

**A SURVEY OF
RACE RELATIONS
IN SOUTH AFRICA**

1972

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IN SOUTH AFRICA**

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**SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE
RELATIONS**

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WHITE POLITICAL PARTIES:
DEVELOPMENTS IN 1972

BY-ELECTIONS IN THE EARLY PART OF THE YEAR

A provincial by-election in Gezina, Pretoria, during February was a straight contest between representatives of the National Party and the ultra-right wing Herstigte Nasionale Party. In a low percentage poll (reported at 42 per cent) the Nationalist candidate was returned with a large majority.

Of much greater significance was the Brakpan parliamentary by-election, held on the same day. Brakpan is one of the Nationalist urban strongholds. The percentage poll was 57 (as against 70.6 per cent in the 1970 parliamentary elections). The result was: N.P. 4 714; U.P. 3 322; H.N.P. 784. According to Professor Willem Kleynhans, a leading political scientist,¹ as compared with the 1970 parliamentary voting, this represented a swing of 12.6 per cent away from the Nationalists, and of 10.6 per cent towards the United Party.

The Oudtshoorn parliamentary by-election in April was vigorously contested by all three parties. Oudtshoorn is a mainly rural constituency in which, for some years before the 1970 provincial elections, N.P. candidates had been returned unopposed.

The results were:

	<i>N.P.</i>	<i>U.P.</i>	<i>H.N.P.</i>	<i>N.P. Majority</i>	<i>% Poll</i>
October 1970	5 693	2 246		3 447	76.9
April 1972	6 666	1 818	259	4 848	85.9

This was reported² as representing a 6.1 per cent swing in favour of the N.P. The tactics used by this party, as described in more detail later, were appeals to Afrikaner group loyalties, and attacks on the alleged dangers to Whites of the U.P.'s race policies.

The same tactics were used by the N.P. in the Brakpan provincial by-election in May. There was, then, a 63 per cent poll, the results being: N.P. 6 161; U.P. 4 031. The N.P. majority was 738 more than in February, but 1 595 fewer than in 1970.

N.P. ATTACK ON THE U.P.

The United Party's racial policy, as enunciated in 1970 and 1971, was that South Africa should be maintained as one economy, under "enlightened White leadership". Communal councils would be established for each of the main racial groups to administer

¹ *Sir.* 24 February.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 April.

their internal affairs, with statutory standing committees serving as links between Parliament and these councils. A federation of racial communities was the ultimate aim. During an interim phase, White representation in Parliament would be unchanged; but Blacks would be granted limited representation in the House of Assembly, with separate voters' rolls for each group. There would be six Coloured representatives, two White representatives of Indians, and eight White representatives of the Africans (a total of sixteen). This arrangement would not be altered unless by resolution of a decisive majority of the White electorate at a referendum or general election held solely to consider the matter.

After the U.P. congresses in 1971, committees were set up to consider and make representations to the leader of the party on constitutional matters, Coloured affairs, and Indian affairs. At the time of the by-elections mentioned, these committees had not reported.

Shortly before the Oudtshoorn by-election, N.P. members and the N.P. Press advanced the argument that the proposed sixteen Black representatives would have the casting vote on any issue over which parties might be divided. Mr. Marais Viljoen, Minister of Labour and of Posts and Telegraphs, said in the Assembly,³ "I want to say here to-day in all seriousness that if this Parliament is to be loaded with such a non-white bloc I do not know whether Nationalist Afrikanerhood will ever again come into its own. Therefore what will be at stake is everything which is dear to the White and everything for which the Nationalist Afrikaner has fought all his life long". The then Minister of Community Development, Mr. Blaar Coetzee, said,⁴ "One cannot get away from the fact that the N.P. consists chiefly of the Afrikaners and the U.P. chiefly of the English-speaking, and you are going to use those sixteen (Black representatives) to keep the Afrikaner out of power . . . If you do that you will create a simply unprecedented situation of hatred in South Africa."

The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M. C. Botha, stated⁵ that he had been asked why the N.P. did not trust even one of the representatives of the Blacks to vote on its side. The N.P. did not want such support, he said: it did not wish to "call in these Non-White peoples as allies of our party against a White opposition party in this Parliament . . . The political struggle between the White political parties must be fought out without the intercession of the Non-Whites". The latter had their own political institutions.

It was alleged⁶ by Mr. P. W. Botha, Minister of Defence, that several U.P. members did not speak Afrikaans. "There are

elements, both inside and outside this House, that hate the Afrikaner," he maintained. This led to uproar, during which personal accusations were bandied to and fro. The then Minister of Sport and Recreation, Mr. F. W. Waring, said,⁷ "If the U.P. does not pull itself together, it is becoming a home for everything that hates Afrikaans."

A prominent member of the U.P., Mr. E. G. Malan, claimed⁸ that all members of Parliament understood Afrikaans, but had the right to speak in either language. He rejected with contempt allegations that there was hatred of the Afrikaner on the part of any U.P. members, said he was ashamed of some of his fellow-Afrikaners, and added, "What we are seeing here to-day is a return to political barbarism." Sir de Villiers Graaff, leader of the Opposition, said⁹ he was "shocked and disappointed at the lengths to which they (some of the Nationalists) were prepared to go to try to persuade the electorate of Oudtshoorn to ignore the problems of South Africa, to ignore the frustrations, and to try to vote in accordance with the call of the blood or in accordance with race prejudice in South Africa."

The Minister of Transport, Mr. B. J. Schoeman, alleged later¹⁰ that the English-language Press had distorted Mr. Botha's original remarks. Those who had pleaded for equality for the Afrikaans language "were accused of beating the tribal drum, and the most despicable cartoons were published in certain of the newspapers." On the other hand certain U.P. members, for example Mr. D. M. Streicher,¹¹ maintained that it was the Afrikaans Press which had boosted the so-called "Boerehaat campaign".

The Prime Minister said,¹² "We want respect for each other's language." Such respect was not shown by a "person who has had the opportunity and who has the intelligence to learn a language but refuses to do so". He indicated that certain of the (U.P.) members of the Natal Provincial Executive were unable to have interviews with Afrikaans-speaking people in their own language. "I have no reason," he stated, "to feel confident that if the U.P. came into power, the rights of Afrikaners would be safe in South Africa."¹³

DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE NATIONAL PARTY

Mr. Theo J. A. Gerdener, a former Administrator of Natal, had been Minister of the Interior for two years. He announced, during June, that he intended resigning from the Cabinet as from 31 July, in order to be able to give his full attention to the priority

³ Hansard 10 col. 4587.

⁴ Col. 4603.

⁵ Hansard 14 col. 6866.

⁶ Hansard 10 cols. 4671-2.

⁷ Col. 4674.

⁸ Col. 4681-6.

⁹ Col. 4831-2.

¹⁰ Hansard 18 cols. 8803-4.

¹¹ Col. 8816.

¹² Hansard 11 cols. 5187-9, 5198.

¹³ The above is but a brief summary of a prolonged debate.

problems of improving relationships between South Africa's language and race groups, and of securing co-operation at all possible levels between South Africa and the other anti-communist states of Southern Africa, both White and Black. (Subsequent developments in this regard are described later.)

On 31 July the Prime Minister announced a major cabinet reshuffle. Four other Cabinet Ministers had resigned—Senator D. C. H. Uys, Mr. Frank W. Waring, Dr. Carel de Wet, and Mr. Blaar Coetzee, as well as a Deputy Minister, Mr. Herman Martins. Dr. Connie P. Mulder would become Minister of the Interior, while retaining some of his previous portfolios. Four Deputy Ministers and a Senator had been brought into the Cabinet, and four new Deputy Ministers had been appointed.

Six vacancies in the House of Assembly resulted from these Cabinet changes.

Mr. Ben J. Schoeman, Minister of Transport, retired during September from his position of leader of the N.P. in the Transvaal. By a large majority, Dr. Connie Mulder was elected to succeed him as provincial leader. In a Press interview¹⁴ shortly afterwards, Dr. Mulder said he thought the future divisions in South Africa would be between left and right. As he saw U.P. and Progressive policies, there was no other home for the conservative English-speaking South African than in the National Party.

It was reported in September¹⁵ that certain younger members of the N.P. had drawn up a "youth action" plan. They recommended that the eleven branches of the Nasionale Jeugbond should be replaced by youth branches, fully integrated into the senior structure of the party, on an equal footing with other branches. A central co-ordinating committee for the youth branches would be established.

The attitude of the N.P. to such matters as the future of the Coloured, Indian, and urban African people, the homelands, employment, student affairs, sport, foreign affairs, and other matters is described in subsequent chapters.

THE AFRIKANER BROEDERBOND

In various of its issues, for example 21 May and 17 and 24 September, the *Sunday Times* has published an exposé of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond. Other newspapers too, for example *The Star* on 20 September, have carried long articles on the organization. The Bond is said to have been founded in 1918 with the aim of creating a "brotherhood" in which Afrikaners could find one another at a time when there was disunity, and when it was felt that the rights of Afrikaners were being denied.

¹⁴ *Star*, 15 September.

¹⁵ *Star*, 6 September.

Membership is by invitation only, to people who have proved that they are working in the Afrikaner cause. There are stated to be more than 9 000 members, organised in some 500 divisions. Over the years, this body has used its influence to secure the election or appointment of Afrikaners (not necessarily Bond members) to key positions in the life of the country, and to further exclusive Afrikaner interests.

It was reported in May that Dr. Andries Treurnicht, M.P., had recently become chairman of the Broederbond, succeeding Dr. Piet Meyer (chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation). Among the twelve members of the Executive (Uitvoerende Raad) were said to be Dr. Connie Mulder, Professor Gerrit Viljoen (Rector of the Rand Afrikaans University and until September chairman of the S.A. Bureau of Racial Affairs), the Rectors of the Universities of Potchefstroom and Pretoria, Professors H. J. J. Bingle and E. J. Marais, and the Director of Education for the Transvaal, Dr. A. L. Kotzee. Members of the Bond were stated to include leading Cabinet Ministers and the head of the Bureau for State Security, General Hendrik van den Bergh.

According to the reports, the Broederbond has departed from its previous non-party political stand by expelling or suspending a number of members of the Herstigte Nasionale Party. One of these, the Rev. Jan H. Jooste, then made disclosures to the Press.

In the *Rand Daily Mail* and other papers on 18 September, Dr. Treurnicht acknowledged that the Broederbond did make representations to the Cabinet on various matters, for example sport in South Africa. The Prime Minister said that the policy of the Government was dictated by the National Party, not by any society.

THE UNITED PARTY

Africans domiciled outside the homelands

During the no-confidence debate in the Assembly, Mr. Dave J. Marais and Sir de Villiers Graaff attacked the National Party on the question of Africans who are domiciled outside the homelands. Mr. Marais said¹ the Government did not seem to grasp the fundamental fact that there would be millions of detribalized Africans living in the industrial areas of South Africa by the turn of the century. With its "politically naive" policy, the Government was creating a landless, rootless, and voiceless proletariat which constituted the flashpoint of the country's race problems. The fact must be faced that the millions outside the homelands were not temporary citizens, but an integral part of South Africa with a decisive and vast rôle to play in the future of the country.

¹ Assembly, 1 February, Hansard 1 cols. 159-62.

Mr. Marais suggested that urban Africans must be provided with better residential and social amenities; there must be an immediate acceleration of work training methods for them; there should be a relaxation of influx control to provide job mobility and an uninterrupted home life; deserving Africans should be exempted from the pass laws and be given an opportunity to obtain freehold title for the land on which they lived in the urban areas.

Sir de Villiers said². "Blacks in their millions are always going to be in and around our urban areas. I am afraid that they are not going to be that settled population which we would so like to see. . . . We on this side of the House are very sick of the sense of guilt that one gets when one sees what is happening to the family life of the Bantu people under this Government, when one sees the conditions under which they live . . . when one looks at the unutterable waste of human material which could be put to good purpose".

Later³, Sir de Villiers stated that, in terms of Government policy, urban Bantu had no job security, no rights of home-ownership, no stake in the maintenance of law and order, no stake in the well-being of their own people, inadequate schooling, inadequate training, and no security when their working lives ended.

The African homelands

The United Party has continued to oppose very strongly the creation of independent African homelands, and all legislation designed to further this policy. Spokesmen have maintained that independent Black states within or adjoining South Africa might constitute a security threat if, for example, they entered into alliances with communist countries.

Not all of the members have agreed with these tactics, however. Mr. Japie D. du P. Basson, M.P., has frequently pleaded for the acceptance of those aspects of Nationalist policy which are accomplished and which are positive. Mrs. Catherine D. Taylor, M.P., is reported⁴ to have said, in a speech in Natal during May that the basic constitutional machinery established in the homelands by the Government had become an integral part of the political scene, and the U.P. would have to take this into account. According to a Press report⁵, she was thereafter told by the party hierarchy to refrain from making statements on policy matters.

Criticism of the U.P.

In articles published in the *Sunday Times* on 2 and 9 July the political commentator, Mr. Stanley Uys, described the U.P.

² Col. 421.

³ 19 April, Hansard 11 cols. 5293-5.

⁴ *Sunday Times*, 7 May, and *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 June.

⁵ *Sunday Times*, 7 May.

leaders as being under the influence of "a kind of verkrampte Mafia". In their attitude, particularly to the "Bantustan" policy, they had tried to win the support of the most backward, not the most enlightened, section of the N.P., he maintained. Instead of throwing their weight behind the verligte aspects of Government policy, they had consistently opposed these. In the Oudtshoorn by-election campaign, he said, the U.P. had adopted a verkramp approach to try to attract the plattelanders. This had left the N.P. with no choice but to start their "boerehaat campaign".

Mr. Uys said he was convinced that the time had come for the U.P. to undergo a radical personality change. The leaders were failing to mobilise the full potential of the opposition. He called for a verligte re-orientation, a "third force", to break down rigid and outdated party political divisions. Dissatisfied Nationalist verligtes, Mr. Uys stated, would rather float in a limbo than join the U.P.

These articles attracted considerable attention. Sir de Villiers Oraaff challenged all verligtes to join the U.P. in order to bring about a just society in South Africa. He outlined what he considered priorities should be: diversifying the economy of the homelands; encouraging them to maintain a federal relationship with the Republic; removing causes for grievances among urban Africans; and the socio-economic upliftment of the Coloured and Indian people.⁶

A number of newspapers that support the U.P. published editorials agreeing that the U.P. "needed a shake-up". It should cease to equivocate, it was stated, "speaking in different tones from different platforms".

Mr. Japie Basson told a U.P. meeting in Cape Town that, if the party wanted ever to return to power, it would have to come to terms with a growing verligte mood among voters. "I feel certain that the public will appreciate bold and dynamic moves on the political front", he said.⁷

Change in the Transvaal party leadership

Early in 1972 a group of energetic workers on the Witwatersrand, consisting mainly of younger members of the Transvaal provincial council, took over the organization and financing of the U.P.'s Witwatersrand General Council, with the aim of revitalizing the party and capturing the large majority of Reef seats at the next general election. They became popularly known as the "young Turks". They were led by Mr. Harry Schwarz, M.P.C., leader of the U.P. in the Transvaal Provincial Council and deputy leader of the party in the province. According to the political commentator

⁶ *Star*, 11 July.

⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 July.

Mr. John Patten,⁸ their philosophy was based on that of Mr. Japie Basson.

At the Transvaal U.P. congress, held in Johannesburg during August, Mr. Schwarz challenged Mr. S. J. Marais Steyn, M.P., for the leadership of the party in the province. Mr. Steyn is a right-hand man of Sir de Villiers Graaff, and one of the country's most experienced politicians. According to Mr. Patten,⁹ Mr. Stanley Uys, and others, however, he was regarded by the younger men as being one of the "Old Guard", whose tactics were to expose every Government mistake and to exploit grievances, and who tried to avoid being pinned down too closely on details of the Opposition's alternative policies. The younger men believed that grievances alone could not defeat the Government. What was needed was a clear policy, with a fuller acceptance of racial realities and basic justice.

In what was reported to be a marginal victory, Mr. Schwarz was elected provincial leader. Also, apparently, by a narrow margin, Mr. Japie Basson was, however, defeated by Dr. Gideon F. Jacobs, M.P., in the voting for a deputy leader.

The United Party's constitutional plan

During August, an interim report carrying the unanimous approval of the United Party's constitutional committee (which sat under the chairmanship of Mr. M. L. Mitchell, M.P.) was studied by a joint meeting of the party's national head committee and its parliamentary caucus, which, in turn, reported to Sir de Villiers Graaff. He disclosed the plan, as amended in certain respects during the party's Transvaal congress.

The previous policy (described on page 1), of granting limited representation in the House of Assembly to the various Black groups, was scrapped in favour of the plan briefly summarized below.

- (a) About 15 community governments would be set up, each to have a legislative assembly elected on the basis of universal suffrage of members of the community concerned. There would be four White governments, based on existing provincial council demarcations; two Coloured governments (one for the Western Cape and the other for the rest of the country); one Indian government; and about eight African governments based on both geographic and ethnic considerations, and making use, where necessary, of the current homelands. (It was not made plain how urban Africans were to be represented, but this was clearly envisaged.) Parliament would delegate to the legislative assemblies the maximum powers commensurate with good government, and with the purpose

of limiting areas where race conflicts could take place. Sir de Villiers stated¹ that the party had still to decide on the immediate legislative, executive, and fiscal powers to be devolved on the community governments. These might eventually include, for instance, the powers of the present provincial councils, plus matters like housing, social welfare and pensions, and education.

When these governments were functioning, the Departments of Bantu Administration, Coloured Affairs, and Indian Affairs would be phased out.

- (b) Joint standing committees would be established, consisting of Members of Parliament and members of each of the legislative assemblies. These committees would provide the liaison structure required when Parliament contemplated legislation affecting any particular community.
- (c) Referring to the Coloured people, the party's constitutional committee considered that any scheme envisaged "should not exclude the possibility of the Coloured community becoming part of the same federal community unit as one or more of the White community units". According to Press reports, however,² Sir de Villiers rejected the suggestion that a way be left open for a possible future merger of White and Coloured interests.
- (d) A Federal Assembly would be created consisting of at least 150 (apparently, about 165) members. Each of the legislative assemblies would appoint three representatives to this Assembly, and "an additional 120 should be elected on the basis of a formula reflecting the proportional contribution of each community or unit to the Republic, measured in terms of the country's gross domestic product". Sir de Villiers said that this formula had still to be worked out.
- The Federal Assembly would have an executive and civil service. It would elect a Chief Executive Officer, who would nominate members of the Assembly to be members of the Executive Committee (Cabinet). Portfolios would be allocated to executive members in accordance with nominations by a Minister of Federal Affairs in Parliament.
- Parliament would, from time to time, determine the powers which it would delegate to the Federal Assembly.
- (e) The existing (White) Parliament would remain sovereign over all matters except those which were the peculiar and intimate concern of the legislative assemblies. The constitutional committee suggested that Parliament should have the right to veto anything done by the Federal Assembly and legislative assemblies; but Sir de Villiers did not accept this suggestion.

¹ *Sunday Express*, 10 September; *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 September.
² *c.f. Sunday Tribune*, 27 August.

⁸ *Star*, 21 August.
⁹ *Ibid.*

The committee stated that "if Parliament comprises only representatives of the White community, this will guarantee to the White voter that the development of the federal plan will be in the hands of his Parliament. . . . Our recommendations make it clear that the decisions as to whether such (White) control should be relinquished in any sphere or at any time would remain in the hands of the White electorate — and your committee does not envisage such control being abandoned in the foreseeable future". It conceded, however, the possibility one day "of a South African society in which one or more, or all, of the Non-White communities could share responsibility with the White community in those matters of common concern which cannot be devolved upon the constituent elements". Sir de Villiers emphasized that the White Parliament "as it exists to-day" would continue as the sovereign body.

- (f) The constitutional committee stated that it had not completed its investigation of fiscal arrangements. It recommended, however, that the maximum possible powers of taxation be given to the legislative assemblies; that the main taxing authority be Parliament; that, initially, Parliament should appropriate money to the Federal Assembly, which would decide on its allocation; and that Parliament should vote additional sums as subsidies to the legislative assemblies, the allocation of these moneys being done by the Federal Assembly. Various leaders of the Black community, canvassed by the *Rand Daily Mail*,³ rejected the plan because it was based on the maintenance of White supremacy.

THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY

Main principles

Shortly before the Progressive Party's annual congress the chairman of its national executive, Mr. Ray Swart, restated¹ its main principles as being:

- (a) a rejection of racial discrimination;
- (b) recognition of individual merit as the yardstick for advancement in society;
- (c) equal opportunities for all, irrespective of race or colour.

Future election contests

At their national congress, held in Johannesburg during July, the Young Progressives recommended that the party should contest elections wherever it had support, regardless of whether or not a seat was marginal, when a split Opposition vote might result in a

¹ Edition of 31 August.
² *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 August.

Nationalist victory. The aim should be to attract verligtes from both the N.P. and the U.P.

The combined national congress of the party, which took place near Pretoria the following month, accepted this recommendation, deciding to set a target of contesting about 60 seats at the next parliamentary general election (treble the previous number). Mr. Colin Eglin, the leader of the party, urged that it should become the base for "verligte power".

Mrs. Helen Suzman claimed² that Sir de Villiers Graaff, too, had rejected any idea of an election pact. In a Press interview on 23 July, he is reported to have declared that "an electoral or formal understanding with any other political party would seriously harm the United Party, the entire Opposition cause, and would undoubtedly favour the Government at the next general election".

Federal policy

Dr. Zac de Beer, then chairman of the party's political advisory committee, reminded the congresses³ that, as far back as 1962, the Progressives had advocated a federal form of government, following recommendations by the Molteno Commission. It must be accepted that diversity existed in South Africa. There was, thus, virtue in engineering the greatest possible decentralization of forces, and bringing about the greatest measure of local self-government.

Others were now advocating federalism, Dr. de Beer said. But the United Party was abusing the word. It would not be federation if there were one sovereign body in a country which in its own discretion, variable from time to time, allowed other bodies — which might operate within its territory—the right to carry on certain functions. The end picture presented by the National Party was not federation either, but rather a confederation of independent states. There was, however, a good deal that was positive in the doctrine of separate development and separate freedoms, and what was positive the Progressives would accept.

It was part of the Progressives' federal concept, Dr. de Beer continued, that wherever in South Africa there was an area with a certain unique predominant nature, then the party would move towards establishing that area as a separate and autonomous province. By "autonomous", something less than complete independence was envisaged. Federation might be defined as the existence of co-ordinate sovereignties, with powers that did not overlap, within the same state. However, if any of the homelands had become independent when a federation was introduced, or wished for independence, this would not be opposed. Such home-

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 September.
³ Various newspapers of 21 August.

lands, together with states in Southern Africa that had never been part of the Republic, could be invited to become provinces of a federal republic if there were advantages on both sides in such an arrangement.

The provincial boundaries of South Africa should be substantially re-drawn, Dr. de Beer said, to take into account demographic, economic, and other factors. It would not be regarded as anathema to put together in the same province people of different racial groups. The Government's separate freedom policy had foundered on the rock of homeland consolidation. The Progressives would delimit provinces without having to shift populations over massive distances.

The national congress accepted this federal concept. It called upon the Government, in the latter's current plan for the consolidation of KwaZulu, to create a viable unit on geographical, and not on racial, lines, and urged that no one — regardless of race — should be forced out.

In opening the congress,⁴ Mr. Colin Eglin had stressed that constitutional reform would have to be a product of Blacks and Whites working and thinking together.

The question of franchise qualifications, as agreed upon in 1960,⁵ was raised but not pursued. It was pointed out that it was already policy to adjust the proposed income and/or property qualifications, by administrative means, in accordance with changes in the real value of money, and that this had been done.⁶

Nomenclature

Congress decided to abandon the use of any collective term, such as "non-white", to describe people of colour, and, instead, to refer to those not of European origin as Africans, Coloured people, and Asians.

Joint discussions

Before the congress, Progressive Party leaders had held discussions on national issues, behind closed doors, with some 50 especially-invited Afrikaans-speaking experts in various fields—academics, businessmen, farmers, and others. Critical examination of the party's policies was invited, without involving the guests in any adherence to the party.⁷

During September Mr. Eglin, Mrs. Helen Suzman, and other senior party members toured the homelands, for discussions with African leaders of various shades of opinion there.

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 August.

⁵ See 1959-60 *Survey*, page 14.

⁶ *Star*, 22 August.

⁷ *Sunday Express*, 6 August; *Star*, 7 August.

THE LAND AND LABOUR PARTY

It was announced in September¹ that a Land and Labour Party had been formed, under the chairmanship of Mr. Jan Cloete. Its primary concern would be to safeguard the future of White workers, but it aimed also at securing a fair deal for Black workers. The party stood for White trade unions only in White areas, and for the cultural freedom of Black homelands, but without their being granted sovereign independence, and without further "territorial concessions". It supported the view that a Coloured homeland should be created.

SUBSEQUENT BY-ELECTIONS

Parliamentary by-elections were held in Caledon and Malmesbury on 8 November, the Nationalists retaining both seats. The results indicated that there had been little or no change in the political scene in the rural Cape. The United Party did not contest the election in Malmesbury. The voting was:

<i>Caledon</i>		<i>Malmesbury</i>	
N.P.	6 054	N.P.	7 313
U.P.	4 020	P.P.	745
Percentage poll	89.5	H.N.P.	393
		Ind.	58
		Percentage poll	57.2

The National Party also retained the four seats that were contested on 29 November, with increased majorities in two constituencies, but losing votes to the United Party in the other two. The results were:

<i>Wakkerstroom</i>		<i>Klip River</i>	
N.P.	4 609	N.P.	5 227
U.P.	1 574	U.P.	4 995
H.N.P.	583	Percentage poll	81.6
Percentage poll	68.2		
<i>Johannesburg West</i>		<i>Vereeniging</i>	
N.P.	5 345	N.P.	5 271
U.P.	3 903	U.P.	3 193
P.P.	559	H.N.P.	326
Percentage poll	60.8	P.P.	192
		L.L.P.	31
		Percentage poll	62.3

¹ *Sunday Express*, 24 September.

ATTITUDES OF INDIANS

MEETINGS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN COUNCIL

According to various Press releases and issues of the official publication *Fiat Lux*, the S.A. Indian Council has concerned itself with such matters as the impact of the Group Areas Act and the need for better social amenities in Indian group areas, and has made recommendations for the abolition of provincial barriers on Indian movement, the speedier conversion of local affairs and consultative committees into bodies with executive power, and the promotion of Indians in educational services. Periodic meetings have been held between the Council's Executive Committee and Cabinet Ministers who are responsible for matters to be raised.

SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN COUNCIL AMENDMENT ACT, No. 67 OF 1972

1. This Amendment Act provided that, after consultation by the Minister with the Indian Council, the State President may, by proclamation, declare that the membership of the Council shall be increased, from a number not exceeding 25 to a number not exceeding 30. The State President will determine how many members will be appointed and how many elected, the procedure for elections, and the qualifications for membership of the Council and for the franchise.

(The Minister of Indian Affairs said, during the debate in the House of Assembly,¹ that for the time being there would be 25 appointed and 5 elected members. The future composition would be discussed with the Council: after such consultation the number of elected members could be changed from time to time by proclamation. Serving members would continue to serve as appointed members until the term of office of the existing Council expired in August 1974.)

2. The composition of the Executive Committee of the Council will be unchanged, i.e. it will consist of a chairman appointed by the Minister from among the Council members, and four members elected by the Council itself.
3. The Council has thus far had advisory powers only. In future the Executive Committee will deal with certain matters in so far as they affect Indians and to the extent to which power to deal with these matters has been delegated to the Executive

¹ 21 and 24 March. Hansard 8 cols. 3796, 4110-1.

The matters concerned are:

- (a) education;
- (b) community welfare; and
- (c) such other matters as the State President may, from time to time, determine by proclamation in the *Gazette*. Any such proclamation must be tabled in Parliament.

Mr. R. M. Cadman said in the Assembly² that the United Party would support the Bill because it was an improvement on the existing position, but did not consider that the measure went far enough. His party would like to see the Council a wholly elective body, with greater executive functions. He objected to the wide powers to be granted to the Minister, considering that Parliament should have some control over the number of elected members, the conduct of elections, and other matters.

Mrs. Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party did not support the Bill.³ "I think that it is an impertinence in this day and age", she said, "to offer the Indian population of South Africa . . . this pale substitute of an elected council". The Bill offered no meaningful political rights, and would certainly not conciliate the political aspirations of the Indian people.

Replying to various matters raised during the debate, the Minister stated⁴ that, for the time being, Parliament would not appropriate moneys direct to the Council: financial arrangements would be controlled by the Department of Indian Affairs. The Council would carry out functions assigned to it within the framework of funds voted for such services by Parliament on the Departmental vote.

For the immediate future (as at present) the Council would have no Hansard. Members had themselves decided that minutes of proceedings should be kept instead, for the information of the Department and of members. Meetings were not automatically open to the Press.

Asked by the Press to comment on the Bill, Mr. A. M. Rajab, chairman of the Council's Executive Committee said⁵, "I wish to make it perfectly clear that I have always striven to make the Council a fully elected body, chosen by the Indian people themselves, and have made representations to the Government for the realization of this objective as quickly as possible. I am convinced that the sooner this can be realized, the sooner can the present hard-worked and often misunderstood nominated Council hand over its enormous task." He added, "Of course we are not satisfied (with the Bill) but if we refuse to accept what has been given to us we will be back in the position we were in in 1946. Then it was all or nothing — and we asked for all and got nothing."

¹ Col. 3799-3801.

² Col. 3820-4.

³ Col. 3897, 4213-4.

⁴ Natal Daily News, 16 March; Rand Daily Mail, 29 March.

NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS

At its first provincial congress, the recently-revived Natal Indian Congress decided to boycott the Indian Council and not to put forward the names of any of its members for the five elected seats.

There was division of opinion about the membership of the Congress. Some delegates, notably from the Durban Central branch, proposed a change of name to the People's Congress, to include members of all Black communities. Black solidarity, it was stated, was necessary for an effective Black opposition to "racist domination". A motion to this effect was defeated by only two votes. The opponents considered that, at the present stage, it was practical and realistic to confine membership to Indians, inspiring them to strive for a united democratic South Africa. Congress would, however, "co-operate with the organizations of all other oppressed peoples".⁶

⁶ *The Leader*, 28 January; *Star*, 1 May; *Reality*, May.

ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS

DEFINITION OF BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS

The emergence of Black Consciousness was discussed on pages 42 *et seq* of last year's *Survey*. It was pointed out that, according to Mr. Barney Pityana of the South African Students' Organization (Saso) and other spokesmen, there is no close parallel with the Black Power concept as this exists in other countries.

On 16 February Mr. Patrick Laurence of *The Star* quoted from the Saso manifesto: "The Black man must build up his own value system, see himself as self-defined and not as defined by others". From this perspective, it was stated, the Black man rediscovers his intrinsic worth as a person and discards White-tainted perceptions of himself as a problem, a source of labour, or an object of pity. A sense of pride and Black solidarity result. "But the Blackness referred to is not confined to Africans. In this context, Black means anyone who is not White, anyone who is discriminated against because of colour."

NOMENCLATURE

As mentioned in previous *Surveys*, the S.A. Institute of Race Relations and others have for long been searching for an acceptable collective term for those South Africans who are not classified White. When operating in a society which differentiates between people on the grounds of skin colour or racial descent it is essential, however repugnant, when describing legislative measures, party political attitudes, educational and other services, to refer specifically to peoples of various racial groups. For purposes of brevity, a collective term for those who are usually discriminated against is often necessary. But it has for long been recognized that the term "Non-White" gives offence. Being a negative description, it detracts from human dignity.

At its Executive Committee meeting in July, the Institute of Race Relations decided to use the term "Black" when a collective word is essential, but wherever possible to speak, rather, of "Africans, Coloured people, and Asians". (It should be added that terms such as "Bantu" have to be employed when referring to legislative measures and systems which bear these specific names.) It is recognized that not all Coloured people and Asians — or indeed Africans — wish to be referred to as "Black"; but the consensus of opinion appears to be that this term is preferable to "Non-White".

It is, once again, noteworthy how many of those who have to face the stigma of prosecution are, apparently, not convicted. Again, there have been suicides since the last *Survey* was compiled. A White policeman who probably faced prosecution hanged himself, and another White man, who had been charged, flung himself from the top of a skyscraper the day after being released on bail.⁹

⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 November, and *Sunday Express*, 19 December 1971.

MEASURES FOR SECURITY AND THE CONTROL OF PERSONS

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND EQUIPMENT

According to the official Estimates of Expenditure for 1972-3,¹ the following sums are budgeted for Defence:

	R
<i>Revenue Account</i>	
Defence ²	335 336 000
Buildings for defence other than houses	40 000
<i>Loan Account</i>	
Public Works	3 267 550
Housing of personnel	3 919 950
Purchase of shares of the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of S.A.	8 730 000
	R351 293 500

The latest published information regarding the strength of the Defence Force was summarized on page 63 of last year's *Survey*.

During discussion of his Vote in the Assembly on 27 April³, the Minister of Defence said that all the construction work on the Decca navigator system round the coasts had been completed. Receivers had been installed in ships; Air Force installations had progressed far; and maps had reached the stage of completion.

He hoped that the Advokaat project would be completed by October, the Minister continued. This is an underground maritime headquarters in the Southern Cape, connected with Walvis Bay and Durban as advance bases.

Three Satellite Radar Stations have now been completed—at Mariepskop in the mountains of the Eastern Transvaal, Ellisras near the Limpopo frontier, and Mafeking. A mobile radar unit ranges the northern and north-eastern Transvaal. Computers at these stations relay data to the subterranean nerve centre of the Northern Air Defence Sector of the S.A. Air Force at Devon, near Springs.⁴

On 8 September *The Star* quoted the latest issue of *The Military Balance* of the Institute for Strategic Studies as having reported that the South African Navy has nine frigates (five held

¹ R.P. 2/1972, Votes 18 and 32; R.P. 3/1972, Votes B, K and P.

² R18 836 000 more than during the previous year.

³ Hansard 12 cols. 5787-5799.

⁴ *Sunday Times*, 17 September.

in reserve), three submarines, ten coastal minesweepers (seven in reserve), one escort minesweeper, two destroyers, five seaward-defence boats, and one fleet-replenishment tanker. Six corvettes are on order.⁵

Again according to the Institute for Strategic Studies, the Republic has 800 armoured cars, about 25 Saracen armoured troop-carriers, 100 Centurion tanks, 20 Comet tanks, and 50 Ferret scout-cars.

As noted last year, South Africa has produced an air-to-air rocket, called Voorslag. Cactus anti-aircraft missiles have been jointly invented and financed by France and South Africa: it was announced in August that the United States was to manufacture 3 600 of these, under licence.⁶ South Africa is building two marks of the French Mirage supersonic jet fighters.

In his speech on his Vote, quoted earlier, the Minister of Defence said that the Republic could no longer be isolated by arms boycotts: it was self-sufficient so far as domestic requirements were concerned. South Africa could manufacture cannons of calibres varying between 20 mm. and 260 mm. bored and 20 mm. and 160 mm. ground, together with a wide series of calibres and models of rifles. It was independent in respect of armoured cars; and was producing a radio beacon for parachute troops and a man-pack transmitting/receiving communication system for use by the commandos. Machine pistols are being manufactured.⁷

BLACK MEMBERS OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

The Minister went on to say⁸ that the S.A. Coloured Corps was a Permanent Force unit. Salaries had been improved. Nevertheless, recruiting for the Corps had not been as successful as had been hoped. He intended discussing with the Minister of Coloured Affairs and the Executive of the Coloured Persons' Representative Council the possible establishment of a special service battalion, on a voluntary basis, for Coloured men. After 10 to 12 months' training, men would be drafted to the Permanent Force, especially the Navy and Army. Instructors would have to be trained first. If this scheme succeeded it could be extended to Indians in Natal, but not, at the present stage, to Africans.

(As noted in a subsequent chapter, Black men, including Africans, are serving as fully-armed members of the Police Force, guarding the Republic's borders with the Caprivi Strip.)

VOTE FOR SECURITY SERVICES

In the State's Budget for 1972-3,⁹ a sum of R5 500 000 was voted as a contribution to the Security Services Special Account, set up in terms of Act 81 of 1969. (This was R1 985 000 more than in the preceding year.)

⁵ Star, 26 July.

⁶ Rand Daily Mail, 31 August.

⁷ Ibid., 27 April.

⁸ Cols. 5838-40, 5859-60.

⁹ R.P. 2/1972 Vote 4.

POTGIETER COMMISSION'S REPORT

A one-man commission, consisting of Mr. Justice Potgieter, was set up in 1969 to enquire into matters relating to the security of the State. The Prime Minister announced later that a parliamentary committee under his chairmanship, consisting of equal numbers of members of the government and the opposition, would decide how much of the Potgieter report could be released without prejudice to the country's security. Following this committee's deliberations, an abridged version of the commission's report was published during February, as R.P. 102/1971. The Minister of Justice said¹⁰ that the commission's recommendations had been adopted *in toto*.

Mr. Justice Potgieter recommended that all intelligence relating to the continued existence and security of the State, and the vulnerabilities and capacities of an enemy or potential enemy, should be centralized in one Department of State, headed by a Secretary for Security Intelligence, and under the control of the Prime Minister. This department should be the existing Bureau for State Security, constituted basically as it already was.

Existing departmental intelligence services (i.e. those of the Police, Defence Force, and other State Departments) should be retained, and these services should appoint liaison representatives at the Bureau to assist in an advisory capacity in preparing the national intelligence estimate, to be submitted to the Prime Minister for consideration by the State Security Council.

Except in so far as it may be necessary for the S.A. Police to collect information covertly for the purposes of investigating offences connected with the security of the State, it should be the exclusive function of the Bureau to collect information covertly. Other Departments should be allowed to collect overtly data relating to their functions (e.g. information on road communications obtained by the Department of Defence), but, in general, it should be left to the Bureau, too, to collect even by overt means intelligence relating to State security.

It should be left to the Bureau to evaluate intelligence. Other departments, for example the Security Police, should forward such information in raw form, with an indication of the reliability value the department concerned attached to the information.

As was already the case, the Bureau should not be vested with any powers of arrest, detention, entering of premises, or other similar police work. Nor should it have powers in regard to the combating of a threat to the security of the State. The Bureau's activities should at all times be restricted to matters which have an actual connection with the security of the State.

Mr. Justice Potgieter recommended legislative measures to create a State Security Council, and to amend Sections 10 and 29 of

¹⁰ Assembly, 8 June, Hansard 18 col. 9083.

the General Law Amendment Act of 1969. The legislation that resulted is outlined below.

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AND STATE SECURITY COUNCIL ACT, No. 64 OF 1972

This Bill was introduced by the Prime Minister during May, and was supported by the United and Progressive Parties.¹¹

- (a) It set out the functions and duties of the Bureau for State Security, and of other departments of State, in regard to security intelligence.
- (b) It established a State Security Council, consisting of:
 the Prime Minister as chairman;
 the senior Minister of the Republic, if he is not a member under any other provision;
 the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Police;
 such other Ministers as the Prime Minister may from time to time co-opt as members;
 the Secretary for Security Intelligence;
 the Commandant-General of the S.A. Defence Force;
 the Secretaries for Foreign Affairs and for Justice;
 the Commissioner of the S.A. Police;
 such other heads of departments of State as the Prime Minister may from time to time co-opt.
- (c) The Act set out the functions of the State Security Council, which are, at the request of the Prime Minister, to advise the Government on the formulation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the country and the manner in which this should be implemented; to advise on a policy to combat any particular threat to the security of South Africa; and, on the recommendation of the Bureau, to determine intelligence priorities.
- In terms of Proclamation R192 of 4 August the post of Secretary for Security Intelligence was created (the incumbent was previously designated Security Adviser to the Prime Minister). The present incumbent is General H. J. van den Bergh.

GENERAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT, No. 102 OF 1972: PROVISIONS RELATING TO SECURITY OF THE STATE

Sections 10 and 25 of the 1972 Act amended Sections 10 and 29, respectively, of the General Law Amendment Act of 1969.¹² In the following paragraphs, words that were added are in italics, while those omitted are enclosed in square brackets.

(a) **Section 10**

"Any person who has in his possession or under his control any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information

¹¹ Assembly 24 May, Hansard 16 cols. 7923-34.

¹² See 1969 Survey, page 35.

which relates to munitions of war or any military, police or security matter, and who publishes it or directly or indirectly communicates it to any person in any manner or for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the Republic, *and who at the time of such publication or communication was aware of or should reasonably have suspected that such sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information related to munitions of war or any military, police or security matter*, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R1 500 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, or to both such fine and such imprisonment."

(b) **Section 29(1)**

"(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law contained, no person shall be [compellable] *compelled*, and no person shall be permitted or ordered to give evidence or to furnish any information in any proceedings in any court of law or before any body or institution established by or under any law or before any commission as contemplated by the *Commissions Act, 1947*, as to any fact, matter or thing or as to any communication made to or by such person, and no book or document may be produced in any such proceedings, if [a certificate] *an affidavit* purporting to have been signed by the [Prime Minister or any person authorized thereto by him or purporting to have been signed by any other] *Minister responsible in respect of such fact, matter, thing, communication, book or document, or, in the case of a provincial administration or the territory of South West Africa, the Administrator concerned*, is produced to the court of law, body [or], institution or commission concerned . . . to the effect that the said *Minister or Administrator, as the case may be, has personally considered the said fact, matter, thing, communication, book or document [affects the interests of the State or public security and that the disclosure thereof will, in the opinion of the Prime Minister or said person so authorized or other Minister, as the case may be, be prejudicial to the interests of the State or public security] and that, in his opinion, it affects the security of the State and that disclosure thereof will, in his opinion, prejudicially affect the security of the State.*"

The Bill was presented to the Assembly by the Minister of Justice on 8 June. Mr. M. L. Mitchell said that the official Opposition welcomed it.¹³

¹³ Hansard 18 cols. 9083-90. See 1969 Survey, page 35, for criticism of the original Act.

**SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNISM AMENDMENT ACT,
No. 2 OF 1972**

1. In terms of the principal Act as amended,¹⁴ the Minister of Justice had power, by notice in the *Gazette*, to prohibit certain persons from:
- being or becoming office-bearers, officers, or members,
 - making or receiving any contribution of any kind for the direct benefit, or
 - participating in any way in any activity,
- of any particular organization or any organization of a nature, class, or kind specified in the notice, except with the written consent of the Minister or a duly authorized magistrate.

Those who could be so prohibited were all listed and banned persons, or those who were office-bearers, officers, or members of any organization which has been declared unlawful.

In terms of the 1972 amendment, those who can be so prohibited are all listed and banned persons, or those who at any time before or after any organization has been declared unlawful, were or are office-bearers, officers, or members of that organization.

When introducing the Bill, the Minister of Justice said¹⁵ that the amendment expressed the Government's original intention. It had always been desirable, for example, for the Minister to be able to prohibit persons who were members of the African National Congress from joining student organizations or trade unions, in case they promoted subversive activities within these bodies. It was an almost impossible task to prove that a particular person had been a member of the A.N.C. at the time when that organization was declared unlawful. However, a recent court case had cast doubt upon the Government's original intentions, which were now to be more expressly set out.

2. Further sections of the Act¹⁶ simplified the procedure for the registration of new newspapers, and for granting exemptions from clauses of banning orders which required the persons concerned to report regularly to the police.

**GENERAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT, No. 102 OF 1972: PROVISIONS
RELATING TO ATTORNEYS, NOTARIES AND CONVEYANCE
ADMISSION ACT**

Section 32 of the Attorneys, Notaries and Conveyancers Admission Act of 1934 provided that a member of these professions may not practise as such while he is struck off the rolls or suspended. Unless with the written consent of the law society

¹⁴ Section 5 *ter*.

¹⁵ Assembly, 7 February, Hansard 2 col. 454.

¹⁶ Amending Sections 6 *bis* and 10 *quat* of the principal Act.

concerned, he may not, while struck off the rolls or suspended, be employed in any capacity whatsoever connected with these professions. The Amendment Act of 1972 laid down that if such a person is to be employed in some capacity by a practitioner, in cases where he has been struck off the rolls under the Suppression of Communism Act, he must obtain the consent of the Minister of Justice as well as that of the law society.

The Minister said¹⁷ that the reason for the amendment was that the Natal Law Society had granted permission for Mr. Rowley Arenstein (who had been imprisoned for four years under the Suppression of Communism Act and was both banned and listed) to enter employment with his former articled clerk, who was now an attorney. "It did not take long before Arenstein was once again an attorney in everything but name. I forbade him by way of further restriction orders to carry on with this work, but agreed, after representations were made, for him to carry on with his work in connection with the recent Pietermaritzburg terrorist trial."¹⁸

PROHIBITION OF GATHERINGS

As described in a subsequent chapter, there were protests and demonstrations by students at English-medium White universities and at Black universities during the second quarter of 1972.

On 7 June Government Notice 999 (replaced by No. 1017) was issued. As amended, it stated: "Deeming it necessary for the maintenance of the public peace, the Minister of Justice prohibits the assembly of any public gathering of a political nature, that is to say, a public gathering at which any form of state or any principle or policy of the government of a state is propagated, defended, attacked, criticised, or discussed, or which is held in protest against anything; with the exception of such a public gathering which takes place, for as long as it lasts, within the walls of a building", in 20 magisterial districts, from the date of the notice until 8 July. Magistrates of districts might grant exemptions. This action was taken under the Riotous Assemblies Act. On 15 June Government Notice 1104 was gazetted, adding a further district to the list.

The Minister is reported¹⁹ to have said that he had taken these steps in view of the "defiant and provocative conduct of students and others at certain universities, and in view of certain information in the Government's possession."

Further action was taken for a longer period, under the Suppression of Communism Act, in respect of two areas of central Cape Town (including the land around the Anglican Cathedral) in terms of Government Notice 1389 of 11 August. From then until

¹⁷ Assembly, 2 June, Hansard 17 col. 8698.

¹⁸ See 1971 Survey, page 85. Mr. Arenstein was helping to assist the detainees or their relatives.

¹⁹ Star, 7 June.

11 August 1974 all assemblies or gatherings in these areas were banned if they were likely to promote aims of communism, or were political meetings or demonstrations as described above. Expressly exempted were bona fide divine services, and trading.

RESTRICTION (BANNING) ORDERS ON PERSONS

On 12 May the Minister of Justice said in the Assembly²⁰ that 34 banning orders on persons had been withdrawn during the previous twelve months, 21 orders were relaxed, and 83 had not been renewed on expiry. As at 30 April there were 237 restricted persons. A list of their names was gazetted on 28 July²¹; they included 28 Whites.

The Minister stated²² in June that 563 persons were then "listed" under the Suppression of Communism Act, of whom 23 were subject also to banning orders. Of these, six were living abroad. During 1971, he said,²³ one person was warned by a magistrate to refrain from engaging in activities considered to be furthering any of the aims of communism.

During the year under review, one Coloured, one Indian, and three African men whose banning orders had expired were re-banned for further periods of five years. Another African was placed under restrictions for a further two years.

A five-year banning order on Professor Raymond Hoffenberg, now living in Britain, expired in July. Under the Suppression of Communism Act, however, he may still not be quoted in South Africa unless permission is granted by the Minister of Justice. Questioned by the Press, the Minister said that he did not propose to give such permission in Professor Hoffenberg's case.

The banning orders on Mrs. Helen Joseph and Miss Molly Anderson expired at the end of October, and were not renewed. Both women are still "listed", however, thus may not be quoted.

Three prominent churchmen were among those banned for five years in 1972. One of them was the Rev. Basil Moore, a former acting general secretary of the University Christian Movement, who was also placed under house arrest. Because of the persecution of his family by unknown persons and his children's consequent state of fear, he decided to leave South Africa. The other two were Anglican churchmen who, as described in a subsequent chapter, had shortly before been expelled from South West Africa. One of them was Mr. David de Beer, who had just been appointed to a post with the Christian Institute, and the other was the Rev. Steven Hayes. When Mr. de Beer was banned, in June nine Anglican Bishops signed a protest, as did a number of prominent lay persons and members of his congregation. The

²⁰ Hansard 14 cols. 7057-8.

²¹ *Government Gazette* 3621, *Government Notice* 1307.

²² Assembly, 2 June, Hansard 17 col. 1138.

²³ Assembly, 21 March, Hansard 8 col. 647.

Christian Institute arranged a Mass in thanksgiving for the witness that he and other restricted persons had given to Christ's love of the poor, at which a sermon was preached by Father Cosmas Desmond (placed under house arrest in 1971).²⁴ The security police questioned a number of those who attended the service.

When Mr. Hayes was placed under restrictions, the following month, the Archbishop of Cape Town deplored the banning order, and the National Union of S.A. Students held a protest demonstration.

Father Desmond's house arrest order confined him to his home all weekends and on public holidays. He contravened the order to preach at the service on 2 July, after Mr. de Beer was banned, and subsequently attended Mass every Sunday. On 30 July he preached in a Methodist Church at a service of praise for the courage of Christians who had suffered for their convictions. No action was taken against him, however, and on 15 September he received a notice signed by the Minister of Justice, relaxing his order of house arrest between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. on Sundays "for the sole purpose of attending bona fide religious services".²⁵

Others who were placed under house arrest during 1972 included Mr. Sabelo Ntwasa, an official of the University Christian Movement, and Mr. M. D. Naidoo, who had just completed a five-year prison sentence under the Suppression of Communism Act. After completing a nine-year sentence for a political offence Mr. William Khanyile was restricted for the two years to a small village in a rural area of Natal. Further banning orders are mentioned in relevant chapters of this *Survey*.

During March, many of the restricted persons and a number of others fasted over the Easter weekend, or for a week, as a sign of protest against punishment without trial. A protest demonstration was held by the Black Sash and university students.

BANISHMENT OF AFRICANS IN TERMS OF THE BANTU ADMINISTRATION ACT

Questioned in the Assembly on 29 February,²⁶ the Minister of Justice said that eight removal orders under the Bantu Administration Act were withdrawn during 1972. Four Africans died in banishment: they included Mr. Paulus Mopeli, whose removal order had been issued as far back as 1950. It would appear that up to eight Africans, including one woman, are still living in banishment.

EMERGENCY REGULATIONS IN THE TRANSKEI

The emergency regulations for the Transkei, gazetted as Proclamation 400 of 1960, remain in force.

²⁴ See 1971 *Survey*, page 67.

²⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 September.

²⁶ Hansard 5 col. 396.

The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said in the Assembly on 14 April²⁷ that 23 Africans were then under removal orders issued by chiefs (the same number as a year previously). The first of these orders had been issued in 1961.

According to the Minister of Police,²⁸ of the 24 Africans who were in detention on 31 March 1971, 20 were eventually released without charges being laid, the remaining four having been charged. Their trial had not been concluded at the date when the Minister spoke. Before being released or charged, these people had been in detention for periods ranging from 103 to 303 days. Since 1 April 1971, a further 6 Africans had been detained, but all were released, after periods ranging from 16 to 167 days, without being charged.

TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND CITIZENSHIP

Questioned in the Assembly,²⁹ the Minister of the Interior replied that, during 1971, 154 990 applications for passports were received from persons in South Africa and South West Africa. All but 83 of these were granted. No figures were available indicating the number of passports that had been withdrawn. Of those who had been refused passports, 12 were permitted to make use of permanent departure permits (three Whites, one Coloured person, four Asians, and four Africans).

There were 34 Whites (no Blacks) who were, during 1971, deprived of South African citizenship. Of these, 27 had, despite warnings, made use of passports of other countries of which they were also citizens; six had obtained the citizenship of other countries by voluntary formal acts; and one was convicted of a drug offence during the first five years after he had acquired South African citizenship.

The removal of 49 Whites and 122 Blacks was ordered in terms of the provisions of the law relating to deportation, the Minister indicated.

He said that no statistics were available in respect of the number of clergy, ministers, and religious workers whose passports had been withdrawn, who had left on exit permits, whose temporary residence permits were cancelled or not extended, or who were declared prohibited immigrants.

Among those who were allowed passports were several Black political leaders who had opposed Government policies, for example Mr. David Curry and Mr. Knowledge Guzana.

Those who were refused passports, or ordered to surrender them, included Mr. Peter Randall, the director of Spro-Cas, a member of staff of the Christian Institute, Mr. Drake Koka and Mr. Saths Cooper of the Black People's Convention, six senior

executive members of Nusas, at least eight other prominent students or ex-students, and an Indian school-boy who had wanted to attend the multi-racial Waterford School in Swaziland.³⁰ When the application by the sixth member of Nusas was refused, the president of this organization said that not a single member of his senior executive committee now had a passport.

It was mentioned in last year's *Survey*³¹ that Miss Shanthie Naidoo was, that year, granted a permanent departure permit by the Department of the Interior, but that this proved useless because the Department of Justice refused to relax her banning order to allow her to proceed to a port of departure. On re-application, both Departments allowed her to leave, during September, a condition being that she should refrain from political activities.

Mr. Roy Wilkins, head of the American National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, was granted a visa to visit South Africa; but an application by Congressman Charles Diggs was refused: he had wanted to re-enter the Republic and to visit South West Africa. Among others who were refused visas were Professor Robert Williams of New York, who was to have addressed a congress of the South African Students' Organization, and the two sons-in-law of the late Chief Albert Luthuli, who had wanted to attend the unveiling of a monument to his memory. Both of his daughters were allowed to come.

It was announced on 7 October that the Minister of the Interior intended refusing visas to academics from other countries who intended coming to South Africa to investigate the operations of overseas business concerns. The *Rand Daily Mail* reported on 12 October that, for this reason, two officials of the African-American Institute of New York had been denied entry.

Several people from overseas have had to leave South Africa because their temporary residence permits were cancelled or not renewed. They included Father Wilfred Jackson of Ladysmith, who had worked at the Limehill resettlement township, the Rev. Dr. Ulrich Lochmann of the Theological College at Mapumulo, and Mr. Mark Douglas-Home, editor of *Wits Student*, in which a controversial cartoon had been published. As mentioned elsewhere, among those who were forced to leave South West Africa were the Rev. Colin O'B. Winter, the Rev. Stephen Hayes, and Mr. David de Beer of the Anglican Church. Another was the Rev. Hans Ludwig Althaus of the Rhenish Mission. Miss Antoinette Halberstadt was required to give up her work as principal of an Anglican school in Owambo, while Mr. John Witherow, Mr. James Corrigan, and Dr. Lothar Engel were refused permission to take up educational posts in that territory.

²⁷ Hansard 10 cols. 433-4.

²⁸ Assembly, 18 February, Hansard 3 cols. 289-90.

²⁹ 29 February, Hansard 5 col. 391; 24 March, Hansard 8 cols. 687-8; 21 April, Hansard 11 col. 875; 19 May, Hansard 15 cols. 1051-2.

³⁰ *Survey*, 17 July.

³¹ Page 71.

ATTACKS ON PROMINENT PEOPLE

During 1972 there was an increased number of anonymous threats and attacks on prominent people, mainly opponents of the Government's racial policies. In September the Rev. Dr. C. F. Beyers Naudé, Director of the Christian Institute, told the Press that a number of duplicated smear letters had been circulated, some issued by the so-called "Patriotic South Africans for South Africa". After various attacks during the weeks that followed, newspapers received anonymous telephone calls, the callers saying "Scorpio has struck again". Leaflets issued by "Scorpio" were found in letter-boxes in Cape Town, attacking "leftists", liberals, Jews, and others. The police offered a reward of R1 000²² for information about the organization.

Many of these actions took place in Cape Town. During 1971, damage was done to the cars of Dr. Michael Whisson and Dr. Francis Wilson of the University of Cape Town, Mr. Barry Streek of Nusas, and the Rev. Theo Kotze, Cape Regional Director of the Christian Institute. Anonymous telephone calls were received late at night by members of this Institute, and communist slogans painted on the walls of the Ecumenical Centre in Cape Town where the Institute has its offices.

These activities were stepped up in 1972, Mr. Theo Kotze being a frequent victim. Petrol bombs were twice thrown at his home, and shots were fired at it, one smashing a bedroom window. Death threats were made in anonymous telephone calls and letters. The tyres of his car were slashed, a communist sign painted on the back walls of his home, and various unrequested delivery vans and taxis arrived there. Mr. Kotze was given police protection.

Two attempts were made to set fire to the offices of the Christian Institute in Cape Town. During September this Institute held its annual meeting in the hall of St. Thomas's Church in Rondebosch: a few hours later the hall was set on fire and badly damaged.

Others whose homes were attacked with petrol bombs were the historian, Mr. Leo Marquard, who was then organizing a Students' Defence Fund, and Mr. Geoff. Budlender, president of the S.R.C. at the University of Cape Town (extensive damage was done). At the time of the attack, Mr. Budlender was addressing a meeting: attempts were made to disrupt the proceedings by scattering sneezing powder on the floor of the hall and throwing a petrol bomb against an outside wall.

Libellous pamphlets were issued falsely under the names of leading churchmen in Cape Town. Mr. Adam Small, a lecturer at the University of the Western Cape, was harassed by the arrival at his home of unrequested furniture vans and delivery

²² *Rand Daily Mail*, 2 October.

lorries. Communist signs and slogans were painted on the homes of the Anglican Dean of Cape Town, Mr. Colin Eglin, leader of the Progressive Party, and Mr. Hamilton Russell, who had taken over the Students' Defence Fund, and on the offices of Nusas, the Progressive Party, and the *Cape Times*. The walls of a Methodist Church in central Cape Town were twice daubed with red paint.

There were attacks in other centres, too. During July, two attempts were made to set fire to Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's car, he has received threatening letters, and his chauffeur's home was set alight.

In Johannesburg, abusive and threatening telephone calls were made to Professor John Dugard, Dean of the Law School at the University of the Witwatersrand. A plastic pool belonging to the children of the Rev. Basil Moore was slashed, and the skinned body of their cat was left on the doorstep. Death threats were made by telephone to Mr. Adam Klein and Mr. Ralph Judah of the S.R.C. at the University: they were given police protection.

Two White men were arrested in Cape Town on 9 October, in connection with the attacks there.

MOVEMENTS-IN-EXILE AND GUERRILLA FIGHTERS

UNITED NATIONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S CONSIDERATION OF VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

During September, shortly after the killing of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Games, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations' Secretary-General, asked the General Assembly to inscribe on its agenda the consideration of acts of violence and terrorism against innocent people. There were misleading reports about Dr. Waldheim's reply at a Press conference, when he was asked whether or not he intended that the activities of "liberation movements" in Southern Africa should be included.

South Africa's Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, then asked the Republic's Ambassador at the United Nations to clarify the matter with Dr. Waldheim. The latter cabled back a verbatim transcript of what he had actually said. He is reported to have added that the reason for his request to the General Assembly "did not relate specifically to the situation in Southern Africa or, indeed, to any other specific situation". In accordance with the Charter, "the Secretary-General must urge peaceful settlement and is against any acts of violence or terrorism as a method of solving problems. Discussing this reply, Mr. Vorster said, "I want to make it clear that if at any time a double standard is applied with regard to terrorism, then South Africa would not continue a day longer with those negotiations." (The Republic's decision to withdraw conditionally from deliberations of the Trusteeship Committee when this Committee decided to admit, as observers, members of African liberation movements, is described in the next chapter.)

By 66 votes to 27, with 33 abstentions, the General Assembly passed a motion calling for "measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms", and for "study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair, and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical change".¹

The South African Ambassador, Mr. Carl von Hirsch, then issued a statement reading, "My delegation voted in favour of inscription on the agenda of the item on terrorism . . . because we are in no doubt that effective steps to prevent terrorism are long overdue and must be taken, and because we remain hopeful that

¹ *Revd Daily Mail*, 14 September.

² *Ibid.*, 25 September.

such steps will be taken by this assembly, notwithstanding the attempts of some members to circumscribe the ambit of the item and to introduce confusion and doubt. I wish to make it clear, however, that our affirmative vote should in no way be interpreted as acceptance of the restricted or ambivalent definition of terrorism which some members evidently have in mind. Terrorism is terrorism so far as we are concerned, and wherever and whenever it may be perpetrated it brings with it the same misery, as those who have been its victims would testify."²

In a speech to the Assembly a few days later, South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, is reported to have re-emphasized that there could be no differentiation between types of terrorism. Terrorism would survive "so long as this and other organizations continue not only to condone the use of force and violence as a means to an end but, in certain circumstances, to support and even to subsidize it". It was inexplicable and unforgivable that United Nations members "should actively, or even obliquely, support in any way programmes of force, violence and terror", while at the same time disavowing South Africa's policy of dialogue and communication. "We must speak with one voice on this scourge (of terrorism), without equivocation".

On 2 November the General Assembly approved a resolution calling upon all member states and the U.N. agencies "to provide moral and material assistance to all peoples struggling for their freedom and independence". The right of such people to use all necessary means at their disposal was recognized. The states and agencies were urged to assist national liberation movements of the territories in Africa, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Organization of African Unity. The voting was 99 to 5, with 23 abstentions. Those voting against the resolution were the United States, Britain, France, South Africa, and Portugal.³

The chairman of the legal committee, Mr. Eric Suy of Belgium, recommended on 9 November that, during the current session of the Assembly, attention should be focussed on the question of defining international terrorism. It was of the utmost importance that the U.N. should express its concern and disapproval, he considered.⁴

FINANCIAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS

A meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Organization of African Unity, held in Addis Ababa during February, decided to increase the special fund for the Dar-es-Salaam-based Liberation Committee by a substantial percentage. A spokesman said that instructions had been given to the Committee to divide the extra money between those liberation movements that were effectively

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 30 September.

⁵ *Revd Daily Mail*, 3 November.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 10 November.

mounting the struggle in various territories, whether by military or political means.¹

As mentioned in previous issues of this *Survey*, in 1970 the World Council of Churches set up a special fund to combat racism and decided to make annual grants from this fund to a number of groups. Movements-in-exile and guerrilla fighters would be included, on the recommendation of the OAU. The money was to be used for humanitarian, not military, purposes. An appeal was made in 1971 for donations to the special fund: it is understood that some have been received.²

The three Nordic Governments, among others, are reported to have given assistance to some groups for humanitarian purposes such as education and health services. Denmark's Foreign Minister said in March that his country was contributing about R650 000 in goods or services (none of it in cash). It would be paid direct to movements that were recognized by the OAU (i.e. not channelled through the OAU's Liberation Committee).

During the same month the chairman of the Evert Vermeer Foundation in Holland announced that, in co-operation with other organizations in that country, a large-scale fund-raising campaign was being launched to raise money for the African National Congress (ex-South Africa), Rhodesia's African National Council, Frelimo in Mozambique, Swapo (ex-South West Africa), and the Dutch branch of the Defence and Aid Fund. No strings would be attached to grants made to the African groups, but the purchase of weapons would not be welcomed.⁴

The British Labour Party is augmenting its funds to aid "liberation movements" by asking for weekly contributions from its branches and from trade unions.⁵

Other organizations that are assisting were mentioned on page 94 of last year's *Survey*.

ACTIVITIES OF GUERRILLA FIGHTERS

Caprivi Strip

Two White South African police sergeants were killed in the Caprivi Strip, in January and April, when vehicles in which they were travelling drove over landmines which had apparently been laid by guerrillas crossing from Zambia. Ten others were injured in these explosions, seriously so in at least seven cases.⁶ It was reported⁷ in January that policemen on border patrol had recovered a number of landmines planted near the road.

African, Coloured, and Indian members of the police force

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 February.

² *Natal Mercury*, 19 August.

³ *Star*, 21 March.

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 March.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Star*, 6 January and 1 April.

⁷ *Sunday Express*, 9 January.

have been serving in the Caprivi Strip together with Whites for some time, being equipped with the same uniforms and weapons.

Rhodesia

According to a Press report,⁸ because of past heavy casualties the Rhodesian movements-in-exile have abandoned plans for direct armed confrontation, and are, instead, aiming at forming armed cells of Africans in rural areas of Rhodesia. The only reported incidents were the explosion of two land mines near the Zambian border in September and October. The first wrecked a private car and injured the driver, while the second killed a Rhodesian soldier on patrol and injured another.

Portuguese territories

It is reported that sporadic fighting between Portuguese security forces and Frelimo and Corcemo guerrillas continues in the Cabo Delgado area in the extreme north-east of Mozambique, and the Vila Cabral area near Lake Malawi, but that the main activity has been in the Tete area around the Cabora Bassa dam project. This area protrudes between Rhodesia, Zambia, and Malawi. The Frelimo men apparently come from Tanzania via Zambia, then, in some cases, via southern Malawi. The dam site itself is well guarded, thus the attacks have been on supply routes such as the railway line linking the village of Tete (a little to the south of the dam) with the coast, and the international road from Rhodesia to Malawi, which passes through the projecting strip of Mozambique. It is thick bush country, providing concealment.

It is reported⁹ that small African settlements have been attacked too, and chiefs murdered or kidnapped, in order to intimidate the people and deter them from reporting Frelimo movements. The Portuguese are resettling scattered groups in large villages for their protection and also to prevent them from giving any assistance to the guerrillas.

During February in particular several trucks travelling along the international road in armed convoys were blown up by landmines, with casualties, and two convoys were fired upon in hit-and-run raids. A train hit a landmine during September: no-one was injured but several coaches and the line were damaged. Bridges along the road have been blown up. The railway line was again cut, in a number of places, in mid-November.

It was reported in May that Portuguese security forces had intercepted and captured a party of 21 Frelimo demolition experts, bearing arms and explosives.

Sporadic fighting continues, too, in the north and east of

⁸ *Star*, 20 April.

⁹ *Star*, 23 June.

Angola. Maintenance of the necessary security forces in the large areas involved is a severe drain on the Portuguese budget.

A Press report¹⁰ stated that a spokesman for the Guinea Liberation Movement claimed that his organization had overrun two-thirds of that country, and had 10 000 men under arms. Portuguese authorities maintain that these claims are much exaggerated.

¹⁰ *Star*, 21 March.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE UNITED NATIONS

For the second year in succession, the United Nations General Assembly refused in December 1971 to endorse the South African delegation's credentials. The action was not intended to unseat the delegation but to serve as a warning to South Africa to change her policies.¹

South Africa was not represented (she is entitled to observer status) at the meeting of the Security Council in Addis Ababa in January.² In an important change of strategy, the Council passed an Argentinian resolution authorizing the Secretary-General to hold consultations with the South African Government over South West Africa (Namibia).³ Later in the year, Dr. Alfred Escher was appointed the Secretary-General's personal representative in respect of this territory. The Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, said that South Africa's future relations with the United Nations would largely be determined by the outcome of the discussions on South West Africa.⁴

Towards the end of 1971 the General Assembly's special political committee approved by 87 votes to one (Portugal) with six abstentions (Belgium, France, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom) a resolution calling on all governments fully to implement the arms embargo against South Africa.⁵

A study published in England in February, *The International Trade in Arms*, concluded that the arms embargo had done no more than temporarily inconvenience South Africa and Rhodesia. South Africa's own arms production, French sales of sophisticated aircraft, missiles, and submarines, and British co-operation had cumulatively enabled South Africa to shrug off the embargo.⁶ These conclusions were borne out by Dr. Barakat Ahmad, rapporteur for the UN Special Committee on Apartheid. He said that despite the embargo imposed in 1963, the value of arms sold to South Africa had quadrupled between 1960 and 1969, and that in 1969 South Africa had imported more arms than all of sub-Saharan Africa put together. Mr. Abdulrahim Farah, retiring chairman of the UN Special Committee on Apartheid, reported to the Secretary-General that the "large-scale expansion of the manufacture of arms, military vehicles and ammunition within

¹ *Star*, 21 December 1971.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 January.

³ *Star*, 11 February.

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 October.

⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 November 1971.

⁶ *Cape Times*, 24 February.

South Africa with the assistance of foreign governments and companies is creating a new situation by which the whole object of the arms embargo might be lost".² Dr. Ahmad said that South Africa's expenditure on sophisticated armaments development was irrelevant to the questions of suppressing internal revolt and threatening neighbouring States. "What the South African regime wants is to make itself an attractive ally to the Western powers and bind itself with them militarily so that they should feel an interest in its stability and survival." The strategy of the South African Government was to constantly "harp on the so-called communist threat in order to entice the Western powers to an alliance and in order to build up a regional group under its domination".⁴

In September the United Nations Fourth Committee, which deals with trusteeship and non self-governing territories, resolved by 78 votes to 13 to grant observer status to guerrilla movements when it discusses South West Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies. South Africa immediately withdrew from the committee's proceedings on these territories, but not from the committee itself. The Prime Minister said his Government wanted "no part in the violation of the Constitution and encouragement of terrorism as well as the further extension of the already known double standard". The chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid replied that "in our view the biggest terrorist of all is South Africa".¹ Portugal also withdrew from the committee's proceedings.²

According to the *Rand Daily Mail* of 3 November, the Special Political Committee adopted five lengthy resolutions, reaffirming certain resolutions passed in previous sessions. One of these called upon the Security Council to invoke economic and other sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations' Charter, with a view to eliminating apartheid. The voting was 96 in favour, three against (Britain, the United States, and Portugal), with 21 abstentions. South Africa was one of about a dozen delegations which were absent. Other resolutions, *inter alia*, requested all international agencies and organizations to deny all aid and commercial or other facilities to South Africa; commended the activities of anti-apartheid movements and called for campaigns to put an end to foreign investment in the Republic.

The resolution calling upon the Security Council to invoke sanctions under Chapter VII was passed by the General Assembly on 15 November, by 100 votes to 4 (the United States, Britain, South Africa, and Portugal), with 21 countries abstaining.

² UN Unit on Apartheid: Arms Embargo against South Africa, New York, June.

³ *Natal Mercury*, 16 August.

⁴ UN Unit on Apartheid, *op. cit.*

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 September.

² *Star*, 10 October.

EUROPE

France

Seven French senators who visited South Africa for ten days in January tabled an 88-page report in the Senate in which they said South Africa was badly misunderstood. The South African was not a racist in the general meaning of the word, having lived alongside Africans for three centuries and seen that fusion was not possible, although co-existence was. The rightness or efficacy of apartheid could be debated, but not the Government's sincerity, when one considered the financial sacrifices the policy imposed on the nation.

Trade links between the two countries were modest, but France was viewed favourably in South Africa, which could have important consequences for French industries and banks. Exports for motor vehicles, transport material, and aircraft made up 72 per cent of French sales to South Africa, and now France was turning from the sales of finished arms to the granting of licences.¹

As stated below, France has played an important role in helping South Africa establish contacts with Black Africa.

The United Kingdom

It was reported in February that there was intensive lobbying of defence policy-makers in Whitehall to persuade the British government to place greater emphasis on maritime defence around the Cape.¹

The British Labour Party is apparently to extend its Southern Africa Solidarity Fund (previously limited to supporting guerrillas in the Portuguese colonies) to include guerrilla movements in South Africa and Rhodesia such as the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress. No conditions will be attached to the grants.² A policy document published in July by the Labour Party's national executive said that the party was committed to total abrogation of any arms agreement with South Africa entered into by the present British Government. A future Labour government would terminate South Africa's trading privileges, refuse her special facilities with the European Economic Community, and repudiate existing agreements in respect of South West Africa. The Labour Party would also support international action against South Africa and the use of trade embargoes — "but would expect parallel action by the international community to re-direct Britain's trade elsewhere".³ A resolution passed at the Labour Party's annual conference in Blackpool asked that a future Labour Government should curb further investment and bring to an end all investment in South Africa, intensify the campaign against emigra-

¹ *Star*, 12 October; *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 October.

² *Star*, 17 February.

³ *Natal Mercury*, 25 March.

⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 July.

tion to South Africa, not acquiesce in South Africa's "illegal presence in Namibia", and cease the supply of NATO arms to Portugal.⁴ Labour Party resolutions do not, however, bind Labour Governments.

In 1971, Britain's purchases from South Africa amounted to R412 587 000 and South Africa's purchases from Britain to R676 144 000.¹

West Germany

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany withdrew its financial support for uranium prospecting in South West Africa. The Government bore 75 per cent of the costs of prospecting which the Urangesellschaft MBH concern in Frankfurt was conducting in collaboration with the British firm Rio Tinto Zinc.² The West German Government also threatened to withdraw financial support from the Max Planck Society if it proceeded with plans to establish an observatory in South West Africa.³

Following a 16-day visit to South Africa as the guest of the South Africa Foundation, the former German minister, Dr. Gerhard Schröder, said that the opposition Christian Democrat party would strengthen West Germany's links with South Africa when it came to power.⁴

The Netherlands

After a visit to the Netherlands, the political correspondent of *The Star* reported that the already uneasy official relations between that country and South Africa could only deteriorate. The conservative Anti-Revolutionary Party saw the situation in South Africa as "complex", and did not wish to intervene. The Christian Historical Union had a long tradition of "building bridges", but had found that apartheid was not a bridge. They did not agree with isolation, however, believing that a prosperous South Africa would have a greater desire to solve its problems. The Democrats of 1966 favoured "more vigorous action on behalf of the underdogs in South Africa," and the Socialist Party thought that "dialogue" was pointless unless "pressure that hurts" was put on the Government. Mr. H. Wieringa said that the Socialists believed that they should give greater public encouragement and financial assistance to the "liberation movements."⁵

A campaign to raise funds for guerrilla movements in South Africa was launched in the Netherlands in May. It had the support of the Dutch Labour Party and the Socialist International.¹

⁴ *Star*, 5 October.

¹ Department of Trade and Industries, London.

² *Windhoek Advertiser*, 8 February.

³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 10 March.

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 April.

⁵ *Star*, 6 October.

¹ *Natal Mercury*, 25 March.

Scandinavia

Following a visit to Zambia in March, the Danish Foreign Minister announced that Denmark would give R650 000 to guerrilla movements in Africa to finance schools and hospitals in liberated areas.² The Netherlands campaign mentioned above, reportedly also had the support of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland.³

Portugal

While visiting London in March to renew the 600-year-old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Rui Patricio, said that Portugal had "the best of relations" with South Africa and that these would continue.⁴

ASIA

Israel

South Africa opened a consulate-general in Israel in April.⁵

China

The Deputy Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Chiao Kuan Hua, told the United Nations that the Chinese people resolutely supported the "heroic struggle" in Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies. But he added that the people in Southern Africa who "have not yet achieved independence are increasingly aware that the only way to overthrow the White colonialist rule and win national liberation is to rely on their own efforts".⁶

Japan

Japan's policy towards South Africa appears to be ambivalent. Japan vehemently attacked apartheid at the Addis Ababa UN meeting in February and eschewed any possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa.¹ (Relations exist at consular level). However, Japanese exports to South Africa increased by 586 per cent from 1961 to 1970 and imports from South Africa by 331 per cent. Trade between the two countries is expected to rise from the 1970 level of R502 000 000 to R1 490 000 000 over the next decade. Efforts are apparently being made to have the Japanese prohibition of direct investment in South Africa relaxed.²

² *Cape Times*, 17 March; *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 April.

³ *Natal Mercury*, 25 March.

⁴ *Natal Mercury*, 15 March.

⁵ *Star*, 19 April.

⁶ *Star*, 4 October.

¹ *Star*, 1 February.

² *Financial Gazette*, 23 July.

AMERICA

The United States

Mr. Nixon's administration continued to show greater sympathy towards South African policies than had those of either of his predecessors. In a report to Congress, Mr. Nixon said the United States would "not condone recourse to violence, either as a means of enforcing submission of a majority to a minority or as a formula for effecting needed social change". The outside world was "witnessing with sober hope the suggestions of change inside South Africa, where questioning voices are being raised... Private companies, many of them American, are considering new ways to open opportunities for African workers. There is an imbalance between the needs of South Africa's active economy and her adherence to racial policies which deprive her of the growing pool of human talent which that economy requires. There is some hope in that anomaly". Southern Africa contained within itself the seed of change.

The US had maintained its arms embargoes in the areas of "minority rule", "stressed the need for self-determination in colonial areas," and "facilitated contact between the races", which was a record "second to none among the major powers". Future policy would be to support progress in Africa by encouraging communication between the races and "making known directly to the parties involved our views on their actions".¹

Mr. Nixon's views were repeated by senior members of his administration. The US Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Mr. George Bush, told the meeting of the Security Council in Addis Ababa that the United States had adhered to her arms embargoes against South Africa and Portugal. The US had also been "second to none" in the enforcement of mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia.²

The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. David Newsom, said the introduction of Blacks into skilled jobs, the "evolution" of Black leaders in the Reserves, and a "certain ferment" within the White community in Southern Africa represented an "evolution toward change". More and more American companies were making an effort to improve the conditions of employment of their Black employees.³ Later in the year, Mr. Newsom denied that US policy towards South Africa had "softened" with the advent of the Nixon administration. It was facile to allege that the United States would intervene on the side of the White regimes in the event of trouble in Southern Africa. By the strict maintenance of arms embargoes towards both South Africa and the Portuguese territories, the US had

¹ Richard Nixon: US Foreign Policy for the 1970's—A Report to the Congress, 9 February.

² US Information Service: *America Reports*, Johannesburg, 16 February.

³ US Information Service: *American News Digest*, Johannesburg, 15 March.

demonstrated its support for self-determination and its desire to avoid any support either for apartheid or colonial rule.¹

The assessment of Southern Africa by the Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, was less optimistic than that of Messrs. Nixon, Bush, and Newsom. In 1971 there had been limited signs of ferment in South Africa and a willingness on the part of some leaders to speak out in favour of progressive changes. But "unfortunately, the indiscriminate application of harsh security legislation detracted from these promising indications of progress".²

At the beginning of April, *The New York Times* published a detailed study of the changes in American policy on Southern Africa. Its conclusion was that the Nixon administration was quietly pursuing a policy of deliberately expanding contacts and communication with the White governments of Southern Africa. These changes had been widely reported in the South African press, but barely noticed hitherto in the American press. They included the sale of small executive jet aircraft to South Africa and of Boeing 707's to Portugal, the ending of the ban against the import of Rhodesian chrome ore in defiance of the United Nations, and a series of abstentions and negative votes in the UN on Southern African resolutions. The policy had generated "unconcealed delight among corporate and other interests that make up the powerful Rhodesian and South African lobbies" in Washington, although this had not been the intention of the policy-makers.³ Earlier in the year it had been reported that the United States was to pay R327 000 000 to the Portuguese Government for the Azores military base.¹

The Washington correspondent of the morning group of South African newspapers, Mr. Raymond Heard, wrote that further evidence of the change in American policy towards South Africa was: the appointment of Mr. John Hurd as ambassador in Pretoria "to establish rapport with the South African establishment"; and a recent cabinet-level decision in Washington to allow the Export-Import Bank to guarantee on liberal terms a R37 000 000 loan to enable General Motors to bid for a South African Railways locomotive contract.²

In August the appointment of Mr. James Baker, a Black diplomat, was announced after what was reported to have been a two-year search by the State department for a man who could bear up under the "psychological pressure of being in a White-supremacist country".³

Four State Department advisers who visited South Africa during the year recommended that the US government allow

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 June.

² *Ibid.*, 8 March.

³ *Ibid.*, 3 and 4 April.

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 31 January.

² *Cape Times*, 17 April.

³ *Sunday Times*, 27 August.

American aid and investment to be made in the Reserves, a policy which they claimed would be supported by Chiefs Matanzima and Buthelezi. Such aid would take the form of, *inter alia*, agricultural assistance to the Transkei and an agricultural school in KwaZulu, technical assistance for the homelands, and leadership training grants.⁴ No decision on the recommendations has yet been made.¹ The four advisers also recommended the appointment of three Black diplomats to South Africa within the year, and claimed that the US embassy in South Africa was in the lead of other embassies in its "association with the oppressed peoples of South Africa".²

Mr. Nixon's African advisory council recommended that the US Government train the unenfranchised majority in South Africa for self government whether or not the South African Government was itself serious about developing the Bantustans.³

Mr. Nixon's policy towards South Africa was endorsed by the Republican Party.⁴ By contrast, the Democratic Party and its 1972 presidential election nominee, Senator McGovern, pledged themselves to "end United States complicity" with Southern Africa's White minority governments should Senator McGovern be elected President. A Democratic administration would not return to the interventionism of the past, but would: abolish American tax credit for US companies and subsidiaries paying taxes to White minority governments in Africa; withdraw South Africa's American sugar quota; press US business in South Africa to take measures for the fullest possible justice for their Black employees; assign Blacks to all levels of the US diplomatic and consular corps in South Africa; vigorously support UN sanctions against Rhodesia (especially chrome imports); give full support to the United Nations' assertion of control over South West Africa; and end all military aid to Portugal.⁵

Senator McGovern said that the Nixon administration's policy failed "to comprehend the degree to which violence is intrinsic to the stability of these minority governments. . . . Tacit and covert support for these regimes can only serve the cause of continued racial oppression". The policy of expanding contacts with South Africa only enhanced the legitimacy of White minority rule.¹

Mr. Charles Diggs, chairman of the House of Representatives sub-committee on Africa and former chairman of the congressional "Black caucus", visited South Africa in 1971, but was subsequently barred from the country. He has said that his campaign for equal rights in South Africa is only just beginning. With

⁴ *Star*, 3 October.
¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 October.
² *Star*, 3 October.
³ *Star*, 5 October.
⁴ *Star*, 21 August.
⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 July.
¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 October.

regard to United States companies in South Africa he said that there was a "force labour situation that protects their huge margins of profit — by their own admission the highest in the world". He intended to call a conference in the United States and draw up an "action agenda", support possible boycotts of South African goods, press US businesses to improve employees' working conditions, and persuade business, labour, and civil rights leaders to visit South Africa.² Mr. Diggs has also started to press the administration to force the termination of further sales of South African gold to the International Monetary Fund under the 1969 agreement. The very urgent human issue of the plight of African mineworkers who suffered conditions akin to "the old-age evil of slavery" had to be injected into the gold debate.³ Mr. Diggs also published a 471-page report on his three special study missions to Africa, predicting a Vietnam-type "holocaust" in South Africa.¹

The administration's "soft" policy was criticized by others too. Most of these critics cited the Azores agreement, the Export-Import Bank loan, the sale of "civilian" jets to South Africa, and the US's violation of sanctions against Rhodesia as evidence.²

A "Washington office on Africa" was opened in October by three anti-apartheid church groups and the American Committee on Africa. Its head, Mr. Edgar Lockwood, said that the office "would work to keep members of the Congress and the Administration informed on political issues which affect the course of political struggle for majority rule" in Southern Africa.¹

The Minister of the Interior, Dr. C. P. Mulder, announced in October that he had had enough of foreign visitors' investigations of foreign companies' employment practices, and would in future refuse them entry to the country.² Subsequently it was reported that two officials of the African-American Institute in New York who wanted to study Black employment conditions had been refused entry to the Republic.³ Earlier in the year, the political reporter of the *Sunday Times*, on his return from Washington, warned that previous refusals of visas had led to a serious deterioration in South African-American relations, and that more refusals would lead to further deterioration.⁴ The Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs said that South Africa's relations with the United States were likely to enter a "delicate phase" with the growth of American pressure-groups in respect of US companies' operations in the Republic.⁵

It was reported in 1972 that United States trade with South

¹ *Ibid.*, 24 January.
² *Ibid.*, 12 September.
³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 September.
⁴ *Star*, 4 February; *Daily Dispatch*, 9 February.
⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 October.
¹ *Ibid.*, 7 October.
² *Ibid.*, 12 October.
³ *Sunday Times*, 27 August.
⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 20 October.

Africa had grown by six per cent in 1971, exports rising from R352 000 000 to R435 000 000 and imports dropping from R202 000 000 to R201 000 000.⁶

The Argentine

A South African/Argentinian chamber of commerce was established in June, with headquarters in Buenos Aires and Johannesburg.¹

Brazil

The Brasilia correspondent of *The Star* reported that Brazil was to make a big effort to improve economic and political relations with Black Africa, but that she was not prepared to accede to South African requests to elevate diplomatic relations between the two countries from ministerial to ambassadorial level. Nor did Brazil have any interest in any "South Atlantic Pact" with the Argentine, Portugal, and South Africa.²

AFRICA

Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland

Relations between South Africa on the one hand and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland on the other deteriorated in 1972. Dissatisfaction with South Africa's "peremptory" failure to consult them as partners in the rand monetary area over devaluation, and the suspension of foreign currency transactions at the end of 1971, led the three countries to establish a commission to examine their relationship with the Republic. The commission advised against their leaving the area, but they are to seek changes in its method of operation, including greater consultation over fiscal and monetary decisions, and guarantees that South Africa will honour their foreign exchange transactions. The question of representation on the board of the South African Reserve Bank was also to be raised.¹

Botswana maintained her policy of keeping links with South Africa to the minimum dictated by economic necessity, while moving towards a closer economic and political alignment with Zambia and Tanzania. South Africa still has no diplomatic representative in Gaborone.² The construction of the Nata-Kazungula road, linking Botswana and Zambia, is due to start in 1973 and be completed by 1977. The road, which will be financed by an American loan, originally encountered strong opposition from South Africa.³ The president, Sir Seretse Khama refuses

⁶ US Information Service: *America Reports*, Johannesburg, 15 March.
¹ *Financial Gazette*, 16 June.
² *Star*, 9 October.

¹ *Financial Gazette*, 28 January.

² *Ibid.*, 24 December 1971.

³ *Daily Dispatch*, 9 August.

to allow guerrilla movements to operate from Botswana,⁴ but does grant asylum to political refugees from South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, and even Lesotho. Several thousand such refugees, the majority of them from Angola, have passed through Botswana.⁵

Lesotho's attitude towards South Africa cooled during the year. The Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, who for six years has helped South Africa promote her policy of "dialogue" in Africa, made several outspoken attacks on apartheid and also slowed down the progress of dialogue. Chief Jonathan intervened to dissuade a representative of the Ivory Coast from holding talks in South Africa, because he felt Lesotho was being "used" by South Africa. Lesotho's proposals for dialogue were based on the Lusaka Manifesto,¹ whose signatories are committed to work for equality and non-racialism throughout Africa. South Africa, it was reported, regards dialogue as a means of making friends and increasing her influence in Africa, which approach is seen as incompatible with the Manifesto. Lesotho has been sending regular reports on political activity in South Africa to African states and asked all African States favouring dialogue to postpone action until a joint approach has been approved by the Organization of African Unity.² Chief Jonathan said that racial discrimination had escalated to such a point that "even the moderates begin to doubt whether force may not be the only solution". The opportunity for a peaceful solution would not endure forever. "The opposition to racism is escalating to such a point where soon there will be no room for dialogue and the victims of the system will see violence as presenting the only chance for the attainment of equality and freedom."³

Later in the year, Chief Jonathan said that South Africa would be to blame if dialogue finally collapsed. It had virtually done so already because Mr. Vorster had "adamantly" refused to discuss peaceful change in South Africa's race policies. Dialogue must now start within South Africa itself.⁴

Lesotho supported the seating of observers from the movements-in-exile at hearings of the United Nations Trusteeship Committee. It saw contact with them as a means of promoting a non-violent settlement in Southern Africa.¹

South Africa has announced that she is to exchange consular representatives with Lesotho. Contrary to usual diplomatic practice, however, there was no simultaneous announcement from Lesotho.²

⁴ *Business South Africa*, February.

⁵ *Star*, 15 March.

¹ See 1969 Survey, p. 78, and *South African Outlook*, September 1969.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 4, 6, and 7 March.

³ *Star*, 21 March.

⁴ *Sunday Times*, 20 August.

¹ *Star*, 13 October; *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 October.

² *Natal Mercury*, 5 August.

Numerous other complaints were made about South Africa over economic matters, involving both the Government and the private sector. Despite the fact that all four countries are partners in a customs union, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were not consulted about the imposition of import controls in November 1971 and they were reportedly investigating the case for collecting their own customs duties. "Concern and anger" were also expressed by the three countries over what they saw as South African attempts to thwart development projects which could endanger established industries in the Republic.³

The Lesotho National Development Corporation, with the endorsement of the Lesotho Government, attacked South African firms which thought they could take advantage of Lesotho and make a "fast cent" by producing inferior goods and selling inferior service.⁴ Lesotho shelved two industrial projects during the year, and also abandoned plans to establish a Japanese motor assembly plant because of pressure from South Africa.

A maize mill—which will go ahead—also encountered opposition from South African interests.¹ Lesotho and South Africa also had a dispute over the former Ox-bow project, known as the Malibamatso scheme. To be viable, the scheme must be able to sell water to South Africa, but South Africa does not want to pay the 14 cents per 4 546 litres which Lesotho is asking.²

Lesotho was reportedly anticipating South African opposition to plastics, electronic components, manufactured steel, and synthetic fibre factories because of the competition they would create.³

The viability of a R5 000 000 plant established by Swaziland Chemical Industries depends on its being able to import cheap ammonia and phosphoric acid from Iran and on selling surplus output in the Republic. Despite "tremendous pressure" from Pretoria, the Swazis refused to shelve the project. South African fertilizer companies responded by asking the Government to raise the tariff on the two imports. No decision appears to have been taken yet on this question, but the South African Government was reported to be threatening not to extend to purchasers of Swazi fertilizer the 15 per cent subsidy usually paid to fertilizer consumers.⁴ The possibility of a similar conflict of interest appeared over a proposed urea formaldehyde plant in Swaziland, a pharmaceuticals and household chemicals industry, and a television set production plant.⁵

Swaziland was also reported to be concerned that the construction by South Africa of the Morgenstond dam on a tributary

³ *Financial Mail*, 7 April.

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 January.

¹ *Financial Mail*, 7 April.

² *Business South Africa*, April.

³ *Star*, 20 July.

⁴ *Financial Mail*, 7 April; *Star*, 16 June.

⁵ *Financial Gazette*, 21 April, 14 July.

of the Usuthu River would prejudice irrigation and industrial projects in Swaziland by reducing the river's flow.⁵

The landlocked location of Lesotho and Swaziland also led to differences with South Africa: ten Black businessmen en route to Swaziland from elsewhere in Africa were refused transit visas at Jan Smuts Airport.¹ All three countries were reportedly inconvenienced by South Africa's alleged lack of co-operation over facilities for United Nations staff travelling between the three of them.²

Yet despite the uneasy state of relations between the Republic and her neighbours, circumstances are drawing them closer together in important respects. The four countries, and Malawi, Rhodesia, Mocambique, Angola, and South West Africa are likely to become inter-linked in a vast power grid covering the sub-continent, through the construction of hydro-electric dams like Cabora Bassa and the Cunene River Scheme.³ The *Financial Gazette* reported that 1972 would see the beginning of a "very heavy commitment to Angola".⁴

Angola

South Africa's economic links with Angola are likely to increase. The South African Foreign Trade Organization has been undertaking market investigations there for South African companies.¹ Hitherto, South African interest in Angolan mining opportunities has been largely through General Mining's holding in the Cabinda oilfields and De Beers' diamond explorations. In 1972, however, both General Mining and the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company were seeking concession rights, while Union Corporation and the Industrial Development Corporation were negotiating participation in an iron ore export project.²

Mocambique

Opening the Rand Easter Show in Johannesburg, the Governor-General of Mocambique, Mr. Manuel Pimental dos Santos, said there could be no slackening in vigilance on the borders of South Africa and Mocambique. He added that the Cabora Bassa dam would "represent the first step towards the establishment of an inner-African power-transport grid".³ The Republic's Southern Cross Fund presented the Portuguese armed forces in Mocambique with R60 000 worth of medical equipment.⁴

¹ *Business South Africa*, April.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 July.

³ *Star*, 20 July.

⁴ *Financial Gazette*, 19 November 1971.

¹ *Ibid.*, 14 January.

² *Star*, 26 January.

³ *Financial Gazette*, 25 February; 3 March.

⁴ *Sunday Express*, 26 March.

⁵ *Daily Dispatch*, 18 April.

Rhodesia

Following the Peace Commission's finding that the Home-Smith agreement was not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia, Mr. Vorster said that the Commission's report "does not in any way change South Africa's relations with and attitude towards Rhodesia and its Government".⁵ South Africa recognises Rhodesia *de facto*, but has never made a *de jure* act of recognition.

Zambia

In 1971 Britain replaced South Africa and Rhodesia as the principal supplier of Zambia's imports. Zambia continues to pursue a policy of reducing her dependence on the White-ruled states.¹ In a surprising announcement which was neither confirmed nor denied by his Government, the Zambian Finance Minister said Zambia was to relax trade restrictions with South Africa. He said his country would continue buying from the South until the Tanzan railway was completed in 1975.²

Malawi

The State President, Mr. J. J. Fouché, paid an official visit to Malawi in March. It will be recalled that Mr. Vorster visited Malawi in 1970 and that President Banda visited South Africa in 1971. The two countries signed an extradition agreement, effective from April 1972. It provided for extradition for offences such as murder, culpable homicide, abortion, rape, prostitution, kidnapping, robbery, hijacking, and narcotics offences. The agreement also provided that extradition might be refused if the offence for which it is requested is regarded by the requested country as a political offence. Offences under military law which are not offences under ordinary criminal law are also excluded from the scope of extradition.³

In mid-year two men hijacked a South African aircraft to Malawi, but they were not extradited, despite a request to that effect. Instead they were tried in Malawi.⁴

Malawi was the only African state which continued firmly to support the policy of dialogue with South Africa.⁵

Dialogue

As indicated above, South Africa's policy of promoting dialogue with Black Africa suffered several reverses in 1972—not only in Lesotho, but in Ghana, Uganda, and the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Organisation (OCAM) too. The precarious nature

⁵ Department of Information, Cape Town, 23 May.

¹ Rand Daily Mail, 31 January.

² Rand Daily Mail, 2 February.

³ Star, 24 March.

⁴ Star, 18 July.

⁵ Star, 12 October

of the policy and its dependence on individual African leaders were well-illustrated by changes in South Africa's relations with the Malagasy Republic. Although trade with Madagascar was small (exports there amounting to R2 393 000 in 1970),¹ close ties were being made through the exchange of cabinet-level official visits and the establishment of a permanent commission to further co-operation.² South Africa was also building roads, hotels, and an airport on the island,³ and the Government was considering helping Malagasy pay for a R42 000 000 port and dry-dock complex.⁴ In May, however, the government of President Philibert Tsiranana collapsed after a student-inspired public revolt.⁵ The new government of General Gabriel Ramanantsoa completely repudiated "dialogue": South Africa had not changed its policy of apartheid "one iota"; rather under the "more and more threadbare mantle of dialogue, the segregationists in Pretoria have looked only for one thing: to divide the Africans and to find susceptible clients to support their imperialist and racist policy".⁶

After making initial overtures to South Africa,⁷ General Amin, the President of Uganda, last year proposed the formation of an army under the OAU to defend African States against aggression from the White-ruled states and to do away with White minority rule in Southern Africa.⁸

The deposed Prime Minister of Ghana, Dr. Kofi Busia, had been willing to consider dialogue with South Africa based on the Lusaka Manifesto. The new leader, Colonel Ignatius Acheampong, has pledged support to the OAU declaration rejecting dialogue as a means of bringing about change in South Africa. He has also declared Ghana's support for the Southern African liberation movements.¹

Next to Malawi and Lesotho, the Ivory Coast under President Felix Houphouët-Boigny was the African country doing the most to promote the policy of dialogue. It was reported at the beginning of the year that a minister from the Ivory Coast was to visit South Africa, but the visit did not take place, apparently partly at the instance of Lesotho. Liaison between South Africa and the Ivory Coast had already involved substantial South African financial aid, but President Houphouët-Boigny was evidently awaiting support from elsewhere in Africa before carrying contact further.²

President Leopold Senghor of Senegal reportedly altered his stance to one of support for contact with South Africa following the visit to his country in 1971 of the leader of the Progressive

¹ Star, 17 April.

² 1971 Survey, p. 101.

³ Daily Dispatch, 23 March.

⁴ Sunday Times, 21 May.

⁵ Star, 19 May.

⁶ Rand Daily Mail, 6 October.

⁷ 1971 Survey, pp. 106-7.

⁸ Daily Dispatch, 23 February.

¹ Star, 14 February.

² Star, 13 January.

Party and Mrs. Helen Suzman.³ However, he supported dialogue with Black and White South African liberals, not with the Government,⁴ and said that aid to liberation movements should continue.⁵

Following a meeting between them in France, Presidents Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor endeavoured to promote dialogue at the conference in Togo of the fifteen-nation Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Organization (OCAM) in April. A communiqué issued after the conference made no mention of South Africa, but the issue of dialogue had evidently caused friction within OCAM.⁶

Of the OCAM nations, Chad and Gabon were reported to favour some form of dialogue.¹ The coalition government of Mauritius was divided: the Prime Minister was against dialogue, but some ministers were in favour of it. Trade and investment from South Africa were welcome, however,² and South Africa's Southern Sun Hotels group joined an international consortium to develop and manage a R3 500 000 hotel in Mauritius.³ South African Airways has landing rights in Mauritius, denied to it in Black Africa. In 1972 Zaire, Niger, Dahomey, Togo, Upper Volta, and Cameroun all opposed dialogue,⁴ although in 1970 and 1971 nearly all of them appeared to think it worth considering.⁵ The stance of the Central African Republic under President Bokassa was uncertain.

Only Malawi was absent from the summit meeting of the 41-member Organization of African Unity in Rabat in June. The 1971 meeting of OAU heads of state had been opposed to dialogue and had resolved by 28 votes to 6, with 5 absentions and 2 absentees, that member-states should make no attempt to solve the problems of South Africa without the guidance of the OAU.⁶ Although it was reported earlier in 1972⁷ that Presidents Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor would attempt to persuade the OAU to change its attitude to dialogue, President Houphouët-Boigny did not attend the conference in Rabat, and the question of dialogue was not even raised.⁸

The retiring president of the OAU, President Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania, had travelled to twelve Western capitals and to Tokyo to try and stop arms sales to and trade with South Africa. The most positive response had come from Turkey and Scandinavia. Citing Britain's veto of a Security Council resolution on Rhodesia, French arms sales to South Africa, and American

³ *Star*, 2 March.

⁴ *Star*, 5 June.

⁵ *Star*, 15 March.

⁶ *Star*, 24, 27 April.

⁷ *Natal Mercury*, 1 January; *World*, 7 March.

⁸ *Star*, 21 March.

⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 October.

¹⁰ *Cape Times*, 28 March; *Star*, 15 March; *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 May, *Sunday Tribune*, 8 October.

¹¹ *Star*, 28 June.

¹² 1971 Survey, p. 106.

¹³ *Star*, 27 April.

¹⁴ *Star*, 15 June.

purchases of Rhodesian chrome, President Daddah accused the Western powers of "refusing to help Africa rid itself of the colonialist and racist yoke."⁹

It was reported that diplomats in Bonn, Paris, and the United States saw dialogue as being on the verge of collapse. Paris was the principal link between South Africa and the former French colonies, but the French were reported to "have cooled off considerably to South Africa," disillusioned that South Africa had been unco-operative and lacking in initiative in the cause of dialogue. The French also evidently feared they might become embarrassed by their economic and other ties with South Africa.¹

At the United Nations in September, the foreign minister and chief architect of the dialogue policy, Dr. Hilgard Muller, reiterated South Africa's belief in dialogue, and added: "Let me make it clear once again that we are prepared to discuss even South Africa's internal policies in the course of such a dialogue."² There was no response from any African country to his statement.³

At the end of 1972, South Africa's established official links with Africa were limited to an exchange of ambassadors with Malawi, consuls-general in Angola and Mocambique, and an accredited representative in Rhodesia.⁴ Consular links were due to be established with Lesotho.

NAVAL CO-OPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA

In the speech from the throne in January, the State President issued what amounted to an open invitation by South Africa to nations interested in Indian Ocean and South Atlantic defence to take part in the regular Capex exercises off the Cape Coast. Hitherto only British and South African ships have taken part in the exercises, but a degree of co-operation between the French and the Argentinian and the South African navies does exist, and its extension would be welcomed by South Africa.¹

¹ *Daily Dispatch*, 14 June.

² *Sunday Times*, 24 September.

³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 September.

⁴ *Sunday Tribune*, 8 October.

⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 May.

⁶ *Cape Times*, 29 January.

The Spes Bona Savings and Finance Bank, Ltd., established by the Corporation in Athlone, Cape Town, had assets worth R2 509 295 by 31 September 1971, consisting of funds contributed by Coloured people. This bank had made loans worth R1 469 906 to enable members of the Coloured community to acquire houses, businesses, or industrial land.

The Minister stated that in its 1970-1 financial year the Corporation had shown a profit of R34 728 on its interest in the rock lobster export market.

RURAL COLOURED AREAS

Replying to questions on 26 April,¹⁰ the Minister said that in the State's 1970-1 financial year, R389 930 was voted from revenue funds and R10 279 from loan funds for betterment and development schemes in rural Coloured areas. All of the loans, together with one-tenth of the grants from revenue funds, were recoverable from the Coloured management boards. Besides these amounts, the boards spent R48 827 from their own funds on development work.

In the 1971-2 financial year, the Minister continued, the Coloured Development Corporation received R348 813, and Coloured management boards R17 928, in respect of prospecting and mining royalties and taxes in Coloured rural areas. Thus far, mining rights for base minerals had been granted to five Whites: prospecting rights were held by sixteen Whites and eleven Coloured persons. The Corporation itself held the prospecting and mining rights for precious stones. In its report, this Corporation stated that it contracted with companies nominated by the Minister of Mines to undertake operations on its behalf. Four companies were at the stage where they could commence mining operations. Three were still prospecting: all the shares in one of these were held by Coloured diggers.

INTER-PROVINCIAL TRAVEL PERMITS FOR INDIANS

In spite of repeated representations by the S.A. Indian Council, Indians still require permits to travel from one province to another, or through the Transkei or northern part of Natal. The Minister of Indian Affairs said in the Assembly in March¹¹ that, during 1971, his Department issued 43 permits authorizing Indians to change their places of residence from one province to another, and 23 343 authorizing temporary inter-provincial travel. It is not known how many more of the latter type of permits were issued by the Department of the Interior, magistrates, and police stations.

Later, however, during October, the Minister indicated that there might be some relaxations of these regulations in 1973.

¹⁰ Hansard 12 cols. 914, 911-3.

¹¹ 10 March, Hansard 6 col. 518.

EMPLOYMENT

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

In its annual economic report for the year ended June 1972 the South African Reserve Bank stated that the gross domestic product at current market prices increased by 12 per cent, compared with 8 per cent in 1970/71. (However, the real gross domestic product increased at about the same relatively low rate of 4 per cent.) This higher rate of increase was attributable to a favourable agricultural year, the high gold price ruling on the private market, the recovery of metal and mineral prices on international markets, higher export prices obtained for important agricultural products, and the effects of the general re-alignment of currencies during the past twelve months. The mining sector's contribution to the gross domestic product which had declined by nearly 8 per cent in 1970/71 increased by more than 14 per cent in 1971/72. The lower rate of increase in salaries and wages also made a significant contribution to the reduction of inflationary pressures. The total current and actual expenditure of the public authorities, i.e. the central, provincial, and local authorities, which had continued to increase sharply during the second half of 1971, showed a changed trend and actual reductions were recorded during the first two quarters of 1972.

The South African rand was devalued by 12,28 per cent compared with a 7,89 per cent devaluation of the U.S. dollar in December 1971, but the authorities decided in June 1972 to maintain the existing exchange rate relationship between the rand and sterling after the British authorities' decision to allow the pound to float.

On 24 October, the Minister of Finance announced a further formal devaluation of the rand by 4,2 per cent from R28,50 a fine ounce of gold to R29,75. In effect this decision severed the rand's link with the downward "floating" pound sterling and effected a some 4 per cent revaluation of the rand. The total devaluation of the rand since December 1971 was 16,48 per cent.¹

After December 1971 the balance of payments deficit showed marked improvement but still amounted to the relatively high figure of R499 000 000 at the end of June 1972. The Reserve Bank attributed the improvement, in the main, to: (1) the exceptionally sharp rise in the price of gold on the private market, (2) the significant improvement in the world market for some of South Africa's major exports, such as diamonds, wool, sugar, and

¹ Rand Daily Mail, 20, 25 and 26 October; Star, 25 October.

platinum, and (3) excellent agricultural crops. However, a net inflow of capital of R578 000 000, although smaller than the record inflow of the previous year, also contributed materially to the rise in the gold and foreign reserves. This was the seventh consecutive year that South Africa recorded a net inflow of capital.

The upturn in the economy enabled the authorities to relax in July 1972 the somewhat stringent import controls which had been imposed in November 1971. In August the Reserve Bank also reduced the Bank Rate by $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent and the rates on government stock by $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.

A further relaxation of import controls followed the devaluation of the rand in October,² as did the removal of the ceiling on bank lending.³ In November the gold and foreign reserves of the Reserve Bank approached the level of R1 000 000 000.⁴

During the year under review both fixed investment and government consumption expenditure increased at a lower rate than the previous year whereas private consumption expenditure rose at a slightly higher rate. However, if the price increases were to be taken into account, private consumption expenditure would also have increased at a lower rate.

There was a slight easing of labour conditions during the year with an increase in the unemployment of Whites, Coloured people, and Asians, of whom 12 771 were unemployed in June 1972. This represents about $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent of the total number of Whites, Coloured people, and Asians employed in the second quarter of 1972.

In March, Mr. H. F. Oppenheimer, chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, in an address to students at the University of Stellenbosch, questioned the role of the State in the South African economy.⁵ Mr. Oppenheimer maintained that "in practice, the public corporations are moving rapidly into the general business field without any regard to the special purposes for which they are supposed to have been formed". He went on to say "there seems to me good reason for an inquiry into the functions of these public corporations, their relationships with the private sector, and the extent to which their activities run counter to the official policy of encouraging private enterprise".

A more detailed question on the role of "State capitalism" was posed by the *Financial Mail* of 2 June. This pointed out that between 1960 and 1970 the public sector share of total fixed investment had risen from 41 per cent to 46 per cent, and that during the same period public sector gross fixed investment grew at an average annual rate of 13,3 per cent, against 11 per cent in the private sector. The *Financial Mail's* analyst maintained that

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 October.

³ *Ibid.*, 31 October.

⁴ *Star*, 1 November.

⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 March.

in addition to State ownership of railways, harbours, airways, electricity, telecommunications and armaments manufacture, coupled with the commercial activities of the Department of Forestry and the activities of the Department of Water Affairs' construction section, the State already controlled the major part of the South African steel producing and fabricating industry, while the Industrial Development Corporation owned 61 per cent and 57 per cent, respectively, of two investment trusts: National Selections and Industrial Selections.

The findings of the Commission of Enquiry into Exports (Reynders Commission), mentioned on page 173 of last year's *Survey*, have not yet been released by the authorities although it would appear that some of the interim recommendations, particularly those in regard to export financing, have already been implemented.⁶ In a report published in September, the South African Foreign Trade Association (Safto) maintained that the formation of a national export policy was imperative.⁷ This report maintained that even if the price of gold were \$120 an ounce South Africa could face a trade gap of R2 000 000 000 on current account in 1980. The report stated that there was strong evidence to support the view that the Republic's trade gap over the last 10 years had been basically structural and not cyclical. The recent measures concerning import control, devaluation and floating of the rand were, therefore, not long-term solutions to the Republic's international economic problems.

In an address to a symposium on South Africa and the Southern Hemisphere arranged by the Centre for International Politics at Potchefstroom University on 25 August, Mr. Jan Haak, a former Minister of Economic Affairs, questioned the value for the Republic of membership of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and asked whether the time had not arrived to establish an Organisation for Economic Co-operation in the Southern Hemisphere.⁸ In answer to charges by Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jnr., that South Africa was persistently violating GATT rules by maintaining and extending important quotas, the Assistant Secretary Mr. David Abshire, replying on behalf of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, condemned the South African Government's "inefficient use of labour resources" and the "ineffectiveness" of its monetary and fiscal policies to contain inflation in the second half of 1971.⁹ Mr. Abshire revealed that in July 1972 the United States Embassy in Pretoria had been instructed to lodge a "protest" with the South African Government on the grounds that "local content" rebates

⁶ *Star*, 30 August.

⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 September.

⁸ Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir C.H.O. Sentrum vir Internasionale Politiek. Suid-Afrika en die Suidelike Halfrond. Symposium 25 Augustus 1972.

⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 September.

for locally-manufactured cars were in violation of GATT. The United States had also "objected strongly" to South Africa's re-invocation in November of article 12 of GATT and believed that the firm position which had been adopted was probably a significant factor in the extensive relaxation of import controls which occurred in July, 1972.

Dr. A. D. Pretorius of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, in a survey of South Africa's membership of Gatt, concluded that GATT rules did not take sufficient account of the special development needs and burdens of the Republic. While GATT membership was "probably essential" the time might have come for South Africa to pursue a more aggressive policy of protection for its industries.¹⁰ The Minister of Economic Affairs, in announcing the Government's decision to remain a member of Gatt, gave a firm undertaking to manufacturers that, regardless of South Africa's GATT obligations, the Government would continue to give protection where justified.¹¹

In the first half of 1972 the Economics Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society issued its report on the South African economy which was entitled *Power, Privilege and Poverty* and which highlighted the urgent need for a fundamental redistribution of power in South Africa.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY

General

The question of the role of foreign investment, briefly mentioned on pages 173-4 of last year's *Survey*, received further attention during 1972.

On 17 April the Minister of Finance told the House of Assembly that foreign investment in South Africa would be "as welcome as ever".¹ He mentioned the considerable inflow of foreign capital the previous year and went on to say: "By far the greater part of those investments has been in respect of private permanent capital. This government has always welcomed the investment of foreign moneys in this country, not only because we need those investments for quicker growth, but because of the knowledge which usually accompanies these funds, and because of the contacts which such foreign investments bring to South Africa." Dr. Diederichs, elaborated upon this theme on 29 June when he said that during the 5 years ended in 1970 investment from outside South Africa increased by over 70 per cent. In 1970, the sterling area supplied 58 per cent, the dollar area 15 per cent, Western Europe 24 per cent and other sources 3 per cent of such investment. Foreign capital had played an important part

in the earlier development of South Africa, but the Republic, today, generated a large proportion of her capital requirements internally. Nevertheless, foreign investment was still welcome, particularly where it was long-term investment, and especially when it was accompanied by technical expertise and "know-how". He added that nationalisation or confiscation of foreign property, or repudiation of foreign debt was completely alien to (the South African Government's) philosophy. (It should be noted, however, that the financial controls needed to restrict the outflow of capital from the Republic are available in terms of Section 9 of the Currency and Exchanges Act of 1933, and more particularly, in terms of the regulations issued under Government Notice No. 1111 of 1 December 1961.)

In an article entitled *The Rich get Richer*,² John Kane-Berman estimated that nett capital inflow from abroad contributed an annual average of 11 per cent to gross domestic investment over the period 1965-70 and was particularly high in 1968 (20 per cent) and 1970 (15 per cent). He pointed out that between 1956 and 1967 the Republic's foreign liabilities increased at an average annual rate of 3.4 per cent, but from the end of 1967 to the end of 1970 the rate increased to 14.2 per cent. Private sector investment constituted 86 per cent of total foreign investment (both direct and indirect) at the end of 1970. Direct investment, i.e. investment in South African enterprises where foreign investors have a degree of control that can have a material influence on company policy, amounted to 73.6 per cent of total foreign investment.

In May, the World Council of Churches' Commission of the Programme to Combat Racism urged that all investments in South Africa be withdrawn. It endorsed a publications programme which would produce information booklets on Portugal, South Africa, and the European Economic Community; the role of corporate investment in Southern Africa; military support for colonial and racist regimes in Southern Africa; and the growing links between Southern Africa and countries such as Japan, Argentine, Brazil, and Israel.⁴ In August, the 120-man Central Committee of the World Council of Churches (W.C.C.) voted by an overwhelming majority of 110 to withdraw its investments from companies with direct investments in and trade ties with 6 countries in Southern Africa including South Africa and South West Africa (Namibia). The Central Committee urged its 250 Protestant and Orthodox member churches, representing 350 million Christians "to use all their influence, including stockholder action and disinvestment to press corporations to withdraw investments from and cease trading with (South Africa, South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau)."⁵ The President

¹⁰ *Star*, 4 October.

¹¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 October.

¹ Hansard 11 col. 5058-9.

² Department of Information News Release 139/72(P).

³ *Realty*, July 1972.

⁴ *Okoumene* (W.C.C. Communication) 6/8-72 5 May.

⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 August.