

THE NINETEENTH ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLE
MEMORIAL LECTURE

SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT:
THE CHALLENGE OF THE
TRANSKEI

DELIVERED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
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by

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A LECTURE entitled the Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture (in memory of the late Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, President of the South African Institute of Race Relations from 1934 to 1943 and of his wife, the late Winifred Hoernlé, President of the Institute from 1948 to 1950, and again from 1953 to 1954), is delivered once a year under the auspices of the Institute. An invitation to deliver the Lecture is extended to some person having special knowledge and experience of racial problems in Africa and elsewhere.

It is hoped that the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture provides a platform for constructive and helpful contributions to thought and action. While the lecturers are entirely free to express their own views, which may not be those of the Institute as expressed in its formal decisions, it is hoped that lecturers will be guided by the Institute's declaration of policy that 'scientific study and research must be allied with the fullest recognition of the human reactions to changing racial situations; that respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and usages of various national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the population; and that due account must be taken of opposing views earnestly held.'

Previous lecturers have been the Rt. Hon. J. H. Hofmeyr (*Christian Principles and Race Problems*), Dr. E. G. Malherbe (*Race Attitudes and Education*), Prof. W. M. Macmillan (*Africa Beyond the Union*), Dr. the Hon. E. H. Brookes (*We Come of Age*), Prof. I. D. MacCrone (*Group Conflicts and Race Prejudices*), Mrs. A. W. Hoernlé (*Penal Reform and Race Relations*), Dr. H. J. van Eck (*Some Aspects of the Industrial Revolution*), Prof. S. Herbert Frankel (*Some Reflections on Civilization in Africa*), Prof. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (*Outlook for Africa*), Dr. Emory Ross (*Colour and Christian Community*), Vice-Chancellor T. B. Davie (*Education and Race Relations in South Africa*), Prof. Gordon W. Allport (*Prejudice in Modern Perspective*), Prof. B. B. Keet (*The Ethics of Apartheid*), Dr. David Thomson (*The Government of Divided Communities*), Dr. Simon Biesheuvel (*Race, Culture and Personality*), Dr. C. W. de Kiewiet (*Can Africa Come of Age?*), Prof. D. V. Cowen (*Liberty, Equality, Faternity—Today*) and the Rev. Denis E. Hurley, Archbishop of Durban (*Apartheid: A Crisis of the Christian Conscience*).

SEPARATE development is no longer merely a theory; since the Transkei became a semi-autonomous territory in December, 1963, separate territorial development has begun to take form in practice. It is not too early to begin to examine its characteristics and to speculate on their meaning. Is the Transkeian type of development only an imposed measure of decentralisation, or does it represent the first step in what may ultimately be a far-reaching partition of South African territory? Is it a new kind of cover for African control and repression, or has it possibilities of establishing those 'areas of liberty' of which Dr Hoernlé himself once spoke? More broadly still: Could separate territorial development jointly and freely planned and carried out by whites and Africans provide an atmosphere within which society in southern Africa would shed discrimination and establish non-racial standards?

No concept used in South Africa has been turned to more varied purposes in the past than that of separate development. Intellectuals and church leaders, particularly among Afrikaner nationalists, have seen in separate development a means to provide Africans with their own area within which to develop freely according to their own will, thereby salving white consciences troubled by the overt discrimination against Africans in the so-called white areas of the country. Others have looked to separate development as a means of distracting nationalistic Africans from their country-wide objectives. Some support separate development as the most promising way of diverting the criticisms of racial discrimination made by outside countries. There have even been and are a few Africans, notably those who can expect to benefit personally from newly provided local opportunities, who are prepared to accept a partial territorial separation as an alternative to a white-controlled, legally-enforced national system of colour and racial discrimination.

What developments in the Transkei have done is to take the theory of separate development into the arena of action where it can be weighed and measured. Thus the expectations and objectives of those who have supported the theory of separate development for their own particular

purposes and aims can now be evaluated with a touchstone of reality. In other words, what has been permitted and is to be expected in the Transkei and other areas for which separate development is planned by the government, provides concrete evidence with which to consider whether the system as instituted so far and projected has potentialities for achieving any of the end results that have been, or are hoped for from it.

Before turning to the current situation, let us look back briefly at earlier white and African responses to the notion of separate territorial development for the purpose of setting the stage on which current actions are being carried out. The fact that most of the words I will now cite come from Afrikaner bodies or government sources reflects the fact that separate development has received its most serious and continued theoretical consideration in these quarters and that the latter are intimately associated with or possess the national sources of political power. This balance of words is not intended in any way, however, to overshadow the crucial importance of the majority of Africans who, for a time at least, will be the most affected by any policies of separate development. Nor is there any intent to play down the concern of still a third set of parties that care deeply about what may take place in South Africa: This is, the countries represented in the United Nations, including my own, that over a long period of time, and with varying degrees of humility and patience, have sought to secure the reduction and ultimate abolition of those features of South African law that not only permit, but in practice enforce racial discrimination.

In looking now at some of the earlier Afrikaner statements on separate development, there is no claim that they represent the totality, or even a majority of reactions in that community. On the contrary, it is likely that they reflect the thinking of rather special groups, although groups that have felt particularly deeply on the subject. Most South African whites, it seems evident, have rarely thought seriously in terms of transferring unrestricted political power to Africans in substantial areas of the country, but rather of continued white control regardless of what African areas might be developed. Yet in the progression of theoretical statements about separate development, the ultimate implications of the concept were borne in on at least some persons. Indeed the wide spectrum of Afrikaner thinking on this subject is not the least significant aspect of its consideration.

One of the earliest statements on separate territorial development was included in the 1942 draft republican constitution that declared in Article IX, Section 2:

To each of such segregated race groups of Coloured subjects in the Republic, self-government will be granted within their own territory under the central management of the general government of the country, in accordance with the fitness of the group for the carrying out such self-government for which they will have to be systematically trained.¹

A further encouragement to the concept of autonomous African development came from the mammoth 1944 people's congress of 200 Afrikaner organisations on the race question called by the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge. One of the key speakers, Dr E. G. Jansen, who became the first Minister of Native Affairs in Dr Malan's Cabinet in 1948, declared:

It is time the Afrikaner policy of separate development be given a chance to be put into practice . . . it will have to be a system based on the principle that whites and nonwhites should develop separately and be treated separately.²

The Reverend J. G. Strydom carried this proposal a step further by advocating that African tribes should be developed into Christian-National units in their own areas. Moreover, this proposal was not limited to him. Significantly the congress conceded a measure of African autonomy in its resolution

that it is the Christian duty of the whites to act as guardians of the nonwhite races until such time as they reach the stage of being able to manage their own affairs.³

But the central issue considered was not what kind of dispensation the Africans should receive, nor how gradually to end white trusteeship, but on immediate methods for differentiating them by statute.

Typical of the dualism of Afrikaner thinking at this time was a resolution of the 1944 Transvaal NGK Synod that only through racial apartheid 'could the coloured and black races . . . achieve the highest possible level of racial independence.' But 'independence' was to be qualified by white trusteeship. 'The policy of the Church,' they stated, 'is founded on the principles of Christianity which support the policy of racial separation and guardianship of whites over the native.'⁴

(1) The full text of the draft constitution is Appendix B of the International Commission of Jurists Report, *South Africa and A Rule of Law*.

(2) *Inspan*, October, 1944.

(3) *Ibid.*

(4) NGK newsletter in issues immediately following the Synod.

Others foresaw, however, that it would not always be possible to limit African self-expression in separate areas by white control. By far the most articulate of the group that looked so far was Professor G. Cronje. In 1948, he predicted the inevitable demise of guardianship and its replacement by black autonomy. 'While the execution of guardianship means that the Bantu must develop under the guidance of the white man, he wrote, 'it must be considered that the logical development of this will eventually end in emancipation, maturity and self-determination.'

Toward the end of the 1940's, thinking about the Africans' political future by intellectuals and theologians converged. In 1947, the Dutch Reformed Church in a national congress on the theme of 'Our Church and the Colour Question,' urged more territory for the Africans where they 'could achieve the right to govern themselves and advance to the highest positions.'

Meanwhile, Dr Malan's general election manifesto of 1948 committed the party to 'the ultimate ideal of total apartheid.' It declared:

The principle of territorial segregation between whites and natives is, in general, accepted The native reserves must become the true fatherland of the native A greater variety of economic undertakings will gradually be established to bring greater stability and productivity in the reserves.

The issue was dramatically brought to a head in 1950 when the three sister churches of the Dutch Reformed Church, together with their mission offshoots, at a special Bloemfontein Congress, committed themselves to territorial separation in its most radical form. As a corollary the Congress rejected ultimate integration on the ground that it would lead to unnecessary clashes between the two races—white and black—to the great disadvantage of Christian civilisation in South Africa. Calling on Prime Minister D. F. Malan to define clearly the long-term constitutional development of Africans, the Congress declared, 'In his own areas, the Bantu must be guided in accordance with his own national background [and] fertilised by Christian civilisation to develop to full nationhood.'

These proposals, with their revolutionary overtones of African sovereignty and the partition of the economy, were judged premature at that time by the Nationalist party. While accepting total separation as a final ideal, Malan rejected it as economically impracticable. More cold water was thrown on the plan by Advocate J. G. Strijdom who bluntly

stressed that the National Party's single goal remained 'the preservation of Whitedom, and its domination in South Africa.' Rejecting, by implication, any notion of African independence, he declared in 1955 that

nonwhites should be given the opportunity to develop in their own areas under the guidance of the whites, and there, insofar as they developed in accordance with the systems which conform best to their nature and traditions, to govern themselves and to serve their community in all the various fields of their national life.

Nonetheless there had crystallised in the 1950's a concept of the Africans' right to self-determination in their own territory, leaving the whites in control of 'white' areas. Underlying this view was the theoretical conception that national characteristics—language, culture, and customs—were gifts from God that laid a duty on the recipients to cherish and conserve them. 'The Scriptures,' declared the 1951 Transvaal NGK Synod, 'teach that God divided the human race, as a result of sin, into races and peoples and languages. God did not only will the existence of separate peoples, but also consolidated it.' Professor B. F. Nel put the same view in Christian National terms:

A Christian-National world and life outlook means *inter alia* the conviction and faith that God the Almighty has not only created every human being according to its own nature, but that He is also the creator of nations; and that it is in accordance with His will and world plan that there must be nations, each with its own language and culture, and with its own destiny. Consequently, every individual must be convinced of and believe in the fact that Afrikanerdom is not a human product but was brought into being by the Will of God and welded together by spiritual bonds of language, history, religion, and so forth; and that every individual should and must come to the highest unfolding within the volkscommunity.⁵

It was this notion of divine origin, cherished by Afrikanerdom, that was extended to nonwhite groups. This important development of the theory of Christian Nationalism was reflected in DRC Synod decisions in 1950, 1951, 1953 and 1956, which stressed the African right to national self-determination.

The corollary to this right, however, was said to be the duty of all racial groups to preserve their ethnic-cultural identity and to prevent a

(5) *Report of the Conference on Mother Tongue Education*, a report of a F.A.K. conference in 1944.

blurring of the divinely-ordained boundaries between groups. The 'pluriformity of peoples is the result of the gracious providence of God,' wrote Professor H. G. Stoker. 'It follows therefore that man must not tamper with the immutable national differences contained in the divine ordinance . . . man must honour the variety.'⁶

The Bantu Authorities system with its emphasis on separate ethnic groups coupled with the preservation of white control, reflected the dualism of Afrikaner, and indeed of much of white thinking in South Africa in the 1950's. Moreover to a large extent the present institutions of the Transkei—a Legislative Assembly composed of an *ex-officio* majority of 64 chiefs and an elected minority of 45—which possess circumscribed authority within a limited rural sphere similarly reflect this dualism. Infused within this dualism, however, is an almost mystical notion—in opposition to the universality of Pan-Africanism—that each ethnic African group in South Africa has special qualities and values that should be reflected in its particular institutions. In other words, African development through territorial separation, even though it is being extended only partially and hesitatingly, is restricted by national fiat to those areas which the white government is prepared to recognise as acceptable ethnic entities.

In his decisive formulation of government policy on January 23, 1962, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd spoke of the Bantu Authorities system as 'an important step in binding together hereditary national units of which they naturally form a part.' He also spoke of this machinery as 'producing true leader-groups' and giving a say to 'the natural representatives of a whole community, aided by councillors in accordance with the democratic character of the typical Bantu structure.' But the analogy he drew with West Africa—that ethnic groups in South Africa were themselves 'national units' as the former British colonies in West Africa had proved to be by developing as separate states, was not the apt one. Far more comparable to what Africans have sought and seek in South Africa is the over-bridging or blurring of ethnic differences that is the objective of nation-building in independent states, whether African-controlled or otherwise, and the establishment of non-racial norms in personal and group relations.

It is particularly significant that despite a limited degree of consultation with Transkeian leaders regarding the form their new legislative body would have when the territory achieved its semi-autonomous status, the

(6) *Die stryd Om die Ordes*, 1944.

basic character of those institutions was also decided by fiat of the national government. Although important groups within the Transkei, notably the Tembus, desired a non-racial citizenship and representation, Prime Minister Verwoerd specifically refused to permit these to be multi-racial. He maintained, in contrast, that 'the principle of a distinctive national identity must be coupled to the principle of a distinctive citizenship,' i.e. not only defined by birth and former association as well as residence but restricted to Africans.

What may be called the theoretical basis of this externally shaped and circumscribed pattern of development was put in more mystical and indeed flowery language by the Hon. de Wet Nel, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, in his opening addresses in December, 1962, to a number of newly established territorial authorities. He told the Sotho counsellors on December 5th that

today you enter upon the road of a volk and accept the task, calling and duties of a volk. God has a task and calling for every volk in the world. Similarly He has a task and calling for you The task and calling of a volk is bound up in service—service, in the first place, to God who is the creator of volks, and in the second place to the volk's own national possessions. . . . You must be proud to belong to this national group. You must be proud of your own language and traditions. . . . One of your greatest tasks ahead is to build up and develop the spiritual values of your own volk You must always remember that a people without a culture is a people without a soul and ultimately doomed to die.”⁷

In similar vein, he addressed the Matchange Territorial Authority on the 19th:

With this step [the formation of an authority] you have saved the soul of the Shangaan people. With this step you have laid the basis upon which the spiritual values of the people can be built. Herewith you have given form and anchorage to yourself as a volk You are called upon to perform a service, service in the first place to God, who is the creator of peoples and of everything which is beautiful and good; service in the second place to your people and fellow-men.

Opening the Venda Sotho ethnic group Authority on December 12, 1962, Mr Nel continued to emphasize his point:

(7) Official minutes of the Territorial Authorities.

The true unity of a volk consists in the fact that all its sons and daughters are welded together by the bonds of its spiritual values. Every Venda must henceforth be proud to be a Venda. Today is an historic day because henceforth the Ba-Venda will again, as a people, have a calling and a task. The highest task and calling of a volk lies in the harnessing of all its forces to further the spiritual and material welfare of a volk.

Thus the government is attempting to stamp the Afrikaners' own sense of what made, and perhaps still makes them a separate nation onto the separate African ethnic groups, and to reinforce this separation by a structure of white-devised and, at least at present, white-controlled institutions.

It is true, of course, that there is more than this kind of theory underlying the policy of Bantu Authorities and its projection into the system now possessed by the Transkei. Prime Minister Verwoerd, and Dr W. M. Eiselen, the architects of South Africa's contemporary race relations policies, have made sufficient reference to Basutoland as a prototype of what they have in mind for the African areas of South Africa, to bring out significant further implications of their policies. Crucial are the facts that no African ethnic group is sufficiently large to challenge by itself the political or strategic dominance of white South Africans and, still more, their economic dominance. Indeed, Basutoland with the overwhelming dependence of its people upon the economic opportunities provided by the South African economy is a classic example of why even independence—from which at the moment the Transkei is still very far—provides no particular hazard at present for continued white control in southern Africa. Whether this situation will always remain true can be considered later in relation to other factors but for the moment the fact is indisputable.

Dr Verwoerd has gone even further, however, than envisaging a number—the figure commonly mentioned is eight—of separate and scattered African ethnic areas within current South African boundaries in which he proposes ultimately to have the same kind of institutions and opportunities—whether limited as at present or even extended to independence as in Basutoland—as has the Transkei. He has noted, for example in the speech already referred to, the possibility of a genuine division of South African territory between white and African areas. Reacting to a United Party challenge, he declared:

If the Opposition is correct and we are now dividing the country, then I now have to choose between dividing it (and thereby retaining

control over the area settled by our white forefathers) or regarding the country as one governmental unit (and thereby turning it into a multi-racial society under black domination). I choose division.

He did not specify, it must be noted, what he considered to be 'the area settled by our white forefathers' though this might be in the long run a major point to consider in any division of South African territory. Other major points must clearly be the process by which such a division takes place, and the degree to which it reflects the desires and interests of Africans as well as whites.

The context within which Africans have reacted to proposals for territorial separation has been the steady diminution of their relatively small role in South African political life and the growing restrictions on their use of land, and their tenure outside the reserves. Formed in 1912 as a national response by Africans to the newly established white-controlled Union of South Africa, the South African National Native Congress, meeting in Pietermaritzburg on October 2, 1916, formulated a resolution and covering letter that protested the restrictions embodied in the Natives Land Act of 1913, and showed them to be highly conscious of the significance of the purpose and process through which any territorial separation was carried out.

While the Bantu people will gladly welcome the policy of territorial separation of the races if carried on fair and equitable lines (they wrote), they cannot bind themselves to support a government which cannot carry out that principle with justice.

And they charged that while the 'ostensible aim' of the Act was to provide such territorial separation, evidence before the Natives Land Commission had demonstrated that 'the ulterior object' was

to deprive the natives as a people of their freedom to acquire more land in their own right: To restrict or limit their right to bargain mutually on even terms for the occupation of or settlement on land: To reduce by gradual process and by artificial means the Bantu people as a race to a status of permanent labourers or subordinates for all purposes and for all times with little or no freedom to sell their labour by bargaining on even terms with employers in the open markets of labour either in the agricultural or industrial centres: To limit all opportunities for their economic improvement and independence: To lessen their chances as a people of competing freely and fairly in all commercial enterprises.

Examining the evidence presented to the Natives Land Commission, we also find an early statement of a persistent view held by representative Africans, i.e., that before such decisive action affecting territorial separation should be instituted, it would be essential to have a convention representing both whites and Africans. J. T. Gumede, subsequently president of the African National Congress, put this point forcefully when he said:

It is proposed, for the first time in the history of South Africa or of any other British Dominion, to separate the races, this having been agreed upon by Europeans through their representatives. We have not been consulted on a matter which touches us deeply. Therefore, in our minds, after considering the matter, we feel that if this separation must be done a Convention of the two races concerned is necessary to consider the question; two races that have lived together under different conditions all these years. We beg to urge for this Convention of the two races to go into the whole question.⁸

That Africans might be consulted on a crucial issue like territorial separation through councils, such as that existing in the Transkei, was not considered in any sense a satisfactory alternative to a convention that would represent the total African population. This emphasis on sharing in a national forum that created policy for Africans as well as whites can be found also in the unanimous opposition from members of the Transkeian General Council to the Hertzog measures that threatened and ultimately in 1936 deprived them of their franchise on the common roll. At no time did Bunga representatives consider that there could be an acceptable alternative to the right to vote with whites for representatives to Parliament. Thus, whether it was through a convention representing all Africans as well as whites, or through a share in choosing parliamentary representatives jointly with whites, the emphasis by representative Africans both in the Transkei and outside was on their right to be consulted on matters affecting them and to have this consultation carried on through some national body.

A far less desirable arrangement but one which the barriers even to previously existing national representation forced some few Africans to consider was self-government in a lesser area. Even then, however, it was to be only after open and full consultation and in a form free from central control. The Rev. R. V. Selope Thema at the Government Native Conference in Pretoria, November 2-5, 1926, declared in response to the earlier Hertzog proposals to remove Cape Africans from the Common roll:

(8) Select Committee on Native Affairs, *Minutes of Evidence*, 18 June 1917, p. 639.

In regard to the principle of separate representation the idea seemed to be that the people of South Africa—black and white—were not one nation. Apparently the Government thought that certain matters only affected Natives or whites. He knew of no such matters . . . [But he then added] If they must have separate representation then political segregation was necessary, that is, firstly territorial segregation and then political separation so as not to be under the control of the white Parliament.

It was impossible to evolve a Nation within a Nation. They could not have a separate Bantu Nation and a separate European Nation in South Africa so long as the two races lived side by side.⁹

This possible alternative to an equitable share in the making of national decision by establishing a sovereign African state through the joint agreement of black and white was touched on only once within the Bunga. This was in 1944, and significantly by Councillor Qumata from Emigrant Tembuland, presumably with the concurrence of Chief Kaiser Matanzima. He proposed that

as a post-war reconstruction measure this Council requests the Government declare the Transkeian Territoris a Union Native Province or State with sovereign rights in the administration of government and its affairs and people.¹⁰

To justify his proposal, Qumata pointed out that the native problem had existed from the day the first European set foot on the coast of South Africa. Citing Prime Minister Smuts' 1942 comment that segregation had been a failure, he pushed the point to one of its logical ends: that the application of segregation had not been carried to 'its legitimate conclusion.' If 'we were allotted our own part of the country in which to reside, with the Europeans in a separate area,' he said, 'the position will be solved.' The Europeans would 'protect us from the enemy outside and they will be our trustees in every way.' He went on to argue:

Let us have an opportunity to stand on our own two feet. This country is large enough and rich enough. When you regard the extent and wealth of the country you will find there is no place for the native . . . There is no hope that we will ever be anything under existing circumstances under the policy of the Union Government.

(9) UG 17—27, Report of Native Affairs Commission, 1927. Quoted from Minutes of the Government Native Conference held in Pretoria, November 2—5, 1926.

(10) United Transkeian Territoris General Council, *Proceedings*, 1944, p. 81.

Then with a flash of frankness he declared:

It is not always true when we affirm our love towards the Union Government, and we say we like our Government. We say these things because we hope the Government will be persuaded and take us into its confidence.¹¹

Twenty years later, in 1964, the new Chief Minister of the Transkei, Kaiser Matanzima formed the Transkei National Independence Party.

Qumata's statement, and even that of Thema, penetrating as are the latter's implications, cannot be taken as representative of the sentiments of more than their authors. Apart from the former, all the members of the Bunga continued to insist that only the right to vote with whites on the common roll could provide Africans with an adequate means of expressing their desires and needs. Even at the moment of accepting the Bantu Authorities system for the Transkei, Chief Tutor Ndamele expressed the vain hope that this move would be a step towards eventual national representation. The national organisations for Africans—the African National Congress, the All-African Convention and, after 1958, the Pan Africanist Congress—remained unanimous in their objective of sharing in national representation and thus in national power. Moreover, as the government moved to implement its plans for separate territorial development in the Transkei, the spokesmen of these and other African organisations made it clear that they regard such territorial separation as the balkanisation of a country they consider to be as much theirs as the whites.

Nonetheless, the government, effectively supported by Chief Kaiser Matanzima, has moved step by step to institute in the Transkei those institutions that it considers suitable for that territory, and has stated that it intends to establish comparable institutions in those other African areas that it is prepared to recognise. By setting up these institutions in a form that it alone has determined, in particular in the ban on multi-racial representation, the government has made it abundantly clear that it is only prepared to permit consultation and the use of elections within its own circumscribed limits. Yet to be taken seriously as a reflection of popular African sentiment and a forum for African self-expression even in the poverty-ridden, rural territory of the Transkeian Legislative Assembly, there was needed far more genuine consultation and contact at many levels, a more genuine compromise on conditions, and national planning carried

(11) *Ibid.*

on jointly by Africans and whites about the form and implications of an agreed plan of separate development.

Dr Hoernlé himself believed, as suggested earlier, that the total separation of Africans and whites into distinct 'areas of liberty' would be a liberal ideal. But the first Hoernlé lecturer, Jan Hofmeyr, believed that white South Africa would never pay the price involved in total separation. Moreover he foresaw that to bring about total separation 'would require the use of such force that it would cease to be a genuine liberal ideal.' Both factors are as significant today as they were when he spoke. Indeed they may be still more significant since the present government is already attempting to institute some form of territorial separation.

Let us look first at the current situation in the Transkei and then contrast it with what would be necessary to make separate territorial development in South Africa acceptable to the outside world even if not palatable to most Africans. The objective facts of the Transkei's situation are: the heavy dependence on white officials, which is so much greater than before the establishment of the Transkei Legislative Assembly; the dependence, made public in mid-1965, on its financial support by the South African national government for four-fifths of the total estimated expenditure of the six departments under the Transkei government at that time; the dependence for jobs by Transkeians on outside opportunities of which the territory itself and the border industries offer only a minute proportion; the national government-imposed ban on white-owned capital entering the territory and what Matanzima himself in the Transkei Legislative Assembly on June 3, 1964, called 'the idle dream' of depending solely on black capital and initiative for the industrial development of the Transkei; the lack in any case of exploitable resources and of attractive other outlets; and the limited African entrepreneurial skills to direct enterprises. At present, as is well known, the largest enterprise in the Transkei is the Vulindlela factory near Umtata which makes furniture and pre-fabricated houses and employs less than 200 persons. Thus the Transkei seems irretrievably tied to and dependent on whites, politically and economically, and for a long time also administratively.

The Transkeian leader of the opposition, Paramount Chief Victor Poto, who secured a much higher percentage of the votes of the elected members of the Transkei Legislative Assembly for the office of Chief Minister than did Matanzima, upholds the principle of multi-racialism or non-racialism in defining political rights both within the Transkei and throughout South

Africa. In this attitude he agrees with most representative national African leaders of the past and present. The Chief Minister of the Transkei, Chief Kaiser Matanzima, already maintains, however, that ultimately there will be no place in the Transkei for whites. Thus, Matanzima is enunciating a more exclusive black nationalism for the Transkei than was ever voiced by members of the Pan-Africanist Congress or is advanced by the leaders of any independent African controlled state. One cannot help but wonder whether Matanzima's philosophy arises from personal bitterness, or is a reaction to white exclusiveness, or comes from frustration at the huge gap between his aspirations and current reality. For indeed, there has been and is little in the Transkei situation which provided a sense of genuine power and self-sufficiency of the kind of which Cronje and some in the Dutch Reformed Churches spoke at an earlier time.

Suppose, however, that the South African government decides in time to move the Transkei to what it calls independence, perhaps after pouring far more massive funding into that territory and other areas for which it plans comparable political development. The African and outside response to be anticipated is that as long as certain basic conditions for territorial separation are predetermined by whites alone, or there is only limited consultation with particular ethnic groups, in line with the other type of Afrikaner thinking earlier described, the result cannot be accepted as a genuine expression of the free choice of Africans. Moreover those areas the government proposes for African separate territories do not represent any possible alternative to the progressive extension of political, social and economic rights within the present boundaries of South Africa.

Could any plan for separation offer possibilities for racial harmony in South Africa? Looking from outside, I dare to propose that separate territorial development might be worthy of consideration if it met three distinct requirements and showed great promise of leading to a corollary that goes to the heart of the South African situation. In the first place, white and African areas would have to be separated in a manner that provided both groups with urban and economic resources, and with port facilities and communications related to their population needs and spread. Secondly, and intimately related, is that nonwhite areas would not be shut off from the world outside and from each other by white-controlled strips of territory and pockets such as Port St. Johns. In the third place, the settlement would have to be the product of genuine and extensive discussion, and agreement by representative national as well as local leaders of the groups concerned. And beyond these three requirements would lie the hope that such a parti-

tion would lead to the establishment of non-racial policies in both white and African areas, a fact essential if separate development is to attract serious consideration as an alternative to liberal change within a united South Africa.

The hope that racial discrimination could be eliminated in southern Africa by a far-reaching territorial division of South Africa rests on the assumption that discrimination arises from fear. If so, the psychological effect upon whites of becoming either the majority or near-majority in a newly demarcated area or areas might be to create new attitudes to colour and race. The extensive consultation and compromise between whites and Africans essential for a mutually agreeable division of territory would in itself help to provide an atmosphere in which such non-racial societies could be organised. This process, admittedly, would require a fundamental change in attitude on the part of the white government and electors of South Africa, but they could expect at least two positive results: freedom from their underlying but pervasive fear of violence, and acceptance in full measure by the western world.

Over and over again representatives of states all over the world have assailed South Africa for its racial policies. Among such comments American representatives have generally tried to indicate their awareness of the complexity of the South African racial scene and their recognition that the United States has been and is still notably inadequate in fulfilling its own objectives of racial equality. Only once, but in a highly significant statement, has an American representative hinted at the acceptability of the Bantustan concept if it were realised to the full. In the course of the sharpest criticism of South Africa ever made by an American delegate, Mr Plimpton declared on October 24, 1961, that 'carried to its logical conclusion, the result of apartheid would be real partition, with the negro and other non-white inhabitants in possession of their own territory and independent government and with the white South Africans gathered into their own independent enclave.'¹²

What in practice might be 'a real partition?' It might begin by joining the Transkei and Ciskei, and continue by linking the major African areas of South Africa to the former High Commission Territories as the latter secure their independence. The Transkei adjoins Basutoland; Zululand is close to Swaziland; Tswanaland is near Bechuanaland. But although these territories occupy some 45 per cent of the land within these boundaries, their

(12) United Nations, Special Political Committee, 16th Session, 260th Meeting, October 24, 1961.

proportion of its resources is very small. With the addition of South West Africa, wholly freed from South African control, both area and resources would be considerably increased.

But much more than this would be necessary to establish an equitable and stable partition. Some part at least of the most industrial sections of Natal, as well as developed ports, whether now existing or newly constructed, would have to be incorporated in the ring of African-controlled territory that must be expected to cut off Durban and its vicinity from the rest of the Republic. Port Elizabeth and East London might well become part of the African lands stretching at least to the northern boundary of Basutoland. The wealth of the all-important Witwatersrand area would have in some way to be shared. In fact, the complications involved in arriving at such arrangements might be still greater than those resulting from the partition.

It is this latter fact that makes the process of territorial division at least as important as the division itself. Today it is a white government that is defining boundaries and putting conditions on what goes on within them. But in some unforeseeable future the process might be managed by others. Only as one puts oneself in the position of those who are now the objects of policy can one appreciate the vital character of the way in which far-reaching decisions are made. What might seem on paper to be a far more equitable plan for separate territorial development than any yet advanced will fail utterly to establish what Dr Hoernlé called, 'areas of liberty' if it is not the result of full, free and widespread consultation between Africans and whites of all groups, national and local, such as has not yet been seen in South Africa.

Of itself, what is happening in the Transkei is of minor importance. What makes it significant is that it seems to indicate the current direction of official South African race policy. What has happened to and in the Transkei makes it clear that far more is being claimed for separate development than either the process or the accomplishments warrant. And yet of all African territories controlled by South Africa the Transkei is the one best able to make something constructive out of its limited opportunities. To consider the parody of separate development which the Odendaal Commission proposes for small isolated groups in South West Africa is to recognise the devastating extent to which the policy might be pushed.

Transkeian developments have taken territorial separation out of the realm of theory into that of practice. It is not too soon to draw guide

lines from even so limited a move about what basic changes in policy and procedure are needed if the establishment of territorial divisions is to be made a constructive means of establishing better relations between whites and Africans. But a haunting question persists: if there were enough good will to embark on a mutually acceptable partition, could not this sentiment be turned towards establishing more equitable arrangements within South Africa as a whole?

Granted that if the sense of security white South Africans want so badly can be gained only through partition, then it may be necessary to rend apart the most closely-knit and flourishing economic structure in Africa. In that case the road to a far-reaching, mutually acceptable partition should be followed through to its grim and logical conclusion. But if the price for following this road is gauged too high, or the end result illusory, is it too much to hope that such a realisation might encourage a new effort to achieve racial harmony in southern Africa by changes within an undivided country?

The Institute greatly regrets that Professor Gwendolen Carter was unable to come to South Africa to deliver her lecture at the 1966 Council Meeting in Cape Town. Professor Carter did not hear in time whether her visa to enter South Africa was to be granted.