola they have been surprised and overwhelmed by the support of the people, even in areas which were always traditionally MPLA and FNLA. This is because they are tired of misery and war. Everyone in Angola is now longing for peace. This must be achieved through open debate. UNITA is for dialogue.

21. Dr Crocker expressed his interest in the Administration's recovery in the US about the Administration's recovery in the US

19. Regarding Zaïre, Savimbi expressed himself as follows :

- a. Mobutu is a political survivor, but he has a vision for Southern Africa. He himself will decide on what he can do and his decision will be based on political reality.
- b. Zaïre has an extremely long border with Angola, the security of which is essential for Zaïre's survival.
- c. UNITA has never used Zaïre's territory for attacks against Angola, even though Dos Santos accused Mobutu of allowing UNITA to do so.
- d. Kaunda sent a message to Savimbi stating that he was not prepared to receive a UNITA envoy as he "wishes to remain loyal to the young man (Dos Santos)". Mobutu/MPLA relations are different. Mobutu tells them that he is a friend of UNITA, but still retains his relations with Angola (MPLA).

20. Turning to the question of US/UNITA relations Savimbi said that :

- a. The US government is accountable to the people (referred to as the constituency by Savimbi). The same accountability applies to UNITA.

22. b. The leaders of UNITA are finding it extremely difficult to explain US relations with UNITA to the people, to the military commanders, to the woman and youth organisations. They cannot understand why UNITA is not being recognised as an important and integral part of the negotiations for the future of Angola. UNITA needs some sign from the USA, a sign which will indicate that UNITA is recognised and involved. //
- c. UNITA's minimum requirement is that the US should admit that regular contact is being made with UNITA and that developments in Angola are being discussed with them. The US is accused of doing so, so why not admit it. //
23. d. UNITA wants fairness in US dealings. Dr Crocker and his team are very cautious of upsetting the MPLA, but what about UNITA. UNITA is getting no credit, yet they have paid in blood for the favourable situation which we are now experiencing. This is extremely unfair and the UNITA constituency must be appeased. //

21. Dr Crocker replied to Savimbi as follows :

- a. There is controversy in the US about the Administrations handling of Southern Africa. Nevertheless the President is positive and has given a firm message to the critics that current policy is to be maintained. The State Departments policy and strategy for Southern Africa is, therefore, on track despite strong opposition and criticism.
- b. Dr Crocker and his team are in contact with all UNITA's friends in Africa and they are given clear information on developments in Angola. The US will continue to do so.
- c. UNITA also has some "key friends" e.g. Mobutu and these are told very clearly what US/UNITA relations are.
- d. Even the Western Powers know what the situation is and whole heartedly support the US initiatives.
- e. The US has however taken note of what UNITA has said and will investigate new ways of clearing up the position. //
- f. In conclusion, dr Savimbi and UNITA should accept that the MPLA are fully aware of US/UNITA contact and relations. The US keeps the MPLA informed about their meetings. //

22. Dr Savimbi restated UNITA's insistence on some form of recognition. He said that this could be accomplished by getting some US official in Europe, for example, to say that the US and UNITA "are talking". UNITA has a special team of people who listen to and analyse all statements and reports relevant to UNITA and Angola. No mention has ever been made of any meetings with UNITA. Replying to Mr Galbard's interjection that Mr Casey of the CIA had recently made a public reference to the US support of UNITA, Dr Savimbi stated that he was not aware of the statement.

INTERRUPTION

23. The meeting, having lasted one and a half hours, was interrupted for a meeting between Dr Savimbi and Minister R.F. Botha.

24. Separate notes on this meeting are available.

CONTINUATION

25. The encounter between Dr Savimbi and Dr Crocker was continued on a far more informal basis and the two leaders had private talks which lasted approximately one hour.

26. On completion of the meeting Dr Savimbi reported on his private talks with Dr Crocker as follows :

- a. Dr Crocker stated that the MPLA are to be approached with the following proposal :
 - i. 20,000 Cuban troops are sent back to Cuba within seven months of the implementation of UNR 435.
 - ii. At this time RSA troop strength will have been reduced to 1,500.
 - iii. In the 4 - 5 month period required to write the new constitution, plans will be finalised for the withdrawal of the remaining Cubans.
- b. Crocker's team was preparing to return to Washington from where they would proceed to Luanda to put the proposal to the MPLA.
- c. Dr Savimbi stated that there was a risk that the MPLA would go back on their word and retain the Cubans once the RSA troops had withdrawn. Another problem was the exact number of Cubans present in Angola and the exact nature of their tasks.
- d. Dr Crocker replied that the figure of 30,000 Cubans was jointly agreed upon between Dr Crocker's team and Gen van der Westhuizen.

- e. Dr Savimbi restated his conviction that the MPLA wanted independence in SWA in order to attack UNITA from the rear. Dr Savimbi then asked dr Crocker what he thought of Dos Santos.
- f. Dr Crocker replied that Dos Santos is a strong man, undoubtedly the leader of his party and in a good position in Luanda and Angola.
- g. Dr Savimbi disagreed, pointing out that UNITA had paralysed the communications in Angola, has surrounded Luanda and is present in the City. He asked dr Crocker if he believed this.
- h. Dr Crocker replied that he believed this to be true as his own men travel to Luanda regularly. Dr Crocker then warned UNITA against attacking US interests in Angola, saying that it would only damage UNITA's own position. The US administration is facing strong opposition in the USA and in Europe as it appears that US and Western interests are being threatened. Dr Crocker asked if he could go back to the USA and say that US interests in Angola are safe.
- j. Dr Savimbi replied that it was not UNITA's policy to attack US or Western interests and that everything would be done to ensure that such persons and their property would be protected. However, almost 90% of Angola is now a war zone and people living there could become involved. This is a risk which is taken in a country which is at war. UNITA has already started operating in Cabinda as it is an integral part of Angola. The Cabindans also want to get rid of the Cubans and are supporting UNITA in the struggle.
- k. Dr Crocker then said that he will return to the US with the impression that US interests in Cabinda are to be attacked. Dr Savimbi replied that he should return with the impression that there is war in Angola and that Cabinda is an integral part of Angola.
27. During the meeting Mr Pecous also spoke privately to dr Savimbi. It was agreed that contact between UNITA and the CIA should be developed and that an exchange of information and intelligence was vital. The practical implementation of future co-operation would be decided at a next meeting. CID

PRETORIA
15 February, 1985.