FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1969–1976
VOLUME XXVIII

SOUTHERN AFRICA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington
Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. Those regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series must include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purpose of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

*Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of the subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important decisions and actions of the foreign policy of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The subseries provides a comprehensive documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of both administrations. This volume documents the U.S. policy towards Southern Africa, 1969–1976. Although both administrations developed policies that were discrete to the re-
gion, those policies often impacted other countries on the continent. The Nixon and Ford administrations’ policies in sub-Saharan Africa are covered in volumes E–5 and E–6.

*Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXVIII*

This volume documents the foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations toward Southern Africa. The volume does not cover all countries in the region, but focuses on the countries where U.S. interests and concerns were greatest. Both administrations were concerned about Communist influence in sub-Saharan Africa and the potential for even greater encroachment as a result of the nationalist insurgencies in Angola, Namibia, and Rhodesia. Growing opposition to apartheid presented another, thornier challenge, due to South Africa’s dominance and influence in the region as well as their stalwart opposition to Communism.

The first chapter documents the Nixon administration’s policy discussions and decisions for Namibia, South Africa, and Rhodesia. These policies evolved and changed throughout the course of both administrations under pressure from the British, the Front Line Presidents (Kaunda, Nyerere, Machel, and Kama), the United Nations and the U.S. Congress. Despite these pressures, neither administration directly condemned the South African Government over apartheid or their administration of Southwest Africa. Both Presidents sought to maintain a constructive relationship with a strategic partner they viewed as necessary to preserve stability in a volatile region.

The second chapter, on Portuguese Africa, begins with the Nixon administration’s efforts to persuade the Portuguese Government to improve their relations with black African countries and the insurgents in Angola and Mozambique, without antagonizing an important NATO ally. Much of the chapter is devoted to the evolution of U.S. involvement in Angola, particularly following the Alvor Agreement in January 1975. The Ford administration’s covert action in Angola is covered from a policy rather than operational perspective. The chapter ends with the official departure of the Portuguese on November 11, 1975.

The third chapter chronicles the deteriorating prospects for both UNITA and the FNLA in light of major gains by the MPLA and their Cuban allies. It documents the administration’s attempts to continue support for Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi despite conditions on the ground in Angola and the passage of the Tunney Amendment on December 19, 1975. Finally, the chapter covers deliberations leading to the termination of the covert action program in Angola, debate over the establishment of diplomatic relations, and Angola’s admission to the United Nations.
The final chapter documents the administration’s efforts to broker a negotiated settlement to the conflicts in Rhodesia and Namibia. The majority of the chapter covers the negotiations on Rhodesia, where Kissinger worked with and through the British, South Africans, and the Front Line Presidents to bring Ian Smith and the black nationalists to the negotiating table. Despite an intensive effort that resulted in a framework for negotiations and the convening of a conference to produce an interim government, the participants failed to reach an agreement.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words repeated in telegrams to avoid garbling or provide emphasis are silently corrected. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information.
This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and related implementing public access regulations require NARA to notify formally the Nixon estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All For-
Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Nixon White House Tapes

Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the PRMPA and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon Estate. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the President’s Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editor has made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts produced here. Readers are advised that the tape recording is the official document; the transcript represents an interpretation of that document. Through the use of digital audio and other advances in technology, the Office of the Historian has been able to enhance the tape recordings and over time produce more accurate transcripts. The result is that some transcripts printed here may differ from transcripts of the same conversations printed in previous Foreign Relations volumes. The most accurate transcripts possible, however, cannot substitute for listening to the recordings. Readers are urged to consult the recordings themselves for a full appreciation of those aspects of the conversations that cannot be captured in a transcript, such as the speakers’ inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of all the documents published in this volume. The review was undertaken in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information, and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State and other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government. The declassification review of this volume, which began in
2006 and was completed in 2009, resulted in the decision to withhold 2 documents in full, excisions of a paragraph or more in 13 documents, and minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 41 documents.

The editors are confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that this volume is an accurate record of the foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations toward Southern Africa between 1969 and 1976.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to thank Bridget Crowley and the staff at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The editor would also like to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential Recordings and the Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace for facilitating that access. The editor wishes to thank Geir Gunderson, Karen Holzhausen, Donna Lehman, Helmi Raaska, and the rest of the staff at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan for their invaluable assistance. Thanks are due to the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who were helpful in arranging full access to Agency files and to John Haynes of the Library of Congress, who was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers. The editor was able to use the Kissinger Papers with the permission of Henry Kissinger. The editor would like to thank the staff in the Manuscript Reading Room at the Library of Congress for their assistance. The editor also wishes to thank Sandy Meagher for her assistance in expediting the use of files of the Department of Defense.

Myra Burton collected, selected, and annotated the documentation for this volume. The volume was completed under the supervision of Laurie Van Hook, Chief of the Middle East and Africa Division and Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the series. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Renée A. Goings and Aaron W. Marrs did the copy and technical editing. Breffni Whelan prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs  
July 2011  

Ambassador Edward Brynn  
Acting Historian
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Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It also requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department’s indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department’s decentralized office files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have also been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records, including tape recordings of conversations with key U.S. and foreign officials. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. The papers are a key source for the Nixon-Ford subseries of Foreign Relations.
Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still classified documents. Nixon’s papers were transferred to their permanent home at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, in Yorba Linda, California, after research for this volume was completed. The Nixon Library staff and Ford Library staff are processing and declassifying many of the documents used in the volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXVIII

For the Nixon period, the Nixon Presidential Materials Project contains several collections from the National Security Council Files that are relevant to research on Southern Africa. The administration conducted a series of policy reviews on Southern Africa, focusing on individual countries and the region as a whole. This collection of National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM), the interagency studies, and the National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) are in the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files). These files also contain records of high-level meetings and policy papers. The Country File for Rhodesia focuses primarily on the issue of sanctions on Rhodesian chrome and the Byrd amendment. The Country File for the United Kingdom focuses on the U.S.–U.K. strategy for resolving the Rhodesian crisis. The Country File for South Africa contains materials covering the denial of a visa to Arthur Ashe, the U.S.–South African understanding on gold and the proposed nuclear fuel agreement, as well as the assignment of a black Foreign Service Officer to the Embassy. The Presidential Tape Recordings at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project contain little regarding administration decision making. However, they do provide greater insight into Nixon’s attitudes toward Africans in general and his personal beliefs about Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa.

The Central Files of the Department of State are a particularly useful collection located at the National Archives. These files contain detailed information from the Department and African posts. The most relevant subject-numeric designations for South Africa’s administration of South West Africa are POL 15–2 SAFR, POL 23–5 SAFR, POL 19 SWAFR and POL 29 SWAFR. The most relevant subject-numeric designations for U.S. relations with South Africa are POL SAFR–US, POL 1 SAFR–US, POL 17 SAFR–US, POL 23 SAFR, DEF 12 SAFR, DEF 12–5 SAFR, SOC 14 SAFR and PPT Ashe, Arthur. The most relevant subject-numeric designations for Rhodesia are POL UK–US, POL 16 RHOD and FT 11–2 RHOD. For Portuguese Africa, the most relevant subject-numeric designations are POL PORT–US, POL 17 PORT–US and POL AFR–PORT.
For the Ford period, the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), contain documentation about U.S. relations with South Africa pertaining to maritime defense. The issue is also covered in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Chronological Files. NSSMs and NSDMs dealing with South Africa can be found in both the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSSMs and NSDMs file and the Ford NSC Institutional Files (H-Files).

The documentation for Angola is located in multiple collections. One of the richest sources is the Kissinger Papers located in the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress. Within this collection, there are several sub-collections which contain detailed memoranda of conversation on this topic. They include: Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, and Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File. National Security Council meetings on Angola are located in NSC Committees and Panels, as well as in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File. Other important collections are at the Ford Library as well. The Presidential Country Files for Zaire provide documentation of U.S. efforts to enlist Mobutu Sese Seko’s support to serve as a conduit for American aid to Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi. This is also documented in the Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office File, Angola. Communications between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin regarding Angola are located in the same file. The Scowcroft Daily Work Files contain backchannel messages seeking support for U.S. efforts to thwart an MPLA victory. The Country Files for Portugal provide details on the situation in Angola and Department efforts to ensure an orderly transition to independence. Memoranda for the record of 40 Committee meetings are located in the National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Details on the covert operation in Angola are contained in the Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee Files section of the INR/IL Historical Files at the Department of State. These collections also contain a number of interagency studies and papers on Angola. The Department of State’s State Archiving System (SAS) is a word-searchable database and an excellent source for cable traffic after 1973. Historical documents from this system have been transferred to the National Archives and are part of the online Access to Archival Database (AAD). This is a valuable source for all cables, but is particularly useful for chronicling the effort to establish diplomatic relations with Mozambique and for documenting the Portuguese exit from Angola.

Kissinger’s negotiations on Namibia and Rhodesia are found primarily in the Kissinger Papers, Department of State Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations and the Geopolitical File, Africa Chronological File. Kissinger’s reports on the progress of his talks with various
XIV Sources

African leaders are located in the Kissinger Papers, Cables File and the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Henry A. Kissinger Trips File. The Presidential Country Files for the United Kingdom at the Ford Library is an excellent source for the U.S.–U.K. efforts to resolve the Rhodesia crisis. The Country Files for Switzerland provide comprehensive documentation on the Geneva conference negotiations. The Presidential Country Files for Zambia and South Africa contain correspondence to and from African leaders on the progress of the negotiations.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

INR/IL Historical Files
   Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee Files
   Angola-Washington
   Angola NSSM 224 Papers
   Angola 1975–1976
   Rhodesia 1974–76
   Intelligence Committee Report File
   January 22, 1975

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Central Files 1967–1969
POL 15–1 PORT, head of state, executive branch, Portugal
POL 15–2 SAFR, South African Parliament
POL 15–5 RHOD, Rhodesian constitution
POL 16 RHOD, independence and recognition, Rhodesia
POL 17 PORT–US, diplomatic and consular representation, Portugal-U.S.
POL 17 SAFR–US, diplomatic and consular representation, South Africa-U.S.
POL 19 S WAFR, administration of dependencies and territories, South West Africa
POL 23 SAFR, internal security, South Africa
POL 23–5 SAFR
POL 29 S WAFR, political prisoners, South West Africa
POL UK–US, political affairs and relations, United Kingdom-U.S.
PPT Ashe, Arthur

Central Files 1970–1973
DEF 12 SAFR, armaments, South Africa
DEF 12–5 SAFR, procurement and sale of armaments, South Africa
FT 11–2 RHOD, foreign trade, boycotts, Rhodesia
FT 11–2 RHOD/UN, foreign trade, boycotts, Rhodesia/U.N.
INCO–CHROME 17 US–RHOD, industries and commodities, chrome trade, U.S.-Rhodesia
LAB 10 SAFR, special groups, special categories of labor, South Africa
POL 1 AFR, general policy and background, Africa
POL 1 AFR–PORT, general policy and background, Africa-Portugal
POL 1 AFR–US, general policy and background, Africa-U.S.
POL 1 BOTSWANA-US, U.S. general policy toward Botswana
POL 1 S AFR–US, general policy and background, South Africa-U.S.
POL 1 SWAZ–US, general policy and background, Swaziland-U.S.
POL 1 UK–US, general policy and background, United Kingdom-U.S.
POL 1–2 ANG–US, general policy and political analyses, Angola-U.S.
POL 1–2 MOZ–US, general policy and political analyses, Mozambique-U.S.
POL 15–1 ZAMBIA, head of state, executive branch, Zambia
POL 16 RHOD, independence and recognition, Rhodesia
POL 17 THE CONGO, diplomatic and consular representation, Congo
POL 19 SW AFR, administration of dependencies and territories, South West Africa
POL 19 SW AFR/UN, administration of dependencies and territories, South West Africa-U.N.
POL PORT–US, political affairs and relations, Portugal-U.S.
POL S AFR–US, political affairs and relations, South Africa-U.S.
SOC 14 S AFR, social conditions, human rights and race relations, South Africa

Lot Files
National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and related papers, 1969–1976, Lot 80D212

Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (now at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California)

National Security Council Files, Country Files
Africa
  Mauritania
  Rhodesia
  South Africa
  Zambia
Europe
  Portugal
  United Kingdom
Name Files, Dean Acheson
Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda

National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files)
  National Security Study Memoranda
  National Security Decision Memoranda
  Senior Review Group Meetings
  National Security Council Meetings

White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary
White House Tapes
XVI  Sources

Central Intelligence Agency

DO Files
   Job 80–00464A

Executive Registry Files
   Job 80–B01086A

NIC Files
   Job 79–01229A

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

National Security Adviser
   Kissinger Trip Files
   Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files
   Memoranda of Conversations
   NSC Meetings File
   NSC Staff Secretary Files
   NSDMs and NSSMs
   Outside the System Chronological File
   Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
   Presidential Country Files for Africa
   Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada
   Presidential Trip Files
   Scowcroft Daily Work Files

National Security Council
   Institutional Files

Staff Secretary’s Office
   President’s Daily Diary
   Presidential Handwriting File

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Papers of Henry A. Kissinger
   Geopolitical File
   Cables File
   Memoranda of Conversations
   Memoranda to the President
   Department of State, Memoranda
   Top Secret
   National Security Council

National Security Council

Ford Administration Intelligence Files
   Angola
   40 Committee Meetings
Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
73A–1975
Secret Files of the Office of International Security Affairs

Published Sources


Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, Anti-Ballistic Missile
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AID, Agency for International Development

BLS, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland
BOSS, Bureau for State Security (South Africa)

C, Confidential
CA, circular airgram
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCEUR, Commander-in-Chief, European Command
CINCLANT, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
Codel, Congressional Delegation
ConGen, Consulate General
CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DDO, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
DOD, Department of Defense
DOS, Department of State

EATP, East African Training Program
EC-9, the nine European Community countries
EPB, Economic Policy Board
ERDA, Energy Research and Development Administration
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, exclusive distribution
EXIM, Export-Import Bank

FAZ, Forces Armées Zaïroises (Zairian Armed Forces)
FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of the United Kingdom
FEA, Federal Energy Administration
FLEC, Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda)
FMS, foreign military sales
FNLA, Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FonSec, Foreign Secretary
FRELIMO, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FSO, Foreign Service officer
FY, fiscal year

GA, General Assembly (of the United Nations)
XX  Abbreviations and Terms

GDP, Gross Domestic Product
GE, General Electric
GNP, Gross National Product
GOB, Government of Botswana
GOF, Government of France
GOM, Government of Mozambique
GOP, Government of Portugal
GPRM, Government of the People’s Republic of Mozambique
GRAE, Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile)

HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
Hakto, series indicator for telegrams sent by Kissinger when away from Washington
HHE, household effects
HMG, Her Majesty’s Government
HNP, Herstigte Nasionale Party van Suid Afrika (Reconstituted National Party of South Africa)

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICJ, International Court of Justice
IG, Interdepartmental Group
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/IL, Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

J, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

L, Legal Adviser, Department of State
LAW, Light Anti-tank Weapon
Limdis, limited distribution

MAC, Military Airlift Command
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MiG, Soviet-built fighter aircraft
MP, member of parliament
MPLA, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)

NAC, North Atlantic Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NASA, National Aeronautic and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIBMAR, No Independence Before Majority Rule
NIC, National Intelligence Council
Nocontract, not releasable to contractors/consultants
Nodis, no distribution
Noform, no foreign dissemination
Notarl, not received by all addressees (telegram B, referenced in telegram A, was not sent to all recipients of telegram A)
NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty
Abbreviations and Terms

NSC, National Security Council
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NUSAS, National Union of South African Students

OAS, Organization of American States
OAU, Organization of African Unity
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
OEI, Bureau of Oceans and International Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
ONA, Overseas National Airways
OPAG, Operations Advisory Group
OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Orcon, dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAIGC, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde)
PCP, Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party)
PEFCO, Private Export Funding Corporation
PL, public law
PM, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State
POLAD, Political Adviser
PPD, Partido Popular Democrático (Democratic People’s Party)
PRC, People’s Republic of China
PriMin, Prime Minister

reftel, reference telegram
RG, Record Group
RH, Rhodesian dollar
rpt, repeat
RTTY, Radio Teletype

S/S–I, Information Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SA, South Africa
SA–7, low altitude, surface to air missile
SADF, South African Defense Force
SAG, South African Government
SAR, South African Republic
SARG, Syrian Arab Republic Government
SASP, Southern African Students Program
SC, Security Council (of the United Nations)
SCA, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) to the Department of State
septel, separate telegram
SR–71, “Blackbird,” long range strategic reconnaissance aircraft
SRG, Senior Review Group
SWA, South West Africa
SWAPO, South West Africa People’s Organization
SYG, Secretary General

TA, Terrorism Act
TAAG, Transportes Aéreos de Angola (Angolan Airlines)
XXII  Abbreviations and Terms

TDY, Temporary Duty
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation)
TOW, Tube-Launched Optically-Tracked Wire-Guided missile
TS, Top Secret

U, Unclassified
U-2, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
UBLS, University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
UDI, Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK, United Kingdom
UKG, United Kingdom Government
UN, United Nations
UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIP, United National Independence Party (Zambia)
UNITA, União Nacional para e Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIS, United States Information Service (overseas name for USIA)
USN, United States Navy
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WATTS, Wide Area Telecommunication/Telephone Service
WH, White House

Z, Zulu, time designator on White House, State Department, and Defense Department messages/cables based on Greenwich Mean Time
ZANU, Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union
ZAPU, Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZIPA, Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
Persons

Abshire, David M., Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs from April 1970 until January 1973

Adham, Kamal Sheik, Chief Advisor to King Faisal; Director of the Saudi Arabian Political Intelligence Bureau

Agniew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States from January 1969 until October 1973

Ahidjo, Ahmadou, President of Cameroon

Amin, Idi, President of Uganda; President of the Organization of African Unity from July 1975 until July 1976

Andrew, Robert, Political Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Zaire

Ansary, Hushang, Iranian Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance

Antunes, Ernesto de Melo, see Melo Antunes, Ernesto de

Arenales, Alfonso, Deputy Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

Armstrong, General R.F., Acting Chief of South African Defense Staff

Austin, Timothy, Assistant to Rogers C.B. Morton (Counsellor to the President for Political Affairs)

Azevedo, José Baptista Pinheiro de, Admiral, Portuguese Prime Minister from September 1975 until June 1976

Banda, Rupiah, Zambian Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1974 until 1975; Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1975 until 1976

Bergsten, C. Fred, member, National Security Council staff from 1969 until 1971

Bongo, Omar, President of Gabon


Bowdler, William G., U.S. Ambassador to South Africa from May 1975 until April 1978

Brezhnev, Leonid I., General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Brown, George S., General, USAF; Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force from 1973 until 1974; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1974 until 1978

Brown, Robert L., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State

Buchanan, Thompson R., Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Department of State

Buchanan, Patrick, Special Assistant to the President until 1974

Buffum, William, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from 1973 until 1975

Bula, see Mandungu Bula Nyati


Butler, Malcolm, member, National Security Council staff

Butterfield, Alexander P., Deputy Assistant to the President from January 1969 until January 1973

Byrd, Harry F., Jr., Democratic Senator from Virginia until 1970, Independent Senator from Virginia from 1970

Caetano, Marcello, Portuguese Prime Minister until 1974
XXIV Persons

Callaghan, James, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from March 5, 1974, until April 5, 1976
Cardoso, Antonio Silva, Portuguese High Commissioner and Governor General in Angola from January 1975 until August 1975
Carlucci, Frank, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from December 1974 until February 1978
Carter, Jimmy, Governor of Georgia, Democratic Party candidate in the 1976 Presidential election
Carter, W. Beverly, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania from July 1972 until October 1975
Catto, Henry E., Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations in Geneva from July 1976 until April 1977
Chissano, Joaquim Alberto, leader of FRELIMO; Mozambican Foreign Minister from 1975
Chona, Mark, adviser to Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda
Clark, Richard, Democratic Senator from Iowa from 1973
Clements, William P., Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1971 until 1977
Colby, William E., Director of Central Intelligence from September 1973 until January 1976
Connally, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury from January 1971 until May 1972
Connor, James E., White House Staff Secretary and Secretary to the Cabinet, Executive Office of the President from 1974
Costa Gomes, Francisco da, President of Portugal from September 1974 until July 1976
Coutinho, António Alva Rosa, High Commissioner of Angola from 1974 until 1975
Covey, James P., Office of the Secretary of State
Cromer, Third Earl of (Baring, George R.S.), Lieutenant Colonel, British Ambassador to the United States from 1971 until 1974
Crosby, Oliver S., Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
Crosland, Anthony, British Foreign Secretary from April 1976
Cutler, Walter L., Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State; U.S. Ambassador to Zaire from November 1975
Davis, Nathaniel, Director General of the Foreign Service from November 1973 until March 1975; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from April 1975 until December 1975
Dellums, Ronald, Democratic Representative from California
Denney, George C., Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Devlin, Lawrence R., former Chief, Africa Division, Central Intelligence Agency
Diggs, Charles C., Jr., Democratic Representative from Michigan; Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus from 1969 until 1971
Dobrynin, Anatoly, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, British Foreign Secretary from June 1970 until March 1974

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from May 1975 until February 1977
Easum, Donald B., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1974 until 1975; U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria from 1975
Edmondson, William B., Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State; Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in South Africa from September 1974 until September 1975; Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State from 1976 until 1977
Ekangaki, Nzo, Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity from June 1972 until June 1974
Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 1969 until September 1975
Ellsworth, Robert F., Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1975 until 1977
Eteki M’Boumoua, William A., Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity from June 1974

Fish, Howard M., Lieutenant General, USA; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance from August 1974
Flanigan, Peter M., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs from 1972 until 1974; Executive Director, Council for International Economic Policy from 1972 until 1974
Ford, Gerald R., Vice President of the United States from December 6, 1973, until August 9, 1974; President of the United States from August 9, 1974
Fourie, Bernadus Gerhardus “Brand,” South African Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Gabella, Elliott, Deputy President, African National Council
Garin, Vasco Vieira, Portuguese Ambassador to the United States
Gaylard, Jack, Secretary to the Cabinet, Rhodesia
Gebelt, Stephen G., Portugal Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from November 1968 until September 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Lesotho from September 1969 until October 1970
Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, President of France from 1974
Gomes, Francisco da Costa, see Costa Gomes, Francisco da
Granger, Clinton, member, National Security Council staff
Grennan, Dennis, British Special Adviser on Rhodesia
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister

Habib, Philip C., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from June 1976
Haldeman, H.R. “Bob,” White House Chief of Staff from January 1969 until April 1973
Hartman, Arthur, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January 1974
Hawkins, Harold, Air Vice Marshal, Rhodesian diplomatic representative in South Africa
Healey, Denis W., British Chancellor of the Exchequer from March 1974
Heath, Edward R.G., British Prime Minister from June 1970 until March 1974
Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence until February 1973; U.S. Ambassador to Iran from April 1973
Hinton, Deane, U.S. Ambassador to Zaire from June 20, 1974, until June 18, 1975; U.S. Representative to the European Communities from January 1976
Hoffacker, Roscoe L., U.S. Ambassador to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea from December 1969 until June 1972
Holloway, James, III, Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations from 1974
Horan, Harold E., member, National Security Council staff from 1973 until 1976
Hornats, Robert C., member, National Security Council staff
Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, President of the Ivory Coast
Hughes, Thomas L., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until 1969
Hurd, John, U.S. Ambassador to South Africa from September 1970 until April 1975
Hyland, William G., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from January 1974 until November 1975; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1975 until 1976

Ingersoll, Robert S., Deputy Secretary of State from July 1974 until March 1976
Irwin, John N., II, Deputy Secretary of State from July 1972 until February 1973; U.S. Ambassador to France from March 1973 until October 1974

Jacobs, Martin, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1969 until February 1973; Ambassador at Large from February 1973; Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee of the National Security Council, 1973

Journiac, Rene, Special Assistant to French President Giscard d’Estaing

Kaduma, Ibrahim M., Tanzanian Foreign Minister

Kapuuo, Chief Clemens, Herero leader, Namibia

Kasanda, Peter, Special Assistant to President Kaunda of Zambia

Kaunda, Kenneth, President of Zambia; President of the Organization of African Unity from September 1970 until June 1971

Kennedy, Richard T., Colonel, USA; member, National Security Council staff from 1970 until 1972

Kenyatta, Jomo, President of Kenya

Khama, Sir Seretse, President of Botswana

Killoran, Thomas, U.S. Consul General in Luanda

Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 1975; Secretary of State from September 21, 1973, until January 20, 1977

Kleindienst, Richard G., Attorney General from June 12, 1972, until April 30, 1973

Knight, Ridgway, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from July 1969 until February 1973

Laingen, R. Bruce, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1975 until 1976

Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense from January 1969 until January 1973

Landau, George W., Director of the Office of Spain and Portugal Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Laver, Patrick, Head of the Rhodesia Department, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Leigh, Monroe, Department of State Legal Adviser from 1975 until 1976

Lord, Winston, member, National Security Council staff until 1973; Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from October 1973

Low, Stephen, U.S. Ambassador to Zambia from August 1976

MacBride, Sean, Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, U.N. High Commissioner for Namibia from 1973

Machel, Samora, leader of the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) from 1969 until 1975; President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique from June 1975

Mahon, George H., Democratic Representative from Texas; Chairman, House Appropriations Committee; Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense of the House Appropriations Committee

Mandungu Bula Nyati, Zairian Foreign Minister from 1975 until 1976

Mansfield, Michael J., Democratic Senator from Montana; Senate Majority Leader

Marsh, John O., Counselor to President Ford

Maw, Carlyle E., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance from July 1974 until September 1976

McCloskey, Robert J., Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs from February 1975 until September 1976

McGovern, George S., Democratic Senator from South Dakota

McNamara, Robert S., President, World Bank
Melo Antunes, Ernesto A. de, Portuguese Foreign Minister from 1975 until 1976
Millard, Guy E., Minister of the British Embassy in the United States
Mitchell, John N., Attorney General from January 1969 until February 1972
Mobutu, Séso Séko (born Joseph-Désiré Mobutu), Lieutenant General, President of the Republic of the Congo (Zaire) and Minister of Defense
Mogwe, Archibald, Foreign Minister of Botswana from 1974
Mondlane, Eduardo, President of FRELIMO
Moore, Charles R., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; U.S. Ambassador to Cameroon from July 1972 until July 1975; also accredited to Equatorial Guinea from January 1973 until July 1975
Moose, Richard M., staff member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Morris, Roger, member, National Security Council staff until 1971
Mugabe, Robert, leader of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) and, in 1975, of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
Mulcahy, Edward W., U.S. Ambassador to Chad from 1972 until 1974; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1974 until 1976
Muller, Hilgard, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs
Muzorewa, Abel, Bishop, leader of the United African National Council, Rhodesia
Mwaanga, Vernon, Zambian Permanent Representative to the United Nations until 1972; Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1973 until 1975
Mwale, Siteke G., Zambian Ambassador to the United States from 1974 until 1976; Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1976

Nelson, Harvey F., Jr., Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
Nelson, William, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, from August 1973 until May 1976
Neto, Agostinho, leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); President of Angola from November 1975
Newsom, David, U.S. Ambassador to Libya from October until June 1969; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from July 1969 until January 1974
Nguza Karl I Bond, Zairian Foreign Minister from 1972 to 1974 and again from 1976
Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States from January 20, 1969, until August 9, 1974
Nkomo, Joshua, leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU)
Nujoma, Samuel D., President of the Southwest Africa Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO)
Nyerere, Julius, President of Tanzania

Obasanjo, Olusegun, Lieutenant General, Nigerian Head of State from 1976
Ogilvie, Donald G., Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget
O’Neill, Paul, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget from 1974

Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 1969 until December 1971
Palliser, Michael, British Permanent Under Secretary of State and Head of the Diplomatic Service from 1975
Palme, Olof, Swedish Prime Minister from October 1969 until October 1976
Palmer, Joseph, II, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until July 1969
Percy, Charles H., Republican Senator from Illinois
Peterson, Peter G., Secretary of Commerce from February 1972 until February 1973
Phillips, Christopher H., U.S. delegation to the United Nations
Pletcher, Charles H., Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
XXVIII Persons

Potts, James M., Chief, Africa Division, Central Intelligence Agency

Ramphal, Sir Shridath Surendranath “Sonny,” Commonwealth Secretary-General from 1975

Ramsbotham, Sir Peter, British Ambassador to the United States from 1974

Ratliff, Rob Roy, member, National Security Council staff; Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee

Reagan, Ronald W., Governor of California; Republican Party candidate in the 1976 Presidential election

Reid, Ogden R., Republican Representative from New York until 1972; Democratic Representative from New York from 1972 until 1975

Reinhardt, John E., U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria from December 1971 until February 1975; Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from April 1975

Richard, Ivor, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1974; Chairman, Geneva Conference on Rhodesia

Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State until June 1970

Roberto, Holden A., leader of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)

Robinson, Charles W., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from January 1975 until April 1976; Deputy Secretary of State from April 1976

Rodman, Peter W., member, National Security Council staff

Rogers, William D., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from October 1974 until June 1976; Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs from June 1976 until December 1976

Rogers, William P., Secretary of State from January 22, 1969 until September 3, 1973

Roosevelt, Archibald B., Jr., Chief, Africa Division, Central Intelligence Agency

Rountree, William, U.S. Ambassador to South Africa until June 1970

Rowlands, Edward, British Minister of State from 1976

Rumsfeld, Donald H., Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council from February 1973 until December 1974; White House Chief of Staff from September 1974 until November 1975; Secretary of Defense from December 1975

Runyon, Charles, III, Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs, Department of State


Sadat, Anwar el-, President of Egypt from October 1970

Samuel, Richard C., Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States

Saunders, Harold H., member, National Security Council staff until 1974; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1974 until 1975; thereafter, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Sauvagnargues, Jean, French Foreign Minister from May 1974 until August 1976

Savimbi, Jonas, President of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

Schaufele, William E., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from December 1975

Schlesinger, James, Director of Central Intelligence from January 2, 1973, until July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense from July 2, 1973, until November 19, 1975

Schori, Pierre, Aide to Swedish Prime Minister Palme

Scott, David A., Assistant Under Secretary of State at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1970 until 1972; British High Commissioner to New Zealand and Governor of the Pitcairn Islands from 1973 until 1975; British Ambassador to South Africa from 1976
Scott, Hugh D., Jr., Republican Senator from Pennsylvania; Senate Minority Leader from September 1969

Scowcroft, Brent C., Lieutenant General, USA, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1974 until November 2, 1975; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 3, 1975 until January 20, 1977


Seeleye, Talcott W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1976

Seitz, Raymond G.H., Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom

Senghor, Leopold S., President of Senegal

Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from February 1969 until February 1974; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1974 until June 1976

Sithole, Njabingi, Reverend, founder, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)

Smith, David C., Rhodesian Minister of Agriculture until 1976; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance from 1976

Smith, David S., U.S. Ambassador to Sweden from May 1976 until April 1977

Smith, Ian D., Prime Minister of Rhodesia

Smith, William Y., Lieutenant General, USAF; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Soares, Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes, Portuguese Prime Minister from July 1976

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, Counselor of the Department of State from January 1974 until February 1977

Spain, James W., U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania from November 1975

Spinola, António de, General, Portuguese President from April 25, 1974, until September 30, 1974

Stans, Maurice H., Secretary of Commerce from January 1969 until February 1972

Steel, Henry, British Legal Adviser for the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia

Stevenson, John, Legal Adviser, Department of State

Stewart, Robert Michael Maitland, British Foreign Secretary from March 1968 until June 1970

Taswell, Harald L.T., South African Ambassador to the United States until August 1971

Thompson, Alan R., Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Tibbetts, Margaret J., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Vance, Cyrus, Secretary of State-designate

Vance, Sheldon B., U.S. Ambassador to Zaire from June 1969 until March 1974

Van den Berg, Hendrik Johannes, Director, Bureau for State Security and Security Adviser to the Rhodesian Prime Minister

Van der Byl, Pieter K., Rhodesian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense

Vorster (also Voerster), Balthazar Johannes, South African Prime Minister

Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary General of the United Nations from January 1972

Walker, Peter C., U.S. Consul General, Lourenco Marques

Walters, Vernon A., Lieutenant General, USA; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1972 until 1976

Wilkowski, Jean M., U.S. Ambassador to Zambia from September 1972 until July 1976

Wisner, Frank G., III, Director, Office of South African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

Witman, William, II, Director, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Department of State

Worrel, Stephen W., Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
XXX  Persons

**Wright, Marshall**, member, National Security Council staff for African and United Nations Affairs

**Young, Andrew J.**, U.S. Representative-designate to the United Nations

**Ziegler, Ronald L.**, White House Press Secretary from 1969 until 1974
Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United States statute that requires inclusion in the Foreign Relations series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological warfare” prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4–A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.1

The CIA’s early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4–A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

1 NSC 4–A, December 17, 1947, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257.
covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare. The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific

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2 NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed ibid., Document 292.
projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA’s latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.5

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special Group,” emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.6 The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the

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6 Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, pp. 63, 147–148; Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book 1, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp. 50–51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Documents 212 and 250.
group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.7

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.8

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.9

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson

8 Ibid., p. 82.
assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.\textsuperscript{10}

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.\textsuperscript{11}

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.\textsuperscript{12}

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,\textsuperscript{13} which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee.


\textsuperscript{11} For text of NSAM No. 303, see ibid., Document 204.

\textsuperscript{12} Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 56–57.

XXXVI  Note on U.S. Covert Actions

NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI’s responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and “politically sensitive” covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA’s individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d’etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.14

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a “finding” and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.15

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in polit-

14 Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.

15 Public Law 93–559.
ical assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.\textsuperscript{16}

Southern Africa

Regional Issues

1. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers


SUBJECT
South West Africa: Shrunken Autonomy

During its current session in Cape Town, the South African Parliament probably will enact legislation to bring South West Africa under closer administrative control. Although a UN resolution in 1966 declared that South Africa had forfeited the League of Nations Mandate over South West Africa, the Republic remains in de facto control of the territory. A South African law passed in 1968 and a bill pending in the 1969 Parliament drastically curtail South West Africa’s autonomy and reduce it to the status of another province of South Africa.

The Homelands Act. The 1968 law specified 12 ethnic groups in South West Africa that are to be assigned to separate “homelands.” Six such homelands already set apart on paper will lack sufficient population or resources to become viable states. The tribal groups immediately affected are: the Ovambo, 270,000; the Damara, 50,000; the Herero, 40,000; the Okavango, 30,000; the East Caprivians, 17,000; and the Kaokovelders, 10,000 (see map). Even before this formal introduction of apartheid, South African authorities had begun shifting the black population around into ethnic compartments and purchasing white farm land at a much faster rate than was taking place inside the Republic for a similar Bantustan program.

Chiefs and Councils. On the road to “self-rule” these six tribes will have legislative councils, consisting mainly of tribal chiefs subsidized

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–2 S AFR. Confidential.
3 Not attached.
by the South African Government. The homelands will resemble the Transkei, the Republic’s first and still its only functioning Bantustan. Ovamboland, perhaps the nearest of all tribal areas in South West Africa to viability, took the first step towards homeland status in October 1968, when its legislative council was established.

*The South West Africa Affairs Bill.* While purporting to follow the spirit of the Mandate, the bill now under consideration provides for Pretoria’s wholesale takeover of South West Africa’s administrative machinery, hitherto operated with some degree of autonomy. The list of bureau functions transferred is long and impressive: services dealing with labor, African education, interior, prisons, commerce, industries, justice, colored affairs, mines, public works, posts and telegraphs, transport, social welfare, water affairs, and agriculture. The bill also makes any and all South African laws applicable to South West Africa.

*Local Reactions: Whites.* Most whites in South West Africa accept apartheid and go along with the 1962 Odendaal Plan, which provided the guidelines for Pretoria’s incorporation of the territory. The South Africans have reassured them that taxes will not be raised in South West Africa and that the German language will retain its special status. Another concession was to abolish a split tariff that had increased the price of goods imported into South West Africa from South Africa. Little opposition will come from white political leaders since a wing of South Africa’s ruling National Party controls all the South West African seats in South Africa’s Parliament as well as all the seats in South West’s Provincial Council. Even those whites in South West noted for their independent streak resigned themselves long ago to being ruled from Pretoria, because they are not about to allow themselves to be governed by any UN committee, let alone some future combination of local non-whites.

*Local Reactions: Africans.* For black South West Africans the proposed new administrative arrangements probably will not mean much of a change in their daily lives. Neither in this case nor in that of the Homelands Act—which has affected where and how individuals live—has there been much chance for Africans to react without getting into serious trouble. Theoretically, the introduction of legislative councils will provide greater opportunities for political expression and self-government, but it is doubtful that this will be true in practice. The chiefs will be the dominant figures in the new councils, and they will tend to do what the authorities tell them to do. Furthermore, since non-white political movements have been effectively suppressed in South West Africa, it is hard to see politics freely developing in the homelands. South West African exile groups and African members of the UN will presumably protest the current measures, which under-
score South Africa’s continuing defiance of the UN General Assembly’s resolutions on South West Africa.

2. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Cape Town**

   *Washington, February 17, 1969, 2112Z.*


   1. Department seriously concerned by press reports on SWA Affairs Bill introduced in Parliament last week and already through second reading. Reportedly, bill will give SAG power to apply any SA law to SWA without reference to Parliament and also to change these laws as it deems fit. This and reported provision in bill for acceleration apartheid program in SWA appear represent such flagrant defiance of UN authority and world opinion that Dept believes quick reaction important.

   2. Therefore, even in advance of receiving details of bill, Dept proposes urgent Embassy approach to SAG along following lines: (a) Your remarks would of necessity be couched in general terms, but should express our concern over challenge this legislation poses to international status of SWA, to UN responsibility for the territory and to rights of inhabitants to international safeguards and self-determination. (b) You could emphasize inevitable heightening of international tensions at moment when Afro-Asians have decided call for SC meeting to consider SWA, and point out bill is retrograde step bound to harm instead of further SWA’s own interests and particularly its efforts improve re-

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2 The primary location of the U.S. Embassy was Pretoria, where the majority of the executive branch of the South African Government was located. The Chief of Mission and members of the country team relocated to Cape Town when the South African Parliament was in session.

3 In telegram 196 from Cape Town, February 12, the Embassy summarized the South African Parliamentary debate over provisions of the South West Africa Affairs Bill, which effectively turned South West Africa into a province of South Africa. (Ibid.) Telegram 431 from USUN is ibid., POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Telegram 203 from Cape Town was not found.
lations with other African states and throughout the world; SWA Affairs Bill will repel not only potential friends, but also nations with which SAG already has good and constructive relations. (c) You should urge SAG weigh these considerations in light its own best interests and the overwhelming world opposition to direction of movement concerning SWA. USG sincerely hopes SAG will reconsider and take action to ensure bill is not adopted.

3. Dept hopes foregoing can be conveyed urgently, as approach would be more effective if made before final adoption SWA bill. Same approach should be made, but urging non-implementation, if Bill already adopted.

4. Please keep info addressees advised.

Rogers

3. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

No. 100


SUBJECT

Southern Rhodesia: Smith’s Great Leap Rightward

A New Constitution. Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith’s new draft constitutional proposals come close to eliminating any remaining possibilities of settlement with the UK. They break abruptly with the suggestions for a UK-Rhodesian agreement that emerged from the meeting in October 1968 between Smith and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson on board H.M.S. Fearless. At the outset, the new constitution would halve the present number of directly elected African representatives in the Rhodesian parliament. It would establish avowedly racial voting rolls and drop even the pretense of a non-racial electoral system maintained under the present constitution. Finally, the proposals explicitly discard the idea that Africans could ever work their passage to majority rule. The far-distant goal of the new document is at most political parity of Africans and Europeans. Al-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–5 RHOD. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.
though Smith has moved to the right he has not gone far enough for some extremist elements in his own Rhodesian Front party, who have already attacked the proposals as inadequate.

*The Mechanics.* Regional congresses of the Rhodesian Front have approved the proposals. The next step is a referendum, which could be held as early as May. The timetable may slip, however.

*The Proposals in Outline.* Since the full text is not yet published (or even drafted, according to some reports) a number of important details are lacking. But in general they will probably provide for:

1. *a national assembly* consisting initially of 66 members. Of these, 50 would be elected by a voters’ roll consisting of Europeans, Asians, and Coloreds. The remaining 16 would be Africans—8 directly elected by an African voters’ roll, 8 indirectly chosen by an electoral college composed of chiefs, headmen, and councilors.

2. *an African membership* that could be expanded to ultimate parity with the Europeans (i.e., 50 seats) as the African population’s income tax payments increase. (According to one recent estimate, Africans currently pay one half of one per cent of the total personal income tax collected in Rhodesia.) The increase in African seats is to be four at a time, to maintain parity between the two largest tribal groups, the Matabele and Mashona.

3. *a senate* (10 Europeans chosen by the assembly, 10 chiefs, and 3 appointed members) that would exercise delaying powers with respect to legislation considered unfair to any racial group.

4. *three provincial assemblies*—two African, one European—to which Parliament could delegate powers.

*Smith’s Motives.* As he did in mid-1968, when the debate over a new constitution erupted within the Rhodesian Front, Smith has moved to check his right wing critics by prompting [preempting] most of their positions. But in the process he seems to be burning his last bridges to the UK. He may be signalling to London that if there is to be another round of negotiations, it must come quickly. But in that case he will have to be prepared to discard the present proposals or modify them drastically, because there is little if anything in them that Wilson could square with his “Six Principles” for a Rhodesian settlement.2

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2 The “five principles” served as the basis for confidential talks between the British and Rhodesian Governments from November 1970 onwards. First enunciated in October 1965, a sixth principle was added in January 1966 after Ian Smith’s unilateral declaration of independence. The sixth principle, which ensured there would be “no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority” was not included in the November 1970 negotiations. (*Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, 1965–1966, pp. 21025 and 21756, and 1971–1972, p. 24981)
4. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State¹

Cape Town, February 19, 1969, 1543Z.

242. Subj: Protest on South West Africa Bill. Ref: State 025151.²

1. Pursuant ref tel, I called on FonSec Fourie today and informed him SWA Affairs bill to implement decisions of White Paper issued June 1968³ has given rise serious concern by USG which believes legislation poses challenge to international status of SWA, to UN responsibility for territory, and to rights of inhabitants for international safeguards on self-determination. I said enactment and implementation of bill would heighten international tensions, the more so at time when Afro-Asians have decided call SC meeting to consider SWA. USG considers bill to be retrogressive step which bound to harm instead of further SA’s own interests and particularly its efforts to improve relations with other African states and nations throughout world. We believe bill will repel not only potential friends but also nations with which SAG already has good and constructive relations.

2. I urged that SAG weigh these considerations in light its own best interests and overwhelming world opposition to direction of movement concerning SWA. I expressed earnest hope that SAG will reconsider and take action to ensure bill is not adopted.

3. Fourie listened attentively to my presentation and made notes of all points. He inquired whether reference to challenge to international status of SWA suggested that bill would be in violation SAG responsibilities under old Mandate or would be challenged on basis UN resolutions which SAG had made clear it did not accept. I replied that while, as SAG knew, US fully supported legality UNGA Resolution 2145⁴ we feel that SWA Affairs bill would not only violate that, but also SAG responsibility under the original Mandate. Fourie said discussion latter aspect more appropriate for SAG, which would “in due course” give reasons to me why it considers bill necessary and within its responsibilities and in interests SWA inhabitants. He said he would convey my message to govt, but at this stage could comment only that, apart from merits of case, bill had gone through two readings and was now virtu-

² Document 2.
⁴ See footnote 2, Document 1.
ally through Parliament. I said our interest of course was first to persuade SAG not to enact legislation, and I hoped it not too late to prevent this, but if it enacted to urge non-implementation.

Rountree

5. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

NSC Review of Policy toward Southern Africa

At Tab A is a National Security Study Memorandum which I propose to send out on Southern Africa. This is not an immediate crisis. Though some would argue that the black terrorist raids into Rhodesia and the white reprisals are the first rounds of the long-predicted race war, that violence remains minor. The white-ruled regimes should contain any military threat for 3–5 years easily. But the black-white confrontation in Southern Africa will be with us with growing insistence politically throughout the '70s.

There are three principal reasons why I think we should get an early Presidential grip on this subject:

(1) There has been no full, high-level review of U.S. interests and objectives in Southern Africa since the early Kennedy years. Yet the situation in the area has become more volatile and complicated in the last few years, including the presence of the Soviets and Chinese as patrons of the terrorist groups operating against Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories of Angola and Mozambique.

(2) The United States has meaningful yet potentially conflicting interests in the area which should be clearly identified and weighed. We have a political stake in dissociation from the repressive racial policies of the white regimes. At the same time, we have important material interests—a NASA tracking station, overflight and refueling rights,
heavy U.S. investment, and a major trade potential—which require some involvement with the white authorities. These interests are sometimes at odds in fact, and sometimes because others—in Africa or here at home—regard them so. A recent example was the call of the Carrier FDR at Capetown, which was suddenly cancelled by the Johnson Administration after a major furor by U.S. civil rights groups.

(3) Finally, the NSC should have the arguments on all the options open to U.S. policy in dealing with the white regimes. I think Dean Acheson had a point in his recent conversation with you that State has been tied rather stubbornly to one track on this aspect of the problem. There is clearly a legitimate case for a quite different policy than the current posture toward the white regimes.

If you approve, we can schedule a NSC session on Southern Africa for mid-May.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to sign the NSSM on Southern Africa at Tab A.

Approve NSSM

Disapprove

Speak to me

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^3 Nixon initialed this option.
6. National Security Study Memorandum 39


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT

Southern Africa

The President has directed a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Southern Africa (south of Congo (K) and Tanzania).

The study should consider (1) the background and future prospects of major problems in the area; (2) alternative views of the U.S. interest in Southern Africa; and (3) the full range of basic strategies and policy options open to the United States.

The review of interests and policy options should encompass the area as a whole—including Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the Portuguese territories, and adjacent African states.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa perform this study.

The study should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by April 25th.

Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–144, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 39. Secret. Haig initialed the memorandum. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Administrator of AID, and Acting Director of NASA.
7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Cape Town

Washington, May 2, 1969, 2141Z.

1. Agree representations along lines ref tel timely and appropriate both here and Cape Town.

2. Suggest Embassy avail self first opportunity make known growing concern USG. Be sure you leave no doubt continued application TA and similar legislation inhabitants of SWA, including both detention and criminal proceedings, is central issue. If SAG has support it claims among people such measures superfluous as well as contrary to rule of law and illegal in their application to international territory. Their continuance can only entrench rejection by moderate overseas opinion of bona fides of SAG development objectives SWA and qte outward looking unqte initiatives.

3. Avoid any implication we suggest continued detention under section 6 TA rather than trial under TA. Former more heinous than latter. Moreover, propriety any trial, whether for TA, other statutory or common law offenses, vitiated if trial follows after detention under section 6 TA. Thus, trial of qte Ten unqte for common law offenses can be viewed as in right direction only if SAG moves to cease application TA and similar legislation to SWA and SWAfricans. Moreover, dropping

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2 “1488” is an error; reference is to telegram 639 from Cape Town, May 1. In that telegram, Rountree proposed the Department consider démarches to the South African Government expressing concern over the treatment of Southwest Africans, especially the use of the Terrorism Act against SWAPO. (Ibid.)

3 In telegram 684 from Cape Town, May 9, Rountree reported on his meeting with Fourie, during which the Ambassador expressed U.S. concerns regarding the upcoming trial of Southwest Africans. Rountree reported that Fourie made notes during the meeting, but his “comments were mainly to seek clarification.” Rountree also asked about replies to previous démarches on Southwest Africa and was told that replies were forthcoming. (Ibid.)

4 Section 6 of the Terrorism Act (1967) allowed someone suspected of involvement in “terrorism” to be detained for an indefinite period without trial on the authority of a senior police officer.

5 In early 1969, 10 members of SWAPO were detained in Pretoria. The “Ten” were advised on February 22 that they would be tried under the Terrorism Act. The trial began on July 1, 1969.
Sobukwe clause,\textsuperscript{6} however helpful, vis-à-vis parliamentary opposition, likely be lost on international community if TA remains, especially in its application SWA.

4. Dept preparing for oral démarche to Embassy here at appropriate level. May profit slightly from groundwork extensive discussions Justice Steyn, substance of which on rule of law side presumably conveyed Taswell. Will keep you informed.

5. Appreciate very much your efforts paras 1 and 2 refel.

End

\textbf{Rogers}

\textsuperscript{6} General Law Amendment Act 37 of 1963 allowed the South African Government to detain political prisoners beyond the length of the prisoners’ original sentences. It was referred to as the “Sobukwe clause” because it was used to extend the 3-year prison sentence of Pan Africanist Congress leader Robert M. Sobukwe for an additional 3 years. Sobukwe was the only person imprisoned under this clause.

8. \textbf{Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)}\textsuperscript{1}


\textbf{SUBJECT}

Chrome Imports and Rhodesian Sanctions

At \textit{Tab A} is a memo from Bob Haldeman telling you that the President has made a policy decision on imports of Rhodesian chrome on the strength of a recommendation from Pat Buchanan,\textsuperscript{2} (Buchanan’s piece is at \textit{Tab B}).\textsuperscript{3} Haldeman is asking you to implement the decision.

This is the first I have heard of this process. The major U.S. chrome companies in Rhodesia—Union Carbide and Foote Mineral—are always lobbying hard to obtain relief from sanctions. And OEP is taking up their case (for its impact on our stockpiles) in the context of the

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Confidential; Sensitive. Sent for action.

\textsuperscript{2} Tab A, dated May 1, is attached but not printed.

\textsuperscript{3} Tab B, undated and unsigned, is attached but not printed.
ongoing NSC review of Southern African policy. Buchan’s memo is clearly an end-run around the NSC channel. The problem is that there are several issues here in honest dispute within the Government, and the President should certainly see all sides of the question before making a final decision. Here is a brief run-down:

1. The first UN Security Council Resolution on mandatory Rhodesian sanctions in December 1966—which the U.S. implemented by Presidential Executive Order still in force—specifically prohibits UN members from importing chrome from Rhodesia.6

2. There was provision accompanying our Executive Order to issue licenses for chrome imports from Rhodesia in certain “hardship cases.” This was generally interpreted to cover imports of chrome which had left Rhodesia prior to the adoption of the Security Council Resolution but were still in transit after its adoption.

3. Union Carbide and Foote Mineral are now asking for an import license for some 200,000 tons of chrome which had not left Rhodesia prior to December 1966. Buchanan argues that both companies should be given the licenses because they paid for this ore prior to the sanctions.

In fact, Foote’s 57,000 tons of this total was not even mined until 1967–68—and even then with money which was licensed by the U.S. on the clear understanding that (a) the mining would only serve to keep the Foote mine operating as a salvageable U.S. property in Rhodesia, and (b) none of the ore so mined would be licensed for import to the U.S. in violation of the sanctions. Union Carbide’s 150,000 tons was paid for after the Security Council Resolution, yet just before the formal U.S. Executive Order. Thus, in both cases the legal point here about when the ore was paid for is by no means clear cut.

4. The merits of the chrome sanctions—as for all sanctions—are certainly arguable. Honest men will disagree about the general impact of sanctions on the Smith regime, the hardship to U.S. industry, the market benefits to other chrome suppliers like the Soviet Union, etc. All these points bear on the license for this deal.

5. Buchanan argues, for example, that the sanctions have brought “serious pressures” on the domestic chrome industry. Yet there is a 1- to 2-year supply of chrome presently available in the U.S. There are significant quantities of chrome purchased from our stockpile but still unused by the purchaser. And chrome ore is available on the world market, albeit at higher prices.

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4 See Document 6.
6. Buchanan argues that importing this chrome will actually hurt the Rhodesians by depriving them of a valuable asset which they might sell on the black market. The fact is that Ian Smith has not been able to sell all the chrome he’s got, let alone these 200,000 U.S. tons. Most important, however, neither the Rhodesians, nor the Africans, nor our own Congress would see this as a simple economic deal. Sanctions are nothing if not a political instrument. Ian Smith and his supporters will jump on this licensing and play it for all it’s worth as a softening of U.S. pressure, a lessening of our support for the UN, and a signal to other countries to throw in the towel. The President may wish to do that, but that is a decision that has to be taken after the most careful review of all the consequences and in the framework of our general policy objectives in Southern Africa. This is not only an economic benefit to U.S. firms, but a clear political windfall for Rhodesia. We could reasonably extract some quid for the chromium quo.

7. Buchanan says a license would win us some friends in the business community and encounter only “short-lived . . . flak from the Left.” I must say this seems to me the most dubious proposition of all, when Senator Kennedy et al. are looking for every chance to embarrass the Administration on racially loaded issues such as Southern Africa. As for our business friends, other users and importers of chrome might well frown on a deal which gave Foote and Union Carbide special access to captive chrome supplies. Then too, we can expect the nickel, asbestos and lithium people to seek similar relief. The door would be open on sanctions, or we would indeed lose some business friends.

Again, a case can be made for the President taking that heat as the cost of a conscious policy calculated to be in the national interest. But that only argues further for the most rigorous and comprehensive look at all sides of the problem.

8. Chrome companies, Southern Africa and the Congress aside, our British allies are in Rhodesian sanctions up to their necks. If nothing else, the President’s relationship with Harold Wilson demands that we look at Rhodesian chrome as a decidedly political commodity.

9. Finally, if this is to be, as Buchanan presents it, a “one-shot” deal, it solves neither the long-range problem of chrome supply which is allegedly hurting the industry nor OEP’s desire for U.S. industry to be freed from greater dependence on the world market (read the USSR).

**Recommendations:**

1. That you reply to Haldeman that this decision has wide implications for Southern African policy, and we should hold implementation
a few weeks pending the current NSC study (a note to that effect is at Tab C).  

2. That I introduce the chrome problem as a specific issue for decision in the NSC paper.

Approve
Disapprove
Speak to me

7 Tab C is not attached.

8 Kissinger initialed his approval and wrote: “Do memo for Haldeman. Also point out that Pat shouldn’t by-pass chrome channel.” A May 16 memorandum from Kissinger to Haldeman emphasized the need to address the issue as part of the administration’s policy review of southern Africa. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Rhodesia, Vol. I)

9. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Black African Manifesto on Southern Africa

Fourteen states held the fifth East and Central African Summit meeting earlier this month in Lusaka, Zambia. The main product of the summit was a joint manifesto which is rather remarkable for its conciliatory tone toward the white states in Southern Africa. Attached is a copy of the manifesto, which is worth skimming as background for the upcoming NSC consideration of U.S. policy toward Southern Africa. (I have taken the liberty of marking important passages in the document).

The black Africans are never at a loss to condemn minority rule in the white regimes or to criticize the West for its failure to take tougher


2 Attached but not printed. The Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States was held April 14–16. The “Manifesto on Southern Africa” was issued on April 16.
action on the problem. But this latest statement is notably more moderate than those of the past. Some of its main points:

(1) The “liberation” of Southern Africa does not mean racialism in reverse. All people now living in the area are judged to be “Africans” regardless of skin color.

(2) The Portuguese hold on Mozambique and Angola was criticized not for racialism, but for “the pretense that Portugal exists in Africa.” If the Portuguese would accept the principle of self-determination, the African states would try to get the guerrilla movements in the territories to put down their arms and work for a peaceful transfer of power. White settlers would be welcomed by new black governments, however, with the hope that a “liberated” Angola and Mozambique would simply become African versions of Brazil.

(3) But

(a) the British should “re-assert” their authority in Rhodesia to bring about majority rule (just how this is to be done the statement doesn’t make clear);
(b) the UN should enable Southwest Africa to exercise self-determination (again the means are not specified); and
(c) South Africa should be kicked out of the UN and generally ostracized by the world community.

Comment

We should not read too much into the manifesto. The hard political realities of the area remain: (1) for reasons of domestic politics and racial pride, African leaders will not abandon their basic opposition to white minority rule, yet (2) they can’t reach their objective in Southern Africa without outside—and especially U.S.—support. The long-run problem here for black Africa is how to reconcile their passion with that dependence.

We certainly cannot deduce the ultimate thrust of black policy from this manifesto. But it is interesting for its departures from the standard rhetoric. For the moment at least, the Africans may have found tactical reasons for trying a milder approach in talking about their problem.

10. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers


SUBJECT

South Africa: The Invisible Government

A South African law, soon to take effect, further strengthens the secret police at the expense of an open society. While there is no visible threat to white domination, the government continues to extend its repressive legislation.

*The Latest Club.* Under South Africa’s weird blend of parliamentary democracy and totalitarianism, the government has once more passed another bill to further limit civil rights. A recently enacted law makes legally unanswerable to the courts the Bureau for State Security, a combined police and intelligence agency. In essence, the new legislation forbids disclosure of any information concerning BOSS (an acronym bestowed by the English-language press), even in judicial proceedings, without the government’s authorization. The government, for example, can prevent accused persons from testifying even in their own defense, if it wants to suppress their evidence. The law is vague enough to encompass most public discussion of police activities and may silence future criticism in this area.

*Who’s BOSS?* Formed earlier this year by a merger of military and police intelligence, BOSS has a direct line to Prime Minister John Vorster. It is headed by General H.J. Van den Bergh, probably the strongest man in the country after Vorster. The two men have been close friends for years, dating from when both were imprisoned during World War II by the Smuts government for pro-Nazi activities. Van den Bergh, who rose to be head of the Security Branch when Vorster was Minister of Justice, has successfully crushed white and non-white opposition in the country; he even felt strong enough in 1968 to crack down on extreme-right Afrikaner critics of Vorster.

*Overkill.* There is no imminent foreign threat, and Pretoria’s military and police power have the internal security situation under firm control. An arsenal of legislation already exists, providing for indefinite detention without trial, house arrest, banishment, and other forms of intimidation, so that the BOSS law will not really cover any serious chink in the government’s defensive armor.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23 S AFR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Denney initialed for Hughes.
Embarrassment. The law, however, will plug the few remaining loopholes that permit publicity damaging to the regime’s efforts to improve South Africa’s image overseas. One recent subject of press coverage has been the death of James Lenkoe, a Lesotho national caught in a minor pass raid, who was reputed to have hanged himself in jail. A public inquest has suggested the likelihood that he was electrocuted during police interrogation. An on-going trial of a liberal antigovernment newspaper has given publicity to torture and brutality in prisons.2 In 1968 Gabriel Mbindi, a South West African, became the latest of a number of political prisoners to have his case for damages stemming from police beatings settled out of court by the government; the case was widely publicized in the English-language press. The act also reflects the government’s mounting resentment of overseas-financed legal aid programs for political prisoners. The BOSS law will probably stop all this.

No Signs of Loosening Up. In spite of a booming economy and an ever increasing standard of living for whites (and for some non-whites too), a growing trade with black Africa, and a desire to establish better contacts with the outside world, South Africa’s repressive legislation has multiplied in the past decade. The fact that the government is so strong and yet still goes to such lengths to quell even mild criticism suggests that South Africa has no intention of easing rigid controls or of liberalizing the political system.

11. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Dean Acheson’s Views on our Consulate in Rhodesia

Dean Acheson gave me the attached paper\(^2\) on the question of maintaining our Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia. It is interesting reading.

He believes that we should maintain our Consulate there\(^3\) for two reasons:

1. Maintaining the Consulate is not recognition of the regime.
2. To end all relations with Rhodesia is contrary to our national interests, since the effect of sanctions against Rhodesia—now that the regime has adopted a constitution which precludes black African majority rule—is to foment race war there.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 807, Name Files, Acheson, Dean. No classification marking. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

\(^2\) Dated July 7, attached but not printed.

\(^3\) Nixon circled “we should maintain our Consulate there” and wrote “I agree.”

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12. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State\(^1\)

Pretoria, July 24, 1969, 1559Z.

2094. Subject: Ashe Visa. Ref: State 121981.\(^2\)

1. In reply my questions concerning Ashe visa, FonSec Fourie told me in meeting today: (A) Foreign Ministry had, following press reports concerning alleged visa denial, made inquiries of SA Embassy Wash-

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\(^2\) In telegram 121981 to Pretoria, July 23, the Department asked the Embassy to determine the status of tennis player Arthur Ashe’s visa. (Ibid.)
nington and ConGen New York and had ascertained that no visa application had been received from Ashe; (B) if Ashe should apply for visa, application would be considered on merits as any other application.

2. Fourie commented in personal vein that hundreds of visas issued annually for non-whites, and fact Ashe is Negro would not be cause of rejection of application. He cited cases several American Negroes who had visited South Africa in recent past and again stated that question concerning conditions of Congressman Diggs’ visa were not repeat not related to his race but were associated with his committee work.

3. I asked whether, if Ashe applied for visa and was granted same, he would be permitted to play tennis with white South Africans. Fourie said this was matter within purview Ministry of Sport and he not able give response to hypothetical question. All he could say was that circumstances of visa application would be considered. If purpose was deemed to be to “show up South Africa”, i.e. to come to country for political purposes, this no doubt would be taken into account.

Rountree

13. Memorandum of Conversation


[SUBJECT]
Visa Applications of Congressmen Diggs and Reid, Application of Repressive Legislation to South West Africa

[PARTICIPANTS]
Ambassador H.L.T. Taswell, Embassy of South Africa
Minister Daniel P. Olivier, Embassy of South Africa
Acting Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson
Deputy Legal Adviser John B. Rhinelander
John D. Stempel, Staff Assistant to the Under Secretary

Ambassador Taswell called at the request of the Acting Secretary, who voiced regret that the purpose of his first meeting with the Ambassador should be to express the grave concern of the US Government to

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 S AFR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Crosby. The memorandum is attached to an August 6 briefing memorandum from Crosby to Newsom.
the Government of South Africa. He then gave the Ambassador Aides Mémoire concerning visa applications of Congressmen Charles C. Diggs and Ogden R. Reid and concerning the application of repressive legislation to South West Africa.2

Regarding the visa matter, the Secretary emphasized the importance of the Congressional role in the U.S., mentioned a meeting with Congressman Diggs not long ago regarding U.S. policy towards southern Africa, and observed that determination of our policy toward South Africa is apt to be affected by the fact that the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa has been excluded from South Africa. The action of South Africa, Communist China, or other countries in walling off their states, particularly to keep out responsible elected officials, is inevitably regarded with suspicion abroad. The Secretary pointed out that Congressional trips are a necessary part of foreign policy formulation and although some Congressmen have critical views on South Africa, they are not irresponsible, and on balance it is wiser to permit an exchange of ideas, which should contribute to better understanding.

Ambassador Taswell said he had already told Congressman Reid he would be welcome to come and look around in South Africa. But this is not the object of his visit; he wants to speak at universities and participate in agitational student groups. It is hard to think this purpose does not constitute interference in domestic South African affairs. The Congressman is clearly going to stir up trouble and engage in anti-South African activity. Congressman Reid’s press release expressed his objections to apartheid and his support for human rights and the rule of law; his implication was untrue that the South Africans are not interested in human rights and the rule of law.

The Secretary observed there is a wide gulf between Congressman Reid’s intentions and interference in South African affairs. An elected U.S. official should be able to go to talk with people in South Africa.

Ambassador Taswell responded that Congressman Reid is not being excluded because of his views but on the basis that he would be going to make trouble, as can be seen from the attitudes and activities of the student group (NUSAS) that invited him. Reid is an elected official in the U.S. but not in South Africa, and he is not the first elected official to be excluded from a foreign country.

Taswell said Congressman Diggs was also welcome to visit South Africa, but under the restriction that he not engage in activities or make statements that would constitute interference in internal affairs nor address any public meetings. Taswell said these were very reasonable re-

2 See Document 14.
strictions and asked whether the Secretary would say such visitors should interfere in South Africa's affairs.

The Secretary said there is no question about the right of a sovereign country to control admission of foreigners, but the present case represents an unhappy state of affairs that could affect our relations. It is one thing to tell a Congressman to leave if he misbehaves, but something else to restrict his coming on the assumption that he intends interference, even though there is no clear indication of what form that might take.

Ambassador Taswell opined it would be worse to expel misbehaving Congressmen than to restrict their admission. He concluded with the observation that South Africa would like more Congressmen to visit, but was not prepared to allow them to interfere in internal matters; the South African members of Parliament who visited the U.S. recently did not meddle in American affairs.

An impasse having been reached, the Secretary then turned the conversation to the application of Clauses 10 and 29 of the 1969 General Law Amendment Act to South West Africa. He said the U.S. is especially concerned because of the international status of the Territory. We consider the General Law Amendment Law lacks legal basis, as the U.N. has responsibility for South West Africa. Moreover, Articles 10 and 29 are arbitrary and restrictive, violate the rights of the inhabitants, and are incompatible with the Rule of Law. The U.S. therefore urges the South African Government not to apply the law to South West Africa.

Ambassador Taswell said South Africa disputes the claim of U.N. responsibility for South West Africa. South Africa administers the Territory in the spirit of the Mandate, Article 2 of which states South Africa can apply its laws to South West Africa. There may be things in the General Law Amendment Act the U.S. does not like, but South Africa considers the law necessary because of terrorism and people on its borders stirring up trouble and harboring terrorists. Taswell assured the Secretary the terms of the law would be applied with restraint and would not harm South West Africa. There has been much progress in the Territory, South Africa has done a good job and it plans to continue on these lines.

The Secretary referred to five outstanding unanswered U.S. communications on this general subject and reaffirmed them and our oral representations regarding the South West Africa Affairs Act and the

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3 Clause 10 broadly defined a security matter as anything relating to the security of the Republic and imposed stiff penalties for violations. Clause 29 hampered the defense of the accused by preventing evidence that might be “prejudicial to the interest of the public or State security” from being introduced into court. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1969–1970, p. 23619)
detention and trial of South West Africans under the Terrorism Act. The U.S. would welcome the promised reply to these communications as a contribution to a constructive exchange of views.

Taswell said the South Africans would be happy to have a constructive exchange and had long wanted the U.S. Ambassador to go to South West Africa to look around and talk with the people.

The Secretary said the international status of South West Africa could be discussed without going to the Territory.

Taswell agreed but reiterated the desire to have the Ambassador go to South West Africa. He said some people term South West Africa a threat to international peace and security; how about Nigeria, where they say 1.7 million have been killed—three times the population of South West Africa? If South Africa followed the advice to administer South West Africa as a single entity, the small war-like Heroro group would fight the Ovambos, who are 45% of the population, and enslave them. The Ambassador cited the loss of life in the Sudan; there is no concern or complaint in the U.N. about that.

The Secretary repeated it is the international character of South West Africa and specific U.N. responsibility for the Territory that make the situation different there.

Taswell responded that South Africa does not recognize such a U.N. responsibility. He added that with no criticism of the U.S. role in Vietnam, the number of people killed there exceeds the population of South West Africa.

The Secretary said we prefer to avoid such situations. Where we see one on the horizon, we try to prevent trouble, as we have recently in Central America. We are pleased at our contribution in that area and would like to make a contribution in South West Africa.

Ambassador Taswell said again: Send your Ambassador to South West Africa.

Another impasse having been reached, the meeting was ended after 55 minutes.

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4 See Document 14 and footnote 4 thereto.
14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa

Washington, August 1, 1969, 2246Z.

129016. Subj: SWA, BOSS, TA Trial II.

1. Acting Secretary Richardson yesterday called in Ambassador Taswell and delivered strong protest application BOSS, TA, SWA Affairs Act, etc. to SWA. At same time protested treatment Codel’s visa applications. Report conversation both matters by separate cable. Following text aide-mémoire handed Ambassador on SWA:

Qte: The Government of the United States has noted the passage by the South African Parliament of the General Law Amendment Act of 1969 and, in particular, notes that clauses 10 and 29 of this Act apply to the international territory of SWA. Such application lacks proper legal basis, since SA has forfeited its right to administer the territory, for which direct responsibility rests in the United Nations.

It is a matter of additional concern to the Government of the United States that the clauses in question are of such nature as to contravene important rights of the inhabitants. Such rights continue to demand respect and could not have been divested or diminished by reason of South Africa’s forfeiture of its own rights in the territory. The Government of the United States is particularly concerned that clause 10, which amends the Official Secrets Act and is applicable to South West Africa, makes unlawful the communication or publication “in any manner or for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the Republic” of any information relating to any “security matter.” Security matter is very broadly defined as “any matter relating to the security of the Republic.” It specifically includes “any matter dealt with by or relating to the relationship subsisting between any person and the said Bureau.” By its very generality clause 10 is suppressive of freedom of information in and concerning South West Africa, which is essential to the development of free institutions and to the well-being and self-government of the inhabitants.

Clause 29 prevents the introduction before any court or “any body or institution established by or under any law” of any evidence or in-
formation in matters where the Prime Minister, any functionary authorized by him, or any other Minister, certifies a claim of executive privilege on the basis of state or public security. It necessarily follows that any person involved in an administrative, or possibly even a legislative proceeding, or litigating a civil matter in court, as well as any accused in a criminal proceeding, will be barred, upon the requisite unreviewable certification, from presenting information which could be essential to a fair outcome or adjudication. Clause 29 is thus in derogation of the rule of law and injurious to the well-being of the inhabitants.

Without addressing itself to the question of the implications of clauses 10 and 29 for South Africa’s obligations in respect to matters other than South West Africa, the Government of the United States wishes to make clear that it considers their enactment contrary to South Africa’s international obligations with regard to South West Africa and in contravention of the rights vested in the inhabitants by the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Mandate Agreement and the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, extension to South West Africa of South African legislation so arbitrary and restrictive in nature cannot fail further to arouse international tensions to the prejudice of friendly and cooperative relationships.

The Government of the United States therefore urges the South African Government to take account of the implications of this legislation and reconsider and withdraw its application to the international territory of South West Africa.

Certain earlier communications from the Government of the United States to the Government of South Africa concerning legislation made applicable to the international territory of South West Africa conveyed views and put questions in the hope that they might be productive both of dialogue and developments consistent with the interests of the inhabitants of that territory. A list of such communications is attached.

On the present occasion the Government of the United States wishes to reiterate the concerns expressed in these communications and in its recent oral representations concerning the South West Africa Affairs Act of 1969, as well as concerning the continuing application to South West Africa of the Terrorism Act of 1967, as evidenced by the current trial at Windhoek and detentions of South West Africans under that Act.

The Government of the United States hopes that an early response by the Government of South Africa to its past and present observations, inquiries and requests may help to advance a constructive exchange of views on the international territory of South West Africa.

Attachment: List of certain representations made by the Government of the United States to the Government of the Republic of South
Africa concerning the international territory of South West Africa (1967–1969).\(^4\)

3. Aide-mémoire. Delivered at Cape Town, April 2, 1968  
5. Note (No. 287) Delivered at Pretoria, January 14, 1969

End of aide-mémoire.

Richardson

\(^4\) The text of the February 10, 1968, aide-mémoire is in telegram 113548 to Cape Town, February 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 29 SW AFR) The text of the May 3, 1968, aide-mémoire is in telegram 158297 to Athens, May 3. (Ibid., POL 19 SW AFR) The others were not found.

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15. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers\(^1\)

No. 605 Washington, August 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

South-West Africa: The Issue That Won’t Go Away

The Issue Remains. The UN Security Council’s resolution of August 12, calling for South Africa’s withdrawal from South-West Africa (Namibia) by October 4, 1969,\(^2\) further narrows the maneuverability of the US and the UK on the South-West Africa issue. South Africa has no intention of giving up South-West Africa, and the Afro-Asian countries can therefore be expected to begin pressing again for UN enforcement measures sometime after the October deadline has passed. The UK will

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 19 SW AFR. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 

\(^2\) Resolution 269 declared South Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia a violation of territorial integrity and an encroachment on the authority of the United Nations. It also requested all states to increase their assistance to the people of Namibia. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1969, p. 697)
probably use its veto, if necessary, to defeat mandatory sanctions, but
this will not dispose of the issue or ease Afro-Asian pressures on the
US.

Afro-Asian Tenacity. In their long-fought battle in the UN against
the white minority regimes of southern Africa, the Afro-Asians have
had mandatory sanctions against South Africa as their long-term goal.
They failed, most recently in June, to get a Rhodesian resolution (that
would have extended Rhodesian sanctions to South Africa and Mo-
zambique) through the Security Council. They succeeded the next
month in having the SC condemn Portugal over frontier incidents with
Zambia. The resolution on South-West Africa of August 12 illustrates
how Afro-Asian support in the Security Council on this issue has now
broadened to the point where there were no negative votes and the
only abstentions were the US, UK, France, and Finland.

What Type of Sanctions? The resolution provides that if Pretoria
does not comply with the demand for withdrawal, the “Security
Council will meet immediately to determine upon effective measures.”
For the Afro-Asians, “effective measures” mean Chapter VII actions, al-
though it is not clear yet whether the Afro-Asians are prepared to scale
or slow down their demands in order to obtain US support. But what-
ever the tactics, the August 12 resolution has brought the Security
Council measurably closer to the point where it will have to decide one
way or the other on mandatory sanctions.

South Africa Adamant. Entrenched in South-West Africa since
World War I, South Africa has hardened its position since the World
Court decision of 1966. It has virtually annexed the territory3 and has,
contrary to the original mandate, some military units there. Only con-
certed measures by the major world powers might shake South Africa’s
hold over the area, but prospects for such international action seem
dimmer than ever.

UK Problems. Among the permanent Security Council members,
the UK in particular is strongly opposed to measures against South Af-
rica. The UK and South Africa are important trading partners and,
more significantly, British investment (currently exceeding $3 billion)
constitutes 60 percent of all foreign investment in South Africa. The
UK, therefore, would probably try to dilute any future Security Council
resolution on mandatory sanctions and, if it did not succeed, would
probably be prepared to use the veto.

Not the End. A British veto might get other members of the Security
Council off the hook, but probably only temporarily. The South-West

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3 See Intelligence Note 81, “South-West Africa: Shrunken Autonomy,” February 11,
1969. [Footnote is in the original. Printed as Document 1.]
Africa issue will continue to be a source of recurring frictions between African states and the West, and the Afro-Asians are likely to bring new pressures on the US to “do something” about South Africa’s continued presence in the territory.

16. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 23, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
The Secretary’s Bilateral Talk with Foreign Secretary Stewart—Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS

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<td>The Secretary</td>
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<td>Amb. Pedersen, Counselor</td>
<td>Lord Caradon</td>
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<td>Asst. Secy. Hillenbrand</td>
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When the Secretary complimented Stewart on his excellent speech before the General Assembly on September 22, the British Foreign Secretary noted that the section of the speech dealing with Rhodesia had attracted the most attention in the British press. Stewart said that while he was grateful for past American support of the British position on Rhodesia, he hoped we would not continue to maintain our “diplomatic mission” at Salisbury. Our having official representation there only gave impetus to Rhodesian hopes for “creeping recognition” from the Western countries which kept representatives stationed in Rhodesia. The UK had withdrawn its diplomatic representatives and the Foreign Secretary hoped that we would now do likewise. The Secretary said that the U.S. was aware both of the British viewpoint on this matter and of the drawbacks involved in our maintaining a Consulate

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UK–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson on September 24 and approved by Brown on September 27. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. The memorandum is part 3 of 7.
General in Rhodesia. He had discussed the situation with several African leaders, and he understood how they felt. On the other hand, there was some thought within the U.S. government that we should continue to have a few people to service the needs of the Americans in Rhodesia. The U.S. had considerable interests there. The Secretary believed that our staff at the Consulate General was now down to three men.

The British Foreign Secretary asked whether we would at least withdraw our people at the time Rhodesia declares itself a republic. (Lord Caradon thought this might be in the spring or even earlier.) The Secretary replied that he would recommend to the President that we close our Consulate General when the Rhodesian republic is declared.

Stewart said the Rhodesian issue was a smoldering one which can flame up again in the UN at any time. Lord Caradon observed that the Security Council Resolution on Rhodesia had been unanimous; the fact that the U.S. government continued to have representatives in Rhodesia might give us some difficulties. Ambassador Pedersen pointed out that the SC resolution had been in the form of a recommendation to UN members and was not mandatory.

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2 During a January 28, 1970, meeting between Rogers and Stewart, the Foreign Secretary repeated his request for the United States to close the Consulate in Rhodesia. Stewart said that the issue was damaging to “long term policy in black Africa,” and was used by “those who wanted a complete reversal of HMG’s Rhodesia policy.” (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL UK–US)

3 In telegram 102572 to London, June 23, 1969, the Department transmitted its reaction to the June 20 Rhodesian referendum seeking constitutional changes and the establishment of a Republic: “The US regards a referendum in which only 1.1 per cent of the population of Southern Rhodesia approved the results to be a travesty of commonly accepted methods of ascertaining the popular will.” The telegram concluded: “The question of the future of our small consular office in Salisbury is under study at the present time.” (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 RHOD)

4 A July 22 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon mentions Rogers’s recommendation to close the Consulate in Salisbury in response to the June 20 referendum. Kissinger noted Nixon’s earlier decision to maintain the Consulate, and requested that the Department of State’s recommendation be rejected. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Rhodesia, Vol. I) Nixon reaffirmed his decision to maintain the Consulate on January 15, 1970, but changed his position at the request of the British Government on March 9 (see Documents 25 and 28).

5 Presumably a reference to Security Council Resolution 253 (1968), which was adopted unanimously on May 29, 1968. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, pp. 152–154) Concerned about the lack of compliance by several member states, the Council revisited the issue in a series of meetings held June 13–24, 1969. A draft resolution submitted by Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, and Zambia on June 19 reiterated many of the points in Resolution 253 (1968), called for mandatory sanctions under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, and called on the United Kingdom to “take urgently all necessary measures, including the use of force” to put an end to the minority regime. The Council voted on June 24 with 8 in favor, 0 against, and 7 abstentions. Without the required majority, the resolution was not adopted. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1969, pp. 119–120)
17. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council
Interdepartmental Group for Africa

AF/NSC–IG 69–8 Rev. A

[Omitted here are a title page and table of contents.]

Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39.2
Southern Africa

I. A. U.S. Interests in Southern Africa

Our policy positions on southern African issues affect a range of U.S. interests. None of the interests are vital to our security, but they have political and material importance. Some of these interests are concrete and evident in the region itself, while others relate to our position in black Africa and the world. The interests can be summarized as follows:

1. Political

Racial repression by white minority regimes in southern Africa has international political ramifications extending beyond the region itself. Politically conscious blacks elsewhere in Africa and the world deeply resent the continuation of discrimination, identify with the repressed majorities in southern Africa and tend in varying degrees to see relationships of outside powers with the white regimes as at least tacit acceptance of racism. Many others in the non-white world tend to share this view in some measure. The communist states have been quick to seize on this issue and to support black aspirations. Thus our policy toward the white regimes of southern Africa affects, though it may not necessarily govern, our standing with African and other states on issues in the United Nations and bilaterally. Depending on its intensity, adverse reaction to our policy in southern Africa could make more difficult our relationships elsewhere in Africa on a variety of matters including U.S. defense installations, over-flight rights and the use of port facilities. The same consideration applies to economic relations: direct investment in Africa outside the white regime states currently totals

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and related papers, 1969–1976, Lot 80D212, NSSM 39. Secret. This paper is a revised version of an August 15 study. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–026, National Security Council Meetings, NSC Meeting 12/17/69 Southern Africa (NSSM 39)) The revisions were requested at an October 16 Review Group meeting. (Minutes of a Review Group meeting; ibid., Box H–040, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group Meeting—Southern Africa 10/16/69) The annexes are not printed.

2 Document 6.
about $1.5 billion (of which the greater part is in black Africa south of the Sahara), or about two-thirds of the total U.S. investment in Africa. U.S. exports split about 60% to the black states of Africa and 40% to the white regime countries.

Because of the multi-racial character of our society and our own racial problems, other countries tend to see our relationships with southern Africa as reflections of domestic attitudes on race. This situation is exacerbated by the extension of South African racial discrimination to black Americans who may be refused visas or who are subjected to segregated facilities in South Africa.

If violence in the area escalates, U.S. interests will be increasingly threatened. In these circumstances the U.S. would find it increasingly difficult without sacrificing interests to find a middle ground in the UN on questions of insurgent violence and counter-violence in the region and to resist demands for more positive actions against the white regimes.

2. Economic

U.S. direct investment in southern Africa, mainly in South Africa, is about $1 billion and yields a highly profitable return. Trade, again mainly with South Africa, runs a favorable balance to the U.S. (Our exports to South Africa were about $450 million in 1968 against imports of $250 million.) In addition the U.S. has indirect economic interest in the key role which South Africa plays in the U.K. balance of payments. U.K. investment in South Africa is currently estimated at $3 billion, and the British have made it clear that they will take no action which would jeopardize their economic interests. South Africa produces over 75% of the free world supply of gold. The long-term importance of South African gold sales has been reduced by the creation of IMF Special Drawing Rights but they are nonetheless significant in the international monetary system and very important to South Africa.

3. Defense

Southern Africa is geographically important for the U.S. and its allies, particularly with the closing of the Suez Canal and the increased Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. uses overflight and landing facilities for military aircraft in the Portuguese Territories and South Africa. Any of a number of contingencies could require U.S. military air transit to the Indian Ocean/Mid East areas. All but one feasible air route across Africa south of the Sahara would depend upon overflight and, in some cases, landing rights in South Africa or Zambia and Mozambique. The DOD has proposed periodic use of these routes in normal times. However, apart from tracking station support aircraft, the policy has been to request clearance for South Africa as infrequently as possible.
There are major ship repair and logistic facilities in South Africa with a level of technical competence which cannot be duplicated elsewhere on the African continent. We have not permitted U.S. naval vessels to use South African port facilities since early 1967, except for emergencies. We have made use of U.S. Navy or foreign oilers to refuel carriers transiting to and from S.E. Asia via the Cape of Good Hope. Navy force reductions now call for the deactivation of two Atlantic Fleet and one Pacific Fleet oiler, which will attenuate already meager oiler assets so that, the DOD considers, assignment of oiler support to a carrier transit would seriously degrade our fleet posture vis-à-vis commitments and requirements. Regular use is made of ports in Angola and Mozambique, however, but these ports cannot accommodate aircraft carriers.

The DOD has a missile tracking station in South Africa under a classified agreement, and some of the military aircraft traffic involves support of this station. The future need for the DOD station is under review. The tentative conclusions are that the station is no longer required for research and development of missiles. We also finance a U.K. atmosphere testing station for nuclear materials located in Swaziland which helps us monitor nuclear atmospheric explosions worldwide.

4. Scientific

NASA has a space tracking facility of major importance in South Africa, and overflight and landing rights for support aircraft are utilized in connection with various space shots. The NASA station is particularly oriented towards support of unmanned spacecraft and will be of key significance for planetary missions. We have an atomic energy agreement with South Africa initiated under the Atoms for Peace Program; this relationship is important in influencing South Africa to continue its policy of doing nothing in the marketing of its large production of uranium oxide which would have the effect of increasing the number of nuclear weapons powers.

B. Views of the U.S. Interest in Southern Africa

In weighing the range of U.S. interests in southern Africa, there is basic consensus within the U.S. Government:

1. Although the U.S. has various interests in the region, it has none which could be classified as vital security interests.

2. Our political interests in the region are important because the racial policies of the white states have become a major international issue. Therefore, because other countries have made it so, our foreign policy must take into account the domestic policies of the white regimes. Most non-white nations in the world in varying degrees would tend to judge
conspicuous U.S. cooperation with the white regimes as condoning their racial policies.

3. The racial problems of southern Africa probably will grow more acute over time, perhaps leading to violent internal upheavals and greater involvement of the communist powers. Though these developments may be years or even decades ahead, U.S. policy should take account now of the risks to our interests and possible involvement over this uncertain future.

There are specific differences of view within the government regarding future trends in southern Africa and the U.S. role in the area. These contrasting views are central to a judgment of U.S. policy options. The following reflect a basic intellectual disagreement within the government in approaching the southern African problem:

(1) U.S. Involvement to Promote Change

U.S. efforts for constructive change: Some argue that racism and colonialism are central issues in African and world politics. The race issue in southern Africa has already led to armed conflict and disharmony which will spread if left unchecked. The U.S. is obligated under the UN Charter to do what we can to promote the non-discriminatory observance of human rights.

Non-involvement: Others reply that our disagreement with the domestic policies of any state should not govern the pursuit of our foreign policy interests in that state. Our concern with internal human rights problems has caused us to ignore serious cross-border infiltration which is a more legitimate UN concern and could lead to larger conflicts in the area. The actions taken against the white states, particularly on South West Africa and Rhodesia, have no valid basis in international law.

(2) Violent vs. Evolutionary Change

Violent Change: Some argue that mounting violence is inevitable unless change occurs and that there is no prospect for peaceful change in the racial policies of the white regimes, embedded as they are in prejudice, religious doctrine and self-interest and bolstered by economic prosperity, particularly in South Africa. The results will be: (a) black guerrilla and terrorist activity on a growing scale within these countries until change occurs, and (b) because of their support of the blacks, the Soviets and Chinese will become the major beneficiaries of the conflict.

Evolutionary Change: Others contend that there will be violence up to a point, since change can only come slowly. But there is some prospect for peaceful change in the white states in response to internal economic and social forces. In any event, peaceful evolution is the only avenue to change because (a) black violence only produces internal
reaction, and (b) military realities rule out a black victory at any stage. Moreover, there are reasons to question the depth and permanence of black resolve. Recently there has been a decline in the level of insurgency. Neighboring black states—vital to successful guerrilla activity—will choose to preserve their own security in the face of inevitable punishing white retaliation at an early stage of any significant guerrilla warfare.

(3) The Possibility of U.S. Influence Toward Evolutionary Change

No Influence: Some contend that we can neither reform the whites nor restrain the blacks. Racial repression is deeply ingrained in the whites—the product of tradition, economic privilege and fears for their survival. These attitudes are not amenable to the kinds of influence one nation exerts upon another through peaceful international relations. Only isolation and stronger forms of pressure (i.e. force or mandatory economic sanctions backed by blockade) could have any impact.

Yet, they argue, without some change in the whites we cannot hope to influence the blacks to accept “peaceful evolution” as a substitute for force. The blacks will see such advice as a fundamental U.S. betrayal of their cause.

A related school of thought believes that in this sensitive area any effort by the U.S. to exert influence on internal policies could retard rather than stimulate the natural dynamics of change in the white-dominated societies.

Some Influence: Others argue that our tactical encouragement of economic and social forces already at work within the white regimes can constitute marginal but important influence for change. That influence, however, can be exerted only subtly and over several years. We should not give up whatever chance we have—through contacts with whites as well as blacks—to defuse the dangerous tensions in the area and to demonstrate the alternatives to the disastrous racial policies of the white regimes. Exposure of these regimes to the outside world is necessary if there is to be peaceful change. Isolation of the white societies has only intensified repressive policies. Moreover, external efforts to force change by pressure or coercion have unified the whites and produced an obdurate counter-reaction.

(4) Importance of Political vs. Other Tangible Interests

Political Interests: Some argue that racial hostility as a reaction to centuries of white predominance is a relatively new political force in the world, gaining power and effectiveness as the developing countries become independent and control access to their own territories. We cannot foresee exactly when race will become a major factor in the international power balance, but that time is coming. It is equally clear
that the racial repression by the white regimes in southern Africa is now the most volatile racial problem on the international scene.

For the non-white states, they also argue, the reckoning of support on the racial issue in their time of weakness will determine their friendship or hostility for the U.S. a generation hence when their importance in world politics may be substantially greater. Thus failure to demonstrate an appreciation today of African aspirations may eventually (a) forfeit great influence to the communist powers, who have taken a clear position in support of black states and liberation movements and (b) jeopardize our strategic and economic interests in non-white Africa. Any anti-U.S. or pro-communist reactions, however, are unlikely to be either solid or early, and many black states are very aware of the dangers of association with the communists.

Other Tangible Interests: Others reply that our interests in the white states of southern Africa—albeit having a relatively low priority among such interests worldwide—are clearly worth retaining at their present political cost. These interests include access to air and naval facilities for which alternatives are expensive or less satisfactory, a major space tracking station, and significant investment and balance of trade advantages. Our political concerns and other interests may be accommodated because (a) the great majority of non-white states in Africa and elsewhere will put their own immediate self-interest ahead of penalizing us for our interests in the white states, and (b) even the most directly involved black states (Zambia and Tanzania) will temper their reaction because our continued good will and support for their cause will be important, and they know it. In any event other countries will judge our standing on the racial issue worldwide by the outcome of the racial problems in the United States.

II. Present Policy

The aim of present policy is to try to balance our economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states with the political interest of dissociating the U.S. from the white minority regimes and their repressive racial policies. Decisions have been made ad hoc, on a judgment of benefits and political costs at a given moment. But the strength of this policy—its flexibility—is also its weakness. Policy is not precisely recorded. And because there have been significant differences of view within the government as to how much weight should be given to these conflicting factors in any given instance, certain decisions have been held in suspense “pending review of the over-all policy”—e.g., visits of naval vessels to South African ports enroute to and from the Indian Ocean or Viet-Nam, export licensing of equipment for South Africa, Angola and Mozambique, which might be used either for military or civilian purposes, participation of South African military personnel in Department of Defense correspondence courses.
This policy seeks progress towards majority rule through political arrangements which guarantee increasing participation by the whole population. Tangible evidence of such progress has been considered a precondition for improved U.S. relations with the white states. In the case of South Africa, the following are illustrative of the types of actions which that government might take to improve relations with the U.S.:


B. **Internal.** Eliminate job reservation and abolish pay differentials based on race. Recognize African labor unions as bargaining units. Abolish pass laws and repressive security legislation. Move towards qualified franchise for non-whites.

C. **Regional and International.** Recognize UN responsibility for South West Africa and permit UN presence in territory; cease applying repressive legislation there. Withdraw economic and paramilitary support from Rhodesia. Give generous customs treatment to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Expand exceptions to apartheid in cases of visiting non-whites such as sportsmen and businessmen.

(It is realized that most of the foregoing are unrealistic under present circumstances, but they illustrate the directions in which change might be sought.)

Following are the actions taken toward the different countries and areas which, in sum, constitute our present policy toward southern Africa:

**Republic of South Africa**

We maintain limited but formally correct diplomatic relations, making clear our opposition to apartheid. In the early 1960’s the U.S. played a leading role in the UN in denouncing South Africa’s racial policies. We led the effort in 1963 to establish and we continue to support the UN arms embargo on South Africa. We have avoided association with the South African Defense Force except for limited military attaché contacts. We supported the UN declaration that South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa had terminated, and calling for it to withdraw and to acknowledge direct UN responsibility for the territory. On the other hand, we have acted on the premise that the problems of South Africa and South West Africa do not justify either the use of force or the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions, in part because there is no evidence that these actions would be efficacious. Moreover, we have sought to avoid the involvement of any U.S. mili-
tary forces which might be required for such measures. Negro personnel have not been assigned to the U.S. mission and consulates in South Africa.

We have supported efforts to protect the legal rights of victims of discriminatory and repressive legislation in South Africa and South West Africa. This has involved aide-mémoires, attendance at trials to assure international observation of certain legal and judicial practices, and cooperation with private groups in the American bar to reinforce in South Africa traditions of respect for the rule of law. We also have sought to deepen our identification with the non-white majorities through personal contacts, public appearances and our exchange program. We have sought to support through the UN and private agencies humanitarian relief for South African and South West African victims of repression.

There is limited overflight and landing activity by U.S. aircraft in South Africa. Except for three emergencies, there have been no U.S. naval ship calls in South African ports since early 1967, pending a review of policy towards South Africa. We rely heavily on the NASA tracking station near Johannesburg, particularly for planetary missions, but at the same time maintain less satisfactory alternate facilities outside South Africa in case it becomes necessary or desirable to close the station. The future need for the DOD tracking station at Pretoria is under review. The tentative conclusions are that the station is no longer required for research and development of missiles. We enjoy very profitable economic relations with South Africa despite the official approach of neither encouraging nor discouraging investment (apart from the Foreign Direct Investment Program) and keeping trade facilitative services in low key. EXIM loans are not authorized, but export guarantees up to five years are permitted, subject to review for political implications. In general, the restrictions imposed on our economic relations with South Africa, especially the constraints on EXIM financing, may have limited somewhat the growth of our exports and investment there. Profit prospects in South Africa, however, attract U.S. business regardless of official endorsement.

**Southern Rhodesia**

The U.S. voted for the Security Council resolutions of December 1966 and May 1968 which imposed mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia on the basis of a finding of a threat to the peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Executive Orders implementing

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the sanctions program were issued in January 1967 and July 1968 under authority of the UN Participation Act of 1945.\(^4\) (Although Portugal and South Africa have assisted Southern Rhodesia, the U.S. has not supported the extension of mandatory sanctions to them.)

The mandatory sanctions program was devised by the British as a compromise between the use of force, which they were unwilling to contemplate largely because of domestic considerations, and doing nothing, which would have jeopardized their relations with the black African states and other Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth. The United States cooperated with the U.K. largely for the same reasons. We also anticipated that failure to devise peaceful means to influence the Smith regime toward a satisfactory settlement would encourage extremists and dangerous instability in the area. Although it was recognized from the start that the sanctions program would be an imperfect instrument there was a tendency to overestimate the effectiveness of sanctions, which have been weakened by numerous and sometimes large (South Africa and Portugal) loopholes. Similarly, although there was awareness that the convenience of certain economic interests would be disrupted through sanctions, there was a tendency to underestimate the extent to which criticism, both political and economic, would multiply with the passage of time and evidence of the program’s lack of success.

The U.S. has continued to recognize British sovereignty in the colony, and refused to support the use of force by either side to the dispute. We maintain a reduced staff at our Consulate General in Salisbury which continues to operate under exequaturs from the British Crown. With the Southern Rhodesian determination to declare itself a republic, increasingly negative reactions may be anticipated from African nations to our continuing presence in Salisbury. The Consulate General provides citizenship and welfare services to approximately 1,100 American residents, three-fourths of whom are missionary families.

**Portuguese Territories**

Our approach to Angola and Mozambique is influenced by countervailing factors. On the one hand Portugal is a NATO ally to which we currently supply about one million dollars in military assistance and whose islands, the Azores, we find important for use as a naval and air base. On the other hand we sympathize with the aspirations of the Angolans and Mozambicans for self-determination.

\(^4\) Executive Order 11322, signed January 5, 1967, and Executive Order 11419, signed July 29, 1968.
In implementation of these policies we maintain a unilateral embargo on military equipment of U.S. origin for use in the Portuguese Territories either directly from the U.S. or indirectly from our NATO supplies to Portugal. U.S. export controls restrain possible sales of dual-purpose items, such as jet transports and communications equipment to the government of Portugal for uses in Africa.

We cooperate with Portugal on NATO matters and continue to use the Azores facilities. U.S. naval vessels and aircraft also use facilities in the Portuguese African territories for refueling and space support missions. Trade relations with the territories are normal and there are no USG restraints on American investment there apart from the Foreign Direct Investment Program. EXIM Bank facilities are available, subject to review for political implications.

**Black African States of Southern Africa**

The U.S. maintains cordial relations with the five black-ruled states of the area, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. We have Ambassadors in Malawi and Zambia. Since their independence we have maintained Chargés in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland and these countries are pressing us for the assignment of resident Ambassadors. These countries consider the level of our diplomatic representatives to be an important manifestation of U.S. sympathy and support.

As with all developing countries, an important factor in our relations is the level and kind of aid we can provide. Under current policies AID provides funds for regional and multi-donor projects and for the small Special Self-Help and Development Program. Investment guarantees are available, and the U.S. extends additional help through PL 480 food donations, and Peace Corps programs in four of the five black countries. However, there is a body of opinion which considers that programs of bilateral technical assistance are necessary in these states because of their generally isolated and enclave location. Bilateral assistance has been limited as a matter of policy to 10 concentration countries in Africa, none of which are in the southern region. World-wide AID policy is currently under review. (See Annex 7 for a discussion of considerations involved in bilateral aid to the black states of the region).

A further problem with these countries is the Conte amendment to foreign assistance legislation.\(^5\) Zambia, fearful of attacks by the white regimes in retaliation for passage of liberation groups through her terri-

\(^5\) The Conte–Long amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968 directed the President to withhold economic assistance from underdeveloped countries (with some exceptions) in an amount equivalent to the amount spent for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems.
tory, is purchasing air defense missiles and possibly jet aircraft from the U.K. and Italy. The Conte amendment requires the cancellation of U.S. aid of bilateral and some regional types in the amount of weapons expenditures. We have introduced legislation to change the amendment to provide greater flexibility. Despite our explanations of the intent of Congress, application of the Conte amendment may be seen by the black states as evidence that the U.S. is more sympathetic to the status quo of the white regimes than the aspirations of the blacks.

Liberation Groups

The U.S. maintains contact with exile nationalist movements from the white-controlled states. We also assist refugee students from these states through the Southern African Student Program and two secondary schools which are operated for refugee students. The U.S. takes the position that force is not an appropriate means to bring about constructive change in southern Africa.

United Nations

On southern African issues in the UN the relationship between the U.S. position and that of Afro-Asian UN members has altered considerably over the last five years. We played a leading role in the arms embargo against South Africa, the determination that South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa had terminated, and on mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. However, these actions largely exhausted the store of measures we were prepared to take on these issues.

The Afro-Asians have steadily increased pressures to exclude South Africa from the UN, for sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, and for use of force to give effect to UN actions. These demands have moved these states far out in front of the U.S. and some other Free World countries. We have consistently resisted efforts to exclude South Africa from international bodies and to extend mandatory sanctions or use force on southern African issues. Thus the U.S. has made it clear that we have gone as far as we can in the direction of greater UN pressures on the white regimes. (The U.K. and France have adopted an even more restrained position on southern African issues, in their abstentions on the UN General Assembly resolution determining that South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa had terminated on which we voted in favor, and the U.K.’s somewhat more permissive policy on the arms embargo against South Africa, which is virtually a dead letter in the case of France.)

III. The Range of Policy Options

U.S. Objectives

There are several broad objectives of U.S. policy toward southern Africa. Arranged without intent to imply priority, they are:
—To improve the U.S. standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue.
—To protect economic, scientific and strategic interests and opportunities in the region.
—To minimize the likelihood of escalation of violence in the area and the risk of U.S. involvement.
—To minimize the opportunities for the USSR and Communist China to exploit the racial issue in the region for propaganda advantage and to gain political influence with black governments and liberation movements.
—To encourage moderation of the current rigid racial and colonial policies of the white regimes.

These objectives are to a degree contradictory—pursuit of one may make difficult the successful pursuit of one or more of the others. Moreover, views as to the relative priority among these objectives vary widely, depending primarily upon the perception of the nature of the problems in the area and U.S. interests there (see I.B).

Range of Choice

The general policy question centers on U.S. posture toward the white regimes—a key element in our relations with the black states in the area and a factor of varying degrees of importance throughout the continent.

But the range of feasible policy options is limited. On one extreme our interests do not justify consideration of U.S. military intervention in the area. On the other extreme we cannot accept or endorse either the racial or colonial policies of the white regimes. Nor can we identify ourselves with violent or repressive solutions to the area’s problems on either side of the confrontation. The essential choice is among:

(a) Movement towards normal relations with the white regimes to protect and enhance our economic, strategic and scientific interests (Option 1).

(b) Broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to encourage improved relations among states in area (Option 2).

(c) Increased identification with and support for the black states of the region, as a pre-condition to pursuit of our minimum necessary economic, strategic and scientific interests in the white states (Option 3).

(d) Limited association with the white states and closer association with the blacks in an effort to retain some economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states while maintaining a posture on the racial issue which the blacks will accept, though opposing violent solutions to the problems of the region (Option 4).
(e) Dissociation from the white regimes with closer relations with the black states in an effort to enhance our standing on the racial issue in Africa and internationally (Option 5).

(f) Increased U.S. measures of coercion, short of armed force, bilaterally and on an international basis, to induce constructive change in white-regime race policies (Option 6).

Each option represents a range of actions, with some flexibility of choice among specific means without altering the premise or general strategy of the option. The purpose of this paper is to afford the NSC a choice on basic posture toward southern Africa. It is not intended to be a specific scenario for operational action, and the examples in each option are the types of action which would be consistent with the option’s thrust but are neither comprehensive nor necessarily in each case the specific action which would be selected.

A satisfactory arrangement regarding South Africa’s handling of gold can continue to be sought under any of the options, but it would probably be more difficult to achieve under Option 5, and particularly under Option 6.

Option 1

Premise

Our disagreements with the internal policies of governments in power in the region should not govern our relations with either the black or white states. We should follow a policy of pursuing our tangible interests throughout the region. In seeking to induce change, we have erroneously supported UN actions on Rhodesia and South West Africa based on questionable premises. While we cannot reverse our participation in these actions overnight, we can begin to withdraw from implementation of them. The political costs of closer relations with the white states will not be excessive.

General Posture

We would move to normalize our relations with all governments of the area, recognizing that reversal of our support for international actions already taken on Rhodesia and South West Africa will require some time. While we would make limited declarations of moral disapproval of the racial and colonial policies of the white governments, we would take no concrete measures to induce change and place no restrictions on the pursuit of our tangible interests. We would assume the risks of reaction against us in the black areas of the region and the rest of Africa.

Operational Examples

—Gradually terminate arms embargo against South Africa, beginning with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either mili-
tary or civilian purposes or the common defense, e.g., anti-submarine warfare equipment.

—Authorize routine U.S. naval visits and use of airfields.
—Retain tracking station in South Africa as long as needed.
—Promote U.S. exports and facilitate investment (within the framework of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment Program) in South Africa, South West Africa, the Portuguese Territories and eventually Rhodesia; afford unrestricted EXIM Bank facilities.
—Continue sugar quota for South Africa.
—Recognize South African authorities in South West Africa and place no limitations on dealing with them.
—Cease enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia; retain Consulate; if Republic is declared consider recognition.
—Quietly terminate unilateral U.S. arms embargo on Portuguese Territories, beginning with authorization of export of dual-purpose equipment.
—Economic assistance to the black states on the same basis as elsewhere in Africa; no special assistance and no arms supply; possible minority participation in development consortium with South Africa and Rhodesia.
—Public discouragement of insurgent movements and no assistance to political refugees.
—Limited information and exchange programs in both black and white areas.

Pros

1. Would reduce danger that U.S. international commitments on problems of the region may involve us in possible future conflict.
2. Would preserve and expand U.S. scientific, strategic and economic interests in white-controlled areas.
3. Would remove irritant in U.S. relations with Portugal.

Cons

1. Would require repudiation of previous U.S. actions in UN and, in the case of Rhodesia, violation of mandatory provisions of the UN Charter.
2. Would tend to encourage the white regimes in their intransigence.
3. Would provoke strong black African reaction with possible adverse effects on U.S. interests in those countries.
4. Would risk forfeiting to communist powers primary influence with black states of region, the insurgent movements and to degree elsewhere in Africa.
5. Unrestricted pursuit of tangible interests would result in greater restrictions on future actions.

6. Does nothing to deal with problems of potential violence in region.

Option 2

Premise

The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to the black states (a total of about $5 million annually in technical assistance to the black states) help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change. Our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable political cost.

General Posture

We would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states. We would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to tangible—albeit small and gradual—moderation of white policies. Without openly taking a position undermining the U.K. and the UN on Rhodesia, we would be more flexible in our attitude toward the Smith regime. We would take present Portuguese policies as suggesting further changes in the Portuguese Territories. At the same time we would take diplomatic steps to convince the black states of the area that their current liberation and majority rule aspirations in the south are not attainable by violence and that their only hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer relations with white-dominated states. We would emphasize our belief that closer relations will help to bring change in the white states. We would give increased and more flexible economic aid to black states of the area to focus their attention on their internal development and to give them a motive to cooperate in reducing tensions. We would encourage economic assistance from South Africa to the developing black nations.

This option accepts, at least over a 3 to 5 year period, the prospect of unrequited U.S. initiatives toward the whites and some opposition from the blacks in order to develop an atmosphere conducive to change in white attitudes through persuasion and erosion. To encourage this
change in white attitudes, we would indicate our willingness to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward majority rule, provided that they assure broadened political participation in some form by the whole population.

The various elements of the option would stand as a whole and approval of the option would not constitute approval of individual elements out of this context.

**Operational Examples**

—Maintain public stance against apartheid but relax political isolation and economic restrictions against the white states.

—Enforce arms embargo against South Africa but with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes.

—Fuel stops only, or naval visits in South Africa with arrangements for non-discrimination toward U.S. personnel in organized activity ashore; authorize routine use of airfields.

—Retain tracking stations in South Africa as long as required.

—Remove constraints on EXIM Bank facilities for South Africa; actively encourage U.S. exports and facilitate U.S. investment consistent with the Foreign Direct Investment Program.

—Continue sugar quota in South Africa.

—Conduct selected exchange programs with South Africa in all categories, including military.

—Without changing the U.S. legal position that South African occupancy of South West Africa is illegal, we would play down the issue and encourage accommodation between South Africa and the UN.

—On Rhodesia, retain Consulate; gradually relax sanctions (e.g., hardship exceptions for chrome) and consider eventual recognition.

—Continue arms embargo on Portuguese Territories, but give more liberal treatment to exports of dual purpose equipment.

—Continue discussions with Portuguese on African policy. Be prepared to offer discreet good offices in restoring and improving Portuguese relations with Zambia and the Congo.

—Encourage trade and investment in Portuguese Territories; full EXIM Bank facilities.

—Establish Southern African Development Fund for aid projects in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland with U.S. Ambassador accredited to three states to be U.S. representative to Fund Council. Consider pos-

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6 This would not necessarily preclude individual shore leave. [Footnote is in the original.]
sibility of Malawi participation in Fund at later stage, if this appears politically advisable.

—Provide bilateral technical assistance to Tanzania and Zambia; continue at least one major regional development project involving them.

—Respond to reasonable requests for purchase of nonsophisticated arms but seek no change in Conte amendment.

—Official visits for Tanzanian and Zambian heads of state.

—By diplomatic means seek to persuade black states (importantly Zambia and Tanzania) to adopt policy of peaceful coexistence with white regimes.

—Towards African insurgent movements take public position that U.S. opposes use of force in racial confrontation. Continue humanitarian assistance to refugees.

—Increase information and exchange activities in both white and black states.

Pros

1. Would encourage existing tendencies to broaden relations between black states and white and thus reduce tensions—South Africa’s new outward policy, Zambia’s trade and sub-rosa political contacts with South Africa and Portugal.

2. Would preserve U.S. economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states and would expand opportunities for profitable trade and investment.

3. Relaxation of the U.S. attitude toward the whites could help lift their present siege mentality; and it would encourage elements among the whites seeking to extend South African relationships with black Africa.

4. U.S. diplomatic support and economic aid offer the black states an alternative to the recognized risks of mounting communist influence.

5. Increased aid would also give us greater influence to caution the black states against violent confrontation and give them a tangible stake in accepting the prospects of gradual change.

6. Would reduce a major irritant in our relations with Portugal, and afford the Caetano government opportunity for liberalization.

Cons

1. Relaxation of the U.S. stance towards white states could be taken by the whites as a vindication of their policies. Many black states, led by Zambia and Tanzania, probably would charge us with subordinating our professed ideals to material interests and tolerating
white-regime policies. This reaction could adversely affect, in varying degrees, our political, economic and strategic interests in the black states.

2. There is a serious question whether pro-Western leaders of the black states could continue to justify their stance to their populations if the U.S. officially declared its opposition to current liberation efforts. Radical and communist states would be the beneficiaries.

3. Unilateral U.S. relaxation of sanctions against Rhodesia would be a highly visible violation of our international obligations and would be damaging both to the U.S. and to the UN.

4. The current thrust of South African domestic policy does not involve any basic change in the racial segregation system, which is anathema to the black states. There is virtually no evidence that change might be forthcoming in these South African policies as a result of any approach on our part.

5. Requires extensive diplomatic and economic involvement in a situation in which the solution is extremely long-range and the outcome doubtful at best.

6. It is doubtful that the additional aid contemplated would be sufficiently great to influence the black states in the direction indicated.

Option 3

Premise

An effective U.S. role in the region and in Africa requires credibility with the black states. A more active demonstration of interest in the black states of the region is necessary to meet this need and to provide a basis for carrying out with minimum political risk, essential official policies in the white states. We can by so doing meet our minimal requirements in the area and exert a greater influence on the course of events in the black states.

General Posture

We would begin as soon as possible to improve our position in the black states, including a high-level public statement stressing our commitment to the peaceful advancement of human freedoms and dignity in southern Africa. If progress achieved in the first six months should warrant it, we could consider possibility for steps in pursuit of our minimum necessary economic, strategic and scientific interests in the white states.

Operational Examples

—Maintain active stance, publicly, officially and in UN against apartheid.

—Continue arms embargo against South Africa.
—Retain NASA tracking station but with alternative facilities elsewhere.
—Neither encourage nor discourage investment; low-key commercial services.
—No EXIM loans; insurance and credit guarantees subject to political review.
—Encourage Congressional revocation of South African sugar quota and reallocation to less developed African producers.
—Encourage U.S. companies to apply liberal employee policies.
—Maintain persistent opposition and non-recognition of South African rule in South West Africa.
—Encourage U.S. companies to apply liberal employee policies.
—Discourage U.S. investments in South West Africa; no EXIM Bank facilities.
—Take initiatives in UN on behalf of alternatives to Chapter VII sanctions on South West Africa—such as reference to ICJ. Avoid veto if possible.
—Support through exchanges and contacts groups in South Africa and South West Africa seeking wiser racial policies and the rule of law; encourage U.S. private organizations supportive of these groups.
—Terminate U.S. involvement in Rhodesia by closing Consulate and permitting release of chrome stocks if they would clearly fall under Treasury hardship rule (even though this would violate our UN obligations). Make clear no further transactions with current regime will be permitted. Continue sanctions enforcement.
—Continue discussions with Portuguese on African policy. Be prepared to offer discreet good offices in restoring and improving Portuguese relations with Zambia and the Congo.
—Maintain embargo on the supply of arms to either side in the conflict in Portuguese Africa. Continue operational naval visits.
—Normal trade and neutral policy on investment in Portuguese Territories; continue routine EXIM financing and be prepared to grant major EXIM loans when economic and political circumstances warrant.
—Maintain discreet contact with, but give no new assistance (other than educational and humanitarian) to political refugees from Portuguese Africa.
—Establish Southern African Development Fund for aid projects in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland with U.S. Ambassador accredited to three states to be U.S. representative to Fund Council. Consider possibility of Malawi participation in Fund at later stage, if this appears politically advisable.
—Provide bilateral technical assistance to Tanzania and Zambia; continue at least one major regional development project involving them.
—Official visits for Tanzanian and Zambian heads of states.
—Maintain discreet contact and selective non-military support to liberation groups (other than those from Portuguese Africa). Extend educational and humanitarian assistance to individual political refugees.
—Maintain present information and exchange programs in white areas and expand programs in black states.
—After a period of six months from the inception of the program to strengthen relations and understanding with the black states, consider the following actions in pursuit of limited U.S. economic and strategic interests in South Africa:
—Reconsider EXIM policy.
—Flexibility in arms embargo on sale of dual purpose items.
—Unclassified military correspondence courses where there is clearly direct benefit to U.S. in resulting contact.
—Operational naval visits on the basis of fuel stops only or with shore leave restricted to racially integrated activities.

Pros

1. Would preserve most of our minimum necessary economic, strategic and scientific interests in the white states.
2. Would afford access to black states of region and improve our standing elsewhere in Africa and with Afro-Asian states at UN.
3. Expanded aid to the black states would enable us to offset criticisms of our necessary activities in white states.
4. Would retain flexibility for future movements towards either white or black states.

Cons

1. Preparatory moves in black states might not give clear enough results nor be sufficient to offset African criticism for possible later activities in white states.
2. Association with the white regimes at any time is vulnerable to exploitation by the communists and African extremists.
3. Substantial EXIM loan in Portuguese Territories could cause adverse repercussions in Zambia and Tanzania.
4. Chrome “exception” by U.S. would be in violation of a mandatory provision of the UN Charter and might tend toward further weakening of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

Option 4

Premise

The situation in the region is not likely to change appreciably in the foreseeable future, and in any event we cannot influence it. Conse-
quently we can retain some economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states at the same time as we protect our world-wide standing on the racial issue by limiting the nature and scope of our associations with these states and by maintaining present levels and types of aid to the black states of the region. To do so provides us with a posture of flexibility to enable us best to adapt our policy to future trends.

**General Posture**

This is a codification and extension of present policy.

In the UN and bilaterally we would continue basic opposition to the racial and colonial policies of the white states but seek to maintain correct relations with them. We would retain some military access, scientific installations etc., under conditions which do not imply our condoning of racial repression. In concert with the British, we would stand firmly against the Smith regime, closing our Consulate and continuing sanctions. We would lower the level of public criticism of Portuguese policy in Africa to encourage liberalizing tendencies of the Caetano government. We would give economic aid to black states of the region. We would continue to oppose violent solutions to the problems of the region, and to oppose the outward thrust of South African influence where this strengthens South African domination of neighboring states.

**Operational Examples**

—Strict application of arms embargo against South Africa.
—Permit U.S. naval calls in South Africa with arrangements for non-discrimination toward U.S. personnel ashore.
—Retain NASA station in South Africa but with alternative facilities elsewhere.
—Neither encourage nor discourage investment in South Africa, give low-key commercial services, no direct EXIM Bank loans but permit insurance and guarantees of commercial credits.
—Support Congressional revocation of sugar quota for South Africa and its reallocation to less developed African producers.
—Continue to view South African administration of South West Africa as illegal; urge South Africa to accept UN supervisory authority; discourage U.S. investments, no EXIM facilities.
—Support through exchanges and contacts groups in South Africa and South West Africa seeking wiser racial policies and rule of law; encourage U.S. private organizations supportive of such groups.
—Follow British lead on representation and recognition of Southern Rhodesia and on UN sanctions program; withdraw consulate.
—Maintain embargo on supply of arms to either side in the conflict involving the Portuguese Territories, take neutral attitude on investment and permit EXIM facilities for U.S. exports short of major infrastructural projects. Soften criticisms of Portuguese African policy in UN and bilaterally.

—Establish flexible economic assistance programs in the black states of the region permitting the retention of present aid levels.

—Maintain discreet contact with African insurgent movements and extend educational and humanitarian assistance to individuals.

—Maintain modest information and exchange programs in white-ruled areas (except Rhodesia); expand activities in the black states.

Pros

1. Preserves most of our major economic, scientific and strategic interests in the region at least in the short run.

2. Affords access to black states in the region and preserves some standing elsewhere in Africa and with Afro-Asian states at the UN.

3. Retains some flexibility for movement closer to either white or black states, depending upon future developments.

Cons

1. Position would be seen as expedient and hypocritical by both sides. Our condemnation of whites hurts us with them, yet fails to satisfy the blacks, exposing us to pressures for more decisive measures.

2. Policy does nothing to deal actively with problem of violence in the area or increasing communist influence.

3. Restrictions on association with white regimes involve some loss of potential U.S. economic and defense assets.

Option 5

Premise

We cannot influence the white states for constructive change, and therefore increasing violence is likely.

Only by cutting our ties with the white regimes can we protect our standing on the race issue in black Africa and internationally. Since our tangible interests are not vital, this is a reasonable price to pay.

General Posture

We would maintain only minimal relations with the white regimes, emphasizing that improved relations are impossible until they moderate present policies and avoiding actions vis-à-vis these states likely to provoke an adverse reaction in the black African states. This disassociation would be at the official level only: private trade, travel,
and other forms of communication would continue, but without USG assistance or encouragement. We would at the same time stress to the black African states the extent to which we were sacrificing certain of our material interests and would make it clear that (1) we had gone as far as we were prepared to go in this direction, and (2) we would not support any violent solution to their problems nor sanctions against the white states (except Rhodesia). We would take positive official stands against racial and colonial oppression. We would afford economic aid to the black states and sell them reasonable quantities of non-sophisticated military equipment.

Operational Examples

—Strictest application of arms embargo against South Africa.
—Remove NASA tracking station.
—Prohibit official use of South African ports and airfields except in emergency.
—Neither encourage nor discourage trade or investment but provide no commercial services or EXIM facilities in South Africa.
—Encourage Congressional revocation of the sugar quota for South Africa, and its reallocation to less developed African producers.
—Match diplomatic mission and consulates in South Africa to reduced official relationships.
—Make clear that we regard South Africa's continued occupation of South West Africa as illegal. Discourage U.S. investment; deny commercial services and EXIM facilities; hold to minimum U.S. contacts with South African authorities in South West Africa.
—Support through exchanges and contacts groups in South Africa and South West Africa seeking wiser racial policies and rule of law; encourage U.S. private organizations supportive of such groups.
—Support strict international enforcement of sanctions and maintain non-recognition of Southern Rhodesia; withdraw Consulate.
—Limit EXIM Bank activities and official trade promotion in Portuguese Territories. Maintain arms embargo and continue to support self-determination for the Portuguese Territories.
—Establish Southern African Development Fund for aid projects in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland with U.S. Ambassador accredited to three states to be U.S. representative to Fund Council. Consider possibility of Malawi participation in Fund at later stage, if this appears politically advisable.
—Provide bilateral technical assistance to Tanzania and Zambia; continue at least one major regional development project involving them.
—Official visits for Tanzanian and Zambian heads of states.
—Open contact and sympathy for aspirations of African insurgent groups short of material support.
—Reduce information and exchange programs in white areas to a minimum; expand programs in the black states.

Pros

1. Would significantly increase our credibility in black Africa and the UN by demonstrating U.S. is prepared to back its pronouncements on the race issue at some material sacrifices.
2. Would provide maximum leverage to limit Soviet and Chinese influence among liberation groups and in their host countries.
3. Would put white regimes on notice that U.S. is not prepared to bail them out for material or strategic reasons.
4. Would provide a more defensible basis to counter Afro-Asian demands for more far-reaching proposals.

Cons

1. It would tend to identify us with the cause of the insurgent movements and would stimulate demands for more far-reaching action.
2. Would sacrifice economic, strategic and scientific interests.
3. We would forfeit economic opportunities to France, the U.K. and other major trading nations who would be unlikely to take similar steps.
4. Might reinforce the siege mentality of the white regimes and their resistance to constructive change.
5. Would make our relations with the Portuguese more difficult.

Option 6

Premise

The repressive policies of the white regimes are leading to eventual conflict in the region, which in the long run cannot end other than in victory for the African majority. Such conflict would be a tragedy, but for the U.S. to permit communist monopoly of the insurgent struggle would be worse for our long-range interests. Both to obviate a major armed conflict if possible, and to identify with the eventual winners if it is inevitable, the U.S. should now move to active measures to force change in white-regime race policies.

General Posture

After appropriate diplomatic warnings of our impending action, the U.S. would move to active measures of coercion, short of armed force, against the white regimes. We would try to get maximum UN support for these measures. Our actions would include efforts to ex-
tend UN mandatory economic sanctions to include South Africa and Portugal, but would be carried out unilaterally if necessary. We would sharply increase assistance to the black states, and give non-military aid to the liberation movements.

Operational Examples

—Advocate in UN the extension of mandatory economic sanctions to Portuguese Territories and South Africa because of their evasion of sanctions against Rhodesia.

—Toughen present sanctions against Rhodesia to include bans on tourism, postal facilities, telecommunications, and transportation, and include such provisions in eventual sanctions against Portuguese Territories and South Africa.

—Reduce representation in South Africa to chargé and small staff, close consulates in white regime countries.

—Withdraw NASA tracking station from South Africa.

—Afford substantial economic assistance to black states of the region, particularly Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

—Furnish non-sophisticated defense matériel and training in the United States for selected military personnel from Zambia and Tanzania.

—Declare public support for the objectives of the liberation organizations and furnish them non-military assistance.

—Withdraw USIS and terminate U.S. exchange programs in white-regime areas; expand these programs in the black states.

Pros

1. Clear U.S. position on side of majority rule brings our actions into alignment with our declared political position and therefore would increase our influence throughout black Africa.

2. Decisive action by U.S. might induce white regimes to make needed reforms before violence erupts.

3. Policy puts U.S. on eventual winning side, thus undercutting communist influence on liberation effort and insuring long-term dominant U.S. influence in most developed part of Africa.

Cons

1. U.S. initiative in UN would be unlikely to gain support of U.K., France and perhaps others, leaving us to go it alone.

2. Experience with Rhodesia suggests that even stringent sanctions tend to increase siege mentality and unify white minorities.

3. Heavy repercussions from sanctions would fall on new, economically weak African states, particularly Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. These would have to be given economic compensation.
4. The U.S. would have sacrificed a range of valuable material interests in the southern region without reasonable assurances that disruptive conflict would be thereby averted.  

[Omitted here is Section IV.]

18. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Ashe Visa Application

PARTICIPANTS
South African Embassy
Ambassador H.L.T. Taswell
Mr. Daniel P. Olivier, Minister

Department
Assistant Secretary David D. Newsom, Bureau of African Affairs
Mr. Oliver S. Crosby, Country Director, AF/S

At Assistant Secretary Newsom’s request, Ambassador Taswell called at 3:00 December 15 to discuss the visa case of US tennis star Arthur Ashe. Taswell reported that Ashe had applied for a South African visa this morning. He was most courteously received, and when an INS photographer asked to take his picture with the South African Consul General, Ashe declined. Taswell said he thought this wise, as it is preferable to avoid publicity over the case while it is being considered.

Secretary Newsom said the Ashe visa case is a matter of concern to the US, as the Administration genuinely wishes to improve relations with South Africa. Incidents like those over the visa applications of Congressmen Diggs and Reid have a special importance, as they tend to inhibit actions on the part of the US that might lead to smoother relations with South Africa. He said approval of Ashe’s visa application would enable the SAG to show itself in a more favorable light than it had done in the Diggs/Reid cases, and he urged that the SAG give Ashe’s application careful, and hopefully favorable consideration.

Taswell responded that he would relay Secretary Newsom’s comments and request to Pretoria, as he had done with Ambassador Rountree’s request for an appointment with Foreign Minister Muller and Prime Minister Vorster. Taswell hoped the visa could be issued, but he pointed out the case was difficult both because of hostile statements Ashe had made about South Africa and because of the coincidence of the tennis tournament and South Africa’s general elections next April.

Secretary Newsom said we have no confirmation that Ashe had actually made the statements attributed to him by Sports Minister Waring. He said Ashe is no extremist, and we believe he wants to play tennis in South Africa, not engage in politics there.

Taswell observed that Mr. Reinhardt of USIA had just visited South Africa and asked whether he, a Negro, had found it “indescribably bad”.

Mr. Newsom said Mr. Reinhardt had been well received and every effort was made to ensure that no incidents took place. Without such special measures, however, it would have been very difficult for him indeed.

Taswell replied that numbers of Negro boxers have visited South Africa from the US without incident, but he granted that there is a real problem in the restrictions imposed on non-whites.

The meeting concluded after about 15 minutes.

19. **Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State**

Pretoria, December 16, 1969, 1030Z.


1. I met last evening upon my return with Foreign Minister to urge issuance of visa to Arthur Ashe. I explained personal interest of President and Secretary and effects denial of visa could have.

2. Foreign Minister was obviously impressed by what I said. While making clear he not repeat not purporting give me reply at this junc-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PPT Ashe, Arthur. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg.

2 In telegram 206809 to Pretoria, December 12, the Department outlined the next steps for Rountree to facilitate Ashe’s visa. (Ibid.)
ture, he spoke at length about problems confronting government re
visa issue. Coming as it does at critical time in election campaign, gov-
ernment’s treatment of matter might become very important domestic
issue. Moreover, problem increased by highly inflammatory state-
ments made earlier by Ashe and widely reported by SA press. Particu-
larly damaging were alleged statements that Ashe would like to drop
bomb on Johannesburg, and that if he should come to SA it would be
for purpose of breaking crack in wall of SA racial policies. Foreign Min-
ister had understood Ashe more recently had commented that any visit
to SA would be to play tennis, not to engage in politics, but damage had
been done. He speculated as to whether visa might be issued on specif-
c conditions, but to this I replied that offer of conditional visa to Con-
gressman Diggs had been considered even more offensive than if visa
had been denied outright. Nature and wording of conditions would of
course be important aspect. Foreign Minister then speculated as to
whether, in lieu of conditional visa, Ashe might unilaterally give “un-
dertaking” concerning his activities while here. To be useful for SA do-
mestic purpose, however, there would have to be some publicity which
he and I agreed might present difficult problems. This possibility was
not, however, ruled out.

3. Foreign Minister said that he had already spoken with all of his
colleagues, including Waring, who might make statements on visa
question, and in response to my request made through Ambassador
Taswell he thought no South African Government official would make
further statements with respect to matter pending completion of our
discussions. He expressed strong view that I should see Prime Minister,
who presently in remote part of Port Elizabeth area, and asked if I
would accompany him on visit there. In light my affirmative reply he
later telephoned Prime Minister and arranged that we would meet him
in Port Elizabeth on Friday, December 19, returning Pretoria that
afternoon.

4. I shall report further after my talks with Prime Minister. Mean-
while I am hopeful SAG will not further reduce flexibility by additional
public statements.

5. Would appreciate early indication status Ashe’s formal visa
request.

Rountree
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Vice President Agnew
Secretary of State Rogers
Secretary of Defense Laird
General George A. Lincoln, Director, OEP
Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy
Attorney General Mitchell
Acting Secretary of Commerce Rocco Siciliano
Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard
General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, JCS
Director of Central Intelligence Helms
Ambassador Charles W. Yost, US Rep. to the UN
Under Secretary of State Richardson
Lawrence A. Fox, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce
David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
William Watts, NSC
Roger Morris, NSC
Clinton Conger, Chief, Presentations Staff, CIA

RN—This is a peripheral issue. But we need a frank discussion; we must cover the operational decisions. I will make no final decisions today. It is an important question, as there are moral and domestic political issues involved. Many people have been asking about this. We have put them off by saying that there was an NSC meeting coming up.

Rogers—Many of us have worked on this subject for some time, particularly lawyers who have had clients in Southern Africa.

RN—Did all of you get to see Ambassador Rountree when he was here recently? He is a very balanced man, and he is sitting on a volcano.

Helms—(oral briefing given by Helms is attached.)

Kissinger—we have approached this policy question in two stages: to reach a decision on general posture, first, and then to deal

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–026, National Security Council Meetings, NSC Meeting 12/17/69 Southern Africa. Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House from 10:03 a.m. to 12:03 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

2 The briefing is attached but not printed. The report provided some background on the history of the white minority regimes and the various insurgency movements in the region. The report concluded that due to the strength of these regimes, and the weakness of the insurgents, there was little prospect for change in the region for the foreseeable future.
with specific operational issues. The interdepartmental group has had a major job in pulling together this complex subject.

We face, Mr. President, three broad choices. First, there is the approach favored by Dean Acheson and others, to release restrictions on the white states and to avoid any involvement at all in the black-white rivalries. Second, there is a policy choice of some limited association with both sides. Third, there is the option to disengage from the white states and move toward the blacks.

(Kissinger then summarized the pro and con arguments and operational consequences of each of the six options, as outlined in the attached paper on issues for decision.)

RN—What is the total aid to the black states?
Newsom—About $100 million.
RN—What is the attitude of the Congress?
Newsom—At the last go around, it was about the same.
RN—What about PL 480?
Newsom—Our money goes for a variety of things, capital development, assistance to regional projects and multi-donor aid. It is only modest.

RN—What about trade? I understand that six percent of the people (the whites in South Africa) produce 40 percent of the GNP of the continent.

Siciliano—We have $1 billion invested in South Africa. That is just South Africa alone. We have a $200 million favorable trade balance.

RN—How much do we have invested in black Africa?
Newsom—The investment in black Africa is about equal to the investment in South Africa.

RN—I think we have to be realistic on this question and straddle it. It is obvious that we have to avoid the colonialist label but we must analyze where our national interest lies and not worry too much about other peoples’ domestic policies.

To what extent do the black states respond to overtures from the whites?

3 Acheson’s paper, “U.S. Policies Toward Southern Africa Require Change,” April 30, suggested the United States should abandon its current policies toward southern Africa, which he argued “align this country among the adversaries of those regimes.” Acheson offered the following reasons to support his argument: the policies were impossible to achieve, they were contrary to U.S. national interests, and they were frustrating the common interest of the United States and of both the black and white nations of southern Africa in the stability and development of that area. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 807, Name Files, Acheson, Dean)

4 Attached; printed as Document 17.
Newsom—With great reluctance. The Ivory Coast carries on some quiet trade. Malawi has diplomatic relations. But there is no other real exchange.

The IG asked the question what the US can and cannot do, and what is the extent of our influence. Economic forces will ultimately bring change, but our ability to exert influence is minimal.

Rogers—There is the moral argument. If we could do anything then we would have a moral responsibility. But since we can’t do anything, there is no responsibility.

RN—Well, the whites can’t go home. It is a practical problem we have come up against. They are there to stay.

Richardson—I agree there is no real solution. A white minority ruled by a black majority will not work and a black majority ruled by a while minority does not work. There must be partition. The whites feel they have a right to be there, as we do in the U.S.

RN—What about the U.N.? Is this a hot issue?

Yost—There are operational problems all the time. There are 40 African members, 1/3 of the UN, increasingly frustrated and restive and resentful. They want forceful action. It is hard to apply any option which will satisfy them.

RN—How can we avoid UN votes on this question?

Yost—We can’t. Sometimes it is a vote for human rights, sometimes it is an attack on Portugal.

RN—Can’t we roll with the punch? That is the only useful thing to do. We don’t accomplish a thing by isolating the Portuguese.

Newsom—It is a difference between New York and African governments. Very few African delegations have precise instructions. They may be extreme on one vote since that is the way it goes in the African caucus; but home governments would not have restricted them to go that way. We should generate greater communication between African capitals and New York.

Yost—Rhodesia and Southwest Africa are major problems.

RN—Should we send the Secretary of State to Africa?

Rogers—I agree with Newsom. The governments back home are concerned primarily with bilateral relations and not with the UN.

RN—That’s what they raised with me when I was there.

Rogers—There has been no real penetration by the Soviets.

Newsom—They are just as white as we are.

Rogers—On the whole, our relations are pretty good with Africa.

Yost—Southwest Africa is a problem of a legal mandate. We are caught on this one. It would be helpful to disengage. Rhodesia also is pretty well stuck. It is a peculiar place, only 4% white.
Kissinger—(Outlined the issue on South Africa arms embargo and port calls as contained in the paper on operational issues.)

Laird—You mean they only refuel, no liberty?
Kissinger—These are the two military issues.
Newsom—There were four planned transits in 1970. Two can refuel from British tankers.
Lincoln—There was a strong objection in the past to port calls, with no refueling.

Laird—The arrangements for shore leave raised hackles with Congress. It became a domestic issue.

Newsom—The paper says South Africa would not agree to refuelling stops without shore leaves. Rountree thinks that stops with shore leave might be possible. The real problem is to go beyond integrated shore leave to independent shore leave.

Rogers—Anything we do is a problem.
RN—Particularly on timing. Not only in the UN is it a problem but also in the Congress. What about Arthur Ashe?
Newsom—It has not been decided yet. He applied but an election is coming up.
RN—After the election will Voerster move to liberalize?
Newsom—It depends on how the election comes out, and how strong Hertzog shows.

Kissinger—(Then described the issue of the Rhodesian Consulate and chrome imports as outlined in the attached paper on operational issues.)

Lincoln—Chrome is a major problem. The President of Foote Mineral claims a hardship case. I would not argue his cause on the basis of economic sanction, just on the basis of equity. Foote Mineral is suffering.

RN—Isn’t Union Carbide Ken Rush’s old firm?
Lincoln—Union Carbide has put in its dollars and brought seven thousand tons to the surface. They have an additional grievance, the ferro-alloy problem. The only place to get chrome now is the USSR. We get 70% from the USSR. The price is up from $35 to $45 a ton and it will keep going up. If our purpose is to sanction, we should recognize that we have already put money into Rhodesia and they are selling elsewhere. These cases should be considered on equity not policy.

Newsom—Chrome is a symbolic issue. The lawyers in State are not satisfied with the Union Carbide case. The money may have been paid to a South African subsidiary, not to Rhodesia.

Siciliano—in our view, there is no question of the facts.
Rogers—We think they may have transferred it from one pocket to another.

Newsom—This requires added documentation. It is not clear where the money is.

Lincoln—We have three years supply of chrome or chrome equivalents, and the Soviets will sell.

Yost—I have no comment on the chrome but I would like to close the Consulate.

RN—*National Review* and *Human Events* are all raising hell about chrome. Are we kicking ourselves in a vital spot again?

Rogers—We can make a decision on both at the same time.

RN—A double play?

Rogers—Many Africans favor our closing. We could get some good out of it.

Every foreign minister raises it as an issue.

RN—Maybe we could do some economic things.

Rogers—If I go to Africa and the Consulate is not closed, my life is going to be miserable.

Agnew—Will it offend the government if we close? If we go, it could upset the incumbent government in that upcoming election. (The Vice President has confused South Africa with Rhodesia.)

RN—If we go, many will follow.

Newsom—In January or February they will bring the new Constitution in.

Rogers—Then we either recognize or get out.

Laird—That implies that recognition means approval. We don’t want to be in that business. It opens up a whole new problem.

Rogers—We may want to get to that, but not now. It would be a real breach with the UK and lose all the Africans. We have said the Rhodesian regime is illegal.

Yost—I am sympathetic to the general point of view that recognition should not imply moral approval. But this is a special case and the whole world would be against us.

Kissinger—This must be the only case in which the world community supports the maintenance of colonialism.

Laird—This is first and foremost a political problem.

RN—I will have to cancel my subscription to *Human Events*.

Richardson—The chrome problem raises the prospect of a balancing move; that is, letting in the chrome leans to one side, pulling out the Consulate leans to another. On balance, we have to decide which
way we are going. There are merits to each side and we have to look at
the total package.

RN—For example, there is China, where we have moved on eco-

demic things, but not politically.

Lincoln—Petalite is produced only in Rhodesia. Corning Glass

uses it as a hardening material and they may have to close down one of

their plants in West Virginia.

Helms—I believe that over the long run we would gain little by

closing the Consulate. We simply blind ourselves in an area of potential

trouble. Two or three years from now we will have to ask if it bought

anything. I don’t think it will.

Rogers—Yes, but this case is special. Everyone is against the Smith
government.

Agnew—I would like to ask a naive question. Why is the Rhodes-
dian government any more illegal than we were when we declared

independence?

Yost—Only 4% of the people are represented by the government.

Agnew—Do the blacks strongly oppose that government?

Yost—There is no way of knowing.

RN—Well, only a very small percent supported the American Rev-

olution. But the world has changed a lot since then.

Rogers—There are factors of world opinion and our relations with

the United Kingdom.

RN—Our relations with the British are the overwhelming thing.

Rogers—How can we be hard-headed on economic matters but do

symbolic things that black Africa will like? Why couldn’t we help

Botswana?

Newsom—(Summarized the issues on Southwest Africa, the Por-

guese territories, Exim and aid, as outlined in the attached paper on

operational issues.)

Rogers—Botswana has real promise. Its president gave a good

toast at the UN and relations with South Africa are sensible.

RN—Is Botswana a potential bridge builder?

Rogers—Yes.

Newsom—It is part of the mini-state problem. The Senate Foreign

Relations Committee has opposed sending ambassadors to those states.

Rogers—We can overcome that.

Yost—The public members of our UN delegation have sent a

memo to Secretary Rogers on Southwest Africa, proposing disengage-

ment. We might have to cast our first veto on Southwest Africa.

RN—How soon?
Yost—in the next few weeks.
Rogers—we should move on Southwest Africa and the Consulate in Salisbury; these have the greatest visibility.
RN—Economics are the most important foreign influence on South Africa and Rhodesia. I think we should come down on the side of permitting more trade and investment.
Siciliano—This can be done with low visibility.

21. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Pretoria, December 19, 1969, 1738Z.

3498. Subject: Ashe Visa.
1. As reported Pretoria reftel, arrangements were made for FonMin and me to meet PriMin in Port Elizabeth to discuss Ashe visa matter. FonMin and I flew there today where we had session in hotel with PriMin who had driven 90 miles for meeting. Time and effort involved demonstrate importance attached to subject by SAG.

2. At outset I told PriMin something of my visit to Washington and said on basis of my talks there I could assure him U.S. administration genuinely wished improve relations with South Africa. However, we deeply concerned that SAG treatment of visas for some Americans (inter alia Diggs and Reid) greatly limits U.S. freedom and flexibility. I made special point of interest of President and Secretary in Ashe visa and, using all arguments which seemed appropriate. I urged that visa be granted. I said I aware from my previous talk with FonMin that SAG attitude had been materially affected by earlier statements by Ashe which led it to conclude his desire to visit South Africa was politically motivated. However, most recent statement by Ashe (which PriMin had) would provide S.A. opportunity issue visa with assurance that Ashe would cause no trouble while here. This would be far better than conditional visa proposed for Diggs and Reid. I said high officials who knew Ashe personally considered him responsible and had confidence he would conduct himself here as guest of S.A.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PPT Ashe, Arthur. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg.
2 Reference is presumably to telegram 3471 from Pretoria, Document 19.
3. In reply PriMin expressed sincere appreciation re attitude of President and other administration leaders concerning relations with S.A. He said South Africa fully accepted American leadership of free world and desired to be as close to U.S. as we permitted. He had been greatly impressed by President Nixon’s statement in Rumania concerning U.S. relations with countries whose internal order differed from our own. He could assure me that South Africa wished build upon areas of agreement wherever they existed, recognizing that we had different approaches to our respective internal problems.

4. He wished make clear that SAG attitude toward visa for Ashe was not repeat not because of his race, any more than denial of unconditional visa to Congressman Diggs was because he was Negro. It was most unfortunate that application was for visit to S.A. during crucial election period. Ashe’s recent statement to which I had referred had included phrase which could present real problems, and would be seized upon by Hertzog group to “clobber” government if visa granted. That phrase dealt with Ashe’s undertaking that any political remarks he might make would be only after several weeks following his departure from Johannesburg, that is, after the elections. Opposition already was preparing groundwork for charge that this was concocted by SAG and Americans so as not to embarrass National Party election prospects. Statement thus made favorable decision on application even more difficult.

5. Turning specifically to internal political situation, PriMin said he confident that, in absence new ammunition in hands of Hertzog group, it would be “destroyed” in elections. However, he wished to tell me frankly that if group succeeded in gaining even one or two seats, result would have snowball effect which could end in political disaster, and he simply could not risk destroying his party and thus stability of country. His decisions and actions must be based upon knowledge that substantial majority of Afrikaners and National Party members were in fact opposed to his outward policy, objected to “too much” being done for non-whites, criticized his refusal to enact legislation making Afrikaans the only official language, and strongly resisted his sports policy. They had to be carried along and he could do this, but he convinced that Ashe visa question, if mishandled by him, could put his back to the wall by setting into motion domestic political forces of considerably more significance than the outside world realized.

6. At this point I spelled out possible consequences to US–SA relations of refusal of visa including increased pressures against improved relations, demands for retaliation against South African athletes com-

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3 For the text of Nixon’s remarks on August 2 in Bucharest, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 604–605.
peting in the U.S., etc. I observed that from what PriMin had said, choice for him difficult, but I thought so much would be endangered by negative decision as to warrant his willingness give further thought to means permitting Ashe to come. PriMin responded that his present thinking was that domestic political consequences of issuance of visa would be such that he must be willing to accept any external consequence of its refusal, as regrettable as this might be. He observed that if we could get over the period immediately ahead, matters of this sort could be handled more easily. He was determined to permit Maoris to participate in S.A. as members foreign team whose selection not made for political purposes. He then put forth a suggestion that if Ashe were to come to S.A. as member of U.S. Davis Cup team, not as an individual, he would be welcome. I asked if he meant only after elections, to which he replied he would be willing proceed with this even before elections because principle was so sound that it could be defended against attacks by opposition. It was Ashe coming as individual that presented special problem.

7. I expressed considerable doubt that U.S. Davis Cup team would accept invitation to play in South Africa, particularly if it appeared device to get around Ashe individual visa application. Moreover, I thought it unlikely that commitments of members of team would in any event render this practical, at least in near future. PriMin, strongly supported by FonMin, urged that I nevertheless confidentially explore this possibility of U.S. team playing S.A. team here at any time, before or after elections.

8. At conclusion of talk, PriMin said if he were pressed now for final reply re Ashe visa, it would have to be negative. He would prefer to discuss matter with Cabinet, members of which now on vacation and dispersed throughout country. Next Cabinet meeting would be in Cape Town in late January. He would prefer hold matter until then, meanwhile giving it further thought himself. I encouraged him to do so, and we arranged to pursue question again in late January.

9. Comment: While PriMin appeared sincerely to desire more time to deliberate and, as is his practice in such matters, to consult Cabinet, I seriously doubt that this will result in favorable decision next month. New estimate of degree potential threat of HNP might, if sharply reduced by then, encourage more venturesomeness than now appears in prospect. In any event, it would appear advisable, in order leave open whatever slight chance may remain, to suggest that Ashe await results final consideration late January.

Rountree

4 In a letter from Cape Town, January 28, 1970, Rountree informed President Nixon that Ashe’s visa request was denied. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 744, Country Files, Africa, South Africa, Vol. I)
22. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
U.S. and South Africa Reach Understanding on Gold

At Tab A is an information memorandum from Treasury, alerting you to the possibility of an early understanding between the United States and South Africa on the marketing of South African gold. Such an understanding has now been reached. Treasury issued a press release this morning announcing “that a basis for a satisfactory mutual understanding may be emerging.” (Tab B)

Background

The major countries adopted the two-tiered gold system in March 1968 to divorce the monetary and private markets for gold—monetary gold now moves between national authorities at $35 per ounce while all other transactions take place in private markets at whatever price develops from supply and demand. This means that monetary authorities no longer sell gold to private parties to hold the price to all comers to $35.

The agreement was a response to the crisis which began with the devaluation of sterling in November 1967 and which bled $3 billion of official gold—most of it from the U.S.—into private hands. It remains of critical importance to the United States because it prevents private purchases of gold from draining U.S. monetary reserves, and we are its primary policemen.

The two-tiered system has worked so well that it now faces a problem opposite to the problem which caused its creation: far from worrying about increases in the gold price, there have recently been sharp price declines. In fact, the free market price has declined precisely to $35—the official price. The decline has occurred because of strengthened confidence in the dollar, the decision to activate Special Drawing Rights as a substitute for gold to augment international liquidity, and the lure of Eurodollar deposits yielding more than 10 percent.

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2 Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.
These price declines cause problems for the South Africans, whose major export is gold. They also arouse great concern among some of the European monetary authorities, who fear that the value of their gold reserves will come into question if the free market price drops below the official price. The two-tiered system is indeterminate on what happens at this point.

**U.S. Proposal**

We therefore came under pressure from both South Africa and the Europeans to agree to an arrangement which will place a $35 floor under the free market. Our interest in doing so was essentially to pacify the Europeans, whose cooperation we need continually in international monetary matters—and who may have to hold a great many dollars next year if our balance of payments turns as sour as most experts expect. In addition, absent a U.S.-South African agreement it was possible that the Europeans would make their own deal with South Africa, or set up a pool among themselves to support the gold price, either of which would lead to disorderly market conditions and a serious departure from our normal monetary cooperation.

Treasury therefore negotiated an understanding with South Africa on the basis of a proposal which we had had on the table since last spring, but which South Africa had heretofore not accepted:

1. All newly mined gold to be sold into the free market when the price is above $35.
2. Sales to monetary authorities, probably through the IMF, permitted when the free market price drops below $35.
3. Sales to monetary authorities permitted when South African balance of payments deficits in a given time period exceed its gold production during that period, after all of that production is sold into the free market.
4. Sales to monetary authorities also permitted from a small “kitty” of around $250 million, representing some of South Africa’s gold reserves at the time the two-tiered system was inaugurated.

The understanding assures the maintenance of the two-tiered system and assures that most of South Africa’s gold will go into the free market, holding down the price and therefore promoting confidence in the official price of gold. It does not provide a legal floor for the free market, although it comes close to doing so psychologically.

**Political Aspects**

Any U.S. understanding with South Africa will of course be subject to some political criticism. In addition, some international monetary experts—including Representatives Reuss and Widnall, the most knowledgeable Congressmen in this area—are opposed to any U.S. conces-
sions on gold. (Reuss’s Joint Economic Subcommittee has just issued a report opposing any settlement with South Africa.)

The U.S. proposal was developed solely on its monetary merits, however, and will be readily justifiable. The understanding will clearly be part of an international endeavor, with the European countries and the IMF, and Treasury’s press release makes this clear. The agreement should not cause any significant foreign or domestic political problems; failure to settle would clearly have caused problems with some of the Europeans, and now was the best time to settle in view of the mechanism of the gold price and hence South Africa’s negotiating position. State was fully involved in the development of the U.S. position and concurs with it.3

3 In a December 22 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten noted: “State in fact helped Treasury draw up the negotiating position for the understanding and fully agreed with it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 744, Country Files, Africa, South Africa, Vol. I) On December 29, Nixon wrote at the bottom of the last page of Kissinger’s memorandum: “I approve—We had better look after our own interests where national security + int’l monetary matters are involved.”
23. National Security Decision Memorandum 38


TO
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT
United States Policy Toward Southern Africa

Based on the meeting of the National Security Council on December 17,2 the President has made the following decisions with regard to U.S. policies toward Southern Africa:

1. Our Consulate in Salisbury, Rhodesia, will be retained so long as the legal question of U.S. recognition does not arise. If this question does arise—through British withdrawal of accreditation or by the Rhodesians' raising the question of the Consulate's status—the President will review our policy.

2. With regard to the issue of imports of chrome from Rhodesia, the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice and Commerce should study the Union Carbide case under the chairmanship of the Justice Department to clarify its status under present regulations, with interdepartmental differences to be resolved by Justice. This study should be submitted to the White House by February 15.3 With this case clarified, the more general issue of our policy on imports of Rhodesian chrome should be presented again to the President for decision.

3. Naval vessels should continue through 1970 to limit calls at South African ports to emergencies only.

4. The arms embargo on South Africa will be maintained.

5. Non-lethal equipment which has dual civilian and military uses will be excepted from the arms embargo on Portugal.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–213, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 38. Top Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

2 See Document 20.

3 See Document 37.
6. Southwest African issues should be played down at the U.N. to head off the prospect of a U.S. veto, until the situation clarifies. Once the outcome of the U.N. Security Council debate is clear, the issue may be presented again through the NSC system to the President for long-range decision.

7. The President has directed that individual provisions of this NSDM be communicated for purposes of implementation strictly on a need-to-know basis. He expects the security classification and very limited dissemination of the memorandum as a whole to be observed scrupulously.

Henry A. Kissinger

24. National Security Study Memorandum 89


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy for Southwest Africa

The President has directed a study of U.S. policy on Southwest Africa (Namibia) in light of NSDM 38 and the United Nations Security Council’s decision to establish an ad hoc subcommittee to recommend further steps to carry out relevant UN resolutions. This study should:

—briefly summarize past developments, the current situation, and likely prospects both in Africa and the United Nations;
—examine U.S. interests and objectives;

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.

2 Document 23.

3 For details on the establishment of the ad hoc subcommittee (Resolution 276 of January 30), its recommendations, and actions taken by the Security Council and General Assembly, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970, pp. 734–746.
—propose optional U.S. policy courses for the longer term, including any specific proposals needed to implement them over the coming months.

This paper should be drafted by an ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State including representatives of the action addressees of this memorandum and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The paper should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by February 20.

Henry A. Kissinger

25. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 27, 1970.

SUBJECT
British Démarche on Rhodesia

The British Minister came in at his request to request clarification of Ron Ziegler’s statements to the press today concerning the status of our Consulate in Salisbury following the declaration of the Republic of Rhodesia. Roger Morris participated in the discussion. Mr. Millard was furnished the text of Ziegler’s comments at the afternoon briefing today and was also referred to McCloskey’s statement at noon today.

Millard then said on instructions that he wished to convey the utmost concern of HMG concerning our Consulate and to ask that a decision to withdraw it be made before midnight on Sunday. We explained that a decision one way or the other was unlikely in this time frame but that the status of the Consulate would of course be reviewed in the light of the new situation, as our public statements had indicated.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent to Kissinger. Printed from a copy that Haig initialed.

2 Telegram 30031 to Salisbury, February 28, transmitted Ziegler’s statement that the United States would maintain the Consulate in Rhodesia following the declaration of a Rhodesian republic, however, “this did not constitute recognition of Salisbury regime.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 RHOD)

3 March 1.
Millard said he had come to the White House, rather than the State Department because it was thought that the matter had come up between the President and Prime Minister. I said I could not recall whether it had but that of course the Secretary of State had told Foreign Secretary Stewart that declaration of the Republic would bring about a new decision point. We told Millard that he should feel free to convey his instructions to the Department of State.

Millard was visibly disturbed about the possibility that no US decision would be forthcoming in the next two days. He said the British were asking us to withdraw because they hoped this would inhibit others who might be thinking of recognition (he did not know what countries might do this) and would also induce those countries maintaining consulates to withdraw them.

I assured Millard that I would bring his comments to the attention of Mr. Kissinger, noting at the same time that we were of course already fully aware of HMG’s views.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

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4 See Document 16.
5 Sonnenfeldt initialed “HS” next to his typed signature.

26. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Salisbury

Washington, February 28, 1970, 2233Z.


1. UK Minister Millard called on Acting Assistant Secretary Moore February 28 to deliver urgent British démarche calling for closure AmConGen Salisbury.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Bruce and Jacobs, cleared in AF/S, and approved by Moore. Repeated Priority to Conakry and London; and repeated to Pretoria, Cape Town, Lusaka, and USUN.

2 Telegram 29574 to all African diplomatic posts, February 27, informed recipients of the dissolution of the Rhodesian Parliament on March 3 and the Department of State’s response to press inquiries regarding the Consulate in Salisbury. (Ibid.)
2. Millard said HMG hopes for quick decision to close our consulate. He expressed gratification that White House statement of Friday (ref tel) had not meant to imply a USG decision to keep open Consulate but added that HMG does not rpt not believe status AmConGen can remain under review any longer without creating awkward situation for both US and UK.

3. Millard said early US decision close consulate would (a) have good political effect in Africa and UN (b) cause other countries with consulates to follow suit and (c) serve to forestall any tendency on part other countries to recognize illegal regime. Millard said HMG had received satisfactory assurances from South African Foreign Minister on latter point.

4. Stating that HMG considers republic will come into being March 2, Millard emphasized that HMG believes USG holds key to international reaction to establishment republic and urges early decision.

5. British FonSec plans to make statement on Republic March 2. End

Rogers

27. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, March 6, 1970.

SUBJECT

Status of U.S. Consulate General, Salisbury, Rhodesia

Discussion:

The Smith regime has announced that the new Rhodesian Republican Constitution came into force on March 2, 1970, and that the present Parliament will be dissolved March 3. The dissolution represents the final and formal break with Britain as the new Constitution provides for an Acting President who replaces the British Crown as

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head of State. Although the Rhodesians have made no formal announcement that the Republic came into existence on March 2—and indications are that no announcement will be made—Ian Smith has earlier stated this would be the case on the dissolution of Parliament, and the British have informed us they, too, consider the Republic to have been established. The press is treating the dissolution in this way, and we believe the terms of the Constitution support this interpretation.

General elections under provisions of the new Constitution will be held on April 10. The new Parliament will sit and choose Rhodesia’s first President. At this point the various steps involved in setting up the institutions of the new Republic will have been completed.

The UN Secretary General has suggested that the Security Council meet urgently to consider the Rhodesian situation. Although it is not clear just what course the Council’s deliberations may take, we can foresee two possibilities. There may be strong pressures for extreme measures such as the use of force or closure of the gaps in the Rhodesian sanctions program by its extension to South Africa and Mozambique. Alternatively, there may be a general condemnatory resolution which would also require the withdrawal of all consular missions in Salisbury. Such a resolution would certainly be supported by sufficient members, including the United Kingdom, to ensure passage unless vetoed by a permanent member.

Quite apart from possible Security Council action, we can expect strong condemnatory statements from black African states if we do not act now to close our Consulate. The OAU is in the process of adopting a special resolution which, among other things, will criticize those countries which still maintain consulates in Salisbury. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister has indicated that even moderate African states will have to condemn the failure of the U.S. to close the Consulate and the Zambian Ambassador has expressed his Government’s “grave concern.”

We have publicly and privately assured the British Government on various occasions that we regarded it as the sovereign power in Rhodesia and that we have no intention of recognizing the illegal regime in Salisbury. On February 28, the British delivered an urgent démarche asking that the U.S. quickly reach a decision to close the American Consulate General in Salisbury. The British informed us that they do not believe the question can remain under review any longer without creating an awkward situation for both the United States and the United Kingdom.

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2 See footnote 2, Document 25 and footnote 4 below.
Conclusions:

By bringing into force the new Constitution, the Rhodesians have, in effect, brought about a situation in which the continued maintenance of our Consulate in Salisbury will be looked upon by the British, the Africans and most of the international community as acceptance and approval of the Smith regime. The continued presence of our Consular office would become increasingly difficult to explain.

In light of the British request for an early decision to close, our failure to heed the desires of the sovereign power could be interpreted by the British and others as an affront to British sovereignty and acceptance of the Rhodesian regime and Rhodesian statehood, even though we may expressly deny we either approve or recognize the Smith regime. It would be inconsistent for the United States to maintain that we do not recognize either a state of Rhodesia or the Smith regime, but rather consider Southern Rhodesia to be a non-self-governing territory with the United Kingdom as the recognized sovereign, and yet continue to have a consular mission in that territory against the expressed wishes of the recognized sovereign.

In any UN consideration of the Rhodesian question, the credibility and goodwill which we would gain by having announced our intention to withdraw would enable us better to resist pressures for extreme measures or to organize sufficient abstentions to prevent passage of a resolution embodying them. Should we be faced with a resolution requiring withdrawal of consular missions from Salisbury, we would be spared the unpalatable choices of (1) appearing to have been forced out of Salisbury; (2) maintaining a Consulate in violation of a mandatory Security Council resolution; or (3) casting the first U.S. veto.

The consular service and assistance requirements of American citizens in Rhodesia can be adequately covered by our Consulate General in Johannesburg. Maintenance of the office in Salisbury would offer no material or other advantages comparable to the disadvantages involved.

Closure of our office would give concrete meaning to our statements that the United States neither condones nor approves of the discriminatory racial policies of the minority regimes in southern Africa. It would also remove an issue in our relations with the UK and would save us from the political liabilities we would encounter in Africa should we maintain the office.

In light of the coming into force of the Republican Constitution cutting the last formal tie with the British Crown and of the British request that we close the office, I believe we need to review the status of our Consulate in Salisbury.
Recommendation:

In light of the above, I believe we should close our Consulate in Salisbury and announce our intention to do so immediately. I would appreciate your approval of this course of action and of the proposed press statement announcing our action.4

William P. Rogers5

4 The press statement is attached but not printed. Nixon did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation. Rogers issued a statement on March 9, which included this text: “On March 2, 1970, the Rhodesian regime implemented a new constitution and a Rhodesian President is substituted for the British Crown as head of state. This constitutes the final and formal break with the United Kingdom. The United States has regarded and continues to regard the United Kingdom as the lawful sovereign.” (Department of State Bulletin, March 30, 1970, p. 412)

5 Rogers initialed “WPR” above his typed signature.

28. National Security Decision Memorandum 47


TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Rhodesia

The President has decided to close the U.S. Consulate in Rhodesia in response to the request of the Government of the United Kingdom. The President has directed that the announcement of our withdrawal be consistent with our previous public position on the question of the presence of our Consulate in Salisbury. The maintenance of the

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-214, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 47. Secret; Nodis. Haig initialed the memorandum. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.
Consulate did not imply recognition of the regime in Rhodesia. Withdrawal is a response to the request of the legal sovereign power in Rhodesia, the United Kingdom.

The President also has directed an urgent review of all existing regulations implementing UN sanctions against Rhodesia and all pending applications for imports from Rhodesia, especially with respect to imports of chrome ore. This review should examine alternative revisions in these regulations designed to minimize penalties to U.S. firms acting in good faith, while at the same time meeting U.S. legal obligations under our adherence to UN sanctions against Rhodesia.

This review should be conducted by an ad hoc group comprising representatives of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury and Commerce, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The group should be chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. The study should be submitted to the President by March 27, 1970.

The President has instructed the security classification and very limited distribution of this memorandum be observed scrupulously.

Henry A. Kissinger
ment, we need to determine U.S. policy towards the Territory over the longer term, involving, as it does, our bilateral relations with South Africa, our relations with black Africa, and our role in the UN. In this broader context we need to determine whether there is anything that can or should be done to bring about accommodation between South Africa and the United Nations.

II. Background

South West Africa is an international Territory illegally occupied by South Africa. South Africa became the administering power by virtue of a League of Nations mandate of 1920. Following the demise of the League, International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinions established that the mandate continued in effect, that South Africa could not alter the status of the Territory without UN consent, that the UN had supervisory authority, and that South Africa was obligated to “promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants”. When, in 1966, the International Court of Justice refused to pass on the merits of a contentious proceeding brought by two former League of Nations members to contest South Africa’s administration, the United Nations decided (GA RES 2145 (XXI), October 27, 1966), that (1) because of South Africa’s violations of its obligations and disavowal of the Mandate, the Mandate conferred on it was terminated, (2) that South Africa had no other right to administer the Territory which (3) thenceforth came under the direct responsibility of the United Nations.

Although South Africa acknowledges that South West Africa has an international character and periodically makes available reports on developments there, it denies that the United Nations is responsible for the Territory and for over two decades has failed to submit to the United Nations the reports and petitions required under the Mandate. Under South African administration, the developed areas, comprising half the Territory, have been reserved to the white minority and apartheid and repressive measures on the South African model have been introduced. South Africa regards the Territory as an important security buffer and economic asset. Short of the use of force, therefore, we do not see any immediate possibility of inducing South Africa to withdraw.

Our direct economic and strategic interests in South West Africa are limited. We have approximately $60 million in direct investment, accounted for largely by the Tsumeb mining complex. Several oil and mining companies are also engaged in exploratory work in the Territory. Apart from current direct investment controls, our policy is nei-
ther to encourage nor discourage U.S. investment; we carry on some trade with the Territory. 2

The Military Airlift Command (MAC) and U.S. Air Force overfly the Caprivi Strip but otherwise the U.S. Government makes little use of South West Africa.

The U.S. supported Resolution 2145 and we have made clear in our bilateral relations with South Africa and at the UN that we regard South Africa as illegal occupant of the Territory. The U.S. Ambassador has refrained from visiting South West Africa to avoid any implication of recognition of South Africa’s illegal occupation. We have not permitted U.S. Defense Attachés to travel in the Territory to avoid any U.S. association with the stringent internal security and military measures being pursued there by South Africa. We have protested South African violations of the rights of the inhabitants, especially the introduction of the Terrorism Act, whose application to the Territory we regard as both obnoxious and illegal.

We have not in recent years contributed to the UN training program for SWA refugees.

We participated in the work of the 1967 Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa which sought practical means to administer the Territory while the inhabitants were being prepared to exercise their right of self-determination. 3 We urged that alternative arrangements for the administration of the Territory be thoroughly studied. The Africans and others called for various approaches to a UN takeover of South West Africa.

When the Committee failed to reach agreement, the General Assembly established a UN Council for South West Africa to take over immediate control of the Territory. None of the big powers supported establishment of the council—whose terms of reference, in our view, were impractical—or accepted membership in it. As a result, the Council is virtually powerless. Nevertheless, the majority of UN members would contend that it is the UN body designated to administer South West Africa should South Africa withdraw or be forced out.

The U.S. has supported Security Council resolutions calling on South Africa to withdraw its administration and has made similar representations in bilateral discussions with the South African Government. At the same time, we opposed the setting of arbitrary time limits for withdrawal and have opposed calls for extreme measures such as the use of force or economic sanctions against South Africa. We have

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2 We apply our South African arms embargo to South West Africa. [Footnote is in the original.]

3 The reference is to the UN Council for South West Africa, or the UN Council for Namibia, established by General Assembly Resolution 2248, May 19, 1967.
stated in the Security Council that the present situation in South West Africa is not one which can sensibly and humanely be remedied by mandatory sanctions.

The 1965 Security Council study concluded that the South African economy, though not immune, would not be “readily susceptible” to the effects of sanctions. Even if the South African economy were less self-sufficient, sanctions are unlikely to be effective without universal support, especially of the major powers. The UK, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and a number of other trading nations are actively seeking to expand their shares of the South African market. None of these countries would be likely to support a call for sanctions, and we could expect that evasions would occur. Enforcing sanctions with a blockade, moreover, would involve immense cost and effort, the brunt of which would have to be borne by the U.S.\(^4\)

On January 30, 1970, the U.S. supported a Security Council resolution establishing a subcommittee to prepare recommendations by April 30 on the implementation of UN responsibility for the Territory. The immediate problem posed for the U.S., in view of the pressure being put on us by African leaders to take effective action against South Africa, is how to encourage the subcommittee to take a constructive approach and to avoid inappropriate recommendations.

Although we will be credited with steps we have taken in the past, we must expect to be under continuing pressure to do more. We must anticipate that we will be confronted with proposals for sanctions which, if presented in mandatory form, could require the exercise of a veto. We have already abstained on, or opposed, such proposals in the General Assembly. Thus our suggestion of alternatives to sanctions in the Security Council subcommittee could have some positive impact on African opinion, but it is probable that it would only postpone the day when the Western powers are faced with a Security Council call for more extreme measures and possibly the need to cast a veto.

III. U.S. Interests and Objectives

The U.S. is committed by its national experience, public policy, and international undertakings to support the principles of human rights and self-determination. That commitment was reaffirmed by the President in his recent Report to the Congress “US Foreign Policy for the 1970’s” as follows:

“Clearly there is no question of the United States condoning, or acquiescing in, the racial policies of the white-ruled regimes. For moral as

\(^4\) 1965 Joint Chiefs’ study of naval blockade in support of sanctions estimated a requirement for 4 carrier task forces. In event blockade would have to be extended to Mozambique and Angola to make it effective, 3 additional carrier task forces would be needed. [Footnote is in the original.]
well as historical reasons, the United States stands firmly for the principles of racial equality and self-determination.”

The way in which we deal with the South West African issue will be taken as a measure of our commitment to these principles. In particular, it will affect our credibility on a range of questions pertaining to southern Africa and will help to determine the degree to which the Africans listen to and are influenced by our views.

The U.S. has an important interest in placing itself in the best position to dissuade or at least delay African insistence on inappropriate coercive measures against South Africa and, if a U.S. veto of such measures should prove unavoidable, to be able to put the best face on it. Pursuit of this interest involves readiness to put forward and support reasonable alternatives, while avoiding a commitment—or even an implication of readiness—to use force.

Any choice of options will affect U.S. economic ties in Africa outside the white-controlled areas ($1.7 billion in trade; nearly $2 billion in direct investment) as well as our ties to South Africa ($750 million in trade, $700 million in investment). Other factors involved include strategic interests in both the black and the white-ruled parts of the continent, and NASA space-tracking facilities in both areas.

IV. Range of Options

The South West African problem is included in the study prepared in response to NSSM 39. For reasons of feasibility, options suggested here are in the middle range of those set forth on SWA in NSSM 39. This, however, does not exclude the possibility, indeed the probability, that we will be faced with demands for actions on the more extreme part of the spectrum. The international status of the Territory makes it possible for us to take action on South West Africa without necessarily foreclosing options on Rhodesia, the Portuguese Territories, or South Africa contained in the NSSM 39 response.

Underlying the options are three basic assumptions:

—that the U.S. regards the present South African administration of the Territory as illegal;
—that the U.S. does not support the use of force or measures that would not be effective without the use of force to terminate South Africa’s control over South West Africa;
—that South Africa will remain in effective control of the Territory for the foreseeable future.

Within these limits, the options set forth possible U.S. actions in ascending order of U.S. initiative: they begin with continuation of present

restrictions on U.S. activities in South West Africa and work their way up through supporting measures to implement the UN administrative authority.

V. The Options

The options are:

1. Continue present restrictions on U.S. activities in SWA but avoid any major new action involving Territory.

2. Take selective actions in addition to present restrictions to disassociate ourselves from South Africa’s illegal administration of Territory.

3. Join in international efforts to assert UN responsibility for Territory.

Option 1—Continue Present Restrictions on U.S. Activities in SWA But Avoid Any Major New Action Involving Territory

Posture: Although continuing to support principle of international responsibility for South West Africa, we would try to play down issue in the UN and avoid any major new action. We would counsel moderation and encourage the UN and South Africa to seek accommodation. To put best face on our inaction, we would continue present restrictions on U.S. activities in Territory.

Operational Examples:

Neither encourage nor discourage U.S. investment in South West Africa.

Continue trade with Territory.


Support efforts to establish contact between UN Secretary General and South Africa; quietly promote talks within or outside framework of UN, whichever will help to break deadlock.

Encourage Security Council subcommittee to avoid impractical measures and to examine alternative approaches to the problem.

Encourage UK and others to veto mandatory sanctions and be prepared to take such veto action ourselves as last resort.

Pros:

Would tend to serve U.S. trade and investment interests in South West Africa.

Would limit irritant effect of SWA issue in U.S.-South African relations.

Would afford some credibility to our stated position on SWA issue.
Would not encourage expectations we cannot meet.

Cons:

If this course of action is interpreted as evidence of declining U.S. energy on SWA issue, as it is likely to be, it would reflect adversely on our credibility on southern African issues in general and lend itself to communist exploitation.

Would not offer enough to black African states to head off demands for mandatory sanctions and could thus still pose a veto problem.

Would not persuade South Africa to change its South West African policy or to engage in serious negotiations.

Option 2—Take Selective Actions in Addition to Present Restrictions To Dissociate Ourselves From South Africa’s Illegal Administration of Territory

Posture: Recognizing that there can be no immediate solution to the problem, U.S. would take selective unilateral and multilateral action—in addition to present restrictions—in order to dissociate ourselves more fully from South Africa’s administration of SWA and to establish a credible position of upholding UN responsibility for Territory. We would attempt to dissuade the parties from taking actions prejudicial to the interests of the inhabitants or which would make the possibility of future negotiated settlement more remote.

Operational Examples:

Depending upon tactical situation, we would take some or all of the following steps in addition to those in Option 1:

Publicly discourage U.S. investment in South West Africa.

Announce that U.S. nationals who invest in the Territory in the future on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government since adoption of Resolution 2145 cannot expect U.S. Government assistance in protecting such investments against claims of a future lawful government of South West Africa.

Announce cut-off of Export-Import Bank facilities for trade with Territory.

Through our bilateral relations or the Security Council, as appropriate, encourage other countries to take actions parallel to these increased U.S. restrictions.

Support referral to International Court of Justice for advisory opinion on appropriate legal aspects of South Africa’s administration of SWA.

Continue support of humanitarian efforts on behalf of South West Africans (UN programs, activities of private American church and legal groups).
To the extent that South Africa showed flexibility, be prepared to take proportionate action to reduce aforementioned restrictions on Territory.

Pros:

Would be consistent with U.S. support for human rights and self-determination.

Would demonstrate to UN and South Africa that the U.S. is willing to sacrifice some material interests in support of its avowed policy.

Would tend to preserve our freedom of action by limiting our economic stake and involvement in South West Africa.

Would help defer at least temporarily demands for mandatory sanctions and consequent possibility of U.S. veto.

Might secure support of moderate Africans who do not believe stronger measures are feasible.

Cons:

Would cost us some trade and investment opportunities in the Territory.

Would still be criticized as inadequate, and would not eliminate the likelihood of calls for more drastic measures.

Would not soon bring South Africa to negotiate seriously or make significant concessions on South West Africa.

Option 3—Join In International Efforts To Assert UN Responsibility for Territory

Posture: U.S. would take further positive steps to implement direct UN responsibility for Territory.

Operational Examples:

In addition to steps listed in Options 1 and 2, U.S. would take the following actions:

In the Security Council subcommittee, seek recommendation to the General Assembly on revision of terms of reference of UN Council for South West Africa and/or the establishment of a new continuing body, such as the subcommittee itself, to explore alternative approaches to problem. Be prepared to become a member of such a body if we can be assured of practical terms of reference.

Study and, if feasible, support measures to divert to UN for administrative costs of UN Council for SWA and education expenses of SWA refugees, any foreign corporate taxes generated in Territory in the future.

Consider a Security Council resolution calling upon the UN Secretary General and member states to submit periodic reports on compliance with 1963 Security Council arms embargo on South Africa.
Contribute to a UN training program for South West African refugees.

**Pros:**

Would be positive affirmation of U.S. commitment to human rights and self-determination in eyes of most of the world.

Would improve U.S. influence and standing in black Africa.

Assistance to refugees would help to meet humanitarian need and prepare them for future responsibilities.

**Cons:**

Would not meet demands for mandatory sanctions.

Still would not be strong enough to persuade South Africa to accept UN role, much less to relinquish strategic area.

By creating bloc of potential South West African civil servants, refugee training could lead to pressures for government-in-exile.


**VI. Analysis of New Actions under Options**

**A. Restrictions on U.S. Investment**

(Options 2 and 3)

*Publicly discourage U.S. investment in South West Africa.*

**Present Policy:** At present we neither encourage or discourage U.S. investment in South West Africa.

(Options 2 and 3)

*Announce cut-off of Export-Import Bank facilities for trade with Territory.*

**Present Policy:** At present we allow short-term (up to 6 months) EXIM credit guarantees for such investment. But we have had only one request for EXIM help in the past 5 years.

(Options 2 and 3)

*Announce that investors subsequent to UNGA Resolution 2145 (October 1966) cannot expect U.S. Government assistance against claims of future lawful governments in SWA.*

**Pros:**

—Will demonstrate U.S. firmness of purpose to South Africa.
—Will strengthen our moral position in the UN by demonstrating good faith effort to give practical effect to UN resolutions.
—Discouraging further economic ties now would prevent U.S. from becoming “locked” economically—and politically—in SWA.
—Retroactive effect can be avoided, so that U.S. investment already in SWA need not be affected.
—U.S. Government will not in future be embarrassed by claim for protection.

**Cons:**
—South Africa is unlikely to change its policy in response to such marginal moves.
—Proposed measures would not entirely cut off further U.S. investment.
—Unlikely that these measures will head off pressures for further and stronger measures.
—To the degree that U.S. investment is hampered, others (especially South Africans, British, and perhaps also the Germans) might step in.

**B. U.S. Policy at the UN**

*(Options 2 and 3)*

Support non-mandatory steps by Security Council to have all member States take actions similar to above unilateral steps.

**Pros:**
—Will reduce risk of other states taking advantage of our self-abnegation.
—If other states refuse to go along, may ease African pressure on U.S. and divert pressure onto others.

**Cons:**
—Other investing and trading countries unlikely to follow us.
—Even if other nations follow U.S., measures unlikely to change SAG policies.

*(Option 3)*

Consider a Security Council resolution calling on member states and the SYG to submit periodic reports to the Council on their application of the 1963 Security Council arms embargo on South Africa.

**Present Policy:** We have a strict embargo on the sale of military equipment to South Africa, but others (U.K., France, Italy) are less strict and the French, in particular, are quite lax in implementation.

**Pros:**
—Gives us a chance to take political initiative.
—Reaffirming U.S. support for embargo and showing up others’ non-compliance would ease African pressure on U.S.
—Tying arms embargo to situation in international Territory would strengthen authority of embargo.

Cons:
—Would antagonize the French and, to a lesser degree, the British.
—Though our compliance has been better than others’, we cannot expect Africans to shift their pressure onto U.K. and France. Africans are already aware of who sells most arms (France) and who trades most (U.K.) with South Africa.
—Will antagonize South Africans without depriving them of arms.

(Option 3)
In Security Council subcommittee seek recommendation to General Assembly on revision of terms of reference of UN Council for SWA and for establishment of new continuing body and be prepared to become member if terms of reference are practical.

Present Policy: We abstained on UNGA resolution which created 11-member Council, primarily on grounds that its terms of reference were unrealistic and unachievable. (U.S. not a member.)

Pros:
—Would allow U.S. to take constructive initiative, instead of remaining on defensive.
—Would strengthen our moral and political position by demonstrating willingness to study ways of effectuating UN responsibility for SWA.
—Might improve our chances of guiding UN discussion and action on the SWA issue.

Cons:
—Would open up Council’s composition and terms of reference to new pressures and bargaining. No guarantee of U.S. control or influence over outcome.
—Afro-Asian sponsors attach importance to Council as it is, and U.S. position might appear a negative one.
—Entities created by the General Assembly are less amenable to U.S. influence than the Security Council, where we have the option of a veto.

(Option 3)
Actively support inclusion in UN regular budget of funds for education and training of indigenous Namibian refugees.

Present Policy: U.S. already supports humanitarian efforts on behalf of South West Africans (some UN programs; private U.S. church
and legal groups), but there is evidence of Congressional opposition to U.S. voluntary contributions for training of southern African leaders.

Pros:

—Would enhance U.S. standing with African states.
—Would be affirmation of UN responsibility for South West Africa.
—Funds involved would not be large.

Cons:

—Inclusion of such funds in regular UN budget could open door for similar demands in relation to other programs for training southern African refugees.
—Could put UN (and U.S.) in position of promoting violent action or government in exile. No guarantee that UN-trained groups will restrict themselves to non-violent means.

(Option 3)

Support referral to ICJ for advisory opinion on appropriate legal aspects of South Africa’s administration of SWA.

Pros:

—Would demonstrate U.S. commitment to human rights and our continued abhorrence of repressive policies of South Africa.
—Would undergird U.S. view of SWA as legally distinct from South Africa.
—Favorable advisory opinion would knock out South Africa’s position that 1966 ICJ judgment undercut 1950 ICJ advisory opinion.

Cons:

—No assurance African states would support another referral to court.
—ICJ ruling favorable to Africans could not be given practical effect. This will only stimulate pressures in UN by giving Africans additional legal reasons for demanding mandatory sanctions vs. South Africa.
—U.S. proposal of submission to ICJ is not likely to postpone immediate UN consideration of SWA issues.

The following measures parallel to proposals by the U.S.U.N. delegation would require extensive study as to feasibility and advisability prior to their consideration by the U.S. Government for possible action:
(Option 3)

Support UN action under which members would terminate avoidance-of-double-taxation privilege for their investors in SWA.

Present Policy. U.S. investors in SWA are allowed credits on U.S. tax for taxes paid to South African Government on revenues from investments in SWA, or other means of avoiding double taxation.

(Option 3)

Support measures to divert to UN tax and royalty revenues derived from foreign commercial activities in South West Africa.

Annexes.\textsuperscript{6}

A—Chart: Comparison of U.S. Actions under the Options
B—South West Africa: Further Background
C—Memorandum to the Secretary of State from U.S. Delegation to 24th UNGA
D—Memorandum to L/AF from L/UNA, ICJ Advisory Opinions on South West Africa, February 27, 1970
E—Memorandum to AF/S from L/UNA and L/AF, South West Africa, March 12, 1970
F—UNGA Resolution 2145 (XXI) Question of South West Africa
G—National Security Study Memorandum 89, February 12, 1970

\textsuperscript{6} Annexes A–F are attached but not printed. Annex G is Document 24.

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30. Memorandum for the Record\textsuperscript{1}


SUBJECT

NSC Review Group Meeting, 10 April 1970

1. The Review Group met at 1445 hours on 10 April under the chairmanship of Henry Kissinger to discuss the response to NSSM 89: “US Policy for Southwest Africa (Namibia)”\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01086A, Box 7, Subject Files, NSC Review Group Meeting Agenda/Minutes, Folder 223. Secret.

\textsuperscript{2} Document 29.
2. Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting by saying that this matter would not be brought before the NSC but would be handled by a memorandum to The President. It was ascertained that a Presidential decision was needed by 20 April so that the US representatives to the United Nations could be given instructions.

3. There was considerable discussion of the three options presented in the response to NSSM 89. All present agreed that regardless of the option selected, it is “just a matter of time” until the UK or the US would be forced to veto a resolution on imposing mandatory sanctions on South Africa.

4. State recommended Option 2—take selective actions in addition to present restrictions to dissociate ourselves from South Africa’s illegal administration of the territory. State would want some flexibility in selecting specific courses of action under Option 2 with the addition of three other courses of action presented under Option 3 if necessary. Specifically, State would want authority to support a proposal in the United Nations for reporting on compliance with the arms embargo on South Africa, to provide funds for refugees from Namibia, and to support referral to the International Court of Justice for an opinion of some legal aspects of South Africa’s administration of Southwest Africa.

5. JCS, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Commerce, and Treasury recommended Option 1—continue present restrictions on US activities in Southwest Africa but avoid any major new action involving the territory. When asked the position of the Agency, I said that it would be inappropriate for CIA to take a position on these policy questions. The OEP representative took a similar stand.

6. It is interesting to note that Mr. Shakespeare said that the people at USIA were for Option 2 and that he personally was for Option 1. Mr. Kissinger pressed Mr. Shakespeare for an agency position, and the response was Option 1.

7. All agencies that wish to express their positions are to do so in writing by close of business 13 April for inclusion in the memorandum to The President.

Edward W. Proctor
Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence

3 Document 31.
31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, April 15, 1970.

SUBJECT
South West Africa (Namibia): Response to NSSM 89

Our earlier review of southern Africa touched briefly on South West Africa: NSDM 38 announced your decision that the issue be “downplayed” at the UN. The response to NSSM 89 (at Tab A) addresses the issue in more detail, in preparation for the forthcoming discussions in the UN.

The Problem

In 1966, by a resolution we supported, the UN General Assembly terminated South Africa’s League of Nations mandate for South West Africa, and declared the Territory to be under UN responsibility. In January, 1970, the Security Council created a subcommittee (of the whole) to study ways of implementing UN authority. This subcommittee is to report out recommendations by April 30, and these will be debated in the Council in May or June.

Ambassador Yost needs guidance on positions to take (1) in the drafting of the subcommittee’s recommendations, and (2) in the formal debate.

The Issue

The Africans will press for stronger measures, (e.g., mandatory sanctions), to assert UN responsibility for South West Africa. The US needs a posture which limits political damage while we essentially oppose this pressure. The response to NSSM 89 presents three alternative postures, which range from present policy (Option 1) to two levels of new operational steps dissociating us from South African policy in South West Africa and asserting UN responsibility (Options 2 and 3).
—Our present policy (Option 1) recognizes UN responsibility. We abstained in 1967, however, when the General Assembly created a Council on South West Africa to “administer” it, because we considered the terms of reference (to promulgate laws, etc.) unrealistic. We restrict US diplomatic and attaché visits, port calls and overflights in the Territory. We neither encourage nor discourage US investment there; we allow trade. We do not withhold diplomatic assistance or Export-Import Bank credit guarantees. We support some UN and some private US humanitarian programs for South West African refugees, but have not recently contributed to the UN Education and Training Fund for these refugees.

—Option 2 would (in addition to the above restrictions) limit US investment in South West Africa by verbally discouraging it, by terminating EXIM guarantees, and by withholding diplomatic assistance. It would encourage other countries to act similarly, and it would support referral of appropriate legal questions to the ICJ.

—Option 3 would (in addition to the steps in Options 1 and 2) consider much stronger measures against US investment and take more conspicuous initiatives in the UN to strengthen the arms embargo and refugee programs, and to revise the mandate of the General Assembly’s Council on South West Africa (now the Council on Namibia).

Our problem in the UN is tactical, but there is a basic issue of strategy: Do we gain anything with the Africans by making concessions?

—The argument for new measures is that South Africa’s occupation of the Territory is clearly illegal, and its extension of racial repression there is morally objectionable. Gestures of economic sacrifice would confirm our moral and legal stand against these policies and demonstrate our good faith to the Africans, who might then be more receptive to our counsels of moderation. Since we are prepared to veto any extreme proposals that may arise (e.g., mandatory sanctions), we have no reason to fear escalation of African pressures; demonstrations of our good faith will make it politically easier to veto if we have to.

—The argument against new steps is that there is no reliable bloc of African moderates, and the radicals are unappeasable. The Portuguese Territories, and apartheid in South Africa proper, will be raised in the UN very soon, too; US concessions on South West Africa will not dampen, and may even stimulate, pressures to do more on all these issues. Our sacrifices will gain us little or nothing; we may even be accused of hypocrisy if the sacrifices seem too modest.

Individual Agency Views

Agency views are at Tab B. Defense, JCS, OEP, Commerce, Treasury and USIA recommend sticking to present policy (Option 1); Defense and JCS believe that new measures will only raise African expectations.
that cannot be met and will stimulate pressures for sanctions; they see a firm stand as the best hope of dampening pressures. OEP and Treasury prefer present policy but do not object strongly to Option 2, provided it is made clear that the US opposes mandatory sanctions. Commerce believes that any restrictions we impose will simply allow other nations’ investors to step in, and it fears setting a precedent which could lead to new restrictions against South Africa.

State recommends Option 2. It sees the economic sacrifice involved as slight, but believes these measures will demonstrate more clearly that US policy is not prejudiced by economic interests and will establish a more easily defensible posture from which to oppose extreme demands.

My own view is that we should have no illusions that limited measures will stop African pressures. Nevertheless, the steps in Option 2 involve only modest sacrifice but will strengthen our position in the (probable) event that we are forced to veto proposals for stronger measures. They would be tokens of our good faith. In the heated UN debate, remaining rigid would not successfully “downplay” the issue.

I suggest that you focus on the proposed new operational steps individually, rather than on the options. My specific recommendation accompanies each operational step.

Specific Operational Steps

Option 2 includes the first five steps:

2. Deny EXIM credit guarantees for trade with South West Africa.
3. Deny diplomatic protection against claims of a future lawful government of South West Africa to US nationals who invest there on the basis of rights acquired since the 1966 General Assembly resolution.

The argument for these steps is that most agencies believe they will have only slight economic impact, since US investment is high-return and low-risk anyway, and EXIM facilities are hardly used. Any economic effect these steps did have would give substance to our moral and legal position. By limiting our stake there, they would keep us from becoming more “locked in” and would thus preserve our freedom of action in the future. The argument against them is that we could be accused of hypocrisy for taking ineffectual steps. (Commerce, on the other hand, sees significant new export possibilities emerging and urges that EXIM facilities not be foreclosed.) Any economic impact they did have would be a sacrifice for which we will not necessarily receive any political benefit. They might be taken as a precedent and stimulate pressures to do the same or more against South Africa and the Portuguese Territories (though the legal issues in South West Africa are unique).
I recommend that you approve these steps. The economic sacrifice will not be great, and these will strengthen our position in the event we have to veto.

Approve 1–3 _____³ Disapprove 1–3 _____.

Approve only: _____.

4. Encourage (but do not pressure) other countries to take actions similar to the above.

The argument for this is that if it succeeds, others will not capitalize on our self-denial; if it fails, it might deflect African pressures on to others. The argument against it is that others will probably not emulate us, and, even so, African pressures on us will probably not subside. This measure might antagonize our allies.

I recommend that you approve this step. Pressure on our allies is ruled out. There is no assurance that it will have any effect, but we are entitled to hope that others will not take advantage of our self-denial.

Approve 4 _____⁴ Disapprove _____.

5. Support (but do not propose) referral to ICJ for advisory opinion on legality of certain aspects of South Africa’s administration of South West Africa.

The argument for this is that if others propose referral to the ICJ, the US has no basis for opposing it; the ICJ would probably only confirm the legal position the US has already taken. The argument against it is that an ICJ ruling condemning South Africa could not be given practical effect, but would accelerate pressures for sanctions.

I recommend that you approve this step. An ICJ ruling might well stimulate African pressures, but US opposition or abstention on the question of referral would raise doubts about our legal position.

Approve 5 _____⁵ Disapprove 5 _____.

Option 3 includes the above five steps plus the five following:

6. Seek recommendation to General Assembly of revision of terms of reference of Council on Namibia or creation of new continuing body. Be willing to join if terms of reference are practical.

Some argue that this would allow us to take a constructive initiative. If successful, it might channel off African pressures and might improve our chances of guiding UN discussion and action. Others point out, however, that there is no guarantee of US influence over the new bargaining on the terms of reference, and there is no veto in the Assembly.

³ Nixon initialed his approval.
⁴ Nixon initialed his approval.
⁵ Nixon initialed his approval.
I recommend that you disapprove this measure. There is too much risk of an undesirable result.
Approve ______. Disapprove ______.6

7. Contribute to a UN training fund for South West African refugees.

The argument for this is that it would cost little and would give substance to UN responsibility for the Territory. It would consist mainly of scholarship aid. (We used to contribute.) The argument against it is that Congress has specifically disapproved of funds for this in recent years. It could conceivably put the UN and USG in the position of educating the leaders of a liberation movement.

I recommend that you disapprove this measure. Even if Congress is amenable to persuasion, we could not revive this in time for it to be useful in the upcoming UN debates.
Approve ______. Disapprove ______.7

I recommend also that we continue present forms of US support for refugee assistance (private US, and other UN programs).
Continue present aid ______.8 Disapprove ______.

8. Support (but do not propose) a Security Council resolution calling on states and the Secretary General to report periodically on their application of the arms embargo against South Africa.

Some argue that this would dramatize the fact that we interpret the embargo strictly. It might deflect African pressures on to others (e.g., UK, France, Italy) who are less strict. On the other hand, this step would probably antagonize these allies on an occasion when cooperation among the Western powers is desirable. In any case, it would not significantly reduce African pressure on the US.

I recommend that you approve this measure with the following qualifications: The US need not oppose such a resolution if others propose it. We should vote for it only if our allies do not object; otherwise, we should abstain. In no case should we actively support such a resolution, or introduce it ourselves.
Approve 8 as is. Approve 8 with qualification ______.9

Disapprove 8 ______.

9. Support UN action by which members would end avoidance-of-double-taxation privilege for investors in South West Africa.

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6 Nixon initialed his approval, crossed it out, and initialed his disapproval.
7 Nixon initialed his approval, crossed it out, and initialed his disapproval.
8 Nixon initialed this option.
9 Nixon initialed “Approve 8 as is.” Kissinger initialed “Approve 8 with qualification” for Nixon. According to an April 16 covering memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, Nixon mistakenly initialed “Approve 8 as is.” Lord asked Kissinger to initial “Approve 8 with qualification.”
10. Support measures to divert corporate tax revenues generated in South West Africa to the UN.

Measures 9–10 are noted here for your information. These would have a significant economic “bite”. No agency favors them at this time; all agree that these require further study because of legal complexities. No Presidential decision is being asked for.

11. Review applicability to the Territory of US treaties with South Africa.

12. Consider suspension of South Africa’s sugar quota.

Measures 11–12 were suggested by State in its written submission of its views (at Tab B). They were not raised in the paper or considered by the Review Group. They, too, would require further study. You do not need to take a position on them now, and I recommend you not do so.

At Tab C is a draft NSDM embodying my own recommendations. Approve as is ______. Modify according to above decisions ______.¹⁰

¹⁰ Nixon initialed “Approve as is” but crossed it out. He circled “At Tab C is a draft NSDM embodying my own recommendations” and wrote “OK.” A stamped notation indicates that he did so on April 16.
32. National Security Decision Memorandum 55


TO
The Vice-President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT
South West Africa

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 89 (South West Africa) and has decided that:

1. Present restrictions on official visits to, military contacts with, and overflights of South West Africa shall remain in effect.

2. The United States will officially discourage investment by U.S. nationals in South West Africa.

3. Export-Import Bank credit guarantees and other facilities shall not be made available for trade with South West Africa.


5. The United States will encourage other nations to take actions similar to the above, but will not exert pressure on them to this end, either in the United Nations or in our bilateral relations.

6. The United States will support, but will not propose, United Nations action to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of aspects of South Africa’s administration of South West Africa.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence, and Director of the U.S. Information Agency. The NSDM was originally issued on April 17.

2 Document 29.

3 When page 1 was revised on May 22, “and other facilities” was added to the sentence.
7. The United States will not seek a recommendation to the General Assembly of revision of the terms of reference of the Council on Namibia or the creation of a new continuing body.

8. If a resolution is introduced into the Security Council requiring member states or the Secretary General to report periodically on application of the arms embargo against South Africa, the United States will not oppose such a resolution. We shall vote for it only if this course is not objected to by our allies; otherwise we shall abstain. In no case will we actively support such a resolution, or introduce one ourselves.

9. The United States will continue all forms of assistance presently being provided on behalf of South West African refugees, but will not seek at the present time to contribute to special funds to which Congress has disapproved contributions.

The President intends that the foregoing decisions be regarded as concerned solely with South West Africa. They are not to be regarded as a precedent for application of similar restrictions and policies to South Africa or the Portuguese Territories.

The President desires that the United States continue to make clear its opposition to mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa or the Portuguese Territories and to any use of force in southern Africa.

The Under Secretaries Committee shall report on the implementation of the above decisions by June 30, 1970.\(^4\)

Henry A. Kissinger

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\(^4\) See Document 33.
33. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Johnson) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Implementation of Decisions on South West Africa (NSDM 55)

On April 17, you provided guidance on our policy toward South West Africa (Tab B).\(^2\) Specific steps you directed include:

— We should officially discourage investment by U.S. nationals.

— Export-Import Bank credit guarantees and other facilities should no longer be made available for trade with South West Africa.

— U.S. nationals who nevertheless invest in South West Africa (on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government since adoption of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145) should not receive U.S. assistance in protection of such investments against claims of a future lawful government.

— We should encourage other nations to take similar actions, but without exerting pressure on them, either in the United Nations or in our bilateral relations.

Actions Taken or Planned

Following are the principal steps taken to implement your guidance:

1. Your decisions in the economic area were announced on May 20 by Ambassador Yost in an address to the United Nations Association in New York and by Assistant Secretary Newsom in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa.

2. Ambassador Phillips stated the U.S. position in accordance with your general guidelines to the Security Council’s subcommittee on South West Africa. In his June 18 statement, the Ambassador issued a general call for governments to discourage trade and investment by their nationals in that territory.

3. Additionally, the new policy was communicated to the subcommittee in our reply on June 30 to a subcommittee questionnaire asking all states for information on their activities and the activities of their nationals and companies in South West Africa.

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2 Tab B, not attached, is printed as Document 32.
4. Posts in Africa and embassies in London, Paris and Lisbon advised their host governments and conveyed our hope that they would take similar action to discourage trade and investment by their nationals and companies in South West Africa. Further approaches are contemplated.

5. Ambassador Phillips also expressed support for the Finnish proposal (still under discussion in the Subcommittee) that the following question be put to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion:

“What are the legal consequences for states, in light of Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia?”

6. The Department of Commerce, the Export-Import Bank, and the Department of State have taken steps to notify the business community (Tab A).³

(To date no resolution has been introduced into the Security Council requiring member states to report on application of the arms embargo against South Africa. Hence the point of your guidance dealing with this aspect has not become applicable. The Under Secretaries Committee is conducting a comprehensive review of the embargo.)

We believe these actions effectively implement and publicize your guidance on trade and investment in South West Africa. The decisions have been carefully noted in South Africa and have had no harmful effects on our relations with that country. They were favorably received at the United Nations and elsewhere. We will be alert to further opportunities for explaining our policy and encouraging parallel action by others.

U. Alexis Johnson

³ Undated, attached but not printed.
34. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
UK Arms for South Africa

PARTICIPANTS
Guy E. Millard, Minister, British Embassy
C. Robert Moore, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Edward J. Alexander, Staff Assistant

Mr. Millard stated that he had been instructed to inform the Department of the new Government’s decision with respect to arms for South Africa. Knowing that this decision could create problems for the US and having in mind Secretary Rogers’ visit to London this weekend HMG wished to give us as much notice as possible.

Conservative spokesmen, Mr. Millard continued, had made clear before and during the recent British election campaign that a Conservative government would resume the sale of arms to South Africa. The decision it has now taken represents a “minimum” move in this direction. It provides that the UK will consider arms requests from South Africa for maritime defense related to the protection of sea lanes and in keeping with Simonstown Agreement of 1955. The latter, Mr. Millard said, requires the UK to provide South Africa with equipment needed for maritime defense. Public announcement of this new policy will be made in the next fortnight or so, but not before the Secretary’s visit.

Mr. Millard reiterated the reasoning behind the new Conservative policy and added that the Soviet naval presence in the Indian ocean and the threat of its increase if the Suez Canal were reopened were also factors in the decision. He said the policy decision was made in full cognizance of the interest of Commonwealth and African countries in the question. He added that Commonwealth Governments including African members, he assumed, and some other friendly governments were being informed of the decision.

Mr. Millard emphasized that the decision in no way diminished his Government’s opposition to apartheid and that there was no question of arms being supplied for the enforcement of apartheid. Whether the public announcement would reiterate this opposition he could not say.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Moore.
Noting that the US Government had recently reaffirmed its arms embargo on South Africa, Mr. Moore asked what items were embraced by the term “maritime defense”. The press, he added had made reference to frigates, reconnaissance aircraft and equipment for anti-submarine warfare as likely items. Mr. Millard replied that he had no specifics and doubted that the public announcement would contain any. The UK, he stressed, is not offering armament or equipment but is only stating its willingness to consider well-defined requests. He observed that when the UN voted its resolution on the South African arms embargo in 1963, the UK had made note of the right of South Africa to self-defense. The new position is more narrowly defined, the criterion being “maritime defense related to the protection of sea lanes.” It was in fact the minimum UK reaction under the circumstances.

Mr. Millard said his government would be interested in any USG reaction to the new UK decision. Mr. Moore said that the subject of arms for South Africa is on the agenda for the Secretary’s talks in London so it will undoubtedly be discussed there. However, he would be in touch with Mr. Millard if we had any earlier comments to make. He observed that certain African countries, particularly Zambia and Tanzania, would probably have strong feelings on this subject, but the British Government, he assumed, had taken their views into consideration.

35. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

London, July 12, 1970, 0930Z.

Secto 96/5481. Uncleared, FYI only. Subject to revision on review.

Subj: Secretary’s Visit: Discussions with Foreign Secretary—Arms to South Africa.

1. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that the UKG was bound to operate the Simonstown Agreement. It had been decided, however, that there would be narrower definition of categories of arms to be supplied by the UK to South Africa. The definition would be “arms for protection of sea routes”.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 S AFR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated Priority to Pretoria and repeated to USUN. Rogers was in the United Kingdom to meet with Prime Minister Heath and Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home.
2. Sir Alec reviewed the British assessment of the strategic situation. He noted the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and that the Soviets were active in Aden and in Somalia. The Communist Chinese were involved in construction of a naval base for Tanzania. Given these activities in the area, it was the British view that Simonstown could play an important part in the strategic picture. The UKG had therefore decided that it must carry through the implementation of the Simonstown Agreement. He recognized that there would be “squeals” from African countries and probably difficulties in the UN; nevertheless, the UK was determined to proceed.

3. In response to the Secretary’s question, Sir Alec said that HMG was in the process of consulting the Commonwealth. He hoped that none of the governments concerned would leave the Commonwealth, although some were unpredictable, as for example Ceylon under the leadership of Mrs. Bandaranaike. He noted that there might be a particular problem with Kaunda.

4. Sir Alec stated that British arms policy with respect to Portugal would not be changed.

5. The Secretary responded that the UK decision would cause problems for the United States. He noted that our relations with black African states were probably better than they had been for some time.

6. Sir Alec expressed the hope that the US could say that it understood the UK decision and the reasons for it.

7. The Secretary suggested that there be close consultation and said that we would try to work out something mutually acceptable. In response to his question, Sir Alec said that the British Government would be making an announcement of its policy about July 20. It was agreed that there would be consultation in advance on the announcement to be made by the UK and on a statement the US would then make.

8. Department repeat other posts as desired.

Rogers
36. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, July 22, 1970, 2316Z.

117924. Subj: U.S. Reaction to U.K. Arms Sales to South Africa. Ref: State 116834.2

1. Dept Press Spokesman, in answer standing press inquiries, repeated verbatim statement ref tel at noon briefing July 22.

2. In response press questions after statement, spokesman gave replies summarized below:

   A. Although we informed by UKG in advance, we were not requested associate USG with this proposed UK policy. However U.S. in fact disassociating itself from British move.

   B. Reference in statement to increase in flow of arms includes any increase whatsoever, even in arms solely for defense sea lanes.

   C. U.S. is interested in freedom of seas and passage, and understands UK interest in Cape sea routes, but is not able associate with measure resulting in increased arms flow to South Africa.

   D. Statement is better described as our own policy and attitude than as criticism British policy.

   E. Our position on resolution on South African arms embargo pending before UNSC still under discussion.

   F. No comment on similarity U.S. and Black African Governments positions, or on similarity Wilson government disassociation in 1968 from U.S. bombing Hanoi.

   G. Statement constitutes reaffirmation our stand on arms embargo; it not intended weaken position we have held since 1963.

   H. Statement means both that we cannot endorse proposed British action, and that we will not take same action.

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2 In telegram 116834 to London, July 21, the Department transmitted a statement to be delivered July 22, at the noon press briefing, on the U.S. reaction to U.K. arms sales to South Africa. (Ibid.)
Regional Issues 105

I. One aspect of U.S. interest this question stems from U.N. resolution of 1963.3

End

Rogers

3 Security Council Resolution 181, adopted August 7, 1963, called on member states to “cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa.” (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, p. 20)

37. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1


SUBJECT
Rhodesian Sanctions

In NSDM 47 (Tab 4)2 you ordered the closing of our Salisbury Consulate, and directed a review of our sanctions against Rhodesia. You expressed interest in minimizing hardships to U.S. firms acting in good faith, particularly chrome importers, while at the same time meeting our obligations under the UN Resolutions.

At Tab 1 is a memorandum from the Secretary of State regarding this matter. At Tab 2 is an exhaustive report on this problem from the Under Secretaries Committee. At Tab 3 is a memorandum to you from the Secretary of Commerce taking issue with the Secretary of State’s recommendations.3

The options presented in the Under Secretaries Report go beyond your instruction. They range from no revision at all of our current regulations, to revisions which would, in effect, break the embargo and put us in violation of the UN Security Council Resolutions.4 Neither of these extremes is consistent with your instruction. This memorandum,

2 Tab 4 is printed as Document 28.
3 Tabs 1, 2, and 3 are attached but not printed.
4 See footnote 5, Document 8.
therefore, addresses itself primarily to steps that we might take without reneging on our international commitments.

However, I should call to your attention that the Secretary of State recommends that there be no change whatsoever in our current implementation of the embargo. Secretary Rogers argues that we are legally bound to the letter of the UN Resolution (which makes no provision for relief in hardship cases). He further argues that any relaxation at all of our present procedures would “seriously undermine the genuine good will toward your administration . . . of many black African leaders.” Finally, the Secretary asserts that any change in our procedures might lead to a general collapse of the embargo, and our being charged with the responsibility therefor. The Secretary therefore recommends to you that we make a more vigorous effort in the United Nations to ensure compliance by other countries with the embargo and, pending the result of those efforts, adhere strictly to our present procedures. This, of course, means that we would go in a direction directly opposite to the one decided at the NSC meeting.  

Secretary Stans, on the other hand, is frankly opposed to the embargo on chrome imports from Rhodesia. He argues that it leaves us excessively dependent on the USSR for chrome, and enables the Soviets to manipulate prices to the disadvantage of U.S. purchasers. Although not pressing at this time for open abrogation of the embargo, he states that the approval of import licenses to both Union Carbide and Foote Mineral are “necessary to relieve our dependence on the Soviet Union for the long term availability of” chrome. In the Carbide case, the money was paid before our embargo went into effect, and with full knowledge of it. A license for Foote would be hard to portray as anything but an open violation of the embargo. In addition, Secretary Stans’ arguments lose some of their force from the following facts: (1) even before the embargo, we were buying as much chrome from Russia as from Rhodesia, (2) the Foote import would cover less than 7 percent of one year’s U.S. needs. It would therefore hardly affect our dependence on the USSR for about half of our current chrome needs and would have no effect on the “long term” situation.

I do not agree with either Secretary’s views. Neither does Treasury or Defense. This is an extremely complex and multi-faceted issue, but what follows is an earnest attempt to reduce it to the minimal essentials which you should know before making a decision.

1. The Legal Situation

State and Justice disagree. State argues that our compliance with the letter of the Security Council Resolutions is mandatory and permits

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5 See Documents 20 and 23.
of no discretion in its implementation. State also argues that the intervening three years of enforcement have wiped out whatever justification there might have been for hardship exceptions in the early stages of the embargo.

This matter was personally reviewed by the Attorney General and Mr. Kleindienst who find the State Department’s legal argument without merit. Mr. Kleindienst points out that the White House announcement of the Rhodesia sanctions said that “provision will be made...to deal with cases of undue hardship arising from transactions commenced before the date of the order.” Mr. Kleindienst further points out that the Executive Order itself authorized the issuance of import licenses, and that this authorization would hardly have been granted if it had been the intent to permit no exceptions to the embargo. Finally, Mr. Kleindienst points out that licenses have been issued in hardship cases and that no protest was received from the United Nations or any member countries because they understood, as a practical matter, that the implementation of the Security Council Resolution would necessarily involve some hardship exceptions. Justice holds the State argument on timing to be irrelevant in the case of Union Carbide, which has been pending since the embargo went into effect.

2. Security Aspects

An adequate supply of chromite ore is a strategic necessity. However, as of now, our supplies are adequate. All agencies are agreed on that fact.

Our current consumption needs are met by imports from Russia, Turkey and South Africa, and sales from the surplus in our chromite stockpile. Should the USSR cut off sales to us of chromite ore or if Rhodesian ore were to continue to be unavailable for a number of years, we might eventually experience a shortage. There is, however, no indication whatever that the Soviet Union is contemplating such a move; and adjustments to the long-range effect of the Rhodesian embargo is something that can be faced, if and when it becomes a problem. We should, however, keep a continuing watch on the chromite supply situation.

3. Economic Aspects

The sanctions have helped our tobacco industry by enabling us to replace Rhodesian exports to the UK. However the Rhodesian sanctions do put an economic burden on US chrome purchasers. Chrome prices have risen sharply since 1966. The USSR (a major source of our chromite both before and after sanctions) has been able to tie the purchase of lower grade ore to the high grade ore we require. Finally, US and UK firms are disadvantaged by the fact that France, Italy, West Germany, Switzerland and Japan are less careful than we in scruti-
nizing nominally non-Rhodesian chrome imports. Secretary Rogers’ proposal for a more vigorous effort with the UK to insure compliance by other industrial countries with the embargo is intended to reduce this disadvantage to American companies.

Existing tax laws provide relief for US firms affected by the Rhodesian sanctions. We should however ensure that these firms are fully informed of these relief provisions.

4. Foreign Policy Aspects

Your administration is fully committed to the embargo on imports from Rhodesia. Your message to Congress of February 186 stated bluntly our opposition to the racial policies of the white-ruled regimes; and our policy statement on Africa of March 267 unqualifiedly pledged our continuing support for the economic sanctions. Moreover, your decision set forth in NSDM 47 plainly indicated your determination to meet our obligations under the Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia, for which we have voted three times.

5. Who is Being Hurt?

The actual issue for decision, therefore, is not whether to adhere to the embargo but rather what relief can be given within the terms of the embargo to those firms which claim undue hardship. These cases fall into two categories:

(a) Union Carbide. Carbide claims to have paid for 150,000 tons of chrome ore after the Security Council Resolution but before the first Executive Order was issued prohibiting the Rhodesian imports.8 The White House announcement of the Executive Order imposing the embargo stated that provision would be made for “cases of undue hardship arising from transactions commenced before the date” of the Executive Order. The Carbide case seems to fit squarely in that category. Moreover, the Treasury Department announced in March of 1967 that licenses for import would in general be issued where payment had been made prior to January 5, 1967. Again, the Union Carbide case fits.

Carbide is the only case of a US firm which paid for but failed to export Rhodesian commodities prior to the effective date of the Executive Order. Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and OEP feel that an ex-

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6 Reference is to the President’s “First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s.” For Nixon’s remarks regarding racial policies of the white minority regimes, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 158–159.
7 For the text of the Department’s position on economic sanctions, see the Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1970, p. 520.
8 Executive Order 11322, January 5, 1967.
ception for Union Carbide should be granted, and would be consistent with our international obligations. State disagrees.

(b) Sale of American Owned Assets in Rhodesia. Some American firms, including Foote Mineral and Universal Leaf Tobacco, have said that if they are unable to import Rhodesian commodities owned by their Rhodesian subsidiaries, they would like to sell their Rhodesian assets. At the present time, our regulations make such sales difficult. The UN Security Council Resolution, however, does not explicitly prohibit the sale of assets. We could, therefore, merely by reinterpreting our own regulations, permit the sale of American owned Rhodesian assets. Treasury, Commerce and OEP favor such action. State opposes it, on the grounds that the UN Resolutions implicitly prohibit such sales.

6. Political Pressure Aspects

Mr. L.G. Bliss of Foote Mineral has been very active in opposing the embargo of imports from Rhodesia. He has asked for a chrome import license under circumstances which would constitute a clear violation of the Security Council Resolutions and the existing Executive Orders. He has told OEP that if he is not given the license he will attempt to prevent Congressional approval of further sales from our chrome stockpile.

I find it difficult to believe that Mr. Bliss will deliver on his threat. First, the effect of his action would be to increase the already high price of chrome, a subject upon which Mr. Bliss is already considerably exercised. Second, OEP believes the two major firms in the chrome producing field, Union Carbide and AIRCO, can be persuaded to oppose Mr. Bliss's move. This should be particularly true if you grant the recommended approval of a hardship exception for Union Carbide. Third, if you approve the recommended sale of American owned assets in Rhodesia, this will open an avenue of relief to Mr. Bliss, which may dissuade him from pushing his application for an import license to such extremes. OEP believes Mr. Bliss might be able to deliver on his threat this session, but agrees that he would find it difficult to do so if you approve the recommendations regarding Carbide and the sale of U.S. assets in Rhodesia.

In any event, the granting of an import license to Foote Mineral would, as stated above, be a clear violation of the Security Council Resolution, and would involve foreign policy costs which transcend the cost involved in a Congressional refusal to sanction additional sales from the chromite stockpile surplus. (Of the $750 million you hope to realize from FY '71 stockpile sales, OEP plans to get $30 million from chrome sales.)

The facts of the Foote application are as follows: Foote sent money into Rhodesia after the date of the first Executive Order prohibiting
imports, and with the full knowledge that no ore produced as a result could be licensed for import to the United States. The ostensible purpose of the transaction at the time was to prevent the flooding of a Foote-owned mine in Rhodesia. State and Treasury oppose the granting of a license to Foote. Commerce favors granting the license. OEP defers to State and Treasury on the question of legality, but is worried about Bliss’s threat to its plans to sell chromite from the stockpile.

Corning Glass previously had a troublesome problem stemming from its reliance on an ore available only from Rhodesia. However, a domestic substitute has been developed and Corning’s problem is resolved. There are applications from Metallurg to import chrome, from Dibrell to import tobacco and from American Asbestos to import high grade asbestos. None of these firms, however, have paid any money, and they do not, therefore, fall within the hardship category. Asbestos has alternative sources of supply. Granting import licenses to any of these firms would clearly be a violation of the Security Council Resolutions and would be inconsistent with existing Executive Orders.

**Summation**

If the facts are as presented by Union Carbide, this seems a clear case of “undue hardship”. Their purchase of chromite ore in Rhodesia was legal at the time the funds were transferred. The granting of a license to Carbide would be consistent with current U.S. regulations, and although it might be subjected to criticism, it could not fairly be characterized as a break in the U.S. implementation of the embargo. I believe a license should be granted to Union Carbide.

In view of your desire to avoid undue hardship on American firms, I see no reason why we should, in our implementation of the sanctions, go beyond the steps required by the Security Council Resolution. I therefore think we should permit the sale of American owned assets in Rhodesia.

To be blunt about it, the Foote Mineral application to import chromite ore is an exercise in embargo busting. The grant of a license to Foote could not plausibly be defended as anything other than a fundamental change in the U.S. embargo of Rhodesian imports and a U.S. refusal to comply with the Security Council Resolutions. Moreover, if you approve the sale of American owned assets in Rhodesia, this will open to Foote Mineral an avenue of relief.

I am also attracted to Secretary Rogers’ suggestion that we attempt to lessen the competitive disadvantages of U.S. firms by tightening the enforcement of the embargo by the other major industrial nations.
Regional Issues

Recommendations:⁹

1. That you approve, contingent upon the confirmation by Treasury that the facts are as stated by Union Carbide, the issuance to Carbide of a license to import 150,000 tons of chromite ore from Rhodesia.
2. That you approve licenses for U.S. firms to sell their assets in Rhodesia to any buyer.
3. That you approve a more active U.S. effort—in concert with the U.K.—to ensure better compliance by other industrial nations in the UN embargo on Rhodesian chrome.
4. That you approve the continuing refusal of licenses to import Rhodesian goods from any firm which entered into a transaction after the effective date of the Executive Order prohibiting such imports.
5. That you direct the Under Secretaries Committee to review periodically the supply situation on chrome, and call to your attention any change which threatens our strategic needs for this commodity.
6. That you direct Treasury to ensure that U.S. firms affected by sanctions or Rhodesian currency restrictions are aware of all tax relief provisions available to them under existing laws and regulations.

⁹ Nixon approved recommendations 1–6 on July 31.

38. Telegram From the Department of State to All African Diplomatic Posts Except Cape Town and Pretoria¹

Washington, July 24, 1970, 0045Z.

118846. Subject: Arms Sales to South Africa and the Security Council. Ref: State 116834 and 117924.²

1. Action addressees are requested to seek early appointment with Fonoff to explain reasons for US abstention on July 23 SC resolution on


² For telegram 116834, see footnote 2, Document 36. Telegram 117924 is printed as Document 36.
arms sales to South Africa. Resolution carried by 12 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions (US, UK, France). Text by septel.

2. In their démarches, addressees should emphasize to host governments the positive aspects of US policy and stance re South Africa. USG wholeheartedly condemns apartheid and would have wished to join majority in voting for resolution had it not contained special problems described below. Addressees should make clear US abstention in no way implies change in US position with respect to apartheid or connotes any weakening in our support of existing UN resolutions on arms sales to South Africa. US regrets that it placed in a position where we had to abstain. We have carried out provisions of the existing resolutions strictly and conscientiously and would not wish the distinction between our embargo policies and those of others to be obscured.

3. As US statement in Security Council (sent wireless file) indicated, our own embargo was reaffirmed by the Administration in March this year and Secretary Rogers noted this reaffirmation as late as July 11 during his London visit. Quotation from US statement apropos here. Quote And an official spokesman of Department of State only yesterday reaffirmed that the US supports the Council’s resolution on the sale of arms to South Africa and indicated that our government would not be able to associate itself with any measures which might result in an increase in the flow of arms to South Africa. Unquote.

4. Referring to statements by preceding speakers about military equipment we have supplied to South Africa over past few years, US representative said deliveries currently being made consist entirely of spare parts and stem from contracts entered into prior to effective date of US embargo, i.e., December 31, 1963. Deliveries of major items of military equipment under these contracts have long since been completed. However, it is basic tenet of US trade policy that valid contracts, such as those for supply of spare parts, should be honored.

5. US would not go so far as to characterize situation in South Africa as potential threat to international peace and security. In our view, such characterization goes beyond facts of situation and, therefore, would be inappropriate. In particular, proposals contained in operative

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3 For Buffum’s statement and the text of Resolution 282, see Department of State Bulletin, August 17, 1970, pp. 203–205. Telegram 127112 to Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, and Bujumbura, August 6, provided specific reasons for the U.S. abstention on the arms embargo resolution. One cause for concern was that the resolution went well beyond the sale of military equipment to a general embargo on sales to the South African Defense Forces, hampering the U.S. Government’s ability to honor pre-embargo contracts to supply non-lethal spare parts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 S AFR) See also Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970, pp. 120–124.

4 Telegram 1548 from USUN, July 23, transmitted the text of Resolution 282. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 S AFR)
paragraph 4 of resolution would divide the Council, fail to fulfill their intended purpose and thus operate to detriment both of people of South Africa and of UN. Would have been better to concentrate on reaffirmation of SC’s past resolutions on arms to South Africa and to seek more effective implementation of these.

6. Dept is eager to ensure that there is no misunderstanding of our abstention on this resolution. Addressees should express US hope that host governments will appreciate reasons for abstention and of importance we attach to a continuing dialogue with host government, in the capital and in New York, on ways in which our countries can cooperate to advance the objectives of UN Charter with respect to South Africa.

End

Rogers

39. National Security Decision Memorandum 75


TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

Rhodesia Sanctions

After a review of this matter, the President has decided to continue fully to implement the UN Security Council Resolutions regarding trade with Rhodesia. The President has therefore directed that the United States Government continue to refuse to license import of Rhodesian goods by any firm which entered into a transaction after the effective date of the Executive Order prohibiting such imports. The Presi-
dent has also directed that the Department of State initiate forthwith an active effort—in concert with the United Kingdom—to insure better compliance by other industrial nations with the Rhodesian embargo. In this regard, the President wishes that particular attention be paid to more careful scrutiny of nominally non-Rhodesian chrome imports.

In the interest of reducing undue hardship on American firms arising from our implementation of the embargo, the President has decided that:

1. Contingent upon confirmation by the Treasury Department that the facts are as stated by Union Carbide, a “hardship exception” license should be granted to Union Carbide for the importation of the 150,000 tons of Rhodesian chromite ore for which it had paid prior to the effective date of the Executive Order prohibiting such imports.

2. U.S. firms with assets in Rhodesia will be permitted to sell those assets to any buyer.

3. The Treasury Department will insure that all U.S. firms affected by the Rhodesian sanctions or by Rhodesian currency restrictions are aware of all tax relief provisions available to them under existing United States laws and regulations.

The Under Secretaries Committee will periodically review the domestic and international supply situation on chrome, and call forthwith to the President’s attention any change which threatens our strategic needs for this commodity. For this purpose, representatives of the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness shall be members of the Committee.

Henry A. Kissinger
40. National Security Decision Memorandum 81

Washington, August 17, 1970.

TO
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT
Implementation of Arms Embargo on South Africa and Portuguese African Territories

After a review of the implementation of the arms embargo relating to South Africa and the Portuguese African territories, the President has directed that the United States will continue to adhere to the pertinent 1963 Security Council Resolutions and will, on appropriate occasions, affirm its intention so to do.

The President is concerned with the delays that have attended the handling of applications for “gray area” export licenses. The President has therefore directed that such applications in future will be handled as follows:

1. Non-lethal dual-use items which are preponderantly employed for civilian use will be licensed to either civilian or military buyers. Such items will generally not be manufactured to military specifications, and will not have any direct and clear application in combat, or to internal security operations. Items on our “Munitions List” are automatically excluded from this category.

2. Non-lethal dual-use items which are preponderantly used by military forces, but which do not have a clear and direct application to combat or to internal security operations, will be licensed for sale to civilian purchasers for civilian use, and may be licensed to military buyers upon the recommendation of the Department of Commerce and

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2 In an August 10 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger summarized the review of the implementation of the arms embargo and offered a series of recommendations which served as the basis for NSDM 81. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 291, Memoranda to the President, July–August 1970)
with the concurrence of the Department of State. Such items will generally be built to military specifications.

3. Whether preponderantly employed for civilian or military use, dual-use items with a clear and direct application to combat or to internal security operations (including aircraft suitable for troop transport), will not be licensed to military buyers. Such items may be licensed for sale to civilian purchasers for civilian use, only upon the recommendation of the Department of Commerce and with the concurrence of the Department of State.

In accordance with the above guidelines, the President has directed that:

1. Licenses be issued for the sale of Lear jets to the South African Defense Forces.

2. Licenses be issued for the sale of Cessna dual-engine 401s and 402s to the South African Defense Forces.

3. Licenses will not be issued for the sale of Cessna single-engine 180/185s to the South African Defense Forces.

4. Licenses will not be issued for the sale of Lockheed Orion P–3Cs to the South African Defense Forces.

5. Licenses will not be issued for the sale of L–100 transport aircraft to the South African Defense Forces.

The President wishes special care taken to avoid these decisions being related to the current consideration being given by the Government of the United Kingdom to the sale of maritime defense equipment to South Africa. The President has therefore directed that the security classification of this document be scrupulously observed. The President has also directed that his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee together determine and agree upon the procedures for informing members of Congress, interested American companies, and the South African and Portuguese governments of the decisions reflected herein.

Henry A. Kissinger
41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom\(^1\)

Washington, September 10, 1970, 2349Z.

148716. Subject: Rhodesia. Ref.: CA 4706, September 4, 1970 (Notal).\(^2\)

1. During discussions with HMG concerning NSC decisions on Rhodesian sanctions,\(^3\) Embassy requested touch on separate subject possible future Anglo-Rhodesian talks to find acceptable solution present impasse. Embassy may draw on following points in making its presentation.

2. Rhodesia is clearly British problem and responsibility. We also recognize there many roadblocks in way of reaching acceptable accord with Salisbury. But as we have been and are involved with the problem, we would like to share with HMG some reflections on possible British initiatives this area:

3. As none of Rhodesia’s neighbors appears to feel comfortable with present situation, might there be virtue in HMG seeking their views (principally in Lisbon, Lusaka and Pretoria) before entering again into direct negotiations with Smith with the attendant full glare of public attention and African criticism. While Zambians and South Africans might not find it possible publicly to acclaim an acceptable compromise settlement, privately they and the Portuguese might have suggestions on ways to move the issue off dead center toward solution with which they could live. *(FYI. We are not optimistic that another direct approach to Salisbury will be any more productive than the earlier “Tiger” or “Fearless” negotiations unless other affected players can be brought into act in some meaningful and constructive way. We also concerned that should new talks fail, HMG might tend to ease sanctions enforcement, leaving difficult choices to USG. \(End\ FYI.\)*)

   a. Although we have no way gauging probable Portuguese reaction, it occurs to us HMG reviewing future of Beira patrol and in view indications of Portuguese interest and involvement in European developments (British entry Common Market and Portuguese aspirations in

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT 11–2 RHOD. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bruce; cleared in draft in AF/E and IO/UNP; cleared in AF/S, EUR/SPP, and EUR/BMI; and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Lisbon, Lusaka, Pretoria, Cape Town, and USUN.

\(^2\) In Airgram CA–4706 to London, September 4, the Department instructed the Embassy to explain decisions to grant the hardship exception for Union Carbide and to allow the sale of Rhodesian assets before advancing proposals to make sanctions more effective. (Ibid.)

\(^3\) Document 39.
Europe) Lisbon might be receptive to invitation from HMG offer helpful suggestions.

b. It also seems to us that both Zambians and South Africans—Zambia because it feels its security threatened and South Africa for reasons related to its “outward” foreign policy objectives—would be happy to see end to present abnormal and unsettling situation in Rhodesia.

4. Embassy should make clear we are not rpt not making formal proposal for action, but only sharing thoughts and suggesting ideas for UK consideration. Team which will be visiting London to discuss our suggestions on ways to increase effectiveness of sanctions, would be interested in British reaction to these other thoughts on how to resolve the Rhodesian problem, as well as any info HMG might wish to share with USG on timing of new talks with Salisbury.

End.

Rogers

42. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)¹

Washington, November 18, 1970.

Dear Dave:

For some time there has been a need to clarify certain aspects of United States relations with the South African military establishment. How to deal with South African requests for unclassified training films and military correspondence courses and with the question of high-ranking military visits has been a nagging problem for both our Departments for several years.

None of these issues was definitively dealt with in recent southern Africa studies submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) or the subsequent White House policy directives,² but I believe we now have a framework for the determination of policy in these matters.


² For study and decision memoranda regarding U.S. relations with the South African military establishment, see Documents 6, 23, and 40. A paper prepared in response is printed as Document 17.
Therefore, I am proposing a set of guidelines, a copy of which is enclosed, for handling these questions. I hope these can become agreed State/Defense policy. Assuming both Departments reach agreement on the guidelines, I propose we then inform the NSC of our action.

With all best wishes,
Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson

Enclosure

**Guidelines for Relations with South African Military Establishment**

**A. Training Films**

The South African Defense Force may buy from the General Services Administration (GSA) National Audiovisual Center (NAC) unclassified films of DOD origin which are not combat or security related. As some of the 3,000-odd DOD films currently available for GSA sale are combat related, representatives of DOD and State will review the NAC catalog and make up a list of films which may be purchased by the SADF. Defense and State representatives will meet from time to time to review the titles of new acquisitions of the Center in order to keep the approved list current.

Direct DOD sale of such films to SADF is not possible as South Africa has been dropped from the FMS eligibility list.

**B. Military Correspondence Courses**

There may be limited South African participation in a US military correspondence course if the course:

1. is unclassified;
2. has no application to the exercise of internal security, or the enforcement of apartheid;
3. is not significantly related to combat or to training in combat operations; (Courses in economics, management, law, safety and health are illustrative of subject matter that may be considered.)
4. involves no award of a diploma or other public sign of South African participation.

The program will be monitored and applications approved through consultations among DOD/ISA and PM and AF in State with a view to assuring reciprocal advantage to the US and maintaining low visibility. Initiative will be left to the South Africans; course announce-

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3 Johnson signed “Alex” above his typed signature.
ments, which in effect are invitations to apply, will not be distributed to them. Upon South African inquiry about courses in a particular field, information on the availability of qualified courses in that field may be provided.

Approvals of applications for an individual to participate will be held to 12 a year unless special circumstances justify a larger number as in the US interest and involving no significant political disadvantages. There will be full field coordination through the Embassy in Pretoria.

The release of any courses now ready for delivery but held by our attachés in South Africa will be decided on the same basis.

C. Visits and Participation in Military-Sponsored Courses and Conferences

1. As a general rule, official visits on any level will not be encouraged and high-level official visits, e.g. Brigadier General, etc., will not be approved in either direction.

2. Participation of South African officers of any level in military courses or conferences in the US will not normally be approved when the sponsor is a branch of the USG.

3. Exceptions can be made in special circumstances, e.g. where the visit or participation in a course or conference (a) would not be conspicuous; (b) would not contribute directly to South Africa’s military capacity and (c) would offer some special advantage in the pursuit of US objectives.

4. Decisions in such cases will be taken by the Departments of State and Defense jointly, and field control will be exercised by the American Embassy in Pretoria. Similarly, State, Defense and the Embassy will try to discourage nonofficial travel by high-ranking military personnel between the two countries if it appears that such travel would cause us serious foreign policy problems.
43. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia**

Washington, January 21, 1971, 2200Z.

11057. 1. Please pass the following message from the President to President Kaunda.

2. Quote: Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter of November 16.\(^2\) I was pleased to receive your views and appreciated the candid and cooperative spirit in which you expressed them.

We share your concern regarding the racial problems in the southern part of Africa. Racial issues are among the most important facing the world today. Our own unalterable opposition to apartheid and racial injustice wherever it may occur, and our support of the right to self-determination, are abundantly clear. The United States will not cease to work for the attainment of the principles of human justice and equality until these goals have been achieved.

In our continuing consideration of these problems, I welcome the thoughtful views on the Indian Ocean and southern Africa which you have expressed in your letter and on other occasions. They will receive our careful attention. As you suggest, the general security of the Indian Ocean area is a matter of concern to many nations. The policy which each nation adopts is understandably based on its assessment of its own national interests. The United States would be concerned at any dominance of the area which would restrict the free passage of ships and flow of commerce so essential to all nations.

Your wide-ranging responsibilities as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Conference give you a special interest in the views of other governments on various world issues. Ambassador Troxel will continue to be kept fully apprised of our views on all major issues and is ready to discuss them with you from time to time as may be convenient.

I look forward to a continuing close and friendly association with Zambia.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

Unquote

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 S AFR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Coote on December 12, 1970, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Curran. The text was initially received from the White House.

2 In his November 16, 1970, letter to Nixon, Kaunda expressed concerns about southern Africa and U.S. involvement in the region. (Ibid., POL 15–1 ZAMBIA)
44. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

International Court of Justice Proceedings on Namibia

The Secretary has authorized the Legal Adviser to make a statement on behalf of the United States in the oral proceedings in the Namibia Case, which will begin on February 8.² Several other States, Finland, India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of Viet-Nam and South Africa have informed the Court that they intend to participate. In addition, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity have appointed representatives to make statements in the Case. No date is yet fixed for the U.S. statement, although the Court has decided to proceed in English alphabetical order of states participating.

We intend to deal in the United States statement with five issues which were developed by the written pleadings.

Jurisdiction. South Africa argues that the request for the advisory opinion is not properly before the Court because two Permanent Members of the Security Council abstained on the resolution requesting the opinion.³ The consistent practice of the Security Council has been to regard as adopted resolutions which receive the required number of affirmative votes despite the voluntary abstention of one or more of the Permanent Members of the Council. We will argue that the abstentions of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. do not affect the validity of the relevant resolution.

Discretion. Under its Statute the Court is not required to give an advisory opinion even though it has jurisdiction to do so. We shall argue that it should give an opinion in this case since failure to do so would be inconsistent with its prior jurisprudence relating to the exercise of discretion in advisory cases.

General Assembly Resolution 2145. This is the 1966 resolution which terminated South Africa’s rights under the Mandate. The United States

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Dalton and cleared in L, AF, and IO.
voted for that resolution. Several states challenged its validity in their written statements. We shall argue that the resolution was valid.

*Security Council Resolutions and Their Effects.* General Assembly Resolution 2145 was followed by a series of Security Council resolutions. It has been argued that some of those resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter and thus bind states. We will deny that the Security Council acted under Chapter VII. We shall also discuss the effects of those resolutions. In that regard we shall argue against a submission by another participant which, if accepted, would affect private rights, including the right to pass title to goods in or from Namibia.

*De Novo Examination of the Facts.* The South African written statement argues that the General Assembly did not properly apply its mind to the facts relating to the administration of Namibia. The statement contains considerable additional information on current conditions there and offers to supply still further information. We would oppose de novo examination of the facts.

We plan to draw heavily in our argumentation on the written statement submitted earlier by the United States to the Court.

When we have an agreed draft of our oral statement, we will send a copy to you.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

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45. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) and the Department of State Legal Adviser (Stevenson) to Secretary of State Rogers**


**SUBJECT**

Efforts to Induce American Companies Operating in South Africa to Improve Conditions of Employment of Non-Whites—Information Memorandum

American firms doing business in South Africa are coming under increasing criticism from U.S. domestic and black African opinion, inter alia on the grounds that their presence in the Republic gives moral

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, LAB 10 S AFR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Keiter on February 13 and cleared in AF/S, L/AF, and AF.
support to the unpalatable racial policies of the South African Government. We believe that by bettering the conditions of employment of non-whites in their South African plants, American businesses can quietly demonstrate to the contrary that in one important way they are helping to improve social conditions in the Republic in line with the non-discriminatory objectives they support at home.

Over the past year we have developed a number of suggestions that American firms might consider in examining ways to improve their employment, wage and benefit arrangements for non-white South African employees and more generally to support improvements in the situation of all non-white South Africans. We have considered personnel policies followed in the US, the practices of South African, American and other firms in South Africa, and the pertinent South African legislation. We have also discussed the problem with a few selected private individuals, such as William Beatty, a Vice President of Chase Manhattan, George Lindsay of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, Tom Wyman of Polaroid, and Professor John Dugard of the University of the Witwatersrand.

We have found that as a general rule American companies are not in the forefront as regards personnel practices, some falling below common standards, and that there is considerable room for improvements which are legally acceptable and, at least in many cases, economically supportable. Our soundings have indicated that the home offices of many of the more than 300 US firms involved in South Africa are ignorant of the realities of the situation there, and we have good evidence that they would welcome additional information and ideas.

It is clear that ordinarily any changes in the employment and other personnel practices of American firms in South Africa must be initiated by their headquarters in the U.S. With rare exceptions managers of American affiliates in South Africa, whether of American, South African or other nationality, are not prepared to act on such matters without explicit guidance from their home offices.

Although a moral issue of worldwide concern is involved, we believe we can best approach American companies on this problem quietly, and from the viewpoint of the firm’s self-interest, as seen within South Africa, in the rest of Africa, and in the United States. In light of the increasing importance to U.S. business interests of significant labor, civil rights, and consumer groups in the U.S., enlightened self-interest necessarily includes what management, consumers, and stockholders of American business accept as consistent with the principle of racial equality. At the present time, any action we or the companies take should avoid the impression of a concerted attack on the racial system as such, for that could stimulate strong South African reaction and damage U.S. business interests.
While some of the business representatives with whom we have talked would like the State Department to take the lead in this matter, we consider it essential for American companies to be out in front. Some, particularly Polaroid, are already there. Others, such as Morgan Guaranty, which has quietly stopped lending to any South African entities (Chase International never has) and will consider loans only to American firms for trade purposes, are limiting their ties to South Africa. Still others, as exemplified by inquiries we have had from Dupont and AMAX, and by the interest a number of firms have shown in the Polaroid program, are worried about the South African situation and looking for an appropriate course of action.

Attached is a paper outlining some of the constructive personnel policies which can be adopted within the present South African legal framework.²

We propose to continue our soundings and to work quietly with a few key individuals in businesses, banks and the legal profession, raising the kinds of questions discussed in the attached paper and seeking to encourage further inquiry and trial efforts in the area.

We do not at this time plan or propose any formal US Government action in this area. Should this seem desirable after our soundings, we will seek your formal approval.

² The attachment, “Apartheid and U.S. Firms in South Africa,” provides an overview of the problems faced by American companies and their subsidiaries operating in South Africa, and offers suggestions for improving the lives and working conditions of non-whites without drawing undue attention from the South African Government.
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S PLEBISCITE OFFER

South Africa offered on January 27, 1971, to join the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in conducting a plebiscite to let the inhabitants of South-West Africa (renamed “Namibia” by the United Nations) register a choice between South African and UN rule. The offer is an interesting example of political calculation, tailored to appeal to what South Africa sees as responsible world opinion, and intended to undermine the UN’s position on South-West. We discuss below some of the offer’s implications and the possible outcome of a plebiscite if one were held.

South Africa Versus UN. The issue of South-West Africa has been a primary and perennial concern of the UN since the establishment of the world body. In 1966 the General Assembly decided, by Resolution 2145, that South Africa had forfeited its right to administer South-West under its 1920 League of Nations mandate, and that the territory was thenceforth a direct responsibility of the UN as the League’s successor. South Africa claimed that Resolution 2145 was illegal, and has pertinaciously asserted that its stewardship of the territory is both legal and in the best interests of the inhabitants. The matter is at an impasse, leaving South Africa with the advantage because it exerts de facto control over South-West, and because effective UN measures to oust it are not in prospect.

Terms of the Offer. South Africa made its plebiscite offer in connection with current deliberations at The Hague on a UN request for an ICJ advisory opinion on the “legal consequences for states” of South Africa’s continued presence in South-West. The South Africans framed their offer in these terms: the basis of Resolution 2145 was that South Africa had failed to fulfill its obligations under the mandate. However (according to South Africa) the allegations on which the resolution relied are not proved, and the UN still “uncritically” accepts that South African practices and policies in the territory oppress the inhabitants and deny them the right of self-determination. To refute such allegations, South Africa will seek to put them to “the most fundamental test of all: that of the express will of the inhabitants... by way of a plebiscite
... to determine whether it is the wish of the inhabitants that the territory should continue to be administered by the South African government or should henceforth be administered by the United Nations”. South Africa and the ICJ would jointly supervise the plebiscite.

Undermining Resolution 2145. The question presented to the court for an advisory opinion was carefully framed to assume the validity of Resolution 2145; most participants agree, nevertheless, that the court may examine this question. South Africa is trying to use this non-binding proceeding to call into question the competence of the General Assembly to pass such a resolution, the validity of the resolution itself, and, further, to reopen and argue the allegations of fact on which Resolution 2145 was “uncritically” based.

Minimum Risk for South Africa. While South Africa is implying that a plebiscite would be an exercise in self-determination, it has not committed itself to act in accordance with the results of the vote. South Africa is also limiting the scope of the question by omitting reference to a vote on the alternative of independence for the territory. Finally, South Africa is in a position to reject a plebiscite if it finds proposals for the modalities of campaigning and voting unacceptable.

Alternative for the ICJ. In considering the plebiscite proposal, which is one aspect of South Africa’s comprehensive approach to the case, it is questionable that the ICJ could directly participate in setting up or supervising a plebiscite. Additionally, the court would probably want to assure itself that it would not be usurping functions of the UN’s political organs. It is much more likely that the ICJ will refer the offer—if it deals with it at all—directly to a political organ of the UN. If the court thus fineses the plebiscite, South Africa may decline further discussion of it on grounds that it is sub judice, that it was made only to the ICJ, and that in any case the political organs of the UN have already demonstrated their unwillingness to accept the facts of South African administration and are not interested in self-determination for the people of the territory. Thus, the South Africans expect in any event to make political gains at small risk.

A Hope of Self-Determination. A plebiscite arrangement which would give the hope of genuine self-determination would require South Africa to commit itself to act on the vote, to allow ample time for campaigning, to allow freedom for all the inhabitants (including exiles) to campaign, and to immunize those engaged in electioneering from harassment before or after the vote. The UN for its part might commit itself (e.g., by resolution), if it won the plebiscite, to a timetable for independence and to substantial assistance programs. The political obstacles to formulating such an agreement are formidable, but failure to deal with the plebiscite matter would leave the propaganda field to South Africa. Already, Dawid de Villiers, leader of South Africa’s legal
team at The Hague, has said that he would find it incomprehensible that South Africa’s critics should spurn the offer. He added that while he could not commit South Africa to accept the outcome of a negative vote, this would be a “tremendous setback to the stance of the South African government”.

**Will It Come to a Vote?** We doubt that the South African government expects that its offer will be accepted, and we believe the South Africans would be content with the political gains inherent in the offer itself. But they also believe that they would not be taking much of a political risk, should the matter come to a vote under mutually agreed conditions.

**How Would a Vote Go?** South-West Africa has a population (according to 1966 estimates) of 610,000. By far the largest group are the 270,000 Ovambos grouped along the northern border. Ovamboland, South-West Africa’s only functioning Bantu “homeland,” has received a very limited measure of local self-government, and South Africa has devoted substantial resources to the improvement of its infrastructure, social facilities, and agriculture. At the same time, South Africa has entrenched a political structure controlled by government-paid chiefs and has emasculated political opposition through police presence and application of South Africa’s notorious Terrorism Act. Given these carrot-and-stick conditions, plus South African willingness to offer favors to cooperative Ovambos, a majority of the Ovambos would probably vote for continued association with South Africa rather than the UN.

Virtually all of the 96,000 whites, who form the second largest group in the territory, would also vote for association with South Africa; the Ovambos and whites together comprise 60 percent of the population. Among the other inhabitants, only the Hereros and the Rehoboth Basters are presently in outright opposition to South African rule—but this does not necessarily mean they would prefer UN rule.

Much would depend on the manner in which the plebiscite was organized and conducted; in particular, how much time would be allowed to educate the people to the issues involved and how much free discussion permitted. Officials of the South-West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) have expressed full confidence that, given freedom for 9–12 months to work within the territory and explain the issues to the people, the result would favor the United Nations. This very possibility makes it most unlikely that South Africa would permit such a campaign.
47. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to Secretary of State Rogers


SUBJECT
Relations with South Africa—Action Memorandum

Discussion:

The attached proposed instruction to Ambassador Hurd in South Africa is being brought to your attention because it involves a fundamental issue relating to our approach to that country.

We have made it clear by our declarations and our actions that we desire a policy of communication with South Africa. At almost the same time that we have been stressing this theme, the South Africans have expelled a number of American citizens engaged in religious and humanitarian work in that country. These have brought Congressional inquiries and letters from significant church groups in the United States.

Prior to his departure from South Africa, Ambassador Hurd lodged an official protest over the manner of the expulsions. The South African Foreign Minister’s response reflected some embarrassment and suggested that the action may have been taken by Interior and Police without wider consultations.

We are proposing that, upon his return from consultation, Ambassador Hurd raise the matter again, emphasizing the problems such actions create in our relations with South Africa. We feel that:

(a) his failure to raise the issue after his return from Washington and after indicating to them, as he did, that he would discuss the matter here might suggest to the South Africans that we consider it, after all, of little importance;

(b) a response to their obvious desire for better relations requires occasional frank discussion of some of the problems we face; and

(c) such an approach might well strengthen the hands of the Foreign Ministry in dealing with other government agencies in future actions affecting us.

Ambassador Hurd has agreed to the instructions as attached. However, after our first discussion with him, during his routine call on

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL S AFR–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Newsom on March 27 and cleared in L.

2 Attached but not printed.
Marshall Wright of the NSC staff, he mentioned our intention to raise the issue. Marshall Wright has since called me to ask about this matter and I have explained our rationale as above, making it clear, however, that this was solely at that time the view of AF, SCA, and L. He has suggested to me that such an approach, in his opinion, is not compatible with what he understands to be the President’s view on our relations with South Africa. He describes this as one which maintains our official posture of abhorrence for the system but avoids having the United States Government involved in direct pressure against the system, leaving this to private groups involved (as in the Polaroid case.)

In our view our official pronouncements on South Africa will not have credibility with that government if we do not raise with them in frank terms matters bearing on the total relationship of our two countries.

I believe, therefore, that the approach we have suggested is not only appropriate but necessary for the kind of relationship we seek.

In view of Marshall Wright’s intervention, perhaps you may feel that the matter should be formally submitted to the White House. It is my belief, however, that this is a matter which could normally be decided here without White House clearance.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached telegram to Pretoria.³

³ A handwritten notation on the last page of the memorandum reads: “Tel sent 4/1/71 3:30 pm.” It was sent as telegram 54780 to Cape Town. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL S AFR–US)
clearly in mind in conversation with Africans position of US with re-
spect such contacts.

2. US has consistently taken position that improved atmosphere
between South Africa and black Africa is desirable from standpoint sta-
bility and peace of continent. It welcomes moves in this direction as in-
dicated by its recognition of the Lusaka Manifesto issued by the OAU
countries in 1969. US however endorses no particular initiatives, be-
lieving that African nations themselves must judge conditions under
which such improvement is possible as well as form and timing of
contacts.

3. Recent discussion of “communications” with South Africa by US
was solely in defining context US relationship to South Africa and
should not be construed as endorsing any specific moves by African
nations themselves.

End

Rogers

2 See Document 9.

49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
South Africa

Washington, May 1, 1971, 2002Z.


Subject: Attendance at Opera House Opening. Ref: Tananarive
673.

1. Appreciate rundown ref tel on background Opera House contro-
versy, its role in tenth anniversary celebrations, and considerations re-
lating to US attendance at inaugural performance.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 S AFR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Pletcher, cleared in AF, and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Pretoria, Tananarive, Durban, and Johannesburg.

2 In telegram 673 from Tananarive, April 30, the Embassy provided background on the opening of the Malan Opera House in Cape Town, where only whites were allowed to attend, and the pros and cons of U.S. attendance. Marshall proposed two possible courses of action: attendance with an explanation to the South African Government of the difficulties created by the situation; alternatively, the Ambassador and Consul General could be out of town and unable to attend. (Ibid.)
2. Believe that neither you nor any other US official should attend inauguration Opera House. In view attention and controversy now focused on Opera House and the backward step it represents in race relations, attendance would be counter our stand on SA racial system and our efforts keep US association with anniversary celebrations to minimum and in low key.

3. Recognize your absence will be conspicuous, may interject irritant in your relations with SAG, and risk impression it is reaction to Congressman Diggs’ rather intemperate telegram. In telegram 72440 to Cape Town, April 28, the Department included the text of a telegram sent by Diggs to the Department in which he questioned the Department’s commitment to opposing apartheid: “Demand Dept show cause as to why US Ambassador should not reject invitation with appropriate public statement. Further demand Dept establish policy against attendance by our diplomatic representative of any event in any facility that is racial, exclusive or segregated. Otherwise such insensitivity blatantly hypocritical in view of our expressed opposition to apartheid.” (Ibid.)
50. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Cape Town**

Washington, May 14, 1971, 0136Z.

83977. Subject: Diggs Rejoinder on Segregated Facilities in South Africa. Ref: State 72440 and 75658; Tananarive 673.1

1. In response to letter sent him along lines State 75658, Congressman Diggs has replied with following telegram.

2. "Dept’s letter dated May 6 regarding Ambassador Hurd unsatisfactory.2 South African press report which I have indicates Ambassador had already accepted invitation to attend opening of Malan Opera House in Cape Town. Fact that he later arranged to be out of the country irrelevant. Do not agree that policy cannot be devised which will permit our mission representatives to visit segregated facilities if the conduct of official business is necessary in the strictest sense. Any use of facilities outside of this narrow context represents complicity with apartheid policy. We cannot say that we deplore the degradation of apartheid in such facilities and then turn around and use said facilities without admitting hypocrisy, particularly if such use is related to unofficial business. Use of American-controlled facilities on a non-segregated basis is morally correct and therefore hardly releases us from criticism. I fully realize the restrictive dimensions of this proposal, but it would not compare with the restrictions imposed by the racist South African Government upon its non-white citizens and foreign visitors.”

3. Unless Embassy has other suggestion, we not planning comment further on Opera House inauguration in response to Diggs but will confine comments to his proposal re non-use of segregated facilities. While we appreciate manifold problems latter would pose, we believe it would be useful to consider whether there are not some areas in which abstention from visits to or use of segregated facilities by US personnel could be achieved without counterproductive results. Would appreciate Embassy views and specific suggestions re this possibility.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Nelson on May 12; cleared in AF/P, H, and AF; and approved by Crosby. Repeated to Pretoria, Durban, and Johannesburg. A handwritten note reads: “Cape Town for Embassy.”

2 Telegram 75658 is printed as Document 49. For telegrams 72440 and 673, see footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.

3 Letter from Abshire to Diggs; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 S AFR.
4. Would also appreciate information about tenth anniversary celebration events at which SAG will expect US official representation and which might present further problems.

Rogers

51. Telegram From the Embassy in Cameroon to the Department of State

Yaounde, May 16, 1971, 1230Z.

1406. No distribution outside Department. Subject: US Diplomatic Policy in South Africa. Ref: State 085175, 085174.2 From Assistant Secretary Newsom.

1. While perhaps not having all details, I am assuming from refelts that Chairman Diggs has raised further matter our general policy toward attendance segregated gatherings in South Africa following our response on Malan Opera House opening.

2. Obviously we cannot keep doors open for meaningful contacts with all elements in South Africa if we are to avoid all segregated gatherings or facilities. We can, however, seek draw distinction between those events such as Malan Opera House opening which become particularly identified with apartheid and those events which are normal and necessary part of diplomatic courtesy. I believe Ambassador Hurd in his option has suggested appropriate approach re anniversary; I suggest we agree.3

3. Assuming reply Chairman Diggs required, I suggest we make brief response, emphasizing that this administration, as have all previous administrations believes U.S. can most effectively exercise influence and keep doors open for contacts between citizens both countries by maintenance diplomatic relations. Since nearly all events and facil-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 S AFR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

2 In telegram 85174 to Yaounde, May 15, the Department requested Newsom’s comments on telegram 486 from Cape Town; see footnote 3 below. Telegram 85175 was a repeat of telegram 486 from Cape Town. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 14 S AFR)

3 In telegram 486 from Cape Town, May 14, Hurd suggested one way to keep U.S. association with South African anniversary events low key was to attend only the banquet and ceremonial speech. He argued that a total boycott would “offend and alienate government we are trying to influence.” (Ibid.)
ities in country segregated to some extent, policy of non-attendance such events would restrict our contacts with colored, Indian and black groups as well as white. U.S. representatives, however, are under instructions to use appropriate discretion in cases of events which by their special character are particularly identified with the apartheid system in order leave no doubt regarding our continued attitude of abhorrence toward such a system.

4. Carter may wish supplement letter by oral briefing of Chairman pointing out very limited U.S. attendance South African anniversary events and stressing significance our diplomatic presence in facilitating contacts all elements population.

Hoffacker

52. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa


[Omitted here is a title page.]

Swaziland: Policy Planning Paper

A. U.S. Interests in Swaziland

1. Swaziland, as a stable nation based on racial equality and in close contact with its white-dominated neighbors, is an influence for moderation and evolution away from racial repression and minority white rule in southern Africa.

2. Total direct U.S. investment in Swaziland is relatively quite small. There is a U.S.-owned fruit canning factory (Libby), and construction is about to begin on a U.S.-owned radio station.

3. Swaziland is of negligible importance to the United States as a supplier, although it is the world’s fifth largest exporter of asbestos and also exports iron ore and coal.

B. U.S. Objectives Over the Next Five Years

1. Optimum political independence and stable relations with South Africa.

\[\text{Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 SWAZ-US. Secret; Noforn.}\]
2. Economic development and viability.
3. Continuation of the UK and the UN as major sources of economic and technical assistance as well as increased assistance from the IBRD and other western countries.
4. Expanded relations with the states of black Africa.
5. Continued pro-western orientation and support for U.S. positions in international bodies.

C. Swaziland’s Objectives Vis-à-Vis the United States

U.S. assistance in achieving:
1. A prosperous economy with maximum benefits for all the population.
2. Rapid development of technical and academic education.
U.S. support for:
3. Increased political and economic independence from South Africa.
4. The achievement of racial equality throughout southern Africa.
5. Securing the respect of black African states for Swaziland’s independence and their appreciation of the unique problems it faces with regard to South Africa.

D. Recommended Courses of Action

1. Conclude and implement the proposed loan of $2.2 million to the Swazi Government to be used in conjunction with British financing on agricultural development projects. Provide technical assistance to the Rural Development Areas program in conjunction with the AID agricultural equipment loan and British assistance.
2. Continue to encourage private U.S. industry to invest in Swaziland, making maximum use of OPIC.
3. Encourage other donors or private sources to investigate ways to develop direct air services among the BLS countries and other nearby countries.
4. Continue the Peace Corps program.
5. Identify key younger government officials and politicians and expand leader grants to them.
6. Seek to exert a liberalizing influence on the present establishment to counter the trend toward alienation of young educated persons and the growing labor force in the money economy.
7. Continue—and expand if possible—present programs for educational and technical assistance and training.
8. Increase Swaziland’s U.S. sugar quota.
9. Maintain a small information and cultural program.
53. **Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa**¹


[Omitted here is a title page.]

Botswana: Policy Planning Paper

A. **U.S. Interests in Botswana**

1. Botswana, as a stable nation based on racial equality, led by a highly-respected President, and serving as a bridge between white-dominated Africa and black Africa, is an influence for moderation and evolution away from racial repression and minority white rule in southern Africa.

2. American Metal Climax holds a major share in a copper/nickel mining venture in which about $100 million are expected to be invested. U.S. Steel has a substantial interest in a prospecting company looking for additional ore deposits.

3. Although U.S. trade is negligible, Botswana has commercially exploitable deposits of copper, nickel, diamonds, manganese, antimony, and sulphur which could become important for the United States.

B. **U.S. Objectives Over the Next Five Years**

1. Optimum political independence and stable relations with South Africa.

2. Economic development and viability.

3. Continuation of the UK, the UN, and the IBRD as major sources of economic and technical assistance as well as increased assistance from other western countries.

4. Expanded political and economic relations with black Africa, in particular Zambia and East Africa.

5. Completion of the Shashe Complex Project and the successful launching of the mining industry based on it.

6. Improvement of the road link with Zambia.

7. Continued pro-western orientation and support for U.S. positions in international bodies.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 BOTSWANA–US. Secret; Noforn.
C. Botswana’s Objectives Vis-à-Vis the United States

U.S. assistance in:
1. Developing a prosperous economy, with maximum benefits for all the population.
2. Achieving a modern democratic and efficient government (national and local) and a modern social structure which will also preserve important traditional values and characteristics.
3. Rapid development of technical and academic education and a substantial rise in the general educational level of the population.

U.S. support for:
4. Obtaining as much political and economic independence from South Africa as possible.
5. Achievement of racial equality throughout southern Africa.
6. Securing the respect of black African states for Botswana’s independence and their appreciation of the unique problems it faces with respect to South Africa.

D. Recommended Courses of Action

1. Provide U.S. loan assistance for the construction phase of the Botswana-Zambia road and attempt to obtain the participation of other donors.
2. Study, in conjunction with the IBRD, possible multi-donor assistance to Botswana’s ranching/livestock scheme and the plan to build a northern abattoir.
3. Encourage other donors or private sources to investigate ways to provide direct air services among the BLS countries and other nearby countries.
4. Continue the Peace Corps program.
5. Assist the GOB in implementing its population planning program as appropriate.
6. Send GOB police officials for training in the United States under the Africa Regional Project for Public Safety Training.
7. Identify key younger government officials and politicians and expand leader grants to them.
8. Increase assistance to the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to include support for new campuses in Botswana and Swaziland.
9. Encourage U.S. business interest in Botswana, making maximum use of OPIC.
10. Utilize other African country facilities for specialized training for Botswana manpower requirements.
11. Maintain a small information and cultural program.
54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in South Africa and the United Kingdom and the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, September 22, 1971, 1952Z.

174301. Subj: South West Africa.

1. Clifford J. Hynning, Washington attorney for South African Government, initiated meeting on South West Africa with Asst. Secty Newsom September 20. Hynning explained he had, after some delay received authority from SAG to discuss subject with Department.

2. Stating SAG wished find way out this issue he said he sought determine what kind approach might be acceptable to USG. He indicated SAG willing consider “over time”: A) withdrawal application to SWA Terrorism Act and possibly other similar legislation; B) independence for Ovambaland; C) new codification laws and regulations under international commission; D) resumption of reporting to UN. He noted that UK and France less ready than U.S. accept ICJ decision; he felt such decision held real dangers for U.S. and our position should be similarly cautious. SAG prepared endeavor meet legal concerns of Western nations if this likely to be helpful in reducing pressures to more dramatic solutions.

3. In response Newsom said he welcomed chance discuss issue. U.S. interested in seeing acceptable solution if this possible. Obviously matter complex one and even definition of issues involved sometimes difficult. He suggested session be devoted seeking define existing concerns of various parties involved, after which it might be easier determine whether meaningful steps possible. Further meeting might take place after Secretary had seen Foreign Minister Muller. Hynning agreed.

4. In response Newsom suggested would be useful see if U.S. clearly understood SAG concerns this issue which he presumed to be: A) security of its own territory; B) continued control economic resources, including uranium; and C) desire prevent development social or political system in SWA incompatible with that in Republic. Hynning agreed, but said security is less of consideration than economics.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared in L and IO; and approved by Newsom.

2 On June 21, the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion that the Mandate was terminated and South Africa’s presence in Namibia was illegal. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971, pp. 581–586.
5. Newsom then said to understand U.S. position it was essential to recognize four areas of our concern: A) our domestic opinion which, while not fully crystallized on this issue, reacted against what we considered repression, injustice or discrimination elsewhere, particularly in racial matters; B) our responsibilities to UN; C) our concern over international law and support for ICJ; and D) our relations with Africa. Hynning asked how (D) differed from (C). Newsom explained our bilateral relations with Africa, as distinct from our relations in UN context, are affected by our stand on Southern African issues. Commenting on Hynning’s initial presentation, Newsom said in his opinion actions which embraced only Europeans and South Africans would not be helpful; UN and African participation in ultimate resolution essential.

6. In subsequent discussion:

   A) Hynning described South Africa’s thinking on plebiscite as providing a choice between: 1) continued administration by South Africa; 2) administration by UN; 3) independence. SAG was prepared to have international observers and to open plebiscite to all persons of SWA origin, including those banned and in exile. Hynning added that present SAG Ambassador to Washington Botha had made survey of SWA for SAG before SAG brief to ICJ and had concluded SAG would win plebiscite. SAG would require two years to prepare for plebiscite since not all peoples of territory ready now.

   B) Hynning said SWAPO not banned organization and participation SWAPO in plebiscite not ruled out.

   C) According Hynning, SAG would be willing invite SYG visit SA for discussion SWA issue; he had been previously invited but had declined come. Any discussion with an OAU mission as such, however, would be politically impossible. But he did not rule out possibility Africans accompanying SYG.

   D) Hynning emphasized any solution must start with premise SA still has mandate authority. SAG has not ceased consider SWA international territory. Newsom pointed out this would be difficult after UNGA and ICJ actions. Majority of nations in UN would probably take position only issue to be discussed would be transfer of authority—over whatever period—on assumption mandate ended.

   E) Hynning expressed difficulty in understanding why U.S. failed to give greater weight to SA’s role as ally in two world wars, anti-Communist state, and significant Western presence in strategic area, particularly when we appeared take more tolerant view Communist states. Newsom said USG not unaware those elements and desired

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3 See Document 46.
friendly relations with SA, but great significance of factor of race in international as well as domestic arena could not be ignored.\textsuperscript{4}

End.

\textsuperscript{4} The telegram is unsigned.

55. **Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State\textsuperscript{1}**

New York, September 24, 1971, 2138Z.


1. Strongly associate myself with statement of Senator McGee that the Byrd Amendment passed yesterday by the Senate if finally adopted into law would represent “formal US defiance” of the UN embargo on the importation of chrome ore from Rhodesia and would impair US relations “with virtually all African countries”.\textsuperscript{2}

2. Being here in NY as a US UN delegate I can attest that news re: the aforementioned vote was ill received and will be costly to US interest on all questions.

3. USG can recover however if you issue a strong statement against this removal of your authority to ban import of chrome ore from Rhodesia and that the rest of your administration will exert every effort in support of the State Dept’s opposition to the Byrd Amendment.

4. Declaration by Office of Emergency Planning [\textit{Preparedness}] that US chrome stockpile is far in excess of foreseeable strategic needs, among other reasons, would fully justify such a statement.

\textbf{Bush}

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–CHROME 17 US–RHOD. Unclassified.

56. **Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**


**SUBJECT**

Your Meeting with Mauritanian President Ould Daddah, September 28, 3:00 p.m.

Ould Daddah has informed the press that at his meeting with you today he will make known the Organization of African Unity’s position on “the American debate on Rhodesian chrome purchases”.

This is a reference to the Byrd Bill which passed the Senate last week. Senator Byrd’s amendment is a rider on the Military Procurement Authorization Bill. It amends the UN Participation Act of 1945 so as to preclude any action thereunder to prohibit imports of strategic commodities from any free world country so long as the importation of such commodities from Communist countries are not also prohibited. The effect of the bill is to remove the embargo on Rhodesian chrome.

The argument for the bill is that it is dangerous for the United States to be dependent on the Soviet Union for chrome, and that U.S. manufacturers are at a competitive disadvantage because the price of Russian chrome (the only major producer other than Rhodesia) has almost tripled since the embargo went into effect.

The ultimate prospects for the Byrd Amendment are now unclear. Despite vigorous opposition by the State Department, it passed the Senate by a 36 to 46 vote. Senator Fulbright now plans to amend the amendment so that you might keep it from going into effect on national security grounds or on the grounds that it violates a treaty obligation. Apparently, some of Byrd’s earlier supporters are attracted to that formula. Both Senators Stennis and Byrd, however, are said to be adamant that the amendment be retained in its present form.

**Suggested Response:**

—If finally passed, the Byrd Amendment would leave the embargo in effect except for chrome.

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2 Nixon underlined most of this sentence.
—The Administration made a vigorous effort to defeat the Byrd Amendment but it was nonetheless passed by a ten vote margin. The Congress is hostile to the embargo because although the United States has abided by it scrupulously, other nations have not, and it does not appear to have been effective. Moreover, it makes the U.S. dependent on the Soviet Union for the essential commodity of chrome, and the Soviets have tripled the price of their chrome since the embargo went into effect. Finally, Zambia’s recent decision to import $20 million worth of corn from Rhodesia undermined Congressional support for the embargo.

—We are now studying whether it is still possible to get this bill set aside. We will do our best, but the situation is, frankly, not very promising.

57. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Rhodesia.]

Kissinger: If the debate² is delayed, it makes no difference at all because the debate takes about two weeks. If the debate starts the day I get back, which is the 25th—

Nixon: But what could they put in between, Henry? How could they do it—?

Kissinger: Well, they could put in some African issues. They could keep the general debate cooking along.

Nixon: Incidentally—

Kissinger: They could start some deadly—

Nixon: —I trust, speaking of African issues, that you paid no attention to what I said to that OAU fellow?³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 579–15. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The exchange is part of a larger conversation, 5:51–6:42 p.m.
² The General Assembly vote on Taiwan.
³ Mauritanian President Ould Daddah. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Daddah and other African leaders in the Cabinet Room, 3:15–3:52 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)
Kissinger: I didn’t quite understand what point you were making, which was just as well.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: They were all delighted, though. You spoke—
Nixon: Well, I was being nice to them. The point that I was making is that the—there’s the Byrd Amendment—
Kissinger: Oh, oh. I’m—oh, I’m not [unclear]—
Nixon: And, actually, I am for the Byrd Amendment, and—
Kissinger: Mr. President—
Nixon: —and I just want to be sure. Don’t let State pucker out of this and sink the goddamn—we want to continue to buy that chrome. I mean why should—why the hell do we let the Russians always—
Kissinger: Mr. President, we were—I didn’t even bother you—
Nixon: Zambia’s buying it. Well, I just marked on there, I don’t know whether—
Kissinger: I saw your note. I wasn’t even—but, that came up for the first time last week.
Nixon: I know. I didn’t know about it—
Kissinger: And they wanted me to call up Senators who said they would shift if I spoke for you—
Nixon: Jeez [unclear]—
Kissinger: —but they would not shift for the State Department. So I refused to intervene, because I knew your view, but I didn’t want to come to you so that you could disavow me if worse came to worse. You could say I had done it on my own.
Nixon: I think it’d be better—
Kissinger: So—
Nixon: —I’ll tell you this—
Kissinger: —you know—
Nixon: You see—
Kissinger: —the Negro matter, uh—I’m sorry—
Nixon: You see, Henry—you see those poor, child-like Africans. God almighty, you think what the world, you know? We did our best.
Kissinger: You did an absolutely superb job. The guy was almost incoherent anyways. It was—
Nixon: [laughs]
Kissinger: —it was hard to react to him.
Nixon: [laughs]

4 See footnote 1, Document 56.
Kissinger: And these other savages that he—
Nixon: [laughs] It’s really something, though. You’ve got to, Henry, to wonder about Africans [unclear] talk about it—
Kissinger: But Newsom called me and he said that they were just floating on air. He said they—
Nixon: Well—
Kissinger: —thought it—
Nixon: —a lot of patting them on the ass goes a long way. I think what you’ve got to do here is [unclear]. I just feel Bill [Rogers] is—well, he cannot—he will continue to rationalize and confuse the two issues. I mean, he may, but the Chinese trip has got to, you know, has got to go as we plan it.

58. Conversation Among President Nixon, British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the White House Press Secretary (Ziegler)


Douglas-Home: At present [unclear] this is only happening in Rhodesia.
Nixon: Oh, really?
Douglas-Home: I think so. And this will be within the five principles.2 [unclear]—
Nixon: Good.
Douglas-Home: —not giving a time scale at least helps to provide the blocking mechanism to, say, prevent the Africans from doing it. Where it’s been right now is through parity.
Nixon: Hmm.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 582–9. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The exchange is part of a larger conversation, 4:10–5:31 p.m. According to the President’s Daily Diary, British Ambassador Earl Cromer was also at the meeting; Nixon, Kissinger, Douglas-Home, and Cromer met from 4:10 until 5:13 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
2 See footnote 2, Document 3.
Douglas-Home: And we haven’t been able to provide Commonwealth seats beyond on the subject. Now, we may get some agreement—

Nixon: Great.

Douglas-Home: And if we do we’re going to have a hell of a time, [Harold] Wilson told [unclear]. He then said this is as rough as he can.

Nixon: Which way is he? Is he going to [unclear]?

Douglas-Home: No, they didn’t.

Nixon: Why are they against it?

[unclear exchange]

Douglas-Home: Well, because you could say it’s not been announced—

Nixon: We’re not going to have the blacks in [unclear].

Douglas-Home: [unclear]

Nixon: [unclear] Let me tell you that, I want to assure you what I think you heard me say, and I talked on the phone today with Heath [about] this, but we will not embarrass you on Rhodesia or South Africa. Now, the point that I think Henry heard me talk to these Africans when they were in here the other day, and he’s also seen what I had written on that—on those memos as they come through. We have to take positions because of our political situation, but I just feel so strongly on this issue that it’s—but look, who was this—who’s the head of that, who’s that head of the OAU? What country is he from—?

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: Mauritania? Now, Mauritania’s got—Mauritania, they’ve got a million two hundred thousand people. They haven’t—they have to answer to the problems of a million two hundred thousand instead of worrying about worrying about what’s happened in Rhodesia or South Africa. So, he spent the whole time, you know, yelling about that thing. Not yelling, but you know? They’re talking about that. It reminded me of Sukarno. I—when I visited Sukarno in ’53, here’s this great country and the rest, here’s this man with this tremendous mystique, marvelously colorful. I was the Vice President then, and, of course, it meant quite a bit for me to get over to him, perhaps for him to receive me. But, on the other hand, I remember when I talked to him—I was there three days—three-fourths of the time he’s talking about West Irian.


Nixon: Now, the Indonesians couldn’t even digest Indonesia.

Douglas-Home: Right.

Nixon: They don’t even want to deal with a bunch of cannibals up there. You know what I mean? [unclear] That became the great issue.
It’s always this. Now, in the case of Rhodesia, let me say whatever you work out—whatever you work out, I’ll have you remember this, I don’t be pushed on by that African group over there at State because I think that—what else with the chrome thing have we decided?

Kissinger: We have this Byrd Amendment—

Ziegler: Yeah.

Nixon: Well, if it’s—I’m for it.

Douglas-Home: [unclear] if we get this revenue [unclear] set up [unclear] completely, he may get back on it. But he’s, so far, after all the blocking mechanisms [unclear] tax credits [unclear] for proper franchise [unclear] declaration of rights. So, the whole thing looks very, so very [unclear]—

Nixon: I want to be—I want to be informed if you will on this, not [unclear]—

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: I just don’t want it to be, too over to the Hill. I want you to get it, get—

[unclear exchange]

Kissinger: [unclear] wide approach.

Nixon: I will make a policy statement about it.

Douglas-Home: It wouldn’t veto until the beginning of November.

Nixon: Fine. But if it’s something, if it’s anything in the ballpark, I’ll, I’ll be sure to say something about it—

Douglas-Home: It will come to the front of the U.N., too, that we have pushed—

Nixon: I understand—

Kissinger: If you could make sure that I get some advance warning, before it gets to that—

Nixon: This is one where we don’t want to cause you any trouble. We’ve got enough troubles of our own.

Douglas-Home: [laughs] [unclear] Horn of Africa where it could, it would be—

Nixon: Yeah.

Douglas-Home: —that you could get a multiracial state of some kind.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: On the U.N., Mr. President, if, on some of these procedural points like the China issue, if you could give us a hand we know you can’t do much on the basic thing—

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Southern Africa.]
59. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, October 6, 1971.

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Southern Africa.]

Nixon: I’ve been thinking about that Rhodesian chrome thing. Your thought is to call in Byrd? You’re going to do it in a week?

Kissinger: Yes. I wanted directions from you. I don’t oppose doing it with you as well as him. My concern is if it gets out that the White House [unclear]—I mean on the substantive stuff, protect the position.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: A fight would turn into an absolutely unbelievable foreign policy scandal and they would be hacking away at us for months. I just wonder if we couldn’t get word to Byrd. The fact of the matter is this, is that the sanctions are coming out of the British Parliament, but we’ll know early in November. They’re also close to a deal, as Heath told you.

Nixon: Hmmm.

Kissinger: I think those—with either one these circumstances the sanctions would last if [unclear] anyway. If the British renew the sanctions and if the deal goes through then, the Byrd Amendment would become relevant. And then we could, we could do it.

Nixon: Is there a reason or do we want to give it a reason? I mean we need these votes in the U.N.

Kissinger: Well, we can do both. We can keep this U.N. vote and then sanctions are coming up anyway at about the same time.

Nixon: Yeah. Now—

Kissinger: That would give you about six weeks—

Nixon: Fine. Now, having said that let me—

Kissinger: That, I don’t mind.

Nixon: Let me—let me get one thing across on my attitude towards the whole African problem, the South African problem, because I think we’ve got to get State turned around on this thing and that means, particularly, Newsom. Of course, my attitude is that I know that State in the past has had this African policy and for two reasons. Forget all the goddamn principles. One is because they are concerned about the posi-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Executive Office Building, Conversation 283–15. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The exchange is part of a larger conversation, 8:28–9:05 a.m.
Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: Fine. All right. My view has come down to this, my view is: one, that the domestic American political situation should be completely taken out of their feeling on this. I make that decision and this position is not to be made on that basis. For your information I consider it to be detrimental to American political positions—

Kissinger: I agree.

Nixon: —to go this way. You don’t gain any votes from the blacks who give a shit what happens to Zambia. You get it from the others. You see my point?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: The second point is: On the other one, I do not believe that it is worth our while to do something for the Africans that’s against the British or somebody else. The third thing is that it’s in the interest of the Africans, and I have said the same thing—I did say the same thing to Sukarno in 1953—for us to guide them in the direction of solving their own internal problems and get their eyes the hell off of the problems far away. It does no favor to the Africans for us to play their game. For another reason, for the Africans to come in and see the President of the United States, as they did the other day, and to waste their time and my time for 40 minutes talking about the problems that didn’t affect their own countries is an indication of the problem. Now, I want this understood. I think this policy—this is not my policy and I just got to get it out. Now, shall I do that by bringing them all into a meeting to tell them that? No, that’ll all leak all over the government, but that wouldn’t bother me either. But I think we’ve got to understand it. Now, I—we have the South African problem—

Kissinger: Let me get Irwin in. Let me get, uh—the trouble is that without strong leadership over there you shouldn’t have to do it, because they’ll leak it. They don’t mind cutting you up.

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: And while I agree with you that the Negroes don’t help us any it doesn’t do—we don’t gain anything by making anything [unclear]—

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: —over this issue what we’re doing—

Nixon: No. They’re looking for a right, for a reason to [unclear].

Kissinger: Well, you could call Newsom in.

Nixon: How the hell would Newsom want it dealt with?
Kissinger: Well, gosh, if it would help, too. [unclear] Let me try it and then if it doesn’t work we shouldn’t [unclear] you’ve got too much relying on it.

Nixon: Sure. The point, though, on this: I just want—this is my policy. I thought everybody understood it was.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: And they come out and make a goddamn announcement\(^2\) on this thing, and the Byrd Amendment. Now they should have consulted with me on that goddamned thing—

Kissinger: Mr. President, the worst of it is that they did consult you. They were told you wouldn’t do it—

Nixon: Well, were they told?

Kissinger: Of course, that’s how the paper arose to you. They—

Nixon: But did you pass it on to them? I know—

Kissinger: Well, I passed it on and more.

Nixon: Get [unclear] to deal with it.

Kissinger: It went back and forth between couriers because I didn’t want them to—

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: —leak it. But the way this came up is they wanted the White House to be in the clear.

Nixon: That’s right. I said “no” on it.

Kissinger: I said, “I cannot do this without the President’s approval.” I then wrote that memo to you on which you wrote these strong words.\(^3\) I think I’m trying to say that, Mr. President, orders are to stay the hell out of this one.

Nixon: Hmmmm.

Kissinger: And then they put out the word that State is for it and the White House is against it.

Nixon: Do they have a story to that effect?

Kissinger: That’s right. I told this to Hugh Scott and to a lot of other people. Then Rogers called Hugh Scott and said, “No, everybody’s against it.” And, uh—

Nixon: Why don’t you get the word to them down there or then I can do it. I just—I’d hate to—I’m going to be busy today, but I don’t want this to fall between stools and for us to really irritate the conservatives when we don’t have to.

Kissinger: The other—

\(^2\) Not further identified.

\(^3\) Document 56.
Nixon: They’re going to be irritated by Taiwan, they’re going to be irritated by this.
Kissinger: I’ll call Byrd. Incidentally, all the news stories today say that this actually helps the U.N. vote.
Nixon: I know this.
[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Rhodesia.]
Nixon: I know and the reason I suggest you call [Byrd].
Kissinger: I’ll call on the basis—
Nixon: You see, basically, Byrd is my friend, a very close one, and we’d appreciate it if he stands with us. You know all that, Henry. The whole purpose of this, we just, we can’t tell you, but [unclear]—
Kissinger: Is that the Virginia Byrd?
Nixon: Oh, sure.
Kissinger: Oh yeah. I know, I know him very well. I can handle him, but he, uh—besides, he’ll keep a secret [unclear].
Nixon: I’d rather if you did it. [unclear] He’s [unclear]. Christ, I think we need Byrd on this.
Kissinger: Of course.
Nixon: [unclear] very good friend. So, this is Harry Byrd [unclear]. Well, the point is, you can say, “We’ve got to tell you this in confidence. We’ve got some good news on the [unclear] and the British and the President told Hugh [Scott] that you will not—you will back him. Regardless of what the settlement is we’ll back him, but this is going to take about six weeks. If it does not go, I will publicly back his amendment.”
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: And the other thing and it’s considering the fact that we could need two or three votes from the blacks on the Taiwan thing.
Kissinger: Let me get him right away. I think—
Nixon: Fine.
Kissinger: I know him quite well.
Nixon: Right. Sure. Just say that we have appreciated his great support and everything and that I—that as a matter of fact, you can just say: “I want to tell you privately that the President was, frankly, very disturbed when the statement was made by Scott.”

4 Not further identified.
Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: And if he doesn’t then, by God, that’s—we may just change the signals and support the goddamn thing.

Kissinger: I think it will go through without our formal support, but we can just—if we get out of the way. [unclear] From the middle of November on I think we’re in pretty good shape provided.

Nixon: Oh. Then, then, then, then, but I mean—

Kissinger: Oh, you mean now?

Nixon: I’m afraid right now they may bring it up still. Oh, that’s when he may withdraw it. Okay. Good luck, though.

60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in South Africa, the United Kingdom, and France, and the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, October 7, 1971, 0120Z.

184166. Subj: South West Africa.

1. Following up Secretary’s talk with FonMin Muller of South Africa, Assistant Secretary Newsom saw Permanent Under Secretary Fourie in New York Oct 4.

2. Newsom asked Fourie how he saw development of South West Africa issue from South African viewpoint. Newsom noted that U.S. position was and would continue to be determined by its respect for court’s decision and by its necessary awareness of both United Nations and African relationship to South West African problem. U.S. did not wish to get in middle of problem. At same time, U.S., involved as it is in UN consideration, would be interested in any paths which might exist for satisfactory outcome of issue.

3. Fourie said he was speaking privately and personally and Quote might not perhaps say the same thing in Pretoria Unquote. He felt it was necessary and he felt this was the Minister’s position, to avoid closing off in the present consideration of the problem any possible avenues for resolving it. South Africa, he said, wishes to rethink this

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Newsom on October 6, cleared in AF/S, and approved by Newsom.

2 Telegram 2878 from USUN, September 25, transmitted the memorandum of conversation between Rogers and Muller. (Ibid.)
whole question. Much will depend on determining what people of South West Africa want and South Africa hopes to do this over next several months by quiet soundings. South Africa will not necessarily be bound by assumptions of past. When Newsom asked about SWAPO, Fourie said South Africa was not clear whom SWAPO really represented. He did not exclude possibility that SWAPO might at some point play role in solution.

4. Newsom said he also, speaking personally, had felt that at least some Africans recognized realities South West African problem and that South Africa should not exclude possibility of Africans accepting approach to issue which recognized in some form African interests.

5. South Africa had expressed its readiness discuss area with Secretary General of UN. Would South Africa also be prepared for OAU representatives accompany SYG? Fourie said SAG would be unable accept anyone coming under OAU label. He did not rule out possibility individual Africans, including President of OAU in national capacity, coming to South Africa.

6. Newsom asked whether despite South Africa unwillingness accept conclusion of ICJ opinion South Africans might be prepared leave this question aside and talk about future, including removal of legal irritants, such as Terrorism Act. Fourie said, again speaking personally, South Africa might be prepared put less stress on legal status and perhaps talk about future leading toward conferences with peoples or referendum.

7. Pressures of time did not permit further conversation. Fourie expressed appreciation for discussion and said he would perhaps be floating some thoughts with Ambassador Hurd after SAG had given matter additional thought.

For London and Paris—Ref State 174301. Without referring to foregoing conversation you may inform respective governments that U.S. has suggested to South Africa possibility their receiving Secretary General perhaps accompanied by some Africans and discussing future of SWA possibly without direct reference to Court decision. U.S. had impression South Africa may be rethinking approach to SWA in which ways suggestions from friends for more flexible outlook may be helpful.

End.

Johnson

Document 54.
61. **Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**¹


**SUBJECT**

Rhodesia: British Seem Close to an Agreement

Alec Douglas-Home announced to the House of Commons today that he will go to Rhodesia on November 14 to attempt to reach an agreement with Ian Smith.

The British have informed our Embassy in London² that there are still two elements in dispute between Britain and the Rhodesians. The first concerns the British insistence on the rollback of racially discriminatory laws enacted by the Ian Smith regime since the declaration of independence. The second concerns the politically sensitive British need to establish that they have independently examined and ascertained the public attitudes of Rhodesians toward the settlement.

Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that Sir Alec would be going to Rhodesia if he were not confident that a settlement will result from his visit. The British, in fact, have already worked out a scenario by which the initial agreement would be followed by a two or three month period during which the British will, somehow, discharge their commitment to “examine” the attitude of the Rhodesian people. The British consider that this will be a period of particular sensitivity, and they will be sending a senior official (Lord Godber) to Washington to explain to us the mechanics they have in mind and to underline their need for a moratorium on criticism during this two to three month period. The British will then report to the President of the Security Council that an agreement has been reached and that, therefore, the UN sanctions on Rhodesia are no longer necessary. Only at that point, will the British themselves terminate their sanctions program.

Clearly, the British are hoping to avoid a Security Council meeting on the termination of sanctions. I would judge that hope to be extremely naive. No agreement that the British can make with Ian Smith is at all likely to be satisfactory to a majority of UN nations or, indeed, a majority of Security Council members. The Rhodesian issue will proba-

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² Not further identified.
bly be seized upon by the Chinese representatives as an opportunity for them to assert leadership among non-white countries. The Soviets can also be counted upon to be super-virtuous in supporting African denunciations of the British “sellout”.

Assuming that the British go ahead with their present plans, our problem will be to walk a narrow line between making the British position more difficult, and taking positions in which we, ourselves, become the villain of the piece and pay the political costs for the British initiative.

The British have taken their initiative without consultation with us and played a distinctly unhelpful role on the recent Chinese representation matter. They, therefore, have no particular claim on us in connection with this problem.

We are issuing a NSSM\(^3\) on this matter, and will be coming to you with recommendations on the posture which will minimize our political costs while not undercutting the British attempt to terminate the Rhodesian sanctions.

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\(^3\) Document 64.

62. **Conversation Among President Nixon, the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**\(^1\)


[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Rhodesia.]

Nixon: Let me ask you one thing, Henry: what in the name of God does that damn United Nations mean on that Rhodesian chrome thing?\(^2\) Are we going to do what they say? How do we deal with this thing? Do we have to follow it—?

Kissinger: Of course not.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Executive Office Building, Conversation 294–11. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The exchange is part of a larger conversation, 10:55 a.m.–12:42 p.m.

\(^2\) General Assembly Resolution 2765 adopted November 16 called on the United States to take all measures to prevent the importation of chrome from Southern Rhodesia. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1971, p. 103.
Nixon: How do the British feel about that?
Kissinger: They voted against it.
Nixon: With one of their two votes, huh?
Kissinger: But what I think, Mr. President, is the best—
Nixon: Because I don’t want to get into it—
Haldeman: The damned Congress is going to vote the other way.
Kissinger: But, it has already [unclear].
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: I just want to be sure. I want to stay out of it. What’s Ziegler going to say?
Kissinger: Well, yesterday, State sent over a statement they wanted you to make.
Nixon: Yeah, then stop saying we’ll support the United Nations.
Kissinger: Exactly.
Nixon: No, sir. Never.
Haldeman: [laughs]
Nixon: Never.
Kissinger: But Mr. President, I felt so confident about your views that I didn’t bring in to you—
Nixon: Yeah. You’re damn right.
Kissinger: I filled in. Then they wanted you, when you signed the procurement bill, whatever this chrome was attached to—
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: —to say you are reluctantly going along with the chrome part—
Nixon: No, no. That’s good—
Kissinger: —but you’re not going to do with any other part. But what’s going to happen, Mr. President, is that Home is now in Rhodesia.
Nixon: They’re trying to make a deal again and we’re—I hope you got to Cromer the [idea], the thing I that I told Home—
Kissinger: I told him.
Nixon: —at the last of the meeting.
Kissinger: Because he wanted to—
Nixon: And I want him to—I wish he—could I suggest something? That you make a telephone call, and you say: “Now, look here,” and then let him in. Say: “Now, with Rhodesian chrome, the President’s taking a hard line. You know, with the U.N. wouldn’t want him to take the hard line. Second, he wants you to know that whatever deal you make in Rhodesia, we’ll back him.”
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: I think we ought to tell him that.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: `Cause, you know, this will be great if they can make a deal with them—
Kissinger: If they make—
Nixon: —then we can tell those goddamn Africans to go to hell—
Kissinger: If they make a deal with Rhodesia, the British will abolish their sanctions.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: The British sanctions are about 80 percent of the total sanctions, so after that, there’ll be no sense for anyone else having any sanctions. So I think that we should just keep quiet about the U.N. thing because, it will become a moot issue if the British make a deal, and—
Nixon: Well, that’s the thing to tell State: that the British are leading here, and we don’t want to get into it now. But what would you tell them?
Kissinger: I just told them not to have the [unclear]. They’re probably saying [unclear] I didn’t want them to leak that [unclear] set up for the President, if he has anything to say [unclear]. I felt it was better that they would think that I screwed it up than it would [unclear]. It doesn’t do any good to have you, personally—
Nixon: Fighting the Africans.
Kissinger: Uh, on a crappy little thing like the U.N. vote [unclear].
[Omitted here is additional conversation unrelated to Rhodesia.]
63. Memorandum From Michael A. Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
Proposed Nuclear Fuel Agreement with South Africa

Ted Curran (State Secretariat) has written you regarding State/AEC plans to begin negotiations with South Africa on a 30-year agreement to sell nuclear fuel enrichment services for two power reactors in South Africa: one to be completed in 1978, the other several years later (Tab A).²

We already provide relatively small amounts of enriched uranium for a South African research reactor. This agreement elicited only moderate domestic and international criticism when, in 1967, it was extended for ten years. The power agreement would involve about 20,000 kg. [We have agreements with about 19 countries to provide nuclear fuel for research and power reactors, ranging from 500 kg (Argentina) to 335,000 kg (Japan).]³

State notes several factors supporting an agreement with South Africa including (1) our announced policy that we are prepared to enter into new agreements; (2) our effort to establish the US as a reliable supplier not overly susceptible to political considerations; (3) the foreign exchange benefit to the US of about $250M over the 30 years; (4) South Africa’s adherence to non-proliferation safeguards on its exports of uranium to other countries; (5) South Africa’s acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; (6) the mutually beneficial cooperation between the US and South Africa in the nuclear energy field; and (7) the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy’s informal indications of its support for such an agreement.

State also notes that if South Africa builds several more plants before the year 2000 as planned and uses US-type reactors, Ex-Im Bank policy guidelines toward South Africa may have to be reviewed. At present, however, indications are that South Africa considers financing no problem.

² Dated November 15, attached but not printed.
³ Brackets are in the original.
On the negative side, State notes that there is a likelihood of some adverse domestic and international criticism of an agreement with South Africa because of (1) its apartheid policy, (2) the possible military applications of the technology and materials involved, (3) the long-term nature of the commitment, and (4) the fact that South Africa has not signed the NPT.

We agree with State that the factors supporting such an agreement clearly outweigh the political disadvantages.

Marshall Wright concurs.

64. National Security Study Memorandum 142


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Rhodesia

The President has directed that a review be made of the implications for U.S. policy of a British-Rhodesian settlement acknowledging Rhodesia’s independence and calling for the termination of sanctions. The study should also deal with the implication of failure of the present negotiations to produce a political settlement. The study should, inter alia:

1. Assess the probable reaction in the United Nations and elsewhere to a British-Rhodesia agreement and the issues which this development is likely to pose for U.S. policy.

2. Assess the probable reaction in the UN and elsewhere to failure of U.K.–Rhodesia negotiations and the issues which such a development is likely to pose for U.S. policy including the sanctions program.

3. Examine the legal, political, and economic implications involved in (a) U.S. recognition of an independent Rhodesia, and (b) the establishing of diplomatic or consular relations therewith.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–188, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 142. Confidential.
4. Identify the probable consequences of each possible U.S. action for our immediate and longer term interests in the United Nations and for our bilateral relations with the countries primarily concerned.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa and should be submitted to the NSC Senior Review Group by December 13, 1971.2

Henry A. Kissinger

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2 In a July 18, 1972, memorandum to Kennedy, Fred Rondon wrote: “NSSM 142 on Rhodesia was predicated upon a successful British settlement with Ian Smith. It did not come about. With no early prospects for British recognition of Rhodesia, I see no need for us to further consider the policy options in the NSSM 142 study.” (Ibid., Box H–181, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 115) The study is ibid., Box H–188, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 115.

65. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa1

Washington, November 23, 1971, 0305Z.

212392. Eyes only for Ambassador Hurd.

1. Following is text of message which you should deliver by means you consider most appropriate to Air Vice Marshall Hawkins, (or in his absence ranking subordinate) for urgent transmittal to Ian Smith. Message should reach Salisbury ASAP, but in any case no later than COB November 23.2

2. Begin text quote: In view of the importance of the talks in which you are now engaged, the USG thought it right to set forth to you its views. The USG sincerely hopes that these talks will come to a successful conclusion.

The USG wants normal intercourse and trade with all peoples. Until the proper conditions are created, however, it is difficult if not impossible to remove current constraints limiting the contacts between

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated Priority to London. Drafted by Wright and Crosby; cleared in EUR, U, and by Kissinger; and approved by Moore.

2 In an undated message to Nixon, Heath requested assistance to convince Smith to accept the British proposal for a Rhodesian settlement. The message was transmitted by Cromer on November 22. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII)
the US and Rhodesia. It is the view of the USG that you now have an opportunity to create such conditions by a settlement fully responsive to the five principles\(^3\) proposed by the United Kingdom.

The USG believes a lasting agreement genuinely in accordance with those principles is in the long range interest of Rhodesia and its peoples. The USG therefore urges the Rhodesian authorities to make every effort to reach such an agreement with the United Kingdom.\(^4\) End quote.

Rogers

\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 3.
\(^4\) A follow-up telegram authorized Hurd to state that these views represented those of the highest levels of the United States Government. (Telegram 212398 to Pretoria, November 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 RHOD)

### 66. Message From British Prime Minister Heath to President Nixon\(^1\)

Undated.

Dear Mr President

I wished to let you know at once of the outcome of Alec Douglas-Home’s personal visit to Rhodesia. He has managed, in spite of all the difficulties, to obtain the agreement of Mr Smith and his colleagues to proposals for a settlement which we believe can be demonstrated to be in full accordance with the first Four Principles, and which we shall hope to show to be acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole under the Fifth Principle. I am sure that the settlement offers the Africans in Rhodesia a real prospect of political, social and economic advance. It is moreover likely to be the last opportunity for achieving this.

Joe Godber, whom I have asked to bring this message, was hoping to see Secretary Rogers and Henry Kissinger but as I understand they

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 RHOD. Secret. An advance text of the message was transmitted by Cromer to Nixon on November 24.
will both be away from Washington I hope he will be able to see other representatives of the State Department and your own staff.\(^2\) The purpose of his visit will be to give your people the background, and full details of the agreement reached and of our plans for conducting a “Test of Acceptability” in Rhodesia. He will also wish to discuss future tactics, particularly in relation to the United Nations. He will of course be at your disposal should you wish to have a personal report from him. He will be planning later to go to New York for talks there.

The way ahead now hinges on our demonstrating, in the “Test of Acceptability” which is to be carried out by a Commission led by a British Judge, that all the races in Rhodesia accept the settlement as the way out of present stagnation and an increasingly dark future. Subject to this, we would pass the necessary legislation granting Rhodesia independence, and at this stage our sanctions legislation would be terminated. All this will of course take a little time.

Meanwhile, it will be all-important to aim for the greatest degree of international acceptance which it is possible to obtain for the settlement. There are opponents of any agreement with the Rhodesians. There is an obvious danger that they will use every effort in the OAU and the UN to engineer opposition to the settlement regardless of the views or interests of the Rhodesian Africans. They may well try to forestall the outcome of the “Test of Acceptability” by action in the Security Council. We shall at all costs have to prevent this. In the first instance our aim will be to persuade as many Governments as possible not to take up firm positions against the settlement before the result of the “Test of Acceptability” is known. In particular we shall be seeking the necessary number of supporting votes (or at least absentations) to prevent any unacceptable resolution being passed in the Council. In the longer term we shall all need to have it accepted that the implementation of a successful settlement has brought about a situation in which sanctions resolutions have lapsed. Here again we must expect strong opposition from some quarters.

I believe that we are agreed that the existing situation had become increasingly unrealistic and damaging, and I hope that you will feel that Alec Douglas-Home has achieved a solution which we can all support. Certainly your help will be immensely valuable to us in the task of explaining the settlement and resisting attempts to undermine and destroy it. It will be a great encouragement to us if we know we can count on this.

\(^2\) See Document 67.
May I add how extremely grateful I was for your most prompt and helpful response to my message to you about sanctions.\(^3\) It was very good of you to agree to act so quickly.

With best personal wishes,
Yours sincerely

Edward Heath\(^4\)

\(^3\) See Document 65 and footnote 2 thereto. Nixon’s response was not found.

\(^4\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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67. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the United Kingdom and Togo and the Mission to the United Nations\(^1\)**

Washington, November 29, 1971, 1215Z.


*Summary.* UK Minister Godber saw Acting Secretary Irwin November 26 to explain terms and next steps Rhodesian settlement, urge desirability withholding judgment until acceptability or non-acceptability to black Rhodesians known, and express hope that when UNSC considers anticipated condemnatory resolutions, there will be enough abstentions to preclude need for UK veto, which would however be used if needed. Godber expressed measured optimism that majority Rhodesians would find settlement acceptable and that whole business could be concluded first half 1972. *End Summary.*

1. UK Minister of State Godber saw Acting Secretary Irwin November 26 to discuss Rhodesian settlement. Turned over copies of settlement document itself, Declaration of Rights, text of letter from Heath to President,\(^2\) and text Sir Alec Douglas-Home’s report to Parliament. Godber explained future electoral provisions in particular detail, and said agreement reached is fully compatible with first four principles under which settlement sought. Compatibility with fifth principle, acceptability to majority Rhodesians, of course remains to be tested.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by George on November 26; cleared in IO and AF; and approved by Irwin.

\(^2\) Document 66.
Godber said all HMG asks is that judgment be withheld until commission to be set up to look into this has investigated and made its report.

2. In addition to chairman Lord Pearce, commission will include Lord Harlech and Sir Maurice Dorman plus other members. It will be empowered go anywhere and see anyone in Rhodesia, Godber said, although he said later in response to question it probably would not be given access to persons convicted of criminal as compared political offenses. Once commission is set up, Godber thought it could conclude work in couple of months.

3. If committee reports majority acquiescence, Rhodesian Government is to carry out all steps it has undertaken, and HMG will then do likewise, with process culminating in Rhodesian independence. Godber thought this might all be carried out within first half 1972 (by Easter, he personally hoped). If committee reports majority is opposed to settlement, HMG will bow out of whole thing.

4. Immediate HMG concern is weathering expected storm in Security Council. Godber said there will undoubtedly be resolutions put forward which HMG cannot accept. Will veto if necessary but would prefer see sufficient abstentions to prevent passage, which would mean seven, and hoped US would abstain. Acting Secretary made no commitment on this point.

5. In sum, Godber said this was best possible settlement under circumstances, it should be acceptable to Rhodesian blacks, and he hoped they would be let alone think matter out and express views freely.

6. In response various questions, Godber said (a) HMG absolutely opposed to active UN participatory role in commission, although he could perceive some utility in having UN observers, if of impartial nature—a possibility on which he personally had grave doubts; (b) Rhodesian Government will not retain overriding powers which would permit future independent government renege on agreement. Will revert in some respects to 1961 constitution which contains only standard emergency powers section; (c) HMG would have no truck with any kind of UN action purporting to set up governing body for Rhodesia; (d) if commission reports majority sentiment favorable to settlement, and follow-up actions then taken by both governments, HMG will not request SC to revoke sanctions, but simply inform SC that grounds for sanctions no longer exist; (e) HMG sees little likelihood successful Rhodesian right-wing opposition to settlement; (f) It is difficult predict how long it might take for black Rhodesians to attain voting majority but important thing is that there will be unimpeded progress toward that end, and end is inevitable at some future time.

7. In concluding remarks, Irwin said credibility of commission’s report will depend very much on how it operates. Godber agreed, said this is one argument for having UN observers, although HMG has not yet thrashed this question out. Irwin returned to question whether future Rhodesian Governments could be depended on carry out agreement in good faith. Godber said future constitutional changes would require separate majority of both white and black Rhodesians, which should help ensure against reneging by future Rhodesian Governments. If one is thinking of external guarantees of some sort, this means bayonets, which Godber said is out of question.

End

Rogers

68. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of African Affairs¹

Washington, undated.

Policy Planning Memorandum No. 1

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with the African Liberation Movements

Summary:

The cumulative effect of a number of ad hoc decisions and international developments affecting U.S. relations with the African liberation movements may be to impart an unintended direction to our overall policy. This memorandum assesses the current state of U.S. relations with the liberation movements. It suggests a need to clarify our objectives and to develop criteria for choosing among policy options in this area.

Background:

The African liberation movements are targeted at South Africa, South West Africa (Namibia), Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. Most of the liberation movements date

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 AFR–US. Secret. Drafted by Frank R. Golino (AF/PPS) on November 10; revised on December 2. Sent to all African diplomatic posts as an attachment to CA–5713, December 23.
from the period when the greater part of sub-Saharan Africa became independent, that is, the late 1950’s and early 1960’s.

None of the targeted African countries and territories have a single unified liberation movement. All are represented by at least two and often by more groups (see attached list). Within each movement there are competing leadership factions. These cleavages have a number of causes including tribalism and Sino-Soviet rivalry.

The principal sources of support for the liberation movements have been the Communist world and the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity. A strong campaign led by the Afro-Asian bloc has also begun in the United Nations and other international organizations to obtain explicit UN sanction for the liberation movements similar to the approval already contained in the OAU Charter. These pressures have begun to affect US working relationships in nearly all of the UN organizations including such highly technical bodies as the Universal Postal Union and the World Health Organization.

While their goals of independence for the Portuguese African territories, the return to constitutionality and independence on the basis of African majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, independence for South West Africa, and the termination of apartheid and political and legal restrictions on South Africa’s non-whites are all close to official U.S. policies favoring self-determination and opposing racial discrimination, we do not support the use of force or violence in pursuit of these goals.

We officially abhor the racial policies of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and continue to hope Portugal will recognize the long-term advantages of adopting a policy of self-determination for its African territories, stressing that Portugal’s African policy is an important factor in the West’s ability to influence the direction and pace of events in Africa as a whole.

Policy:

U.S. policy toward the various liberation movements has been to maintain discreet and unobtrusive but hopefully useful contacts, avoiding measures which could be interpreted as hostile to friendly governments. While our ability to assist these movements is severely circumscribed by the fact that we oppose force as a means of promoting change, one of our principal goals has been to encourage, if possible, the various liberation movements away from over-dependence on Sino-Soviet assistance.

2 “African Liberation Movements,” attached but not printed.
Programs: SASP and EATP:

Since most of the liberation movements, with the exception of those of Portuguese Guinea, have had serious difficulty in recruiting supporters within their target countries and territories, members have been recruited largely from refugees who have been attracted by offers of education or employment. In an effort to exert a positive and non-violent influence we therefore adopted a few programs beginning in the early 1960’s to train Southern African refugees in occupations other than armed insurgency. Our major effort was based on two activities, the Southern African Student’s Program (SASP) and the East African Training Program (EATP).

SASP was created in 1961. Its aim is to develop educated leaders from among the young African refugees who have fled white dominated areas and who could be of service to their people if political conditions improve. Since 1961, 511 students have received SASP scholarships. There are 162 students currently in the program and the FY–71 cost was $569,000. As recently as FY–67 the SASP budget was $1,800,000 or more than one half of CU/AF’s budget. In an effort to reduce the cost of the program no new students were accepted in FY–68 and FY–69. The program was resumed on a limited scale in FY–70 and it is anticipated that in the future approximately five new scholarships will be awarded annually to graduate students.

The principal difficulty with SASP has been that upon graduation the participants have been unable or unwilling to return to their home countries and other African countries have been most reluctant to receive them. Although more than 150 have gone to independent African countries, arrangements have had to be made for many others to remain in the United States until they can find employment in Africa.

EATP was begun under AID sponsorship in 1963 to provide refugees, who were not qualified for SASP university level scholarships, with secondary educations. Two schools were established: the Kurasini International Education Center in Dar es Salaam, and Nkumbi International College in Zambia. Due to difficulties in attracting students and a decrease in the flow of refugees into Tanzania and Zambia in the late 1960’s, a decision was taken by AID to turn the two schools over to the Government of Tanzania in December 1969 for training clerical workers for civil service employment. Nkumbi was turned over to the Government of Zambia in December 1970. Nkumbi is still maintained primarily as a school for refugees and AID has offered scholarships for refugee students there. At present approximately 120 students receive scholarships at a cost of $240,000 per year. Annual intake of new students is expected to be about 25 per year. We also make substantial contributions to UNHCR which devotes much of its resources to southern Africa.
In addition to training refugees to play useful roles some day in their home countries, SASP and EATP have had the instrumental effect of demonstrating U.S. concern for the problems of refugees from the white dominated areas and of legitimizing contacts between representatives of the U.S. government and those of the liberation movements which nominated training candidates. Although most of the liberation movements appear to be sincerely interested in keeping ties open to both the West and the Communist world, the curtailment of SASP and EATP has therefore had the practical effect of restricting the basis for our communication with the movements. It has also increased their dependency upon Communist sources of support for educational training as well as military aid. This, in effect, works against one of our principal policy goals vis-à-vis the liberation movements. That is, influencing them to move away from over-dependence on Sino-Soviet assistance.

**Portuguese Trends:**

One of the key policy initiatives of the Portuguese Government of Prime Minister Caetano is his constitutional amendment giving a measure of autonomy to the overseas territories. This development has potentially important consequences for another aspect of U.S. policy affecting the liberation movements, that is, our hope that Portugal will recognize the long-term advantages of a policy of self-determination for its African territories. One of the purported purposes of this constitutional amendment appears to be to make some gesture toward self-determination without in any way turning over political control to the blacks. (Lisbon 1622)\(^3\) The implicit danger is that eventual administrative autonomy in the Portuguese territories could result in the establishment of new Rhodesias. Moreover, as a result of growing U.S. investment in Angola, our facilities in the Azores, and our NATO ties, the United States is identified with the Portuguese in both their and insurgent eyes.

**Conclusions:**

The principal conclusion of this assessment is that the cumulative effect of a number of recent ad hoc decisions and international developments affecting U.S. relations with the African liberation movements may be to impart an unintended direction to our overall policy. A number of options, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, for adjusting and/or reaffirming this policy should be considered. These include:

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\(^3\) Not found. For details on the constitutional amendment, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1971–1972, pp. 24855–24856.
1) recognition of the importance of the liberation movements as symbols in Africa and as channels for Soviet and Communist Chinese influence and a decision that the United States accordingly should:

   a) continue discreet contact with the movements’ leadership;
   b) continue to provide educational and humanitarian assistance to refugees;

2) provision of discreet help to pro-western leaders and their movements short of providing arms and military equipment;

3) avoidance of any contact with the liberation movements as being inconsistent with our policy opposing the use of force in providing a solution to southern African problems.

The following are possible courses of action relating to options one and two:

1) adoption by all U.S. diplomatic posts in Africa of an agreed plan of action for handling contacts with liberation movement leaders;

2) consideration of alternatives to SASP and EATP for providing U.S. assistance to the refugees and maintaining contact with their leaders, if such educational programs are either impractical or inadvisable (feeding and health programs through volunteer agencies are suggested as possible alternatives).

3) efforts to influence the liberation movements to adopt non-violent methods of promoting their cause—to convince them that they will rally more international and governmental support in Western countries by such methods and that peaceful methods will be more effective in accomplishing independence.

69. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Rhodesian Chrome and the Byrd Amendment

On January 1, it became illegal for the US Government to prohibit imports of Rhodesian chrome. This was the effect of the Byrd Amend-
ment to the Military Procurement Act. When Rhodesian chrome enters the US, we will be in violation of UN mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia. On December 30, the State Department (Tab A) proposed that you take one of three actions to preclude such a violation. Treasury (Tab B), Commerce (Tab C) and OEP (Tab D) all disagreed with State as do Peter Peterson and I.

(1) Prohibit Soviet Chrome for Six Months.

State’s favored alternative is that you ban Soviet chrome for six months so that we can go on legally prohibiting Rhodesian chrome during this period, which may be long enough to see the British end sanctions. State says you have ample authority to do this under the UN Participation Act. Treasury disagrees, noting that while you have legal authority to enforce UN sanctions, these are against Rhodesia and not against the USSR. Commerce does not argue the legalities but feels that a restriction against the USSR could seriously jeopardize the possibilities of increased trade with the USSR. State on the other hand feels that any damage to relations with the USSR would be limited. If we wanted to circumvent the Byrd Amendment this might be the simplest way. But it would carry some risk for our Soviet relations before your Moscow trip. I therefore would not recommend it.

(2) Remove Chrome From the List of Critical and Strategic Materials.

State suggests you remove chrome from the list of strategic and critical materials—and so make the Byrd Amendment inapplicable to it—based on the fact that chrome is in ample supply. OEP, which has primary responsibility for administering the strategic list objects strongly. General Lincoln of OEP believes that chrome remains a strategic material, and that if we tamper with our standards for identifying such materials, we will jeopardize our whole stockpile policy. This would endanger pending stockpile disposal bills on the Hill which OMB hopes will yield us $600 million. Commerce comments that removing chrome from the list would be an evasion of the Congressional intent. I agree. Such a transparent device to thwart Congress would undoubtedly get us into trouble on the Hill.

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2 See Document 55.
(3) Ask Congress For a Six Month Delay

This appears to be the least objectionable idea, but Congress is out of session and could probably not act quickly, if at all, when they return. Furthermore, the whole sanctions program will probably die this Spring when the UK and Rhodesia finalize their settlement. Even if we wanted to ask the Congress for a delay, we would have to implement the Byrd Amendment in the meantime.

I think we should simply implement the Byrd Amendment as Congress intended to allow imports of Rhodesian chrome. This is obviously not the time to restrict our trade with the USSR, nor can I see jeopardizing our stockpile program or raising an unnecessary storm on the Hill for acting against Byrd’s Amendment.

Following this course of action will require changes in Executive regulations.

Recommendation

That we comply with the spirit and sense of the Byrd Amendment and instruct Treasury to draw up the necessary regulations to allow the importation of chrome. Pete Peterson concurs.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, you may wish to follow one of the courses recommended by State:

Prohibit Soviet chrome imports for six months No _____ Yes _____.

Remove chrome from the strategic and critical list. No _____ Yes _____.

Seek a six-month delay from Congress No _____ Yes _____.

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4 The President initialed his approval of this option. On January 21, Kissinger informed Rogers, Connally, Stans, and Lincoln of the President’s decision. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Rhodesia, Vol. II)
70. Memorandum From Robert Hormats and Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Nuclear Power Reactor Sale to South Africa

GE has recently inquired informally about the possibility of a $50 million direct Ex-Im credit to finance the sale of a nuclear power reactor for South Africa. Under present guidance, Ex-Im provides insurance and guarantees up to a maximum of 10 years but has not provided direct credits since 1959. The amount and form of Ex-Im participation would be a quantum jump from this. In addition, the character of the project would cause political problems in the rest of Africa. Thus, for political reasons it is desirable to avoid using Ex-Im credits to finance this sale.

A more acceptable alternative, which we, State, and Ex-Im favor, is to have the Private Export Funding Corporation (PEFCO) provide the financing using Ex-Im Bank guarantees only. PEFCO has already extended credits for nuclear power plants in Taiwan, Italy and Brazil. Although this approach would not be immune from criticism—since PEFCO would rely on Ex-Im guarantees—it maintains the distinction between USG guarantees and USG credits. Ex-Im is anxious to approach PEFCO on this matter if GE pursues the question further, and would like to get your view on this issue.

Recommendation:

That you approve the PEFCO financing approach.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 744, Country Files, Africa, South Africa, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Peterson.

\(^2\) Haig approved the recommendation for Kissinger.
71. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa


[Omitted here is a title page.]

South Africa: Policy Planning Paper

A. U.S. Interests in South Africa

1. We would hope to see a resolution of racial tensions in South Africa which will minimize for the United States the harmful domestic and international repercussions of the current South African situation and will be consistent with our national principles regarding human dignity and equality. The present situation in South Africa:

   a. Hampers stability in southern Africa;
   b. Provides the communist states opportunities to increase their influence in Africa;
   c. Inhibits the development of normal relations with South Africa; and
   d. Causes dissension within the United States.

2. We must avoid being drawn into internal or external racial conflicts involving South Africa.

3. We are interested in South Africa as an important source of essential minerals—especially chrome, copper, platinum, gold, manganese and vanadium.

4. Our trade with South Africa amounts to about $851 million annually with a heavy favorable U.S. balance ($275 million) and the potential for expansion of U.S. exports.

5. Direct private U.S. investment in South Africa was $864 million at the end of 1970, and considerable potential exists for further profitable investment. Approximately 320 U.S. firms have investment in South Africa.

6. We believe strategic considerations, while not crucial, are important in terms of: denying the area to potential enemies; the availability of landing and overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft; and access to ship repair and logistic facilities.

7. Our NASA tracking station is significant to the space program, and its importance will increase with greater deep space probe activity.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Box 25, Scowcroft Chronological File (B), Scowcroft Chronological 1/16/76 (3). Secret; Nonforn. The paper is an attachment to a copy of NSSM 236, Document 82.
8. The South African atomic energy program, particularly their “new secret process for enriching uranium” may have important political (proliferation) and economic implications for the United States.

B. U.S. Objectives Over the Next Five Years

1. The maintenance of peace in southern Africa.

2. Realization by South Africa that its racial policies are untenable internationally and that peaceful, evolutionary movement toward equal rights for all South Africans will reduce the risk of violence.


4. Avoidance of U.S. identification with or the appearance of acquiescence in South African racial policies.

5. Furtherance of the concept that whites and nonwhites can live together peacefully and productively in multiracial or nonracial societies.

6. Peaceful resolution of South West African issues consistent with self-determination, taking into account the ICJ opinion and African and UN concern with the problem.

7. Avoidance of the development of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories into a bloc.

8. Continued profitable trade with South Africa and maintenance of U.S. investments and access to key resources.


10. Continuing contacts with all elements of the South African population.

11. Support for the United Nations as a political institution which has a constructive role in the resolution of African problems.

12. Continued access to South African military intelligence and continued minimal level of cooperation with the South African military consistent with U.S. national security requirements.


14. Retention of overflight and landing rights currently deriving from the Air Force Tracking Station agreement.

15. Avoidance of military involvement over South West Africa with South Africa or the Portuguese territories or with the liberation groups.

C. South Africa’s Objectives Vis-à-Vis the United States

1. Closer economic, political, and military relations with the United States and the West, for practical strategic reasons and in order to enhance South Africa’s international image and acceptability.
2. U.S. acceptance of the view that South Africa’s racial problem is an internal matter for South Africa to deal with.


5. U.S. support for South Africa’s policy of improving trade and relations with black Africa.

D. Recommended Courses of Action

1. Continue to make U.S. position clear, both in public statements and in bilateral talks and démarches with SAG, that we condemn apartheid as unjust and ultimately unworkable.

2. Make it clear that we do not support or endorse violence as a means of effecting change.

3. Encourage, through wider communication, evolution of white racial attitudes away from apartheid:
   a. Increase U.S. educational and exchange programs for South Africans of all races.
   b. Continue to press the South Africans on visas for American visitors, particularly officials and Members of Congress.
   c. Assign black American personnel to South Africa as soon as practicable and as appropriate to the varying needs of the U.S. Government.
   d. Through discreet use of informational techniques and cultural presentations, provide South Africans of all races maximum exposure to the thought, life-style and social-consciousness of the West and the United States in particular.
   e. While avoiding use of the term “dialogue” or endorsement of any particular approach, and while discouraging any hopes for early results, point out to black African states that increased communication has value as an additional type of exposure and pressure on South Africa.
   f. Avoid endorsement of South Africa’s “outward policy.”
   g. Continue to oppose moves to oust South Africa from international organizations when such moves are in violation of the organization’s constitution, emphasizing that our opposition is a matter of principle and is not specifically on behalf of the South African Government.
   h. Continue cooperation with American religious, legal and other private groups offering humanitarian and professional assistance to South Africans and South West Africans prosecuted under restrictive, discriminatory legislation.

5. Continue the arms embargo against South Africa.

6. Keep contacts with the South African Defense Force to the minimum required for continued access to South African military intelligence and minimal military cooperation consistent with U.S. national security requirements.

7. Keep to an absolute minimum our association with the South African Police, consistent with continued access to intelligence information.

8. Retain the NASA tracking station in South Africa as long as it does not represent an unacceptable political liability.

9. Keep under review the continued requirement for Air Force Tracking Station 13.

10. Keep under review our present policy of non-use of South African ports by U.S. Naval vessels except in case of emergency.

11. Continue our policy of neither encouraging nor discouraging new U.S. investment in South Africa, but make sure interested companies are fully aware of the political, social and economic problems associated with South Africa’s racial policies and of the public relations problems resulting from investment in South Africa. Invite potential U.S. investors’ attention to the advantages of investment in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which are in the Rand customs and currency area.

12. Suggest to U.S. firms in South Africa that public relations and other advantages might accrue from supporting developmental projects in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, such as the UBLS.

13. Encourage U.S. firms to follow fair employment practices in employment of non-whites, particularly with regard to pay, training and fringe benefits.

14. Continue to seek ways of assisting development of effective representation of non-white labor.

15. Provide low profile facilitative services to U.S. exporters, reporting trade opportunities in a factual, routine way.

16. While continuing present Eximbank policy with respect to South Africa, remain alert to possible needs for liberalizing the policy to enable U.S. exporters to meet terms offered by third-country competitors. Eximbank policy currently permits insurance and guarantee coverage for all commodities; it limits the term ordinarily to five years, but extends it to not more than ten years for individual commodities if the proposed term has been internationally defined as normal for those commodities or if it is necessary to meet government-supported competition. Present policy permits discount loans of less than $2 million,
with certain restrictions. Direct loans and all other Eximbank facilities are unavailable.

17. Discreetly explore the South African plebiscite proposal and other possible arrangements to resolve the question of the status of South West Africa.

18. Continue to seek ways of aiding development of economic and political independence in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and encourage the SAG, as appropriate, to permit this development.

19. While avoiding expressions of approval or support for the policy of separate development, challenge the SAG to demonstrate the sincerity of its policy by accelerating physical, social and economic development of the homelands.

20. If the homelands are found to offer the Africans some positive chances for constructive advancement, consider whether the USG could encourage private U.S. investment in these areas without incurring unacceptable political cost.

21. Urge the South African Government to improve the lot of non-white South Africans in such practical areas as family stability, property ownership, rural development, education and training, and greater political and economic rights.

22. Monitor closely the South Africa atomic energy program.

[Attached but not printed are Annex A, a chart of U.S. Government personnel in South Africa, and Annex B, a general background on South Africa.]
MEMORANDUM


SUBJECT
Assignment of Black Diplomatic Officer to Pretoria

On June 4 our Ambassador to South Africa, John Hurd, wrote to Peter Flanigan objecting to the assignment of a black foreign service officer to his Embassy (Tab B). Hurd was concerned that our bilateral relations with South Africa would suffer and also that our domestic conservative opinion might attack the move as a questionable political appeal to black voters in an election year. Flanigan asked Al Haig if we really needed to move this year.

The answer was that it was too late to consider doing anything else. (Memo at Tab C). In April the President had been informed of State’s decision (Tab D), and, in May, Foreign Minister Muller told his Parliament that South Africa would not object to a black diplomat (Tab E). A black FSO in Tokyo, James Baker, volunteered; State cut orders, unclassified as is normal, and the news spread. Congressman Diggs, a leader of the Black Caucus, learned of the assignment from Baker in Tokyo. Newsmen gradually picked up the story, which was broken in the South African press. Peter Flanigan agreed that we should not block the assignment, and State—with our and Flanigan’s concurrence—confirmed it on July 6.

Flanigan has asked us to reply to Ambassador Hurd for him. Our proposed letter (Tab A) is designed to assure Hurd that his views were
taken into account, but to avoid putting on paper anything that could be used against us.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

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73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, November 27, 1972, 2200Z.


1. Dept concurs that we should do what we can to continue SYG mandate on Namibia. Problem is how to do so in face of widespread disapproval of Escher report and of need to avoid US or Western imprint on any future efforts. We wish to avoid being closely identified with any particular course of action at initial Council meeting but believe we (or French if they are willing to continue leading role) can make certain observations along following lines to guide discussion in a useful direction. Purpose of early discussion should be to draw out Africans on whether and how they think mandate should be extended and what they realistically think can be achieved.

2. Discussion should take note of what two missions to Namibia/South Africa have already accomplished. Most important development is that a UN presence has been established and UN now has access to peoples of the territory. The Escher report has confirmed certain UN tenets on Namibia: the overwhelming majority of black Namibians are

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Halsted (IO/UNP); cleared in AF/S, IO/UNP, AF, L/AF, and AF/RA; and approved by Herz. Repeated to London, Pretoria, and Paris.


3 In telegram 4982 from USUN, November 25, the Mission reported on the negative response to the Escher report in the Security Council, and possible suspension of the Escher mission. In telegram 4985 from USUN, November 25, the Mission reported on a meeting between Waldheim and a group of African representatives opposed to continuing the Escher mission, believing he went beyond his mandate in negotiations with South Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR/UN)

4 See footnote 2, Document 74.
against continued South African presence in the territory and do not want separate development. Exercise has clearly heightened awareness among Namibians of alternative to continued South African rule. South Africans are now less likely to rush into repressive policies in Namibia than in the past.

3. Security Council should not become deeply involved in discussion of merits of Escher report. Escher’s efforts should be viewed as a stage in continuing process and not as a definitive indication of where UN and SAG stand on Namibia. While Council free to reject Escher’s efforts, we believe it would be short-sighted to do so in view of some positive aspects of discussions with Vorster, i.e. Vorster’s implicit willingness to treat Namibia as a whole by appointment of advisory council directly under him, his readiness to examine removal of restrictions on movement and to permit legitimate political activity. Council could deal with problem of Escher/Vorster statement in eventual resolution by taking note of Escher report. FYI. We do not believe we should make any effort to retain Escher as SYG’s representative. It would be better to treat his mission as if it all along had been intended as a one-shot affair. End FYI.

4. Although SYG’s mandate should continue it obvious that he cannot personally undertake travel and consultations necessary. A Secretariat official (FYI, perhaps Guyer or Chacko End FYI) would probably be a better choice than again going through tedious process that resulted in appointment of Escher. Council should try to avoid putting future representatives under same pressure that Escher faced to bring home the bacon in a very short period of time. Deadlines lead to one-shot operations instead of a continued UN presence. There should be periodic review to keep pressure on SAG but timing should be at about six-month intervals to allow room for maneuver and more opportunity for SYG to be involved.

5. We believe that three-member advisory committee should maintain its present role. More direct participation such as accompanying SYG’s representative on his rounds would probably be rejected by South Africa. Council could ensure that SYG’s mandate does not allow for any commitments without Council approval and in this way there would be no need for advisory group to play a greater role as watchdog.

Rogers
74. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, May 7, 1973, 1035Z.

345. Subj: Namibia in SC: SAG Position. Ref: USUN 1669.2

1. After studying SAG response to SYG last week,3 it became clear to me that what faces USG now is decision whether we should stay entirely on sidelines, adopting neutral posture, or play more active role. Our in-house analysis led me to conclusion that however attractive hands-off policy might appear to be, our own interests would be better served by some degree of activism. Prior to receipt of reftel, I had therefore instructed my staff to draft telegram which was to have recommended similar course of action as that set forth by USUN. This exercise no longer necessary, for I concur fully in both analysis and recommended courses of action proposed in excellent reftel.

2. I would like reiterate, however, certain points made by USUN which are particularly pertinent from this vantage point.

(A) First is my conviction that despite ambiguities and possible loopholes, SAG statements are indeed most positive and forthcoming ever made on this subject and that they represent significant concession on its part.

(B) I regard SAG statements as genuine attempt to continue dialogue on Namibia, and at some considerable domestic risk from its right-wingers in Cabinet as well as from much of white public in both South Africa and Namibia. In this connection, SYG quite correct in his statement that FonMin Muller was in a difficult position with SAG Cabinet (USUN 1667).4 If present SAG efforts are summarily rejected, I predict almost immediate SAG return to previous hard line on SWA. One outcome of this could well be sharp upturn in repression of black political leaders in Namibia—men like Chief Kapuud could be silenced.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated Immediate to USUN and also repeated to Pretoria.

2 In telegram 1669 from USUN, May 4, the Mission recommended several steps to promote continuing dialogue between the U.N. and South Africa. In addition to praising the efforts made by both parties thus far, the United States would encourage the United Kingdom, France, the OAU, and other states to support continuation of the mandate. (Ibid.)

3 Foreign Minister Muller submitted a statement to Secretary General Waldheim on April 30 clarifying his government’s position on the future of Namibia. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973, p. 722.

4 Dated May 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR/UN)
(C) SAG’s reversion to hard line on SWA in turn would almost certainly lead to spate of boycott and sanctions proposals, more inflamed rhetoric, and very painful decisions for us to make re how to vote on what will almost certainly be unrealistic, ineffective or simply unacceptable resolutions.

(D) I strongly agree that some acknowledgement by USG of SAG movement on this question is called for. Similarly, importance we rightly attach to keeping dialogue alive and fact SAG has not been forthcoming lends great weight, in our judgment, to USUN’s recommendation that we join in urgent and concerted effort to keep it alive.

3. To be sure, undertaking an effort to prolong SYG’s mandate poses certain risks. We cannot be certain SAG will act in good faith in conformance with language of its own proposals or will instead exploit its ambiguities. And even if intentions are good now, there no rpt no assurance that domestic pressures will not induce the pragmatic Mr. Vorster to change once again his stance on SWA. Nevertheless, I feel that these risks are worth running. Without underestimating either the dangers of US “activism” on this question or the difficulties of US démarches in certain AF capitals. I therefore strongly recommend approval of steps suggested in para 5 refel.

Hurd

75. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research


SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: ENOUGH SOUTH AFRICAN–WALDHEIM PROGRESS?

A series of contacts between the South African Government and UN Secretary-General Waldheim have produced perceptible movement in Pretoria’s declared policy on South-West Africa (Namibia). But there are also major ambiguities, and serious doubts that South Africa’s new stance will be acceptable to the African group in the UN. This

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Lambert Heyniger, cleared by G.H. Summ, and released by David E. Mark (INR/Africa and the American Republics). All brackets are in the original.
makes uncertain at best the continuation of Waldheim’s talks with Pretoria; renewal of his mandate would depend largely on whether the Africans could be persuaded that the South African position at least provides a basis for further talks.

The Waldheim Mandate. Last year the Security Council authorized Waldheim to explore the South African position on Namibia, with a view to bringing it into conformity with the UN position or laying the groundwork for future UN action. Waldheim and his special representative, Alfred Escher, made separate visits to Namibia in 1972. Although the African group was critical of Escher’s report on his contacts with Pretoria, it agreed to extend Waldheim’s mandate until April 30.

Signs of Change. During April Waldheim met with South African Foreign Minister Muller in Geneva. Waldheim’s report on these talks, released May 1, suggests that there has been a real, although modest, advance over Pretoria’s earlier policies. For example, the South Africans now state that:

“. . . desiring to enable the population of South-West Africa to exercise their right to self-determination and independence . . . [they] will fully respect the wishes of the whole population of the territory. . . . South Africa will not impose upon the population of South-West Africa any given system contrary to the wishes of the latter or . . . the Charter of the United Nations.”

The reference to “the whole population” of the territory, and other undertakings with regard to freedom of speech, travel, and political activity by the inhabitants, are surprising gains over previous South African policies.

The Other Side of the Coin. At the same time, the Waldheim-Muller exchanges have made Pretoria’s real intentions highly uncertain, since the assurances given to Waldheim are not compatible with other South African statements and actions. The new South African position, for example, sets no timetable beyond the vague statement that “. . . it might not take longer than ten years for the population . . . to reach the stage where it will be ready to exercise its right to self-determination.” Furthermore, the South African Government has introduced legislation in Parliament which would further develop the system of “homelands” for separate tribal groupings in Namibia and has issued proclamations conferring self-government on two such areas this month. It has also set up a government-dominated Advisory Council for the territory.

African Reactions and Their Implications for the US. However forthcoming the South Africans have been in their own terms, African gov-

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ernments are unlikely to find Pretoria’s position satisfactory. The Africans will want to postpone UN consideration of Waldheim’s report, however, until their foreign ministers and heads of state have had an opportunity to pronounce on it at the forthcoming OAU Summit in Addis Ababa (May 17–28). Thereafter, they will probably press for a Security Council meeting in June, at which they are expected to oppose continuation of the Secretary General’s mandate. Instead, the African group may seek international sanctions against South Africa for defying the UN on the Namibia issue. For the US, the immediate problem is whether there are any possibilities for keeping the UN-South African dialogue alive, and if so, whether it can produce any useful results. If not, we may face strong pressures for international enforcement measures against South Africa which would pose serious dilemmas for American policy.

76. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Special Assistant (Flanigan)


SUBJECT
US Economic Policy Toward South Africa

US economic policy toward South Africa, the subject of your memorandum to me of June 14, 1973, has most recently been addressed in an interagency policy planning paper on that country of March, 1972.

As stated in the paper, our principal objective is “continued profitable trade with South Africa and maintenance of US investments and access to key resources.” Under this objective, our courses of action include neither encouraging nor discouraging any US investment in

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2 In a June 14 memorandum to Kissinger, Flanigan wrote that Ambassador Botha was concerned about U.S. economic policy toward South Africa. Flanigan noted the policies enunciated by Newsom before the Diggs Committee on March 27, and added that the policy appeared to have been formulated in 1964. He asked: “Has a recent study of our economic policies concerning South Africa been made, and if so, may I see the conclusions reached?” (Ibid.)

3 Document 71.
South Africa, while making sure US companies are fully aware of the political, social and economic problems associated with South Africa’s racial policies and of the public relations problem resulting from investment in South Africa. The paper calls for providing low-profile facilitative services to US exporters and, while continuing present Ex-Im Bank policy with respect to South Africa, remaining alert to possible needs for liberalizing the policy to enable US exporters to meet terms offered by third-country competitors.

These elements of our policy toward South Africa, which reflect the complex strategic, international and domestic considerations involved in US-South African relations are considered currently valid. I have attached for your information a copy of the March, 1972 guidelines pertaining to economic relations with South Africa.4

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4 Not attached.

77. Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1

Moscow, October 24, 1974, 1631Z.

Hakto 4. 1. The Department has asked me to send a memo to the White House on the South African question at the UN (Tosec 43).2 For obvious reasons, this is a matter best handled orally. I have discussed it with the President and he has agreed with my recommendation that we veto the expulsion of South Africa, if necessary.3

2. Warm regards.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 4, November 1974, Hakto (1). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Immediate. Kissinger was in Moscow for meetings with Brezhnev, Gromyko, and other Soviet officials.

2 Dated October 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D740303-0048)

3 The Security Council debated the issue of South Africa’s expulsion October 18–30. A draft resolution recommending immediate expulsion was not adopted (the United States, United Kingdom, and France voted against the resolution), however, the General Assembly suspended South Africa from the twenty-ninth session on November 12. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1974, pp. 106–117)
78. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹


SUBJECT

Assistance for South Africa (C)

(TS) Early last month the Acting Chief of the South African Defense Staff approached Admiral Holloway to request US assistance in the design and construction of an improved maritime command and control system for South Africa.² The program proposed would be a phased one involving technical assistance from US commercial contractors, purchase of equipment from US commercial sources and system operation by a new, non-military South African agency. Our involvement would be facilitative only (i.e., to assure issuance of export licenses for commercial equipment and technical advice). No US military participation is contemplated.

(TS) We have examined the proposal (attached) and believe it offers real advantages for US national security at a modest political cost. South Africa’s strategic position astride one of the world’s key shipping lanes is well known to us all. In a crisis or war situation, access to information generated by such a system could be highly valuable. Further, such cooperation would be certain to enhance US-South African political-military relations and our ability to influence attitudes within the South African military leadership.

(TS) I therefore request your agreement in principle to the initiation of a cooperative surveillance program with South Africa as an exception to our present arms supply policy. If you and State agree, I plan to discuss the proposed program with CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] before informing the South Africans of our willingness to help them acquire the equipment needed to upgrade their maritime surveillance system.

¹ Source: National Archives, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-218, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 81. Top Secret.

² The attached letter from Armstrong to Holloway, June 12, sought U.S. assistance in upgrading South Africa’s maritime defenses. The United States would provide technical and material support, [text not declassified] coastal surveillance radars, long-range acoustic sensors, and sensor correlation and analysis centers.
(U) I am also writing to Secretary Kissinger along the foregoing lines.³

W.P. Clements, Jr.

³ Not found.

79. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford¹


SUBJECT

Cooperation with South Africa on Ocean Surveillance

The purpose of this memorandum is to elicit your decision on our response to a South African initiative for a cooperative agreement in the area of ocean surveillance. The initiative is contained in a letter from the Acting Chief of the South African Defense Staff to Chief of Naval Operations Holloway proposing a bilateral US-South African agreement designed to upgrade South Africa’s ocean surveillance capabilities. The letter to Holloway is at Tab A.²

Under the proposed agreement, the United States would agree to issuance of export licenses for the equipment needed to establish an improved ocean surveillance system (e.g., [1 line not declassified] coastal surveillance radars, long range acoustic sensors and data analysis centers). In return, South Africa would provide us with information developed by their improved system. The South Africans reportedly have assured Admiral Holloway that their surveillance system would be operated by a new, non-military South African agency, but its military/intelligence functions are clear and acknowledged.

Concerning the intelligence benefits of the proposed agreement, the intelligence community as a whole has not addressed the issue, but CIA believes that ocean surveillance information provided by South Africa would be of marginal intelligence value. Soviet naval move-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–218, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 81. Top Secret. Sent for action. This memorandum is on White House stationery.

² For Tab A, see footnote 2, Document 78.
ments in the Cape sea routes have always been limited. With the reo-
pening of the Canal, CIA believes it unlikely that Soviet use of the Cape 
routes will again reach even the low level that existed during the period 
when the Canal was closed. Moreover, the South African capability 
would be of little use in monitoring activities in the Indian Ocean area. 
On the other hand, Defense argues we would gain the advantage of a 
closer military relationship with South Africa.

In our judgment, confirmed informally by both State and Defense, 
agreement to the South African proposal would be contrary to the 
policy on issuance of licenses for export of arms, equipment and associated 
items to South Africa established by NSDM 81 of August 17, 1970 
(copy at Tab D).\textsuperscript{3} NSDM 81 is the most recent statement of an arms em-
bargo policy dating back to 1963. In summary, the NSDM prohibits li-
cense issuance for all equipment which has a clear and direct applica-
tion to combat or to internal security operations. It is the judgment of 
the Defense Department that the preponderance of items necessary for 
a modern surveillance system would fall into this category. For exam-
ple, under the policy guidance of NSDM 81, the State Department earlier 
this year refused a license for export to South Africa of Sonabuoys, a 
water borne senser device integral to any modern surveillance system.

It appears, therefore, that an exemption to the general guidelines 
of NSDM 81 will be necessary to allow our agreement to the South Afri-
ca proposal. If such an exemption were to become public knowledge, as 
we deem likely, it could be expected to have both domestic and interna-
tional consequences.

Internationally, even a limited exemption to our arms embargo 
policy would be seen by Third World countries, especially those in Af-
rica, as an abrogation of moral responsibility and a reversal, in the 
name of narrowly defined national interest, of long-standing policy. Repercussions could be expected at the United Nations, where we consis-
tently have supported embargo resolutions. In general, we could ex-
pect the issue to make more difficult in the short run our efforts to exer-
cise a moderating influence in southern Africa.

Domestically, any exemption to the arms embargo policy would 
bring a strong reaction from elements opposed to the South African re-
gime. The domestic economic effects, on the other hand, would be 
mildly favorable. Although no thorough analysis is possible in the ab-
sence of more information about the South African proposal, Defense 
informs us that a moderate surveillance system would cost the South 
Africans about $125 million over a three to four year period and pro-

\textsuperscript{3} Printed as Document 40.
vide about 1000 jobs, the majority in New Hampshire. Former Senator Norris Cotton has expressed support for the project.

Recommendation

Our arms embargo toward South Africa pre-dates that of the U.N. Security Council, and, as amplified by NSDM 81, has as its objective a careful balance between conflicting U.S. interests in Southern Africa. It forms a part of our effort to maintain constructive relations with South Africa, while responding to legitimate Black African concerns (supported by a significant domestic constituency) regarding South Africa.

A change in our arms embargo policy, particularly by supplying purely military equipment would be a major shift in our posture toward southern Africa. The change would come at a time when, with the independence of Mozambique, the current Soviet efforts to influence the outcome of independence in Angola, our efforts to convince South Africa to facilitate independence in Namibia, and attempts at obtaining a Rhodesian solution, we are increasingly engaged in southern African affairs. Given these larger considerations, I recommend that you reject the South African proposal, thus confirming our arms embargo for South Africa.4

The State Department concurs in this recommendation.

Alternatively, you may wish to make an exception to our arms embargo policy and authorize the Defense Department to enter into discussions with the South Africans with a view to concluding an agreement on ocean surveillance. If you choose this option you should be aware that your action, should it become public knowledge, will be viewed by domestic and international opinion as an abrogation of our arms embargo policy.5 The Department of Defense supports this option.

4 Ford initialed his disapproval, that is, he approved the South African proposal. In an October 30 memorandum from Kissinger to the President, Ford had previously rejected the proposal. An undated note by Scowcroft on the memorandum, however, reads, “Hal Horan—The President reversed himself on this. He now wants to approve the equipment on a very low key basis. Brent. What do we do now?” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-218, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 81)

5 Ford initialed his approval. In a November 7 memorandum to the President, Scowcroft requested reconsideration of approval of the South African proposal, citing the potential for numerous adverse consequences: secrecy could probably not be maintained, creating problems with Congress (particularly the Black Caucus), some members of the American public, and American media; black Africa would view the agreement as a reversal of U.S. opposition to apartheid, inflaming radical African nations, and cause nations such as Nigeria and Zaire to distance themselves from the United States; and it might also embarrass NATO members attempting to counter accusations of military cooperation with South Africa. (Ibid.)
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements)


SUBJECT
Cooperation with South Africa in Ocean Surveillance

The President has approved your recommendation that the U.S. accede to the request of the Government of the Union of South Africa for cooperation in ocean surveillance, to the extent of facilitating the review of requests for export of equipment and data necessary to upgrade the South African ocean surveillance system.

It is our understanding that International Signal and Controls Corporation is prepared to undertake a study to determine equipment requirements associated with providing South Africa with a modern ocean surveillance capability. Under existing regulations, such a study would require in all probability a Munitions Control license. It is further understood that International Signal and Controls Corporation would apply for specific license issuance for hardware items as subsegments of the study were completed and approved. Accordingly, to implement the President’s decision, the Director of the Office of Munitions Control is authorized to invite International Signals to submit an application for a study, informing the company that the U.S. will view sympathetically but on a case-by-case basis, eventual export of reasonable amounts and kinds of ocean surveillance equipment. The Office of Munitions Control, in coordination with concerned agencies, will ensure that the study and subsequent provision of equipment do not extend to capabilities which would involve sensitive technology transfers or direct U.S. involvement.

When the study is completed, Munitions Control will—again in coordination with concerned agencies—review the final equipment requirements and facilitate, as appropriate, additional license issuance procedures.

In responding to General Armstrong’s letter proposing the cooperation agreement, Admiral Holloway may indicate that the matter has been referred to the Office of Munitions Control, Department of State,
which will be prepared to consider an application for a study of South African requirements in a favorable light.

Brent Scowcroft

81. Memorandum From Clinton Granger and Harold Horan of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
South African Ocean Surveillance

Implementation of the President’s decision to facilitate issuance of licenses for South Africa to purchase ocean surveillance equipment is proceeding apace. Admiral Holloway dispatched yesterday (January 14) his letter to South African General Armstrong informing him that Munitions Control would view favorably an application by International Signals Corporation for a license to study South Africa’s ocean surveillance needs; DOD is sending us a copy of this letter. Meanwhile, the Navy evidently has been in contact with the South Africans, and International Signals has informed Munitions Control that the study application would be forthcoming by January 21. State is also taking steps to ensure that Ambassador Bowdler in South Africa is informed.

One potential issue has arisen in relations between Munitions Control and International Signals. The company was intending to do business with a quasi-private South African organization which would be established by the South African Government to put the ocean surveillance project into operation. This procedure, broached by the South Africans in their original letter to Admiral Holloway, is evidently designed to save us political embarrassment. More likely, however, it would do the opposite, adding the appearance of cover-up to the political controversy which would break out should our role in the ocean surveillance project become known. State believes strongly and has told International Signals that whomever the company deals with, the

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Box 25, Scowcroft Chronological File (B), Scowcroft Chronological 1/15/76–1/19/76. Top Secret. Sent for information. A handwritten note by Scowcroft reads: “Let’s do our best to hold it close while Angola is prominent.”
role of the South African Government must be acknowledged in the study application—and therefore tacitly accepted by us in approving the study. We concur.

You should also be aware that, despite extraordinary efforts at State and Defense to restrict access to information about the ocean surveillance project, the circle of those aware of it is inevitably widening. Aside from State and Defense, International Signals and the South Africans are now aware that a decision has been made to consider exceptions to our embargo policy. We must assume that chances for a leak are becoming much greater.

82. National Security Study Memorandum 236


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Acting Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy

SUBJECT
United States Policy on Export-Import Bank Loans for South Africa

The President has directed a review of United States policy toward Export-Import Bank loans for exports to South Africa.

The study should describe current United States policy and the rationale for continuing or modifying that policy, taking into account the following:

—the economic benefits and costs of an Export-Import Bank policy change, with particular attention to the extent of competitive disadvantage United States business firms presently have in exporting to South Africa;

—the short and long term consequences of a changed policy for overall United States interests in Africa and elsewhere;

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSDMs and NSSMs, Box 2, NSSMs File, NSSM 207. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank.
—the policies of other nations with regard to the use of government export credit agencies for transactions with South Africa;
—United States policy toward South Africa and changes in that policy implied by possible Export-Import Bank policy revisions;
—U.S. relations with other African countries and the effect of a change in Export-Import Bank policy on those relations;
—the extent to which the present unstable condition in southern Africa would be affected by a policy change;
—likely reaction within the United States to a change in United States policy.

Based upon the foregoing assessment, the study should evaluate alternative United States policy options with regard to Export-Import Bank loan policies in South Africa including pros and cons for each.\(^2\)

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group composed of representatives of the addressees and the National Security Council staff and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. Where appropriate, a representative of the Chairman, Export-Import Bank should be invited to participate in the meetings of the ad hoc group. Knowledge of the study and participation in its preparation should be kept on a strict need-to-know basis. Any additional participation should be specifically approved by the Chairman of the Group.

The study should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs no later than January 30, 1976.

Brent Scowcroft

\(^2\) See footnote 3, Document 83.
83. Memorandum From Malcolm Butler and Harold Horan of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)


SUBJECT
Response to NSSM 236: Ex-Im Bank Policy Toward South Africa

We have received the response to NSSM 236, which examines the advisability of changing Ex-Im Bank policy toward South Africa to permit direct lending in addition to the guarantees and insurance which are permitted under the current policy. The economic arguments for making such a change are not impressive, and the decision should rest largely on political considerations. (NSSM 236 and response are at Tab A.)

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize the results of the study, and to obtain your judgment as to whether an SRG meeting should be called.

Background. This review was prompted in large measure by intense lobbying, on the Hill and with domestic agencies, by the Fluor Corporation. Fluor has obtained the overall design contract for SASOL II, a $2.5 billion coal liquification plant which will satisfy virtually all South Africa’s liquid fuel needs; Fluor argues that Ex-Im loans are necessary if US firms are to win supply contracts for the plant. We have emphasized in the NSSM process, however, that we were not examining whether US firms should participate in this project; they will participate significantly even without Ex-Im direct lending. The task was rather the much broader one of determining the economic and political costs and benefits of permitting the Bank to extend its government-supported credits to finance US exports to South Africa.

Economic Considerations. The study shows that the economic benefits of changing the policy to allow Ex-Im direct lending would be marginal. The shift would give US firms access to loans at Ex-Im’s government-supported interest rate, making their bids more competitive with the officially-supported credits of competitors. According to the study, the change would increase US exports to South Africa by $0–50 million per year over the current annual base of $1.3 billion. In

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2 Document 82.
3 Tab A, Response to NSSM 236, February 6, attached but not printed.
addition, SASOL II would bring US firms $575–675 million in additional exports over five years, even without direct lending; with direct lending this would increase by $20–40 million per year over the five year period. These figures are somewhat uncertain, since interest rates are only one of the elements which go into the purchasing decision—also important are service, delivery, down payment, grace period, duration of the loan, and diversification of supply source among several industrial countries for political and economic reasons.

Technological Considerations. One argument advanced for changing our policy is that we need access to the new technology which will be developed in the SASOL II project. Since Fluor already has the overall contract for SASOL II, however, it will have access to any new technology during the design, installation, and start-up phases. Regardless of credit terms, US companies will almost certainly be included in the diversified supply contracts for items of technological interest, thus obtaining useful “hands on” experience. In any case, South Africa has given US companies full access to the predecessor SASOL I plant. (ERDA believes significant technological benefits could be obtained from increased participation, but FEA’s argument that we will obtain the technology without expanding participation with Ex-Im loans is more persuasive. See Annex E of NSSM response.)

Importance of the Precedent. The change of Ex-Im Bank policy appears to be more important in symbolic than in economic terms. South Africa’s strong lobbying supports this view—since the goods are apparently available more cheaply from other suppliers, South Africa would gain no economic advantage from slightly improved US financing. The symbol of liberalized policy, on the other hand, could be valuable. Nor is it clear why Fluor, which already has the overall contract, has expended so much effort on behalf of potential US subcontractors, unless the company plans to deal with its own subsidiaries or anticipates future financial benefits from helping the South Africans. All agencies agree that Fluor’s lobbyists have greatly exaggerated the potential economic benefits.

Political Considerations. In the absence of strong economic arguments, political considerations must be determining. Internationally, a decision to extend US government-supported Ex-Im Bank lending to South Africa would risk alienating all those who disapprove of apartheid. This would be particularly so in the wake of perceived “cooperation” between the US and South Africa on Angola. There is little most African countries can do by way of direct retaliation against US investments or trade interests as a result, but there is no doubt that a policy change would have a negative impact on our relations with the rest of Africa. Nigeria is one example, where the undoubted adverse reaction
could take the form of retaliation with regard to crude oil supplies. Our best friends would have to condemn the policy liberalization if asked.

**Congressional Considerations.** Any change toward closer relations with South Africa will of course draw strong criticism from those members of Congress who oppose apartheid. Ex-Im Bank must notify Congress of any project larger than $60 million, and the Bank candidly admits that even an individual Member could in effect block an action by making enough noise. In this regard Congressman Diggs has sent a telegram to Ex-Im questioning reports of a change in policy (Tab B). Ex-Im is also concerned about the possibility of alienating Congressional support when it is seeking increases in its overall program. Of course there are other members of Congress who would support such a policy change, either because of their political beliefs or because industry in their districts would stand to benefit from increased exports. Ex-Im has received several letters in support, including one from Congressman Dent (Tab C).

**The Secretary of State’s Proposed Trip to Africa.** That we are reviewing our policy toward Ex-Im lending to South Africa, which we tried to hold closely, has been in the press and is known in Congress. A decision to change our policy would quickly become public knowledge—Congress would have to be informed of Ex-Im lending to Fluor in any case—and would have an adverse impact on the Secretary’s reception in Africa.

**Agency Positions.** At a recent IG meeting at the Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretary level, agencies took the following positions:

—*State* opposes any change on political grounds since the economic arguments are not compelling.

—*Treasury* opposes any change because the economic benefits are not clear, and indicates that even if there were economic advantages their position would be negative on political grounds.

—*Ex-Im Bank* opposes change as Congressionally dangerous, even though it does see some economic benefits.

—*Commerce* supports change in order to increase US exports to South Africa and to gain access to important technology.

—*CIEP* opposes change (staff level).

—*Defense* supports change to emphasize US leadership in the development of alternate fuel supplies (DOD position paper, at Annex F of study, is wide of the mark; level of clearance unknown.)

**Bureaucrats.** Because of the strong lobbying which has taken place on the SASOL II project, it may be advisable to hold an SRG meeting despite the rather lop-sided results of the agency poll. We will have to touch base with the EPB in any case, and an SRG would be preferable to the superficial airing the issue would get in a morning EPB meeting.
It might also reduce carping about the decision within the Administration by emphasizing that it is being given high level consideration. Alternatively, we could circulate the paper for official agency comment. Agency positions would probably not vary from those already expressed except possibly in the case of Defense.

**Recommendation**

That we call an SRG meeting to discuss the response to NSSM 236.⁴

**Alternate Recommendation**

That the NSSM 236 study be circulated for official agency comment.⁵

Robert Hormats concurs.

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⁴ Scowcroft initialed his approval. The Senior Review Group did not meet.

⁵ Scowcroft did not initial his approval or disapproval, but wrote: “Isn’t this part of the SRG process?”
—An examination of the question of majority rule in Rhodesia, including an assessment of the likelihood and consequences of violent change, the role of major political groups and leadership in black Rhodesia, and the likely role of neighboring states, the USSR, Cuba and the People’s Republic of China. The study should also examine possible roles for the OAU and the UN.

—A description of possible scenarios for a settlement of the Namibian problem, including an analysis of the likelihood of increased insurgency and of the internal political groups and leaders in Namibia. The study should also include an examination of: attitudes toward Namibian independence on the part of South Africa and other neighboring African states; the likely Soviet/Cuban role; and the possibilities for increased UN actions to achieve Namibia’s independence.

—An analysis of the impact that majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia is likely to have on South Africa, with specific emphasis on its internal policies, and on United States interests in South Africa.

Based upon the foregoing, the study should propose United States goals with regard to Southern Africa and alternative policy options—both immediate and longer term—for achieving these goals. The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa and should be submitted to the NSC Senior Review Group by May 21, 1976.²

Brent Scowcroft

² The study was not completed.
85. National Security Decision Memorandum 330


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Acting Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy

SUBJECT

United States Policy on Export-Import Bank Loans for South Africa

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 236, and has approved the recommendation that there be no change in Export-Import Bank policy on loans to South Africa.

Brent Scowcroft

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 65, NSDM 330. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank.

2 See footnote 3, Document 83.

86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, August 26, 1976, 1558Z.

212140. Subject: Message from the Secretary to Foreign Secretary Crosland.

1. Please deliver the following message from Secretary Kissinger to Foreign Secretary Crosland:

2. Quote. Dear Tony: I want to express to you our deep concern in the United States that South Africa might be suspended from membership in the IAEA or have its credentials denied at the forthcoming 20th

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Keogh; cleared in AF, EUR, OES, and IO; and approved by Kissinger.
General Conference in Rio, or at the related Board of Governors’ meetings. Such a development would be a serious setback to our continuing efforts to halt further proliferation of nuclear weapons. South African suspension would, in effect, deal a serious blow to our efforts to bring all South African nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. We are planning a strong démarche to IAEA member nations emphasizing the serious consequences which could follow the suspension of South Africa from the IAEA.

We look for parallel action on your part, given the gravity of the problem. I know this will be a tough fight, but it is certainly worth making. Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger. Unquote.

Kissinger

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2 At the September meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the Group of 77 requested a review of South Africa’s designation as the member of the Board of Governors from Africa. The South African delegation’s credentials were not rejected until September 1979, at the General Conference in New Delhi. (David Fischer, *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency*, p. 93)

3 In telegram 13941 from London, September 3, the Embassy informed the Department of British agreement to join the U.S. lobbying effort against suspension of South Africa from the IAEA. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Portuguese Africa

87. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Call by Portuguese Ambassador on Ambassador Johnson

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Vasco Vieira Garin, Ambassador of Portugal
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary
Mr. Stephen G. Gebelt, Country Officer for Portugal

Ambassador Garin said he wished to welcome Ambassador Johnson back to Washington and had come to pay his respects.

The Under Secretary expressed his condolences on the occasion of the earthquake which occurred in Portugal during the night. The Ambassador said that fortunately there did not appear to have been any fatal injuries in Portugal although there reportedly were some in Morocco. He commented that it was fortunate that this quake had not been as disastrous as the one of 1774 when some 40,000 persons were killed and the city of Lisbon was almost completely destroyed.

Ambassador Garin said that he had followed relations between the United States and Portugal for many years both here in Washington and while serving at the United Nations in New York and he remarked that there were areas of disagreement between our two countries, particularly in respect to Portugal’s overseas territories. Noting that Portugal had its “three little Vietnams” (Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea) which were smaller but, nevertheless, bore some resemblance to the United States problem in Vietnam.

The Ambassador said that enough years had now elapsed since the troubles began in Africa to demonstrate clearly that this was not a spontaneous revolt of the peoples in the areas but rather an externally stimulated insurgent action.

In response to questions by the Under Secretary, the Ambassador said that there was evidence of Chinese involvement, via Tanzania in activities within Mozambique, including some very sophisticated weaponry. He said that in Angola, guerrillas were infiltrating from Congo (K) and Zambia. However, as both those countries need the Ben-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 PORT-US. Confidential. Drafted by Gebelt (EUR/SPP) and approved in J on March 5.
guela Railway for the export of minerals, they tend to restrain the terrorists. In Portuguese Guinea which the Ambassador said was the most dangerous, there were arms supplied (primarily Soviet or East European) by the Republics of Guinea and Senegal.

The Ambassador said that he considered Portuguese Guinea a dangerous problem for the entire Western world, because it seemed obvious that the Soviets wanted to gain control of Portuguese Guinea and, subsequently, at least one of the Cape Verde Islands. He commented that if he had mentioned ten years before the fact that the Soviets would be in Syria and Alexandria, nobody would have believed him, but they are there now. In the same way, it might seem farfetched to envisage Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands as Soviet-dominated today, but this could very well happen within a few years.

The Ambassador said that the Portuguese considered that with the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands and Portuguese Guinea, Angola and Mozambique, they were contributing significantly to the defense of the Western world. However, faced with an enemy which was being supplied arms and assistance from the communist countries, the Portuguese were denied by the United States any military equipment to defend themselves. He said that they were even denied spare parts for equipment acquired earlier and the average Portuguese could not understand this and was bitter at such an attitude by an ally which it had assisted. He concluded that he hoped there would be some change in U.S. policy.

The Under Secretary said that he understood the Portuguese position and asked how Portugal’s relations were with the new African states.

The Ambassador said that Portugal’s relations with Malawi were excellent as well as with Botswana and the other new states in southern Africa. He said that relations with Zambia were tolerable, despite statements made by President Kaunda and others. He expressed the belief that relations with Congo (K) were better and he understood that the Congolese had even raised the possibility of reestablishing diplomatic relations. He said Portugal would be willing to do so but had laid down certain conditions that had not yet been met. He expressed the belief that there was no possibility of improving relations with Tanzania. He said that he was convinced that the Africans looked on the Portuguese differently, for example, than they did on the South Africans (he added quickly that Portugal’s relations with the South Africans were excellent although they disagreed on racial policies). He said that in his years at

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2 In 1961 the United States suspended military shipments to Portugal on the grounds that Portugal was using arms intended for NATO in its African territories.
the United Nations, he had felt that the black Africans did recognize that the Portuguese were not racially conscious. The Ambassador said that Portugal was proud of her achievements in creating multiracial societies in Brazil, the African territories and Goa which had remained attached to Portugal despite a great propaganda campaign until India had sent in some 40,000 troops.

The Under Secretary said he believed that Portugal must work for better relations with the black African countries and that, with time and patience, much could be achieved. In concluding, he asked the Ambassador to convey his warm regards to the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Franco Nogueira, with whom he had served in Japan many years before.

88. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 19, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
US–Portuguese Relations

PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
Mr. Clement Conger, Deputy Chief of Protocol
Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director, Spain and Portugal

Portugal
His Excellency Alberto Franco Nogueira, Foreign Minister of Portugal
His Excellency Vasco Vieira Garin, Ambassador of Portugal

The Portuguese Foreign Minister thanked the President for seeing him and for being so generous with his time at this moment when he faces so many complex and critical issues. Before launching into bilateral matters the Foreign Minister wanted to thank the President for addressing the NATO Council and explaining the ABM question in such a persuasive, convincing and lucid manner. Armed with this information

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PORT–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Landau and approved by the White House on April 22. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the Oval Office and ended at noon. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)
the Portuguese Foreign Minister said he would be able to explain to his government this problem which affects NATO and the whole world. The President said that the credibility of the U.S. deterrent is of course essential to NATO and the solution to the problem depends precisely on our credibility on this subject.

Turning to US/Portuguese relations the Foreign Minister said that it was no secret that these relations had not been very good after 1961 although he did not want to belabor this point. Now with new administrations in the U.S. and in Portugal the time had come to start a fruitful dialogue between both countries. Since 1961 there had been no true exchange of communications between the two governments and this was one of the reasons for the deterioration of relations. The President asked whether the view that there had been no useful communications between the two governments was generally shared by his government. The Foreign Minister assured him that the feeling in Lisbon was that the USG had not been interested in hearing the Portuguese view but he hoped all this was now over and that there existed a new climate. The Foreign Minister said he wanted to make two points.

1. He could assure the President that the Portuguese derived no pleasure or amusement out of bad relations with the U.S. and moreover he did not believe it would be in the U.S. interests to have bad relations with Portugal. Therefore as a first step to improving relations there should be a dialogue between the two countries.

2. As the President was certainly aware, the US/Portuguese difficulties arose in the context of Portugal’s African policies. There were no problems in other areas as U.S. and Portuguese views on European matters and on the defense of the West largely coincided.

In regard to Africa, Portugal has followed a different policy than the rest of the world. But he wanted to assure the President that Portugal considered this policy vital. Moreover, it was not a personal policy of former Prime Minister Salazar who has now disappeared from the political arena. Portugal’s African policy remains unchanged because it fulfills the needs and desires of the Portuguese people. This policy has been carried out for many years and is supported by the vast majority of the Portuguese. Finally, it was his view that Portugal’s African policy does not run counter to the U.S. policy but that it is useful to the long-term aims of the U.S. in Africa. This point is important and needs to be discussed further and therefore we must have a dialogue. It was his feeling that in the past the U.S. view had been much affected by the general world position which was against Portugal and by UN doctrine. He said he did not want to use a harsh word but he thought the confrontation should end and the dialogue should start. The President said he did not at all object to the use of the word confrontation
and that he was in favor of fair and tough negotiations. The President assured the Foreign Minister that his was a new administration with a completely open mind. He said he knew Mr. Landau who had been dealing with this area and Mr. Landau in turn clearly understood the President’s views. The President said that we wanted the dialogue and that he did not want his administration to continue using doctrinaire views. There were a number of important questions to be discussed between the two countries. The President said his first concern were the U.S. allies in Europe because what they do is important to the U.S. He told the Foreign Minister that he could look to our Ambassador in Lisbon as a channel and we would look to their Ambassador in Washington to talk frankly with Mr. Landau and others or of course at any time with Mr. Kissinger. This was a new game and the U.S. wanted good hard-headed discussions, and good relations with Portugal. The President asked Mr. Landau whether the State Department had already started something in this respect. Mr. Landau said that the Secretary has set up a meeting for next week with the Assistant Secretaries for European, African and UN Affairs to discuss this matter. The President then asked Mr. Kissinger for any additional views.

Mr. Kissinger expressed appreciation for the important role Portugal has played in NATO. He said that in accordance with the President’s wishes the National Security Council has ordered a study of the Southern African problem and that he hoped this complex matter would come before the Security Council within the next two or three months.

In closing the Portuguese Foreign Minister said that he had found some of the policies of its NATO allies hard to understand because Portugal’s allies in the West had placed an embargo on arms sales to Portuguese territories in Africa while at the same time Portugal had a standing offer from the Soviet bloc for arms of any kind and that the Czechs have been very actively offering arms sales to Portugal. Talking about Czechoslovakia the President said he noted with sadness how little public attention had been paid in the U.S. and in Europe when it became apparent that the last vestiges of freedom in Czechoslovakia had disappeared.

The President assured the Foreign Minister that Portugal would get an opportunity to state its case and that it would have a fair hearing from the U.S. He of course expected that Portugal would give the same fair hearing to U.S. views. Meantime we would work on our policy review and in closing he wanted to assure the Foreign Minister once

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more that he agreed with him on the importance of a good dialogue between the two countries.  

3 In an April 22 memorandum Sonnenfeldt expressed his concerns to Kissinger regarding the bureaus in the Department of State conforming to Nixon’s approach to Portugal: “I think it important that AF and IO take note of the President’s remarks about our having a completely open mind and not using doctrinaire views.” Kissinger approved sending the memorandum to the Assistant Secretaries of European Affairs, African Affairs, and International Organization Affairs before a meeting on April 23. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files, Europe, Portugal, Vol. I) Minutes of the meeting were not found.

89. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal  


Subject: Southern Africa. Ref: Lisbon 1663, 1749.  

1. If and when a suitable occasion arises, the Department hopes you will continue the exchange with Caetano on the future of Portuguese Africa. In future conversations, you may wish to draw on the following points which represent the Department’s assessment of the current situation in southern Africa and particularly the attitudes of Zambia and Tanzania.

2. We believe the policies of Zambia and Tanzania, both militant African states, reflect several factors: fear and suspicion deeply rooted in their colonial experience that southern African whites represent a genuine danger to their security; frustration over intractable internal political and economic problems; and deep concern about forces at work in the region which they are unable to control. Men like Kaunda and Nyerere are indeed deeply committed to solidarity with the African majorities throughout southern Africa. At the same time they

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 AFR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Frank Crump, Mark Lore, and Everett Briggs on December 31, 1969; cleared in AF/E, AF/S, AF/C, AF, INR/RAF, and EUR/SPP; and approved by Tibbetts. Repeated to Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, Lourenco Marques, Luanda, and Lusaka.

2 In telegram 1663 from Lisbon, August 15, 1969, Knight gave an overview of his initial conversation with Caetano. With regard to Portuguese Africa, Caetano remarked that if “various elements of population could cohabit peacefully—as they do in Brazil—he would favor independence for Angola and Mozambique in immediate future.” The Prime Minister did not believe that this was possible due to outside interference. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL PORT–US) Telegram 1749 from Lisbon was not found.
have constantly emphasized their belief in multiracial solutions in southern Africa.

3. It is our feeling that the experience of the past decade, during which relations between most of the black and white-ruled states of southern Africa have steadily worsened, casts serious doubt upon Caetano’s expectation that a “better time” will come while the Portuguese continue present policies. We realize that the future of this area is fraught with uncertainties and imponderables; nevertheless it seems most likely to us that the gulf between the black-ruled states and Portugal is likely to widen, in the absence of any attempt at reconciliation. Despite their internecine quarrels and Portuguese military superiority, the insurgent movements are active on more fronts and receive more Zambian and Tanzanian support now than at any time in the past. Completion of the Tan-Zam Railway will end Portuguese control over Zambia’s access to the sea, removing a factor which has done much to moderate that country’s policies up to now. From time to time, it is true that certain of the black-ruled states may make pragmatic policy adjustments which favor Portugal (e.g., the Congo (K) at present). In the absence of some kind of modus vivendi between the two sides, however, the long-term prospects for meaningful progress do not seem promising. The Portuguese may be able to continue to contain the rebellions, but the protracted conflict will continue to drain Portuguese and African resources and will contribute to a prolonged state of insecurity and tension in southern Africa.

4. Such a situation is in no one’s interests. A continuation of the present climate cannot help but provide increased opportunities for communist influence. The current ability of the Portuguese to master the situation may conceal the extent to which other long-range factors (e.g., polarization of racial attitudes) will gradually undermine the Portuguese position in Angola and Mozambique.

5. We believe there are many in Zambia and Tanzania who are aware of these prospects for violence and are anxious to avoid them. The Lusaka Manifesto, largely a product of Zambian and Tanzanian initiative, appears to represent a genuine effort to find a peaceful way out, without abandoning the basic commitment to self-determination. The Manifesto, in which signatory states agree to urge cessation of guerrilla activities if the Portuguese accept the principle of self-determination, has now been formally and publicly endorsed by the African Chiefs of State at the September OAU meeting in Addis Ababa. The Tanzanian and Zambian leaders have privately emphasized to us the importance of the Manifesto. Some have even expressed

3 See Document 9.
their recognition that evolution away from a colonial relationship ought to be gradual and accompanied by intensified measures to spur development of the African populations. Others are doubtless much less flexible. Nevertheless, we have no reason to suppose that the present leaders of these states would seek in any way to prevent a multiracial solution in the Portuguese African territories.

6. It is impossible to judge the ability of African states to deliver on the promises in the Manifesto but we believe the Manifesto contains positive elements which could provide Portugal with an opportunity to determine whether the interests of the Portuguese on one hand and of the African states and nationalist groups on the other, might ultimately be reconciled. We believe that within the limits of their own needs and commitments, the Zambian and Tanzanian expressions of a desire to achieve a peaceful solution are genuine. We recognize Portugal has publicly stated its eagerness to reestablish normal relations with its African neighbors and believe the Manifesto may provide Portugal opportunities to take positive steps in that direction, or at least to test the willingness of African leaders to discuss the problem.

7. FYI: In making these points, we have sought to address two major aspects of Caetano’s earlier assessment (Lisbon 1663). Caetano appears to see black racism as the major motivation of the militant black states. We do not deny that racism is a factor in their political dynamics, but as noted in paragraph 2 above there are other important factors involved and Caetano’s conclusion strikes us as too pessimistic, or at any rate, as premature.

8. We infer from Caetano’s comments that he foresees a time when the emotionalism which currently characterizes African attitudes toward these problems is likely to wane. We have endeavored to explain why we believe the trends are generally in the opposite direction.
90. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Knight
Diego Asencio, Political Officer

Portugal
Prime Minister Marcello Caetano
Ambassador Garin
Antonio Patricio, Chief,
International Political Organizations

SUBJECT
Portuguese and U.S. Policies in Africa

In answer to the Secretary’s question on how he saw the future in Angola and Mozambique, Prime Minister Caetano stated that there were now fifth and sixth generation Portuguese in those provinces. They were building a non-discriminatory society based on a mixed race. This required time. If independence could be granted to these provinces along the lines of the American colonies in 1776 or of Brazil in 1822 there would be no problem as far as he was concerned. However, the type of independence that would satisfy the United Nations was a danger to civilization and would lead to the implantation of communism in that area at great risk to Rhodesia and South Africa. As happens in subversive wars, the problem was the winning of the spirit of the people through economic and social progress rather than the killing of the enemy. Prime Minister Caetano concluded by stating that the Portuguese policy was to make the people realize that the assurances of Portuguese sovereignty were worth more than the uncertainties of an adventure with an unpredictable outcome.

The Secretary stated that he was pleased that Portugal had conveyed the feeling to the outside world that there was some liberalization in Portugal with the continued maintenance of stability. On Africa we hoped to have a fairly practical policy in that we were going to assist African nations in economic development and otherwise. We were not as concerned about the extent of communist penetration as some other nations seemed to be, since the danger compared to prior periods seemed to have lessened. We did see a major problem in the years ahead of confrontation between blacks and whites and this caused concern.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PORT–US. Confidential; Exdis. Part III of III. The meeting was held at Catalazete Fort. Rogers was in Portugal to meet with Caetano and senior Portuguese officials.
The Secretary stated that he would like to suggest that we understood Portugal’s problems and the Portuguese point of view. Just as we intended to be very understanding of these problems and the steps taken, he hoped the Portuguese would be understanding of the problems we faced in the United States, the United Nations, and with other countries. We would prefer to work out a future relationship in such a way that we were not asked or made to appear to either support or oppose Portuguese policies. He added that we were anxious to maintain cordial relations and valued our partnership in NATO. We certainly supported the direction in which Portugal was moving. Prime Minister Caetano replied that while the United States should not have to commit itself to Portuguese policy, there must be many concrete points where Portuguese policy could be supported since these points were in support of world peace.

91. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 4, 1970, 2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Congo (K) President Mobutu: Portugal and Angola (Part 3 of 5)

PARTICIPANTS
Congolese:
H. E. Joseph Desire Mobutu, President, Congo (K)
H. E. Jean-Theodore Umba–Di–Lutete, Minister Delegate at the Presidency
H. E. Evariste Loliki, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Barthelemy Bisengimana, Director of Cabinet of the Presidency

U.S.:
Secretary Rogers
Ambassador Sheldon B. Vance
Assistant Secretary Newsom
John McKesson, Director, AF/C

President Mobutu raised the problem of Angola. He explained that his Government was supporting Holden Roberto, leader of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), while many other Africans were supporting the Popular Movement for the Liberation of An-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 THE CONGO. Secret. Drafted by McKesson on August 10 and cleared by Newsom. The meeting was held in Rogers’s office.
gola (MPLA), which was communist-oriented. Mobutu said that there was no question but that Angola would eventually become independent. If independence is achieved with Holden Roberto in command, relations can develop amicably between Angola and the Congo, but if the MPLA takes over upon the independence of Angola, the Congo will have very serious problems all along the extended frontier between the two countries. Within the Organization for African Unity (OAU), Algeria strongly supports the MPLA while the Congo has so far been able to maintain OAU backing for GRAE. In the long run this situation could lead to grave difficulties.

Mr. Newsom stated that we understood the problem and worked with Holden Roberto as much as our relations with Portugal permit. The Secretary said that he was in Lisbon recently and talked to Caetano.² He did not see much evidence of a change on the part of Portugal but he hoped that there might be eventually. The Secretary stated that we are doing what we can to be helpful. The Secretary felt that Caetano would like to make changes but had to face his own hard-liners. Mr. Newsom noted that the Congo had practical contacts with the Portuguese in Kinshasa and he said that we would like to hear any ideas the Congolese might have on how we could deal more effectively with the Portuguese.

Mobutu said that events such as the MPLA being received in Rome by the Pope while Holden’s group was kept aside were very bad. This gave a psychological advantage to the MPLA over GRAE which was most unfortunate. Mobutu said that the US should try to persuade Lisbon to negotiate with Holden Roberto. In this connection, Mobutu noted that the Western powers had leverage over Portugal through investments in Angola. The US and other foreign countries were investing in oil and diamonds in Angola and this represented encouragement for Portugal.

² See Document 90.
Recent evidence suggests the Soviets may be augmenting their support to various liberation movements in austral and Portuguese Africa (or, at least, may be contemplating such an increase). The margin of increase is not likely to be great, but, even so, may give the various movements a boost—especially if increased assistance takes the form of training cadres in Africa.

_Soviet Team Reported to Have Entered Angola._ One unconfirmed report has indicated that a team of four to six Soviets recently entered Angola from Zambia and that others may soon follow. The same report alluded to a recent “extraordinarily large” Soviet arms shipment to the Angolan Popular Liberation Movement (MPLA) and to the possibility of a new MPLA training camp to be set up inside Angola. The source of the report speculated that MPLA activities may be entering a new and more active phase.

_Conference on the Portuguese Colonies Calls for Increased Aid._ While the foregoing report has not been verified, it makes interesting reading when juxtaposed with the proceedings of the June 27–29 Conference in Support of Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies in Rome, sponsored by two Moscow-controlled front groups, the World Council of Peace and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. (Liberation movements represented at Rome were the MPLA from Angola, PAIGC from Portuguese Guinea, and FRELIMO from Mozambique, all members of the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies and steady recipients of Soviet aid). In addition to the boilerplate condemnation of the “colonial war” being conducted by Portugal with the aid of NATO countries, the final resolution called for a campaign of world-wide denunciations of Portugal, and, perhaps more importantly, for an increase in material aid to the liberation movements.

_Altered Soviet Assessments._ Such calls have been voiced before and have resulted in very little in the way of implementation. This may well be the case again. However, in the wake of events in Libya, the Sudan,
Somalia and elsewhere, the Soviets appear to have become somewhat more bullish in Africa and may be more inclined to give increased support to liberation fronts. If so, they will probably be under no illusions as to the fronts' chances of near-term success; rather, they would see stepped-up aid as a means to increase their own influence not only with the liberation movements themselves but also with the progressive leaders of independent African states who sympathize with them. With such objectives in mind, an increased investment at this time would be consistent with what the Soviets seem to have assessed to be an improved climate in Africa.

**Competition With Other Groups.** Moreover, augmented Soviet assistance would enhance the position of the Soviet-supported groups relative to those aided by the Chinese, or, in the case of Holden Roberto’s group in Angola, those supported by noncommunist sources. In the process, the militant image of the Soviet Union as a supplier would also be improved. That the latter may be a live factor in Soviet considerations is suggested by the fact that the level of vituperation between the Soviets and Chinese over precisely this point has recently increased. Judging by their replies, the Soviets seem to have been particularly stung by Chinese charges that Moscow is “obstructing the liberation struggle”. Increased aid would represent one relatively low-cost, low-risk means to counter such charges.

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93. **Paper Prepared in the Department of State**


**ANGOLA: GUIDELINES FOR POLICY**

**A. Summary**

Angola is a Portuguese colony on the northwest extremity of white-dominated southern Africa. Lisbon’s rule over the territory is opposed by independent African states, particularly those on Angola’s borders. These have supported a 9-year old nationalist insurgency in Angola which, while thus far unsuccessful, shows no sign of abating. U.S. association with Portugal as a NATO ally creates problems for

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1–2 ANG–US. Secret; Noforn. This paper was approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa. Transmitted in CA–5102 to Luanda on October 2.
USG relations with independent Africa. At the same time, differences between the U.S. and Portugal over the latter’s African policies have adversely affected our bilateral relations with Lisbon.

Material U.S. interests in Angola are small, though growing. The territory is important within the context of our concern with the over-all southern African problem. Our policy objectives over the near term should be generally concerned with the lessening of border tensions, the development of local institutions with significant African participation, the limiting of South African influence, and an increased understanding of U.S. African policy by both black and white Angolans. There is little we can do to attain these objectives except to try to maintain some influence in Lisbon and in the black African states most directly concerned. We should continue to remain outside the conflict and maintain our arms embargo.

B. Background

1. Political/Security. Despite occasional references to increased autonomy for Angola from Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, Lisbon continues to control tightly the political-economic life and administration of the province. Internal right-wing pressures, led by the military, to maintain the present colonial policy have apparently precluded any significant GOP policy changes in this area for the foreseeable future.

Although the US, like the UN, treats Angola as a non-self-governing area and thus feels Portugal has international obligations under Article 73e of the UN Charter to promote the political, economic, social and educational development of the territory and to submit reports to the UN, Portugal regards Angola as a “province” being an integral part of the Portuguese nation. Unlike South Africa and Rhodesia, Portugal officially advocates “multiracialism,” defined as the development of a completely racially integrated society. Many centuries of neglect of the territory’s African population as well as its present colonial status have, however, created de facto white minority rule in Angola at least for the time being.

Many leaders of Angola’s 300,000 white community wish more economic and ultimately political autonomy from the metropole. Both patriotism and the realization that Portuguese military forces will be necessary in Angola for the foreseeable future serve to mute the whites’ demands at present, however.

Nationalist African insurgencies in the northwestern and eastern parts of the territory continue. The principal insurgent groups are the MPLA, the GRAE and UNITA, each of these having a somewhat different tribal base. All three movements are dedicated to the “liberation” of Angola from Portuguese rule. They operate from neighboring African
countries and receive OAU and/or communist support. None of the insurgent movements has succeeded so far in enlisting a significant number of Angola’s 5.2 million Africans, who are largely rural and apolitical.

A largely expeditionary (although about 20 percent African) Portuguese force of about 65,000 men plus white and native irregulars numbering about 40,000 has succeeded in maintaining a military stalemate in Angola over the past several years. African nationalist insurgents totaling about 7,000 in the territory at any one time are active only in sparsely populated areas of the east, the northwest and the borders of the Cabinda exclave, all peripheral to Angola’s economic life.

The Portuguese have managed to neutralize most Africans in the areas of active insurgency by resettling them in large controlled villages. As a result, the insurgents have been forced to maintain long supply lines back to their bases in Zambia and the Congo (K); this and their failure to win the support of local tribes have been important reasons for the inability of the rebels to penetrate into the more densely populated central highlands.

The insurgent groups also continue to be plagued by internal and intermural dissension. Nonetheless, the nationalist insurrection in Angola shows no sign of abating and will probably continue to be a major and costly security problem for the Portuguese for the foreseeable future. (Portugal devotes about 38 percent of its budget to defense.) South Africa gives the Portuguese some helicopter support in southeastern Angola, but the Portuguese have sought to hold association with South Africa to a minimum.

2. Economic. With abundant agricultural and mineral resources, the exploitation of which has quickened in recent years, Angola’s economy is healthy and growing. The territory is one of the world’s major coffee and gem diamond exporters, and iron ore and petroleum extraction are increasing rapidly. Although defense spending has limited governmental development efforts, the Angolan insurgency has stimulated an increase in private investment and infrastructural projects, as well as improvements in education and health facilities. Angola’s principal economic problem continues to be its traditional balance of payments deficit with metropolitan Portugal, a problem that new mineral exports will ease but probably not eliminate in the near future.

3. Foreign Relations. All foreign relations for Angola are handled by the central government in Lisbon. Civilian and military intelligence officials of the province do maintain quasi-diplomatic contacts with South African counterparts, and lately, with officials from the Congo (K).

The Angolan insurgents’ Zambian safehaven has exacerbated relations between that country and Portugal. Lusaka’s former sub rosa con-
tacts with Lisbon have been a particular casualty of worsening tempers on both sides over the past year.

C. U.S. Interests

With the exception of Gulf Oil’s $150 million investment in an off-shore oil field in Cabinda, U.S. investment in Angola is miniscule. Investment will probably increase, however, as mineral possibilities increase and the territory’s expanding economy makes it more attractive as a market. In trade, the U.S. is Angola’s second biggest supplier (after Portugal), while buying about one-half of the province’s coffee production. The U.S. took $54.2 million of Angola’s exports in 1969 while selling the province $32.9 million worth of goods. Prospects for increased American exports are excellent.

Angola occupies a potentially strategic position in the south Atlantic. This is particularly so since the closure of the Suez Canal and the prohibition on U.S. Navy calls at South African ports. The U.S. Navy uses port facilities at Luanda and occasionally Mocamedes for refueling on the average of once a month.

As part of the general problem of Portuguese Africa, Angola is a point of friction in our relations with the black African governments and with the Portuguese as well. Both sides are dissatisfied with our essentially middle-of-the-road policy and this manifests itself both in bilateral relations and in the U.N. In the latter case, the General Assembly and the Security Council have called repeatedly on the GOP over the past decade to change its colonial policy. In recent years, resolutions on Portuguese Africa have become more extreme and the choice for the U.S. has often been to abstain or to oppose them. This irritates the Afro-Asian group which sponsors them, and makes it less willing to accommodate us on other matters. An internationally acceptable solution to the Angolan problem would thus serve our interests by removing an impediment to the realization of more vital U.S. foreign aims, whether in Africa, in Europe, or in other areas of the world.

Pacific and equitable long-term solutions to the problems of southern Africa are in the U.S. interest. Events in Angola have considerable strategic and political significance for the future of the region. The continued operation of the Benguela Railroad is necessary to the economies and thus the stability of Zambia (until the Tan-Zam Railroad is built) and the Congo (K). A deterioration of the present uneasy situation in Angola could lead to widespread and bloody racial conflict in the territory. This might stimulate more South African assistance to Portugal, extending Pretoria’s presence to the Congo River, and making peaceful change in southern Africa even more difficult. Such developments would increase African and domestic pressures for the U.S. to actively intervene in the area, and would, in any event, make...
Angola and southern Africa more acute foreign policy problems than at present.

D. U.S. Interests

Realistic goals over the next five years would be the following:

1. Avoidance of becoming identified with either the Portuguese or insurgent side.

2. Improved Portuguese communications and relations with Zambia and the Congo (K).

3. A start in the development of local autonomous political institutions with significant African participation. The successful integration of increased numbers of Africans into the territory’s money economy and urban life.

4. Limitation of South Africa’s influence to the extent possible.

5. Increased awareness by Angola’s black and white populations of U.S. values, traditions, and foreign policy goals particularly as these are reflected in our attitude towards Africa.

6. Implementation of our policy toward Angola so as to minimize, in so far as practicable, adverse effects on our use of our base in the Azores.

7. Maintain overflight rights and access to Port facilities.

E. Courses of Action

There is little that the U.S. can do to influence events in Angola. Our policy should oppose Portugal’s use of force as a curative for its African problems while stressing the belief that only moves toward self-determination will promote long-term stability in Angola. Corresponding with certain of the objectives listed above, the following are possible specific USG actions which might make a contribution:

1. (a) Maintain the present embargo on arms for use in Portuguese Africa by either side in the conflicts.

(b) Give public support to equitable, non-violent means of solving disputes in Portuguese Africa.

(c) Continue the present policy of normal trade relations while neither encouraging nor discouraging American investment in Portuguese Africa. Investment guarantees can be considered on a case-by-case basis, however, using the guidelines of 3 (b) below.

2. In Lisbon and Lusaka, continue informally to stress the advantage of Portuguese-Zambian bilateral contact, and of avoiding recourse to the United Nations in case of disputes.

3. (a) Continue to discuss informally the future of Portuguese Africa with Portuguese officials.

[No additional pages of this paper were found.]
MOZAMBIQUE: GUIDELINES FOR POLICY

A. Summary

Mozambique is a Portuguese colony bordered by both white and black-dominated militant states. It is an important transportation hub, but its colonial status and geographic position render it inherently unstable for the foreseeable future. Lisbon’s rule over the territory is opposed by independent African states, particularly those on Mozambique’s borders. A nationalist African insurgency in its sixth year, while thus far unsuccessful, shows no sign of abating. U.S. association with Portugal as a NATO ally creates problems for USG relations with independent Africa. At the same time, differences between the U.S. and Portugal over the latter’s African policies have adversely affected our bilateral relations with Lisbon.

While concrete U.S. interests in Mozambique are small, the territory’s geography and transit facilities render it important within the context of our concern with the over-all southern African problem. Our policy objectives over the near term should be generally concerned with the lessening of border tensions, the development of local institutions with significant African participation, the limiting of South African and Rhodesian influence, and an increased understanding of U.S. policy by both black and white Mozambicans. There is little we can do to attain these objectives except to try to maintain some influence in Lisbon and in the black African states most directly concerned. We should continue to remain outside the conflict and maintain our arms embargo.

B. Background

1. Political/Security. Despite occasional references to increased autonomy for Mozambique from Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, Lisbon continues to control tightly the political-economic life and administration of the province. Internal right-wing pressures, led by the military to maintain the present colonial policy have apparently precluded any significant GOP policy changes in this area for the foreseeable future.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1–2 MOZ-US. Secret; Noforn. This paper was approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa. Transmitted in CA–5103 to Lourenco Marques on October 2.
Although the US, like the UN, treats Mozambique as a non-self-governing area and thus feels Portugal has international obligations under Article 73e of the UN Charter to promote the political, economic, social, and educational development of the territory and to submit reports to the UN, Portugal regards Mozambique as a “province” being an integral part of the Portuguese nation. There is little separatist sentiment among Mozambique’s 200,000 whites. Unlike South Africa and Rhodesia, as a matter of national policy, Portugal does not discriminate on the basis of race. The Government’s direction in Mozambique is rather defined as the development of a completely integrated “multi-racial” society. Many centuries neglect of the territory’s African population as well as its present colonial status have, however, created de facto white minority rule in Mozambique, at least for the time being.

The FRELIMO liberation movement, seeking an end to Portuguese rule, is conducting insurgent operations in the territory’s extreme north and northwest. The movement operates from the neighboring African countries of Zambia and Tanzania—but has not been permitted to establish bases in strategically-situated Malawi. It receives support from the OAU and communist nations. FRELIMO’s tribal base is largely restricted to the fiercely independent Makondes near the Tanzanian border; as a result, the movement has not found significant support among Mozambique’s 7.8 million Africans, who are mostly rural and apolitical.

Although FRELIMO’s guerrillas probably do not number over 5,000 in the territory at any one time, the insurrection will probably continue to be a difficult and costly security problem for the Portuguese for the foreseeable future. (Portugal devotes about 38 percent of its budget to defense.) To date, however, a largely expeditionary Portuguese force of about 50,000 men (25 percent African) and some native irregulars have been able to contain it. The Portuguese military effort has been supplemented by an African resettlement program which has served to exploit tribal divisions and thus limit the rebellion’s scope. Rhodesia’s Air Force occasionally provides air support for Portuguese operations.

A major security concern at present is the insurgent threat to the Cabora Bassa dam project in Tete district. Any FRELIMO successes near Cabora Bassa could shake international confidence in the project’s feasibility and possibly endanger its completion.

With South Africa, Portugal has refused to observe UN international sanctions on Rhodesia, arguing that coastal states have an obligation to serve landlocked neighbors. The GOP’s real concern, however, is twofold: to protect the security of its African territories while discrediting UN economic sanctions as a means to pressure the south-
ern African regimes; and to protect income to Mozambique from transit charges, which traditionally account for a major source of earnings for the territory. By allowing Mozambique’s port and rail facilities to continue to carry a substantial portion of Rhodesian trade with the outside world, Portugal has become a major partner with South Africa in support of the Smith regime’s defiance of the international community.

2. Economic. Mozambique’s economy has been growing modestly but steadily over the past decade. GDP is increasing about five percent a year at present. Agriculture is the major activity and sugar, cashew, and cotton represent the province’s principal exports. Transit trade from Mozambican ports to South Africa, Rhodesia and Zambia also continues to represent an important source of income despite Rhodesian sanctions. Mozambique’s mineral resources are uncertain, although active exploration for offshore oil is under way.

Although defense spending takes a large percentage of provincial governmental expenditure, the Mozambican insurgency has stimulated increased private investment as well as improvements in health and education facilities. A number of new infrastructure projects are with South African assistance at Cabora Bassa. Mozambique’s principal economic problem continues to be a traditional balance of payments deficit with metropolitan Portugal.

3. Foreign Relations. All foreign relations for Mozambique are handled by the central government in Lisbon. Civilian and military intelligence officials in Mozambique maintain quasi-diplomatic contacts with South African, Rhodesian and Malawian counterparts.

The Zambian and Tanzanian insurgent safehavens have exacerbated relations between these countries and Portugal; Lusaka’s former sub rosa contacts with Lisbon have been a particular casualty of worsening tempers on both sides over the past year.

C. U.S. Interests

U.S. trade with Mozambique is small but growing; in 1969, the U.S. took $16.3 million of the territory’s exports while supplying $26.5 million of its imports. Mozambique is an important producer of the strategic mineral columbo-tantalite, and the U.S. relies on the territory for about 13% of its supply of this metal. American investment is practically non-existent. Several U.S. companies are prospecting for offshore oil.

Mozambique occupies a potentially important strategic position on the Indian Ocean. The territory has a number of large deep-water ports which have become more important with the closure of the Suez Canal. Because our policy excludes U.S. Navy calls at South African ports except in emergencies, the Navy makes heavy use of the facilities
Portuguese Africa

at Lourenco Marques for refueling. At present, visits from U.S. destroyers or intelligence ships occur about once a month.

As part of the general problem of Portuguese Africa, Mozambique is a point of friction in our relations with the black African governments and with the Portuguese as well. Both sides are dissatisfied with our essentially middle-of-the-road policy and this manifests itself both in bilateral relations and in the U.N. In the latter case, the General Assembly and the Security Council have called repeatedly on the GOP over the past decade to change its colonial policy. In recent years, resolutions on Portuguese Africa have become more extreme, and the choice for the U.S. has often been to abstain or to oppose them. This irritates the Afro-Asian group which sponsors them and makes it less willing to accommodate us on other matters. An internationally acceptable solution to the Mozambican problem would thus serve our interests by removing an impediment to the realization of more vital U.S. foreign policy aims, whether in Africa, in Europe, or in other areas of the world.

Pacific and equitable long-term solutions to the problems of southern Africa are in the U.S. interest. A deterioration of the present uneasy situation in Mozambique could lead to widespread and bloody racial conflict in the territory and bring South Africa and Rhodesia in as active participants. Such developments would increase African and domestic pressures for the U.S. to intervene actively in the area, and would, in any event, make Mozambique and southern Africa more acute foreign policy problems than at present.

D. U.S. Objectives

Realistic goals over the next five years would be the following:

1. Avoidance of becoming identified with either the Portuguese or insurgent side.

2. Improved Portuguese communications and relations with Zambia.

3. A start in the development of local autonomous political institutions with significant African participation. The successful integration of increased numbers of Africans into the territory’s money economy and urban life.

4. Limitation of South African and Rhodesian influence to the extent possible.

5. Increased awareness by Mozambique’s black and white populations of U.S. values, traditions and foreign policy goals, particularly as these are reflected in our attitude towards Africa.

6. Implementation of our policy so as to minimize, in so far as practicable, adverse effects on our use of our base in the Azores.
7. Maintain overflight rights and access to port facilities.

E. Courses of Action

There is little that the U.S. can do to influence events in Mozambique. Our policy should oppose Portugal’s use of force as a curative for its African problems while stressing the belief that only moves toward self-determination will promote long-term stability in Mozambique. Corresponding with certain of the objectives listed above, the following are possible specific USG actions which might make a contribution:

1. (a) Maintain the present embargo on arms for use in Portuguese Africa by either side in the conflicts.
   (b) Give public support to equitable, non-violent means of solving disputes in Portuguese Africa.
   (c) Continue the present policy of normal trade relations while neither encouraging nor discouraging American investment in Portuguese Africa. Investment guarantees can be considered on a case-by-case basis, however, using the guidelines of 3 (b) below.

2. In Lisbon and Lusaka, continue informally to stress the advantages of Portuguese-Zambian bilateral contact, and of avoiding recourse to the United Nations in case of disputes.

3. (a) Continue to discuss informally the future of Portuguese Africa with Portuguese officials.
   (b) Consider applications for investment guarantees on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular risks and the long-term value of the investment to the indigenous inhabitants.

4. (a) In public statements in the UN and elsewhere, distinguish Portugal’s racial policies from those of Rhodesia and South Africa.
   (b) To the extent possible, encourage any Portuguese moves towards more association with Western Europe and independent Africa, and away from South African and Rhodesian influence.
   (c) Maintain friendly, cooperative relations with Portugal.

5. (a) Continue to supply USIA informational material to the Consulate General in Lourenco Marques. Maintain the small CU exchange program in Mozambique at its present level.
   (b) Continue discreet contacts with Mozambique insurgent leaders to keep abreast of possible grounds for negotiation.
   (c) Continue to participate, preferably under an international umbrella, in support to Mozambican refugee education; and to grant CU-SASP university scholarships to qualified Mozambican refugee students within the limits of the present program.
95. Memorandum From the Chief of the Africa Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms


[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–01229A, AA–1, AF Division 1971. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

96. Conversation Among President Nixon, Vice President Agnew, and Secretary of State Rogers


[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Portuguese Africa.]

Agnew: That’s the thing about Africa, Mr. President, since you bring that up. The Portuguese are, of course, very sensitive about their African situation. The new Prime Minister, Caetano, is working very hard to liberalize the conditions there. He feels that they’re making substantial progress in—not only in Angola and Mozambique, but he feels that he’s getting great assistance from Malawi, which is a little country that’s very helpful in an intermediate position. And also, Mobuto sent through me a message to Caetano indicating that he was not anti-Portuguese, he thought they were committed to racial equality. They have some differences about how, perhaps, self-determination should come about, or even what it is, but he was willing to be of assistance with Holden Roberto, where the big problem is Angola. So, it would help to have more presence shown in Africa, because things are developing very rapidly there, and the North African countries have a great influence on this Mediterranean question and the increasing So-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation 67–11. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The exchange is part of a larger conversation, 10–11:57 a.m. According to the President’s Daily Diary, other participants in the Cabinet meeting were John B. Connally, Melvin Laird, John N. Mitchell, J. Phil Campbell, Maurice Stans, James Hodgson, John Veneman, George Romney, John Volpe, George Shultz, Robert Finch, Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush, Raymond K. Price, Herbert G. Klein, Ronald L. Ziegler, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Robert Dole. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

viet presence there, even though they’re around on the other side of the Muslim world. It’s still quite interesting.

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Portuguese Africa.]

Rogers: But I don’t think there’s any real danger. I think the danger in Africa comes through between the blacks and the whites. I think eventually we’ll have, probably, warfare in southern part of Africa. I don’t, I don’t think—I think the Russians are trying to stir up as much trouble as they can, but they don’t look at Africa as of strategic importance. It’s just another place to cause trouble and exploit their ideology, but they don’t own it. They’re not playing a very active role. As matter of fact they are this—they aren’t as successful in Africa now as they were in 1960 when I was there.

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Portuguese Africa.]

97. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research


PORTUGAL PROPOSES DIALOGUE WITH AFRICAN STATES

The Portuguese proposal, in mid-November, to hold discussions on their African territories with independent African states is a step forward from traditional Portuguese intransigence on this subject. However, such discussions, if held, are unlikely to resolve conflicting views of “self-determination and independence” for the territories. On November 15 the Portuguese Permanent Representative to the United Nations proposed to African representatives—November Security Council President Cisse of Guinea and OAU Representative Sahnoun—that a “dialogue” be initiated in New York this January between Portugal, the African countries (either singly or together), and/or the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The Portuguese indicated their readiness for ministerial discussions, in the context of the principles of the UN Charter, over the following issues: 1) the situation in the Portuguese African Territories—Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea; 2) relations with neighboring African countries; and 3) general

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL AFR–PORT. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by James Connell on December 8, cleared by Martin Packman, and released by David Mark (INR/Europe and USSR).
African problems. But, at the same time, they emphatically ruled out discussions with representatives of the liberation movements in the Portuguese territories. (On November 14, Prime Minister Marcello Caetano had publicly stated that Portugal’s national honor would not permit such discussions.)

The Portuguese offer may have been only a tactical maneuver in anticipation of the then-upcoming Security Council debate on the Portuguese territories and in recognition of the strong African voting position in the UN. Nevertheless, by specifically including a discussion of the situation in the overseas territories in the agenda, the Portuguese significantly broadened the subject matter which they had previously been willing to discuss—usually on a bilateral basis—only with a few African countries. Another new development is Portugal’s willingness to talk with the OAU.

UN Calls for Negotiations with “Parties Concerned.” In a rare show of unanimity, the Security Council resolution,\(^2\) adopted without a dissenting vote on November 22, calls upon Portugal, inter alia, to negotiate with the “parties concerned” with a view to ending the present armed confrontation in the territories and permitting them to exercise the right to self-determination and independence. The original draft had specified negotiations with the representatives of the liberation movements. However, after lengthy consultations, the co-sponsors accepted the broader and more ambiguous terminology. Whether negotiations will follow is still uncertain.

While the African countries still favor direct negotiations between Portugal and the insurgent groups—particularly with the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verdes (PAIGC)—some may be willing at least to begin talking with the Portuguese themselves in the hope that a way may be found to bring the liberation movement representatives into the discussions at a later stage. (From time to time there have been rumors that the Portuguese have had secret contacts with some of the insurgents.) Commenting on the SC resolution, OAU Secretary-General Ekangaki urged the Western Powers to “help” Portugal embark on the path of negotiations. A surprisingly moderate Foreign Ministry statement on the same resolution reiterated Portuguese willingness to have conversations with “qualified representatives” of African countries.

What Can Portugal Talk About? Last year’s much-debated revision of the Portuguese Constitution, which theoretically lays the basis for increased “autonomy” (in local affairs) for the overseas territories, has not, in fact, altered Lisbon’s dominance. Moreover, following the

\(^2\) Resolution 322 (1972). For the text of the resolution, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972, p. 598.
re-election of 78-year-old President Thomaz in July and the August Cabinet shifts, which left only one “Liberal” in the Cabinet, Prime Minister Caetano is in no position—even should he wish to—to challenge the conservative military and commercial elites who see their interests tied to Portugal’s continued retention and control of its overseas territories. In his inaugural speech the President emphasized that defense of the overseas territories was the principal task of the nation, taking precedence “even over national economic development.”

Recent government statements, however, have noted a need to increase the participation of the local populations in the affairs of the territories. In October the Overseas Minister and the Governor of Portuguese Guinea both made statements encouraging this development, and on November 14 the Prime Minister publicly declared, “We are willing and ready even to examine and increase the process of the participation of Africans in local administration and government.” It is the prospect of greater local African involvement, and its long-term consequences, which the Portuguese apparently propose to discuss with the African representatives in New York.

Any Talks Unlikely To Be Productive. Such an approach could hardly satisfy the Africans, who have successfully publicized the demands of the liberation movements for recognition and independence this year. This publicity has included the following: In January, the Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa (for which the Portuguese refused to pay their share of the costs) heard representatives of the liberation movements; in April, a three-man special mission of the Committee of 24 (the UN Decolonialization Committee) visited parts of Portuguese Guinea, a visit which the Portuguese denied had taken place; and during this year’s General Assembly, representatives of the liberation movements were granted the status of “observers” in the Fourth Committee’s debate on southern Africa. In addition, continued pressure was put on the Specialized Agencies to comply with last year’s resolution 2874 (XVI),3 which called on them to render “all possible moral and material assistance” to the liberation movements.

Under these circumstances, the Africans will want more movement on the question of the eventual independence for the overseas territories than the Portuguese can possibly agree to. Thus, the most likely result of such talks, if they are, in fact, ever held, would be a clearer realization of how little either side has to discuss, and how irreconcilable their conflicting views of “self-determination and independence” really are.

SUBJECT

Coup in Portugal

The virtually bloodless coup that toppled the government of President Thomaz and Prime Minister Caetano on April 25, 1974 was triggered by Lisbon’s African policies and the divisions within the military to which they gave rise.

The leaders of the rebellion, who called themselves the “armed forces movement,” are virtually unknown, but they are almost certainly middle-level officers devoted to General Antonio de Spinola. After broadcasting an initial proclamation that called for both a liberalization of Portugal’s colonial policies and a restoration of domestic liberties, the rebel junta promptly called on General Spinola to head their movement. Spinola accepted the call, reportedly received an enthusiastic public welcome in Lisbon and, according to the Portuguese radio, has been proclaimed “Head of Portugal.”

Superbly organized and well-led, the insurrectionists took the government by surprise. Loyalist forces offered only token resistance, and after fleeing to the headquarters of the national guard, Thomaz, Caetano, and several other ministers agreed after a few hours of negotiation to go into exile in the Madeira Islands. Thus far the new government appears to be in complete control.

In a speech to the nation on the evening of April 25 Spinola promised to restore power to constitutional institutions once a president of the republic has been elected. Spinola can be expected to run for the post.

Portugal’s most decorated war hero, Spinola is also the author of a book which dared to say that a military solution to the problem of insurgency in the African territories is impossible and a political solution must be found. Spinola also called for a new Portuguese constitution to provide civil liberties and democratic institutions in all areas administered by Portugal. The book created a sensation in Portugal when it appeared last February. It led to a small but abortive “march on Lisbon” in March, and the country has since been gripped by coup fever. De-
spite Lisbon’s moves earlier this month to arrest various oppositionists, the government apparently was unaware of the magnitude of the internal threat it faced.

As “head of government,” Spinola appears to be off to an auspicious start. His prestige is such that, despite the divisions within the armed forces, he may be able to keep them fully under control. The country, despite the influence of the ruling oligarchs and the radicalism of some of the opposition elements, may be ready for some modest movement toward change at home and abroad.

A reorientation of Portugal away from Africa and toward Europe could be traumatic, although many African and European countries would welcome such a change and allow time for it to take place. Assuming the new government settles fully into power, we do not expect to delay full relations with the Spinola regime. At present, the coup would seem not to have put US interests in danger, and it could possibly provide some near-term benefits for the United States—for example, a possible lessening or end to Portuguese pressure for U.S. weapons for use in the African territories.

Thus far there is little reaction to events in the metropole from the Portuguese territories of Africa. The local governments there are urging business-as-usual. The rebel movements have not reacted publicly. They will take a cautious approach to developments and to General Spinola’s announcement he will seek a political rather than military solution to Portuguese African questions. The rebels consistently have demanded complete independence, something they will not give up lightly. White settlers, particularly in Angola, will be increasingly concerned about their own security. Rhodesia and South Africa will face basic policy reassessments since Portugal’s continued military effort against Mozambique insurgents has been seen as a buffer for their own internal security.
99. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 12, 1974, 6:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Zaire Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Zaire
Umba-di-Lutete, Commissioner of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Matungulu N’Kuman, Counselor, Office of the President
Basele Ikondi ya Bankoko Lopori, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mbeku Makosso, Ambassador of The Republic of Zaire

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Edward Mulcahy, Acting Assistant Secretary, AF
Mr. Walter Cutler, Director, AF/C (notetaker)
Ms. Helen Kaps (interpreter)

The Secretary: It is a great pleasure to have you here. How is your President? I am sorry for having had to postpone our meeting. As you know, we have had some domestic problems to sort out and these have taken much of my time. I understand you had a problem at the airport the other day. I want to apologize for any over-eagerness on the part of our police. There is nothing to do about it now, but I am very sorry. We will do our best to see that such discourtesy does not happen again.

Umba: Thank you for receiving me. I understand the unusual situation in your country and I appreciate your finding the time to meet with me. The incident you mentioned is now past. The relations between our two countries are so friendly and important that any such incident cannot possibly harm them.

The Secretary (smiling): I am sure that nothing like that would happen to me when I visit your country.

Umba: Oh, no. We would never let anything like that occur.

Umba: I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your appointment. I would also like to express appreciation for the remarks you made on Saturday to the African Ambassadors. I was pleased by your assurance that United States policies would be continued under your new President.

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I wish to raise two matters. The first concerns our bilateral relations. We have noted that you met with the Belgians during a recent trip to Europe. President Mobutu is very concerned by Belgium’s efforts to discredit Zaire in the eyes of foreign investors. The Belgians have carried on this campaign with a number of other countries, including Germany, Japan, and France. They have tried to create the impression that my government is moving against all foreign investments in Zaire. But their campaign has failed. Zaire has not touched any Belgian assets or properties that were built with their own country [capital]. And we will never seize any capital or properties in Zaire which belong to foreigners. We appreciate the importance of foreign investments in Zaire: as much as $1.5 billion, most of which is from the United States. Reynolds alone has almost $600 million invested in our country. President Mobutu appreciates the confidence that the United States has continued to place in Zaire. Despite Belgium’s campaign, the relations between our two countries remain very good.

The Secretary: Our relations with Zaire are of very great importance to the United States. We regard Zaire as one of the key countries in the world and a king-pin in our policies toward Africa.

Umba: I now wish to move to the second question: the Portuguese territories in Africa and Angola in particular. If we speak mostly about Angola it is because it is so important to us. Zaire shares a common frontier with Angola which is 2,000 kms. long.

The Secretary: I did not realize the border was so long.

Umba: Moreover, there are now about two million Angolan refugees in Zaire.

The Secretary (to Mr. Mulcahy): Two million? What is the population of Angola?

Mr. Mulcahy: About six million.

Umba: I would like to speak frankly about independence in Angola. The socialist countries—especially the Soviet Union—have shown a great interest in Angola. They have put forth much propaganda in support of Agostinho Neto, who until now has been the leader of the MPLA, calling him the only true leader of Angolan liberation. Zaire, on the other hand, has supported Holden Roberto, leader of the FNLA. He is a genuine non-communist patriot. Neto is a propagandist, a man of talk and no action.

The Secretary: What can the United States do?

Umba: We are concerned about the activities of the socialist states, which are exerting pressure on the Portuguese to deal with Neto. Perhaps the United States could assist us in our efforts to counter this pressure.
The Secretary: But if you are supporting Holden, nobody is going to push Zaire around for doing so.

Umba: That’s right. Holden is strong. Among the liberation leaders only he is fighting rather than merely making propaganda. Neto is in the process of being removed from MPLA leadership and now, at last, other African countries are swinging their support behind Holden. Zaire is not under any pressure to support Holden. If we do, it is because he is serious—not an ideologist—and is fighting instead of simply engaging in propaganda.

The Secretary: If you support one Angolan leader, and the communists support another, I have confidence you will succeed.

Umba: As I said, others are beginning to understand the true situation—that Holden is the most genuine of the liberation leaders. He has recently been invited to visit Nigeria, Morocco and Libya.

The Secretary: What should the United States do?

Umba: We believe you should support Holden Roberto. Since the socialists are behind Neto, and since it is said that Holden is favorably inclined toward United States interests, we think he deserves US support.

The Secretary: How? From the practical standpoint, how would we support Holden?

Umba: The communists are rushing to have their ambassadors accredited in Lisbon and to urge support of Neto. The US could assist by helping to create pressures in favor of Holden.

The Secretary: My colleagues believe that foreign policy should be conducted in reasonable ways. But I agree with you, sometimes if you want to get something done you have to exert pressure. As for your request that we support Holden Roberto, frankly I have not been able to study the problem. We think well of Holden, but I have not studied this matter enough to know how something might be done. I understand your position: Zaire has an interest in the future of Angola and you wish us to help by supporting Holden.

Umba: One way this might be done is by raising the level of your contacts with Holden.

The Secretary: Where?

Umba: That would of course be for you to decide. Here in the United States or perhaps in another country. You would be in the best position to decide.

The Secretary: I do not exclude this possibility. We will consider it. It might be a good idea as the situation in Angola continues to evolve. When we do so, we would let you know when we are doing it.

Umba: I have another suggestion I would like to make. We have helped Holden a great deal. Even though we have military strength, in-
cluding Mirages, our means for assisting Holden are more limited than those of the socialist states who have been backing Neto. We think there should be some way by which the US might help Holden to strengthen his position as interlocutor with the Portuguese. He is of course already the best qualified interlocutor.

The Secretary: We will have to look into this. Please assure President Mobutu that any suggestions he has will be studied sympathetically. Do you regard Holden as the only viable, pro-Western candidate for leadership in Angola? Are there any others?

Umba: No, not at present. Perhaps there are others who are not in evidence now; but Holden is the only one we have so far been able to identify. The MPLA is, fortunately, on its back. Holden and we share the same political views.

The Secretary: We have to look into this very carefully, now that the Portuguese government has pronounced itself in favor of the principle of independence for its African territories. We will study the matter carefully. We always take President Mobutu’s views into serious account. If he is concerned about Angola, then his concern deserves our attention. When we have made a decision, we will let you know. I am very sympathetic with the basic principles you have expressed. We would appreciate your letting us know what you think we can do. We will have a new Ambassador—Deane Hinton—in Kinshasa when you return. I know him well; you can have confidence in him.

Umba: We will make sure that he is able to present his credentials quickly.

Umba: I would like to make one more point: events can move quickly, and the situation in Angola could very well move quite fast. It is important that events not pass us by.

The Secretary: You were wise to have come here. You have succeeded in attracting my attention to Angola, much to the dismay of my colleagues, I am sure. I will do something about it.

Umba: We hope that the United States may help the process of negotiations on the Portuguese territories, and on Angola in particular, by intervening with the Portuguese at the right moments.

The Secretary: We will do that at the appropriate times. We will talk to the Portuguese.

Umba: May I ask a personal question: how do you manage to master so many problems at once?

The Secretary: I haven’t mastered this one yet. That is why I value your judgment. I have great respect for your President and for his views on African problems. Please convey my warmest regards to him. The interests of our two countries have many parallels in Angola. We understand your desire to have a friendly government on your border.
Umba: There have been reports that Zaire wants to establish itself in Angola and Cabinda. These reports are jokes; they are false. We are committed to the principle of a free Angola. We have plenty of natural resources in our own country. We have no reason to harbor territorial designs on Angola.

The Secretary: I interpret your views to mean that, being a neighbor of Angola, you want to see a government that is at least not hostile to you established in Angola; that economic factors do not concern you; that it is rather the human elements that count.

Umba: Before leaving, I would like to express appreciation for the support you and the Department of State have given to our Ambassador here in Washington. I am most gratified for your receiving me.

The Secretary: May I assure you that President Mobutu is always welcome in the United States, and that President Ford attaches very great importance to the relations between our two countries.

100. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Mobutu's Request for Material Support to Holden Roberto

1. In line with the request made to you on 12 August 1974 by Umba di Lutete, Foreign Minister of Zaire, on behalf of President Mobutu, for material help to Holden Roberto of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)\(^2\), we plan to increase substantially our present payment of [less than 1 line not declassified] to Holden Roberto [less than 1 line not declassified]

2. We intend to keep these payments fairly low but high enough to assure President Mobutu that we are sympathetic to his concern about the future regime of an independent Angola. The exact amount would be subject to some negotiation with Roberto, but we would expect it to

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Outside the System Chronological File, Box 1. Secret; Sensitive.

\(^2\) See Document 99.
be not more than [less than 1 line not declassified] We would explain the payments to Roberto as designed to help him during a critical time of his career [1 line not declassified]

W.E. Colby

3 Colby signed “Bill” above his typed signature.

101. Editorial Note

The overthrow of Marcello Caetano’s government in Portugal on April 25, 1974, led to a series of negotiations between the metropole and the African liberation movements. President António de Spínola’s July 27 speech regarding the independence of Portugal’s African territories provided the catalyst for an unofficial cease-fire and the formation of transitional governments in Mozambique and Angola.

An agreement with the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was reached September 6 and signed September 7 in Lusaka, Zambia. The principal provisions provided for complete independence on June 25, 1975; the formation of a transitional government, appointed by FRELIMO and the Portuguese Government; and a formal cease-fire. The transitional government was sworn in September 20.

Negotiations with the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), were hampered by continued dissension among the leadership. A two-year plan for independence, released August 10 by the Portuguese Government, proposed a coalition government comprised of representatives of the liberation movements and the white Angolan community. The Provisional Government would hold elections for a Constituent Assembly that would draw up a constitution, after which the Assembly would be dissolved. Elections would be held for a Legislative Assembly, and a government representing the Angolan people would be established.

The proposal was immediately rejected by the FNLA, and internal dissent within the MPLA threatened to fracture the organization and dilute the MPLA’s influence. A series of meetings, mediated by the Organization of African Unity and various African leaders, enabled the groups to resolve their differences. An official cease-fire agreement was reached with the FNLA on October 14 and the MPLA on October 21.
UNITA had already ceased hostilities June 17. All three movements became legal political parties and established headquarters in Luanda. On January 5, 1975, the liberation groups announced they had established a united front, an important prerequisite for independence negotiations with Portugal to proceed.

An agreement was signed January 15, 1975, between the liberation movements and Portugal, providing for Angolan independence on November 11 and equal representation in a transition government that would take office on January 31, 1975. A High Commissioner was appointed to represent Portugal’s interests until independence. The transitional government was responsible for organizing elections and drafting the fundamental law, which would remain in effect until a constitution was drafted. The agreement, signed at Alvor, Portugal, became known as the Alvor Agreement.

102. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

40 Committee Decisions

At a meeting of the 40 Committee on 22 January 1975 it was decided that:

- The Department of State would obtain our Ambassador’s views regarding CIA’s proposed Portugal operations.
- Covert support for Holden Roberto was approved in the amount of [dollar amount not declassified][2]

[Omitted here are decisions unrelated to Portuguese Africa.]

Rob Roy Ratliff
Executive Secretary
The 40 Committee

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1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Intelligence Committee Report File, 40 Committee, January 22, 1975. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted on January 23. Distributed to Clements, Sisco, General Brown, and Colby.

2 Handwritten notes on the portion of the record of the meeting pertaining to a proposed program in Angola stated: “This matter has been resolved by the Secretary’s decision to limit our covert action in Angola to continuation of a subsidy to Holden Roberto.” (Ibid.)
103. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 19, 1975, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia
Mr. Vernon Mwaanga, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia
Mr. Mark Chona, Presidential Advisor
Siteke Mwale, Ambassador to the United States from Zambia
President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Jean M. Wilkowski, United States Ambassador to Zambia

SUBJECT

Office call on the President

Secretary Kissinger: I told the President that the Zambians seem to come at times of crisis. Foreign Minister Mwaanga came here last August during the Cyprus affair and now President Kaunda is here when we have problems in Southeast Asia.

President Ford: I am delighted to have you here. I have been looking forward to this chat and to seeing you this evening. I would be grateful if you would give us your comments and views on the situation in southern Africa. It is an area which I have not personally visited. At some time I hope to be able to pay a visit.

President Kaunda: May I express to you my own personal gratitude and that of my colleagues and Mrs. Kaunda for the wonderful way in which you have received us. Fortunately, we have no bilateral problems and for this we have to thank our two ambassadors. I think our bilateral relations are very good indeed.

President Ford: I would agree. They are in excellent condition.

President Kaunda: The only problems are in southern Africa.

President Ford: I understand you have been working with Vorster and others to resolve the situation.

President Kaunda: As I told Secretary Kissinger, we need your help and I say this not in any critical way. I want to draw your attention to future prospects in the area. For a long time, in fact ever since 1966, we have been trying to urge greater attention to the area. I believe the

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The time listed on the memorandum is 3 p.m.; however, the President’s Daily Diary records the meeting starting at 3:22 p.m. and ending at 4:20 p.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office) Kaunda visited Washington April 18-21.
U.S. and others in the West should examine the problems in a search for solutions. Otherwise, events may overtake you and the U.S. could find itself even fighting on the side of the racists.

We in Africa fought for independence against colonialism. We did not allow ourselves to be taken over. There was a buffer between us and the communists. I have discussed this with your representative in Zambia before the coup in Portugal. At that time I urged your country to support the liberation movements in the Portuguese territories. I said Portugal was your ally in NATO and an ally against communism. But I believe you must examine the motivations of liberation movements. They counted on the support of the anti-colonials. This is an underlying and historical factor. I am not apportioning blame. But I hope that you can see the right thing has been done in southern Africa.

As regards the leaders in Mozambique: The Secretary of State has just now asked us in Zambia to speak to FRELIMO. We will do this. I can tell you from our experience that these Mozambicans want to be independent. They have been helped by China and Russia, but they are no-one’s puppets.

President Ford: I understand they want to be independent.

President Kaunda: Other countries supplied arms but FRELIMO fought and achieved its independence. Angola gives us problems. I am authorized by President Nyerere and my other neighbors …

Secretary Kissinger: Does Mobutu also agree?

President Kaunda: (laughing) Yes, this time he does.

President Nyerere and I agreed to seek the suggestions of President Mobutu on Angola. We went to Kananga in Zaire. After all the issues were laid out, we asked Mobutu to brief us. He said he did not arm Roberto to kill Angolans, but to defeat colonial power and to bring peace to Angola. How do you see the situation now, we asked Mobutu. What means exist for a practical solution? I was straightforward.

President Ford: Are there three major contending forces in Angola?

President Kaunda: Yes, FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA. UNITA was more or less on its own. We did not support it, but we did not ignore it.

Secretary Kissinger: Where did it find its support?

President Kaunda: (rather vague) On the outside. We almost ignored Jonas Savimbi, the president of UNITA. Our colleagues had ignored Savimbi in the past, but this time he emerged as someone who could save the situation. Mobutu said that Neto of MPLA would not accept Roberto as president of a free Angola. Holden Roberto of FLNA would not accept Neto. The only chance we had of putting someone forward to the OAU with the possibility of acceptance was to suggest
that Neto and Roberto should each lead his party and Savimbi would be the compromise leader of all three.

Secretary Kissinger: Do we know Savimbi personally?
Ambassador Wilkowski: Yes, I have met twice with him for long talks.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think of him?
Ambassador Wilkowski: He is a very impressive leader and quite solid and does not strike me as being self-serving or a loner.

President Kaunda: It was thought that Neto could be the Prime Minister or head the National Assembly. Or, for that matter, that Roberto could be one or the other. At least this is the way Mobutu proposed it. We had ignored Savimbi while he was fighting in the bush, although he had made pleas to Zambia to recognize him. He said if Zambia did not recognize him, the OAU would not recognize him either. He came out of Angola last year and we changed our minds. We concluded that if we did not bring him into the picture, he could cause trouble. Therefore, Zambia sponsored his membership in the OAU and then we asked him to come and talk with us. All of us in UNIP were impressed with Savimbi’s sincerity and his honesty of purpose. This changed us overnight. We asked President Nyerere to see him and also Mobutu. Both were impressed.

The new Portuguese Foreign Minister Melo Antunes was in Dar es Salaam. Samora Machel of FRELIMO asked us to see Melo Antunes. He came to Zambia and told us he too was impressed with Savimbi. Melo Antunes said without Savimbi we would not have reached an accord with the liberation movements for the transition of Angola to independence. Savimbi is a man of humility and good qualities. All of us in southern Africa, including Machel, are impressed with him. This is our finding. He speaks freely and frankly and together we are working for a solution in Angola. We realize it is not for us to choose a leader of that emerging country. That is for the people themselves to do. But Africa and its friends have no choice but to be interested in Angola’s future. If not, the situation there is as South African Prime Minister Vorster said, “too ghastly to contemplate.”

President Ford: It would be a disaster.

President Kaunda: In the future the people themselves can choose their leader.

President Ford: Are there substantial ideological differences in the area?

President Kaunda: MPLA and its leader Neto follow the Moscow line.

Secretary Kissinger: And they are financed by Moscow.
President Kaunda: MPLA is financed by Moscow. But, Mr. President, perhaps I am taking too much of your time.

President Ford: I am very interested. Please take the time.

President Kaunda: This whole question is linked with Portugal. Angola cannot cut off its links with the metropole. It is important for Angola. We would like to speak our minds freely as Zambians, Zaireans and Tanzanians. I have been authorized to speak for them and for Mozambique. We would like the U.S. to understand Portugal. I will give you my own analysis for what it is worth.

I first met Melo Antunes when he was Minister without portfolio. When I recently met with him as the new Foreign Minister I asked how he looked at Savimbi. Melo Antunes said he was worried about Neto who was supported by the Communist Party in Portugal, and because of this he could not support him. Melo Antunes further said the Portuguese could not support Neto because he had repeatedly embarrassed them. He said he would tell us he approved certain issues only to change his mind and follow the communist line. For this reason, Melo Antunes said he would rather support Savimbi. I told Melo Antunes that we Zambians had the same problem with Neto. Then Melo Antunes said that Portugal had a problem with NATO, which did not seem to understand the new Portugal, but in time he hoped NATO would. Melo Antunes said Portugal was not chasing the Russians away—they would have an embassy. He said Portugal could not follow a non-aligned course. At any rate, he anticipated that Portugal would approach the U.S. to explain itself. I bring this up now because of the tie-in with Angola.

President Ford: Most of us did not approve the tactics or the methods of the previous Portuguese government, but now we do not want to see a big swing from the extreme right to the extreme left. Frankly, it is difficult at this stage to see where Portugal fits in. How soon do you think it will be before the situation in Angola comes to a head?

President Kaunda: We must wait for the general elections. It is difficult to say. We must see if the scheme of a compromise candidate is accepted.

Secretary Kissinger: Is Savimbi strong enough to govern? Or will a situation develop where Neto and Roberto are fighting for power?

President Kaunda: Savimbi does not even know of the compromise proposal for having him be President although it may have leaked. We have not yet told Savimbi. We must convince him of the rightness of it.

President Ford: How old is Savimbi?

Minister Mwaanga: In his 40’s I believe.
President Ford: As regards our foreign aid legislation, I believe there is a provision for approximately $25 million for the former Portuguese territories, part of which, at least $10 million I believe, is for Angola and Mozambique.

Secretary Kissinger: How do you propose to contact Savimbi?

President Kaunda: I think we may be given this task by the OAU.

Secretary Kissinger: Will you report back in favor of UNITA?

President Kaunda: We have noted that when the two opposing factions of MPLA and FLNA attack, the people run toward UNITA forces. This is a good development.

President Ford: Do these groups hold defined areas?

President Kaunda: Yes, each of the armed forces of these movements has definite areas. We are trying to discourage this so as to unify them more.

Minister Mwaanga: Savimbi is not a political lightweight. He has grass roots support. He put forward a formula for bringing the three parties together. Under the Albarge [Alvor] accord, each liberation movement or political party was to put forward 8000 troops for a total of 24,000. The Portuguese were to match this with another 24,000 troops. If there is an election, there is a danger of 8,000 loyal troops and 16,000 not loyal. The President (assumed reference to Kaunda) is emphasizing the need for some formula to deal with this before the election.

Secretary Kissinger: If the OAU supports UNITA, does that eliminate the other two in the elections?

President Kaunda: Regardless of the outcome of the elections, Savimbi would be the President.

Secretary Kissinger: Would the other two groups accept this? Would they disarm if UNITA takes over?

President Kaunda: There is need for some ideas on how to form a national army.

President Ford: Does Angola have enough raw materials to be self-sufficient?

President Kaunda: It is a very rich country.

Secretary Kissinger: It is rich in oil deposits in Cabinda. In fact some of its neighbors are keeping their eyes on this. I am not suggesting you, Mr. President. If this is an offense (humorously) our Ambassador will apologize to you.

President Kaunda: There are two liberation movements in Cabinda, called FLEC, one supported by Zaire and one by Congo Brazzaville.
Secretary Kissinger: It is going to be one hell of an election. There are a lot of refugees in Zaire who have got to get back to vote.

Minister Mwaanga: We have a few Angola refugees in Zambia. Cabinda is a problem that has created real difficulties. All three liberation movements in Angola are agreed that Cabinda is an integral part of Angola. We in Zambia support that position.

President Ford: Will they elect members of Parliament also or just a president? It sounds like a terribly complicated situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Will you keep in touch with Savimbi?

President Kaunda: He was in Paris recently and he agreed to disagree with the French authorities who are supporting FLEC.

Secretary Kissinger: Because of oil interests in Cabinda.

President Kaunda: Savimbi also had discussions with the British.

Now I should like to talk about Rhodesia. Four countries (Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) have all been pursuing a consistent line in the OAU in support of the Lusaka Manifesto which favors peaceful negotiations. But if these are not possible to achieve a free people, then there will be a resort to arms. It is not that we are going to fight; we want the opportunity to negotiate. It is only if we fail in this regard. So far we have met with some success and some disappointments. On the success side we have met with South Africa Prime Minister Vorster and other top leaders and with Rhodesian liberation groups. Much depends on what outside pressure can be brought to bear. We would like the memorandum which Foreign Minister Mwaanga left with Secretary Kissinger last August to be followed up by the U.S.\(^2\) We have done some of the work. We hope that when your pressing issues in other parts of the world are resolved, you could have time to pay some attention to southern Africa. We believe Vorster will do what he has promised; that is pull out his troops from Rhodesia by the end of May as he has said publicly, or by the end of April as he said privately. This is a necessity. Once that happens, we hope Smith will understand we are serious about negotiations and a settlement, but we need pressure from those countries who also say they want a peaceful solution.

Regarding Namibia, we have told you we are grateful for the positions you have taken in the UN in 1966 and in 1972. We have told you this, but we want you to do something practical. Vorster needs pres-

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\(^2\) Kissinger met with Mwaanga on August 14, 1974. The two discussed greater U.S. involvement in southern Africa and the need to repeal the Byrd Amendment. Mwaanga’s memorandum is not attached to the memorandum of conversation. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memoranda of Conversations, Box CL 272, Chronological File, August–September 1974)
sure to move forward or else he will do too little too late. Vorster is planning Namibia’s future along the lines of Bantustans.

President Ford: What is that?

Ambassador Davis: That is, he would like to isolate the blacks from the whites in specific areas for separate development.

President Ford: Are there many tribes in Namibia?

President Kaunda: Sufficient for Vorster to create the Bantustans. We hope you can pressurize him.

Regarding South Africa itself, the OAU position is clear. We have said that 3 million whites are Africans. If they are not prepared to recognize this, then we must throw them into the sea. We do not want to create an OAU army, but this year Uganda President Amin will be Chairman of the OAU.

Secretary Kissinger: (Jokingly) If he had kept his Foreign Minister I would have negotiated with him.

President Kaunda: These whites in South Africa are Africans. They have to accept the challenge of being Africans. They are not doing this. If there is an explosion it could mean civil war.

Secretary Kissinger: It would be bloody. The South Africans are tough. It would be a disaster, which all of us would rather avoid. There are Boers you know who fought hard against the British.

President Kaunda: It would not be confined to South Africa alone. South Africa has the ability to strike all of Africa.

Secretary Kissinger: We should all try to avoid this.

President Kaunda: I hope you give these issues your attention and study the implications. My task has been to analyze the situation. We look for leadership on the question of southern Africa.

President Ford: Your survey for us has been extremely helpful, and there will be personal attention given to it. We will try to be constructive. We hope to get rid of the Byrd Amendment.3 We hope Congress will rescind it. I promise personal attention.

President Kaunda: (Turning to Minister Mwaanga) What issues have I left out?

Minister Mwaanga: President Kaunda is not an advocate of armed struggle, but peaceful change. Our whole position would be weakened if the West and the U.S. do not support our stand. Change is bound to occur in southern Africa but it will not be automatic. It needs to be worked for to be achieved. A joint effort for peaceful change is needed. In Rhodesia talks have been going on aimed at a constitutional settlement. It would help if the U.S. said something about these negotiations.

3 See Document 56.
Regarding Namibia, UN Security Council resolution of last December put a deadline at the end of this May for action for South Africa.4

Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. supported this.

Minister Mwaanga: May is just around the corner. What do we do if South Africa fails to act?

Secretary Kissinger: We are making some representations to South Africa at this moment.

Minister Mwaanga: Our President’s position will be weakened if it is not supported.

Mr. Chona: The OAU at Dar gave us an important gate or opening for a compromise solution on Namibia. The African members of the Council on Namibia have been tasked with making contact with South Africa.

Ambassador Mwale: Timing is important.

Secretary Kissinger: We can give better attention the first week in June.

President Ford: I look forward to seeing you this evening. I have just come from Concord where we began the first of a series of celebrations of the 200th anniversary of our revolution. We have great sympathy for others who have followed along the same footsteps toward freedom and liberty.

President Kaunda: We hope you will come to Africa and visit us.

President Ford: I have never been there, but after I get re-elected . . .

Minister Mwaanga: We hope Secretary Kissinger will take up the long-standing invitation to visit Zambia.

Secretary Kissinger: I will try to come to Africa within the next year and if I do, I will come to Zambia.

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104. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Recognition of Mozambique and Establishment of Embassy at Lourenco Marques

In accordance with an agreement reached on September 7, 1974, between Portugal and representatives of the nationalist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the Portuguese territory of Mozambique is to become fully independent on June 25, 1975.

This country of 8.7 million people comes to independence after an eleven-year guerrilla struggle against Portugal. FRELIMO, its principal liberation group, now dominates a Portuguese-headed transitional government, and believes that its efforts were largely responsible for ending colonialism in all of Portuguese Africa. Much of black Africa shares this view. In terms of our overall relations with Africa and of our bilateral interests in the countries of southern Africa, I believe it important that we establish diplomatic relations with Mozambique shortly after independence.

Mozambique probably will be recognized promptly by most other nations, and undoubtedly will apply for UN membership soon after independence.

If you approve US recognition of Mozambique, I will seek an early opportunity to notify the FRELIMO leadership of this fact and of our intentions to establish diplomatic relations at the Embassy level.

Recommendations

That you approve US recognition of Mozambique immediately upon its attainment of independence scheduled for June 25, 1975.

That you approve raising our Consulate General in Lourenco Marques to an Embassy on June 25, 1975.

That you sign the letter at Tab I which will be dated and delivered to the Head of State of Mozambique June 25. Paul Theis has cleared the text.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 3, Mozambique. Confidential. Sent for action.
2 Ford initialed his approval of both recommendations.
3 The letter at Tab I as approved and signed was sent to Machel on June 25. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 3, Mozambique)
105. National Security Study Memorandum 224


TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
United States Policy Toward Angola

The President has directed a study of United States policy toward Angola. The study should analyze United States interests and objectives in Angola in both the immediate and post-independence future. The study should then project the possible ranges of political evolution in Angola, both before and after independence, and propose options for United States policies that take into account United States interests and objectives.

The study should examine, among others, the following elements:

—The potential for increased civil strife, or civil war, in Angola and its impact on the transition to independence;

—The relative political, economic and military strengths (and their political orientation) of the three independence movements and their leadership;

—The role of Portugal and neighboring African states, including South Africa, as well as an assessment of likely efforts on their part to shape the future of Angola;

—The extent of the involvement, past and future, of the Soviet Union and China in political developments in Angola;

—The prospects for and likely pattern of economic development in Angola and its need for development assistance or for aid in settling refugees;

—Possible role of international organizations (e.g., UN, OAU, UNICEF, and UNHCR) in promoting stability in Angola and providing other assistance (e.g., refugee relief and resettlement); and

—Likely Congressional and public attitudes toward alternative United States policies.

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSDMs and NSSMs, Box 2, NSSMs File, NSSM 224. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa\(^2\) and be forwarded by June 30, 1975 to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for review by the Senior Review Group prior to consideration by the President.

Henry A. Kissinger

\(^2\) Document 109.

106. Memorandum for the Record\(^1\)

Washington, June 5, 1975, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 5 June 1975, 10:00 a.m.

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General George S. Brown; and Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Also Present: Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Lt. General John Pauly, William G. Hyland, Captain Joseph Gleason (USN), and Carl Duckett

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

Item 3—Angola

Mr. Colby explained that there were three independence movements—one supported by Mobutu and headed by Roberto, to whom we are already giving support; one headed by Savimbi, with whom we have had some contact in the past but to whom we are giving no support now; and a third, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola headed by Neto, who is receiving Soviet support. The latter also has Chipenda, who has broken with Neto. What CIA’s paper\(^2\) suggests is that we give \([\text{dollar amount not declassified}]\) support to the second group—to Savimbi—to strengthen it.

\(^1\) Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.

\(^2\) Not found.
Dr. Kissinger said we don’t want to make the same mistake we did in Chile—to give money to everybody and then lose to the Communists.

Mr. Colby said that the hope was to get Roberto and Savimbi to work together.

Dr. Kissinger asked who was best for us.

Messrs. Colby, Sisco and Hyland responded: Roberto.

Mr. Colby added that his main shortcoming was that he was not in the country.

Mr. Sisco said he went along with help to Roberto, but he was concerned about the “spray tactics” in CIA’s paper, proposing to give aid to several individuals. We should realize that the dollar amount not declassified would not be the end, that Savimbi would be back for more and want arms. We are for Roberto and believe that he will come out on top.

Dr. Kissinger asked if all were for Roberto. He explained that he had asked for papers from State, and instead of policy statements or recommendations he only got a weeping response.3

Mr. Sisco acknowledged that there was some division within the African Bureau, but that he and Mr. Hyland had gone over this recently and there was agreement that Roberto was likely to come out on top.

Dr. Kissinger said that if we wanted Roberto to win, why didn’t we work with Mobutu—he’s ruthless and will get the job done.

Mr. Colby said that it was the Agency’s belief that he was erratic lately.

Dr. Kissinger asked what our policy was. He explained that he had asked State for policy papers but that they would not give him an opinion. He was of the impression that they were saying not to do anything.

Mr. Sisco said he thought that might be the best course—that everything is going our way so we don’t need to do anything.

Dr. Kissinger said they don’t say anything. We have Kaunda telling us that Savimbi is going to win; the Portuguese Left is backing Neto; Mobutu wants Roberto. We can concede; not do anything and let nature take its course.

Mr. Sisco said that was close to his view. Angola is not of great importance.

Dr. Kissinger said we can’t let the Communists win there.

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3 An apparent reference to a May 7 briefing memorandum in which the Department advised against direct involvement. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File)
Mr. Hyland said we were supporting Roberto and that Mobutu would not allow the Communists to take over.

Dr. Kissinger asked if we did not care what happened in Angola. If we do, is [dollar amount not declassified] enough for Roberto? And what else can we do?

Mr. Hyland said we could give arms.

Mr. Clements asked how.

Mr. Hyland said through Mobutu.

Mr. Sisco said that our diplomatic involvement is not to recommend help for Roberto. Our diplomatic posture is hands off.

Dr. Kissinger says that stands to reason, but what does Roberto need and are we doing enough? Does he need our organizational help?

Mr. Colby said that if you are talking about people, he would have to get them through Mobutu—that we should not try to use Americans.

Dr. Kissinger asked if Mobutu would know how to do it.

Mr. Colby replied that he had done it before and would be able to do it again.

Mr. Hyland said that what we have now is a civil war.

Dr. Kissinger said we would have to take a position. What is going to happen in Angola?

Mr. Hyland said that this fall someone will be dominant, but that Mobutu would not allow Neto to take over.

Dr. Kissinger said we needed to complete the NSSM.4

Mr. Colby said the issue was whether we helped Savimbi.

Dr. Kissinger said we were involved here. Didn’t someone tell him he would be welcome to visit the U.S.?

Mr. Hyland said that he walked into the Embassy and said he would like to come to the U.S. and asked for arms.

Dr. Kissinger said yes, but didn’t someone tell him he would be well received here?

Mr. Sisco said he doubted it. The judgment is Roberto versus Savimbi.

Dr. Kissinger said the proposal is to give money to Savimbi in order to get into contact with him and to support Roberto if we don’t want Neto to win. We need to finish the NSSM. If they took six weeks they wouldn’t come up with anything different. Let’s get it in next week. Then we can determine what our interest is. By early July we will have a position.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

4 Reference is to NSSM 224 and its response, Documents 105 and 109.
107. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable


COUNTRY
Angola/Zaire

DOI
28 May 1975

SUBJECT
Private Meeting between UNITA President Savimbi and Zairian President Mobutu

ACQ
[less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE
[1½ lines not declassified]

FIELD NO.
[less than 1 line not declassified]

1. Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), met privately with Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko in Kinshasa on 28 May 1975 to discuss the situation in Angola. Mobutu said he had appreciated Savimbi’s assessment of the Angolan situation, presented during their joint meeting with Holden Roberto, leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and that this assessment more closely corresponds to the independent reports which Mobutu receives. Mobutu said he believes that FNLA leaders inside Angola are not accurately reporting the situation to Roberto, and Mobutu no longer trusts these reports. He said he was aware that Savimbi regularly briefed Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and he, Mobutu, would like to be included on these briefings. Savimbi agreed.

2. Mobutu raised the subject of Roberto’s failure to return to Angola, saying that Roberto feared he would be assassinated. Savimbi replied that if there are elections in November, Roberto must return to Angola soon or face the accusation that he is a coward which will thwart any election chances of the FNLA. Mobutu said that Johnny Eduardo Pinnock, the FNLA Presidential Council representative, had

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.
tried to convince Roberto to return to Angola but without success. Mobutu asked for Savimbi’s assessment of Eduardo, and Savimbi praised Eduardo’s leadership abilities. (Source Comment: Savimbi believes that Mobutu may be looking for a replacement for Roberto as the FNLA leader and that Eduardo is a potential candidate if Roberto refuses to enter Angola.)

3. In discussing recent developments in Angola, Mobutu said he does not want a civil war there. He believes that the Soviet Union would heavily support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in a civil war. Mobutu asserted that the Zairian economy cannot support an armed struggle against the supply capability of the USSR, nor does he believe that the West would support the moderates in a struggle of this type. Therefore, a civil war would probably bring to power a Communist government in Angola which would be against the national interests of Zaire.

4. Mobutu said that although he and Savimbi had had disagreements, he believes that Savimbi’s initiatives are the best alternative to civil war. He stated that Kaunda and Nyerere also believe in Savimbi as the only force which can save Angola. Mobutu said he wants regular contact with Savimbi and that, although the Zairian economy is in serious trouble, he would find some financial support for him. It was then that Savimbi agreed again to return to Kinshasa for regular meetings with Mobutu. Mobutu said he would soon be able to advise Savimbi more specifically of the support which the Zairian Government could provide. Mobutu claimed he had terminated his assistance to the FNLA; but said that FNLA forces had been well armed by the Chinese.

5. [less than 1 line not declassified] Savimbi was pleased with the turn of events in Kinshasa between himself and Mobutu; however, he does not fully understand nor trust Mobutu’s motives. He will probably again see Mobutu secretly during his 10 June visit to Kinshasa and believes that he will be in a better position to assess Mobutu’s new approach to him at that time. Savimbi suspects that there has been some kind of a breach between Mobutu and Roberto. Savimbi said he had, in strictest confidence, briefed the Zambian Prime Minister and the Secretary General of Zambia’s ruling party, UNIP, on the substance of his discussions with Mobutu.)

6. [1½ lines not declassified]
108. Memorandum


SUBJECT
Angola

1. Attached is a paper discussing in a preliminary way what could be done covertly to support a major effort to prevent a Neto takeover in Angola.

2. [3½ lines not declassified]

3. Please do not reproduce these papers and return them when no longer needed.

Attachment

1. Covert action in support of an effort to prevent Neto from taking over Angola would fall under three categories:

   a. Covert financial aid to Neto’s principal opponents at a level matching that now enjoyed by Neto. (For example, [1 line not declassified] puts the Yugoslav aid to Neto at U.S. $1.7 million and Yugoslavia is not his chief backer.)

   b. Covert political action to prevent civil war in Angola and advance a Roberto-Savimbi coalition. Neto’s best chance of dominating Angola appears to be to push the FNLA back into the Bakongo tribal area and then crush UNITA militarily leaving the MPLA on top in Luanda and other key cities. By stopping the fighting we improve chances for an FNLA–UNITA coalition, and FNLA seems to rest on too narrow a tribal base (the Bakongo people) to win supremacy in Angola without a more broadly based ally such as UNITA.

   c. Covert military aid to Mobutu to permit him, in the failure of efforts to end the fighting, to arm and resupply the FNLA and possibly the UNITA forces from his army’s own stocks with the assurance that the United States Government would inconspicuously make good his losses.

2. Covert financial aid could be carried out in secrecy. Payments to the principal leaders opposing Neto could be made directly and with the recipients sharing an interest in secrecy. With this covert financing

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; No Foreign Dissem.
we might include advice on political, intelligence, financial and logistic matters but this could be managed secretly.

3. Covert political action could include secret collaboration with Mobutu and Kaunda individually to try to keep them working in concert. In this connection we might provide Mobutu with funds to help him line up political support for his Angolan cause in Africa, including efforts to cut down facilities available to Neto in Brazzaville. We could secretly seek Kaunda’s help in providing Savimbi with political advice, especially in helping him on the African and international stage. We could help Kaunda in his efforts to stop the flow of arms to Angola and to encourage initiatives such as an OAU-sponsored peacekeeping force in Angola. We could also attempt to break off some of Neto’s lieutenants and to encourage the fragmentation of his organization. We could inspire greater attention in the world press to the staging of arms from the USSR through Brazzaville and to other similar issues.

4. We have considered an effort to provide “covertly” weapons, ammunition and improved training to match further escalation in the level of fighting. Such weapons of both U.S. and foreign origin are at hand in current stocks in sufficient quantity to match any likely needs in the immediate future. Similarly communications gear and transport could be readily found. Deliveries to the FNLA or UNITA would require an African intermediary through whom to stage such help. Mobutu would no doubt do this for the FNLA and possibly the UNITA as well. In the event of air delivery from the United States, however, security would be weak. Such an arms flow to Angola would be quickly detected and publicized with damage to the international standing and political prospects of the FNLA and UNITA. Similar side effects argue against the hiring of mercenaries or the provision of aircraft. Unlike the earlier Congo efforts, we do not have the umbrella of a legitimate central government asking our help. Therefore, it seems more feasible to encourage Mobutu to use his existing stocks which could be replaced less conspicuously by sea shipment.

5. Exposure of American arms aid to the FNLA through Mobutu would tend to spoil political efforts to get African leaders such as Kaunda, Nyerere and Gowon behind efforts to stop the fighting. And to stop the fighting remains very much to the advantage of Neto’s opponents.

6. The attached budget figures are very tentative and based on a force of 10,000 fighting men each for UNITA and FNLA. These strengths are probably high for military combat action alone, but are based on the needs expressed by both Roberto and Savimbi.

7. In brief, covert financial aid and covert political action appear feasible choices. Military aid can best be extended via Mobutu and without American or American-hired technical advisors if we are to keep any degree of security and to avoid damage to efforts to keep
some minimum state of peace until independence in November. And for the present at least, breaking the peace is in the MPLA’s interest and not that of MPLA’s opponents.

TENTATIVE BUDGET—THROUGH 1975

[1½-page table not declassified]

109. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council
Interdepartmental Group for Africa


RESPONSE TO NSSM 224:
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

[Omitted here are a title page and table of contents.]

I. Introduction and Summary

In response to NSSM 224,\(^2\) this study analyzes the current situation in Angola and attempts to project the future trends in the soon-to-be independent territory. It weighs US interests and objectives, the involvement of other third countries, and sets forth options on which United States policy could be formulated.

The study finds the situation in Angola unstable, with continuing factional strife between the contending nationalist parties probable. The presence of Portuguese military forces and perhaps also the recognition of the need to appear ready for independence have kept the contenders from pushing the conflict to the point of full civil war. The point of greatest danger in this regard will be immediately after independence when the Portuguese forces are withdrawn and before the government in power has had opportunity to consolidate its hold.

Neither of the major liberation movements, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) commands military superiority over the other. The FNLA has been the stronger throughout most of the period

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee Files, Angola NSSM 224 Papers. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.

\(^2\) Document 105.
of insurgency, but during recent fighting the MPLA has more often come out on top. The third movement, The National Movement for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), is militarily much weaker than either of the other two groups.

Of the three party leaders, the MPLA’s Neto, a Marxist poet, has the greatest intellectual stature. Jonas Savimbi, of UNITA, has appeared of late to be the most pragmatic and practical of the three and is also reputed to be the most articulate and well-informed on current events. The FNLA’s Roberto is an anti-communist and close associate of Zairian President Mobutu. Roberto refuses to go back into Angola from Zaire, where he has long lived in exile. His prolonged residence in Zaire appears to hurt the FNLA’s chances.

Portugal’s primary objective seems to be to cut her losses and to get out of Angola completely and as rapidly as possible. Neighboring African states have provided financial and military assistance to the liberation movements. For ideological reasons, Congo supports the Marxist-oriented MPLA, while Mobutu has backed the FNLA. Both the Congo and Zaire have their eyes on the Cabinda enclave, primarily because of its petroleum riches and strategic location.

The Soviet Union has long backed the MPLA, and there is evidence it has lately provided the movement with considerable new military equipment. China has had some associations with all of the movements in the past, but is now most closely associated with the FNLA, to which it has supplied military equipment as well as some training.

Because of its important petroleum deposits and large coffee production, Angola is one of black Africa’s richest countries. The country’s agricultural potential is great—two-thirds of its arable land is not now being cultivated—and significant deposits of other minerals add to the promise of a bright economic future for the country. Angola will, of course, need development assistance for many years to come, primarily because it has such a small pool of trained manpower.

There may be a role for the OAU or the UN in promoting internal stability in Angola or in helping resettle refugees, particularly with respect to Roberto’s efforts to move three-quarters of a million Angolan Bakongo back into the country from Zaire where they now live in exile. It should be noted, however, that it is unlikely that the OAU—which strictly avoids interference in the internal affairs of its members—will want to take on the Angolan problem, and so far only UNITA has shown any interest in appealing to the UN for help with their troubles.

A FNLA and/or a UNITA regime would be somewhat easier to deal with than a MPLA government and would probably more readily encourage an interest in mutually beneficial ties. Even so, Savimbi and Roberto are nationalists, who would want to control (or even national-
ize) Angola’s resources, practice non-alignment, and accept aid from all countries, and support Third World causes.

An MPLA regime would probably try to put the party’s socialist doctrines into practice. But practical nationalists might postpone the application of some measures, since even a socialist Angola might well accept foreign investment. Political relationships would not be very cordial; we would probably have the arms-length relationship we have with, say, Algeria or Somalia.

In spite of considerable press coverage in Angola, little public feeling on the subject seems to have been generated in the United States. Congress has shown some awareness of the situation in the former Portuguese colonies as they approach independence and has appropriated modest amounts of assistance for them. As yet there is no substantial Congressional sentiment regarding US policy toward Angola. It can be assumed, nevertheless, that there would be strong Congressional opposition to any US involvement in support of one of the contending factions.

The study presents three options for US policy:

—Neutrality, under which we would make no commitment of US prestige or resources to influence the course of events in Angola.

—Active promotion of a peaceful settlement which, by reducing the chances of a continuing armed conflict, would create a situation in which we believe the FNLA and UNITA might better be able to compete with MPLA.

—Providing support designed to help ensure the continued viability of the FNLA and UNITA, with a view to preventing the MPLA from gaining power.

[Omitted here are sections 2–9 and an annex.]
1. Following is text of Secretary’s letter to Machel. Do not repeat not use until authorized by separate message from Assistant Secretary Davis.  

2. Text: Qte Dear President Machel: It gives me pleasure to congratulate you upon your return to Mozambique, which will soon become a new member of the family of nations. It is particularly opportune to welcome the independence of your new country as we in the United States approach the 200th anniversary of our own independence. As President Ford said in his toast to President Kaunda during a White House dinner on April 19, “We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola and the island territories with great satisfaction. The United States stands ready to help the emerging countries, and to provide what assistance we can.”

I am also pleased to inform you, on behalf of President Ford, that the United States plans to recognize the new government of Mozambique upon independence on June 25, and to enter into diplomatic relations with it.

It has been our custom, in welcoming other countries to independence, to close our consular posts in their countries and to establish Embassies, subject of course to the concurrence of the new government. Subject also to your concurrence, we would like to name an Ambassador to be resident in Lourenco Marques. If you agree, the President would send the name of his candidate to you for agreement. Upon your agreement, the President would publicly announce his intention to nominate him to that post. As required by our Constitution, the United States Senate would then be asked to confirm the nomination. While we anticipate no unusual delays, it will take some time to complete this process.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Arenales (AF/S) and approved by Mulcahy (AF/S). Repeated Immediate to London and Lourenco Marques.

2 In telegram 636 from Lourenco Marques, June 16, Walker proposed several alternative methods for delivering Kissinger’s message to Machel. In telegram 2108 from Dar es Salaam, June 16, Carter agreed to deliver the message. (Ibid.)

3 Repeated attempts to deliver Kissinger’s letter to Machel proved unsuccessful. In telegram 659 from Lourenco Marques, June 19, Walker informed the Department that he delivered the letter to Chissano’s Chief of Cabinet Amaral. (Ibid.)
In order that we be represented in Mozambique from the beginning of its nationhood, I therefore propose that our present Consul General, Mr. Peter C. Walker, be accredited as Chargé d’Affaires, ad Interim, until arrangements are completed for the arrival of our Ambassador. As you may know, Mr. Walker arrived in Mozambique in July 1974.

The United States in turn would be happy to receive news of your plans for entering into relations, and would welcome your initiative to establish an Embassy in Washington and to accredit an Ambassador.

I look forward to friendly and mutually beneficial relations between our two governments and peoples. Best regards. Signed Henry A. Kissinger. End text

Kissinger

111. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 20, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Under Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Vance
Acting Assistant Secretary Mulcahy
Walt Cutler, AF
Jerry Bremer (notetaker)

SUBJECT

Africa

The Secretary: I really have few instructions to give you—since I know what I want. I don’t really care what AF thinks. I just want you to do what I tell you or there’s no sense in your going.

I think we’ve mishandled Mobutu and the whole area. I have not given too much attention to it, so it’s partly my fault. Mobutu looks at the Congo in 1960 and that [then] what we’re doing in Angola now where the Communist influence is greater than it was in the Congo in

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Bremer. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
1960 and he must conclude that we have written off the area. If we’re letting Angola go, then in essence we’re letting him go. At least I think if he’s rational, that’s what he’s thinking.

Vance: I agree completely. I haven’t seen him in a year and a half but I agree.

The Secretary: If you add to that whole situation in Vietnam I don’t find what he does incomprehensible. Hinton is not easy to get along with. You should stress first that we consider Zaire one of the two or three key countries in Africa. Two, we consider him one of the two or three key leaders in Africa. Three, we want to cooperate with him. Four, however, we will not be pushed around. He will not win popularity by pushing us. I want no handwringing, all right? Tell him my assessment of Angola. We have been somewhat neglectful, and we would like his judgment of the situation and what can be done, especially to support the non-Neto groups. He and Kaunda would have to take the front row. We’d also be glad to send Devlin if he’d like to talk to him. It’s possible that we can’t do it, but get his best judgment and come back and we’ll get the President’s decision.

I want no wailing. By the way, thank you very much for skipping your son’s wedding. It was a very patriotic thing to do.

Now do you agree with me on what we are trying to do?

Vance: Absolutely.

The Secretary: We slid into this mess. Mobutu I think is a semi-savage, but I’m trying to see it from his point of view. You can say that we gave Roberto [dollar amount not declassified] but he didn’t need money, but strategy. Does Mobutu know strategy?

Vance: He’s pretty shrewd—if he’s still rational and not too imperial.

The Secretary: Just let him and me get together (laughter).

Vance: But if he’s still rational, that is exactly how he has to read the situation.

The Secretary: Make that point too—that we won’t be pushed. I won’t yield on Davis. He must understand that. Davis will not follow Hinton.

Vance: Even a year and a half ago he was lecturing us on Angola.

The Secretary: He was right. His foreign minister was here last summer and I got talked out of it at the time. The strategy of this building is to keep me from making any irrevocable decision. They

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3 See Document 99.
were content as long as we did nothing. Now I’ve made a decision, and I will get the Presidential endorsement, though it may be too late.

Vance: I will add that I cannot predict the outcome on this, though I think this will make us fairly pregnant.

The Secretary: In what way?

Vance: To say we’re leaning this way and then to say we can’t do it may be a problem.

The Secretary: What real choice do we have? If Angola is taken by the Communists, what conclusions can the African leaders draw about the United States. I know the AF bureau says they care about economic aid, but there’s no empirical evidence for that. I just don’t think African leaders really care about aid unless they’re about to go bankrupt. They can only conclude that we don’t care. Do you disagree, Joe?

Sisco: I’m not sure of the judgment yet that the situation is leaning in the direction of Neto coming out on top.

The Secretary: If not, this should tip it over. I think Neto will take Luanda.

Mulcahy: In effect he’s already top dog there.

The Secretary: I confess I didn’t focus on it early enough. Mulcahy didn’t break his back getting my attention, though.

Mulcahy: We’re a minority of two in our bureau.

Cutler: S/P feels very strongly about it.

Sisco: Your judgment then is that hands off leads to Neto winning?

The Secretary: I’m not in favor of the US involving itself, but in favor of it making it possible for Kuanda or Mobutu to.

Mulcahy: The Africans are really schizophrenic on this. They all say they want help for Savimbi but then they always talk about having no outside interference in their affairs.

The Secretary: I’m not sure we should switch to Savimbi. I would like Mobutu’s assessment.

Mulcahy: We double our chances I think by throwing a few bones to Savimbi.

Cutler: The resources required to keep Neto out are considerable. We should be showing political support and perhaps arms to both movements.

The Secretary: I’m not sure we should go in to achieve a total victory à la Vietnam. What we are going to do is break the psychological back of the non-Neto people, since they see no US support.

Forget for a moment how important Angola itself may be. I am concerned on the impact on Nyerere, and Kaunda and Mobutu when they see we’ve done nothing.
Do it in the way which makes us the least pregnant, but most decisive. Don’t dither around and lecture him on reconciliation. He must be puking when he hears that kind of stuff, I know I do. I know it won’t come about with reconciliation.

Mulcahy: They will be issuing a communique in Kenya today. That will be the latest so-called reconciliation. Of course it won’t last long.

The Secretary: Oh, I’m all for it. We shouldn’t break it, but we should not kid ourselves.

Don’t push Mobutu. Just tell him we’ve had a rough year with other preoccupations. We want to know what his analysis is and what he thinks. We could send Devlin in if necessary.

Cutler: He’s there now. He’s actually a resident of Kinshasa.

The Secretary: Then we could still use him.

Cutler: Well, we have used him in the past.

Vance: He personally may be compromised at this point.

The Secretary: Well, you work it out. Are you leaving tonight? And when are you getting back: I’m leaving on Friday—will you be back by then?

Vance: Yes, we’re leaving tonight. Will you be leaving Friday night?

The Secretary: Yes.

Vance: All right. We’ll try to be back Friday morning.

Mulcahy: Hinton should probably come back promptly.

The Secretary: Well, he certainly should not be part of the conversations.

Mulcahy: He wants a few days in Spain.

The Secretary: Of course, he should do that. Tell him that he’ll get another post, and that this is no reflection on him. Tell him to calm down.

Well, I’m counting on you two.

Cutler: I think there’s an advantage this time, since the last serious talk we had with the foreign minister was last August and I believe after that he seriously mislead Mobutu thinking we were already committed.

The Secretary: It is important not to give him the idea that he can kick us around and get an emissary whenever he needs domestic support.

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4 June 27.
Cutler: One nice thing that might come out of this would be to get the foreign minister out.
Vance: Yes, he’s quite a guy—a product of Lumumba University.

112. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Kissinger
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll
Ambassador Vance
Acting Assistant Secretary Mulcahy
Walt Cutler, Country Director for Zaire
Jerry Bremer, Notetaker

SUBJECT
Africa

Vance: I was looking over my reporting cables and I’m not sure I made this point clear, but I left our friend Mobutu with a very clear indication of the direction we are leaning.

The Secretary: Well, I must say that didn’t come through in the cables.

Vance: The last thing that he said to me was that he hoped I would return soon with a message that we would do something on Angola.

The Secretary: Well, what should we do?

Vance: I think we should give substantially more money to Holden and Savimbi.

The Secretary: Did he agree?

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Bremer. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.

2 In telegram 5605 from Kinshasa, June 23, Vance reported on his first meeting with Mobutu, in which he sought to reassure the President that the United States wanted to work with the Government of Zaire on Angola. (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 278) In telegram 5644 from Kinshasa, June 24, Vance reported on his second meeting with Mobutu regarding Angola, during which the President urged more help for both Roberto and Savimbi and proposed a power-sharing arrangement among Roberto, Neto, and Savimbi. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 7, Zaire)
Vance: It was his idea.
The Secretary: What do we mean by substantial?
Vance: Several millions I think and arms also given through him.
The Secretary: Would he handle it?
Vance: Yes.
The Secretary: Would we send officers?
Vance: No. I saw Holden too. Mobutu says Holden’s superiority has disappeared due to the heavy Soviet arms shipments.
The Secretary: How quickly will we have to move?
Vance: Very quickly I think. The strategy is if nothing is done by November 11 . . .
The Secretary: But do we have two weeks?
Vance: I think so. The stuff should get into the hands of Holden and Savimbi in the next month or two.
The Secretary: How fast can CIA move?
Mulcahy: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Cutler: I think November 11 may not be that critical either.
The Secretary: My problem is I’ll be away for a week and I don’t want it done while I’m away. We’ll turn it into a religious movement if that happens.
Mulcahy: I can tip off the CIA to get ready.
The Secretary: If we do it, we should not do it half-heartedly. Can we win?
Vance: They think it can be done.
The Secretary: What’s your view?
Vance: It would take a lot of direct advice. I gathered that our minimum requirement is to avoid having Neto take over.
The Secretary: My disposition is, if we do it at all, we should try to win. Can the Soviets escalate?
Vance: Not as fast as we can. We have a continuous territory through which we can supply and they don’t.
The Secretary: Should we try to involve Kaunda?
Vance: I don’t know enough about Kaunda and Mobutu’s relations. Kaunda and Nyerere are supporting Savimbi.
Mulcahy: They urged us to support Savimbi. I think we should let them know we’re helping—but not in detail.
The Secretary: My impression is that Kaunda was for it.
Mulcahy: He’s now stopped arms going through Zambia in an effort to deflate the situation.
Vance: Mobutu said that any idea of the three of them getting together is total nonsense. Neto will succeed if the others are not helped.
The Secretary: Will Mobutu get off our back if we help?
Vance: Well the air went out of him each time I saw him.
The Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Vance: [5 lines not declassified]
The Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Vance: [1 line not declassified]
The Secretary: [1½ lines not declassified]
Vance: [1½ lines not declassified]
The Secretary: Will Mobutu send his Ambassador back to us?
Vance: I don’t know. He hopes we’ll send a new one back out soon.
I must say he never treated me in a more friendly manner. When I ar-
rived he was convinced that we were involved in the coup and yet by
the time I left he was pretty much off it.
The Secretary: How was he in general?
Vance: He’s as rational as ever and, as a matter of fact, even less
imperious.
The Secretary: How is his style of life? I imagine he’s suffering no
pain.
Vance: No, he’s in no pain but he is slightly less imperial.
The Secretary: What decision do we have to make now?
Vance: We have to help them via the IMF to get over his short-term
cash flow problem. Our people think this is reasonable. Second, we
need to increase the cash to the two Angola groups and put together a
plan to propose to Mobutu of arms. It’s not a huge amount of arms.
The Secretary: How are we going to get it done?
Mulcahy: When we discussed the implementation of Option 3 before, we found the CIA already has on pallets in warehouses a lot of
arms and can get them moving in a matter of hours.
The Secretary: What’s the procedure for starting it?
Vance: One, we need the decision. Two, who can run it? I think it
would be disastrous to have it run by the military. It should be the
Agency. Then we need to get the right guy—somebody like Devlin.
Conceivably we can take him back.
The Secretary: Would he do it?
Mulcahy: I think so.
Vance: I don’t know. He’s making $100,000 a year.
The Secretary: That’s more than me! But anyway, someone like
him.

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3 See footnote 6, Document 113.
Vance: I think he might be talked into it.
Mulcahy: He's been very helpful on the kidnapping.4
The Secretary: How are we doing on that, by the way?
Mulcahy: We talked to Carter5 who thought it would take place today.

(Secretary is interrupted for a phone call)
The Secretary: Colby doesn't want to ship arms but he'll be talked to. I tell you this is a heroic phase in US foreign policy. He just wants to give money because it will give him less trouble with the Hill.

Cutler: Of course they can purchase arms in Europe, fast, anywhere.

Mulcahy: And we could ship European weapons. They have warehouses in Europe.

The Secretary: Well, it's nonsense. You're not going to be fooling anyone. He thinks [less than 1 line not declassified] could handle it. Can he do it?

Cutler: With help from headquarters he could.

Vance: He's a good man but he's not a Devlin [1 line not declassified]

Ingersoll: Devlin still has Mobutu's confidence doesn't he?

The Secretary: Why not try to get him back?

All right, next week I want you to work with the Agency and defer the decision until I come back. You should plan to go back to the Congo with an integrated plan.

Ingersoll: That should also include economic aid for Zaire.

The Secretary: Okay, let's get that started too.

Vance: You mentioned the possibility of giving some C–130's when you met with Nat Davis.

Mulcahy: There's a PM paper on that somewhere too I think.

Cutler: If you're going to get three C–130's you might as well get six. I gather priority has also already been given to the East Asian countries and I don't think they could handle more than six of them.

Mulcahy: These are older models too so they're not a real favor.

Cutler: He has about five already.

Vance: Back in the old days of the rebellions you could go anywhere in that country.

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4 In May two Americans and a Dutch student were kidnapped in Tanzania and held hostage by leftist rebels from Zaire. They were released in July after their families paid their ransom.

5 Ambassador W. Beverly Carter, Jr.
Cutler: Three Soviet armored personnel carriers are not a lot. We’re not talking about squadrons.

Vance: He wants M–16’s—things like that. A dozen APC’s, trucks, bazookas.

Cutler: You know with just cash you can rent a lot of trucks.

The Secretary: But then we’d have to try to help them find the trucks.

Vance: We could do an awful lot just making money available.

The Secretary: If we’re going to do it we should do it. I don’t understand the difference in virginity between giving money and giving arms.

Mulcahy: They do need some money for uniforms, food, etc.

The Secretary: I have no objection to giving some money too.

113. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, June 27, 1975, 2:30–3:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Angola

PRINCIPALS

The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

OTHER ATTENDEES

State: Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll
Defense: Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
White House: Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
NSC: Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Harold E. Horan

The President: Bill [to Colby], will you brief us on Angola and related problems.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting, June 27, 1975. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House. All brackets, except those indicating material not declassified, are in the original.
Mr. Colby: Yes, sir. [Briefed—as attached.]

The President: Cabinda was a part of the Portuguese territories? [This was in reference to a point in Mr. Colby’s brief as he described Cabinda.]

Mr. Colby: Yes, sir.

The President: What are the white areas within the borders of Angola?

Mr. Colby: These are essentially tribal, not military areas. These are additional tribes and I just chose [pointing on the chart] to mention those three. They have different languages and are different socially.

The President: Did the Portuguese do much in combating illiteracy? Are there many educated blacks?

Mr. Colby: The Portuguese were not forceful in this area. The literacy rate is between 10–15 percent.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, until the coup, the Portuguese had no intention of leaving their territories in Africa and didn’t organize them for independence.

Secretary Schlesinger: Most of the educated classes are in Luanda and support the MPLA.

The President: What is the white population?

Mr. Colby: Three to four hundred thousand.

The President: Out of a total population of how many?

Mr. Colby: About 5.7 million.

The President: Are these mostly white Portuguese?

Mr. Colby: Yes.

The President: Now, Henry, can you give us the options?

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I will be reasonably brief. This is an area where no one can be sure of the judgments. I do question the judgment that control of the capital is not of importance. The history of Africa has shown that a nation’s only focal point is the capital, and whoever has the capital has a claim on international support. In the Congo civil war, the reason we came out on top is because we never lost Leopoldville. If Neto can get Luanda, and drive the others out, he will have a power base, and gradually gain support of other Africans.

Mr. Colby: I agree, except to note the importance of the (Benguella) railway and Zaire and Zambia’s need for it.

The President: What is the name of the city at the end of the railway?

Mr. Colby: Lobito. There is, of course, always the possibility for fragmentation.
Secretary Kissinger: Soviet arms shipments have reversed the situation. Sheldon Vance has just come back from talking with Mobutu,\(^2\) who has stressed the change in the balance of power. Portugal is tilting toward Neto, and the Soviets are putting important equipment, such as armed personnel carriers, into Neto’s hands.

Our understanding from Vance is that this is one reason Mobutu is moving away from Roberto and wants a coalition.

An interagency effort has developed options,\(^3\) none of which I am in wild agreement with. The first is neutrality—stay out and let nature take its course. This would enable us to avoid a costly involvement in a situation that may be beyond our control; protect us from some international criticism; avoid tying us to any group; and avoid further antagonizing the MPLA. The probable outcome would be that Neto would establish a dominant position. Mobutu might try to go with Savimbi, or adjust to reality; Angola would go in a leftward direction; and Zaire would conclude we have disinterested ourselves in that part of the world and move towards anti-Americanism.

As for the second course, my Department agrees, but I don’t. It is recommended that we launch a diplomatic offensive to get the Soviets, the Yugoslavs, and others, to lessen arms shipments to the MPLA, get Portugal to exert its authority, and encourage cooperation among the groups. We could have direct dealings with the Soviets or get African states to do it. If we appeal to the Soviets not to be active, it will be a sign of weakness; for us to police it is next to impossible, and we would be bound to do nothing.

If we try to affect events, we could support Roberto and Savimbi with arms and money. If we move to arms supplies, it would be best to do so through Mobutu, but we could give some money directly to Roberto and Savimbi.

Mr. Colby: We have had a relationship with Roberto [1½ lines not declassified]

The President: Is this for him, or for him and his activities?

Mr. Colby: For him and his activities. Savimbi has had a [less than 1 line not declassified] and we could up that.

\(^2\) See Document 112.

\(^3\) At the Senior Review Group meeting, June 19, it was agreed that an NSC meeting would be held on Angola, and “a paper would be prepared on the implications of U.S. neutrality and the implications of the U.S. taking a hand through a third party.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Paper, Box TS 71, National Security Council, Senior Review Group, August 1973–October 1975) The undated paper, “Addendum to Response to NSSM 224, U.S. Policy Toward Angola,” was prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee Files, Angola NSSM 224 Papers) The response to NSSM 224 is Document 109.
The President: Have we got any benefit out of [less than 1 line not declassified] Roberto?

Mr. Colby: Some. Mobutu knows about our relationship.

Secretary Kissinger: There is need for money to increase the discipline of his organizations. The agency has weapons that it could get [less than 1 line not declassified] into Zaire to control the situation with Mobutu as the front man.

I am not against diplomacy, but you can do that only if you know where you go if you fail. To launch a campaign against arms supply and not know where you’re going afterward is an impotent policy. We would be the first victims of failure.

The President: Is there a specific proposal from the group on grants in the arms area? I don’t want to make a decision now, but I didn’t see any proposals in the briefing papers.

Secretary Kissinger: The Forty Committee has met twice to discuss the situation. The first meeting involved only money, but the second included some arms package. I recommend a working group make a more systematic study of this option and return to you.

Mr. Colby: give Mobutu money for the purchase of arms; [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]

The President: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [1 line not declassified]

The President: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified]

The President: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]

The President: Is it CIA’s recommendation that the effort of doing something is worth it?

Mr. Colby: There is great value to aiding Roberto through Mobutu. The first is the effect on Angola, and the effect on Mobutu himself. Assistance to Savimbi could come in cooperation with Kaunda.

The President: At dinner he was very forceful on this. He said that it was important to get his man in first, and then he will win the election. I asked him if there were not going to be elections, and he said yes,

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4 See Document 102.
5 See Document 106.
and that was why it was important to put Savimbi in first and then he would win.

Secretary Kissinger: Kaunda was giving the President a lesson in political science. [Laughter.]

Mr. Colby: While it would be useful to give assistance, it would be matched by the Soviets and there could be increased fighting and there would be no happy ending. I don’t think we can put up a large enough sum to wrap it up quickly, and, with CIA’s own present exposure, to get away without a great deal of criticism.

The President: We can’t sit here and worry about six Committees if we do what’s right.

Mr. Colby: What I’m worried about is leakage and scandal in the present situation.

The President: It seems to me if you’re going to do something, you have to do it in a meaningful fashion.

Mr. Colby: In answer, I doubt we could have an immediate strategic effect.

Secretary Kissinger: But the reverse of that is that if we don’t do something they would be suppressed.

The President: Once the Popular Movement takes over you can write it off.

Secretary Schlesinger: We might wish to encourage the distintegration of Angola. Cabinda in the clutches of Mobutu would mean far greater security of the petroleum resources.

Mr. President, may I follow up—if we do something, we must have some confidence that we can win, or we should stay neutral. Roberto is not a strong horse. The fact that he stays in the Congo suggests he doesn’t have the tenacity to win.

The President: It seems to me that doing nothing is unacceptable. As for diplomatic efforts, it is naive to think that’s going to happen, and the proposals on Portugal sound amateurish. I would like some re-study aimed at doing something that looks at the levels of assistance, the speed and the resources. [to Colby]: When could you have that?

Mr. Colby: We could have that next week. South Africa would like us to join with them in an effort, but we can avoid the problems that would create and deal with the blacks. Some would be encouraged for the US to take a role, and that would activate them.

Mr. Clements: I agree with this. Doing something now and keeping the two parties afloat may well be encouraging Mobutu. Whatever happens in November is not final, and it’s important to keep Roberto and Savimbi viable and keep the options open. Give Mobutu some help and let him channel it.
Secretary Kissinger: In the first instance we could activate Mobutu and inform Kaunda.

The President: He [Kaunda] was talking at dinner about getting together with someone. Who was that?

Secretary Kissinger: With Savimbi and Mobutu.

The President: Let’s get some options prepared, Bill [to Colby]. When can you have them?

Mr. Colby: By mid-week.

Secretary Schlesinger: Can we look at something other than arms? The FNLA has a weak capacity to enforce discipline and we should look to see whether the Congolese (Zairians) can be used for instilling discipline. And then there’s the question of the degree to which we can bring Roberto and Savimbi together.

The President: Those are some of the things that have to be in the study. I think we need something for a week from Monday, so let’s set something up.

Attachment

June 27, 1975.

ANGOLA

I. The current situation in Angola is highly unstable. Rivalry between contending nationalist groups has featured increasing violence, with each group trying to stake out territory and gain military superiority before independence on November 11 and final Portuguese withdrawal by next February.

A. The fighting over the past few months has been between the two largest groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, and the National Front for the Liberation of An-

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6 The Central Intelligence Agency suggested four options for assisting Roberto and Savimbi: 1) limited covert financial support for organizational and political activity as well as covert action to stop the flow of weapons to the MPLA; 2) substantial covert financial support and covert action to insure the Roberto and Savimbi groups would be active participants in an independent Angola; 3) a larger financial and matériel commitment, in addition to option 2, to defeat Neto militarily; 4) provide approximately one-third of the arms and supplies needed by Savimbi and Roberto. This option was considered too large scale to be covert. The paper was sent to the NSC on July 2. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 1, General Subject File, Angola)

7 July 7.

8 Confidential.
Portuguese Africa 271

gola led by Holden Roberto. A third group in the picture is the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi.

1. In action early this month Neto’s Popular Movement pushed the National Front out of some areas north and east of Luanda, thus blocking the Front’s supply lines into the capital.

2. Although there were some clashes in Luanda this month, the two remain essentially in a standoff there.

   a. Military control of Luanda by either group would necessarily not determine control of or influence over the rest of Angola, particularly in the rich agricultural areas or along all the main transportation routes.

3. Roberto’s National Front still remains strongly entrenched in large areas of northern Angola where it has substantial tribal support.

B. New fighting can erupt at any time:

   —There is a continuing buildup of the military forces of all three nationalist groups;

   —Heavier weapons—mortars and bazookas—are being introduced into Angola by the USSR and Zaire;

   —Armed and undisciplined civilians are in Luanda on behalf of the Popular Movement;

   —Neither major group is able or willing to exercise effective control over its own forces;

   —All three groups are initiating military operations in parts of Angola yet untouched by the fighting where no single group has an edge; and

   —Politicking for the October elections for a constituent assembly will increase tensions.

C. The oil-rich enclave of Cabinda remains a tinderbox. The Popular Movement has a slight military edge there, but both other groups also have forces active.

   1. *All three* want the enclave to remain a part of an independent Angola.

   2. The picture is complicated by the presence of a factionalized separatist movement supported by both Zaire and Congo.

   3. Both countries have endorsed Cabindan independence, and any intensification of the fighting there could bring outside intervention either directly or in support of the separatists.

II. The transitional government installed last January has proved unworkable.

   A. It is constructed on a system of checks and balances, but in the current climate members of the three liberation groups, as government officials, concentrate on the competition between them.
1. Portuguese officials are not effective—they are caught in the middle.

2. The liberation groups have not honored their commitment to establish an integrated national army as called for in the independence accord.

B. The 24,000 Portuguese troops are mostly kept in Luanda. They will intervene in the fighting only to protect the whites.

1. The Portuguese have in effect abandoned most of the countryside to the nationalists, and are already crating some of their heavy equipment for shipment to Lisbon.

2. Portuguese forces are scheduled to begin withdrawal in October and are to be totally removed by next February.

3. There is nothing in the independence accord to prevent the Portuguese from withdrawing as fast as possible after October.

C. Lisbon’s policy insofar as it has one, is neutrality among the factions.

1. Portugal wants to protect its important agricultural and mining interests.

2. The Portuguese also want to be on good terms with whoever ends up in charge after independence, but their ability to affect events is diminishing.

3. At this point, the Portuguese leaders’ major concern is to prevent civil war, which could have serious political repercussions in Lisbon. They hope to avoid, for example, an increase in the number of white refugees returning to Portugal who would add to the turbulence there.

4. Thus, Lisbon can be expected to expend considerable diplomatic effort to reduce tension in Angola, and would certainly welcome similar efforts by interested third countries.

III. The role of outside powers in supplying military assistance to the nationalist groups remains a key factor.

A. The Soviet Union has been a long time supporter of Neto’s Popular Movement, providing both arms and cash during the years of the insurgency against the Portuguese.

1. We are unable to determine how much Soviet military aid is now reaching the Movement, but it helped the Movement score some of its recent gains.

2. Most of the aid is being channeled through Congo.

3. Soviet long-range goals in Angola are unclear, but in the short run Moscow supports the Popular Movement in a situation where all three nationalist groups are viable contenders for power.

B. Peking has had some association with all of the liberation movements in the past, but the Chinese are most closely associated with Roberto’s National Front.
1. They have supplied military equipment as well as some training. Some 100 Chinese advisers may now be in Zaire working with the Front.

2. Chinese assistance has helped the Front to establish its forces firmly in northern Angola.

C. Roberto has had little success in finding assistance elsewhere.

1. Zaire’s President Mobutu has loose family ties with Roberto and has long supported him and the Front with funds, arms, and training. He has also allowed Roberto to maintain his headquarters in Zaire.

   a. Recently, however, Mobutu has cut back his assistance to the Front, in part because of his government’s serious financial problems and because he is cooling toward Roberto.

   b. Mobutu is alarmed over the Front’s recent setbacks and feels Roberto’s position has been damaged because he refuses to leave Zaire and go to Luanda.

   c. Mobutu now believes Jonas Savimbi of the National Union should be the primary figure in an independent Angolan government.

2. Mobutu, of course, has some serious concerns of his own.

   a. Zaire is experiencing a severe foreign exchange shortage because of the low price of copper on the international market.

   b. He has now privately acknowledged that the US was not involved in a recent coup plot, as he alleged, but may remain suspicious for some time.

IV. The prospects for Angola between now and November are poor. Further violence could take place and edge the territory closer to civil war. At best, Angola will lurch along and become independent without a strong leader.

A. The constituent assembly scheduled to be elected in October is supposed to select a head of government of an independent Angola, but new violence could force a postponement.

B. At a meeting in Kenya last week Savimbi, Roberto, and Neto reached what amounts to an uncertain truce that merely postpones a confrontation.

   1. They “agreed” to a number of measures, such as disarming civilians, designed to prevent new fighting. Similar agreements in the past have failed, however.

   2. All three contenders seem to recognize the inconclusiveness of the pact. They state that they will meet again to try another form for the transfer of power if the elections are not held.

V. After independence, it now appears that no single liberation group in Angola will have the power to impose its own ideology as national policy.
A. If civil war is averted and the three liberation groups establish some kind of coalition, the government’s policies probably will be a delicate mix of the philosophies of the two major groups.

B. Both major groups want a non-aligned foreign policy and will seek to maintain some balance between East and West.

1. The Popular Movement, if dominant, would establish a highly-centralized and authoritarian one-party regime with a pronounced socialistic orientation and close ties to the communist world, with US ties kept to a minimum.

2. The National Front would probably seek to establish a highly nationalistic and personalized regime. Because of the Front’s rather narrow political base, an FNLA state might be highly coercive. The Front would likely accept development and/or military aid from the West as well as the East.

C. Both groups can be expected to nationalize Angola’s major productive enterprises, but the Front probably would be more hospitable toward selective Western investment than the Popular Movement.

D. As long as an independent Angola does not restrict access to its transportation facilities, good relations with its neighbors Zaire and Zambia probably can be maintained.

1. An independent Angola will give moral and political support to black nationalists in Rhodesia and South Africa. It would probably not become immediately involved in supporting insurgencies there, however, because of distance and the dominant role now being played by Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique in seeking a settlement with the Smith regime.

VI. If, on the other hand, protracted civil war develops, Congo and Zaire could be brought into the conflict.

A. Civil war could also convince either one, or both to move into Cabinda in an attempt to annex or neutralize the enclave.

B. Continued fighting in Angola would exacerbate the confrontation between black and white Africa. It would intensify the fears of Rhodesia and South Africa concerning black majority rule.

1. South Africa is particularly concerned that a communist or unfriendly regime in Angola might support guerrilla activity in Namibia.

2. A hostile or unstable Angola would increase South African pressure on us to support its domestic and international policies. This would complicate our efforts to promote peaceful solutions to Southern Africa’s racial problems.

3. South Africa does not seem to be planning any action to counter this threat.
114. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 7, 1975, 9:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola]

Kissinger: Regarding Angola—there are three options: [dollar amounts not declassified] If this is worth doing, we should do it right. I would suggest a 40 Committee meeting Monday, and I will get a paper to you by Tuesday.

President: I agree. [less than 1 line not declassified] I think it should be [less than 1 line not declassified]

I read that the Chinese are supporting Savimbi and the Soviets are behind Neto. We would be supporting Roberto and Savimbi. You steer it so we come up with a minimum of [dollar amount not declassified]

Kissinger: I have no view between [dollar amount not declassified] We will have a working group meeting to refine the [dollar amount not declassified] package and maybe put some direct arms in it.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, July 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 10:12 a.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office)

2 See Document 115.
115. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 14, 1975, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 14 July 1975, 10:30 AM

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco; Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. General John W. Pauly; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Also Present: Director of INR William Hyland; Deputy Director of CIA William Nelson; Chief, Africa Division, CIA, James M. Potts. Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Lt. General Brent Scowcroft arrived late and was in and out during the meeting.

Kissinger: Is Nat Davis going to be here?

Sisco: I don’t know. Was he invited?

Ratliff: Mr. McAfee told me he might attend.

Sisco: I don’t invite people.

Kissinger: Well, he’s not here. I just wanted to be sure that he was invited.

Sisco: It’s his area and he should have been.

Colby: (Briefed on current situation in Angola, using maps and charts.) Mobutu complained that in spite of Vance’s promises, no substantial aid had been forthcoming.

Kissinger: What is our Consul General doing? Just going around wringing his hands?

Hyland: He is following the overt line; he can’t talk about covert action because he doesn’t know about it.

Kissinger: I don’t want our people giving Africans any lectures on non-violence, on love and brotherhood—lectures which to them will be nonsensical, which will sound insane to them.

Is there any question that Neto is trying to knock off the others?

Colby: None, although his main thrust now is against Roberto.

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1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.

2 Not attached.
Kissinger: (Referring to Favorable/Unfavorable chart) Under Unfavorable you should list the lessons that other countries might draw from what happens.

What is the estimate of the outcome?

Colby: The options are outlined on these charts.

Kissinger: We don’t have time for Option Two. How much time do we have?

Colby: Some. Neto is on the offensive, but we’ve not yet seen Mobuto’s full reaction.

Kissinger: How much time to get something in?

Colby: Dollars won’t take much time; arms from Mobutu likewise. If we are talking about the physical shipment of arms from elsewhere we are talking about weeks to months. The key is the arrival of Phase One dollar aid which would have immediate impact.

Kissinger: How long would it take to ship arms?

Nelson: Two to three months.

Colby: It would take less time if we use arms from Mobutu.

Clements: Will he release arms?

Nelson: Yes, if we agree to replace them.

Clements: Where would they come in?

Nelson: At this port (pointing to map) which is really in Zaire.

Kissinger: Will the Soviets match our effort quickly?

Colby: They can respond, yes.

Clements: I’ve been away. What did Mobutu say to the man we sent to talk to him?

Kissinger: He expressed his extreme concern, and an eagerness for cooperative action.

Clements: If we channel aid through him is it going to go where we want?

Kissinger/Colby: 80%.

Kissinger: It is strategically important to him.

Clements: If Mobutu is willing to help, I am in complete accord with the [dollar amount not declassified] package which would include small arms.

Colby: We should do Phase One immediately to show that we are serious.

Clements: Time is important.

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3 See footnote 6, Document 113.

4 Not further identified; possibly a reference to Sheldon Vance.
Kissinger: You cite 69 C–141 flights, but what could we do intelligently?
Colby: Send five or six plane loads.
Kissinger: That plus two a week thereafter?
Colby: Yes, we could keep something going that way.
Kissinger: I would like to see a schedule on that.
(To Sisco) Do you agree?
Sisco: No. I do not think that our interests in Angola are significant enough to warrant covert action. It is simply not important enough.
Kissinger: You’re willing to let it go Communist?
Sisco: Yes.
Kissinger: And Zaire?
Sisco: I’m not so sure that would happen. I’m just not sure that covert action would help.
Kissinger: Well, we will never know if we don’t try.
Sisco: (To Hyland) You have views on this; say your piece, Bill.
Hyland: We have played around with Roberto . . .
Kissinger: Well, State is committed to see that nothing happens in Angola.
Hyland: Roberto has constantly lost strength, he is weak.
Kissinger: Why? Because we’ve not supported him.
Hyland: Roberto won’t go out into the country; he’s weak, he’s had every opportunity but has lost ground. Savimbi is stronger. Mobutu could do more if he wanted to. Roberto has only a rag-tag army.
Kissinger: How can he defeat anyone with a rag-tag army?
Hyland: He has had every opportunity to win over the years and hasn’t.
Colby: Savimbi may be better; let’s support Savimbi but don’t throw Roberto over.
Hyland: If Mobutu is so sold on him, why doesn’t he help? He could pass him $1 million.
Nelson: He is sending North Korean arms now, so he is doing something.
Kissinger: What you are saying is that the Soviets and Chinese should take action, but the U.S. should not. That’s what it comes down to.
Hyland: Our biggest asset is that we are not involved militarily. We can go and say to Africans that we are staying out and Africans can face up to the fact that it is the Communists who are sending arms.
Sisco: We are considering an aid package to Mobutu, and he can do something with that.
Hyland: We must get Kaunda to help with arms, but it is doubtful that he will go along.

Potts: Kaunda has gone back and forth. Savimbi saw him recently and said that Kaunda said he would let arms go through.

Kissinger: How can we find out?

Colby: Ask him.

Clements: I don’t believe we should walk away from this. I don’t have the long-term background that the rest of you do, but I’ve visited this area and we can’t let the Communists just do what they want. We have Mobutu there, and we should try to help him implement his policy. Let’s get going. If we can depend upon him with a degree of reasonable expectation, then by God we should help him do it.

Kissinger: It is a question of his perception of who is behind him. (To Hyland) You’re sophisticated enough to understand that. What he wants to know is if the U.S. is politically interested.

Hyland: He must know about the dollar amount not declassified to Roberto.

Kissinger: Oh, come on!

Potts: The Yugoslavs have given $1 million; the Swedes large amounts. We don’t know what amounts the Soviets have spent, but they have people there, armored personnel carriers, etc.

Colby: Let’s give dollars and let them decide what to do with it—if they want to buy arms—and this will keep Congress off our backs.

Kissinger: I’m surprised at you, Bill (Hyland). They can get involved but we can’t.

Hyland: If you do go in, you can’t use a program that will fail. That means massive intervention, and I do not think we can stand the heat in Africa.

Colby: Not if we just give money. Let’s go the funding route first. I’m scared of the Congress on this.

Kissinger: I’m scared of losing. Is anyone else? Why would Zaire break with the USSR and Yugoslavs if the U.S. will not give political support? And don’t tell me that political support is an aid package. Where do we stand?

Sisco: Disapprove.

Colby: Funds, but not arms.

Clements: Do as quickly as possible. They can use money to get their own arms. They only want small arms. We can guide them, if necessary.

Kissinger: Some of my staff argue that Mobutu is not long for this world.
Colby: He shows signs of instability, but we can still work with him.
Kissinger: That’s no bar.
Colby: He has money problems, and the aid package could help him there.
Kissinger: If we don’t do something we are going to have a string of countries dependent upon the USSR.
Colby: The big issue is the black/white one.
Sisco: Yes.
Colby: The extremists will exacerbate this situation. We need to work with the moderate leaders.
Kissinger: Can you tactfully ask Kaunda what he will do?
Colby: He is basically sympathetic to Savimbi.
Potts: We’ll get an answer on the basis of financial support. If we promise support to Savimbi, he will agree.
Kissinger: If all the surrounding countries see Angola go Communist, they will assume that the U.S. has no will. Coming on top of Vietnam and Indochina their perception of what the U.S. can and will do will be negative. If the USSR can do something in a place so far away, what is the U.S. going to do?
Clements: We ought to do something. We’ve already taken too much time.
Kissinger: Not because of me. I tried to get something going six weeks ago.5 The President is going to do something anyway. The President noticed an item in his daily intelligence brief this morning on Angola and asked why we weren’t doing something. Brent said the bureaucracy was against it, and the President responded that he wanted to do something.
Colby: Let’s give [dollar amount not declassified] right away and maybe the full [dollar amount not declassified] over a month. We can come back to the Committee before doing anything about arms.
Kissinger: I think Vance should go to Mobutu.
Colby: I’m afraid of Congress on arms.
Clements: If we give money then they can buy arms and we won’t have to send any. We can help him a bit.
Nelson: We need to talk to Kaunda, too—he has the arms.
Kissinger: How soon could you do this?

5 See Document 106.
Colby: Right away.
Kissinger: Tell Kaunda that if he cooperates he will get money. I am sure the President will approve.
Hyland: For Roberto and Savimbi?
Colby: Yes, agree on [dollar amount not declassified] and we'll come back if we need more.
Kissinger: The President favored [dollar amount not declassified]
Colby: I would be wary of trying that now while the House is marking up our budget. This could work against us.
Kissinger: How many committees must be briefed?
Colby: Six.
Kissinger/Sisco/Colby: Incredible!
Colby: All six know we’re giving peanuts to Roberto.
Kissinger: (To Sisco) Do me a two-page summary of why State does not approve.® (To Colby) Reduce that chart to something I can hand to the President; add the impact issue under Unfavorable. (To Sisco) Tell Vance to be ready to go Friday.®
Hyland: The first phase of Option Three?
Potts: The [dollar amount not declassified] and we will come back for more if arms involved?
Kissinger: We need to hear from Mobutu. Must give substantial aid. Do it fast.
Clements: We want to ask him how he is going to spend it.
Kissinger: Send someone with Vance.
Colby: Certainly. [less than 1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Potts: We ought to deal directly with Savimbi.
Hyland: How would you do that?
Potts: We can send him a message and he will meet us outside.
Kissinger: We need a program in detail other than the funds. The working group should have this ready by Thursday—who contacts whom, when and what for. Someone will go with Vance before we send arms.

® In a memorandum to Scowcroft, July 15, Sisco explained the Department of State’s opposition: “In sum: (1) we have no vital interests; (2) the risks of exposure are extreme; (3) our clients will be discredited; and (4) the results will be indecisive.” (National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, Angola)
® July 18.
PLAN FOR COVERT ACTION—ANGOLA

Background

A. Intelligence Brief—Angola—16 July 75

1. After almost a week of intense fighting in Luanda, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has forced its rival, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), to withdraw from the city. The fighting may well have destroyed the fragile six-month-old transitional government set up to lead Angola to independence.

2. The FNLA’s senior representative in the transitional government, Johnny Eduardo Pinnock has announced his resignation. Pinnock and a number of the FNLA’s leaders in Luanda have fled to Zaire.

3. During the fighting, the Zairian press announced that Agostinho Neto, president of the MPLA, had been ousted by Major Nito Alves, one of his major military commanders. Although Neto’s ouster has not been confirmed, Pinnock said publicly that the MPLA is now controlled by “extremists” who have taken over from Neto. With Pinnock, and perhaps Neto, out of the way, and Front President Holden Roberto still apparently refusing to leave Zaire for Angola, the territory’s transition to independence has been severely jolted, even though the transitional government has been largely a facade during the more than six months it has been in existence.

4. The Portuguese do not want their decolonization effort in the territory open to charges that independence was given to one group by default or by armed takeover. Lisbon will probably try to convince the FNLA to return to the government. The FNLA is unlikely to return unless the Portuguese can guarantee peace in the territory at least until national elections can be held.

5. Pinnock’s resignation, which carried an acknowledgement that the FNLA is mobilizing for full-scale war throughout the northern part of the territory that it controls, was probably designed in large part to prod the Portuguese into imposing a truce through force of arms. Such a truce may be the FNLA’s best chance to pull itself together. With the exception of a few small garrisons scattered around the environs of Luanda, the FNLA is now isolated in northern Angola, separated from

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1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee Files, Angola-Washington. Secret; Sensitive. The paper was submitted to the 40 Committee on July 16.
the capital by territory controlled by the MPLA. It is no doubt very low
in ammunition and supplies. Despite its threats, the FNLA seems in no
position to wage sustained war at the present time, particularly if it
should try to force its way back into Luanda.

6. It is probably too late for Portugal to guarantee security in the
territory. Until now, Portuguese military authorities have been hoping
they would not have to order the 24,000 Portuguese troops remaining
in Angola to intervene between the two hostile liberation groups be-
cause they fear the very real danger that the troops would refuse.
Lisbon is also faced with the possibility that troops from Portugal
proper will refuse to go to Angola.

7. Portuguese Foreign Minister Antunes rushed to Luanda but was
unable to arrange a cease-fire. He subsequently informed UN Secretary
General Waldheim that Lisbon may have to take “emergency meas-
ures” in order to guarantee a relatively peaceful transition to independ-
ence for the territory. Antunes hinted last Sunday night prior to his de-
parture for Luanda that Lisbon might have to appeal to the UN in order
to protect the decolonization process.

8. Whatever the Portuguese and the FNLA may have in mind, the
MPLA appears determined to score a military victory against its com-
petitors, including the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA), the smallest of the three liberation groups. The
UNITA has refused to take sides in the fighting between its larger rivals
but on several occasions has been attacked by the MPLA.

9. Zairian President Mobutu is clearly in a quandary. Because of
economic difficulties he has been forced to cut back drastically on his
substantial aid to the FNLA at a time when the FNLA has met serious
reverses.

10. Mobutu strongly opposes the MPLA and wants to keep Neto
from becoming president of an independent Angola. He probably has
been seriously jolted by the FNLA’s poor showing in the latest fighting.

11. Prior to that fighting, Mobutu was reassessing his relationship
with Holden Roberto. Mobutu seems to have concluded that the FNLA
would be unable to win a protracted war against its chief rival. Mobutu
apparently also believes Roberto’s position has been damaged by his
long-standing refusal to return to Angola from Zaire. Roberto fears that
he would be politically embarrassed if he failed to match the personal
popularity of Agostinho Neto on appearance in Luanda and that he
could even be assassinated.

12. According to reliable sources, Mobutu believes Jonas Savimbi
of UNITA should be the primary political figure in an independent An-

\(^2\) July 13.
golan government, with Roberto as a figurehead president and Neto as vice-president. Mobutu reportedly discussed his concerns with Savimbi in a meeting in Kinshasa in late May.

B. Other Developments

1. President Mobutu continues to ask for a concrete demonstration of U.S. support for his efforts to prevent a takeover of Angola by the MPLA. He is alarmed by the large influx of Soviet arms to the MPLA and the defeat of the FNLA in Luanda.

2. President Kaunda has also been concerned about an MPLA-dominated Angola on his borders. There have been recent signs, however, that MPLA successes may be causing him to feel obliged to make some accommodation with the MPLA.

3. In addition to arms previously supplied to the FNLA by the PRC and Zaire, there may be deliveries of arms for Roberto and possibly Savimbi from other countries.

[Omitted here is detailed discussion of phases 1 and 2 of the covert action plan for Angola.]

117. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 17, 1975, 9:55–10:40 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECTS

Frank Lindsay; Angola; Zaire; Middle East

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

Kissinger: On Angola. I favor action. If the U.S. does nothing when the Soviet-supported group gains dominance, I think all the movements will draw the conclusions that they must accommodate to the

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, July 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
Soviet Union and China. I think reluctantly we must do something. But you must know that we have massive problems within the State Department. They are passionately opposed and it will leak.

President: How about Davis?
Kissinger: He will resign and take some with him.
President: After what you and I did for him.
Kissinger: I also have a problem with the Ambassador to Tanzania. He participated in giving the ransom for the students. I would like to recall and retire him. But you have to know there would be a major blow-up—mostly blamed on me.

Has Colby gone to Kaunda?
Scowcroft: No. He felt that he should wait for approval.
Kissinger: That is a disgrace.

[Describes the State paper of objections.]

There isn’t one African leader who doesn’t govern by physical domination, except maybe Nigeria.

President: Does the paper recommend arms?
Kissinger: We should send Vance with [dollar amount not declassified] Then we should have Mobutu and Kaunda get together and work it out.

Without us, Neto will win. And the argument is, it doesn’t matter.
President: What are the odds if we do it?
Kissinger: We will know better when we see the Mobutu plan.
I will send you the Nat Davis paper.

You have a Zaire economic aid package from Lynn. We would like to give a $20 million economic package for Zaire. Lynn objects because there is no economic justification. He is right, but the political considerations override. This won’t hurt us, but the covert action will.

President: I am not sure if we are opposing the Soviets, we are not right.

Kissinger: But those who rant against the Soviets won’t follow through on it.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

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2 W. Beverly Carter, Jr.
3 See footnote 6, Document 115. Brackets are in the original.
4 Presumably a reference to a briefing memorandum from Davis to Sisco, July 12, in which he argued there was no “irrevocable commitment of U.S. power and prestige in Angola.” However, should the United States decide to “go in,” he proposed the effort should be massive, quick, and decisive. (National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, Angola)
118. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 18, 1975, 9:07–10:12 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECTS
Middle East; Angola; Soviet Grain; SALT; President’s Trip

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

President: I have decided on Angola. I think we should go.  
Kissinger: You will have to certify it.
President: I am willing to do it.

Kissinger: We’ll send Vance to Mobutu [1 line not declassified] and more if needed, and ask him to come up with a program. It may be too late because Luanda is lost. Unless we can seize it back, it is pretty hopeless. We’ll have a resignation from Davis, then I’ll clean out the AF bureau.

President: But if we do nothing, we will lose Southern Africa. I think we have an understandable position.

I think we can defend it to the public. I won’t let someone in Foggy Bottom deter me.

Kissinger: In six years I have been on the tough side. But I push détente in order to be able to be tough. If we were publicly tough, the Soviet Union would have no incentive. Now, so long as they think we are pushing détente, they will keep their heads down.

Call the Agencies and give them the decision.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, July 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

2 In a July 21 memorandum for the record on Angola, Ratliff informed members of the 40 Committee that Ford approved the expenditure [text not declassified] for covert action on July 18. (National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings)
119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zaire

Washington, July 23, 1975, 0003Z.

172996. Subject: Zaire Aid Package. References: (A) Kinshasa 6755, (B) Kinshasa 6798. For Vance from the Secretary.

1. We will provide you with the information you asked for regarding transportation and other costs within 24 hours if possible.

2. I would suggest that you proceed as follows: first, put together a package based on the highest priority items which is in the dols 6 million range. Bear in mind that political action and other programs come out of that total, and CIA estimates transportation can add 25–50 percent to cost. (Your figure of dols 1,200,000 for 5000 M–16s is about half the cost our preliminary estimates show. You should also consider cost of spare parts, etc.)

3. Secondly, put together a package based essentially on Mobutu program as reported in Kinshasa’s 6798 and bring that back as well. In the meantime, we will be costing it out. In any event, we will have to look quickly at both programs and assess the impact.

4. Mobutu has been given a [dollar amount not declassified] dollar starter; he knows there are dols [dollar amount not declassified] additionally available if we consider the program realistic. You should tell Mobutu, that if he has some other program in mind which is realistic and offers prospect of success, we will consider it. You should avoid getting into specific figures.

Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840178–1901. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco and approved by Kissinger.

2 In telegram 6755 from Kinshasa, July 22, Vance recounted his meeting with Mobutu and listed the President’s requests for military hardware. A note on the telegram reads: “General Scowcroft has seen.” In telegram 6798 from Kinshasa, July 22, Vance stated, “What Mobutu wants is for us to replace with U.S. equipment the equipment for all ten battalions which he is sending to Angola from his own reserve and regular forces.” A note on the telegram reads: “General Scowcroft has seen.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 7, Zaire)
120. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State

Kinshasa, July 24, 1975, 1335Z.

6877. Subject Vance Mission: Fourth Meeting with Mobutu July 23. Ref: State 172996.²

1. Following receipt reftel, I telephoned Mobutu and arranged to see him again evening July 23. He invited me to stay for dinner with the family, following which we had most useful talk on status of our joint planning for assistance to Angola.

2. I told Mobutu that we had reviewed and forwarded to Washington the list of equipment replacement requirements given us by his generals as well as the categories of equipment they had designated as being most urgently needed. I said I had this morning received instruction reiterating the need to put together a program not to exceed [dollar amount not declassified] although we did not exclude the possibility of some additional assistance now. In explaining this limitation I observed that our ability to help was subject to certain obvious considerations, notably the limitation on funds available, the cost and time required for shipment, and the risk of leaks that arises if large quantities of matériel are sent all at once. I stressed the importance of the last point, noting the need to move in such a way as to avoid exposure, which could seriously harm our efforts to help. Mobutu said he understood these considerations, but that he considered that much less than the equipment from five of his para-battalions (four for Roberto and one for Savimbi) would not redress the balance. He also reiterated his hope that the items already sent Angola from his mobilization reserve as well as the key items from his paratroops which we cannot supply in the present emergency program would be replaced subsequently.

3. I said it was important that I provide Washington with as precise a view as possible of his order of priorities within the broad priority categories of equipment his generals had given us (on his instruction, it is clear). This so we could determine the most useful types of assistance both for a [dollar amount not declassified] program and for any aid we might be able to provide above that. I then reviewed with Mobutu the list provided by the generals and he indicated how he would refine his relative priorities. His most urgent need remains 5,000 M–16 rifles with

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840178–1917. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
² Document 119.
one–two months’ ammunition, all of which he hopes can be air shipped to Zaire as soon as possible. His second priority is anti-tank guns to replace more than has already been shipped south to counter the Soviet-supplied armored vehicles he said were having devastating effect on the FNLA. Mobutu went on to designate a number of other priority requirements from the list and indicated which should be shipped by air and which by sea. We have incorporated his views both in a [dollar amount not declassified] package and in a larger package which we have developed as requested reftel [1½ lines not declassified]

4. In discussing Zairian military aid to Angola, I took the occasion to remind Mobutu about US restrictions on the transfer from one country to another of equipment (I had in mind his paratroopers have some old MAP equipment.) supplied under MAP. Mobutu said he understood this and reiterated his assurance that no US matériel, no matter how old it might be, would be sent to Angola.

5. Mobutu commented on the importance of moving ahead with political action programs, noting that he had already instructed appropriate security and intelligence officials to sit down [less than 1 line not declassified] and start working up plans. In this regard, Mobutu said he had Amin’s assurance that, as chairman of the forthcoming OAU summit, he would see to it that the Soviets are appropriately taken to task at the meeting for their intervention in Angola. Mobutu intends also to work behind the scenes there to encourage other such criticism.

6. Mobutu did not have much news from Angola. However, he was concerned by reports that two more Soviet vessels have delivered military equipment to the MPLA. I noted reports I had seen recently reflecting adversely on the conduct of certain FNLA officials and troops in Luanda. Mobutu acknowledged this has been a problem, and said he would admonish Roberto again on this matter.

7. I told Mobutu that I intended to return Washington July 25 and would press for earliest possible decision. Mobutu reiterated need for urgent action. “The Soviets are continuing to send arms into Angola,” he said, “while we are sitting here talking.”

8. Recommendation: As noted para 3, we are sending separately the composition of two possible packages: one which meets the current [dollar amount not declassified] ceiling, and the other which incorporates Mobutu’s most urgent minimum requirements and, according our rough estimates, amounts to [dollar amounts not declassified] I wish to make clear Mobutu would not rpt not regard what we could send under the [dollar amount not declassified] program as enough to redress the balance in Angola. As it is important that we start to move just as soon as possible, I urge that Washington agencies give top priority to final reviewing and costing out of both packages to permit a decision in the next few days on what can be our highest level. I urge that the decision
be in favor of a larger than \[\text{dollar amount not declassified}\] dollar program so that we will have a real impact on Angolan situation.

Andrew

121. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)


PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll
Under Secretary Sisco
Deputy Under Secretary Eagleburger
Ambassador Vance
Ambassador Davis
Jerry Bremer, Notetaker

SUBJECT

Angola

The Secretary: I noticed that President Kaunda has reacted in a way totally unpredicted by AF. He’s delighted but concerned that we’ll leak it. That’s inconceivable don’t you think? (laughter) \[\text{less than 1 line not declassified}\] He’s eager and he’s designated Chona as the cut-out man.\(^2\) I think this will be the reaction of the other Africans too. You guys have the Africans pegged all wrong. They act in foreign policy as they act in domestic policy.

Now on Zaire, how can we communicate with Mobutu in a reliable way?

Vance: Well, as you know, I took the Chargé \[\text{less than 1 line not declassified}\] in on the meetings. \[\text{less than 1 line not declassified}\]

The Secretary: We must get an Ambassador out there fast.

Vance: I agree. These goodies will help rub off on him too. \[1 \text{ line not declassified}\]

The Secretary: What decisions do we need to make now?

\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive.

\(^2\) As reported in telegram 1372 from Lusaka, July 23. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 8, Zambia)
Vance: We have the figure of roughly [dollar amount not declassified] which I know he would not see as enough—and I would agree with that.

The Secretary: I’ve never thought it was enough.

Vance: (handing the Secretary a memo) We have this list also. This does not include anti-aircraft and tents.\(^3\)

The Secretary: Why does he need anti-aircraft?

Vance: The Portuguese have aircraft and they’re afraid it may be used against them.

The Secretary: The first thing is, how much do we need?

Vance: I think [dollar amount not declassified]

The Secretary: My view is that if something is worth doing, it’s worth doing right and the amount we put in will not increase the heat we take.

Ingersoll: Colby says if we go too far, we may have budget problems.

The Secretary: I don’t want to hear about Colby. If he doesn’t send the arms then that’s a point—but it is crazy not to send arms. Who is backstopping this back here? We’d better get Larry in here. (Kissinger makes a phone call to Eagleburger)

Vance: Mobutu’s suggestion which I think makes sense is that we get the stuff to him and he then releases his stuff to Angola. Then it goes fast and it’s not US stuff.

The Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Vance: [1 line not declassified]

The Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified] (Eagleburger enters room) The way to handle this is to send our stuff by ship, not by air. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Davis: [less than 1 line not declassified]

The Secretary: Well, Larry, I want you and Bob to follow this Zaire thing. [less than 1 line not declassified] Mobutu is to send his arms into Angola from his own stock. We can use the CIA stuff to replace his stuff. Most of it we should send by ship [less than 1 line not declassified] Tell Colby I want no more crying. It’s decided. Get that equipment in there.

Vance: Mobutu wants new US equipment and not the European stuff.

The Secretary: Well, let’s give him US equipment. How do we pay for it?

\(^3\) Memorandum and list are not attached.
Ingersoll: That’s Colby’s problem.
The Secretary: Work it out with Colby and tell him to do it.
Sisco: He has problems because he has got money all right, but arms are more difficult.
The Secretary: That has been decided. At least let’s give Mobutu what he wants. Does he have a chance in this?
Vance: He thinks so. He’s moved equipment for up to 5 battalions into Angola over the months and nine armored cars during this last week.
The Secretary: Who is handling Savimbi?
Vance: He says we should take Belgian and French equipment from the five battalions and give four to Roberto and one to Savimbi.
The Secretary: Is there any reason not to do that?
Sisco: No.
Vance: This will then replace it.
The Secretary: It’s all below the [dollar amount not declassified] which the President has approved.
Sisco: Let’s do it fast now that it’s being done.
The Secretary: I agree, let’s do it fast and get an Ambassador in who doesn’t get a heart attack when things get rough.
Vance: Do I understand he’s approved the [dollar amount not declassified]
The Secretary: Yes, and he’s only released [dollar amount not declassified]
Vance: The other thing is, he hopes we’ll replace what he’s given out of his mobilization reserve.
The Secretary: The major problem is to get it moving fast. Bob will you talk to Clements please?
Ingersoll: I can.
The Secretary: Now that it’s being done, it must be done fast.
Vance: By air we can certainly send in the urgent things.
The Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Vance: We could deliver the M–16’s in just four flights.
The Secretary: Then double the flights and do it in two weeks.
Cutler: That’s certainly fast enough. He’s willing to take a small gap if he knows our stuff is coming.
The Secretary: Get him a message saying we’ve approved it and we’re working out the details next week. What are you working on now anyway?
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]
122. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee (Ratliff) to Director of Central Intelligence Colby


SUBJECT

Angola

On 27 July 1975 higher authority approved the full [dollar amount not declassified] program incorporated in the NSC task group paper “Plan for Covert Action—Angola” which was submitted 16 July 1975. This includes the previous approval noted in the minute of 21 July 1975, adding [dollar amount not declassified] of Phase II of the plan for a total approval of [dollar amount not declassified]

Rob Roy Ratliff

1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
2 Document 116.
3 See footnote 2, Document 118.

123. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, August 8, 1975, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 8 August 1975, 11:00 a.m.

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Also Present: Director of INR William Hyland; Deputy Director of CIA William Nelson; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.
1. Angola

Kissinger: I’d like to discuss Angola first. My friends at State have been going around weeping about this. They’d like strict neutrality.

Colby: (Briefed on the current situation.² Savimbi is into the fighting now, but he needs arms. All we are doing will not necessarily give military superiority over the Neto troops. (Presented charts showing objectives and accomplishments.)

Kissinger: Anything with Kaunda?

Potts: Yes, he has agreed to send arms to Savimbi.

Kissinger: I think you’ve done damn well in a very short time. (To Scowcroft) Mark this down, we don’t give accolades that often.

Colby: We have not been getting much praise lately, either.

Clements: I’m surprised. I didn’t think you could do so much so fast.

Kissinger: Is this enough? Has all the money been spent?

Colby: Only about [dollar amount not declassified] The political support money is being passed out in increments.

Kissinger: Our purpose is not to spend dollars, but to prevail. We want to prevail. Are they getting enough advice, or should we send in some advisors? Should we send more aid?

Colby: More military aid is going to Roberto. Israel is shipping a lot which was bought by South Africa.

Kissinger: Do they know how to use it?

Colby: They’ve got help from the Congo Army.

Hyland: Portuguese officers are involved.

Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Colby: [1½ lines not declassified]

Nelson: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Colby: I don’t think that is necessary; [1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]

² Briefing is not attached.
Colby: [1 line not declassified]
Clements (to Kissinger): [1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Potts: We have a military Colonel who speaks French . . .
Kissinger: The trouble with Africans is that you can’t just leave them alone—you have to keep pushing them to get things done.
Colby: We’ve made a big start, a big impact. The job now is to keep the momentum.
Kissinger: You’ve made a great start.
Clements: I agree.
Kissinger: What I want to do is to make Kaunda a little more pregnant.
Colby: Well, Savimbi needs arms now.
Kissinger: We want him to get them through Zambia and give us a little more protection. I need more protection from my African Bureau. Get Kaunda involved, give him some of the action. This will help us and give him confidence.
Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Potts: We have a good relationship with Kaunda . . .
Kissinger: I want action! Let’s get some arms to Savimbi through Zambia. Let’s move to get Kaunda a piece of the action so he doesn’t have to go through Mobutu.
Colby: Okay.
Sisco: This is very important, to get him a little more pregnant.
Potts: We’ve to keep Kaunda from being exposed . . .
Kissinger: Let him worry about exposure. I’ve got these worriers in my Department who said he would be offended if we suggested he become involved; he drooled at the chance.
Mulcahy: One of the concerns is American arms . . .
Colby: Let us handle those details; we can work this out.
Kissinger: I want Kaunda involved. If Kaunda thought Savimbi was swinging to Mobutu, it would be bad. How you do it is up to you. Get Kaunda involved.
Colby: Fine. We will get right to work on this and be back in touch with you next week to tell you how we are doing it.
Kissinger: We don’t want to have to get involved in the tactics. Let’s form a working group, an NSC task group to meet weekly to see what is going on and to determine if it is necessary to have a 40 Committee meeting on any problems.
Clements: Let’s just have one person from each organization—keep it small.
Kissinger: CIA to chair it.
Clements: Do we need more dollars?
Kissinger: If we need more, we can get more.
Colby: The only problem we have is if we run down the reserve too far.
Kissinger: What you have done in two weeks is phenomenal.
Hyland: I’m worried about the security. We had a report [less than 1 line not declassified] which revealed Roberto talking in a jubilant manner about what he was getting.
Kissinger: My view is that they can’t touch us on this. I don’t see how we can be faulted on what we are doing. We are not overthrowing any government; we are not subverting anyone. We are helping moderates combat Communist domination.
Hyland: That’s not my point. I’m just worried about their own security standards.
Colby: Well, we’ll take a look at that. Maybe they need better communications equipment.
Kissinger: Let me make this clear. We are in touch with Mobutu and he is helping Roberto. We want to have contact with Kaunda and help him to help Savimbi. Are we in touch with Savimbi?
Colby/Nelson: Yes.
Kissinger: Excellent. (To Mulcahy) How about our consul?
Mulcahy: He’s a good man.
Potts: We have instructions out to brief him, but no report back yet.
Clements: (To Colby) What is that chart about?
Colby: (Briefed on arms distribution.)
Kissinger: No problems in briefing the Congress?
Colby: No. Just a little questioning. I start by telling what the Communists have sent and that sets the scene. They ask what the U.S. interest is and I explain about blocking a Soviet foothold.
Sisco: Can’t we get some more information out about what the Soviets are doing?
Colby: We are doing that everywhere but in the U.S. It is up to you to get more done here in America.
Clements: What are you doing about stopping offloading of Soviet cargo?
Colby: Well, we have generated a lot of publicity and have made people more wary of helping move Soviet material.
Clements: What about the report that there were two Czech ships ready to unload?
Potts: Our man can’t find those ships. We suspect that it is not an accurate report.

Kissinger: Well, the work has been done well. (To Hyland) Do you want to weep about all this?

Hyland: No. Good. The problem down the road, however, is who is going to be in charge—Roberto or Savimbi?

Kissinger: That’s a problem I’d like to face—get us to that point.

Hyland: We will have a problem of answering critics.

Kissinger: I’m relaxed. The Pentagon will have a problem—they can’t call me soft and hard at the same time. They’ll have to make a choice. So what if critics attack us, we can’t be faulted. What grounds would they use?

Hyland: They can claim that we are perpetuating war by arming the people; that we will turn a civil conflict into a bloodbath.

Kissinger: What would they have us do, abandon the country to the Communists?

Colby: In my briefings on the Hill I have said that we are on the way toward a coalition.

Kissinger: That’s not going to happen. Our objective is to keep the Communists out.

Colby: Even with our help, we can’t be sure that the MPLA will be defeated militarily.

Kissinger: Stop making that statement. We don’t want to lose.

Clements: The strongest argument is resisting Communism.

Sisco: Prevent a Communist takeover.

Kissinger: Our objective is to stop Communism. We’ll let later political events take care of themselves.

Hyland: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee got into this.

Kissinger: How?

Colby: When I gave the usual briefing it was to Sparkman, Case and Pat Holt. Senator Clark had a pre-set session with Ingersoll a couple of days later. Sparkman directed Holt to brief Clark. Holt made a written briefing sheet and evidently distributed it to all the members.

Hyland: Other members were there; some were in and out, but Staff Member Moose was there, too.

Kissinger: I want to complain about that to Sparkman. We’ve gone down there on this for years. You can’t give in to them. That won’t stop them. We’ll worry about the political solution in Angola later. The Africans aren’t going to get together in a coalition. There will be no coalition. That’s a pipe dream. Show me one country in Africa where that has happened.
Sisco: What can we do to prevent spreading these things all around the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?
Kissinger: Sparkman has no authority to direct you (Colby) to report to anyone. You don’t work for Sparkman.
Colby: I know that.
Hyland: They had all the details about this effort at the briefing.
Kissinger: We can’t have that. Unacceptable.
Hyland: Moose is unacceptable. He is hostile toward the Administration. I don’t see why he was included.
Kissinger: (To Colby) Talk to Sparkman. I’ll back you up.
Hyland: Moose wanted to know how this project started—did CIA submit it, what others thought of it . . .
Scowcroft: We don’t have to report on who supports something and who doesn’t; that’s executive privilege.
Sisco: We don’t.
Colby: Pat Holt was the only staff member I talked to. When I briefed Clark, he specifically requested that Moose be present.
Kissinger: Moose is unacceptable. He’s gone so far he doesn’t even like me.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

124. Telegram From the Consulate General in Mozambique to the Department of State

Lourenco Marques, August 20, 1975, 1030Z.

899. Subject: Mozambique–U.S. Relations. Ref: Lourenco Marques 860.2

1. We received the following letter addressed to Consul General Peter C. Walker from GPRM Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Quote The

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Repeated Immediate to Blantyre, Dar es Salaam, Lisbon, London, Lusaka, Mbabane, and Pretoria, and repeated to Gaborone, USUN, CINCLANT for POLAD, and CINCEUR.

2 In telegram 860 from Lourenco Marques, August 12, Consul General Peter Walker informed the Department that he had told Chissano in a letter of his imminent departure and named his deputy, Randolph Reed, as the new senior representative in Mozambique. (Ibid.)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Mozambique,
in face of your letter of August 12, 1975, would like to remind you
that: 1—Your consular functions in the Mozambican territory have
ceased as from the 24th June 1975. 2—The People’s Republic of
Mozambique does not recognize any representation of the Govern-
ment of the United States of America in Mozambique until such
time when diplomatic or consular relations will be established be-
tween the United States of America and the People’s Republic of
Mozambique.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly demands your office to
immediately stop any consular business which it might be
undertaking.

None of the consular representatives of the United States of
America who were in Mozambique before the 25th of June 1975 are al-
lowed to continue representing their government in Mozambique.

Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advises them to leave
the country as soon as possible: Lourenco Marques, 15th June 1975 (sic)
initial illegible. End quote.

2. Letter referred to in para 1 is that delivered per ref tel on Walker
departure.

3. If we interpret last paragraph correctly GPRM is instructing all
U.S. officers who were in Mozambique prior to June 25 (all of us) to de-
part soonest, although no deadline given. We will attempt to obtain
clarification through Senator Clark if he is received by high level GPRM
officials. Otherwise, propose sending letter to Foreign Minister Chissa-
no as follows: Quote We acknowledge receipt of letter 259/75 from
your Ministry dated June 15 addressed to Mr. Peter C. Walker, who de-
parted Mozambique August 19.

In view of the serious implications of the letter for
U.S.–Mozambique relations, we would appreciate clarification of the
last two paragraphs of the letter requesting the departure of U.S. con-
sular representatives who were in Mozambique prior to June 25, 1975.
Specifically, we wish to know whether this is a request for the depart-
ture of all American staff members of our official mission in Mozam-
bique, every one of whom was in Lourenco Marques prior to June 25, or
only those who were specifically given consular exequatur by the Por-
tuguese Government.

Sincerely, Randolph Reed. End quote.

4. If interpretation para 3 correct, we recommend evacuating all
American staff and their effects overland to South Africa. We would
seek GPRM escort of vans and other vehicles which AmEmbassy Preto-
ria may be able to arrange to pick us up.
5. We are proceeding to destroy files.
6. Request instructions soonest.3

Reed

3 In telegram 918 from Lourenco Marques, August 22, Reed reported on a dinner meeting between Senator Clark and Chissano. The Foreign Minister said that Mozambique “expected all the top consular personnel (Codel interpreted this to mean Consul General) to depart prior to independence and that replacement should not be sent until agreement on diplomatic or consular relations reached with new GPRM government.” Chissano informed Clark that he was working on documents to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. (Ibid.) The United States and Mozambique established diplomatic relations on September 23, and the Embassy was opened on November 8.

125. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, August 20, 1975, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT
40 Committee Meeting, 20 August 1975, 3:00 p.m.

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Also Present: Director of INR William Hyland; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. General John W. Pauly; Assistant to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Lt. Colonel Robert C. McFarlane. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs L. Bruce Laingen was present for Item 1; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs James G. Lowenstein was present for Item 2; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy, Chief, Africa Division, CIA, James M. Potts, and NSC Senior Staff Officer for Africa Harold Horan were present for Item 3; Deputy Chief, Europe Division, CIA, [name not declassified] was present for Items 1 and 2.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on August 21.
3. Angola

Colby: (Briefed—using charts.)²
Kissinger: Are we still playing around with lifting Portuguese out of Angola?
Sisco: We told Carlucci that we could offer the Portuguese help.³
Kissinger: Depending upon what their policy is. We’re not a charity organization.
Sisco: We’ll remind Carlucci.
Kissinger: They want us to help with the lift, but before we help we want to know what their policy is toward Angola.
Sisco: It would destabilize the situation . . .
Kissinger: Don’t use that word. Let the record show that the word “destabilize” is banned and was not said here.
Sisco: Well, would continue the evolution of deterioration in Angola.
Kissinger: In this we can get both—we need an excuse to ask the Portuguese what they are going to do in Angola.
Clements: How are we going to help? With an air lift?
Kissinger: Fuel, expediting acquisition of a 747 they are trying to purchase.
Hyland: The 747 is in the mill, but they want it now.
Kissinger: We can slow up if we have to, as leverage in Lisbon to discuss Angola.
Clements: Darn good idea.
Colby: (Continued briefing.)
Sisco: It looks to me as if Kaunda is getting a little scared.
Colby: He’s scared of being tainted with CIA.
Kissinger: Okay by me, just so Savimbi gets the arms he needs.
Colby: (Continued briefing.)
Kissinger: I must say that when you guys get started with something, you really can produce.
Clements: Right. Those armored cars. We’ve been discussing those—where, when, if we can get them . . .
Mulcahy: Who is going to pay?
Clements: Right; they cost [dollar amount not declassified] to [dollar amount not declassified] each.

² Not attached.
³ In telegram 197494 to Lisbon, August 20, Kissinger instructed Carlucci to inform Costa Gomes that the United States was prepared to assist in the evacuation of refugees from Angola to Portugal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Potts: Mobutu had agreed to deliver 12. We were told that the lead time was such that we couldn’t make the boat. If we can do so, we should.

Colby: I’m getting to that. We’ve spent most of the money the Committee authorized; we’re running out of money.

Kissinger: What do you need?

Colby: There are three choices. We can piddle around which will take about [dollar amount not declassified]

Kissinger: No. That won’t do.

Colby: We can go for a concerted, continuing effort at [dollar amount not declassified] Or, we can go all out to win the war, and that would cost about [dollar amount not declassified]

Kissinger: You’re not seriously suggesting the [dollar amount not declassified]

Colby: No. But my problem is that we are running out of money. By the end of June we had about [dollar amount not declassified]

Kissinger: Has the Committee ever considered bank robberies?

Sisco: Assassination to bank robberies!

Colby: This will be the first time we have run out of funds in the Reserve in all our experience. There’s some money going in, but more is going out.

Kissinger: Isn’t any new money added?

Colby: [2½ lines not declassified]

Clements: You want more dollars put in.

Colby: Yes. We had [dollar amount not declassified] and spent [dollar amount not declassified] already.

Kissinger: Is any new money going in?

Colby: No. We need to take [dollar amount not declassified] out, and we were talking about other draws from the Reserve just 10 minutes ago. We are going to end up with less than [dollar amount not declassified] for the rest of the fiscal year. I think we should go to the Congress and ask for [less than 1 line not declassified] for Angola.

Kissinger: Why not? What do you think?

Hyland: We’ve already given about [dollar amount not declassified] We’ve given them quite a bit already and they haven’t done too much with it. I’d want to see some more solid results.

Kissinger: When do you need an answer?

Colby: Well, they’ve already marked up, but it’s not too late .

Kissinger: Congress won’t be back before early September.

Colby: I’ll have to get OMB’s okay, too.
Clements: It’s a calculated risk. You’re including what’s in the budget process now?
Colby: Yes.
Kissinger: Our only concern is that we do what is necessary to win. It is a mistake to consistently try to see how we can get by with the minimum expenditure.
Colby: If we use [dollar amount not declassified] now, then in the next few months we will need another [dollar amount not declassified] and we will end up with nothing in the Reserve. We can’t get a supplemental.
Clements: [1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: I’ll talk to the President tonight. If the decision is to approve [dollar amount not declassified] now, can you put the armored vehicles on the ship?
Clements: Done.
Colby: No problem.
Kissinger: I’ll tell the President that there is no use to ante [dollar amount not declassified] unless we go get another [dollar amount not declassified] for Angola.4
Clements: Bill, have you talked to your Congressional contacts about this?
Colby: Yes, I’ve briefed them.
Kissinger: No problems?
Colby: No problems. Some said they didn’t like it, but . . .
Kissinger: What do you call a problem?
Colby: What I am concerned about is a leak.
Sisco: It is bound to blow.
Hyland: We got this cable today . . .5
Potts: But that’s not based on anything.
Hyland: Well, they’ve got the facts straight.
Kissinger: (To Colby) Can you get together a white paper6 to show what funds have been dispersed by the Soviets and Yugoslavs for the MPLA?
Colby: Yes, that might be helpful to show Congress.
Kissinger: People in my Department worry because there’s not much of a coalition. If a coalition bothers them, there’s the MPLA.
Colby: Talk federation—they can work that out.

4 See Document 126.
5 Not further identified.
6 Not found.
Hyland: We can’t do much until Roberto/Savimbi stop the MPLA.
Kissinger: Anything’s better than a MPLA victory.
Sisco: The Portuguese Communists will try to work something out with Neto.
Kissinger: That’s why we must back a coalition.
Colby: Confederation.
Kissinger: We don’t need a total victory.

126. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

40 Committee Actions

Following the discussion at a 40 Committee meeting on 20 August 1975 the Chairman of The 40 Committee raised the question of additional funding of Angola operations with higher authority. The latter approved an additional expenditure of [less than 1 line not declassified] and authority for the Director of Central Intelligence to initiate action to obtain an appropriation of [less than 1 line not declassified] in anticipation of continuing operational requirements.

Rob Roy Ratliff
Executive Secretary
The 40 Committee

1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Distributed to Clements, Sisco, General Brown, and Colby.
2 See Document 125.
127. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, September 13, 1975, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT
40 Committee Meeting, 13 September 1975, 9:00 a.m.

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Substitute Members Present: Lt. General H. M. Fish, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance, vice Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements; Lt. General W. Y. Smith, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vice JCS Chairman General Brown.

Also Present: Director of INR William Hyland; Deputy Director of CIA William Nelson; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Lt. General Brent Scowcroft; Ambassador Sheldon Vance; Director of the Office of Central African Affairs Walter L. Cutler; Chief, African Division, CIA James M. Potts; and NSC Senior Staff Officer for Africa Harold Horan.

Angola and Cabinda

Kissinger (to Colby): Will you give us a briefing?
Colby: (Briefed.)

Kissinger: I notice in your paper that you say the effect of our arms shipments has not been fully felt. Considering that the ship only arrived yesterday, that sounds like a cautious statement.
Colby: Well, there have been air shipments.
Kissinger: You’re not going to get caught out on a limb with that.
Colby: (Referring to chart) This shows where Soviets are sending in more.
Kissinger: Where does it say that?
Colby: (Pointing) Here.
Potts: We have reports that Soviet shipments continue to arrive.
Kissinger: Is that true?
Potts: We’ve had reports.

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1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.
2 Briefing is not attached.
3 Not found.
Horan: We’ve had reports recently about the Soviets sending tanks, and that may be confused with armored cars.

Potts: This information is from our own reports.

Colby: (Referring to chart) This shows the political developments.

Kissinger: How are you doing with world opinion?

Colby: Well, we’ve not been hacked hard, yet.

Kissinger: Is that because the MPLA can’t read? What do the colors mean?

Colby: Nothing.

Scowcroft: Henry, in case you didn’t know, those are all different colors.

Colby: We have several policy questions.

Kissinger: Before we get to those, let me ask: Will our arms shipments make any difference?

Colby: The main function is to replace arms that Mobutu has already issued.

Potts: Yes. Some of it will go directly to Angola.

Fish: But American arms are not to be transferred into Angola. The shipment will really be to help Mobutu.

Kissinger: Let’s not delay.

Colby: We do not intend to.

Fish: Your paper says you will not send American arms into Angola.

Nelson: Let’s make a distinction there. We have sent some American arms into Angola. We are drawing a line between recent stuff and World War II-type items.

Kissinger: What are we saying—that the Soviets can send arms in, but we can’t?

Colby: We have a problem with Congress and the public.

Kissinger: But Congress has been informed.

Colby: Confidentially, but if this was exposed . . .

Kissinger: What does “expose” mean?

Colby: Publicly—if it became public knowledge that we were sending American arms in.

Kissinger: And what would that do?

Colby: There would be a great uproar about CIA getting involved in a war.

Kissinger: There could be an uproar about CIA not doing anything to block the Communist takeover of an African nation.

Colby: What we’d like to do is to send arms.
Smith: But the question is, can they use them?
Colby: We’ve got to give them training. We’ll get money in there so they can get the necessary training. [less than 1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: American training—that’s what bothers me. Can’t we get other nationalities?
Colby: Savimbi doesn’t want Portuguese, but he would accept Americans.
Kissinger: Can’t we get other Europeans?
Nelson: There has been some talk about sending in South Africans.
Kissinger: I’m worried about U.S. training involvement, what with the specter of Vietnam. I am not worried about American arms.
Potts: [1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Potts: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Sisco: Send in black Brazilians.
Kissinger: Why not white?
Sisco: I said black purposely.
Kissinger: I know you did, and I said why not white?
Nelson: We really haven’t looked.
Kissinger: I think we can get away with American weapons. That doesn’t bother me. I fail to see the rationale that Soviets can but we can’t—that we have no moral right to respond to the Soviet intrusion in Angola.
Cutler: Well, this could adversely affect our other programs we are trying to get through the Congress, including the aid package.
Fish: If someone raises hell, they could argue that we should stop all aid to Zaire because they transshipped American arms.
Scowcroft: Well, this isn’t MAP material.
Fish: They won’t make that distinction.
Sisco: There’s a very simple issue here. We are supporting Mobutu who is intervening in a war, publicly. As our role becomes more exposed, how far are we going to go? I’d like to hear from Bill (Colby) what’s going to happen next—in the next three or four weeks.
Colby: There’s no good news. Zaire is going to become more involved . . .
Kissinger: The Americans’ masochism is beyond all help. The Soviets gave maximum aid and turned a minor movement into a dominant one. Angola’s neighbors see this and see that the Soviets can do this, but the U.S. can’t. Then to say that Mobutu is intervening . . .
Colby: I think the major force with which we have to work is the UNITA.
Kissinger: Which group we back is a different issue. What I’m asking is why the U.S. should be so afraid of what we tell Congress.

Colby: We have done this; we’ve told them and have been well received, generally.

Kissinger: We may reach some point where we think it is hopeless and throw in the towel.

Sisco: Yes. I don’t think we’ve reached that point yet.

Kissinger: We can defend material aid, but I don’t want to put in American trainers. Can’t we do it with others?

Colby: Yes.

Potts: But we can’t do it as well.

Kissinger: I’m in favor of sending in American weapons if they need them. That we can defend. But we’ve got to get it in; we can’t dole the stuff out. We’ve got to decide if they can make it or not.

Colby: A problem is money. We’ve got enough now, but it will soon be a problem.

Kissinger: How can we get more?

Colby: I’ve asked Congress for more, but unless we get more we will soon be out. I’ve asked for [dollar amount not declassified] more.

Fish: Adjusting the MAP might help. We have [dollar amount not declassified] and I sent you a note suggesting raising that to [dollar amount not declassified] This would help.

Colby: That would help.

Fish: I’m concerned with what’s on the ship—[less than 1 line not declassified]

Scowcroft: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: Has anyone estimated what it will take to stabilize the issue?

Hyland: They are not losing because of lack of equipment.

Fish: Training is the problem.

Colby: Yes.

Fish: They broke and ran when they were attacked by rockets. Training would have had them in trenches and they would have been okay. The troops went into shock and ran.

Kissinger: How many troops involved?

Potts: There were about 1200 and another 500 in reserve.

Kissinger: If they can’t stand up against a small group . . .

Hyland: The people who ran were not Savimbi’s people.

Fish: It all goes back to training—that would help.

Kissinger: Had they training?
Potts: Yes, and Portuguese advisors.
Colby: Most troops are shaky when they first get shot at.
Hyland: The FNLA accept Portuguese trainers.
Kissinger: Are the Portuguese any good as trainers? I once reviewed a Portuguese honor guard and if those guys could beat anyone . . .
Fish: Well, we go back to black Brazilians.
Potts: No. [1½ lines not declassified] It would take time.
Kissinger: No difference if they are black or white. My concern is if we don’t have people who are trained, how can they handle the weapons? If we send in Americans there will be the cry that we are starting another Vietnam, and I’ve been on the Hill all week explaining that we are not doing that in the Middle East.
Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: I would, too—if we could stand the heat.
Nelson: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: I don’t want to hear about it.
Nelson: I just wanted to be sure you were aware of it.
Colby: Let’s summarize—we’ll send American weapons, if necessary; train UNITA in Zaire; try to get non-American trainers in Angola . . .
Smith: Americans training in Zaire, but not Angola?
Colby: Yes.
Smith: I think we ought to avoid U.S. trainers there. To the extent we engage in training there I think we ought to use non-Americans.
Colby: I would prefer no restrictions on training in Zaire. [1 line not declassified]
Smith: I could take that better than training.
Kissinger: I’ll take your views to report to the President. Or you can submit a paper if you wish. I would prefer to keep paper to a minimum.
Colby: Yes, so would I.
Smith: No, that’s all right. I’ve said what I want to say and wanted to be sure you understand my position.
Kissinger (to Colby): What about Mobutu?
Colby: He has sent in troops and may send more. We can encourage that or tell him to keep his hands off. [1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: I saw a report this morning that said Mobutu and Roberto were cooperating. Cabinda is less of a priority. Why does he want to do it now?
Colby: He feels he needs a victory.
Smith: He’s right there.

Sisco: If he moved into Cabinda now there is a danger that he would be overextending. Second, African leaders look with quiet acquiescence on his moves into Angola, but Cabinda would be a different matter.

Vance: There is the problem of the reactions of Roberto and UNITA—they would not like this.

Potts: A Cabindan liberation force might get licked. It shouldn’t go in if it is not going to win. I think that should be our best argument with Mobutu and then we help him organize and train the force.

Kissinger: Cabinda has a lower priority than Angola. But, it would be better to take it than to let it go to the MPLA.

Cutler: He can’t do much about the MPLA in Angola, so he’d like to take Cabinda, and hope to create a buffer zone in northern Angola.

Hyland: Mobutu could take Cabinda anytime he wanted.

Kissinger: Then we don’t resist.

Vance: He is under pressure for oil, and he can’t get credits.

Colby: He needs the railroad, too, but that’s in the south.

Hyland: Controlled by the MPLA.

Colby: Let me summarize what we’ve said and see if you agree. Don’t encourage him to go into Cabinda with his own troops. If the situation in Angola gets worse, then we won’t stand in his way.

Smith: Let’s give the Cabindans training. If that’s going to determine whether they can win or not, let’s do it now.

Colby: We can give arms and training to the Cabindans.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Sisco: Now?

Colby: Yes.

Sisco: Aren’t his hands full?

Colby: What’s why he wants to take over Cabinda now, before MPLA gets too strong.

Vance: If he does it will help divide Roberto and Savimbi, and affect our strength in Angola.

Hyland: It hasn’t yet, and Mobutu has told Roberto that henceforth their efforts in Cabinda will be joint. He means to take over Cabinda but not to annex it to Zaire.

Kissinger: I want to get something straight here. What is our strength in Angola?

Potts: The fear is that this move would divide Roberto and Savimbi and they would not work together.
Hyland: There’s an advantage if Savimbi stays in alliance with Roberto. The Portuguese want cooperation with the MPLA so they can walk away. Unless Savimbi sees some hope he will have no option but to cooperate with the MPLA.

Kissinger: What does that mean—a takeover by the Communists?

Hyland: Whenever that point is reached Mobutu will take over Cabinda.

Kissinger: How many MPLA troops are in Cabinda?

Fish: 2500.

Potts: There’s a militia of 1500.

Colby: There’s also the danger that the Congo might move if Mobutu moves.

Kissinger: What does that mean?

Colby: I don’t know.

Kissinger: Well, this could be a blow to the U.S., Cabinda’s loss on top of the loss of Angola. If Angola is going down the drain, then Mobutu should take Cabinda. The question is should we arm and train Cabinda forces?

Fish: Why not?

Cutler: But lose the cooperation of UNITA/Roberto.

Hyland: If we don’t help Mobutu on Cabinda—something that is close to his heart—but spend [dollar amount not declassified] on Angola, he is going to wonder what kind of friends we are.

Kissinger: Let’s arm and train Cabinda forces and see if we can get something going.

Smith: Can he handle both?

Hyland: He can take Cabinda anytime.

Kissinger: But not so nakedly. Start a commotion first. As long as nothing happens why should Savimbi object? If Savimbi joins the front, he turns against us. If we don’t help Cabinda, what can we do?

Colby: Support Cabindan efforts against the MPLA.

Kissinger: We’re not sending them in, but training a standby capability.

Colby: We need to stop a MPLA takeover. We can straighten things out after we stop the MPLA.

Kissinger: I don’t think revolutionary war is our specialty.

Sisco: What is?

Hyland: Nuclear.

Sisco: I hope.

Scowcroft: Intragovernmental.

Colby: You need time; you can’t do it quickly.
Hyland: But by November we have to do something.
Kissinger: We’ve blown it, basically.
Hyland: A military victory would help.
Kissinger: We need to get something now. If we wait until November then it will be too late. The UN will move in.
Colby: If Savimbi could take these ports (points to map). Then we would get the railroads.
Kissinger: Can he do it?
Colby: I don’t know. But that’s what we ought to be doing.
Fish: If we were to do that in six weeks we would have to send in lots of arms.
Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: I’ll raise that with the President tomorrow.
Colby: Things are not good in the north, but if we could get Savimbi to show something . . .
Sisco: The odds are very strongly against it.
Colby: We might approach the Chinese and ask them to increase their support.
Kissinger: We look like pitiful characters. Angola is about as far away from the Soviets as they can get, so we go to the Chinese who are also about as far away from China as they can get—all because we can’t do anything. If this was 1960, you’d win it.
Colby: Yes, no problem. Because we have to tip-toe through the tulips with Congress—that stops us.
Kissinger: At this point we must do all we can.
Colby: We can arm 1,000 Cabindans, train them and get them ready to act in Cabinda while holding off Zaire troops for now.
Sisco: When they are needed, let us know—come back to us.
Colby: Not use Zaire troops in Cabinda for the time being.
Smith: Agree.
Colby: In the south, give our full support including U.S. weapons, if necessary.
Kissinger: Right. Don’t dole them out, waiting for a signed chit from a soldier that he has only a few bullets left.
Colby: Not too parsimonious with U.S. arms. Savimbi’s request for trainers . . .
Kissinger: I think I know the President’s answer—you’d better look elsewhere for trainers.
Colby: More trainers, training in Zaire.
Hyland: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Fish: And leadership—command.
Colby: Yes.
Fish: You’ve got to have leaders to go in with the troops.
Colby: Yes.
Kissinger: Get French trainers.
Colby: Yes. I know. I’m aware of that.
Kissinger: Okay. What would it take to win?
Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: In six weeks?
Colby: No.
Fish: To hold until 11 November?
Kissinger: We’ve got to win.
Sisco: Holding is losing.
Colby: If Savimbi showed some strength it would help things politically.
Hyland: It is probably too late to bring this up, but we ought to consider what cooperation we could get from the Portuguese.
Kissinger: I can fight one of my bureaus, but I can’t fight two at the same time. Six weeks ago I said we would help the Portuguese get their people out of Angola if we could get some help from them on Angola. I was in the Middle East but the cables I saw on this were mush, and we never talked to Portugal in terms of what we wanted done in Angola.
Sisco: Carlucci did.
Colby: Let’s wait a few days and talk to the new government. Ask their help.
Kissinger: Let’s go back fast on this.
Hyland: As soon as they get a new government, go back.
Sisco: It’s too early now.
Colby: You could talk to Antunes now.
Hyland: They just want out.
Kissinger: Have we ever given them any idea what we’re after? What did we tell them?
Hyland: They know we don’t want to help the MPLA.
Kissinger: But they might think we just don’t give a damn.
Sisco: Carlucci has specific instructions about our aims. He went as far as he could go.
Scowcroft: When I got back from Vail there was a cable to be released, and I would not release it until I was sure we did tell them, and I was assured that it was done.
Sisco: I’m not sure this is the time.
Kissinger: Tell them what we want.
Colby: You can talk now to Antunes and Soares.
Hyland: Put pressure on them.
Kissinger: Okay.
Colby: Fine.
Kissinger: Get a cable to Carlucci to have a talk before he comes back.4

Sisco: They don’t have a government.
Kissinger: Talk to Antunes. Tell them what we want in Angola and ask what Portugal is doing.

4 See Document 128.

128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal1

Washington, September 17, 1975, 0346Z.

221159. Subject: Portuguese Policy in Angola. For the Ambassador.

1. As Secretary directed during your consultations here, we want you to go back to Antunes on your return and advise him, in connection with his earlier representations to you that we increase our airlift of refugees from Angola, that before reaching any decision to do so we frankly need some better understanding than we have now on Portuguese policy and objectives in Angola. We leave it to your discretion whether to make similar or supporting representations to Azevedo.

2. For your discussion, you already have available (State 199405)2 general talking points with respect to USG policy in Angola. With that as background you should indicate to Antunes our hope and expectation that GOP actions in and with respect to Angola will in future more

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 11, Portugal, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—Nodis (2). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Laingen; cleared in INR, AF/C, and S; and approved by Hartman.

2 In telegram 199405 to Lisbon, August 21, Carlucci was instructed to “draw out what GOP intentions and general policy are with respect to Angola” and to present U.S. objectives in Angola. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850047–2496)
accurately reflect stated GOP policy of complete neutrality. You should indicate that in recent months it has seemed to us that GOP more often than not has departed from that policy. You should make clear that in our view a policy of neutrality with respect to Angola dictates that Portugal take steps to correct present posture which for example seems to be one of acquiescing in delivery of Soviet arms to MPLA and of pressuring Savimbi to come to terms with the MPLA at the expense of the former. We can appreciate GOP policy of seeking genuine accommodation among opposing factions in Angola in order to facilitate peaceful transition of power on November 11. However, we believe current GOP policy has amounted to one of pressuring Savimbi to come to terms with the MPLA on a coalition arrangement, a policy that serves more to serve MPLA objectives than it does to effect a genuine peaceful transition of the kind Portugal professes to seek.

3. There follows our assessment of where we believe GOP policy has departed from one of neutrality and from which you may draw for your conversation with Antunes.

4. Portuguese Assistance to the MPLA. There is little evidence of direct Portuguese assistance to the MPLA in the form of material support. However, Portuguese actions—or, more often, the failure to take appropriate action—have had the practical and sometimes intended effect of assisting the MPLA.

5. Arms Control. Admittedly, the small number of Portuguese troops in Angola have been limited in their ability to monitor and control arms shipments into the territory by all three liberation movements. Nevertheless, even in those instances where the Portuguese were in a position to take action, they have not. This is particularly true of arms deliveries by air and sea to MPLA-controlled areas along the southern coast. For example, a recent clandestine report indicates that a large shipment of arms was delivered by a Soviet vessel to Porto Amboim south of Luanda in mid August. According to the report, Portuguese military officials advised the MPLA to use an inconspicuous route in moving the arms, which included a number of armored vehicles and tanks, to MPLA bases near Caxito. The weapons subsequently were used in the MPLA’s successful offensive to recapture Caxito on September 6. It is impossible to determine whether such actions are undertaken by local Portuguese commanders acting on their own initiative or reflect the conscious policies of higher officials. In either case, the result is the same.

6. Security. Portuguese actions have also assisted the MPLA in gaining complete military control over the capital of Luanda. The deliberate policy of not intervening in the fighting in the capital resulted in the gradual erosion of the positions of both the FNLA and UNITA. In early August, the Acting High Commissioner forced the FNLA to sur-
render its one remaining garrison at the Sao Pedro de Barra fortress, ostensibly to remove the potential threat to shipping (specifically oil tankers) in the Luanda harbor. Despite Portugal’s announced intention to secure a similar withdrawal of MPLA troops and to “demilitarize” the capital, it has made no effort to do so.

7. Indirect Political Assistance. The unwillingness and/or inability of the Portuguese to assure the safety of FNLA and UNITA political officials in Luanda was a major factor leading to the decisions by both movements to withdraw their representatives from the transitional government. When the MPLA subsequently moved to take over the abandoned Ministries, Portuguese officials voiced no objections. Later, in setting up the new Directorates General to replace the Ministries in the transitional government, the Portuguese High Commissioner relied almost exclusively on MPLA and pro-MPLA appointees. Despite an announced limitation on the authority of the Directorates General, the High Commissioner has interpreted the decree in such a way as to allow the MPLA appointees to make major policy decisions, such as assuming control of private banks and insurance companies.

8. Diplomatic Activities. A number of high ranking leftists within the Portuguese armed forces movement have been lobbying for some time, both in Lisbon and with neighboring African states, for the creation of a coalition government in Angola that would exclude the FNLA. Recognizing that any accommodation between the MPLA and FNLA is out of the question, these officials hope that a nominal coalition of the MPLA and UNITA would at least allow Portugal to claim the presence in Luanda of a government representing a majority of Angolans when it withdraws from the territory on November 11. That view now seems to reflect official Portuguese policy for Angola.

Sisco

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State

Lisbon, September 19, 1975, 1812Z.

5542. Subject: GOP Policy in Luanda.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 11, Portugal—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Exdis (2). Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Luanda.
1. Following a call by Senator McGovern on President Costa Gomes I remained behind and spent 15 minutes alone with the President to discuss Angola.

2. Told him USG was becoming increasingly concerned about evolution of events in Angola. Under no circumstances would we tolerate a Communist takeover there. While the official GOP policy was one of neutrality we had information that that policy was not being observed on the ground. For example Soviet arms continued to arrive in Angola in large quantities. The GOP had said it was going to evacuate MPLA forces from Luanda, but that had not happened. No effort had been made to impede the MPLA military advances. We knew of one occasion where Portuguese troops had actually facilitated a MPLA military maneuver.

3. We also knew that pressure was being applied to Savimbi to get him to join with MPLA. The US could not accept a solution where Angola was turned over to the control of a group, the MPLA, which had achieved hegemony by the naked use of force supported from abroad.

4. Costa Gomes replied that the GOP was criticized on all sides for its Angolan policy. MPLA accused it of favoring FNLA. Just recently in Bissau at a meeting of the World Peace Conference the MPLA had attacked the “partisanship” of the Portuguese forces. Costa Gomes said GOP had tried to bring the three parties together. When Alvor Accord broke down, GOP appealed to neighboring African states for help. He understood that the OAU now intended to send a goodwill mission. It was as hard to get the FNLA and the MPLA to sit together as it was to get the PCP and PPD together in Lisbon, but GOP intended to keep trying. Their goal was to have a valid “interlocutor” to whom to turn over power on November 11.

5. As far as arms were concerned, these were coming in to all the parties from a number of sources. UNITA had received arms through Zambia. The FNLA had received French equipment and Chinese arms, as well as support from Zaire. The Portuguese forces were essentially located at five points: Cabinda, Luanda, Nova Lisboa, Lobito and Sa da Bandeira. They had very little capacity to restrict the arms flow or impede military movements. Some progress had been made in negotiating MPLA troops out of Luanda.

6. I said I had to clarify to my government exactly what GOP policy was. Were they neutral or were they favoring MPLA. Costa Gomes said their policy was one of neutrality, but MPLA enjoyed greater popular support than FNLA although latter had superior military capacity. He pointed out that FNLA had had modern equipment at the battle of Caxito. When I asked why they lost, he said because MPLA forces have a better spirit and more popular support.
7. I said that that was not exactly Washington’s understanding of the respective support and military capacity of these two groups, but that was not the essential point. Did Portugal intend to continue to allow the MPLA to expand with the intention of turning Angola over to it on November 11? Costa Gomes claimed MPLA was not Communist—it would be like FRELIMO, perhaps, but that in any event GOP policy was to continue to try to work with the three groups without showing favoritism to any. Costa Gomes pointed to yesterday’s (September 18) interview by Angolan High Commissioner Cardoso to the effect that Portugal does not feel it has the legal right to hand over power on November 11 only to MPLA, that MPLA does not presently represent the Angolan people and that GOP will continue to try to unite the three movements.

8. Comment: As usual Costa Gomes has any number of reasons for not taking a strong stand, i.e., GOP is accused of partisanship by both sides (therefore it must be neutral), its military capability is limited and MPLA isn’t really so bad. While I doubt GOP could do anything significant to alter military situation if it wanted to, our démarche may have an effect on the kind of political solution the GOP espouses. Costa Gomes has at least been put on notice regarding our strong views.2

Carlucci

2 In telegram 5546 from Lisbon, September 20, Carlucci reported on his meeting with Melo Antunes where he restated U.S. concerns about the deteriorating situation in Angola. Melo Antunes expressed his concern, and promised: “You may inform your government that I am very conscious of the situation and of the repercussions it can have abroad. I intend to use all the political force and all the military force I can muster to create a more stable situation prior to independence.” (Ibid.)

130. Telegram From the Consulate in Luanda to the Department of State1

Luanda, September 25, 1975, 1700Z.

1430. Subject: Portuguese Will Not Accede to UDI by MPLA.

1. I talked on September 24 with High Commissioner Admiral Cardoso about the politico-military situation and specifically what the Por-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Kinshasa, Lisbon, Lusaka, Pretoria, and USUN.
The Portuguese Government’s attitude would be toward an MPLA unilateral declaration of independence.

2. Cardoso said he just queried Lisbon on GOP policy with respect to any attempt by the MPLA to take over the country and was told that under no circumstances will the Portuguese Government acquiesce in such a move. If the MPLA attempts a UDI before scheduled independence day on November 11, Portugal will stand fast. If an acceptable political solution cannot be found by November 11 the GOP must try and give jurisdiction to the United Nations. If that body refuses to take a hand, Cardoso said he may just stay on in Luanda as the symbol of Portuguese sovereignty until a formula can be found that will bring at least one other liberation movement into the government. Cardoso does not believe that MPLA will attempt a UDI before November 11. The Portuguese have intelligence to the effect that the Soviet Union told MPLA about a month ago that a UDI now would not be politically expedient.

3. If MPLA does try to take over the country, he said, he is confident that Portuguese troops will fight. They do not like the MPLA and their antagonism is growing. Cardoso cited three reasons for this feeling. Firstly, whites here universally blame the MPLA and its “popular power” groups for the ills that have befallen Angola. Although some of the troops have little use for Portuguese colonels, many of them have relations and friends here and identify with their plight. The soldiers who have been in Angola for some time have a different attitude than the military in Portugal itself—they have seen the Angolan situation on the ground and they definitely do not sympathize with the MPLA. They are not pro FNLA or pro UNITA, merely anti-MPLA. Secondly, the campaign of vilification by the MPLA-controlled media in Luanda against the Portuguese military has served to solidify the anti-MPLA feeling among the troops. Thirdly, when FNLA attacked Caxito on July 25, the MPLA fell back so rapidly as to arouse suspicion they were trying to draw the Portuguese into the battle.

4. Cardoso said there are now 20,000 Portuguese troops in Angola, 12,000 of them in Luanda, of which 6,000 can be classified as combat troops. By November 1, he said 9,000 of the troops in Luanda will have been withdrawn and the 3,000 that remain will be specially selected for combat readiness. They will be removed on November 10.

5. I asked about the defense of Luanda in the event of an FNLA attack. Cardoso said that MPLA President Agostinho Neto called on him two days after his return here as High Commissioner. He told Neto that he would not use his troops to defend the city against FNLA unless MPLA withdrew its forces from Luanda. Neto promised to give him a reply within two days but to date Cardoso has not heard from him. Lisbon has told the High Commissioner that he is to defend the city notwithstanding MPLA presence, but he told me Lisbon does not under-
stand the realities; the only leverage he has with MPLA is to refuse to send his troops into battle in the event of an attack on Luanda. Again, if Portuguese soldiers were to fight alongside MPLA troops, the world would be even more convinced of the myth that the GOP is in league with the MPLA.

6. Cardoso backtracked a bit to review Portuguese policy in Angola since April 25, 1974. Former High Commissioner Admiral Rosa Coutinho was charged with strengthening both MPLA and UNITA in order to counterbalance the then overwhelming FNLA military superiority. MPLA at that time, in military terms, was on its knees, he said, and UNITA was not even that far off the floor—it was prostrate. Rosa Coutinho succeeded in his efforts, but since the installation of the transitional government on January 31, 1975, the Portuguese policy has been one of active neutrality—treat all three movements alike and get involved with none of them except to see that they all had what they needed to function properly.

7. If any movement has been favored, continued Cardoso, it has been UNITA, and yet UNITA President Savimbi complains bitterly about imagined GOP favoritism toward MPLA. The High Commissioner said he sent a letter late last week to Savimbi in which he pointed out that Savimbi knows what Portugal’s policy is and he knows where Cardoso stands. He told Savimbi that if he thinks he, Cardoso, is partial to the MPLA, he is completely wrong.

8. The GOP is not helping the MPLA in any way, said Cardoso, even though the MPLA political ideas more closely approximate those of the Portuguese military than either of the other two liberation movements. Foreign Minister Melo Antunes, while on the left is a reasonable man who leans toward the countries he has always been in the center and is pleased to see the pendulum swinging toward him. Cardoso added that after MPLA drove both FNLA and UNITA out of Luanda in July and August it began to assume charge of the entire governmental apparatus. He said he went to then Acting High Commissioner General Macedo, explained the danger and recommended that Macedo take corrective action. It was then that Macedo took over the administrative powers formerly reserved to the Presidential Council. Cardoso said he cannot guarantee that individual officers and soldiers do not help one or another movement—all three have received such assistance, but these are actions taken on the spot by Portuguese military and the movement they help depends upon the circumstances and outlook of the officers involved and their perception of the situation. He said that as High Commissioner his physical location has a great deal to do with how people view his role: if he were sitting in Carmona or Nova Lisboa he would most certainly be accused of siding with FNLA or UNITA.
9. As far as he is concerned, he went on, his presence in Luanda allows him to serve as a brake on the MPLA. He pointed out that he has taken over the visa issuing function precisely in order to prevent the MPLA from slipping in foreign “advisors”. The only interesting cases that have come to his attention are the applications of a French movie actress and seventeen MPLA-sponsored applications for Cuban technicians in such areas as fishing, industry and agriculture. He told the MPLA that the number seemed excessive and he told me he plans to sit on the Cuban applications for the duration. I asked about Russian advisors. He has seen no visa applications since he took over the function, but he does not know how many if any are in the country, nor does he have any way of checking applications using phony passports.

10. In light of the charges made by President Mobutu that the Portuguese military are handing over arms to the MPLA, I asked Cardoso what the Portuguese do with their arms when they leave an area of Angola. They take them with them, he replied. The only weapons that have gone to the liberation movements, he said, were those that were given when the movements seconded troops to the integrated forces provided for in the Alvor Agreement. When the Portuguese left Malange and Luso they came out loaded with arms, he said. UNITA unhitched the locomotive from the cars carrying the troops from Luso and stole their weapons, but the point is the Portuguese do take all arms, ammunition and vehicles with them when they pull out. They leave behind office equipment, kitchens, bedding and other bulky items not worth transporting. On independence the GOP will transfer to Angolan Government twenty-eight vessels and some old planes; jets and helicopters will be removed to Portugal.

11. What about efforts to bring about an MPLA/UNITA coalition in the government? Cardoso said that both movements are playing a waiting game. MPLA keeps threatening UDI while maintaining its military offensive in order to force UNITA to capitulate before independence. UNITA for its part, is trying to regain enough territory to be able to force the MPLA to negotiate its (UNITA’s) entry into the government rather than having to capitulate to MPLA demands. Cardoso believes within a few weeks of independence, probably by October 20. UNITA, he added, is anxious for the Portuguese military and the whites to leave Nova Lisboa in order to be able to use the airport to bring in arms. The fields it is now using at Silva Porto and Serpa Pinto are not adequate for large planes and not close enough to crucial areas to allow the rapid deployment of the weapons now available to UNITA. The sooner the airlift of refugees from Nova Lisboa is completed, he said, the happier Savimbi will be.

12. Comment: I can vouch for a number of things Cardoso told me. The animosity between the Portuguese military and the MPLA is grow-
ing and I give little to stories put out by Mobutu, Holden Roberto, Savimbi or anyone else that the Portuguese are aiding the MPLA. All of the troop commanders I have met here are anti-MPLA and it is a good thing they are because the aggressive actions against Portuguese troops by FNLA and UNITA soldiers would have otherwise driven the former toward MPLA had it not been for MPLA’s provocations against the Portuguese. Neither FNLA or UNITA want to admit that their old adversary, the MPLA, is a better fighting force than either of them, hence the charges that the Portuguese are responsible. Even that most anti-MPLA High Commissioner, General Antonio da Silva Cardoso, considered the FNLA to be a bunch of corrupt imbeciles who could not find their way from Caxito to Luanda with a compass and a road map. I realize that U.S. officials talk with FNLA and UNITA leaders and their supporters and that it is difficult to obtain from the outside an appreciation of what is going on inside Angola, but I hope all will keep in mind that MPLA has the edge at this time because it is better organized than its adversaries. Has received large amounts of weapons from the Soviet Union and possesses capable leadership. The Portuguese have had nothing to do with MPLA gains in recent months. For that matter, if it were not for the Portuguese, Savimbi would still be stumbling about in the bush with a few guerrillas.

13. I have known Cardoso since I arrived here a little over a year ago and I believe him to be as neutral as he says he is. Still, his job is to try and get Portugal out of here on November 11, if he possibly can. The Portuguese want to leave with honor and claim they will not submit to MPLA demands. The Admiral’s idea of sitting in his chair after independence like Sewell Avery is admirable, but the MPLA is likely to carry him out, and I doubt the Portuguese will mind very much.

14. I trust no one in this drama—not the Portuguese, who have no will, not the MPLA, which has no scruples, not the FNLA which has no sense and not UNITA which has no power, at least for the moment. All of the factors driving the leaders of the three liberation movements are negative—hate, greed, ambition—and the final solution in Angola has to be by force of arms. The denouement will come after independence and it will be bloody.

Killoran
131. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 10, 1975, 12:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Maj. Gen. Ernesto de Melo Antunes, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal
Amb. Joao Hall Themido, Portuguese Ambassador
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[The press entered for photographs. There was a discussion of the Kissinger/Antunes meeting in Bonn in May and Antunes’ first visit to the United States. The press then left.]

The President: How long will you be here?

Antunes: I will be returning right away. There are many things pending in Lisbon. I am staying over a day, though, because you are kind enough to receive me.

The President: That was good of you. We have a great interest in developments in your country. We are encouraged by what has happened recently. We congratulate you on the strong stand that you and your associates have taken and we think it is very important to the West.

Antunes: Thank you. I am sure you know there are important things afoot and I am eminently aware of the importance of this to the West and I know you are aware of the role that I and my associates have played in the building of democracy. I want to assure you that we will continue.

The President: We want to support that in the proper way, and we agree the Portuguese people want to support that democratic development.

Antunes: Regarding those sentiments of the Portuguese people. I am convinced that the capacity of the Portuguese people is adequate to the task, and I think the sentiments of the people will be correctly confirmed in the coming elections. I think the people will justify the confidence of the West.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 6, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 1:05 p.m. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office) All brackets are in the original.
The President: I was pleased by the vote last spring and I was pleased to see that the most recent Cabinet was limited in Communist participation.

Secretary Kissinger is meeting with you again later today, but I want to say now that we are increasing our assistance to you, both for the refugees and to rebuild your economy.

Antunes: With regard to participation of Communists in the government, the recent prolonged crisis has revealed that the Communist Party does not represent the aspirations of the people. In another vote I am convinced they would get only 6–7%. The minor role they have in the government represents that minor role.

We appreciate your announcement of economic help. We are very grateful. But you should know that our needs are enormous—both as a result of the past government and the recent revolutionary governments. I will be talking to Secretary Kissinger about this.

The President: We are pleased to be able to help. We plan to help further with the evacuation of refugees, and I understand that this is on the basis that you will not leave military equipment in Angola, when you leave, for the MPLA.

Antunes: We are very grateful for the refugee assistance. It has been valuable, and anything you can do will be a vital help in stabilizing the situation in Portugal.

I already told your Ambassador that we won’t help any of the factions in Angola, so we won’t leave any equipment at all, based on our policy of neutrality among them.

The President: We deplore the fighting. Is there any prospect of a settlement prior to the independence date of November 11?

Antunes: As I said to the UN, our position remains in favor of a conference of the three movements, together with us and representatives of Africa chosen by the three, to settle the situation in accordance with this conference. There should be a settlement which would provide national unity and therefore there should be a government

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2 During Kissinger’s meeting with Melo Antunes at 3 p.m. that afternoon, the two men discussed the issue of military equipment left behind in Angola in some detail. Kissinger said: “Our concern is that the MPLA has received considerable amounts of Soviet equipment. We are very concerned that if the other Africans see that the Soviet Union can be this effective such a long distance away, it will affect the whole African situation, even though Angola may not be directly involved. We therefore hope very much that you will not make available to the MPLA the arms that you leave behind. We are strengthening Savimbi and the FNLA and I agree with what you said to the President this morning about this being a formula for civil war. But at a minimum we do not want the communist-supported side to win, and this has certain parallels with Portugal.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 274, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, August–November 1975)
formed which can receive these powers. This is our last effort in Ango-
la, but I am optimistic now, even if a political solution is achieved as a
result of this conference. I think civil war will continue.

Kissinger: Do you think Neto is a Communist?

Antunes: I think he is pretty close, although it is difficult to classify
him as an orthodox Communist. We all are aware of the support he has
received from the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, primarily
from the Soviet Union.

The President: What about Roberto and Savimbi?

[Secretary Kissinger leaves the meeting at this point.]

Antunes: In regard to Roberto, he has no solid political back-
ground. He is easily corruptible and dependent on Mobutu. Of the
three factions I would say Savimbi is the most intelligent, the most able
and the strongest politically. Some question his political judgment. He
has played on all sides and has switched supporters from outside. I
think he will end up losing popularity because of these actions. But at
the present moment he has considerable support from Zaire and
Zambia, while Neto, because of his bull-headedness, has lost some of
that support.

The President: They have all been involved in decolonization?

Antunes: Yes, so all of them have been involved in fighting against
the Portuguese regime.

The President: With the refugees leaving, do they have the capa-
bility of running the economy?

Antunes: From what I know of Angola—and I am familiar with it
in depth—we will see administrative and economic chaos. They don’t
have the numbers needed to maintain it.

The President: What will happen to Cabinda?

Antunes: Cabinda is now characterized by a separatist tendency,
aided by native Cabindans, supported by Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville.
So it will probably be separated, with grave consequences to Angola
because of its economic value.

The President: We are very sympathetic with what you are doing,
and I hope you will convey our support for what your group is doing
and we will do our best to help. What you are doing is in the best in-
terest of the West, and free societies around the world.

Antunes: Thank you for your expression of support. Our struggle
is truly a difficult one. We will go the whole route to achieve a free so-
ciety. We are facing a real struggle against obstructionist groups and
we need all your help.

The President: This meeting with you is much more encouraging
than the one I had in Brussels with Goncalves. It appeared then that the
will of the Portuguese people was not being expressed. We will help all we can and I give you my very best wishes and those of the American people.

Antunes: Thank you, Mr. President. I want to say how much I appreciate your receiving me and your offer of help. This has been a fruitful dialogue which should lead to new cooperation.

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132. Report Prepared by the Working Group on Angola¹

No. 75 Washington, October 22, 1975.

SUBJECT
Cuban Involvement in Angola

1. Based on current available intelligence information, it is estimated that there are between 1,200 and 1,900 Cuban military personnel in Angola. The majority of these Cubans have been introduced in late September and early October 1975—greatly augmenting Cuban long-standing involvement. The public rationale for this significantly increased intervention was provided by the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations in a speech at the U.N. on 8 October 1975—quoted in part in paragraph 6 below.

2. Cuban assistance to the MPLA has stretched over the past ten years. Begun in part as support for an “anti-colonial struggle,” it has been intensified since the Portuguese announced their intention to leave Angola. Over this period, several hundred MPLA cadre are estimated to have been trained by the Cubans, mainly in the rear MPLA bases in the Congo, but more recently in MPLA bases in Angola itself. Cuban technical advisors, probably numbering several dozen, have been assisting the MPLA both in the Congo and more recently in Angola. Some Cubans are reportedly working with Soviet advisors at the Massangano MPLA training base in Angola.

3. Two Cuban ships were reported to have called at Porto Amboim (south of Luanda) during the first week in October 1975: The “Isla Coral” and the “Viet Nam Heroica.” One is a combined passenger/

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 102, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger directed the establishment of an NSC working group at the August 8 40 Committee meeting; see Document 123.
freighter, equipped to carry 240 passengers, and the other is a freighter. It is reliably reported that as many as 700 Cubans arrived on these ships, claiming to be volunteers for service with the MPLA. We have confirmed that these ships were in African waters at the time.

4. At about the same time, Cuban troops and equipment were reported arriving in Pointe Noire, Congo. According to these reports, three Cuban ships arrived there between 25 September and mid-October 1975 and offloaded equipment which included tanks, armored vehicles, military trucks and several cases of unidentified matériel. Most of the equipment delivered by these ships is already en route to Angola, being transported in MPLA-owned ships. In addition, the Cuban ships were reportedly to have carried at least 900 Cuban troops, about half of whom subsequently departed for Angola proper while the remainder were sent to the Cabinda border area.

5. The Cubans have provided professional leadership to the MPLA in fighting against UNITA at Norton De Matos, in South Central Angola, where at least one Cuban military advisor was reportedly killed in early October 1975.

6. Ricardo Alarcon DeQuesada, Cuban Ambassador to the U.N., recently provided the basis and explanation for a much more active intervention, not only on the part of Cuba, but also of other Communist nations. He said on 8 October 1975 in his speech to the UNGA:

a. “In Angola the conspiracy of imperialism, its allies and lackeys, has found concrete expression in the brazen interference designed to frustrate true decolonization while threatening its territorial integrity; snatching away from the people’s liberation movement of Angola the fruits of its dauntless struggle against colonialism, while condemning the future state to control by transnational corporations. Cuba renews the expression of its full solidarity with the people’s liberation movement in Angola—yesterday heroic in its struggle against the European colonizer; today firm in its defence of true independence.

b. “In the face of the scandalous interference of imperialists, colonialists and racists (in Angola), it is an elementary duty (for Cuba) to offer its (the Angolan) people the effective assistance that may be required for that country to ensure its true independence and full sovereignty. In order to spur the decolonization process, a coherent strategy must be implemented with the participation of all progressive forces. This strategy is essential in order to face up to colonialist and racist machinations against the peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe and must oppose

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2 This is taken from the Provisional Verbatim Record of the 13th Session of the UNGA. A later time limit for corrections was set. We believe the Cubans may have caught their error for this title, which in all probability should have been “Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola,” that is the MPLA. [Footnote is in the original.]
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations in every corner of the earth."

133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Luanda

Washington, November 2, 1975, 0020Z.

259582. Subject: Angolan Contingency Planning. Ref: Luanda 1720 Notal.2 For Killoran from Mulcahy.

1. Department decided close ConGen prior Nov. 11, on date to be determined. We believe that advantage should be taken of the last scheduled refugee flight on Nov. 3 to reduce personnel and sensitive material to absolute minimum. You are authorized to depart. You should choose either Rodgers or Doubleday to remain and retain one State communicator and comtech. Agency will communicate directly with COS on their per. questions, etc.

2. In separate message DOD will authorize you to hold last relief flight until all is in readiness to depart. This will provide you with some flexibility for loading ConGen personnel, equipment and those American, British and Canadian citizens who decide to seize this last opportunity to depart on relief flight. You are authorized to discreetly inform these citizens of our plans to reduce staff to minimum, and you should strongly urge them to depart. ConGen equipment and HHE of staff will be given priority on baggage space ahead of refugee effects.

3. ConGen personnel should remain in Lisbon pending further instructions. Orders will be transmitted Lisbon.

4. All WATTS equipment should be loaded aboard Nov. 3 flight. Backup RTTY system should be retained.

5. For Lisbon and Luanda: Inform the GOP and the High Commissioner that in view of the sharp deterioration in security conditions in Luanda, we are reducing our official presence to a minimum and may decide to close the Consulate General before Nov. 11.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Fugit; cleared in AF/EX, OC/T, SY, M, S, and EUR; and approved by Mulcahy. Repeated Immediate to Lisbon.

2 In telegram 1720 from Luanda, November 2, Killoran reported on the logistical problems associated with closing the Luanda post. (Ibid.)
6. For Luanda: Request that you ask High Commissioner if we could evacuate few remaining ConGen personnel and small amount of baggage and equipment aboard last Portuguese frigate we understand will depart Nov. 10. We would utilize this only as a contingency if air travel not feasible.

7. For Lisbon: Appreciate your help in assisting three or four ConGen personnel who would have to remain in Lisbon pending Department decision.

8. We all are well aware and proud of your efforts and those of the entire staff throughout the last grueling weeks. The reporting, airlift and protection of citizens has been superb.

Kissinger

134. Telegram From the Consulate in Luanda to the Department of State

Luanda, November 2, 1975, 1815Z.

1721. For Mulcahy from Killoran. Subj: Closing of Consulate. Ref: State 259582.²

1. I appreciate timeliness of Dept decision to reduce staff and we are proceeding to implement instructions contained ref tel. However, I want to make one final effort to persuade Dept to close post temporarily at this point rather than allow it to remain open with reduced staff for several additional days. The question to be asked and answered, it seems to me, is what do we stand to gain and what price do we have to pay for keeping reduced staff here until Nov 10. [1½ lines not declassified] I doubt very much that [less than 1 line not declassified] extra week here will significantly enhance our knowledge of state of play or future directions of MPLA or sources and extent and kind of outside assistance being given to MPLA.

2. [2 lines not declassified] only real value to USG of continued operation here would have to derive from post’s ability to protect US citizens as well as those of UK and Canada. This is important but I frankly think that ability of remaining Consular officers to render protection

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 2, Angola (2). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
² Document 133.
services is going to be sharply curtailed by circumstances. The price that we may have to pay for this limited value operation is in the very great exposure and vulnerability of those USG officials who remain behind. [3 lines not declassified] As the FNLA military challenge to the MPLA becomes even stronger, and we can expect that to happen between now and Nov 11, and since Portuguese authority here is almost non-existent now, I think we have to accept possibility that MPLA hot-heads might well find it necessary or convenient to arrest or detain one or more members of Consulate staff. Even if this were not a real possibility, I would still recommend closing of post now on grounds that prospective military situation between now and Nov 11 will expose remaining USG personnel to unacceptable levels of personal danger and their ability to leave at the last minute will be severely curtailed by the lack of commercial transportation. I have not yet been able to locate the High Commissioner today, but I suspect the vessel in which he will leave is going to be fully loaded. He just may have to refuse to take our six remaining employees.

3. In the event the Department decides to keep the post open for additional period, both Rodgers and Doubleday have volunteered to stay. In light of Rodgers’s greater experience, seniority and contacts, I have asked him to remain. CRO Casey will also stay.

4. [2½ lines not declassified]

5. After we close, we will keep as many locals on the payroll as are willing to remain in Luanda. A number of them have long years of service and we cannot in good conscience lay them off. Too, they will be needed for maintenance work and other services and we will want qualified people to be on board when we come back in.

6. I understand that ONA aircraft making final refugee flight is scheduled now to make ferry trip to Los Angeles following delivery of passengers to Lisbon and brief stop in Rome. If this schedule holds, I and staff and TDY personnel (except those assigned elsewhere in Africa) will remain on plane and ask to be dropped off at Dulles Airport rather than holding over in Lisbon. I would appreciate if the Department could ensure ONA is directed to carry us as passengers Lisbon/Washington. I am doing this on the assumption that my immediate availability to Dept would be useful in these final days before Angola independence and that it would be more economic in terms of dollars and manpower to move other staff members to Dept in this way rather than holding over in Lisbon for later commercial flight.

Killoran
135. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts

Washington, November 8, 1975, 1700Z.

265503. Subject: Angolan Recognition.

1. Portugal will grant independence to Angola on Nov. 11 and, it appears, without transferring power to any one of the three major liberation movements. In this event it seems certain that Soviet-backed Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA), based in Luanda, the capital, will proclaim itself sole govt of Angola. USSR intends to recognize MPLA regime immediately. Most Communist powers and some “progressive” countries in Africa and elsewhere are likely to follow suit fairly quickly.

2. It is probable the two rival movements, National Front for Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) will also proclaim jointly their own regime.

3. MPLA likely to base its claim to legitimacy on purported control of capital, of 12 of the 16 district capitals, and of two-thirds of Angolan territory and population. It will presumably also repeat its current charges that other two movements are “tools of the imperialists” (meaning Zaire, South Africa, US and France) which have lost any right to represent Angolan people.

4. MPLA control is actually limited to six district capitals and only one entire district. It controls about one-third of Angola’s territory and people. It also controls Luanda and the administrative structure remaining there after MPLA ejected FNLA and UNITA elements from Luanda last July ending transitional coalition govt composed of all three movements. On the other hand, FNLA and UNITA together control majority of territory and population and, since July reverses, have continued to make military comeback. FNLA and UNITA forces have recently advanced close to Luanda in north and have recaptured key centers of Lobito and Benguela in south.

5. (FYI) On Nov. 3 we temporarily closed our Consulate General in Luanda and withdrew its staff to Lisbon. A Dept spokesman stated that the decision to close the Consulate was made for security and political reasons (End FYI).

6. OAU, which recognizes all three movements, is currently engaged in last ditch effort to restore peace and to insure orderly transfer
of sovereignty by Portugal. It is our hope that this effort will succeed, or at least provide opportunity for further negotiations among Angolans. Present indications are that MPLA will probably not be deterred from unilaterally declaring independence and seeking widest possible international recognition as sole govt of Angola. FNLA/UNITA have reportedly told OAU representatives in Kampala that they are prepared to join a government composed of all three movements, but will establish a rival government of their own if MPLA does declare itself Angola’s sole government.

7. US position is to favor true independence for the state of Angola and its rule by a government that, through a peaceful, negotiated solution, attracts the support of the great bulk of the population of Angola. We would view a claim by the MPLA that it is the government of Angola, and that it merits recognition as such, as unfounded, because in fact it controls a minority of the population and territory of Angola and consequently is not in a position to represent the interests of the state of Angola internationally. Recognition by the international community of the MPLA regime as the Angolan government could only serve as further obstacle to search for a peaceful, negotiated solution and to validation of principle of self-determination. The claim of FNLA/UNITA would, in our view, deserve to be taken into account by the international community in weighing possibilities and timing of recognition of the state of Angola and of the government which actually exercises effective control of that state.

8. Action requested: Unless you have objection or believe it would be counterproductive, action addressees should immediately seek to discuss current developments in Angola with host governments, drawing on information and guidance above. Purpose of discussion is 1) to seek host governments’ assessment of situation; 2) to insure they are aware of actual situation with respect to territorial/population control; and 3) to express our hope that they, too, would refrain from making any hasty move toward recognizing MPLA as government of Angola at time of independence.

9. Report results soonest. If during course of discussion it becomes apparent that host governments have in fact decided to recognize MPLA, you should include in your response recommendations on the next step in our dialogue with your host government on this issue.

Kissinger
136. **Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts**

Washington, November 13, 1975, 2307Z.

269496. Subject: Angolan Recognition Update. Ref: A) State 265503; B) Mogadiscio 3355 (Notal); C) Damascus 4466 (Notal).

1. The last Portuguese frigate, bearing the Portuguese High Commissioner, departed Angolan waters at midnight on November 10, ending Portuguese sovereignty in Angola. As expected the Soviet-backed Popular Movement (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto, immediately declared itself the legitimate government of Angola. Simultaneously a government was proclaimed by the National Front (FNLA) and the National Union (UNITA). This government is headed by Holden Roberto of the FNLA, with the Prime Minister to be named by UNITA. The temporary capital is to be at Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa), in the heart of UNITA’s ethnic area.

2. According to information available as of November 12, the MPLA regime has been recognized by USSR, Cuba, East Germany, Poland, Mozambique, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Romania, and Brazil. No state has yet recognized the FNLA/UNITA government.

3. Certain posts have reported that their Foreign Ministries find the information provided in ref (A) on Angolan situation to be at variance with reports provided by roving MPLA emissaries or Soviet Embassy. You may say our information on areas of control is based on up-to-date reports.

4. Current Situation: An FNLA/UNITA column moving up from the south has, in less than 20 days, covered 1300 kilometers, captured five district capitals and the key port of Lobito and may have reached Porto Amboin. This is only port besides Luanda still held by MPLA. Fighting also broke out November 8 or 9 in Cabinda enclave. Reports indicate forces of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Fugit; cleared in EUR, IO, S/P, NEA, EA, ARA, and S; and approved by Mulcahy. Repeated to Lourenco Marques.

2 Document 135.

3 Not found.

4 In telegram 4466 from Damascus, November 11, the Embassy reported: “Had impression that Syria is waiting final word from Kampala regarding OAU’s last-ditch efforts at reconciliation, which it hopes will succeed, but that SARG will soon recognize govt of Angola in any case.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
(FLEC), operating from Zaire, have attacked the MPLA forces in the enclave but may not have penetrated very far.

5. Department spokesman issued following statement November 11: Begin quote: At this time of the historic end of Portuguese rule in Angola, the United States has the fullest sympathy for people of Angola in the tragic circumstances attending their achievement of independence. We strongly hope the OAU will succeed in bringing an early end to the fighting and in promoting negotiations among all Angolan parties. We remain ready to assist the Angolan people in the vital task of building their nation. End quote.

6. On November 10 the Secretary responded to two questions on Angola and Soviet involvement as follows:5

Begin quote: Question: Mr. Secretary, will you discuss with us in some detail the nature and volume of the involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola, which unexpectedly got its independence a day early? You mentioned this at a hearing the other day, and I would like to know if it is in manpower, dollars, etc.—what you can tell us about it.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don’t have the figures here, and I cannot go much beyond what I stated the other day, which is that the Soviet Union earlier this year introduced a substantial amount of military equipment into Angola—substantial in relation to the balance of forces that then existed, that Cuba has also participated in the form of advisors and of military equipment. We consider both of these steps by extra-continental powers a serious matter and really, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, not compatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions.

Question: Sir, we are also an extra-territorial power. What are [we] doing there?

Secretary Kissinger: Our interest in Angola, which is related to the fact that the access to the sea of the surrounding countries goes through Angola, was basically generated by the intervention of other countries. The United States has no other interest except the territorial integrity and independence of Angola. We strongly support the call of the Organization of African Unity for a cease-fire and for negotiation among the three factions that are involved there to form a coalition government, and we have no United States interest to pursue in Angola. End quote.

7. Posts should use own judgment on necessity of follow-up calls on their Foreign Ministries on Angolan recognition. In general Department believes follow-up needed only in cases where host government

5 For the text of the November 10 press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, December 1, 1975, pp. 776–784.
wavering on recognizing MPLA, or in cases where host governments asked to be kept informed on developments.

8. Neither MPLA regime nor FNLA/UNITA government has submitted applications for membership in the UN, although an MPLA delegation in New York has reportedly looked into the procedures of submitting an application. We will, of course, not support UN membership for MPLA delegation.

FYI: Preliminary consultations at the UN indicate that should MPLA application be submitted to the Security Council, it would likely receive only five votes of support (USSR, Byelorussia, Iraq, Mauritania, and Tanzania) and would likely be defeated by eight abstentions (US, UK, France, Sweden, Italy, Japan, China, and Costa Rica); nine votes in favor are required for Security Council recommendation of application to General Assembly. The positions of Cameroon and Guyana are presently unclear. Those listed as abstaining would also likely support a deferral of any MPLA application. End FYI.

Kissinger
Angola

137. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 14, 1975, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 14 November 1975, 3:00 p.m.

Members Present: Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Substitute Members Present: Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll vice Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Sisco; Deputy Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance Lt. General H. M. Fish vice Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements.

Also Present: Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. General W. Y. Smith and Deputy Director for Operations, CIA, William Nelson, for all items. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Edward Mulcahy; Director of the Office of Central African Affairs Walter Cutler; Chief, Africa Division, CIA, James M. Potts; and NSC Senior Staff Officer for Africa Hal Horan for Item 1. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur Hartman, Country Director Robert Barbour, and Chief, Europe Division, CIA, William Wells for Items 2–4.

Angola

Scowcroft: Bill—

Colby: (Briefed on Angola)

Scowcroft: What about the South Africans?

Colby: It looks now as if they will stay in for awhile.

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1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared on November 15. Ingersoll’s handwritten notes from the meeting are in the National Archives, RG 59, Records of Robert S. Ingersoll, 1972–1976, Lot 76D329, 40 Committee/HAK Meetings.

2 Scowcroft took the oath of office as Assistant to the President on 20 November 1975; however, a subsequent announcement by Press Secretary Ron Nessen said that Scowcroft had held the post since 10 November, and that his commission, signed on the 20th was dated 10 November. [Footnote is in the original.]

3 Briefing is not attached.
Potts: They have been worried [1½ lines not declassified] has been pushing for them to pull out and use mercenaries. The South Africans have put their own units in with armor and done the actual fighting.

Nelson: They are worried about casualties.

Potts: They are also worried about air defense.

Fish: Are there reports that the South Africans did some bombing of Luanda?

Potts: That was on the 10th of November.

Fish: What did they do?

Potts: They were trying to disperse rocket units.

Fish: What did they use?

Potts: Eighteen 1,000-pound bombs.

Horan: But it didn’t work.

Potts: That was a one-time final gesture as they prepared to withdraw. They also provided two 25-pound guns.

Scowcroft: I gather you think the tide is going to turn back toward the MPLA with new Soviet equipment and Cubans.

Colby: The number of Cubans there is a new factor and the possibility of air support being introduced creates an entirely new picture. What we’d like to get the group’s approval of—subject to OMB scrubbing of the dollar amounts before it goes to the President—is for an additional [dollar amount not declassified] sending Redeye missiles; a crash effort on the political front; keep the South Africans involved; work on the Soviets to get out—a direct approach.

Scowcroft: That last is a dream, isn’t it?

Colby: Probably, but serious political efforts by us and other Africans to get them out might have some effect.

Scowcroft: Before we tackle the [dollar amount not declassified] what do we want to do? The paper by the working group\(^4\) says that we’ve accomplished our objective and should now work for a military disengagement.

Potts: The other side has got us to a level where we can’t cope.

Scowcroft: It is the same story as last year. We have done a successful job. Now, would dollars help? What ought we to do? And [dollar amount not declassified] won’t do it, will it, Bill?

Colby: Not really.

Scowcroft: What do we need?

Potts: First, what our allies are asking for. Mobutu wanted 15 aircraft by the end of the month. We’ve been fighting in small units and

\(^4\) Not found.
the side with the long-range weapons has dominated in every fight. MIGs will be a new factor and be a big psychological blow. The Redeye missiles would help there.

Scowcroft: Are MIGs there?
Colby: Possibly. We have reports.
Scowcroft: Do we know where they are based?
Colby: In the Congo.
Scowcroft: And will they be used from there?
Potts: No, Luanda. [less than 1 line not declassified] the MIGs but we have reports [less than 1 line not declassified]

Scowcroft: An alternative would be to send a team in and take them out on the ground. That would be effective and less expensive.
Fish: Yes, and they are only 15 miles from Kinshasa.
Potts: Well, the problem is that we have to deal with the local people. We can’t get them to go in and do anything. They talk about it, and they say they are willing but nothing has been done. So when we talk about a team, we would need something better than we have. The working group’s first consideration was to try to get the MIGs before they became operational.

Colby: We need to stir up the African countries and to get them involved.
Mulcahy: We might get Amin.
Ingersoll: He’s called an OAU meeting, but we don’t know what about yet.
Scowcroft: Maybe we should send Moynihan to talk with him.
Colby: We’ve got to get the Africans involved.
Ingersoll: We’ve done this on the recognition issue.
Colby: We ought to send someone to talk with them.
Brown: Bill, aren’t there any Portuguese we can use as a force?
Potts: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Colby: Even if we take the planes out, we are in a no-win position—just buying time.
Brown: If MIGs are there, they will have a dramatic effect. If we tried to take them out air-to-air it could take a couple of years.

Colby: [1½ lines not declassified]
Potts: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Fish: Isn’t he expecting some Mirages?
Potts: Mobutu wants them for a parade, but they are in Bordeaux, so he may not get them soon.

Nelson: If you are talking about a ground raid, you are talking about a lot of work. Lots of planning and training has to be done, and we don’t have the assets to conduct such an operation now.
Scowcroft: Well, what is feasible—something more feasible than sending 15 aircraft to Zaire? The Redeye would make a difference.

Colby: Even that would really be short term. We might knock one or two down and it would have an effect.

Brown: Is the U.S. label on this equipment still a problem?

Fish: You know, the British Blowpipe is about the same as our Redeye. We could buy some from them.

Potts: [1 line not declassified]

Fish: South Africans?

Potts: Political dynamite.

Fish: The Israelis have the Strellas. They have about 100 to 200. We wouldn’t need more than 50 or so.

Ingersoll: Can they handle those?

Fish: Yes. They can be fired by two-man teams, easy to use.

Potts: Well, we don’t need to get the Israelis in. We are trying to maintain our influence, and if we get the Israelis in, too, it would make more trouble.

Brown: The Israelis don’t need to go in. We can just buy them from them and ship them in.

Fish: We can fly them down.

Colby: What is the advantage over the Redeye?

Fish: Non-U.S.

Brown: Do we care?

Fish: We have agreements about not spreading them around.

Ingersoll: But we haven’t agreed not to put them in Africa.

Colby: [1½ lines not declassified]

Scowcroft: [1 line not declassified] We have the momentum now and the question is, how do we keep it up?

Colby: I think we’ve not yet seen the Cuban effect.

Scowcroft: What can we do?

Colby: It is a big African problem, and we ought to get them to take action. Another [dollar amount not declassified] won’t solve the problem.

Scowcroft: I’m not sure that an African political effort will work either.

Colby: It might do some good to get them to try to get out the Soviets and Cubans.

Ingersoll: What’s the lever?

Colby: Africa for Africa—no foreigners.

Fish: Self interest.

Nelson: The Africans haven’t said much about U.S. or South African intervention.
Scowcroft: Any political power over the Soviet Union must be limited.
Ingersoll: We’re not in a good position.
Colby: It may be our best.
Scowcroft: Why would the USSR walk away now?
Colby: Because all of Africa wants them out.
Scowcroft: I don’t see that being worth much.
Colby: I can’t contest that.
Ingersoll: Eight states have already recognized the MPLA.
Horan: There’s the report of Nigeria’s refusal to allow the Soviet Union landing rights. Nyerere would want to know what was going on; Amin has broken with the USSR—so it is not all hopeless.
Scowcroft: That’s right. State should push, but that should not be the only string in the bow.
Ingersoll: We should go ahead with the [dollar amount not declassified]
Colby: On page 5 (referring to a working group paper which had not been distributed to the Committee principals—a report: “Working Group on Angola,” 13 November 1975, Working Group Paper No. 92) we are talking about what would be needed—[less than 1 line of text not declassified]
Scowcroft: Most of this deals with response to the MIGs.
Colby: Here’s what you’ve got to counter (pointing to chart)—$81 million from the USSR and the presence of Cuban troops.
Scowcroft: But we’ve been countering that, and successfully.
Colby: We’ve not had the impact of the Cubans yet. I think that will come at the end of the month.
Potts: They put the best Cubans and armor up North and we’ve seen the effect in Cabinda.
Scowcroft: Before you said it was hopeless . . .
Colby: We said before we’d try to get a stalemate.
Scowcroft: You said it would cost [dollar amount not declassified] to win. Well, you’ve spent [dollar amount not declassified] so if we gave you another [dollar amount not declassified] you ought to be able to bring it off. Now what would it take?
Cutler: As I look at your list, you have here the 15 fighter aircraft which we won’t give, so maybe the total is more than you really need.
Colby: Matching the USSR is the real problem.

5 Not found.
Scowcroft: But what you show they’ve put in has been done over the last 18 months.

Potts: It does not include ammunition, while our figures do.

Mulcahy: And we have to spend [dollar amount not declassified] for transport, too.

Potts: A problem is the South African requests for help, they want help to pay some mercenaries and they will need some help for air defense.

Ingersoll: Now is not the time to let down; get the dollars and move ahead.

Scowcroft: Can we agree to work up something that will keep us in the ball game?

Colby: Yes, we can draw up something beyond the [dollar amount not declassified] We need the [dollar amount not declassified] right now, but let us come back with estimates about additional needs to keep us in the ball game.

Fish: In the long run, you say [dollar amount not declassified] but can they absorb that much?

Ingersoll: We need to maintain our position.

Colby: Just to stay alive—to stay in the game.

Scowcroft: We are really talking about time—the work on the political option ought to go full out.

Fish: Are we willing to put in 50 CIA officers for leadership?

Brown: General, did you ever hear of Laos?

Scowcroft: Are there any good mercenaries?

Potts: [4 lines not declassified]

Fish: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Scowcroft: Can’t we counter the Cubans?

Brown: Aren’t there some Portuguese mercenaries we could recruit? There must be some who have a heart for Angola and want to help out, who know the language, and work well with the Angolans.

Potts: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mulcahy: The South Africans came in with their armored cars.

Colby: The problem is, if we get more South Africans we get more political trouble.

Ingersoll: Their being there is not out yet?

Colby: It has been mentioned.

Scowcroft: But they’re not the same problem with the Portuguese.

Colby: Right.
Scowcroft: You’ll work up options; we okay the SA-7’s; the dollar amount not declassified subject to OMB scrubbing, okay? Prepare two or three levels—enough to stay alive with options on how to get the dollars.

Colby: An option to put CIA into an action role, and can we turn to State for the political program?

Ingersoll: Yes.

Colby: We’re running out of time on the political problem.

Potts: We want to try to keep South Africans in the game, less than 1 line not declassified

Scowcroft: The President has decided to give the South Africans an ocean surveillance system, and this is a departure from our posture. 6

Ingersoll: Sonobuoys, not the other system?

Scowcroft: We are not going to advertise it as a change, but the South Africans will see it as a new position.

Colby: less than 1 line not declassified

Scowcroft: Let us see a proposal.

Colby: I’ll make it a part of the options.

Scowcroft: less than 1 line not declassified

Horan: The South Africans have an interest in this themselves; they asked for help but when we didn’t give it they stayed because of their own interests. I believe we should approach this very cautiously.

Mulcahy: Forty-five other countries would be up in arms.

Scowcroft: Let’s have that ready for a meeting next week.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

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6 See Document 79.
138. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll
Under Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Buffum—IO
Ambassador Mulcahy—AF
Jerry Bremer, Notetaker

SUBJECT
Angola

The Secretary: We’ve got to decide now how to take some diplomatic action on Angola. The tide is turning. This hero at CIA has already so informed the White House and has probably been briefing the committees to that effect, too.

Ingersoll: At the Forty Committee meeting he said he was running out of money and we had to get the diplomatic side going. The Secretary: It really is a sign of the amateurs at work. Diplomacy is no alternative to what he’s doing.

Ingersoll: Brent and I told him to crank up another program to show what it would take to win.

Mulcahy: The paper is being prepared with three options at a [dollar amounts not declassified] level. The operations will then be presented to the committee this week but he is certainly pushing us to do something on the diplomatic side.

The Secretary: That g.d. CIA does not push us! The CIA does their work and we handle diplomacy. All we want to know is the cost of covert actions.

Mulcahy: I agree. I think at the moment until we see what comes from the OAU, we should just talk to our friends.

The Secretary: I think Colby will leak that he’s urged a diplomatic effort so we’d better do something.

Sisco: Particularly on the Soviet angle.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Bremer.
2 See Document 137.
3 See footnote 3, Document 139.
The Secretary: Can’t we figure out some démarche to the OAU saying we’re in accord on the ceasefire and on the coalition government? Second, let’s do a note to the Soviets saying their intervention goes beyond the declarations we have in the past signed and detail the stuff going in and ask them to produce a ceasefire. What can we do at the UN?

Buffum: It would be helpful if Mobutu circulated a complaint right away about the intervention.

Mulcahy: We can do a message to Mobutu backchannel if you want.

The Secretary: Yes.

Mulcahy: We sent one saying he should present his initiative. We’ve delivered our reply to him.

Sisco: He should move on it now. I wonder what the possibility of UN involvement is. Get some, you know, Waldheim appointee out there. I think Mobutu should stress in his note that the OAU is already in it.

The Secretary: How can anyone be in government 15 years and say we’ll lose a war in two weeks and therefore you should settle it diplomatically.

Ingersoll: He didn’t give a timeframe.

Mulcahy: He feels the Soviet escalation has been to the MIG level, which will turn the tide. The Strelas from Israel is enough of an answer he thinks. He feels it will gain us a month.

Ingersoll: He thinks we haven’t seen the effect of the Cubans being there yet either.

The Secretary: That I think is correct. Either we will lose, and you know those guys are pros; they’re not amateurs. They will have a ceasefire if the military balance comes towards them and then they’ll break the ceasefire as soon as they can and take over the rest. The other route is to match them if we can. Everything else is doubletalk.

Sisco: Did you get any reaction from the Soviets?

The Secretary: They say they’re doing it against the Chinese.

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4 A message from Kissinger to Eteki, November 20, praised OAU efforts to obtain a negotiated solution to the Angolan problem, offered U.S. support and assistance, and reiterated the U.S. position to withhold diplomatic recognition to any regime until “a government which truly represents the will of all factions of Angola’s population.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee Files, Angola-Washington)

5 See Document 140.

6 A message was sent on November 20. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee Files, Angola-Washington)
Mulcahy: Well, they saw the Chinese pick up Mozambique.
The Secretary: Have they?
Mulcahy: Pretty well.
Buffum: Is the Strella a match for the MIGs?
The Secretary: No, for Christ’s sake.
Ingersoll: They think knocking down one or two planes will stop them, and they say the MIG’s are not effective.
The Secretary: They don’t have to be effective! They just have to drop a bomb or two within a kilometer of the troops and they’ll scatter.
Buffum: Can’t the Zairians put in planes?
Mulcahy: They have seven Mirages, which have just arrived. They’re working on getting them some French pilots right now.
Sisco: I think we should get them some French mercenaries or any other kind.
Mulcahy: The French just gave $1½ million of ammunition to them.
The Secretary: Okay. Prepare these messages. Let’s get Mobutu triggered. Bob, I want you to push Colby. Tell him now he’s given us some advice, that he can get his program put forward in 24 hours.
Mulcahy: The committee meeting is Friday. On the note to the Soviets, should that be prepared as a cable?
The Secretary: No, on a plain sheet of paper. Discuss it with Sonnenfeldt before. In fact you might let him draft it.
Sisco: We should keep in mind the public relations aspects too.

7 November 21.
139. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 21, 1975, noon.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 21 November 1975, 12:00 Noon

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Also Present: Lt. General W. Y. Smith, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lt. General Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of CIA; and Mr. William Nelson, Deputy Director for Operations, CIA, were present for the entire meeting. Ambassador Roger Kirk, Deputy Director of INR, was present for Items 1–3. Mr. Edward W. Mulcahy, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, African Affairs; Mr. Walter L. Cutler, Director, Office of Central African Affairs; Mr. James M. Potts, Chief, African Division, CIA; and Mr. Hal Horan, NSC Senior Staff Officer for Africa, were present for Item 1. Mr. Robert Barbour, Country Director, Mr. William Wells, Chief, Europe Division, CIA; and Mr. Denis Clift, NSC Senior Staff Officer for Europe, were present for Items 2 and 3.

Scowcroft: I’m sorry I was delayed. It was Congressman Pike again. As you probably know, he’s after the 10 years of our 40 Committee records. These records vary—some are minutes of what went on at a meeting, while others simply record a decision. We’ll have to trim down what was decided without getting into details of how we arrived at that decision.

Well, Bill.

Angola

Colby: (Briefed on situation in Angola.)2

Scowcroft: Then we really don’t know if MIGs have been delivered.

Colby: That’s right—we don’t know for sure.

Clements: Is that figure of 3,000 Cubans a hard figure?

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1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.

2 Briefing is not attached.
Colby: Yes, pretty hard. The Cubans are becoming the mercenaries of the Communist world. (Continued briefing.)

Now, our paper offers three options—One, mainly diplomatic; two, supporting the South Africans; and three, substantial increments of hardware. ³ Joe (Sisco) may want to brief on diplomatic initiatives.

Scowcroft: These are not mutually exclusive.

Sisco: I agree. We do not see the diplomatic alternative as a viable one. We were seeking stabilization of the military situation; we did not expect our covert action efforts to result in a military victory. There’s no doubt that we need to step up our efforts. We’ve taken two steps. One is a note we’ve drafted to go to the Soviets. ⁴ The main thrust is that it is costly to both sides, and it would be in everybody’s interest to reach a settlement. The second item is that we’ve sent a message to see if the OAU could get involved. ⁵ But obviously this effort will be of no pressure on the Soviets unless the military activities are stabilized.

Colby: [1½ lines not declassified]

Scowcroft: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Scowcroft: [2½ lines not declassified]

Potts: [1 line not declassified]

Scowcroft: No doubt.

Nelson: They thought that they had not been paid back.

Scowcroft: They were—or are.

Colby: (Pointing to chart). This is what we are doing. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Scowcroft: You do have some more?

Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Colby: There is a new problem. We are fresh out of money. We are just about to the edge of nothing, or below. [1 line not declassified] An alternative would be if OMB would direct Defense to reprogram money to CIA for this purpose. That is a possibility. In fact, the only one I see. It would require not only the normal finding, but the consent of the appropriations committees.

Clements: Well, it would take a lot more power than Jim Lynn of the OMB—the President would have to demand that this be done and order us to do it.

Scowcroft: Isn’t there a second option—increasing the Reserve?

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⁴ Document 140.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 138.
Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Scowcroft: Do you have to go through the notification procedure to ask directly for a supplemental?

Colby: We would have to hook on to someone else’s supplemental.

Clements: I can’t see your going in with a direct request.

Colby: No, that’s what we’ve been trying to avoid—revealing the intelligence budget. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Clements: That’s possible. We may be.

Scowcroft: Look at all the possible options. Not only for this, but other things that might come up.

Colby: Right. The three options (referring to charts) are about the same. The main difference is in air. These are big operations. The scope and size are such as to make one question whether we should attempt it.

Scowcroft: Can they use such material?

Colby: We would have to send technicians.

Sisco: We can’t send technicians.

Clements: I agree, Joe.

Brown: Right. There’s no stomach for that here.

Scowcroft: Option B, encouraging South Africa. What does that include specifically?

Colby: They’d like to get their troops out, and hire mercenaries. They say that they don’t have the money to do this and have turned to us. I think that this is political dynamite. The press would be after us. They and Africans would say that the MPLA is supported by the big, brave Russians, while the others are backed by the bad South Africans and Americans. That would be unpleasant.

Sisco: More than that. Your description is too mild. What is in the interests of the South Africans? They have more interest in being there than we do and they don’t need our help. I do not favor giving any support to the South Africans. I do not think we ought to get into the position of financing their effort. I want our lawyers to look into the legal question, but even if it is not illegal, it certainly would be violating the spirit of several UN resolutions. I have strong reservations about this. We would not want to discourage them, but leave them to their own devices.

Scowcroft: We do not want to discourage them.

Potts: One of their requests is to buy C–130 aircraft.

Mulcahy: We’ve given them permission to purchase the civilian version.

Potts: Yes, but they must sign an agreement not to use it for military purposes.
Colby: On the legal question, I’d like our lawyers to talk with yours (Sisco’s).

Sisco: What would these three options buy for us? The Soviets have the bit in their teeth and they are not going to let go. What would be the practical impact of these options, and over what period of time?

Colby: I’ve said before that I do not think that the full impact of the Cuban influence has been felt yet. I thought maybe by the middle of December, but maybe now not until January. But once it does, the direction of the fight will go all the other way. The [dollar amount not declassified] will slow but not stop it; the [dollar amount not declassified] might hold it awhile; the [dollar amount not declassified] might enable us to go ahead.

Potts: These are not mercenaries; they are regular Cuban troops. And the experienced Cubans and best equipment were in the North.

Sisco: What is the capacity of our side to fight?

Colby: I don’t think that is a major problem.

Sisco: You don’t?

Colby: They are not much different from the other side, but the others have had training by the Soviets.

Scowcroft: It is a question of whether or not they will break and run at a rocket attack. With South Africans beside them they have done well.

Clements: What is all this talk? I’ve visited there and these people want to fight. They are natural fighters; they even eat each other. Leadership is the main factor.

Sisco: Is it possible to give priority to some leadership component? Second, with the hardware, what do they get to combat Soviet air support?

Colby: We definitely have not done the training that was needed, because we had to concentrate on a surge of equipment. Savimbi wouldn’t send any of his men out for training—he claimed that he needed them. We have been helped by South African and Zaire’s troops.

Potts: And the relationship between some of the outsiders and the locals is not good. They are always squabbling.

Walters: The Portuguese commandos did well in the North when they were left alone.

Colby: Well, we’ve put in this material and have not been able to do the training.

Scowcroft: Can’t we do a better job of identifying mercenaries?

Colby: We’ve tried—Brazilians, Greeks, etc.
Nelson: The French have put in $1.5 million in ammunition and they are going to put in another $.5 million.

Sisco: What it comes down to is the quality of leadership.

Nelson: Even with good leaders, when they first meet up with tanks and armored cars, they will run.

Colby: As to your second point about air, all we would include here would be anti-air.

Sisco: What about pilots flying Zaire’s Mirages?

Potts: They have cut their order from France in half. They started with 15, cut it to 12 and now six, simply because they did not have the money. This [dollar amount not declassified] item (pointing to chart) would be for gunships.

Scowcroft: That would raise things to a whole new level. American technicians—that would introduce another level.

Colby: If we contemplate a long fight we will have to send in Americans.

Sisco: We can’t send Americans.

Clements: Why not Brazilians?

Nelson: They turned us down flat.

Mulcahy: They’ve recognized the MPLA.

Walters: This is disturbing to the Brazilian military, but they recognized the MPLA within hours and they also supported the Zionist resolution.

Scowcroft: The diplomatic option is fine, but to expect anything to come of it until the Soviets see the results of what they are putting in, is unrealistic.

Colby: I’d rather put [dollar amount not declassified] in to get other African nations into the act.

Sisco: Well, these options are not mutually exclusive.

Colby: We ought to help the Africans become more aggressive on this issue. If Amin wanted [dollar amount not declassified] to do this, I’d give it to him.

Scowcroft: What we come down to is this: Do we quit now or stay in the ball game? Ten African countries have already recognized the MPLA.

Colby: We could send delegates to an OAU meeting.

Scowcroft: There’s just no chance of that having much of an impact.

Potts: The Soviets would be embarrassed by it.

Scowcroft: I don’t disagree that we ought to do all we can, but as part of, not instead of doing something else.
Colby: Let’s go full tilt to see if we can get the Africans to act.
Scowcroft: No quarrel with that, but no illusions, either.
Colby: Well, I’m not quitting the other.
Scowcroft: Well, we need an options paper for the President.
Check with Lynn on the options for getting money.
Nelson: Don’t forget that we will have to tell Congress.
Colby: We could have a bad problem—McGovern, Dick Clark—
they’ve already spoken against this.
Brown: Congress would be opposed to doing anything except
through State.
Scowcroft: We’ve really had modest flack on this so far. We’ve
spent [dollar amount not declassified] Maybe we can’t do anything more,
but let’s at least give the President the options.
Colby: Options, not alternatives.
Sisco: I’d like to see a little more precision as to what the options
can do.
Brown: Yes, more specifics. Another thing, the last thing we want
to do is to get Mirages in there before any MIGs show up. Then we
would be accused of escalating things. The Ambassador has ordered
our Defense Attaché not to even look across the river to the airport. We
have a wire that the Ambassador said this stand was supported by the
NSC Staff.6
Horan: It is a new subject to me.
Potts: The Defense attaché has been flying his plane [1½ lines not
declassified]
Scowcroft: Look into that, Joe.
Sisco: I see two broad alternatives—a position where we admit de-
feat or we opt for stabilization at this cost.
Brown: Militarily.
Scowcroft: Does Zaire have any commandos?
Nelson: That’s what he sent into Cabinda.
Scowcroft: Can’t we send a couple of squads across the river to
Brazzaville with bazookas?
Horan: Mobutu’s reaction to the news of the MIGs was to ask for
radar, Redeyes, aircraft.
Clements: Say, not to change the subject but any late news on Fer-
nando Poo?
Potts: We have some photos of what’s there.

6 Not found.
Clements: The Russians have moved in there. This is important. We talk about Diego Garcia; that’s nothing compared to Fernando Poo. It is a former Portuguese . . .

Walters: Spanish.

Scowcroft: I see no difference of opinion. We want to do what we can on the diplomatic front, and try to stay in the ball game militarily. How do you feel?

Brown: I’d like to see us develop a paper and see what we think we can accomplish with each option. Although we should not propose using any Americans.

Sisco: I concur in that.

Colby: Does that include American equipment—TOWs?

Sisco: We ought to drive hard on the SA–7’s. We ought to exert every effort to get those before we turn to Redeyes.

Clements: Are we interested in increased reconnaissance of Angola? Say, with the U–2’s?

Potts: Very much.

Brown: We can do this with the U–2 or SR–71. The U–2 is better. Although we’d have to fly that out of Ascension, which means we need the Brits’ concurrence.

Clements: What do you think, Joe?

Sisco: We’ll see. We’ll give you word back on this.

Brown: The U–2 would be simpler, respond faster, cheaper, although we’ll have to get permission of the British. The SR–71 is more expensive and there would be a longer reaction time, but we could launch from the U.S.

Colby: Go over Brazzaville, too.

Scowcroft: Good idea. Good.

Clements: I’ll send you a copy of the memorandum.7

Scowcroft: Okay—for Committee records.

Colby: Joe, in this diplomatic endeavor, we will, of course, do as much as possible in the covert field to support you.

Scowcroft: Give us the proposals—start with one that is bare bones to keep things together. I note that the [dollar amount not declassified] package contains aircraft; maybe that is not necessary and you can cut that some. It may not be essential.

Sisco: Option One—show what it means geared to the thrust of what the Soviets are putting in.

Colby: We’ll do that for the three options.

7 Not found.
Horan: Does Option Three take care of the Soviet 122’s?

Colby: There’s not much that we can do. When one first comes in it really terrifies, but when you get used to it, it is not too bad.

Brown: I want to point out that the TOWs are a sophisticated weapon, a lot can go wrong, and they need a lot of maintenance. We’ve had a lot of trouble with them. They are hard to handle, even with good troops. So don’t think you can put those in there and expect effective use. The LOW might be better.

Colby: One advantage is in how close you have to get to a tank to knock it out.

Potts: We’ve asked the French for some of theirs with the idea that they’d also provide a team to operate them. That was five days ago, and we don’t have an answer yet.

Walters: We’ll get a reply in a couple of days.

Colby: This [dollar amount not declassified] is not much of an answer.

Clements: Well, those 3,000 Cubans worry me.

Sisco: We ought to have a political assessment—South Africa, domestic—well rounded.

Scowcroft: The working group should get to work on this right away. We ought to have a paper to look at early in the week, maybe Monday—Tuesday\(^8\) morning at the latest.

Colby: Shall we go ahead on the SA–7’s?

Scowcroft: No dissents on that question?

Potts: We ought to get these in a hurry.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

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\(^8\) November 24 and 25. The paper was not found.
140. Message From the United States Government to the Soviet Government

Washington, undated.

We have viewed with astonishment the precipitate action of the U.S.S.R. in extending on November 11 immediate diplomatic recognition to only one of the three political factions and to one purporting to be the legal government of the Republic of Angola, when in fact that group represented a minority of the population and controlled less than one-third of Angolan territory on that date. Moreover, the Soviet Union must be conscious of the fact that it has extended its recognition in the face of an appeal from the Organization of African Unity for all countries to refrain from extending diplomatic recognition to any of the three liberation movements while the Organization undertakes efforts to obtain a negotiated solution to the Angolan problem.

Together with the rest of the world the United States is fully aware of the large quantity of sophisticated arms, military equipment and personnel which the Soviet Union has caused to be sent by air and by sea to enable the aforementioned minority faction to perpetuate a tragic and bloody civil war in a country that has already suffered much. In our opinion the conduct of the Soviet Union in this matter has now surpassed all bounds of restraint, and has additionally placed it in serious conflict with the great majority of the members of the Organization of African Unity. It is not in the spirit of our mutual efforts to reduce tensions in the world; it is not consistent with the Declaration of Principles we both signed and if continued can set back the progress of détente.

We urge the Soviet Union to give serious consideration to a re-examination of its present policy in Angola. We propose that the Soviet Union discontinue the efforts it is now making to escalate the fighting in Angola, to give public support to the efforts of the O.A.U. to promote a cease-fire and the subsequent initiation of peaceful negotiations among the three Angolan movements and to issue an appeal to all nations to cease their intervention in Angola’s internal affairs.

The United States for its part pursues no unilateral interests in Angola and is exclusively concerned with seeing the people of that country live in peace, independence and well-being. We oppose any ac-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office File, Box 30, General Subject File, USSR—Dobrynin/Kissinger Exchanges, Items 98–105. No classification marking. A notation on the message reads: “Hand delivered to USSR Embassy from State Department, 8:00 a.m. 11/22/75.”

2 At the summit in May 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev signed a code of conduct for U.S.-Soviet relations.
tion that would make Angola an arena for competition between external powers. Our policies and actions are designed to assure achievement of these objectives and we are prepared to cooperate in any effort that insulates Angola from major power conflict.

We are willing to play any helpful diplomatic role that promises to lead to a cease-fire and to peaceful negotiations toward a solution in Angola which will be acceptable to the three political movements.

141. Message From President Ford to French President Giscard d’Estaing

Washington, November 25, 1975, 0200Z.

WH 52262. Deliver at opening of business.

Dear Mr. President:

I thank you for your message of November 19 and welcome the opportunity to respond to your questions on Angola. I am replying at some length because I regard this problem as one of great importance, which has ramifications that go well beyond southern Africa.

Moscow has given the MPLA financial and military aid since 1956. In 1972, Moscow’s interest in the MPLA appeared to wane because of factional disputes within the movement, but after the coup in Portugal in 1974, the Soviets renewed their support. Deliveries of military aid were stepped up in the fall of 1974 and had become particularly evident by March 1975.

There are many reasons why the USSR has committed itself in Angola:

—A pro-Soviet regime in Angola would enable the Soviets to exert a major influence on the liberation drive in southern Africa, which they have publicly pledged to support.

—Soviet support for the MPLA contributes to Soviet credibility and influence with other clients in the region, such as Congo-

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 12, General Subject File, France, General (4). Secret; Sensitive. Written on November 24.

2 In a November 19 message to Ford, Giscard d’Estaing expressed apprehension over growing Soviet aid to the MPLA and inquired whether the United States would continue to support the other liberation movements, or promote a cease-fire and establishment of a coalition government. (Ibid.)
Brazzaville, Guinea and Mozambique, with the Portuguese Communist Party and with other liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere.

—The Soviets regard the Chinese as their major competitors for influence with militant regimes in Africa in general and with liberation movements in southern Africa in particular; they do not want to be bested in this competition.

—Strategically, Angola would be of significance to the Soviets if they contemplate an expansion in their naval activities in the South Atlantic on a scale that would require a naval base in the region. For the time being, however, we believe that their primary goals are political rather than strategic.

Since March 1975, when the Soviet supply effort assumed large proportions, we estimate that the USSR has delivered over 10,000 tons of arms and equipment to the MPLA. We believe that this effort is continuing, and that the rate of deliveries has increased in the past few weeks, especially since the beginning of November. We understand that deliveries have included armored vehicles, heavy artillery, air defense weapons, anti-tank missiles, mobile rocket launchers, infantry weapons, and possibly MIG aircraft.

There are indications also of the presence in Angola of some Soviet advisers and technicians performing support functions as well as advising on military strategy. We know that Soviet technicians are in Brazzaville to instruct MPLA personnel in the use of new weapons. If the sophistication of the weapons provided by the USSR increases, more Soviet technicians will be required in Angola. Up to now, however, the Soviets have allowed the Cubans to act as their surrogate in many support roles.

The estimate of Cubans now in Angola is 2,500–3,000. This includes advisers, technicians, and direct combatants in Cabinda and throughout Angola, and possibly pilots.

The inflow of Soviet aid is critical to the MPLA’s fortunes. Earlier this year, Soviet weapons and equipment permitted the MPLA to expand greatly the territory under its control and to threaten the very existence of FNLA and UNITA. The new and heavier influx of arms, together with Cuban and possibly Soviet personnel and technical advisers, suggests that the military balance may once again turn in favor of the MPLA.

We do not believe that Soviet assistance is intended to permit the MPLA to negotiate with the other movements but is rather intended to give the MPLA the means necessary to achieve a victory. Having accorded immediate recognition to the MPLA regime and endorsed the MPLA’s claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the Angolan people, the Soviets have publicly staked their prestige on the outcome
in Angola. Despite the damage to its relations with other African governments as a result of its commitment to the MPLA, Moscow seems to believe that there is more to be lost by backing down than by pressing on with its present policy.

Should it prove impossible for the MPLA, even with substantially increased Soviet assistance, to gain a decisive military advantage, Moscow would be obliged to reconsider its present course. We do not believe the USSR is prepared to commit its own combat forces to Angola, although it may introduce pilots and send more technicians and advisers. Even if the Soviets opt for a political solution in Angola in the future, they will want to assure that the MPLA negotiates from a position of strength and emerges as the dominant force in any agreed upon coalition government.

With regard to the effect on Soviet-American relations we have already made it clear to the Soviets that we view this blatant intervention of theirs with deep concern and we intend to pursue this theme more publicly in the coming weeks. Frankly, Mr. President, we are inclined to believe that there is a substantial anti-Chinese character to the Soviet move. They hope to demonstrate to militant Third World leaders that only with Soviet aid can they pursue their revolutionary ambitions.

With regard to our aid, we feel the problem now is less one of matériel than an aggressive offensive effort which depends on inspiring confidence in local forces and providing them with adequate leadership and training. Nevertheless, our commitment is a continuing one though, for obvious reasons, we will not make it public.

As far as negotiating a ceasefire is concerned, we should be prepared to accept a ceasefire in place, but this would have to be conditioned on an end to Soviet military aid. Moreover, we would not object to the idea of a tripartite coalition, and, in general, our strategy is to support OAU and other African efforts to promote a ceasefire and settlement. As you know, our original aim in supporting FNLA and UNITA was to prevent a massive MPLA victory before independence. That has been achieved and we now believe the political dimension should be given more emphasis, especially in terms of working with key African countries in support of a reasonable settlement. In this regard, we hope to work closely with you and we hope that your government can play a key role in developing African support. As an immediate concrete step toward the achievement of a peaceful settlement, Mr. President, I urge your government to use its influence to persuade other governments, especially in Africa, to restrict overflight and landing rights for Soviet aircraft en route to Angola with cargoes of arms and other military equipment.

The United States seeks neither to dominate an independent Angola nor to confront the Soviet Union there, but we cannot remain aloof
in the face of a clear Soviet power play. I hope, Mr. President, that you will convey this assurance to African heads of state.

I am grateful for this opportunity to exchange views on the Angolan situation with you, Mr. President, and I hope that we can work closely together on this problem in the future. Perhaps we should initiate further contacts among our senior officers responsible for these matters. I would welcome your own views on this serious and complex issue, and propose that we stay in contact on this matter. If you would find it useful, I would be glad to send someone over to discuss the subject in greater detail.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

142. Message From the Soviet Government to the United States Government

Moscow, undated.

Assertions made in the approach by the State Department of November 22 concerning the Soviet position with regard to Angola could not be viewed other than as an attempt to divert attention from the real causes underlining the events which are taking place in that country.

As has already been stated earlier to the US Government the information disseminated in the USA alleging mass shipments of arms by the Soviet Union to Angola and the presence there of “hundreds” of Soviet military personnel is without foundation. Not a single Soviet man is taking part in the hostilities in Angola. Likewise the Soviet side rejects assertions that it is the support by the Soviet Union of the legitimate Government of the People’s Republic of Angola, which is recognized already by many states in the world, [that] is the cause of what is going on in Angola.

The real causes of that are an open secret. It is well known that the foreign monopolies which for scores of years were masters in the land

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 30, General Subject File, USSR—Dobrynin/Kissinger Exchanges, Items 98–105. No classification marking. Dobrynin sent this message under cover of a November 28 letter to Kissinger. A handwritten notation on the letter reads: “Delivered to State Department at 5:45 p.m., 11/28/75.”

2 Document 140.
of Angola were in no way happy by the beginning of the process of decolonization in this country which was bound inevitably to lead and had led to the victory of the national patriotic forces. That was why even prior to the granting of independence certain foreign circles banked on splitting the national liberation movement in the country and encouraged and supported militarily those separatist movements which bound themselves with foreign interests.

Now the events have reached the point when a direct intervention of neocolonialist forces has begun in Angola, in the first place, on the part of the Republic of South Africa. Regular units of the SAR, detachments of South African and Rhodesian mercenaries are participating in the military actions. It is also known that these groupings receive an extensive aid, including military aid, from the United States. In other words, the original cause of the continuing bloodshed in Angola lies in the interference into the internal affairs of that country by the forces, which do not wish to reconcile themselves to the loss of their position there. And the US Government knows all this.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, being a consistent supporter of the liquidation of remnants of colonialism, it recognized the People’s Republic of Angola and its Government, formed by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which enjoys a wide support of the Angolan people as a leading national patriotic organization. It is not by chance that by the present moment the People’s Republic of Angola has been already recognized by nearly 30 states of the world, half of which are the African countries—members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It shows in itself the groundlessness of statements that the Soviet position on this question supposedly contradicts the position of the African states.

It is also known that after concluding in January 1975 an agreement among the three Angolan movements on the order of granting independence to Angola and on establishing a transitional Government with the participation in it of representatives of those movements the USSR welcomed the creation of such a Government.

Yet, shortly after, the FNLA and the UNITA embarked on the path of undermining the transitional Government thus frustrating its normal functioning and eventually starting military actions which were encouraged and supported from outside.

The Soviet Union never was and could not be in favour of unleashing a civil war in Angola. It has always supported and is acting in support of the aspirations of the Angolan patriotic forces, as well as of the efforts of the African states designed to ensure national independence and peaceful development of Angola. The Soviet Union would only welcome such mode of action which would be pursuing the goal
of consolidating in Angola all the forces that are striving for a genuine independence and free development of this country.

The Soviet Union firmly adheres to the position that armed aggression in Angola be seized and the right of its people be safeguarded to decide by itself how to build the new life under conditions of independence and territorial integrity without any outside interference.

The Soviet Union is prepared to state publicly about it. If the USA is also prepared to make a similar statement and act accordingly, we would welcome this.

In the light of the above-stated, attempts to lay some sort of blame on the Soviet Union for the present developments in Angola are devoid of any foundation. Equally groundless are the endeavors to present this matter in such a way as if the policy of the Soviet Union toward Angola is not consistent with the Soviet-American documents.

143. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

Approvals by Higher Authority

On 28 November 1975, higher authority approved the following:

- Release of [dollar amount not declassified] from the CIA Reserve Fund.
- [3 lines not declassified]
- Deployment of Redeyes and TOWs in the event SA-7’s and French anti-tank missiles are not available, subject to submission of the necessary review cited by JCS as to possible compromise of advanced U.S. technology before TOWs are deployed.

Rob Roy Ratliff
Executive Secretary
The 40 Committee

1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only. Distributed to Clements, Sisco, General Brown, and Colby.

2 See Document 139.
144. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Under Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Schaufele
Ambassador Mulcahy
Jerry Bremer, Notetaker

SUBJECT

Angola

The Secretary: The Soviet note says nothing.\(^2\) Tell me about your trip.

Mulcahy: Well briefly, it was a good idea I went.

The Secretary: I read your cables.\(^3\)

Mulcahy: It was very useful. Kaunda didn’t come to Kinshasa because there was a helicopter crash. At least that was the ostensible reason. Actually the real reason was that Amin was there.

The Secretary: Was he irrational?

Mulcahy: No, he was quite soft and gentle and chummy. I saw Roberto for about two hours.\(^4\) I didn’t write up my own cables, the Embassy did. We were able to have serious and formal talk. The unanimous answer from each President was they all felt our position was right. We should help more, we should not put in US forces and we should continue our aid.

The Secretary: But can we prevail?

Mulcahy: Without another big input, no.

The Secretary: The President has approved an additional [less than 1 line not declassified]

Sisco: That’s good.

Mulcahy: We have a hang-up with the CIA which still says that the [dollar amount not declassified] has not been approved by OMB.

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\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Bremer.

\(^2\) Document 142.

\(^3\) Mulcahy visited Kinshasa November 22–26 to attend the tenth anniversary celebration of Zaire’s independence. He met with several African leaders, including Gabonese President Bongo, Amin, and Muboto. Many of his reporting cables are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.

\(^4\) No report of this meeting was found.
Sisco: It was in that package he approved because he approved 
[dollar amount not declassified]

The Secretary: Will it be successful?

Mulcahy: If we don’t act fast with Roberto, it won’t be.

Sisco: We’ve got to move right away.

The Secretary: Well let’s see to it that this place pushes, too. Are you acting now Bill?

Schaufele: Yes, I’m in place.

The Secretary: Let’s get the [dollar amount not declassified] flowing.

Mulcahy: We still have no good answer for the 122 millimeter rockets. Roberto said they used two to three hundred one afternoon and pushed his people back. In Vietnam we had 155 millimeter cannons or air strikes.

Sisco: You should meet with the working group tomorrow and go over the details.

The Secretary: I want an aggressive, strong, affirmative action from your bureau. Your predecessors kept the facts from me for three months. If we had moved in March, we would have stifled it.

Sisco: The intelligence reports this morning say that there are a few more planes available.

The Secretary: The other side knows what we are up against.

Mulcahy: The Soviets and the MPLA want to knock Roberto out of it now.

The Secretary: They’re pushing north are they?

Mulcahy: Yes, and if they bring in the MIGs they can do it. He hasn’t made much progress in the north.

The Secretary: How does he impress you?

Mulcahy: He’s serious and sober. I think he’s intelligent and devoted to his cause. But he has no depth of leadership. His No. 2 is impressive and tough, however.

The Secretary: Does he think he has any hope?

Mulcahy: [4 lines not declassified]

The Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mulcahy: [3 lines not declassified]

The Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mulcahy: Well, the boat only made 10 knots and it could not be moved without having our people on board and since it could be caught by the MPLA, the American guys would have been captured. So we thought it was best not to send it. But small things like that are getting to him.
The Secretary: There is no substitute for winning. All the characters here are busy second guessing.

Mulcahy: That one was killed by the CIA, not the working group. It was not considered safe.

The Secretary: There are not many operations Colby would consider safe.

Mulcahy: Few other things like that. [1½ lines not declassified]

The Secretary: Why?

Mulcahy: I don’t remember the reason CIA called that one off. I think they told him the time was not right. It never got to the working group.

There were several other things that came up that I need your views on. Bongo wants to have us try to ship things through Gabon to Angola.

The Secretary: It’s a good idea to involve more Africans. Don’t you think?

Schaufele: Yes.

Mulcahy: What about weapons for Bongo himself?

The Secretary: Can’t we sell them? We can put it in our program.

Mulcahy: It takes a presidential determination to sell them any and there’s only $43 million for all of Africa to give or to sell on credit. He’d have to knock someone else off. Mali has already been taken off in principle.

Sisco: We should be responsive.

The Secretary: I think it’s a good idea to ship something through it. We can go to Congress on that.

Schaufele: As long as we don’t have any illusions with how it will help with the other Africans.

The Secretary: No, but it will help with Congress. Has Easum come in bleeding about Angola?

Schaufele: He wants us to level with the Nigerians on what the South Africans are doing.

The Secretary: Are they in with organized forces now?

Sisco: Yes, that’s the real problem with the Africans.

The Secretary: As many as the Cubans?

Mulcahy: No, perhaps 400 but they are very effective. If they pull out of the South, the MPLA will wrap it up. The MPLA has 30,000 under arms now.

Sisco: How does that compare with the other side?

Mulcahy: Well, we think Savimbi has about 5,000 and Roberto has maybe 4,000 in the north and with others, maybe a total of 7,000.
The Secretary: How will it end?
Mulcahy: If we get [dollar amount not declassified] for ammunition it will help solve the ration problem on which they need advice. Maybe we can do it.
The Secretary: Can it be pulled together?
Mulcahy: If we can move in the next two to three weeks.
Schaufele: Roberto was never very good at organization.
The Secretary: What does pull together mean?
Mulcahy: Roberto says the South Africans are helping Savimbi because the US is helping Roberto and he says the stuff the South Africans claim they’re sending him is not getting to him.
The Secretary: Is it true?
Mulcahy: We think he’s getting it but it’s not possible to tell. [dollar amount not declassified] for ammunition and some 4.2 millimeter mortars should help for about 3 months.
The Secretary: Someone should look to see whether we have a scheme which makes any sense. Colby is trying to do the minimum to cover his ass. He’ll be in worse shape if he fails.
Mulcahy: The problem is how heavily we should try to get more people involved.
The Secretary: Are the French in?
Mulcahy: At the ceremony, I sat next to a Frenchman representing the President who said they would step up their help. [1 line not declassified]
The Secretary: What else can we do?
Mulcahy: Well, there are US naval forces in the area which Mobutu mentioned.
The Secretary: Should we do it?
Mulcahy: [2 lines not declassified]
The Secretary: Well check with the Navy to see if some presence would scare the Russians a bit.
Sisco: I think we have to be careful with that.
Schaufele: The South Africans want us to do that.
Sisco: Back here, it will undermine our efforts I think.
The Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Mulcahy: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Sisco: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Mulcahy: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Sisco: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Mulcahy: I think Mobutu is trying to get us more involved. We should first talk to the French who have also been asked to put a ship there.
The Secretary: How’s the Mission doing out there?
Mulcahy: Terrific. Walker is doing a very good job.
The Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Mulcahy: Very well, they’re supporting our policy even more than we are.
The Secretary: More than you maybe. (laughter)
Mulcahy: Should I go to the French to ask about the ship?
The Secretary: The Quai is a very bad channel. We should use the Brossollet channel instead but not with messages drafted in your bureau. Actually, you’ve been pretty good on Angola.
Sisco: On the Soviet note, do you think there’s any opening there in the last two paragraphs? Should we go back to them and say “are you willing to make this good?” Is it meaningful?
The Secretary: Get Hal to draft a reply⁵ and draw their attention to these last two paragraphs.
Sisco: I think for the record we need a reply.
The Secretary: Also, will you redo this message to Garba please.⁶

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⁵ Not found.
⁶ J.N. Garba, Commissioner for External Affairs, Nigeria. The message is not attached.

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145. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9, 1975, 4:15–4:49 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Amb. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECTS
Delay of Kissinger trip; SALT; Middle East; Angola

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¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 17, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

[The President:] There is another problem—Angola. We don’t think the turmoil there is good. I know in general what you are doing and some of the others. It is not a healthy situation to have that sort of tearing-up situation going on. If we could find some sort of settlement where no one would lose face . . .

Dobrynin: We have no troops there.

The President: But you have our neighbors to the south there—Cuba.

Kissinger: If you could get the Cuban troops withdrawn . . .

Dobrynin: Why don’t you talk to the Cubans?

Kissinger: We have almost no contact. But if you could withdraw them we would get other outside forces withdrawn. If you stop the airlift we will do likewise, and we could turn to a coalition.

Dobrynin: Already almost 50% of the nations have recognized one side. They have always refused a coalition.

Kissinger: If you keep putting equipment in and we do, then we create a strain on our relations because then someone must win and someone lose. Then perhaps the UN could help.

Dobrynin: It is difficult to check equipment. We have to do it directly, but through Zaire it can be done indirectly—not that we accuse you of that. I think a political solution should come first. We are not interested in Angola. It was the process of decolonization. But you know how Africa goes. One day it goes this way; another day that way.

Kissinger: We can’t defend to our people your massive airlift and the Cuban troops. It can’t go on without raising serious questions here. We will have to find ways either to insulate it or match it.

Dobrynin: It is not up to me to argue. Angola is a long way away. I will convey to my government. If you had some proposal other than “you just shouldn’t do this.”

The President: I am for détente, but this is difficult for me to explain.
146. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

Washington, December 10, 1975, 10:15 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

K: Secondly, on Angola. We cannot think of any other solution except to ask outside countries to promise not to send more arms in. If you are worried about the border in Zaire, we are willing to consider a UN force there. We promise you we would exercise restraint on our part and to get all foreign forces out.

D: You are asking us to put this on the same level politically. I see no problem with this kind of thing. I already reported what the President mentioned yesterday.\(^2\) What you are saying, I am going to add. The question really is in this case not very easy to control. It is in the capital of the country and no one knows where they are.

K: But look it will be easily known if something comes in or not. If we don’t keep our word, that will affect our relationship.

D: Do you have any ideas if Africa could do something? It is their business. It is not natural for us really.

K: No, but the way we could do it is to have the Organization of African Unity ask all outside powers, you see, and then we would both have an excuse to do it.

D: Ask whom?

K: Ask all outside powers to stop supplying arms.

D: OK, I will pass this on. A public statement from both sides? Who is going to control it?

K: We would be prepared to have the Organization of African Unity control it.

D: Who is going to control South Africa?

K: We have nothing to do directly with South Africa, but we would bring major pressure on them.

D: But if they continue?

K: Look, we are trying to win. We are trying to get everybody out of it.

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\(1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 31, General Subject File, USSR—Dobrynin/Kissinger Exchanges—Telephone Conversations (4). No classification marking. All blank underscores are omissions in the original.

\(2\) See Document 145.
D: I really don’t have _____ to do this for the time being. I would like some political solution but to stop something very difficult to control.

K: The political solution—why not let the MPLA talk to the other units.

D: You mean they should appeal or we should appeal to them to sit down and talk.

K: We should all appeal to them to sit down and talk.

D: You have more information. I have very little information.

K: We would be prepared to urge them all to sit down and talk.

D: Appeal to them to sit down and talk from the two of us or a member of the Security Council. What do you think is better?

K: It could be an appeal from the Organization of African Unity which the two of us support.

D: In this way and as a second part of the deal, maybe not as a first one, politically I am sure he would understand.

K: But there has to be an end of supplies. This has to be part of it. I think it would make a good impression here.

D: The question is themselves. Whether they are going to take this from us.

K: I think if the two of us agree, we can get them to agree.

D: I will send this to Moscow and see what their reaction is.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

147. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, December 11, 1975, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 11 December 1975, 11:00 a.m.

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.
Substitute Members Present: Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll vice Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco; Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. General W. Y. Smith vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown.

Also Present: Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William G. Hyland and Deputy Director, INR, Ambassador Roger Kirk for the entire meeting. Deputy Director for Operations, CIA, William Nelson for Items 1–5. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy; Chief, Africa Division, CIA, James M. Potts; and NSC Senior Staff Officer for Africa Harold Horan, for Items 1–3. Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia Robert Miller for Items 4 and 5. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Angola—Item 1

Scowcroft: Bill, what do you have for us?

Colby: (Briefed)

Scowcroft: Have the Cubans used Soviet transport?

Potts: Yes. About 2,000 Cubans flew in Cuban aircraft to Conakry and then by Soviet aircraft into Angola.

Colby: (Continued briefing).

Scowcroft: What’s behind the Nigerian thing?

Colby: South African involvement.

Ingersoll: They interfered in the Nigerian war, and they’ve never forgotten it.

Colby: We have a few specific items to get your reactions on.

Scowcroft: First, are you into the [dollar amount not declassified] now?

Colby: Yes, we are spending it now—mainly on ammunition.

Scowcroft: On the [dollar amount not declassified] are we in “G” now on this?

Colby: Bill (Clements) was quite properly wondering about who was trying to reprogram his funds. I went to the House Appropriations Committee—it is the only one really involved—and told them that I was checking in advance, that we were spending funds and were contemplating more and wanted to test their reaction. I expected to be ridden out on a rail. I must say that I was surprised at their reactions—how mild they were. And this committee is not known for its hawks.

Clements: Who did you brief?

Colby: (Named names.)

2 Briefing is not attached.
Clements: That was the full Defense subcommittee.
Colby: Yes. You know them better than I.
Clements: Well, I hadn’t known this before. Now what I need to do is to go forward from here. Also, I will have to talk to the Armed Services Committees. We’ll get right on this.
Colby: Briefly, I’m going before the six committees telling them of the steps we are taking on Angola [less than 1 line not declassified] I’ve briefed House Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, Senate Foreign Affairs, and I talk to House Armed Services tomorrow.
Scowcroft: Okay, good. The President is anxious on the [dollar amount not declassified]
Colby: This came up before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, too. Dellums was strongly against our doing anything in Angola. He thought we would generate a racist problem.
Ingersoll: Clark is against it, too.
Colby: Clark’s bill is not well drafted. He says there should be no aid except under the Foreign Assistance Act and this falls there.
Scowcroft: In general, the opposition has been much less than I expected. Mostly it has been in the press.
Ingersoll: Secretary Kissinger has said that some of the aid we give Zaire might be going on to Angola.
Mulcahy: I briefed seven congressmen last night at about the “Confidential” level and there was no strong objection.
Clements: Are you telling them that we are supplying help directly or indirectly through Zaire?
Mulcahy: Well, I fuzz that over.
Clements: I can’t fuzz it.
Colby: No, in our congressional briefings we tell them the facts—that it is indirect.
Clements: We have to tell them.
Hyland: Are Americans flying?
Colby: No.
Potts: Well, we found that one man hired by one of the airlines is a naturalized American citizen.
Nelson: There are some free lancing, but we are not behind any movement to hire Americans.
Clements: Where do our supply planes go?
Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]  
Clements: Staged?
Colby: Yes, off-loaded and put on private aircraft to go on into Angola.
Smith: Commercial aircraft?
Colby: Yes.
Clements: What about this list of items for the $dollar amount not declassified$
Scowcroft: We have not focused on the list.
Horan: The list changes with the situation.
Colby: Yes. For example, the SA–7’s $less than 1 line not declassified$
We don’t want to give those away unless we have to.
Scowcroft: Can’t anyone find any MIGs?
Colby: You want my guess? There aren’t any.
Potts: We’ve had pictures taken of several airfields and they are not there. There are still one or two places where they might be that we have yet to cover.
Ingersoll: There were reports that two were delivered in crates.
Smith: Yes, but they are reported there today but not there tomorrow. There are lots of reports. But the main thing is, none are flying.
Scowcroft: We’re about to start a study on Angola stemming from an expression of JCS concern. The President wanted to act quickly, and we needed the $dollar amount not declassified$ to stay in the ball game. Without reference to what we might do after the $dollar amount not declassified$ the study will give us a better base to move from. You should know that the President called in Dobrynin and talked to him sternly on Angola. Whether this will lead to anything remains to be seen.
Colby: I think we must move hard on the diplomatic front. There are a number of things coming up: OAU, other African nations, Europe, UN. We will offer all the covert help we can, but the major thrust should be on the diplomatic front.
Ingersoll: We are doing a lot of things.
Scowcroft: Can we get the $dollar amount not declassified$ by the time Congress adjourns?
Clements: Yes, no question. We’ll go right at it today. I won’t brief the Foreign Affairs committees.
Colby: No. Don’t go near them.
Scowcroft: Go ahead, Bill.
Colby: There are several Angola items on the agenda: $2 lines not declassified$
Scowcroft: I think $less than 1 line not declassified$ helicopters would be great. But I am confused about how you keep getting all this from

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3 See Document 148.
4 See Document 145.
that [dollar amount not declassified] We could probably buy a C–130 for what you say it will cost.

Colby: It takes a lot of money.

Scowcroft: [less than 1 line not declassified] Why do we have to rent it?

Colby: We have to cover the cost.

Smith: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Colby: The deal is we provide the C–130, and they provide the helicopters.

Scowcroft: We’re not providing it if we bill them. We provide it by parking it on their runway and say here it is. The crew, fuel, etc. is up to them. Why should it cost us money?

Colby: We have to pay the Air Force.

Smith: I don’t have the details, but we have to show some payment for the use of Government equipment.

Scowcroft: You mean we have to do all this work to reprogram DOD money, just to pay the Air Force?

Clements: We can’t send it for free.

Colby: The accounting gets all fouled up.

Scowcroft: Can’t we rent it for a dollar a year or something?

Colby: [1½ lines not declassified]

Smith: I’ll check this out.

Hyland: How much would it cost to buy one?

Scowcroft: What does it cost to run one?

Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified] plus the cost to operate. Everything—fuel, crews. Look, let us work out the dollars. You don’t care about that . . .

Scowcroft: I do care. We’re strapped. Look at the percentage of the [dollar amount not declassified] this would take.

Colby: Put it on us to do this and we will work on the Pentagon to draw this figure down to the smallest amount possible.

Scowcroft: Will one C–130 do it?

Potts: [less than 1 line not declassified] have been talking about three helicopters.

Scowcroft: That’s two flights right there.

Potts: We’ve been talking one to [less than 1 line not declassified] and they have not dropped out. They would use the C–130 for continuing support to the helicopters.

Colby: You put this task on us, and we’ll get the Air Force down and push this.
Hyland: What is there in any of this that will be militarily significant?

Colby: Nothing.

Scowcroft: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Smith: How long would it take to get the helicopters there?

Nelson: [less than 1 line not declassified] are not really decided on this.

Smith: If they don’t get there soon there won’t be any impact.

Potts: We are working hard on the Portuguese technicians—400 or 500.

Scowcroft: Can you [less than 1 line not declassified] right away and get something moving?

Colby: We’ll go ahead this afternoon and get this going.

Clements: No U.S. personnel, no people, no markings.

Scowcroft: Now you’ll want another [dollar amount not declassified] to repaint.

Clements: Are you speaking with the authority of three stars, or just kibitzing?

Scowcroft: Which is more advantageous?

Hyland: Why in that [dollar amount not declassified] list is there only [dollar amount not declassified] for weapons?

Colby: Most of the weapons were in an earlier package.

Hyland: Are there no other weapons we can give them?

Colby: We have TOWs [less than 1 line not declassified]

Hyland: That’s in the [dollar amount not declassified] package. If we could get some 8mm artillery in one or two places, wouldn’t that make a big bang? And then the other side would break and run.

Potts: Artillery without artillerymen is not much good.

Nelson: We’ve wrecked three or four [less than 1 line not declassified] 130 guns.

Horan: The first two blew up, didn’t they?

Clements: They forgot to pull the plug out.

Hyland: If we don’t have something soon, things will happen. If a tank comes through the bush, they’ll break and run and it will roll right along.

Colby: There’s a problem with TOWs.

Scowcroft: Any disagreement on the C–130?

Colby: That’s the policy then and we will work out the dollars.

Smith: That’s a C–130 [less than 1 line not declassified]

Colby: Right, bailed, no U.S. pilots or markings.
Smith: If you want to go to two . . .
Colby: We’ll come back here.
Ingersoll: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Nelson: Not very.
Scowcroft: Be as positive as possible. Let’s push this. Henry plans to talk to them at NATO.\(^5\)

Colby: On the [less than 1 line not declassified] request, I regret to say that we recommend a cold shoulder. I’ve told the Congress that [less than 1 line not declassified] are doing things and that we know about them, but that we are not collaborating.

Clements: What do they want?
Colby: (Reading from paper) Fuel, C–130, steel planking for an airport, etc.
Scowcroft: We can get the fuel to Mobuto, will that help them?
Colby: Yes, that would help.
Potts: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Clements: Tankers? You know they come in different sizes.
Colby: I forgot I was talking to an expert.
Scowcroft: Any views on this?
Ingersoll: We go along with CIA. Any evidence of a direct approach would be terrible. The political problems are hurting us now.
Colby: There is another element of contention here. [1½ lines not declassified]
Clements: I agree.
Colby: But how do we do this?
Scowcroft: If we don’t do it they will pull the plug and leave.
Smith: Yes, we want them to think they’re appreciated.
Scowcroft: I’m sure they would like to suck us in.
Clements: It goes beyond that. We say we want to encourage them. But what does that mean? Does it mean only lip service? We want to implement things that will help. There are lots of ways to skin a cat. That’s what we’ve got CIA for. They don’t need our dollars, just what we can make available to them.

\(^5\) The NATO Ministerial meeting was held December 11–12 in Brussels, Belgium. During a meeting at Ambassador Firestone’s residence December 12, Kissinger provided an assessment of the situation in Angola. He predicted: “In two months, if the present rate of reinforcement continues, our people think the MPLA can take over.” Callaghan offered to work with France and Germany to persuade the South Africans to leave Angola, and to meet with African leaders to postpone or prevent recognition of the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Lot 91D414, Nodis memoranda of conversation of Secretary Kissinger and related documents, September 1973–January 1977)
Scowcroft: We could help indirectly—like with fuel.
Colby: We are helping by our continued support of UNITA.
Mulcahy: I saw Roberto the week before last. He was complaining that we are splitting our aid 50–50 with Savimbi and since the South Africans are helping only UNITA, he’s on the short end.
Potts: But he also has Zaire troops helping him.
Mulcahy: That’s his view.
Colby: As we tell them that we are continuing to do things, the South Africans will be encouraged to stay in.
Nelson: They are well informed on our delicate political situation.
Clements: If we could get a load of fuel, we ought to go ahead and do it.
Scowcroft: Any other items?
Ingersoll: We concur in the aid to UNITA.
Colby: Right.
Scowcroft: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Colby: We’ll go ahead.
Scowcroft: Absolutely.
Nelson: One problem there that we ought to surface. [1½ lines not declassified]
Scowcroft: Better get them into Angola soon.
Potts: [1½ lines not declassified]
Ingersoll: We are talking about a three-month period?
Potts: Yes, it will cost about [dollar amount not declassified] per month. [1½ lines not declassified]
Scowcroft: We definitely ought to do this.
Clements: Are we working on this [dollar amount not declassified] list?
Scowcroft: We’ll work on the specifics later. The working group will get that in shape and bring it back to us.
Ingersoll: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Potts: [less than 1 line not declassified]

U–2—Angola—Item 2

Scowcroft: Let’s look at the U–2 coverage of Angola. Are we talking about one flight?
Colby: This started with the MIGs—we wanted to see if they were there. We would also get some good battle information.
Smith: We could not determine about the MIGs at the time.
Colby: I have some reservations now. We have gotten some photography, although the U–2 would get us a lot more on a clear day.
Scowcroft: Is there ever really a clear day?

Smith: No.

Scowcroft: If we are talking about one flight, we could stage it from Florida. We did that in the Middle East.

Clements: Yes, that looked good in the White House, but it was not very well received in the Pentagon. It cost a bundle.

Colby: I’m concerned about the reactions on the Hill. They would throw fits.

Scowcroft: Over what?

Colby: Use of the U–2, U.S. involvement.

Scowcroft: Oh, come on!

Colby: I’m telling you how they would react; I’m not saying whether it is right. I think the real question is, is it worth it?

Ingersoll: Yes, is it worth the risk?

Clements: I think if there are no MIGs, this has lost its glamour.

Ingersoll: Are there MIGs at Brazzaville?

Potts: No. We got one satellite picture, but it doesn’t show anything.

Ingersoll: You’ve got a satellite over there?

Colby: Yes, but it can’t do much because the weather is always bad.

Hyland: Anything up now?

Colby: Yes.

Ingersoll: What could the U–2 do that the satellite couldn’t?

Scowcroft: It can go with the weather—when there is a break in the weather. I don’t feel that strongly about it now—if there are no MIGs.

Can’t we get someone to go take a look?

Hyland: But you can’t see all the fields from Zaire.

Potts: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Scowcroft: Over Brazzaville?

Potts: No, along the river.

Horan: What information does Mobutu have?

Colby: He has the same as we do.

Potts: His people saw the same crates, but when we sent them back they weren’t there.

Clements: It is not worth it now.

Ingersoll: Let’s defer any decision. Henry expects to raise this with Callaghan.

Scowcroft: It wouldn’t hurt to get agreement from the British, but don’t twist their arm too hard. Especially since there are no MIGs now.
Hyland: But the one place where we can’t look is the logical place for them to put them.

Colby: The key thing is that they have not been used if they are there—they have not shot at us yet.

Scowcroft: But if they do shoot, [less than 1 line not declassified]

Colby: We can move them down there in a day.

Hyland: But who will shoot them?

Colby: It doesn’t take long to train someone.

Scowcroft: Doesn’t Mobutu have some people he could send across the river to take a look?

Hyland: Do the French have diplomatic representation in the Congo? Why can’t they send their military attaché to have a look?

Potts: He wouldn’t be allowed into a military airfield to look.

Hyland: Can’t he hire someone for 500 francs who could do it?

Potts: We’ve paid out 500 francs for similar reports but they are of no value.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

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148. National Security Study Memorandum 234


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

United States Policy Toward Angola

The President has directed a review of United States interests and objectives in and policy toward Angola. The study should describe United States political, economic and strategic interests in Angola and assess:

—Similar interests of other powers—Soviet, PRC, or other.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSDMs and NSSMs, Box 2, NSSMs File, NSSM 234. Secret; Eyes Only.
—The immediate and longer-range prospects for Angola with emphasis on the likelihood of continued armed conflict, the chances that either the MPLA or FNLA/UNITA will gain a dominant political role, and the policies and goals likely to be followed in each instance.
—The consequences to the United States of Angola’s being governed by those whose interests are inimical to the United States. In this context, the study should assess whether denial of a military victory by the MPLA is essential to the achievement of United States objectives.
—The impact of various outcomes in Angola on United States interests in Africa as a whole, and in particular in the neighboring states, such as Zaire and Zambia, and southern Africa.
—The probability (and extent) of OAU and/or UN intervention, or efforts to influence the conflict.
—The impact on United States interests in Africa and elsewhere of continuing Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola.
—The impact on United States-Soviet relations of continued Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola.
—The interest/concern of other powers—NATO, Germany, France, UK—with United States and Soviet intervention in Angola.
—Whether United States interests warrant support of South African government efforts to influence the outcome in Angola. Evaluate probability and consequence of United States direct or indirect policy change toward South Africa.

Based upon the foregoing assessments, the study should evaluate alternative United States policies toward Angola and present options for achieving United States objectives to include pros and cons for each. The options should take into account the time available for action.

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group composed of representatives of the addressees and the National Security Council staff and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. Knowledge of the study and participation in its preparation should be kept on a strict need-to-know basis. Any additional participation should be specifically approved by the Chairman of the Group. Differing agency judgments should be clearly set forth.

The study should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs no later than January 2, 1976.²

Brent Scowcroft

² The study was never completed.
149. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, December 17, 1975, 3:30–4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Mandungu Bula Nyati, State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Zaire
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Minister Bula: They (i.e., the press) say that you will give us arms.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we will.

Minister Bula: But you have a problem with the Congress.
Secretary Kissinger: So far it’s only with one committee.

Minister Bula: Is he (Lord) your assistant?
Secretary Kissinger: He is a close associate and very discreet, so you can speak freely.

Minister Bula: I read that Mr. Davis did not agree with your policy. Is that true?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I noticed you did not let him into Zaire.

Minister Bula: From the beginning we tried to avoid misunderstanding. Neither he nor Mr. Hinton bettered our relations.
Secretary Kissinger: Right. You explained that to me at the United Nations.

Minister Bula: I informed Mr. Hinton that we wished to separate ourselves from the Soviet Union, but he didn’t believe us.
Secretary Kissinger: He didn’t believe you and did not report it because he was afraid I might do what I did. I did not understand the situation until the end of June, and then we sent Mr. Vance to your President and we began to understand.

Minister Bula: I told my President in March that Mr. Kissinger was not aware of what was going on. Mr. Hinton would say that the Secretary of State said so and so, but I wondered. I gave the full picture to him and also told Mr. Easum.

Secretary Kissinger: He didn’t want to believe it either.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September–December 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the U.S. Ambassador’s residence. Kissinger was in Paris to attend the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.
Minister Bula: I said that if we were not careful the Soviets would send in squadrons and take over Angola in six months. Mr. Easum was optimistic and even said that we should help the MPLA.

Secretary Kissinger: That was foolish.

Minister Bula: I told the President that Kissinger was not aware of this.

Secretary Kissinger: You were right.

Minister Bula: I saw President Sadat last Monday.

Secretary Kissinger: He said that he would support you.

Minister Bula: He will send a military mission to Zaire and see what can be done. It is important that you back him.

Secretary Kissinger: I had dinner with President Giscard yesterday evening and he said he would send a mission to Kinshasa soon.² He said he would move.

Minister Bula: When?

Secretary Kissinger: Very soon, in two to three weeks. He will also send helicopters. When I am back in Washington we will go for new decisions to send you arms. Tell your President not to lose courage.

Minister Bula: The other side is using Katusha (?) [Katyusha] rockets.

Secretary Kissinger: I talked to Giscard yesterday. He will send helicopters with cannons and pilots, and the choppers will go after the rockets.

Minister Bula: Did you know that Brazzaville has missiles?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Minister Bula: We passed the information. They are trying to frighten us. My President wants you to send us some.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t believe that you get frightened.

Minister Bula: We are not scared. We do need to boost the morale of the troops. Last Friday they blew up a bridge. We believe the Soviets want to strangle us and that is why we want help.

Secretary Kissinger: You will get help in the next two weeks.

Minister Bula: Material help is the key. We need heavy weapons. They believe that the United States will not intervene. When they hear the Congress, they are convinced the U.S. won’t intervene.

Secretary Kissinger: The Congress is unbelievable.

Minister Bula: We don’t understand all the noise.

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² No memorandum of conversation of the dinner meeting between Kissinger and Giscard d’Estaing has been found.
Secretary Kissinger: There is no excuse. The major thing is that the Executive Branch is backing you.
Minister Bula: I will tell my President.
Secretary Kissinger: Tell your President that I talked to President Giscard. He is looking for experts. We will finance. He will get people, guns and helicopters.
Minister Bula: How about missiles?
Secretary Kissinger: I will look into that.
Minister Bula: It is urgent. They have Katushas (?) [Katyusha] and are sometimes firing 150 per hour.
Secretary Kissinger: They won’t do that once you get helicopters on the battle field. When the rockets are launched they will go after them with their guns.
Minister Bula: They have some missiles.
Secretary Kissinger: Really?
Minister Bula: Yes. Why don’t you send missiles?
Secretary Kissinger: I’ll see whether we can get the Redeye.
Minister Bula: It is very important. We want to launch a counter offensive. There is already 5,000 people. We need support for the soldiers. Perhaps you could send somebody to Kinshasa to deal with these problems.
Secretary Kissinger: Okay. Can Mr. Medwin (?) do it?
Minister Bula: He can. There is the problem of Congress.
Secretary Kissinger: The Congress will be out of session and will do nothing for four weeks.
Minister Bula: They know about the Americans who work there, even that there are eight.
Secretary Kissinger: Is that true?
Minister Bula: It’s not impossible. It’s better to have your own people rather than to have a leak.
Secretary Kissinger: It’s disgraceful. I have to admit it.
Minister Bula: I can’t understand the collective masochism in the United States.

The Yugoslav Minister told me today that we should not worry, there is a gentleman’s agreement between the USSR and the USA and before that there will be fighting.
Secretary Kissinger: There is no such agreement. It’s not true.

We are thinking of publicly proposing a ceasefire and then stopping of all outside arms. Shall we do this or not?
Minister Bula: Yes, provided you supply arms to Zaire.
Secretary Kissinger: Then there would be no outside arms being sent to Angola.

Minister Bula: We are inside. At the same time diplomacy should be working.

Secretary Kissinger: If they accept this proposal . . .

Minister Bula: The Soviets won’t leave. The Soviet Ambassador said that we have to continue bilateral relations with them and that the Angola problem is an international problem that we shouldn’t care about. We said, no, Angola is a problem of security for Zaire and that comes first.

Our problem now is armament.

Secretary Kissinger: We’ll do our utmost to speed arms to Zaire the next few weeks.

Minister Bula: You should work with European countries.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, France for example.

Minister Bula: And Italy. You have equipment in Europe. If they come to us with it, no one will see American equipment, and we can prove to Congress that there is no American involvement. I believe European countries are ready to help. Giscard will expect American backing.

Secretary Kissinger: At dinner last night I told him that America would back him.

Minister Bula: There’s Germany too.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me see. We will approach them.

Minister Bula: They have good missiles, Roelants (?) [Roland].

Secretary Kissinger: I will have to check. It is complicated but we will deal with it.

Minister Bula: For the time being it is better to have the Executive deal through European countries. Nobody will protest if France and Italy come to Zaire with American armament. The other side has Russian T–54 tanks. (He then explained some of the other side’s military objectives with regard to Cabinda, a seaport, etc. and what his side was trying to do to organize against this.) We are trying to counter the Soviet Union and we can’t let them do all that they want.

Secretary Kissinger: We will counter them and not let them do what they want. First of all we will send someone out to you with a concrete program. I will discuss this with the President.

Minister Bula: He should give us a program. It is a question of time. On Sunday I saw my President for a discussion, and he asked me to tell you that the military situation is very serious. The Katusha (?) [Katyusha] rockets are very powerful; the Germans were afraid of them during the war. We have the men but cannot fight against it.
Secretary Kissinger: We’ll get some French planes in there.
Minister Bula: So you will send someone next week?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Next week is Christmas, so it will be at
the end of next week or over the weekend.
Minister Bula: Tell my Ambassador. We will try to have the Amb-
assador present his credentials next week.
Secretary Kissinger: Good.
Minister Bula: We thought we should have a new Ambassador in
Washington. What do you think?
Secretary Kissinger: It’s up to you. I didn’t know the old one.
Minister Bula: The President is happy with Mr. Cutler.
Secretary Kissinger: We picked the best man. We want you to be
happy.
Minister Bula: Have you briefed him on Angola?
Secretary Kissinger: He knows all.
Minister Bula: Can you help us with communications?
Secretary Kissinger: That I am sure we can do.
Minister Bula: We are trying to counteract the Nigerians.
Secretary Kissinger: Why did they recognize the MPLA?
Minister Bula: They told me it was because South Africa is inside
Angola and they want to get them out.
Secretary Kissinger: We will get them out when the Russians are
out. We don’t want the South Africans in there.
Minister Bula: For the time being we don’t want them to get out. We
will be Machiavellian. Let the South Africans use their forces and
we will then use this to get the Africans to get the Russians out. That’s
my opinion. Talk will not settle anything. The Russians won’t leave.
We’ll continue to attack South Africa and we will condemn the Soviet
Union too.
Secretary Kissinger: That’s what you did at the last General
Assembly.
Minister Bula: And we will do the same thing at the OAU.
Secretary Kissinger: Tell your President that the French President
and I have agreed on joint action. We will do our best. We also talked to
the Chinese\(^3\) and they will be more helpful. I will talk to the German
and Italian Ministers.
Minister Bula: It is not good for your people to come.

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\(^3\) Both Kissinger and Ford discussed Angola with Chinese officials during the
summit in Beijing December 1–5. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVIII, China,
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I agree.
Minister Bula: Let the Germans, Italians and French come.
Secretary Kissinger: I agree.
Minister Bula: Then no one will complain about the armaments.
Secretary Kissinger: The Congress is playing politics. We will fight them.
Minister Bula: I will tell my President.
Secretary Kissinger: Give my best regards to him.
Minister Bula: Next week your man will come.
Secretary Kissinger: He will be there the end of next week. The French Government will probably contact you Friday or Saturday.4
Minister Bula: The French will be helpful.
Secretary Kissinger: They are great admirers of you.
Minister Bula: I saw them, and they said wait until they see whether President Ford will help Zaire.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, on Friday or Saturday the French will come to you.

(The Minister then briefly talked about the situation in Brazzaville. It was agreed that Zaire would keep Ambassador Cutler informed about developments.)

Minister Bula: Let the South Africans know that we will be attacking them as well as the Russians. We will be comparing the Soviets to Hitler in 1939.
Secretary Kissinger: You are a devil.
Minister Bula: History has no place for losers. You once told me that.
Secretary Kissinger: I didn’t think you remembered.
Minister Bula: Yes. Let the South Africans know that this is just our way of showing up the Russians.
Secretary Kissinger: Keep up your courage. We will send somebody. You look tough.
Minister Bula: We will continue to attack the Soviet Union in speeches. Today I was talking about imperialism in the West and in the East. The Yugoslavs are afraid of our propaganda against the Soviet Union. I say that we have to do this. We are convinced the Soviet Union is trying to destroy us.
Secretary Kissinger: And that’s why we are helping. We are only sorry that it took so long.
Minister Bula: Please keep trying.

4 December 19 or 20.
150. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, December 17, 1975, 5:15–5:37 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Rupiah Banda, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia
Mark Chona, Assistant to the President of Zambia
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

SUBJECTS

Angola; Rhodesia

[Photographers were admitted briefly.]

Kissinger: How are things in Zambia?
Banda: The struggle continues, as they say in Mozambique.
Kissinger: Is that a Mozambique saying? That’s a good slogan.

How is your President?
Banda: Very well.
Kissinger: How is his singing?
Banda: He still sings!
Kissinger: When I go to Africa, I look forward to visiting Zambia.
I’m thinking of March.

Chona: That’s the best month for Zambia.
Kissinger: Should I go to Mozambique?
Banda: You shouldn’t worry about Mozambique.
Kissinger: What’s going on in Angola? All I know is what Moy-
nihan says. [Laughter] I’m going back and I’ll get him under control.
Banda: Not just him but the other one, too. What’s his name?
Kissinger: Bennett.2 I’ve already reprimanded him. It is unneces-
sary and untrue. Above all unnecessary. Our UN mission will unify Af-
rica. [Laughter]

What is your view on Angola?
Banda: We still think they should stop fighting, and efforts toward a
government of national unity should be made. Some in the OAU be-
lieve one group can win but we don’t. Because each one is entrenched

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September–December 1975. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held at the U.S. Ambassador’s residence. All brackets, except those indicating the omission of material, are in the original.

2 William Tapley Bennett, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations.
in its area. UNITA is very popular in the South. And we believe Soviet intervention is very dangerous and would set the whole area on fire.

All external forces should come out.

Kissinger: Should we make such a proposal?

Banda: We would support that.

The Tanzanian government newspaper attacked our President today, immediately after the visit of our President there yesterday. Our President and Samora Michel visited there and we thought they had agreed to stick to the common line.

Kissinger: What do you think that means?

Banda: It means we each have to stick to our own position.

Our question is: Will you continue to see that Soviet arms are balanced?

Kissinger: Yes.

Banda: In spite of the [reported Senate subcommittee] vote?

Kissinger: Yes. That was a minority vote of one committee. We will see to it that the Soviet force will be balanced, and then seek a negotiation.

You can tell your President that. We have made a decision for another [dollar amount not declassified]

Banda: What about something directed to the internal organization of the country?

So the vote won’t be steamrolled by one side.

Kissinger: We need your advice. Make a proposal to us.

I wish in retrospect we had listened to your President when he was in Washington.3

Chona: What about a radio station? They have a very powerful radio. We need one.

Kissinger: We’ll look into that. That should be possible to do.

Banda: If the OAU does meet—now it is for January 12—at that point we will all call for the withdrawal of all Soviet, South African and Cuban forces. Because the Soviets have been there and done more work in training cadres, the other units may be at a disadvantage. Could anything be done to train them?

Kissinger: Between now and January 12?

Banda: And after.

Kissinger: The President of France said he’d send 1,000 men down there. It is difficult for us to do because of our domestic situation.

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3 See Document 103.
Chona: It will be necessary for you and France to make a diplomatic offensive.

Kissinger: We are sending a diplomatic note to every African country—except those that are lost—about what we think about Soviet support and the MPLA.

Banda: I talked to Mr. Garba of Nigeria. He said there was pressure from you. I said we don’t see it that way. I said we have had some notes which were very candid. While the Soviets are really pressurizing us.

Kissinger: How do you explain Tanzania?

Banda: Tanzania sent a note to Zambia and others and said it was because of South African involvement. But Samora Michel said this decision should not have been arrived at without consultation between heads of state. Mozambique was not happy about it. According to our President, they agreed they would support the call for all outsiders to get out.

Yugoslavia said they’d support it too. Should we believe that? They said they’re there so the MPLA doesn’t go totally Soviet.

Kissinger: That may be partly true.

I think your position is the correct one. You should stick to it. We will balance the Soviet arms.

Banda: We will support a ceasefire, getting all foreign forces out, getting all foreign arms out, and a government of national unity.

Kissinger: Should we call a Security Council meeting for that?

Banda: Wait for the summit meeting.

After 11 November we think it is legal according to the Charter to consider that Angola is liberated and that all three liberation movements are political parties; therefore, no state has the right to choose one or the other. That is interference in its internal affairs.

Kissinger: That’s a good point. [To Rodman:] We should put that in our note.

Chona: We could have recognized one of them as a liberation movement before November 11, but after November 11, we’ve lost that right.

Kissinger: That’s right. That’s a good point.

Banda: On Zimbabwe, we think this is a very important period. We are optimistic because we feel the conference has resulted in agreement that they will talk about majority rule. So this is the psychological moment to bring the greatest pressure on Vorster and Smith.4 Because it

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4 In a September 3 letter to Ford, Kaunda sought U.S. Government pressure on Rhodesia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom to facilitate the resumption of negotiations on majority rule for Rhodesia. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 4, Zambia)
could be another Angola. Our analysis is that if there is armed struggle, Nkomo will be backed by the Soviets. His group is united; the other group is a conglomerate of three.

Kissinger: What can we do?
Banda: Make sure South Africa sees to it there is no armed struggle. Once there is agreement, the rest is mechanics.

Kissinger: All right.
When I come to Africa, you’ll attack American imperialism?
Banda: Yes, so they’ll listen to the rest. [Laughter]

Chona: On Rhodesia, the President’s thinking always has been that we need not only indirect action through South Africa but direct action. We have been there. Our people have been in Salisbury. The Soviet Ambassador now says he wishes to deliver arms to Nkomo. The other groups are already moving to the border.

Kissinger: What should we do?
Chona: Work on Mr. Smith. He is the only obstacle.
Banda: Smith thinks he’s fighting for the West. He’s not.
Chona: Also in Namibia. Then the whole area will be quiet from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.

Kissinger: Please give my regards to your President.
Banda: Thank you. And our regards to your President.

[The meeting ended.]

151. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger in Paris

Washington, December 17, 1975, 2316Z.

Tohak 57/WH 52526. 1. We are working two angles at the present time on Angola. The first is to avoid a vote in the Senate today. 2 Tonight is the Christmas Ball at the White House and the President will have a

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Confidential; Eyes Only; Flash. Kissinger was in Paris to attend the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.

2 Senator John Tunney (D–CA) attached an amendment to the 1976 Defense Appropriations bill (H.R. 9861) prohibiting the expenditure of funds for the civil war in Angola. The measure was approved December 19. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 867)
good opportunity to put the arm on key leaders. Calling the leaders in
tomorrow is an open option, depending on the President’s soundings
tonight.

2. We are also working with Mahon so that, if the Senate does act,
he will try to bottle up the bill and prevent it coming to a vote in the
House until Congress reconvenes.

3. The first option is obviously preferable and, at the moment, it
looks good. Will keep you posted.

4. Warm regards.

152. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll
Under Secretary Maw
Deputy Under Secretary Eagleburger
Ambassador Schaufele
Mr. Saunders, INR
General Scowcroft, NSC
Mr. Hyland, NSC
Mr. Strand, AF
Mr. Bremer, Notetaker

SUBJECT

Angola

The Secretary: The Department’s behavior on Angola is a disgrace.
The Department is leaking and showing a stupidity unfit for the For-

gi Service. No one can think that our interest there is because of the
Soviet base or the “untold riches” of Angola. This is not a whores
we are conducting national policy.

Just so that you may know my policy, we are interested in Angola
because the Soviets intervened 8,000 miles away and transformed the
third largest faction into the largest. All of the surrounding African
states are profoundly concerned with this development. Even Nigeria,

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103,
Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Bremer.
which had to recognize the MPLA for basic domestic reasons, is concerned. A US collapse will have the profoundest effect in Africa. In Europe it will prove that the collapse in Vietnam was not an aberration. In China—where the President, who is not in the Foreign Service, two weeks ago told Mao that we would stand firm and induce them to come back in through Zaire—the Chinese must be saying “we will see.” Also, it will have impact in Russia which will ask themselves where can they not operate. Where indeed can we stand up to them? The end result will not be an easing of tensions. They want us to pull out of Angola and cut off grain sales as well. That way, we’ll lose Angola and détente and six other places where we won’t stand up—or one day we’ll get desperate and say “let’s clean out the Russians.”

That is my analysis. Do you agree?

Schaufele: Yes, I agree. I’m appalled at the Gelb article.  

The Secretary: I want people transferred out within two months who have worked on Angola. Did I cut off cables at that time?

Bremer: They were restricted.

The Secretary: Even more repulsive is the fact that AF was quiet until Davis was confirmed and then it all leaked. If I were a Foreign Service Officer I’d ask myself what kind of an organization I was in. I’ll be gone eventually but you are people whose loyalty is only to the promotion system and not to the US interest.

Eagleburger: There was something several months ago and I lied to Marder and it didn’t get out then.

The Secretary: The DOD guy then says it’s between Henry and his Moscow friends.

First I want discipline. Someone has to get the FSO’s under control. If they don’t like it, let them resign.

Eagleburger: I have some ideas on that, Bill.

The Secretary: I want action today. I am not terrified by junior officers. I want to discuss Angola. I’ve got papers on the UN and on the Security Council. I had a foretaste from Moynihan who had been brought into the discussions.

Schaufele: Not yet.

Ingersoll: He cooked that up on his own.

The Secretary: Nonsense, he said he discussed it with Sisco. When did he become our spokesman on Angola?

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3 Presumably a reference to a December 17 article by Leslie Gelb, “Ford Said To Bar a Combat Role in Angolan War.” (New York Times, p. 1)
Schaufele: He picked it up in the debate.

The Secretary: Let’s do the substance of it first. What was our strategy? It was working. It was not to get a final victory but to balance off the Soviets. Then to begin the diplomatic campaign in which the Soviets risked their overall relations with us and then we’d get a coalition government and withdraw all of the outside forces. In the illusion that we would put in [dollar amount not declassified] more, I kicked it off in Detroit. 4 We could then tie it in with my trip to Moscow as well and it was working. The Soviets were blinking. The African states were with us.

Moynihan has now screwed it up with his charges of Soviet colonial designs. 5 That kind of talk just drives the Algerians and their friends up the wall. I told Bouteflika it was the Russians and not the MPLA that we were against. That was news to him. He suggested messages to the Africans to make them understand that it was not anti-MPLA. I think that is a good idea. Moreover, we have all of NATO supporting us, the President of France is willing to put in helicopters, Mirages with French pilots, to help counteract what’s going through Brazzaville. The Zambians and Zairians are panicked by our Congress. But our strategy was working.

Now you take the Sisco plan—or your plan or whoever’s plan—the Department’s plan—what is wrong with it? To do it under pressure will be read as a bug out. The plan is to go to the Security Council and ask for a ceasefire and withdraw all the forces within 30 days, to end all supplies. Under the present conditions, it will guarantee an MPLA victory. In principle, I agree if we can spend [dollar amount not declassified] then 10 days after that we could start with this plan. Then it becomes viable. But we have to shore up the countries there first or they will all bug out. I’ve agreed with the President of France that we will send messages to Gabon, to Cameroon and Zaire and all of the states that his delegation visited to say that they should hang in there and that we’re going to continue making an effort. I promised the Foreign Minister of Zaire that we’d send someone there too. Can you go?

Schaufele: Yes.

4 During a news conference in Detroit on November 25, Kissinger expanded upon remarks regarding Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola made before the Economic Club of Detroit. In response to a question about U.S. support for a coalition government, Kissinger said: “We certainly favor the report of the Conciliation Committee of the Organization of African Unity which called for negotiation among all three groups and a possible coalition government, yes.” (Department of State Bulletin, December 15, 1975, p. 856)

5 Presumably a reference to statements Moynihan made in a television interview on December 14, which were reported in the New York Times the next day. ("Moynihan Assesses Both Sides’ Tactics in Angola," December 15, 1975, p. 10)
The Secretary: We may get voted out. This debate shows me that we cannot survive it.

Eagleburger: What is our prediction?

Ingersoll: McCloskey said we’d have a bad road.

Scowcroft: Our supporters will try to filibuster it but we don’t know if they can win.

The Secretary: It’s really something. Nixon went on national television. If the average person doesn’t understand what’s going on, how can you fight Congress without mobilizing the public.

We have to try to wind it up by the end of January. We have to buck up the Africans and move it to a resolution. If we do it the other way, with the resolution before bucking them up, the Africans will bug out.

Schaufele: I think that’s right.

The Secretary: If the next thing they hear is the Sisco cable about a ceasefire, they will draw only one conclusion.

Schaufele: The plan was based on first touching base with some of them.

The Secretary: 24 hours isn’t touching base. That’s just a propaganda ploy. Is there any sense in that?

Hyland: No, first it will make the Zairians and Zambians more nervous to hear that we’re working with the Russians. Second, I don’t know what we can do with the Russians. They have every incentive to wait it out unless we threaten dire consequences across the board with our relations. I think the Senate debate changes things. The only explanation we can make is that we’re opposing the Soviets. But it’s not clear to the public what we’re trying to do.

The Secretary: The withdrawal of all foreign troops will get the Zairians and the South Africans out.

Scowcroft: Maybe you can talk about “extra-continental forces.”

The Secretary: But that leaves the South Africans in.

Hyland: We’re not expecting that anything will happen.

The Secretary: I think we need to get the [dollar amount not declassified] Without that, we’re dead. Then get you out there, Bill, to talk to these guys—explain it—we’ll put money and then within about a week, say in late December, we’ll make our proposal. We’ll call a Security Council meeting in early January. We can decide the timing after your trip.

Hyland: We haven’t even spent the [dollar amount not declassified] yet.

The Secretary: Why not?

Scowcroft: Colby says it’s all cranked up and ready to go.
Ingersoll: They started spending it last week.
The Secretary: Is anyone trying to win? Or are they just covering their ass?

Hyland: That’s the point. We’ve spent [dollar amount not declassified] Colby’s breaking the [dollar amount not declassified] up into small parts—a little for equipment and that sort of thing.

Scowcroft: There’s a C–130 that costs $1½ million.
The Secretary: Who’s getting it done?
Scowcroft: The Air Force.

The Secretary: Can’t we ask the Air Force to make a contribution to the national interest? Can’t you do that as Assistant to the President?

Scowcroft: Not yet, they’re trying to find a way.
The Secretary: We can’t just make a token charge on it?
Scowcroft: That’s what they’re looking at now.

Ingersoll: The mercenaries are the biggest charge.

The Secretary: Giscard said he’d get a thousand mercenaries in two weeks. He says he’s got them but it depends on getting a C–130 to get them there.

Scowcroft: That’s been offered.

The Secretary: If we have the money, why not tell him to perform and keep the foreign office out? Brent, I think you should send a cable to Giscard saying we’ve produced the messages to the Africans. They should just say we’ll hold firm and balance the Soviet power and you’re coming to the area. They should not be confused by our debate. Then later, that’s the time to float the Sisco plan. When you come back, we can do it.

Schaufele: With the uproar in Congress, I don’t think we can do it.

The Secretary: We have cowardly leaders but not such a bad record. Everything you’ve put in your paper we’ve already proposed to the Soviets without any response.

Hyland: What will the situation on the ground be in 30 days?

Schaufele: I think we’ll be tolerably well off on the ground losing some ground in the North.

The Secretary: If we could get some gunships in within 72 hours, it would help the Zairians. They are in a state of shock.

Schaufele: Right.

The Secretary: I assume the Angolan fighters are no better than the Zairians.

Hyland: No, but the Cubans are and there are lots of them.
Scowcroft: They did get shacked by the South Africans.

Hyland: Will the South Africans stay in?
Scowcroft: The *Washington Post* says they will.

Hyland: If the South Africans pull out, it will be all over. I saw a report that they were pulling out in 10 days.

The Secretary: Who will shape up the Department? I’m serious. It must be a disciplined organization.

Eagleburger: The focus now must be on AF.

Schaufele: I’m bringing the new director of AF/C back soon.

The Secretary: Good.

Schaufele: Yes, he’s good and tough. He’s due out at the end of the month.

The Secretary: Well get him back sooner and get Nat Davis’ heroes out fast.

Schaufele: As soon as we can find replacements.

The Secretary: No, I’d rather have no one. I want some of them moved by the end of the week. I want to see a list. I want progressive movement. Should I swear you in?

Schaufele: When can you do it?

The Secretary: Tomorrow afternoon.

Eagleburger: Anything we can do with Congress we should be talking to Dick Moose about. Is it too late?

Scowcroft: Yes it is for now.

The Secretary: We have given no coherent explanations of our policy this week. We are answering charges here and there.

Saunders: Sisco did a good job this morning with Doc Morgan.⁶
153. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: At NATO I presented détente as a combination of conciliation and firmness.

Giscard invited me to a private dinner. He is concerned about Angola. They will recruit mercenaries, provide gunships, and put Mirages into Zaire.

At the very moment when the Soviets begin to blink, the Congress is going to cut our legs off.

Zaire and Zambia were very upset at Moynihan—who is a laughing stock and a disaster in Europe.

I am purging the African bureau, after the *NY Times* article [There was further discussion of State and Defense leaks].

The President: How about a veto if they pass the bill? I could say it was hasty action, and make the point they are toying with the national interest.

Kissinger: We are living in a nihilistic nightmare. It proves that Vietnam is not an aberration but our normal attitude. When our critics can complain about the volume of SS–19s and cave in Angola, when they can try to change the Soviet internal structure . . .

The Soviets have become a superpower. Before World War I, the emergence of Germany as a major power brought about a war. We have to manage the emergence of the Soviets to a superpower status without a war. We are being deprived of both the carrot and the stick. We will lose Angola and then they will want us to cut off grain to the Soviet Union. We are losing all flexibility and we will soon be in a position of nuclear war or nothing.

President: I couldn’t agree more.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 17, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 11:33 a.m. to 12:35 p.m. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office) All brackets, except those indicating the omission of material, are in the original.

2 See footnote 3, Document 152.
Kissinger: No one will ever believe us again if we can’t do this. How can they believe we will back them?

[Discussion of Woodward article in the Post about the circumstances of the Nixon pardon.]

Kissinger: I would recommend to take on the Congress in the national interest. We have little to lose. It was inevitable there would be a Soviet overture—now they are laughing at us. We would have had Angola settled by January if these bastards had not been in town.

President: The more I think of it, the more I think I should veto.

Scowcroft: A veto threat is keeping the bill from being passed.

President: But if we veto and get it sustained, we can at least show that one-third of the government is with us.

Kissinger: We have several problems: even if you veto, we are out of funds.

[Discussion of tactics on veto, delay, [dollar amount not declassified]]

Kissinger: If this works, I would send Schaufele to Africa, go to the UN Security Council in January with a program. We have to be careful about withdrawal of foreign forces.

[The President calls Mahon on Angola reprogramming action.]

President: He was wafflie at first, but I got him back on the track. We will get the Subcommittee down here. I think we can make it.

Kissinger: It is not just Angola. I think when you make a decision it is the responsibility of each agency head to pull his department in line.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

154. Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Ford

Undated.

The considerations of the President on Angola in his talk with the Soviet Ambassador were attentively studied in Moscow.2

We, as the President, cannot of course be but concerned by the attempts of certain circles within and outside the United States to use the

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1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee Files, Angola 1975–1976. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the first page reads: “Delivered by Dobrynin, 18 Dec 75, 7 pm.”

2 See Document 145.
events in this African country for bringing complications into the Soviet-American relations.

Since there is no real foundation, as we are convinced, for such a turn of events, the task consequently is not to give the upper hand to these attempts. And here a considered, sound approach is needed including in the public statements which have been made in connection with the Angolan affairs.

As to the considerations of the President concerning the ways of ending the war and establishing peace in Angola, the Soviet Union, as we already told the American side, never has been and could not be a champion of unleashing a civil war in that country. We would only welcome such type of actions which would aim at consolidating in Angola all the forces striving for real independence and free development of their country.

The case, however, is, that what is happening in Angola is not simply an “internal strife”, but a direct military intervention, in particular, on the part of the Republic of South Africa, with the use of both the foreign mercenaries and splinter groupings inside Angola who tied themselves to foreign interests alien to the people of Angola.

It would be unjustified to equate foreign interventionists, who use as their tool separatist groups in Angola, with the lawful Government of that country, who are fighting back the intervention, and consequently to equate those who are helping the interventionists with those who are supporting the lawful Government.

That is why it seems to us unjustified and unjust to make an appeal for cessation of hostilities in Angola to all belligerent parties there, thus putting on the same level the interventionists and the patriotic forces headed by the lawful Government of the Peoples Republic of Angola. What should be pursued now is the end of foreign military intervention in that country so that its people could in reality be ensured the right to decide by themselves the questions of building new life in conditions of independence and freedom without any interference from outside.

The Soviet Union continues to be ready to make an appropriate official statement. We would welcome such a statement also on the part of the United States, as well as its practical actions leading towards the above goal.

In conclusion we would like to underline once again that the President can rest assured that the Soviet side is in no way interested in having the events in Angola viewed from the angle of “confrontation between Moscow and Washington” and as “a test of the policy of relaxation of tension”.

Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to French President Giscard d’Estaing

Washington, December 19, 1975, 0314Z.

WH 52530. Deliver at opening of business.

Dear Mr. President:

In light of our conversation earlier this week, and after discussing our meeting and the Angolan situation with President Ford, I wanted you to know what our plans are.

We will be sending instructions today to our Ambassadors in Zaire, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Zambia, Liberia, and Senegal, directing them to emphasize with their host governments our support for the FNLA and UNITA and urging them to use their influence to prevent further recognition of the MPLA.

As I informed you in our meeting, we have informed Zaire that we will be prepared to match Soviet military aid.

Early next week, I will be sending Assistant Secretary Schaufele to Zaire, Zambia, the Ivory Coast, and Gabon to assure them of our continuing support. I would be pleased to have him visit any other countries you may think are appropriate.

With respect to the provision of helicopter gunships for use in Angola, I wanted you to know that we have informed your government of our willingness to provide a C–130 aircraft for transportation and support of the helicopters. It is my understanding that we are now awaiting a final decision from your government on this joint project. Perhaps you could expedite initiation of this activity.

I also wanted you to know that the debate in this country will not affect our immediate plans. We are still in a position to provide further support and intend to do so. If we can maintain the local military balance over the next few weeks, we will be in a position to make a political move to put pressure on the Soviet Union. We will want to consult closely with you over this critical period.

Warm regards.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 12, General Subject File, France, General (4). Secret; Sensitive. Written on December 18.

2 Not further identified; see footnote 2, Document 149.

3 See Document 153.

4 See Document 158.
156. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 19, 1975, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT
Angola

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Kissinger
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll
Under Secretary Sisco
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Leigh
Mr. Hyland
Mr. Saunders
Mr. Schaufele
Mr. Mulcahy
Mr. Bremer
Mr. Strand, note-taker

Secretary: Where are we with the Congressional vote, Bill?

Schaufele: There is no way we can go ahead with the new [dollar amount not declassified] The [dollar amount not declassified] we have left will last until the end of January.

Secretary: If the [dollar amount not declassified] will last until then, why were we in such a hurry to get the [dollar amount not declassified]

Hyland: We weren’t. It’s the Congressmen, Clark and others, who have forced the issue.

Sisco: We should get more hardware, less transportation, out of the [dollar amount not declassified]

Secretary: Paying half our money for transport—the Air Force is just charging us to pay off its airplanes fast.

Schaufele: The [dollar amount not declassified] will be used in good part for mercenaries.

Hyland: Should we raise a mercenary force if there won’t be any more money for hardware afterward? Shouldn’t we just use what

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Strand.
2 See footnote 2, Document 151.
3 Ingersoll’s handwritten notes of this meeting expand on Schaufele’s comment: “We have not done well in debate vote in Congress—only [dollar amount not declassified] left to go. We should consider using this for arms—not mercenaries. Someone has suggested we get money from Saudi Arabia.” Kissinger responded: “This may be a good idea.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Robert S. Ingersoll, 1972–1976, Lot 76D329, 40 Committee/HAK Meetings)
money we have now to send hardware to Zaire and Zambia and tell them that’s all there is?

Secretary: The first priority is for you (Schaufele) to get out there and stem whatever panic exists. Redo those cables. Say the Congressional action doesn’t matter, and that you will be coming to discuss how we can continue to meet our mutual objectives. There should be a similar cable to the francophones.

Schaufele: [1 line not declassified]

Mulcahy: They have polled all the agencies concerned except State and everybody is for the idea.

Secretary: The humiliation of the greatest nation in the world going to another country for [dollar amount not declassified] Maybe we should ask the [less than 1 line not declassified]

Hyland: But could we make the arms available?

Schaufele: The CIA would use the money to buy arms just as it has in the past.

Secretary: Can the CIA legally take money from a foreign country?

Deputy Secretary: I just saw Senator (McClellan?) on television saying that the Senate amendment would bar us from funding the [dollar amount not declassified] some other way.

Leigh: Legally, I don’t think that is sound. The Congress appropriates money, but the President makes foreign policy.

Secretary: The first task is to preclude panic in those countries. Then we consider how to get the money.4 Don’t preclude the Saudis. [dollar amount not declassified] would be a pittance for them.

Hyland: It would make sense for us to use our money to buy equipment, then use the Saudi money for mercenaries.

Secretary: We should use our [dollar amount not declassified] to buy hardware. If the Saudi money comes through, we can use it for mercenaries. If it doesn’t, we will have the hardware. The Saudis were willing to give [dollar amount not declassified] to Vietnam—a year of oil imports free.

Schaufele: Zaire has a serious oil problem too. They are running out.

Mulcahy: They want about [less than 1 line not declassified] on credit, enough to tide them over about four months.

Secretary: We can’t ask the Saudis for one thing, and then another. It would soon be up to [dollar amount not declassified] How do we go

4 See Document 153.
about asking? We can’t put it in a cable. It would be leaked. We will have to send someone.

Hyland: The best use for the money would be to give it to the South Africans.5

Sisco: The political price would be too high to pay in Africa.

Secretary: I don’t agree. The Zairian Foreign Minister told me the best outcome would be for the South Africans to take all of Angola and then for Zaire to get the credit for pushing them out.6 The Nigerian Foreign Minister didn’t make much of the South Africans when I talked to him but said it presented a domestic problem for them.

Sisco: If you support the South Africans, you give the Russians an enormous club to beat you with in Africa.

Secretary: Nonsense. There is no problem if the South Africans win and then get out afterwards. The problem is a domestic one for us. That makes any discussion of supporting the South Africans unrealistic.

Secretary: I want options by tomorrow, and how to wind it up if that’s what we want to do. And the cables tonight.7 They say: (1) we are still in business; (2) you are going out next week to discuss the situation. You can give me what you intend to tell those people out there later.

Schaufele: Have you seen the Tanzanian proposal?8 It’s not a good deal, but it does show some flexibility and movement on their part.

Mulcahy: I suspect the Chinese may have influenced them.

Secretary: It might have helped earlier.

Secretary: How do you assess the Soviet note?9

Sisco: I think there may be some light there. It’s polemical, but they also say they don’t want this thing to disturb relations between us.

Secretary: I don’t have the diplomatic experience, but I don’t see any light. They would say the same thing if they invaded Berlin. What

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5 Ingersoll’s notes expand on Hyland’s remark about the role of South Africa in Angola: “The key to keeping our side in Angola from collapsing is So. Africa. As far as Africans are concerned they would agree to have So. Africa clean up Angola, but we couldn’t pay the domestic price in this country.”

6 See Document 149.

7 See Document 158.

8 Telegram 301921 to Lusaka, December 23, reported on Nyerere’s proposal: “If U.S. ceased support to FNLA/UNITA, restrained Mobutu from further intervention in Angola and applied public pressure on South Africans to withdraw back across their border, Tanzania, Zambia and other African governments could induce Neto simultaneously to refuse further Soviet assistance and expel Cuban and other foreign helpers.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850012–2217)

9 Document 154.
if I call in Dobrynin Monday,10 tell him, “Don’t count what Congress has done a victory. If you humiliate us on Angola, we will make it tough on you somewhere else.”

Hyland (Sonnenfeldt?): It might work.
Sonnenfeldt: If three Soviet frigates are going there, why should the US Navy stay 10,000 miles away?
Secretary: Whom would a ceasefire help?
Schaufele: Us.
Sisco: I am not proposing it now, but if we want a diplomatic scenario I would propose going to the Security Council and saying we want all foreign forces out of Angola and that we are proposing this in response to the wishes of the Africans.

Hyland: There should be a week or ten days before we make any political move.
Secretary: What if the Cubans, the South Africans, the Zairians all leave? Does the MPLA win?
Schaufele: No. You have perpetual war.
Sonnenfeldt: We should not be the vehicle for getting South Africa out.
Sisco: I disagree. Not doing it cuts against our whole African policy.
Secretary: Nonsense.
Sisco: You may think I’m stupid, as you said a few moments ago, but that’s what I think.
Secretary: I didn’t say you were stupid; I said I was inexperienced. Our job is to get the Cubans and the Soviets out. If the South Africans must go too, OK.
Sisco: That’s just what I’m proposing.
Hyland: There shouldn’t be any move for the next two weeks. It would just look like weakness and frighten our friends.
Secretary (to Schaufele): Can you get your heroes down there to draft a strong message? They haven’t been able to do that yet.
Sonnenfeldt: The European cheering section is fine, but can’t we get them to do something more themselves? The French? The British? (?): Not the British.
Secretary (to Hyland): Get something to the French tonight. Say we will have another chance at Congress in January, that we have funds to carry us through until then, that Schaufele is going out.
Schaufele: Here’s a memo on Gulf (Secretary signs).

10 December 22.
Hyland: Did you see the Hersch article?\textsuperscript{11} It says we started the thing by giving money to Holden in January, $300,000. And it has all the details; it says we refused $100,000 for Savimbi.

Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Hyland: [1 line not declassified]

(?): [less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary: American masochism . . .

Sisco: It’s ridiculous. We know the Russians made their decision in January to ship arms. Our [dollar amount not declassified] was for political action only.

Secretary: Up from [dollar amount not declassified] And we decided to up the payment to Holden because the African Bureau told us he would come out on top, didn’t we? We wanted to be in solid with the new government.

Mulcahy: We didn’t even know Savimbi then. We thought he was the darling of the Portuguese settlers.

Secretary: Let’s meet tomorrow morning.\textsuperscript{12}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{11} On December 19, Seymour Hersch revealed the decision of the 40 Committee in January to give Holden Roberto $300,000 in covert funds. (“Early Angola Aid by U.S. Reported,” \textit{New York Times}, pp. 1, 14)}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{12} No record of a December 20 meeting has been found.}

\section*{157. Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to French President Giscard d’Estaing\textsuperscript{1}}}

Washington, December 20, 1975, 0217Z.

WH 52536. Deliver at opening of business.

Dear Mr. President:

The President wanted me to supplement my earlier message\textsuperscript{2} in light of the Congressional action today.\textsuperscript{3} We are able to continue the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1} Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 12, General Subject File, France, General (4). Top Secret; Operational Immediate.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{2} Document 155.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{3} Presumably a reference to passage of the Tunney Amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill (December 19), which cut off aid to Angola.}
program of assistance in Angola, with current funds, at least, through the end of January and we intend to maximize weapons assistance. We will have another opportunity to reopen the issue with the Congress in January. Assistant Secretary Schaufele will proceed immediately to Zaire, Zambia, Gabon and Ivory Coast, and I have sent further instructions to our Embassies to prevent discouragement. We would appreciate any additional views you might have.4

Warm regards.

4 A December 24 letter from Giscard d’Estaing agreed with Kissinger’s assessment on the need for increased diplomatic efforts to avoid further recognition of the MPLA as the official government of Angola. He also informed Kissinger that the French Government had “taken the necessary measures on the manpower and matériel front to face this adverse situation head-on.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 12, General Subject File, France, General (4))

158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zaire

Washington, December 20, 1975, 0332Z.

299943. Subject: Angola: Holding the Line. For Ambassador from the Secretary.

You should request immediate meeting with Mobutu to pass on to him message on Angola from the Secretary based on following talking points.

1) We greatly appreciate staunch support which Zaire continues to provide for realization our common objectives and Secretary welcomed opportunity to exchange views with Commissioner of State for Foreign Affairs Bula in Paris.2

2) The President should know that despite the recent Congressional discussions here, we still have sufficient funds available to continue our program of resistance to Soviet intervention over the imme-
diate period ahead. And, we will have a new opportunity to go back to
the Congress for additional funds in January.

3) We want to assure Mobutu that U.S. determination to continue
to resist Soviet attempt to implant itself in Angola has not diminished.
We have undisbursed funds still available and we are looking at other
options if they prove necessary.

4) We believe that only through continued resistance to the Soviet
intervention can we hope to achieve the solution we seek. Therefore in
close collaboration with Mobutu and others we will meet the present
challenge. This is a critical period in which we must keep a steady
course.

5) We urge Mobutu and his government to continue its effective
assistance to the FNLA and UNITA.

6) In addition, during the interim before January OAU meeting on
Angola, we suspect pro-MPLA African states may make concerted
drive to increase number of African states recognizing MPLA to point
that, by sheer numbers, OAU decisions will be determined by them.
Since our common position is to achieve negotiated solution within
purely Angolan and African context the success of such a drive could
produce exactly opposite result. It would be better to avoid any OAU
action if it likely to be adverse. We strongly urge that Mobutu redouble
his efforts, during this uncertain and possibly decisive period, to block
possibility of further African recognition of MPLA.

7) As the Secretary mentioned to Foreign Minister Bula in Paris, he
would like his new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Ambassador
William Schaufele, to travel to Zaire next week for discussions with the
President on the situation in Angola. The Secretary believes it is essen-
tial at this time to maintain our common strategy towards Angola, and
would welcome the opportunity for such an exchange of views if the
President believes it would be useful.

8) FYI: Our major aim with this message is to head off any immi-
nent panic which might have undesirable effects on Angolan situation.
End FYI.

Kissinger
159.  **Backchannel Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Ambassador to Iran (Helms)**


Please pass the following oral message from the Secretary to the Shah. Please do not leave any piece of paper.

1. You have been asked by the Secretary to discuss the Angolan situation with the Shah. We want him to know that despite the Congressional debate on funds for covert support in Angola, there are sufficient resources in the pipe-line to maintain our support for some time. This will allow the Executive Branch to make further efforts when the Congress returns in January to get the kind of additional financial support which will be required. The point to get across to the Shah is that we are not out of business, and that the Executive Branch is resolved to pursue the Angola matter vigorously and with full determination. We do not intend to sit idly by in the face of Soviet intervention.

2. We want the Shah to know that our principal concern in this matter is the one that would concern him most—namely, that a Soviet power play in the heart of Africa not be permitted to succeed unchallenged with all the implications of successful Soviet adventurism in Africa as well as globally. We intend to do everything possible to continue our support of the FNLA and UNITA through Zaire, and we will also in our discussions with the Soviets, making clear to them that their involvement in Angola will inevitably raise questions about détente.

3. The Secretary wants to make clear what our purpose is in Angola. We are not against the MPLA per se; our interests in Angola per se are only marginal; but it is the Soviet challenge which is uppermost in our mind. Our purpose is a limited one—to support the FNLA and UNITA in order to create a military stand-off on the ground which would help promote a peaceful settlement among the three factions looking towards the establishment of a coalition government. We also favor the end of all outside intervention and would be prepared to stop our support provided the Soviets do likewise, and we support the removal of all outside forces in such circumstances—Cubans, South Africans, and Zairois—leaving the Angolans to settle the matter peacefully among and between themselves.

4. In view of the parallel interests which Iran and the US share in this matter, we want to share our assessment that the next six or eight

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. The original is the message as approved for transmission at 6:30 p.m. on December 20. It was sent as telegram WH 52538, December 20.
weeks will be crucial. It is important that the support for the non-communist factions continue.

5. In light of the foregoing you should see if the Shah would find it feasible to make available funds to Zaire for additional equipment and arms which would help preserve the kind of military position for the non-communist forces which is essential if a negotiated settlement is to be achieved. You should stress that we are not seeking funding for our own programs and could not accept such funds. What we are suggesting is additional financial support that would go directly to Zaire for support of FNLA and UNITA. If the Shah is disposed to be helpful—and we hope that he is—it would be important to move promptly. Therefore you should indicate that we would be prepared to discuss specifically how such funds channelled to Zaire could be used most effectively. We believe an additional total of [dollar amount not declassified] is needed. You may tell the Shah that we are approaching the Saudis along the same lines.²

6. With respect to the Iranian inquiry about transferring American-supplied equipment to Zaire, you should explain that we have difficulties on this. In the context of our present debate with the Congress on this subject and our intent to go back to the Congress again in January, we do not believe that we could concur now in an action which would have to be reported to the Congress and which would be seen by Congressional critics as a move to circumvent Congressional views on US involvement in Angola. That is why we are discussing with the Iranians—as with the Saudis—other possible ways for them to contribute directly through Zaire to a strengthening of the non-communist forces in Angola.

7. Please report your conversation promptly in this channel.

² Kissinger sent a similar message to Jidda, December 20. (Ibid.)
Washington, December 21, 1975, 0126Z.

300231. Subject: Angola. Ref: Lisbon 7514. 2

1. We welcome offer by FonMin Melo Antunes to be helpful in Angolan situation. You may tell him that despite current adverse attitude in Congress that USG is determined to push ahead with resistance to Soviet power grab in Angola. Furthermore we are taking further steps in examining promising options to block any deterioration on the ground or elsewhere in Africa.

2. Specifically we are protesting to those governments which have provided overflight and refueling rights to Soviet or Cuban aircraft carrying arms, equipment and personnel to Angola. In this connection we are concerned that Cubans, now that Barbados refueling stop has been denied them and Trinidad and Tobago has refused permission, may request similar facilities through Azores. We believe it essential that such a request be denied. We estimate number of Cuban troops already in Angola at 5,000 or more. Presence is enormously destabilizing and GOP could make important contribution by denying use of Azores to Cuban planes ferrying either troops or military supplies to Africa for Angola or returning from there even if empty.

3. We also taking various diplomatic initiatives including direct approach to the Soviets.3 While we are not opposed to MPLA per se we continue to believe that there must be a negotiated settlement in Angola permitting all three movements equitable representation in some form of coalition government. We fully support OAU efforts to this end.

4. We would welcome GOP intelligence on Angola. We understand there is a Portuguese liaison group of some kind in Luanda and would appreciate any information about GOP relations with three An-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850012–2205. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Schaufele, cleared in EUR/WE and C, and approved by Kissinger.

2 In telegram 7514 from Lisbon, December 18, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Melo Antunes and Carlucci to discuss “the problem of the U.S. Congress and Angola.” During the meeting, Melo Antunes “expressed concern” over Soviet involvement in the region and offered to collaborate with the United States on Angola. Carlucci suggested to the Department that collaboration with Portugal in the following areas might be useful: intelligence, diplomatic action with African nations, and informing others of the “nature of the threat.” (Ibid.)

3 See Documents 140 and 145.
golan factions and its assessment of political, economic and military situation.

5. We would welcome GOP efforts with African countries which it can influence to (A) dissuade them from recognizing MPLA and (B) acquaint them with the nature of the threat. Our information indicates following have recognized MPLA so far—Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, Congo, Guinea, Malagasy, Mozambique, Algeria, Sao Tome-Principe, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Benin (Dahomey), Tanzania, and Sudan.

6. One way in which GOP might be helpful is to facilitate the recruitment of mercenaries. However [less than 1 line not declassified] is examining this and other more concrete ways in which GOP might be able to help and will communicate them to you [1½ lines not declassified]

Kissinger

161. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Iran (Helms) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Tehran, December 21, 1975, 1834Z.

244. Reference WH 52538.2

1. Went carefully over ref message with Shah in early evening audience December 21.

His initial reaction was to ask whether you would meet with Ansary before Christmas. (My inquiry as to what he meant led to semantic exchange during which it became clear that he was speaking of Quote Christmas holiday period Unquote). He then went on to say that if his government gets sufficient funds, he would like very much to help. He wants to know from us how much Saudis will contribute so that he can Quote complement Unquote their amount and thus conceivably bring it up to the [dollar amount not declassified] required. (Please advise).3

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Immediate.
2 Document 159.
3 A backchannel message from Kissinger to Helms, December 21, provided a brief synopsis of the Saudi response on aid to Angola (Document 162), which did not mention a figure. The message instructed Helms to reiterate U.S. resolve to thwart Soviet activity in Angola. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Box 12, Scowcroft Chronological File (A))
Shah commented that he would give the funds to Zaire and never ask that government what it did with the money. He would notify us what he had done but since he did not want to embarrass the USG with the Congress or the public, he would keep such notification entirely private. Quote After all Unquote he said, Quote Jack Anderson might get ahold of the information if we notify you officially Unquote. This was stated with smile but the additional comment, Quote please communicate what I have just said to the Secretary Unquote.

2. Shah told me he had had conversation in last few days with Soviet Ambassador Erofeev during which Angola situation had been discussed. Erofeev regaled Shah with Russian recognition of MPLA and standard Soviet line. In response to query, he told Shah that Cubans were Quote volunteers Unquote. Shah embarrassed Erofeev by saying to him, Quote oh I see. Those Cubans have their planes and big weapons at home with them at all times and carry them with them wherever they go Unquote. Shah concluded by saying Quote I took the same position as your government on the situation. I said just what you have read to me and in almost the same words Unquote. (He was referring to the language in paragraph 3 of ref message.)

162. Backchannel Message From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to Secretary of State Kissinger

Jidda, December 21, 1975, 1441Z.

6. Ref: WH 2537.2
1. Message delivered in full detail to Kamal Adham noon Sunday.3
2. Adham responded immediately that U.S.G. attitude was greatly appreciated and that he concurred fully in the Secretary’s definition of the parallel interests which Saudi Arabia and the U.S. share in this matter. He stressed, in addition, that Saudi Arabia has its own strategic reasons for opposing a Soviet puppet regime in Africa that might even go beyond those of the United States, and that it was these factors that would determine how far Saudi Arabia would finally go to support our Angolan friends.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive.
2 See footnote 2, Document 159.
3 December 21.
3. Adham has been advised by President Sadat that a group of Egyptian officers has been sent or is being sent to Angola to assess the military situation on the ground, and to formulate recommendations as to the nature and level of assistance required by the non-Communists. Iran and Saudi Arabia will be advised of the results of this mission.

4. Saudi Arabia will determine, in concert with Egypt and Iran, how much aid they will send to Angola and how it will be delivered. Adham sent a message to the Shah yesterday or today suggesting that the Shah channel Iranian aid through South Africa, with which the Shah maintains good relations but with which neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt has any contact.

5. Adham reiterated his impression, [1½ lines not declassified] that the Zaire regime has a poor record for dependability in the delivery of assistance to the Angolans. His implication was that General Mobutu retains for himself the best of the military equipment and a substantial percentage of financial subsidies. We offered no comment to that appraisal.

6. Adham promised to keep us informed of Saudi Arabian actions in support of Angola. He acknowledged our willingness to discuss how funds might be channelled most effectively through Zaire, but indicated definitively that he would rather deal with the problem in direct coordination with Sadat and the Shah.4

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4 A backchannel message from Kissinger to the Embassy in Jidda, December 21, expressed appreciation for Saudi support and a desire to maintain close coordination among all interested parties to “maximize” their efforts. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Box 12, Scowcroft Chronological File (A))
163. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, December 22, 1975, 9:30–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

SALT (and Angola)

PRINCIPALS

The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

OTHER ATTENDEES

White House: Mr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

State: Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Defense: Deputy Secretary William Clements
CIA: Mr. Carl Duckett
NSC Staff: Colonel Richard T. Boverie

President Ford: Before we get into the basic part of the meeting, I
want to take a minute to talk about Angola. The vote in the Senate on
Angola was, to say the least, mildly deplorable.2 I cannot believe it rep-
resents a good policy for the U.S. and it is not fundamentally the way
the American people think.

I made a short but tough statement on television, and I reiterated
my position in an informal press conference Saturday.3 I find this the
right thing for the U.S. to do. We should spend every dime legally that
we decided upon. We should spend every nickel and do everything we
can. Hopefully—and Secretary Kissinger recommended this option—it
will lead to some kind of negotiated settlement.

If we become chicken because of the Senate vote, prospects will be
bad. Every department should spend all it can legally—do all we can in
that area.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2, NSC
Meeting December 22, 1975. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets, except those indicating
omitted material, are in the original.
3 For the text of the December 19 statement, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, Vol. II,
p. 1981. The complete text of Ford’s remarks on Angola and the United States Congress at
Director Colby: We have [dollar amount not declassified] left of the last [dollar amount not declassified] authorized, and have [dollar amount not declassified] more in reserve. We can have another [dollar amount not declassified] from the cost of the aircraft. We can stuff missiles back into our inventory.

President Ford: Bill [Colby], spend every dime you can.

Brent Scowcroft: We can have an NSC working group under Bill Hyland figure out ways to spend the money.

Secretary Kissinger: If we keep going and the Soviets do not think there is a terminal date on our efforts and we threaten them with the loss of détente, we can have an effect.

Director Colby: There has been some fluttering among the Soviets. They have some trouble in their Foreign Ministry. [Laughter]

President Ford: Let’s exploit this.

[Omitted here is discussion on SALT.]

164. Backchannel Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Ambassador to Zaire (Cutler) and [recipient not declassified]

Washington, December 23, 1975, 0443Z.

WH 52556. Deliver at opening of business.

1. At earliest opportunity you should tell President Mobutu that we have exerted our influence in friendly countries to obtain some help for Angolan effort. Without specifying countries involved, other than in general area of Middle East, you should inform President that we are encouraged to believe he will receive some significant help within next several weeks.

2. You should take advantage of this happy news to insert idea that we consult with him and his advisors on an effective military program to use any new funds that might become available.

3. FYI: One of our concerns is that any monies not simply disappear. Thus we are keeping a line on any transfers in countries that have indicated they might be forthcoming. While we have not pinned down

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive.
a commitment or any specific figures, we are encouraged to believe about [dollar amount not declassified] might become available.

4. We will keep you informed. Because of extreme delicacy of this matter, we will not indicate countries involved. But you should understand that this is not a transfer to the US, or transfer of US equipment. Our role was simply political one of stimulating assistance.

165. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

South African Decision to Withdraw from Angola

1. [1½ lines not declassified] the South African National Security Council decided on the evening of 23 December to withdraw South African troops from Angola. The timing of the withdrawal is not definite pending consultations beginning 24 December with the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and possibly with President Mobutu. [1½ lines not declassified] emphasized that the withdrawal will be orderly, and that the service hoped to obtain the concurrence of the FNLA and UNITA.

2. [less than 1 line not declassified] the South Africans probably intend to withdraw before the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting now scheduled for the second week in January. By withdrawing before the OAU meeting, the South Africans hope that UNITA and the FNLA will be free to deny the presence of South Africans in Angola and to invite on-site inspection. The South African withdrawal timetable might be adjusted, depending upon the results of consultations with the FNLA, UNITA and President Mobutu.

W.E. Colby

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 103, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A note that reads “Urgent” is attached to the memorandum. A copy was sent to Scowcroft.

2 David H. Blee signed for Colby above Colby’s typed signature.
166. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State

Kinshasa, December 27, 1975, 1915Z.

11014. For the Secretary and Mulcahy from Schaufele. Subject: Angola: Meeting with Mosutu.

1. I met with President Mobutu for an hour and a half this morning, December 27, at his country residence. Also present were his chief advisor, Bisengimana, Foreign Minister Bula and Ambassador Cutler.

2. I began by explaining the purpose of my trip: to consult personally with several key African leaders on Angola, to explain our position and assure them of our continued resolve to oppose foreign intervention, and to exchange views on ways by which the OAU might facilitate a negotiated settlement in Angola. I said we wanted to consult with Mobutu as a first step, and then reviewed with him the substance of the points which I intend to make with the governments I would be visiting. I said I would also be seeing a number of our Ambassadors from other African countries and would instruct them to make the same points to their respective host governments. Mobutu expressed agreement with my presentation and satisfaction that we were taking such an initiative at this time.

3. With respect to our own efforts in Angola, I said that despite problems with the Congress we remained determined to resist Soviet military intervention until a peaceful solution could be worked out. I noted that the issue had by no means been played out in the Congress, and if necessary the administration was prepared to renew the battle when Congress reconvenes next month. For now, however, we have sufficient funds to meet present military requirements.

4. Mobutu said the Congress’ action posed serious problems, both from the standpoint of limiting prospects for additional help and the adverse effect on the attitudes and will of others trying to help. Of even greater concern, he went on, was the question of Zaire’s own security in the face of Soviet threats not only to the south in Angola but also on other sides—in Cabinda and Congo Brazzaville. While the Soviets poured military equipment into those areas Zaire remained essentially unprotected: none of the country’s vital areas—Inga Dam, the copper belt, the capital, the ports—had any protection from military attack.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 7, Zaire—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
Nor did Zaire have any means for making its own armaments. While the Soviet Union and its friends “guaranteed” continued support “until the end” to those threatening Zaire’s security, Zaire had no such assurances. I expressed understanding of Mobutu’s concerns, assured him we would continue to do our best to help, and discussed in this context our FMS and economic assistance programs for the coming year.

5. I then turned to the urgent matter of preventing any additional recognitions of the MPLA before the OAU summit, noting that Zaire was in a position to play a key role in this effort and that we, for our part, were ready to lend support in any way possible. Mobutu reiterated his belief that no more than twenty African states will have recognized the MPLA by the time the OAU convenes, leaving a clear majority with which to work at the meeting. He conceded, however, that the MPLA and its backers were waging a vigorous campaign which had to be watched carefully. Mobutu blamed Algeria in particular for trying to drum up support for MPLA in the name of “non-alignment.”

We then reviewed the status of individual states: Cameroon was shaky but visits by both Bula and me during the next few days should help. Chad was also doubtful, but Mobutu (working through Bongo) had assured them of some military assistance as a counter to the Soviets’ help. The Nigerians, I said, were worth continued attention since, despite their recognition of the MPLA, they had told us they still supported the idea of a coalition government; Mobutu agreed. On the other hand, Mobutu thought Ghana had caved because of Nigerian pressure and was not salvageable.

6. Comment: Mobutu was obviously concerned about developments in Washington and their effects on both the Angolan effort and our ability to continue contributing to Zaire’s own security. However, he was not discouraged and seemed readily to accept my assurances that we have every intention of staying in the game. Somewhat to my surprise, he did not raise the question of South African forces in Angola, as I thought he might with a view to seeking our intercession to keep them there. While we did not get into the substance of Mobutu’s views on a possible OAU settlement—and I am not sure his thinking has progressed very far along this line or that he concerns himself with such details—it is clear that he views the OAU summit as a major challenge, and opportunity, for movement on the political front. (He did point out that the heavily armed and equipped position of MPLA forces makes cease-fire disadvantageous for the other movements and Zaire.)

It is also clear that he shares our concern for holding the line on MPLA recognition before the summit. In this connection, Foreign Min-

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2 See Document 165.
ister Bula will be sent shortly to Zambia and Uganda, as well as Cameroon, to maintain pressure on this issue.

7. I am convinced that, while we can continue to count on Zaire in the military sphere, we cannot look to Mobutu to provide the major impetus for effectively organizing political/diplomatic efforts among friendly African states prior to or during the OAU meeting.

Cutler

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167. Intelligence Alert Memorandum¹


SUBJECT

Possible Adverse Consequences of the OAU Summit Meeting

1. The Organization of African Unity will open its emergency session on Angola in Addis Ababa on January 8. The meeting is bound to be a contentious one. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and its supporters will seek to:

—gain for it official recognition from the OAU as the sovereign government of Angola,
—win condemnation of South African and US involvement in Angola,
—justify Soviet and Cuban assistance,
—eliminate support for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).

2. A majority of OAU members has not yet recognized either of the rival Angolan regimes, and most of this majority will seek to avoid a situation where the member states are forced to “choose up sides.” This group of states will attempt to encourage a political settlement among the factions within Angola by:

—condemning South African involvement,
—seeking the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel,

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 104, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. The paper was submitted to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum from Colby on January 3.
—urging the cessation of all foreign assistance to the warring liberation groups,
—calling for a cease-fire and a government of national unity.

The South African Factor

3. The presence of South African combat forces in Angola has given the MPLA a big advantage in the contest for legitimacy between the rival regimes. This increases the likelihood that the MPLA’s supporters will win out at the OAU meeting.

—Pretoria’s assistance makes it emotionally impossible for most black African states to remain neutral and makes it politically difficult if not impossible for most to support a government of national unity.

—South African support of UNITA and the FNLA has seriously tarnished the image of these organizations as legitimate Angolan nationalist groups in the eyes of many African nations.

—Pretoria’s involvement in Angola was the deciding factor in prompting Nigeria, Ghana and Burundi to recognize the MPLA. A South African presence in Angola at the time of the summit will prompt other African states to follow suit, and probably produce a majority in favor of recognizing the MPLA.

4. The OAU members will also be keenly sensitive to how the fighting in Angola is going. Should it appear that the MPLA were on the verge of gaining a clear-cut position of predominance or that the FNLA/UNITA coalition were collapsing, some OAU states would probably move quickly to recognize the MPLA, in effect getting on what appeared to be the winning side. As matters now stand, however, it does not appear that the fighting will be at such a point before the summit occurs. The MPLA has stepped up its activities, but no decisive breakthrough appears imminent. Moreover, the rainy season is now underway in Angola, and this should serve to complicate military action.

5. Pretoria has recently indicated privately that it plans to withdraw its forces from Angola by the time the summit begins.2 If this is in fact a firm decision and some way can be found to make it credible to the African audience and to make diplomatic use of it, it would strengthen the position of African countries that were prepared to hold off on recognition of the MPLA until some steps could be taken toward a political settlement. Such a development might also stimulate diplomatic efforts by “neutrals” or FNLA/UNITA supporters to promote a compromise solution. Indeed, such follow-up would probably be nec-

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2 See Document 165.
essential if FNLA/UNITA were to gain any benefit from South African withdrawal.

6. Since Pretoria has not announced a decision to withdraw, FNLA/UNITA supporters may try to use the issue of withdrawal as a lever to pry concessions out of the MPLA side, either at the summit or in the preceding diplomatic activity. It is difficult to foretell the success of such efforts. On the one hand, the prospect of bargaining over Pretoria's presence might make some MPLA supporters dig in more; on the other hand, some might think more seriously about a compromise solution. One factor influencing the situation would be whether or not those Africans who are neutrals or at least not hard-core FNLA/UNITA supporters endorsed the idea of bargaining over South African withdrawal.

7. South African withdrawal before the opening of the summit would put moderate OAU members in a better position to insist on withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola. It would also markedly reduce the chance of the OAU officially endorsing the MPLA.

8. Even with a South African withdrawal, however, the MPLA would continue to charge that UNITA and FNLA were obtaining clandestine assistance from Pretoria, and such an accusation would have some credibility because of South Africa's past support. Similar criticism would also be directed against the US. In addition, a South African withdrawal would also serve to persuade the Luanda-based regime to step up military operations in order to take advantage of the damaging effect a withdrawal would have on the military capabilities of its rivals.

9. In any event, the best that UNITA and the FNLA can probably expect is that a stampede of recognitions for the MPLA can be averted at the summit and that the OAU reaches no formal decision as a body. There would then be some chance that a number of African states would become disenchanted with the MPLA's refusal to agree to a government of national unity, and that this, in turn, would create new possibilities for a future political settlement. Even this evolution of events is questionable, however, unless South Africa actually withdraws from Angola.

10. In the week ahead, ongoing diplomatic activity will assume great importance. Among the several areas where there could be some movement are:

—Zambian efforts to persuade Mozambique, Tanzania, and perhaps other pro-MPLA states to accept a government of national unity. It is possible that the Zambians are trying to use South African withdrawal as a bargaining chip.

—Efforts by governments sympathetic to FNLA/UNITA or to reconciliation (e.g., Senegal, Ivory Coast) to hold the line among like-minded states and line up additional support from fence sitters.
—The continuing attempts by pro-MPLA states to turn the accumulation of MPLA strength into a bandwagon. The caucus of states recognizing the Luanda regime, which will reportedly meet just before the summit, will be one such effort.

A critical point will be whether or not the divisions among states recognizing the MPLA may be sufficiently wide to affect the outcome of the OAU meeting. Some states recognizing the MPLA, such as Nigeria and Ghana, appear to be primarily concerned about the South African role and if they could get some satisfaction on that point, might support a serious compromise effort. There will be great efforts made, however, to hold the MPLA group in line.

11. All elements of the intelligence community [less than 1 line not declassified] on alert to watch for and report any change in the positions of OAU states on the subject of recognition of the MPLA. It must be recognized, however, that while we will probably know the positions of most African states in advance of the summit meeting, we cannot provide assurance that we will know the positions of all. In addition, we can provide no assurance that these positions will not change during the meeting.

12. This memorandum has been coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and the [less than 1 line not declassified]

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168. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, January 3, 1976, 0147Z.

1374. Subject: Presidential Message on Angola.

Please deliver following letter from President Ford to head of host government as soon as possible:

Quote Dear Mr. President:

As the OAU summit approaches I would like to share with you some of my thoughts on the Angolan problem. I hope that you will feel

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850083-2272. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Schaufele, cleared in NSC and AF, and approved by Kissinger. Sent to Kinshasa, Lusaka, Libreville, Dakar, and Abidjan.
free to give me your own, as well as any further suggestions you may have concerning further initiatives that might be undertaken by you or by my government to promote a settlement in Angola that does not leave that country in the hands of the Soviets.

My government remains determined to support the FNLA/UNITA forces in Angola until the MPLA is convinced it must negotiate and precipitate the withdrawal of their Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA. We intend to utilize the means which are still available to us in the most effective way to enable us to continue and increase our present efforts. The vote in the Senate on December 19 was primarily directed against covert assistance and, should it be necessary, we will renew our efforts to obtain wider Congressional backing for additional resources to block Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola’s internal affairs.

On the South African question, about which there has been so much concern in Africa, I believe you are aware that the US in no way sought or encouraged the South Africans to become involved in Angola nor was our advice sought. It is reasonable to assume that they acted in defense of their national interest as they see it. We did not initiate any consultation with them and have maintained our military embargo on all arms to South Africa. Our desire is that a negotiated solution can be found so that all intervention—Soviet, Cuban and South African—ceases. We are confident that once Cuban and Soviet forces are withdrawn the weight of world opinion will bring about a withdrawal of South African forces as well.

The upcoming OAU summit meeting on Angola can clearly be extremely important in promoting an early end to the fighting and a peaceful settlement of the civil war. It is our hope that through your efforts and those of like-minded chiefs of state the OAU will insist upon a prompt end to all foreign involvement in Angola, arrange a standstill ceasefire between the forces in Angola, and bring about negotiations among the Angolan groups. My government would support such an initiative and cooperate with it, provided other distant powers do so as well. We would also in that case urge South Africa to end its involvement. I wish again to assure you, however, that we cannot stand idly by if the Soviet and Cuban intervention persists.

I would hope we can continue to exchange views on this and other matters of mutual concern as the need for further consultation arises. Sincerely, Gerald R. Ford. Unquote.

French text being sent septel except to Lusaka.

Ingersoll
169. Message From the Soviet Government to the United States Government

Moscow, undated.

Moscow, naturally, continues to follow closely the developments in Angola and in this regard is ready to maintain an appropriate contact with the American side.

We have in respect of Angola one clear and consistent policy. If we say that the Soviet Union is against foreign interference in the affairs of Angola, we say it to everyone and publicly too.

It is important, certainly, to discern a clear dividing line between a real interference in the affairs of Angola, meaning the military intervention of the Republic of South Africa and the actions of her accomplices, and the support rendered by many states to the lawful government of that country precisely for putting an end to such interference, for securing freedom, independence and territorial integrity of Angola.

When the foreign interference—not the fictitious but the real one—in the affairs of the sovereign state of Angola is stopped and the people of Angola get an opportunity to manage by themselves their affairs, then, it goes without saying, there will be no need to render them assistance in the form required by and granted to the People’s Republic of Angola now. Then the question about anybody’s “military presence” in Angola will solve itself in a natural way.

That is the principled position of the Soviet Union. It is our deep belief that it contains nothing which would hurt anybody’s interests including those of the United States. Therefore it cannot and should not lead to any complications in the Soviet-American relations.

We would like to hope that the United States will not permit rash actions in connection with Angola, including actions against countries rendering assistance to her lawful government, which could really complicate both the Soviet-American relations and the cause of relaxation in general.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 29, General Subject File, USSR—The “D” File. No classification marking. There are two handwritten notations on the first page: “Rec’d 1/9/76” and “Reply to HAK–AD talk of Jan. 5.” No record of that conversation has been found.

We have studied with great care the communication from Moscow concerning Angola which was delivered to us on January 9.\(^1\)

We do not propose to engage with the Soviet side in further disputations about “fictitious” or “real” foreign interference in Angolan affairs, we will evidently not agree on this matter. Our purpose is to have foreign interference ended, whatever characterization is applied to it. In that regard, we have noted with interest the statements in the Soviet communication concerning the military intervention of South Africa. It appears from these statements that the Soviet side now envisages the termination of all foreign military presence in Angola when the above military intervention has ended. We consider this Soviet position to be significant. For its part the US is willing to use its influence to bring about the cessation of foreign intervention. At the same time, we would appreciate having explicit confirmation from Moscow that the Soviet side will end its own military role as well as seeing to it that the military role of Cuba, with which the Soviet role is inextricably linked, will also end. The Soviet communication states that this problem will “solve itself in a natural way.” It will be important to know Moscow’s view as to the time frame in which such a solution, that is, the termination of Soviet and Cuban military presence and activity in Angola, would take place after South African withdrawal has been accomplished.

We would like to be certain that there is complete understanding in Moscow of our fundamental view of the Angolan issue, as it has evolved in recent months.

Angola would never have become a critical issue in American-Soviet relations if there had not been massive infusions of Soviet and Cuban military equipment and forces into the country. We have proceeded from the assumption that the essence of our relationship, if it is to proceed along the lines mapped out in the discussions and understandings of 1972–74, is that neither side will seek to obtain positions of unilateral advantage vis-à-vis the other, that restraint will govern our respective policies, and that nothing will be done that could escalate situations, where there may be turbulence or instability for other reasons, into confrontations between our two countries.

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 29, General Subject File, USSR—The “D” File. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the first page reads: “Delivered to the Soviets.”

\(^2\) Document 169.
It has been our view that these principles of mutual relations were not simply a matter of abstract “good will” but that they are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era. For it must be clear that where great powers are concerned, when either one succeeds somehow to obtain a special position of influence based on military intervention, in some locale because of certain temporary political opportunities and irrespective of original motives, the other power will sooner or later act to offset this advantage. But this will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction that was typical of other historic eras in which great powers maneuvered for advantage only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in major crises and, indeed, open conflict.

But it is precisely this pattern that we sought to break.

Whatever justification, be it as a matter of “principle” or in real or alleged requests for assistance, the Soviet side may consider itself to have had in intervening itself and actively supporting the Cuban intervention in Angola, the fact remains that there has never been any historic Soviet, or Russian, interest in that part of the world. It is precisely because the United States respects the position of the Soviet Union as a great power that it was bound to see the Soviet move into Angola, whatever the motivation, as running counter to the crucial principles of restraint, eschewal of unilateral advantage and scrupulous concern for the interests of others which we jointly enunciated in the early seventies.

It is not for us to lecture the Soviet side about its own interests. But we cannot help observing that whatever the attitudes of the African states with respect to South African intervention and in regard to the three contending factions in Angola, all the major African states view with utmost dismay the establishment of a Soviet/Cuban military position in the region of southwest Africa. Moreover, the Soviet side must be aware also that the steady trend toward a normalization of American relations with Cuba, which we had initiated not least in order to further the process of normalizing US-Soviet relations, has been most seriously damaged by what has happened in Angola. We believe that this is a wholly unnecessary setback to the constructive trends in our relations to which we jointly committed ourselves and we cannot believe that this is ultimately in the Soviet interest.

It is against the background of these very fundamental considerations, going to the very heart of our relations and indeed of a peaceful world order, that Moscow should evaluate our position on Angola. And that is why the speedy clarifications of Soviet policies and intentions for which we are asking in the first part of this message are of such vital importance. We believe there remains time and opportunity for the kind of statesmanship, on both sides, that will avoid our two coun-
tries once again becoming the victims of the iron laws of great power competition which had such disastrous consequences in the past and which it is our historic task to overcome.

171. **Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Diplomatic Posts**

Washington, January 15, 1976, 0212Z.

10166. Subject: Angola and the OAU Summit. For Ambassador from the Secretary.

1. We are encouraged by the leadership and unity demonstrated by moderate African states at the OAU summit, but recognize they will probably be under renewed pressure from pro-MPLA radicals to shift their position in the name of OAU unity. We also anticipate that the radicals will prefer to blame us rather than African states for split at the OAU, thereby keeping door open to moderates to “return to the African fold.” Some countries, however, particularly those recently visited by Assistant Secretary Schaufele, may be singled out for abuse as “American lackeys” who split the OAU at Washington’s bidding.

2. We will need, therefore, to be as supportive of our African friends as we can in the coming crucial weeks but we will also need to do so discreetly in ways which will not over-identify them with us. Rather than relying on top-level correspondence that may leak, or visits, at least at this time by high US officials, we will look to each of you to maintain a discreet dialogue following up on the OAU summit and developments in Angola.

3. It will clearly be crucial in the coming weeks that the moderate states continue to display the leadership and unity which they demonstrated at Addis. To encourage them to think in these terms, you should seek an early appointment with the highest appropriate official to follow up on the OAU summit and developments in Angola. You

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840096–1674. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Buchanan, cleared in AF, and approved by Kissinger. Sent to Rabat, Monrovia, Bangui, Libreville, Nairobi, and Yaounde.

2 The OAU meeting was held in Addis Ababa January 10–13, 1976. All delegations condemned South African entry into Angola; however, discussion of the issue of the MPLA regime in Angola ended in stalemate, with 22 members voting in favor of recognition, and 22 voting in favor of a government of national unity. *(Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1976, pp. 27662–27663)*
should express your gratification at seeing the moderates of Africa for once so united and effective in defense of their principles, and argue that the battle is only just starting. Now it will become even more essential, but also difficult for the moderates to act together to blunt pro-MPLA efforts to gain recognition. You should also encourage your host leadership to go on the offensive, using their prestige and resources to rally OAU members in support of a policy of conciliation.

4. You should encourage host government official to discuss options facing us all in light of OAU standoff and try and elicit:

—Any playback of impressions from the summit (including who were the main driving force on the MPLA-side, who were the compromisers, what was the role of the Cubans, did the Soviets play any roles)?

—What is host government’s estimate of the recognition situation (stalemate, continued danger of more recognitions of MPLA, likelihood someone will recognize the “Huambo government”)?

—Are there any plans for further coordination among the anti-MPLA grouping? What is moderates’ next step?

—Are there any specific steps which host government can suggest which might be taken by moderate African states and/or by us which would help build pressure for a withdrawal of all foreign forces and the establishment of some form of compromise coalition?

5. You should also use occasion to reaffirm the main lines of US policy (cease fire, withdrawal of all foreign forces, efforts to conciliate the factions and form a government of national unity) and say that the administration intends to do whatever it can to see that an equitable solution along the above lines eventually emerges. You should draw upon the pertinent parts of the Secretary’s January 14 press conference\(^3\) (sent by septel) and provide a copy to the official.

Kissinger

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172. Memorandum of Conversation

Brussels, January 24, 1976, 7:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Journiac, Staff of French President Giscard d’Estaing
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Journiac: I have just returned from Kinshasa where I saw Mobutu and his Foreign Minister and discussed Angola. I found the diplomatic situation favorable, with the moderate Africans prepared to face the leftists. The situation could, however, be improved. For the Africans, Angola is a white man’s affair which they look to the West to solve. This present confidence in the West, however, will not last if the military situation continues to deteriorate. Most of the moderate African regimes are not ideologically motivated, and they tend to favor the West because they see us as their traditional friends and as stronger than the Communists. Whether this state of things will last will depend on the military outcome. We believe the military collapse in northern Angola thus far is not too significant because the Zaire Army never was an effective fighting force. A relatively modest effort on our part could re-establish the situation. If the [dollar amount not declassified] is still available, the necessary operation could be mounted to retake some of the lost territory and stabilize the situation. If, on the other hand, nothing is done, South Africa will reduce its involvement. If we do act, South Africa will maintain its presence. The question is whether you have the resources to mount such an operation and on this score your people are pessimistic.

Secretary: Can it be done with available money, or is additional money needed?

Journiac: Our people say the necessary money is presently not available. An account was to have been opened, but nothing has happened.

Secretary: This is a national disgrace. The Cubans are able to send 10,000 men to Angola, and we are unable to even send money! The effects of this will be negative for years to come. I will let you know at the end of next week what the possibilities are.

Journiac: I do not see any alternative policy to the one I outlined. The Zairians are pessimistic about the situation. What the US does in

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, January–April 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Hilton Hotel. The Secretary was in Belgium to brief NATO officials on U.S.-Soviet arms limitation talks.
Angola will have an impact on African attitudes throughout the continent. Not just in Zaire, but among our other friends as well. The present US position is inconceivable to me, and I believe that the African “fence-sitters” will assess the consequences of US inaction and shift from our camp to the other one. In addition, it is our real friends like Houphouet and Senghor who are threatened.

Secretary: I agree with you completely. Where do things stand on your helicopters?

Journiac: We are working on that. In addition, Zaire has asked us for propeller-driven aircraft, Skyraiders and T–28s. These are obsolete models and we do not have enough to respond to this request. You can help us with the Zaire request, by turning some over to us for us to turn over to Zaire.

Secretary: I will let you know by the end of next week what I think we can do. The problem is that the fools in Congress have accused us of involving the US in a “major secret war in Angola” and have produced legislation prohibiting us from acting in Angola. I am due to testify next week and expect the session to be violent and negative. As I said, I will inform you late next week about the prospects.

Journiac: Let me thank you for receiving me, and I convey the best wishes of my President.

Secretary: Please convey to your President my high esteem and my admiration for what he is doing in Angola.

173. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 3, 1976, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 3 February 1976, 4:00 p.m.

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft; Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert F. Ellsworth; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown; Director of Central Intelligence George Bush.

1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Sensitive.
Substitute Member Present: Director of Intelligence and Research Harold Saunders vice Under Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco.

Also Present: Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. General W. Y. Smith and CIA Deputy Director for Operations William Nelson were present for the entire meeting. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele; Chief, Africa Division, CIA, James M. Potts; and NSC Senior Staff Officer for Africa Harold Horan were present for Item 1. Chief, Europe Division, CIA, William Wells was present for Item 2.

1. Angola

Scowcroft: We have two new members here today. Welcome to our group. George (Bush), do you want to tell us where we stand in Angola?

Bush: These are the words of CIA, not mine. I am prepared to brief at some length, or somewhat shorter, at your pleasure. (Briefed on situation in Angola, during the course of which he made the point that during January the Soviets and Cubans had spent about $88 million on Angola.)

Scowcroft: Let’s have the specifics on that.

Bush: Well, here they are (in millions):

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soviets</th>
<th>Cubans</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Materials</td>
<td>23.</td>
<td>41.</td>
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<td>Personnel</td>
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<td>Transportation</td>
<td>2.</td>
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<td>Totals</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>62.6</td>
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Saunders: That’s a dramatic increase. The estimated total for several months was only about $180 million.

Scowcroft: Right—almost half again as much. What we are faced with, it seems to me, is whether to shut off everything, or to continue with what is in the pipeline. The President has not yet decided what to do about overt aid, so there’s no need to address that now. Anyone feel that we should not continue with what is in the pipeline?

Ellsworth: I have two questions. I know I’m the new boy here, but I am concerned with what we are proposing to do in this paper. I’m brand new and should hesitate to open my mouth, but I have questions about some things. The paper says that we should continue to support

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2 Briefing not found attached.

3 Attached to a January 31 memorandum from the Chief of the Africa Division to Bush, entitled “Angola—Plan for Disengagement.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DO Files, Job 80-00464A, Box 34, Angola Covert Action Program Statements)
UNITA and FNLA until they collapse, encourage the French to give their all, Zaire should be encouraged, Zambia, too, but that all this will run out in March and then we will be finished and the whole thing will collapse. I have two questions. First, is this what we want to do? Encourage FNLA and UNITA with every bit of what is in the pipeline and then let them fade away and collapse? We might be injured by letting that happen. Maybe we should approach this on different grounds. Maybe we should explore other means to try to get a better deal, try to buy better terms than ultimate complete surrender. These are big questions. I don’t have the answers.

Scowcroft: This paper does not include all that we should do. The major question is whether we shut off everything now, continue with what’s in the pipeline or use what we have differently. Along with our review we must plan for consultation with the major elements involved and the neighboring countries to ease tension. It is not just to run the pipeline out. There are other alternatives. If we were just quitting, we could shut the pipeline now.

Ellsworth: No, not shut it off now, but put the dollars we have to some other and perhaps better use. What is our money situation now? If the Defense supplemental passes it will bar the use of any of the money in it for Angola, and will rule out any reprogramming, right?

Bush: The President can try to do something overtly, but we do not have a free hand.

Ellsworth: I understand that there is [dollar amount not declassified] but do we have to check with the Appropriations committees on this?

Nelson: Let me clarify our money situation. We have been authorized $31.7 million. All of that has been obligated except [dollar amount not declassified]—or, more correctly, we can deobligate some and make available a total of up to [dollar amount not declassified] There is [dollar amount not declassified] in the CIA Reserve in old money.

Ellsworth: That’s [dollar amount not declassified]

Nelson: This might be available, although we would have to go to the Appropriations committees and explain what we wanted to use it for in Angola.

Ellsworth: And you think they’d agree to using it for refugee aid, resettlement, etc.

Nelson: They might—we don’t know. They might not approve anything. The [dollar amount not declassified] we wanted from Defense reprogramming is out totally. Our use of the 1976 Reserve replenishment would be subject to Congressional approval.

Scowcroft: The sum of [dollar amount not declassified] is really all that is readily available.

Nelson: The rest is all possible, but not assured.
Bush: I agree with what you are saying, Bob (Ellsworth). This paper was not intended by my people as a final plan. We were just trying to disengage.

Ellsworth: Disengagement could be a bridge, but it seems to me that if we push things through the pipeline and then come to an abrupt halt when the money runs out that we may not be doing the best thing. I want to support a policy in the larger concept about which we are all clear. Something better than outright surrender. Something better for Zaire and for France than to encourage them to go all out with us and then for us to pull out in March.

Bush: Action with the [dollar amount not declassified] to build a bridge while delaying a pull-out.

Saunders: In all fairness, there’s something missing here and State should supply it—policy. We have a paper—Bill Shaufele has worked on it—which is before the Secretary for decision.\(^4\) It deals with transitional action to put the problem in a broader context. One alternative would be to maintain a relatively high level of guerrilla activity which will help lead to a political settlement. Or more on the political potential—UNITA withdrawing, going into the woods, but holding territory while talking with others. If we do this, how would the remaining dollars best be spent, which will determine whether we should keep the pipeline open or hold up. There is no decision from the Secretary yet, but this will give us policy.

Ellsworth: I’d like to see that. But I am not ready to agree to this program in principle until I obtain more information.

Scowcroft: One thing to remember. They didn’t start fighting because of us, and they are not likely to stop just because we say so. It is not our decision; it is their decision.

Ellsworth: I don’t agree. We have an interest in what they do.

Scowcroft: But we don’t have control and we shouldn’t try to control.

Bush: We don’t have any clout.

Ellsworth: What are we trying to do then?

Bush: We are trying not to get clobbered.

Ellsworth: We might have an interest in showing that the U.S. is withdrawing.

Saunders: I don’t think that would work. We need to work hard to modify the political situation.

Schaufele: We might have more interest in playing out the Angola matter because of regional concerns. What is the threat to Zaire and

\(^4\) Not found. At the next 40 Committee meeting, the paper was still awaiting Kissinger’s approval. See Document 175.
Zambia? So we would want to maintain whatever military capability we could muster. We want to get the most value from our money.

Saunders: Should we spend the money for general operations to try to sustain UNITA/FNLA? What would they do?

Ellsworth: Who knows?

Nelson: We shouldn’t confuse what we are talking about with the classic definition of guerrilla warfare. I think the trend is to keep up general operations—to try to maintain lines of communications. I think the most you could expect would be that they would try to protect some of the land. UNITA might split on a real guerrilla situation if you tried to move them from the towns where they live and put them into the bush. They may want to make peace. I think that applies to Mobutu, too. He might move to recognize the MPLA. The same with Kaunda.

Saunders: Especially if we tell them the money’s gone and there will be no more.

Scowcroft: What happens when we tell them we want to pull the plug.

Bush: Don’t. Let’s get the Secretary’s views and keep the thing going till then.

Scowcroft: One of the key elements is whether the President wants to take on the Congress again and try to get overt aid for Zaire/Zambia or for Angola or what.

Saunders: Whether he does or not, what should he do with UNITA—stretch out our funds, or are we in a situation where we should go all out for six to eight weeks, or should they hole up? What is UNITA likely to do?

Nelson: Probably try to hold on to where they live.

Scowcroft: Any realistic hope that Savimbi could control his area through March?

Potts: Maybe he could hold on for a week. We can’t even get a lead on what he would do unless we can talk to him about what we can do. If we tell him that this is our plan, then we could talk to him about what he can do. This is the same problem with Mobutu, with Savimbi and Roberto.

Saunders: If we go to him now we could only ask him what he is going to do. If we wait and go with a prepared U.S. strategy we could ask what he would do within that framework.

Potts: There’s not much time to make decisions. He is hard pressed and is trying to save his troops. Probably he would get away from the railroad and from the roads and just try to exist.

Scowcroft: If we go and say we have so many dollars, what’s the most optimistic estimate?
Potts: That he would hold on for a week or so.
Ellsworth: If we asked, he might say he wanted what was in the pipeline.
Potts: He might say he wanted what he asked for last—mortars, ammunition, etc. But the situation has changed and if he has to move, he might want land mines now to protect his area. He might want aircraft to put supplies into a new area. We’d have to look at that and decide if it was possible.
Ellsworth: If he does that, are we going to Zaire and ask them to help us out or just stick with what we are doing?
Scowcroft: We need the political strategy which will give us guidelines about what to do. We need a paper and then to check with the President on further aid. Then we can get what we are doing coordinated with the political strategy of the four or five major actors. It is unlikely that Mobutu/Kaunda/Savimbi/Roberto will all agree.
Nelson: No. Kaunda wants the railroad open. He’ll make peace to do it.
Scowcroft: Savimbi also?
Nelson: Possibly.
Schaufele: How open is the railroad?
Potts: Some bridges have been blown.
Ellsworth: Doesn’t MPLA hold some key points?
Potts: Yes, and they blew the bridges.
Schaufele: I think there is something to be said for playing this out over several months because time may turn the Cuban presence to our advantage, especially as they move more into the country.
Brown: I agree. We’ve not exploited it.
Ellsworth: Not to mention the effect on Zaire and Zambia.
Schaufele: They might have to go back over the line.
Saunders: Does Savimbi know there’s [dollar amount not declassified] available?
Nelson: No. He read about what Congress was doing here and came to Kinshasa to see what was going on.
Scowcroft: He doesn’t have a clue?
Potts: I think he believes it soon may be all over and we could only tell him that we were trying to decide in a few days.
Schaufele: There’s another question. Are the South Africans going to back Savimbi to put some covering on their role in Angola?
Potts: There is no indication what South Africa is prepared to do.
Schaufele: Don’t they know what we are doing?
Potts: We’ve not told them.
Schaufele: They might want to form a buffer in front of the dam.
Potts: That’s logical, but we don’t know.
Scowcroft: It seems to me that we need the political strategy paper, and it also seems to me over the next few days we should advise Savimbi to try to preserve his force and not try to beat the Cubans.
Potts: Savimbi is sending off groups of 10 to 11 troops now and telling them to guard a road, or secure a bridge—trying to protect his forces.

Schaufele: With a significant flow of the pipeline he could hold out in the South?
Potts: Yes, he might.
Ellsworth: Can’t we tell him to move East?
Potts: There’s much symbolism in where he is. If he had to give up the key cities where he is now the MPLA would make much of it as a symbolic victory—it has political significance.
Nelson: The MPLA would trumpet it as a major victory.
Scowcroft: Any realistic hope of doing anything else?
Bush: Brent, there’s another problem—French helicopters. What shall we tell them? I’m not sure what the commitment is, but what do we want to do with these gunships? We shouldn’t wait too long.

Saunders: It can wait two or three days.
Brown: Try to use them.
Nelson: They won’t be ready for a month.
Scowcroft: Really?
Nelson: We sent an expert out to survey the situation, and he believes that they will be ineffective.
Brown: Then cut it off today.
Nelson: He says that they will have no air spotters to tell them where targets are, that they will have no air protection, and that they will be sitting ducks for Redeyes or other ground weapons.
Scowcroft: They won’t be effective now.

Nelson: The French expect us to pay for this, and all we may get will be a bill for lost helicopters.

Scowcroft: Not my understanding.
Nelson: It is complex, but the French expect us to cover their expenses.

Scowcroft: I don’t think that is accurate.
Nelson: Then you’d better talk to Ambassador Rush—he says it is.
Scowcroft: I talked to Henry (Kissinger) and he says no.
Schaufele: I talked to the French and that’s what they led me to believe.
Scowcroft: It won’t hurt to wait a few days on the French, [less than 1 line not declassified]
Nelson: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Scowcroft: Anybody disagree?
Brown: Do that and then call off the helicopters.
Saunders: I agree.
Brown: If they are not effective, why go ahead?
Schaufele: Again, there may be political reasons for keeping the French engaged.
Ellsworth: They are not going to be ready to go for a month, so maybe it is not necessary to make an immediate decision.
Brown: That’s like being in the locker room putting your shoes on when second half begins—you aren’t going to get into the game.
Potts: The French didn’t send the proper training equipment or teams.
Schaufele: Maybe they didn’t intend to get into the game.
Brown: It is one thing to train how to fire missiles from a helicopter, but quite another to use a helicopter in that manner.
Scowcroft: Well, we don’t need to decide this right now. Let’s see where it fits into the political strategy paper. You can move on the C–130. (To Saunders) You will hope to have the paper shortly?
Brown: I have a related issue. I believe we simply have not exploited the scope and degree of the Cuban involvement. If they don’t get burned we are asking for trouble down the road. They are going to raise hell in Latin America. We’ve got to find a way to clip their wings.
Schaufele: I couldn’t agree more.
Ellsworth: And I think we would have the support of many Latin American nations.
Brown: Yes, they would agree, and the OAS, too. We have not yet gotten all the mileage out of this in this country, either. If we had, we wouldn’t have so many goofy things happening. We’ve got to find a way to go all out on this.
Schaufele: What about the 200 Cubans in Laos?
Saunders: Maybe we need a count shown on a map.
Scowcroft: They are all over. Let’s look at this again.
Schaufele: Zaire and Zambia ought to get in on this, too. They ought to work a lot harder. Visitors from there will be in this week, and we’ll talk to them. When the number of Cubans went over 10,000 people began to take notice.
Ratliff (to Scowcroft): Do you want to assign responsibility for this?
Scowcroft: The Working Group should do this. Anything else on this subject?

Nelson: One footnote. [½ lines not declassified]

Scowcroft: Did you recruit any?

Potts: [2 lines not declassified]

Scowcroft: You can’t put [less than 1 line not declassified] with Savimbi.

Potts: No, but Roberto is still trying to do something from across the river.

Ellsworth: Say, when I was on the Hill this afternoon they were asking me about an American military attaché in London who was helping to recruit mercenaries.

Schaufele: We’ve denied that.

Bush: Well, have you all heard of Bufftin? He’s one of your ex-soldiers who has gone AWOL several times, been tried for rape and been in and out of jail, but he’s saying that he is going to recruit Americans.

Schaufele: But that type makes the best mercenary fighter.

Nelson: He was in a hotel bar with a buddy and they were wearing Army green berets and with holsters stamped “U.S.” although they didn’t have 45’s in them. He claimed he was the vanguard of 2,000 Special Forces troops. We’ll be hearing about that in the press soon.

Potts: His military record shows that his military specialty was as a cook and clerk, although he had some training in infiltration and hand-to-hand combat.

Scowcroft: Any views on [less than 1 line not declassified] recruitment?

Brown: I agree, don’t go on.

Ellsworth: Agree.

Scowcroft: Hal?

Saunders: Agree.

Scowcroft: I’ll do what I can to get the paper through Henry and then we will have to meld this paper with the political strategy.

Saunders: I think it should go to the working group to conform the action paper with the political paper.

Scowcroft: Paragraph seven is heavily dependent upon political factors.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]
174. Letter From French President Giscard d’Estaing to President Ford


Dear Mr. President:

Yesterday in Paris I received the President of the Republic of Gabon. He shared with me his thoughts as well as those of President Houphouet-Boigny on the Angolan matter. These two Presidents as well as Chiefs of State of other moderate African countries are going to recognize within a very short time, the People’s Republic of Angola (MPLA).

Our two countries have maintained close cooperation on their policies with regard to Angola. We have, for our part, kept the commitments which we undertook. But, on the whole, the actions which France and the United States have taken have not been able to improve the situation, to my regret, and we are forced to recognize that the People’s Republic of Angola (MPLA) is exercising control over the major part of the territory in this country.

Our moderate African friends are troubled by this situation and are going to recognize the new state very soon. It seems to me important that we avoid their doing this in a dispersed fashion and separately from us. It seems to me as well that France must not give the impression of refusing to recognize the new state until the last moment and rather under the pressure of events. This is why we propose to recognize the People’s Republic of Angola (MPLA) very soon. I wanted to inform you of this personally before this decision is made public.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my most friendly thoughts.

V. Giscard d’Estaing

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 12, General Subject File, France, General (4). Confidential.
2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Washington, February 13, 1976, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 13 February 1976, 9:00 a.m.

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft; Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert F. Ellsworth; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown.

 Substitute Member Present: Deputy Director for Operations William Nelson vice Director of Central Intelligence George Bush.

 Also Present: Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William G. Hyland, Director of INR Harold Saunders, and Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, Lt. General W. Y. Smith were present for all items. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy; Chief, Africa Division, CIA, James M. Potts; and NSC Senior Staff Officer for Africa Harold Horan were present for Item No. 1.

1. Angola

Scowcroft: Let’s start with Angola. Bill (Nelson), I understand you have some new information for us.

Nelson: Right. This is going to be short and sweet. (Briefed, during course of which he reported that 30 of 46 African nations had recognized the MPLA and it will be seated at the OAU meeting.)

Scowcroft: Your people have talked with Savimbi, haven’t they?

Nelson: Yes. He says he will continue fighting, waging guerrilla warfare. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Scowcroft: The President met the other day with the new Zaire
Foreign Minister and announced that we would, of course, continue to offer support until our authorized funds run out.4

Brown: What about the South Africans? What are they doing? I read that they had formed a buffer line.

Potts: That’s right. And they still have some people in Serpa Pinto.

Sisco: What is the guerrilla warfare capability of Savimbi? What is the over-all assessment of his capabilities—training, equipment, etc.?

Nelson: Well, he’s not done that lately; he’s been fighting a conventional war. But he has demonstrated an ability to maintain himself under guerrilla warfare conditions. The big problem will be resupply. He has only one airfield now. There’s a chance he might get some supplies via South Africa, but that’s not certain.

Scowcroft: What was his record against the Portuguese?

Potts: Acceptable. He managed to stay on inside Angola while the others fled.

Ellsworth: Where?

Potts: In the south, which is his tribal region.

Mulcahy: He held on for six years.

Nelson: Of course the Portuguese were not always making a big effort.

Ellsworth: After we got supplies to Serpa Pinto what would he do with them—would he have the means to move them? Are there roads?

Nelson: There are roads, and they have trucks.

Brown: What position is South Africa taking? Are we encouraging them to do more? They may be our only hope. I was told the other day that there are more Cubans in Angola—percentage of the population, that is—than there were Americans in Vietnam at the peak. If the South Africans will stay we ought to help them.

Scowcroft: That’s what they’d like—for us to help them with equipment.

Nelson: We are talking to them, but have offered no aid.

Scowcroft: They’ve asked for enough equipment to choke a horse.

Brown: We can’t touch it.

Scowcroft: It wouldn’t go with Congress, and if we went up there with it, it would only set fire to the issue.

Sisco: What is left that we can put in?

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4 Ford met with Foreign Minister Nguza on February 11 in the Oval Office at 1:45 p.m. (Memorandum of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 283, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, February 1976) According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting ended at 2:10 p.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office)
Nelson: Well, with some reprogramming we can free about \(\text{dollar amount not declassified}\)

Sisco: For how long?
Nelson: For as long as the money lasts.

Scowcroft: You mean that is in the program that we were working on, but a lot of things have happened since then. We would have to take a new look.

Nelson: Savimbi wants demolition equipment now. The South Africans were to have given him some, but they are being cosy with him. They want him to turn over some SWAPO personnel—I guess so they can put them into jail—so they are holding back in delivering aid. The big problem is what are we going to do down the road? Where are we going? We can continue our resupply. It looks as if Roberto is about finished, but Savimbi could use some. We could continue this resupply without going to the Congress. This would enable Savimbi to continue for a while, but it would have no end in sight other than to just support him until we run out. How long and for what purpose?

Ellsworth: Savimbi told \(\text{less than 1 line not declassified}\) that he expected Zaire to go on?

Sisco: I would think he will hold out for a while. Kaunda is more problematical.

Mulcahy: Kaunda is more dependent upon access to the railroad, and he is likely to be the first to negotiate.

Sisco: That’s my feeling, too.

Mulcahy: Mobutu will too, eventually.

Ellsworth: How long?

Mulcahy: A month or two. And once he does he will play it straight. If he tried to operate in Luando Province he would find it hostile territory.

Scowcroft: The French have indicated to us privately that they will move to recognize the MPLA soon.\(^5\) So that will solve the helicopter problem.

Nelson: What about the British?

Sisco: They told us about the French, and they were candid about their not being able to stop them or a European Community ground swell.

Scowcroft: As you know, Secretary Kissinger plans a trip to the area at the end of March or early April. He will try to sort out where we stand with these countries. I’d like to suggest that the Working Group

\(^5\) See Document 174.
watch this daily and treat it as a day-to-day problem—what we do, where we go, etc.

Nelson: May we go ahead and support Savimbi?

Scowcroft: Bob (Ellsworth), you had some problem with this before. I’m going with what the President said. We can present a proposal to him for decision.

Ellsworth: I support Savimbi, but I’m not ready to approve this until we have a plan and a policy. As I recall our last meeting, State was going to come up with a policy paper and I would be pleased to see that.

Sisco: State has no paper. We have one but it has yet to get the Secretary’s stamp. But let me tell you what we have in mind, subject to the Secretary’s approval. We visualize immediate steps so as to try to moderate the adverse impact of this situation. And we are concerned particularly about Angola’s neighbors. With Angola, we could proceed to dribble in aid. No one at State feels we can go to the Congress and ask for anything more for Angola. Savimbi might get some aid from South Africa, and maybe from the French, but if the French recognize the MPLA, they probably won’t help any more. Our objective would be to try to redress the adverse impact. Now a problem I see is can all this wait until after Henry’s trip? I think that we can’t wait until then to go to the Congress for aid for Angola’s neighbors.

Ellsworth: Based on what you just said, what are we doing helping Savimbi?

Sisco: I do agree that his continued activity offers some political options.

Ellsworth: Like what?

Sisco: Some modest political accommodation.

Brown: It would help Zaire rally. I think it would be helping Zaire for us to continue to help Savimbi.

Scowcroft: No question. No doubt that Zaire at present wants us to help out with whatever we can do.

Sisco: What we are doing with Savimbi is de facto disengagement.

Nelson: He wants to continue.

Sisco: That’s about the only case you can make.

Ellsworth: Okay. If that’s what we are doing, then we must be prepared in a cold-blooded way to cut it off when the money runs out.

Scowcroft: Savimbi’s been told that, hasn’t he?

Nelson: Yes.

Sisco: Right.

Ellsworth: Well, we were talking earlier about June or July.
Scowcroft: It may be—depending upon how fast you spend what’s left.

Ellsworth: Well, there simply should be no tears when the time comes.

Nelson: We’d like permission to go to the French and get the helicopters back. If they expect us to pay for them, all we may get out of this is a bill if they lose one.

Brown: Didn’t we make it clear when we started this?

Nelson: No. I think we ought to go to them and say that we are not able to pay any more bills.

Scowcroft: Let’s presume that they have no more bills.

Nelson: We need to clarify this. It was not mentioned when we first made the arrangements.

Hyland: Who has control?

Nelson: The French.

Hyland: Why pay for them? We paid for the delivery, didn’t we?

Scowcroft: Yes, and we’ll have to pay to fly them back, too.

Hyland: Did the French pay?

Nelson: No.

Hyland: Who would pay for them if they gave them to Mobutu?

Nelson: We can’t.

Hyland: That’s probably what we ought to be doing, trying to turn over any equipment we have to Mobutu.

Scowcroft: I think you should tell the French what our problem is, and get the helicopters back on that basis. It is clear that we are not going to get any use out of them.

Nelson: I think we can handle this without directly raising the issue, just review what we are responsible for.

Scowcroft: If the French recognize the MPLA soon, that ought to make it easier to get them back.

Sisco: One thing I want to make clear, I hope that we are not going ahead on the assumption that the totality of the [dollar amount not declassified] has to go to Savimbi. We may need some at the end of the line for transition.

Nelson: We’ll go ahead on a modest scale.

Scowcroft: Keep some in reserve.

Nelson: The situation has changed, and I’m not sure we could get four planeloads in now.

Scowcroft: There’s nothing cheap about [dollar amount not declassified] You can do a lot with that. I recall what we did with the Kurds.

Nelson: Shall we say anything to the leaders, or wait?
Scowcroft: Before we do that we ought to get together with State on policy.

Sisco: A letter went out last night. We had to fuzz this. We said we were not going to cut anything off, but that we couldn’t do very much. Zaire will be talking to the French, Dutch, Germans and Belgians.

Scowcroft: Is everyone happy about Angola?

Ellsworth: Don’t put it that way!

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola].

Angola—Addendum

[1¼ pages not declassified]

176. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Embassy in France

Boston, February 14, 1976, 2215Z.

Secto 3022. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subj: France Plans to Recognize MPLA.

1. I am extremely disturbed by Sauvagnargues’ letter indicating that French recognition of the MPLA is imminent. I can appreciate that France has more at stake than many countries, wishes to keep in step with its former African colonies, and feels vulnerable because it has been involved with us in aiding the anti-MPLA forces in Angola. There is little point in wasting political capital with a close ally if the effort seems pointless. But I would hope that France might postpone its action for about a week until at least we have thought through our own position and been able to convey it to our friends in Africa and coordinate with our friends in Europe.

2. In transmitting my letter below on an urgent basis, you should explore with Sauvagnargues the possibility of postponing recognition in order to apply maximum pressure on the MPLA to make concessions to the viewpoint of half of Africa and much of Europe. You should stress with him that, in our belief, there is an inherent contradiction between the French Government’s proposed assertion to the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840086–1506. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to the Department. The Secretary was in Boston while his wife had surgery.

2 Not found.
MPLA that it attaches “le plus grand prix” to Soviet-Cuban withdrawal and its hasty, unconditional recognition. You should also stress that his move destroys the possibility for any meaningful approach to the MPLA by the countries of Africa and the world which are very prepared to see the MPLA lead an Angolan government but not as a Soviet-Cuban satellite.

3. You may tell Sauvagnargues that we are in the process of refining a policy toward Angola designed to bring maximum pressure to bear on the MPLA to make some concessions, using arguments of persuasion as much as withholding recognition and cooperation. We need a few days, however, to launch a new policy, which we believe will be much more effective than any “sauve qui peut” policy of hasty recognition, at least in limiting the damage inflicted on the Western position in Africa and around the world by our evident loss of will to stand up to a blatant Soviet-Cuban power play.

4. If it seems clear to you that there is no way to postpone recognition in any meaningful fashion, then the main thrust of your “more in sorrow . . .” remarks should be on the need for close consultation in the future, and cooperation in bolstering the shaky position of our remaining African friends.

5. Begin text: Dear Jean:

Your letter announcing France’s intention to recognize the Luanda regime reached me at a time when Angolan circumstances have filled me with deep concern and regret. I can only agree with you that we draw quite different conclusions from rather similar analyses of the situation.

The instant response of your government to the military victories secured on behalf of a minority regime by a Cuban expeditionary force, encouraged and equipped by Moscow, will, I fear, only help to drive home the lesson we have sought to avoid—that Communist intervention on behalf of Marxist allies in conflicts in the developing world is a paying proposition.

It has seemed to me that we could create a scenario, including aid to the neighboring states of Zaire and Zambia, which would have allowed the West to bargain its recognition and cooperation in exchange for concrete concessions in the area of Soviet and Cuban withdrawal and the establishment of some more representative government. But if we recognize first, and then ask for concessions, we are in the weak position of being a “demandeur” intervening in the internal affairs of a state we already recognize. And, as you imply very correctly in your letter, separate acts of recognition only serve to weaken the impact we might hope to achieve with such recognition through a more coordinated and hard-bargaining posture.
In our intense dialogue about Angola with many African leaders, some of them very close to France, we have found a strong desire to do something constructive to strengthen the forces opposed to the MPLA, and to protect moderate states from the sort of radical interference in their internal affairs exemplified by Angola. I am afraid that your action will not seem responsive to their concerns. But ultimately, of course, I recognize France must do what it considers to be in its best long-term interest.

I can agree with you that continued insurgency will tend to prolong a Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola. If you feel that French interests require such rapid recognition then I can only urge you not to throw away your influence by recognizing first—and then negotiating with empty hands. Could you not at least probe to see what concrete assurances you can elicit regarding the withdrawal of the Soviet-Cuban expeditionary force and steps toward a government of national reconciliation?

I need hardly tell you that Western credibility has suffered grievously as a result of US inability to come to the aid of moderate forces in Angola, and general Western European reluctance to get involved. I would like at least to thank France for having done more than any other European country to prevent what we see now happening. It seems to me that, if we are to contain the damage caused by what amounts to a Western defeat, then we must make early and serious moves to provide additional economic and military aid to the countries neighboring Angola, who remain our friends for the time being and which have been made so vulnerable by the MPLA victory. We will still wish to discuss this containment aspect of our Angolan policy with you.

In the meantime, we are working out a policy which we believe will provide us with more bargaining power in dealing with the MPLA than one of simple acquiescence in a Soviet/Cuban victory. I would sincerely hope that your government might find its way clear to postpone any final decision on recognition for about a week, giving us time to consult with our friends and allies and develop a more coherent regional containment strategy.

Whatever your final decision, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to comment on your forthcoming decision. I hope that we can remain in close touch on the Angolan question, even if our policies should now diverge.

Nancy is better and joins me in sending warm regards. Henry. End text.

Kissinger
177. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, February 16, 1976, 1558Z.

4652. For the Secretary from the Ambassador. Subject: France Plans to Recognize MPLA. Ref: Secto 03022.

Summary: Sauvagnargues received me at noon February 16 for review of Angola situation. I argued that it is important that we not give up our trump of diplomatic recognition precipitously before seeking to exercise maximum leverage on MPLA. At least we should wait a minimum time to develop a joint approach to the problem of the Soviet-Cuban presence. Sauvagnargues agreed that our objective in Angola is the same—stimulate Africa’s natural tendency to reject foreign domination. But Sauvagnargues disagreed with our analysis of how to do it. Recognition of reality of MPLA victory, Sauvagnargues feels, gives us opportunity to begin working with MPLA to encourage their taking distance from Soviets. Refusal to recognize only keeps the MPLA locked into Soviet-Cuban embrace. In addition, Giscard has already made commitment to African moderates that France will recognize MPLAs so as not to leave Houphouet and Ahidjo among others all alone and unsupported. Sauvagnargues agreed that while we disagree on recognition tactics, we must continue coordinating our efforts to bolster Zambia and Zaire, to keep moderates on our side, and to encourage African nationalism and moderation within the MPLA. End summary.

1. Sauvagnargues began by reading your letter (reftel). I followed that up with the argument that we must maintain maximum pressure on MPLA by holding back recognition until we can prepare an appropriate program of containment for the Angola area. By conceding recognition first, we weaken our position and give the MPLA every incentive to maintain their solidarity with the Cubans. If we withhold recognition, we give the MPLA a reason to begin separating themselves from the Cubans and Soviets, and give the moderate Africans and Europeans time to work out a plan designed to weaken the Soviet position.

2. Sauvagnargues replied that the situation is both delicate and complicated. Like the USG, France is not anxious to recognize a fait ac-
compli in Angola. But from that point, the French analysis differs from ours. The MPLA victory is a reality. Western options are limited. Support for a guerilla war is out of the question. It would only prolong the fighting and deepen the Soviet involvement by maintaining MPLA dependence. Essentially, we have a choice between recognizing the MPLA first and bargaining afterward, or bargaining first and recognizing afterward. Sauvagnargues said that if we attempt to bargain first, we really do not have the leverage we think we do. We worked against the MPLA, and the MPLA knows that we worked against them. Our refusal to recognize the MPLA will have absolutely no effect beyond driving them more deeply into Soviet dependency.

3. Even more central than the previous arguments, Sauvagnargues emphasized, is the position of the African moderates. Earlier, we asked the moderates to be hard on the MPLA, and they responded positively. Now the Ivory Coast and Cameroon have recognized. Even Mobutu told Giscard in a recent message that he has no objection to France recognizing the MPLA. All Mobutu asks is a guarantee that the MPLA not unleash the Katangese gendarmes. The African moderates supported us when we needed them. We cannot let them down now. We must stay with them. In fact, Giscard wanted to announce recognition of the MPLA on Saturday, but agreed to consult first with the US, UK and the FRG. In effect, Giscard has made a commitment to Houphouet to join in the recognition of the MPLA.

4. Finally, Sauvagnargues said that if there is any chance that Neto and the moderates in the MPLA will distance themselves from the Soviets, it is important that we start working to stimulate this natural African reflex right away. This can only be done through recognition and communications with the MPLA.

5. I told Sauvagnargues that it is clear we agree on fundamental objectives. We just differ on the potential effect of recognition. I suggested that the GOF take some time to reflect and allow us time to come up with a broad plan of action that would protect our position with our African friends.

6. Sauvagnargues then argued that the act of recognition is not all that significant. We must separate the act of recognition from the real leverage we can exercise on the MPLA which will come from their need for a Western economic presence. I countered by pointing out that quick recognition will only give the MPLA the feeling they can get what they want from the West without ejecting the Soviets. Sauvagnargues argued back that the use of recognition as a bargaining lever has never worked, especially when the object of the exercise has just won a military victory to come to power. When Angola was dis-
cussed by the Big Four Foreign Ministers in Brussels,\(^3\) Sauvagnargues said, a prolonged armed resistance was expected. This did not come about, and the issue of recognition is no longer relevant. Moreover, Giscard has made a commitment to Houphouet, and GOF recognition really cannot wait. Sauvagnargues said he was impressed by the Brazilians who told him that the MPLA will quickly understand that Soviet assistance is cumbersome, and will be looking for a way out through contacts with the West.

7. In conclusion, I argued that the GOF should give Washington at least a week’s leeway to develop a plan that will help us pursue our common objective in Angola. Sauvagnargues said he would transmit our request and arguments to Giscard, but did not feel that the President would reverse his decision. He stressed, however, his complete agreement with the need to develop a coordinated approach to an MPLA-ruled Angola, especially the requirement that Zambia and Zaire be bolstered both economically and militarily.

8. **Comment:** I do not see much hope that Giscard will reverse his decision to recognize the MPLA within the next day or so. Apart from his disagreement with us on the impact of recognition, Giscard’s commitment to the moderate Africans is crucial to this decision. I feel, however, that we can continue to work closely and effectively with the French on efforts to encourage the MPLA regime to separate themselves from the Cubans and Soviets.

Rush

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\(^3\) See footnote 5, Document 147.
178. **Message From President Ford to French President Giscard d’Estaing**

Washington, February 17, 1976, 2300Z.

WH 60214. Deliver at opening of business.

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate your having provided me, in your message of February 12, with advance notification that you intend shortly to recognize the People’s Republic of Angola (MPLA).

I understand the considerations which have led you to this decision, but I do not believe that the attitudes of the MPLA are likely to be affected in any manner by the rapidity with which we take steps to recognize it. The failure of resistance in Angola in the face of massive Soviet and Cuban intervention is a geopolitical fact which cannot be ignored. Therefore, the United States intends to move slowly and with careful deliberation. In the meantime, we shall do our best to rally both U.S. and world public opinion against what is taking place in Angola.

Again, Mr. President, I appreciate the courtesy of your advance notification.

Sincerely, Gerald R. Ford

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2 Document 174.
3 France recognized the MPLA government on February 17.
Washington, February 18, 1976, 0400Z.

38732. For Chargé Walker from Ambassador Schaufele. Subject: Message for President Mobutu from the Secretary.

1. You are to seek an appointment with President Mobutu as soon as possible and drawing upon the following talking points, explain the Secretary’s position on Angola and assistance to Zaire.

2. You are to inform him of (A) the firmness of U.S. policy, (B) our determination to continue to work for the withdrawal of the Cuban expeditionary force from Angola and the diminution of Soviet influence there, (C) our current efforts to delay Western European recognition of the MPLA, (D) our concurrent efforts to alert our friends in the European Community to the urgent need of Zambia and Zaire for economic and security assistance and (E) our policy to do everything feasible to increase our own level of assistance to Zaire in both the economic and security fields.

3. Talking points:

A. The USG still believes that the common policy we pursued in Angola these past several months in an effort to bolster the majority liberation movements in Angola was correct.

B. The U.S. shares with President Mobutu the bitter disappointment we know he feels at the failure of our joint efforts.

C. We sincerely regret that, in the end, we could not provide the support which we believe was needed. But we trust that many have learned from this experience lessons that will not be lost in the future.

D. For our part we are determined to continue to oppose further Soviet/Cuban intervention in Africa wherever it may occur.

E. Currently the U.S. is endeavoring to persuade its friends in the European Community to withhold recognition of MPLA in order not to appear to “reward” so readily this minority government imposed on Angola by Cuban troops and Soviet arms. Realizing that recognition by the European Community is inevitable, however, we are asking Community members to link their recognition to the withdrawal of the Cubans and the minimizing of Soviet influence and to an MPLA policy of reconciliation.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 7, Zaire—State Department Telegrams, From SecState—Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Mulcahy, cleared by Kissinger (per Secto 4013), and approved by Schaufele.
F. In our approaches to the Europeans we have taken special pains to alert Community members to the serious economic and security problems faced now by Zaire and to urge that they provide all possible help to Zaire as it confronts potential threats by the MPLA regime in Angola. We are stressing with them the need for building up the strength of the Zairian economy at home to enable Zaire to withstand attempts to undermine its security.

G. The United States has no early plans for the recognition of the MPLA regime; on the contrary it is prepared, in consultation with Angola’s neighbors, to continue to provide whatever assistance it can to UNITA as long as it is able to maintain a credible resistance to the MPLA.

H. We would greatly value at this juncture the President’s assessment of how Zaire expects to pursue its connections with Angola in the short and mid-term.²

I. Will he continue to aid FNLA and UNITA and support their resistance?

J. The U.S. is prepared to take into account the special strains on the Zairian economy and security caused by events in Angola. The U.S. would be prepared to begin a dialogue to discuss Zaire’s needs.

Ingersoll

² In telegram 1512 from Kinshasa, February 20, the Embassy reported Mobutu’s response to Kissinger’s message. Mobutu pressed for more military and economic assistance to guard against a possible attack from Angola; intimated that he would continue to provide assistance to Roberto and Savimbi; and stated that he would not recognize the MPLA in the near future. (Ibid.)

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180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia¹

Washington, February 18, 1976, 0401Z.

38733. For Ambassador from Schaufele. Subject: Message to Kaunda.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 8, Zambia—State Department Telegrams, From SecState—Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Mulcahy, cleared by Kissinger (per Secto 4013), and approved by Schaufele.
1. You are instructed to seek a meeting with President Kaunda at the earliest possible time. You should make the following points:

—The United States not only shares with Zambia disappointment over the outcome in Angola but also wishes to express to President Kaunda our appreciation for the concern we know he feels over the prospect of an unfriendly Soviet-supported government on his western frontier.

—The US remains firm in its policy to exert every possible effort toward the withdrawal of the Cuban expeditionary force and the minimizing of Soviet influence in Angola. It wishes to work with all other concerned governments to this end.

—In recent days we have taken steps to communicate to all members of the European Community our concern for the future stability of central and southern Africa because of the existence in Angola of a sizable Cuban expeditionary force and a large and potentially troublesome Soviet and Soviet-bloc presence.

—The USG is anxious to have President Kaunda’s assessment of the nature of Zambia’s short-term relations with the MPLA regime. Does the President believe Zambia will feel it necessary to extend recognition to the MPLA government? If so, what would be the timing?

—If and when Zambia recognizes the MPLA, what will be Zambia’s attitude toward UNITA? Will it actively help Savimbi continue his guerrilla operations? Will it allow UNITA to use Zambian territory as a sanctuary?

—The USG still has resources that it can make available to UNITA, in the full realization that the continuance of such aid will be increasingly difficult as the weeks pass.

—We are asking our European friends to consider seriously at their forthcoming meetings the urgent need for assistance to the economies and to the security of both Zaire and Zambia.

—Officers in Washington benefited greatly from recent talks with Messrs. Kuwani and Walusiku in gaining an appreciation of the scope of the economic problems which confront Zambia. The USG is concerned with the time factor in the light of the urgency and magnitude of Zambia’s needs as well as the pressing need to present requests for US assistance in the next few weeks to the Congress which is about to begin consideration of next year’s foreign assistance budget. We would appreciate any impetus President Kaunda can give to his government in formulating the requests it is likely to make of the USG. Senators Humphrey and Clark feel encouraged about the chances of success our aid requests on behalf of Zambia are likely to have in the Congress.

—We trust the President realizes that the US is not in a position to meet all the possible needs of Zambia, but it wishes to play an appro-
priate part. Therefore, we would welcome information on present Zambian assessment of reactions of others (including IBRD, IMF and other governments) to Zambian approach. We also hope that Zambia will take steps as early as possible to coordinate donor activities and contribution to avoid duplication and to insure that each donor is called upon for the sort of aid that it can provide best. We will continue to encourage other donors and to apprise them of our perception of Zambia’s needs.  

Ingersoll

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2 Telegram 674 from Lusaka, March 18, reported Kaunda’s appreciation for on-going U.S. support, including economic assistance for Zambia. (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 8, Zambia—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (3))


SUBJECT

Military Matériel Sent to Zaire Under the Angola Covert Paramilitary Program

1. A total of about [dollar amount not declassified] has been committed to date for ordnance and related matériel under the Angola covert paramilitary program. This amount represents:

—The cost of items sent to Zaire or about to be sent to Zaire for transshipment to the forces of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA);

—items given Zaire to replace similar items Zaire donated to FNLA and UNITA;

—and matériel given Zaire in accordance with discussions with President Mobutu which served as an incentive to increase Zaire’s support for FNLA and UNITA.

2. Of the [dollar amount not declassified] total, about [dollar amount not declassified] has been spent or earmarked for matériel for FNLA and

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 104, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
UNITA. The remaining [dollar amount not declassified] has been spent on matériel sent to Kinshasa specifically for the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ). This matériel for FAZ included such items as twelve M113 armored personnel carriers, 9,000 M–16 rifles, and eighteen 4.2-inch mortars.

3. It would appear that the [dollar amount not declassified] spent to replenish FAZ stocks and to encourage Zaire in its support of the FNLA and UNITA was worthwhile: President Mobutu has sent to Angola military matériel from his own stocks worth [dollar amount not declassified]

4. Of the matériel already sent to Zaire for transshipment to Angola, all had been transshipped as of 18 February except 180 M–79 grenade launchers worth [dollar amount not declassified] 700 LAW shoulder-fired antitank weapons worth [dollar amount not declassified] and 18 SA–7 surface-to-air missiles worth [1 line not declassified] (Thirty-two SA–7 missiles were deployed to Angola.) The grenade launchers and LAW’s are expected to be sent to Angola shortly.

5. Matériel not yet sent to Zaire for transshipment to UNITA forces in Angola was described in an attachment to Working Group Paper No. 153. These supplies represent the last remaining items in the pipeline under the approved $31.7 million covert program, and are valued at [dollar amount not declassified]

2 Dated February 18. (Ibid.)

182. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, March 12, 1976, 10 a.m.

Subject

Operations Advisory Group Meeting, 12 March 1976, 10:00 a.m.

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft, Chairman; Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger; Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld; Director of Central Intelligence George Bush.

1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.
Substitute Member Present: Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. General W. Y. Smith vice Chairman of the JCS General George Brown.


Substitute Observer Present: Deputy Director of Office of Management and Budget Paul O’Neill vice Director of OMB James Lynn.

Also Present: Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William G. Hyland; Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert F. Ellsworth; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele; Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, OMB, Donald G. Ogilvie; Deputy Chief Africa Division, CIA, [name not declassified] NSC Senior Staff Officer for Africa Harold Horan.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]


Bush: We have a short report here, with recommendations.2 The Popular Movement has moved ahead and consolidated its control, and has now imposed its authority in most of the urban centers. Incidentally, this is [name not declassified] from my office who is helping me. (Continued briefing.)

Scowcroft: Now what are your recommendations?

Bush: (Read recommendations from paper.)

Kissinger: How much is involved?

Bush: We still have about 90 tons of material—small arms, demolitions.

Smith: Recoilless rifles.

Rumsfeld: I read what you’ve written here, but what does it mean? Does this mean no more weapons?

Bush: No, not necessarily. Let me read through all these recommendations and you’ll see. Savimbi might be able to buy some using our funds. (Resumed reading.)

Rumsfeld: [1 line not declassified]

Bush: [1½ lines not declassified]

Rumsfeld: Now go through these again and tell me what they really mean. Go back to the first one.

Scowcroft: No additional arms shipments?

Bush: Not from the U.S. Isn’t that what that says?

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2 A March 5 paper entitled “Recommended Course of Action for Continued Disengagement from Covert Activities in Angola.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Box 13, Scowcroft Chronological File (A))
Rumsfeld: You said something awhile ago about buying arms elsewhere.

[name not declassified]: Savimbi could use our funds to purchase arms on the market.

Kissinger: Can we cool this room off?
Rumsfeld: They are trying to create a jungle atmosphere for us.
Bush: We can’t deliver anything from the U.S., so this money will enable him to buy anything he needs.
Smith: We had planned to deliver, but we can’t follow through.
Horan: DOD can’t use its aircraft because it would be spending FY–76 funds.

Rumsfeld: I understand all that. What you are saying is that we are not going to deliver any more arms. If he wants some he will have to go out and buy them.

Bush: Right. Savimbi can buy arms from elsewhere.
Schaufele: You could delete the words “from the U.S.” and that would take care of it.

Kissinger: What are we talking about? Are we saying we can’t do this because of the Tunney Amendment or because it is the right thing to do?

Bush: Both.

Kissinger: If the Tunney Amendment says we can’t do this, that’s the law and that’s one thing, but the money we are spending is not affected by that.
Scowcroft: We can’t get the things there via Defense aircraft.
Bush: Overflight problems.
Horan: If a charter aircraft is used it will have to land in Ascension or Monrovia and, as I understand it, it will have to file a bill of lading . . .
Schaufele: A manifest.
Horan: . . . a manifest which will list the destination and the cargo as arms.

[name not declassified]: There are political problems with that.

Kissinger: I know that we are most moral—to a degree not rivaled by anyone in history, but to tell me that the U.S. would declare in a bill of lading that we were delivering arms to Zaire! Now really! What are we going to do when we really want to ship arms to Zaire? And this is something that could come up in six months or so. If we allow something like this to stop us then we are going to have a monumental

\footnote{See footnote 2, Document 151, and footnote 3, Document 157.}
problem. What can we tell Zaire—that we have these arms but we can’t deliver them? Now are you trying to tell me that we can’t deliver arms?

Ellsworth: There are really two points here. First, if you are talking about using DOD aircraft to deliver arms to Zaire for Angola, then because of the Tunney Amendment the answer is “no”. Two, if you are asking could CIA charter an aircraft and deliver the arms, the answer is a qualified “no.” They propose to give them the money and let them go out and purchase arms from wherever they can—Spain or somewhere.

Kissinger: But how will Spain get the arms there? If the great, powerful U.S. can’t deliver them, how can we expect Spain to do it?

[name not declassified]: They could go to an arms broker.

Kissinger: I think that this negative approach might have an adverse impact on Zaire. I just can’t accept that we are cowed by a small African nation like Liberia.

Ellsworth: If we got the arms over to Zaire, would Mobutu put them on into Angola?

Schaufele: Probably not.

Kissinger: That would depend a lot on what we told Zaire. It depends upon the general situation. Are we trying to stop further erosion? I can understand writing off Angola, but not Zaire and Zambia. We’ve got to do what we can to reassure them.

Rumsfeld: Does Savimbi need arms?

Bush: He needs money to buy arms and food.

Scowcroft: He’d probably prefer dollars to a shipment.

Bush: He wants dollars, but he also wants ammunition and arms.

Kissinger: If he gets money he still has the problem of getting arms.

Rumsfeld: It depends on what he wants money for.

Kissinger: Whether Zaire transships depends on what we tell Mobutu to a considerable extent. Zaire means something to us. I don’t necessarily favor shipping arms to Angola, I think we’ve had it with Angola, but I am concerned about Mobutu and what we do with him. We need to boost his morale. We must not permit things to slide any more in Africa. We have to show an interest in propping up Zaire and Zambia. We must not let them think that we are pulling out of Africa.

Rumsfeld: We’ve got to build up Mobutu’s confidence.

Bush: [1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: In dealing with Mobutu, we’ve got to reassure him. It is more important now than before.

Hyland: If you want to help Mobutu, why don’t you take the whole [dollar amount not declassified] and give it to him?

Bush: We can’t do that. That’s not what we got the money for. This money was given to us for Angola.
Kissinger: What we do with Mobutu I think we should do overtly. There’s nothing that covert action should do here. The [dollar amount not declassified] won’t do the job. We must go to the Congress and defend what we ask for. Covert action would not meet the problem here. It is not the answer. I lean toward not shipping arms anymore, so my position here is strange—but I think we must make the decision for the right reason. We need to help Mobutu. We ought to talk to him.

Schaufele: Mobutu may say he wants out.

Kissinger: Fine, but at least we will get something out of it.

Bush: Our concern with giving money to Savimbi is that he not spend it all at once.

Kissinger: Well, my concern is that you give him [dollar amount not declassified] but he can’t do anything with it—he will still have to seek the help he needs. He’d have to talk to Mobutu or Kaunda, and then he’d have to shop in Spain or somewhere, and then get delivery.

Bush: [1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: How can he buy anything?

[name not declassified]: He’d go to an arms broker, an arms dealer. This would get CIA out of this.

Bush: Zaire is still in.

Scowcroft: Why are you so anxious to get CIA out of contact?

[name not declassified]: Not out of contact, but out of arms involvement. As a matter of fact, the financial aid given out in increments would help us stay in contact, collect intelligence, monitor and [less than 1 line not declassified]

Ogilvie: [3 lines not declassified]

Scowcroft: But what we are talking about here is money that is not from the FY–76 Defense appropriation. So to apply the Tunney rule ex post facto is not right.

O’Neill: Don’t the Congress and the general population expect that we have stopped our involvement in Angola? I think that there would a very negative reaction if it were to become known that we were still involved.

Kissinger: Can’t you give the [dollar amount not declassified] to Mobutu to dole out?

Rumsfeld: With [dollar amount not declassified] Savimbi could spend it on anything.

Scowcroft: The amount is proposed to keep him alive and to meet his immediate needs.

[name not declassified]: There are plenty of brokers who are in the arms business.
Scowcroft: He’d have to do it all himself.
Schaufele: Hasn’t he bought things before?
[name not declassified]: Yes.
Hyland: This payment for logistics would be to help him get delivery?
[name not declassified]: Yes. For example, if we had a white elephant in McLean, this would provide the dollars necessary to hire the transportation to get it delivered.
Scowcroft (to Schaufele): I understand that you have some problem with the increments.
Schaufele: Well, we are saying on the one hand that we are shutting off the program, but on the other we will continue to dole out money. I just want to be able to report to the Congress that we are out of this, that it is over.
Bush: [5½ lines not declassified]
Schaufele: That might be satisfactory.
Kissinger: What if there is a last gasp?
Bush: Well, we don’t think that he can do anything with it to sustain anything.
[name not declassified]: We see payments over the next three months of [dollar amount not declassified] increments with the goal of paying it all out by the end of the Fiscal Year.
Horan: The latest indication is that Zaire sees a guerrilla war going on but that it will not go on for a long time.
Rumsfeld: What does the fourth recommendation mean? Two more months of logistical support?
Bush: This refers to arrangements they may make to get things shipped by air.
Rumsfeld: Transportation for their shipments.
[name not declassified]: Let me illustrate the derivation of that figure. We estimate [dollar amount not declassified] for each shipment of food and supplies. For example, Savimbi ordered some Rhodesian K-rations—some dry food packets to sustain his people in the field for a few days. He had a transportation problem. He had to pay out $111,000 to get them flown in. If he wants to buy rice or something he must have funds to pay for the transportation to get the material delivered.
Rumsfeld: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Scowcroft: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Bush: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Rumsfeld: Who coordinated on this proposal for Defense?
Smith: Packard and Colonel Fish for OSD.
Bush: [3 lines not declassified]
Scowcroft: Why bring back six?
[name not declassified]: This is to satisfy a request for Defense researchers who are trying to develop a counter to it. They think they need more for testing purposes.

Hyland: Why don’t we give them to Mobutu?
[name not declassified]: [1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Scowcroft: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Smith: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: Give maximum to Zaire, that’s where we have a foreign policy problem.
Bush: [2 lines not declassified]
Smith: I’m just not familiar with what they need.
Scowcroft: Well, that can be worked out, but with the maximum to Mobutu. Is there anything left in Zaire?
[name not declassified]: Yes. Our agreement was that we would replace anything that he forwarded to Angola, and we have yet to settle the account, but if we turn over what we have there I believe it will come out about even. We have some valuable communications equipment which will interest him. I think that we got more than we gave.

Scowcroft: Well, do we owe him?
[name not declassified]: I think it will be a draw. We haven’t closed the account yet, and the commo gear will be a big item.

Scowcroft: If we get into a bind, some of that [dollar amount not declassified] could be used.
Smith: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]
[name not declassified]: There is some to go to Mobutu himself.

Kissinger: I think that should be handled so that the Ambassador can go to Mobutu [less than 1 line not declassified] He could explain that we have this material to turn over to him and use that to establish our continuing interest in his welfare. (To Schaefe) I want you to send him a cable covering three things: that the Ambassador should make this contact, that we want to deliver these materials to Mobutu, and that we are studying how we can help him in the future and that something will be decided soon.

Horan: The French left their helicopters for Mobutu.
Kissinger: Good.
Scowcroft: Anything else to add to these recommendations? If not, okay. Then we approve them.  

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4 A March 17 memorandum for the record on Angola by Ratliff noted the President’s approval of the recommendations. (National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings)

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183. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Bush to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (Mahon)¹


Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to the Committee’s request of 16 March 1976, enclosed is a rundown on the expenditures of Agency funds on the Angola program dating from November to the present. There is also enclosed a paper relating to the effect of the Tunney Amendment on this matter.²

If we can be of further assistance to the Subcommittee, please let me know.

Sincerely,

George Bush³

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¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 104, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive.

² Attached but not printed. The March 18 report on the impact of the Tunney Amendment on the Angolan operation by CIA General Counsel John Warner stated: “Under the Tunney Amendment (a) the Agency could not obligate any additional FY 76 funds for further covert action in or related to Angola without specific legislation appropriating funds for such an activity, and (b) the reprogramming of DOD funds for transfer to the Agency and subsequent obligation of these funds for covert action in Angola was prohibited.”

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
SUBJECT
Termination of the Angolan Covert Action Program—Key Briefings, Decisions and Status of Funds

1. The total funds approved for the Angolan Covert Action Program are $31,700,000. The final increment of [dollar amount not declassified] was approved by two consecutive 40 Committee Meetings—14 and 21 November 1975—by the President on 28 November 1975 and released by the Office of Management and Budget on 4 December 1975. The CIA Comptroller allotted the additional [dollar amount not declassified] to the DDO on 10 December 1975.

2. Nine days later when the Tunney Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act of 1976 was passed by the Senate on 19 December 1975, a total of an estimated [dollar amount not declassified] had been committed to specific planned purposes leaving an estimated balance of uncommitted funds (or funds for which no specific planned use had been as yet decided) of [dollar amount not declassified]

3. By 27 January 1976, the date the House concurred in the Senate Amendment, the estimated total of the committed funds was [dollar amount not declassified] leaving an estimated balance of [dollar amount not declassified] as uncommitted or not designated for a specific purpose.

4. On 9 February 1976, the President signed the Defense Appropriations Act for 1976 (Public Law 94–212) into law. The total committed funds (computed as of 3 February for the 40 Committee meeting of that date) were still [dollar amount not declassified] leaving an estimated balance of [dollar amount not declassified]

5. Subsequently, the CIA was directed to propose a course of action to the Operations Advisory Group, which was designed to terminate the operation with a minimum amount of human suffering.

6. This included cancelling all airlift of ordnance in the pipeline from the United States, terminating all third country national recruitment, cancelling plans under consideration for improved communications, discontinuing all requisitions for military equipment, and terminating all other planned logistical support facilities.

7. These funds have been redesignated to provide terminal financial support to UNITA and FNLA to include for example purchase of food, clothing, shelter and resettlement of their adherents. None of this involved further supply of U.S. arms to Angola. The funds required for direct termination purposes, total $3,849,964. This reformulation resulted in identifying [dollar amount not declassified] for return to the CIA Reserve Fund.
8. The CIA General Counsel and the CIA Comptroller found the proposed expenditure of the $3,849,964 contained in the OPAG Proposal for use in termination of the Angolan Covert Action Program in no way contravenes the Tunney Amendment. (See separate attachment for details.) The plan has been approved by the President.

4 Attached but not printed.

184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Cape Town

Washington, March 19, 1976, 0063Z.


1. During meeting with Secretary March 17 UK Ambassador Ramsbotham informed us of Soviet approach to HMG concerning South African withdrawal from Angola.

2. According to Soviets, SAG authorities now ready to get in touch with MPLA but latter did not feel able to establish direct contact. Therefore since MPLA desires settle question of peaceful withdrawal of South African troops they had approached Soviet Government in order that South African authorities could be informed the following:

A. Direct contacts between Angola and SAG are impossible as long as SAG troops remain in the territory of Angola.

B. Hydroelectric power station on the Cunene River is the property of the people of Angola and it has no intention whatsoever of destroying it.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 6, South Africa—State Department Telegrams, From SecState—Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Schaufele and approved by Kissinger. Repeated Immediate to USUN and repeated to London.

2 Kissinger met with Ramsbotham in his office, March 17, 6:20–7:05 p.m. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820117–1574)
C. The Government of the People’s Republic of Angola does not wish to harm the people of Namibia by depriving it of electricity supply.

D. The Government of the People’s Republic of Angola respects UN resolutions on Namibia.

E. The Government of the People’s Republic of Angola wishes South African troops to pull back from the border with Angola.

3. Your British colleague has been instructed to inform SAG of above approach and will urge it to accept message as assurances it has sought from MPLA in order to withdraw. (British assume assurance in point C includes water supply for Namibia and point E to mean withdrawal of South African forces to unspecified but not necessarily considerable distance from the Angolan frontier.)

4. UK will suggest, for public consumption, that SAG state it has decided to withdraw forces on receipt of satisfactory assurances privately conveyed but not at liberty to disclose. British realize that this will not hold up long.

5. UK plans to inform EC–9 partners of above at Political Directors meeting at Luxembourg March 18.

6. You should inform SAG³ that UK has informed us of Soviet démarche. We understand African group at UN plans begin Angolan debate⁴ March 22 while SAG wishes it delayed to March 27. According to British, current Chairman African UN group said that public statement by SAG of its intention to withdraw within short time would obviate necessity for SC meeting even if actual withdrawal occurs later in week of March 22.

7. You should inform SAG that although we realize point E is a troublesome one with which we do not associate ourselves, we concur in British recommendation and urge SA to announce its withdrawal from Angola to be completed within one week.

Kissinger

³ No record of a meeting has been found.
185. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Mulcahy) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Angola

As a result of a CIA briefing on March 22 of the Senate and House Defense and Appropriations Subcommittees, we may shortly face renewed accusations of continuing a “covert war in violation of the intent of Congress.”

CIA owes the Government of Zaire [dollar amount not declassified] to reimburse it for the loss last week of an Air Zaire F–27 aircraft destroyed on the airstrip of Gago Coutinho in southern Angola where the plane was unloading food for UNITA forces. A Cuban-piloted MIG–21 caused the damage. CIA lawyers were concerned about reimbursing Zaire without first discussing it with the Congress since there had been no previous agreement that money could be spent for damaged aircraft. CIA Director Bush decided in consultation with the lawyers that Congress should be consulted, and he is said to have received clearance for Congressional consultation from the White House.

Only in the case of Congressman Mahon of the Defense Subcommittee did the discussion reportedly go beyond the narrow question of reimbursing Air Zaire. It would appear that Mahon followed up on the March 22 briefing and asked Director Bush to appear in person and when he and General Walters could not do so, met with William Nelson on March 23. Mahon, flanked by staff members Snodgrass and Preston, accused CIA of being “a law unto itself” and of failing to respect the intent of Congress to cease all further contributions to the Angolan war. Having been told in January that only [dollar amount not declassified] remained unexpended, Mahon could not be convinced that CIA was in fact in the final phase of its operations. In response to his detailed questioning, Mahon was made privy to virtually all of the details regarding the disengagement program approved at the March 12 meeting of the Operations Advisory Group, including the fact that [dollar amount not declassified] are to be funneled to Savimbi and [dollar amount not declassified] used for the final air shipments to Savimbi’s forces. Mahon gave every indication of being furious and threatened to

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2 See Document 182.
take the issue to the public. He agreed not to do so until at least next week when Director Bush has been requested to appear before the full Defense Subcommittee. A time for the meeting has not yet been set pending the return of Bush to Washington on Friday, March 26, when he must decide how to handle Mahon’s challenge.

It seems to us we could, and should have avoided consulting with Congress on this reimbursement question. It is difficult to imagine that the details of this phasing out operation will not become public property, particularly if Bush appears before the full Defense Subcommittee. Not only has the Agency but also the Administration left itself open to renewed sharp public criticism and heightened suspicions regarding our clandestine support for insurgency in Angola. Renewed debate in Congress risks complicating approval of increased economic and military assistance for Zaire and Zambia. Publicity will also embarrass Mobutu in his efforts to normalize relations with the MPLA. And, finally, even if our legal case is impeccable, as our lawyers have at least assured us, the political reality of Mahon’s reaction would make it very unwise for CIA to proceed to disburse the [dollar amount not declassified] either directly or indirectly to Savimbi.

Even if Mahon and his aides could be persuaded to keep what they know to themselves, it seems likely that some members of the other three oversight committees will ask themselves what the Air Zaire plane was doing in southern Angola. The argument that we are merely providing UNITA with food and the possibility of resettlement will cut little ice, if Mahon’s reaction is any criterion.

The only hope we have, and it is a slim one, is to have Bush persuade Mahon that the Agency is indeed phasing out its final operations in Angola and a full subcommittee hearing could affect US national interests adversely.

**Recommendation:**

That you telephone Bush, indicate our unhappiness over the decision to go to the Congressional committees and urge him to explain in some detail to Mahon and perhaps other key members of the Defense Subcommittee the importance of not renewing domestic debate over covert aid to Angola.³

³ Kissinger initialed his approval.
186. Report Prepared by the Working Group on Angola


At a meeting of the Working Group on 24 March 1976, the following topics were discussed:

1. Military

A MIG–21 rocket attack destroyed an Air Zaire Fokker-27 at Gago Coutinho, Angola. The aircraft was offloading foodstuffs for UNITA. The airport at Ninda was also attacked. Savimbi is believed to be currently in the area of Sessa.

The Zambian Government has released a previously impounded UNITA Fokker-27 aircraft, but the Pearl Air Viscount is still being held and the crew is under arrest.

The FNLA is conducting practically no military activities in northern Angola. There are some FNLA troops still in the vicinity of Fort Republica. The FNLA office in Kinshasa has been closed. Its major concern is the refugee problem.

Chipenda’s force has been broken up: About 2,800 are now with UNITA; about 700 are with the MPLA; and about 3,000 remaining loyal to Chipenda are under the protection of the South African military in Namibia.

There are reports of pockets of guerrilla activity throughout Angola. About 100 UNITA troops turned themselves over to the MPLA at Luso.

The Effect of Angolan Involvement on South Africa

The South African involvement in Angola cost South Africa 31 dead and about 200 wounded. The South African troops appear to have left Angola with little respect for the Cubans as fighters, and with the belief that they could have won militarily had they used heavier ground arms and air power.

Cuban Involvement and Soviet and Cuban Shipments to Angola

The combined Cuban and Soviet material sent to Angola in February 1976 is estimated to be $125 million (U.S. equivalent costs), bringing the total Soviet and Cuban aid to $400 million (including matériel, maintenance and transportation). The total of February deliveries is higher than January with less emphasis on ammunition and

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 104, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
more on food. The first photographic confirmation of MIG–21’s to Angola was made in mid-February 1976—satellite photographs of MIG–21 crates on board a Soviet ship.

One thousand five hundred (1,500) Cuban troops arrived in February bringing their presence to 13,500. Flights from Cuba continued every other day during the month of February. Some Cuban families have arrived in Angola. Only one flight from the USSR was reported during the same period. Of sixteen ship arrivals, twelve were Soviet and four Cuban.

_Cuban Presence Elsewhere in Africa_

An undetermined number of Cubans are serving in Mozambique as military advisors; there is, however, no evidence of Cuban combat troops. The Prime Minister of Mozambique admitted the presence of Cubans to the British Ambassador. Cuban technicians have been reported to be assembling MIGs in Mozambique. Rhodesian air and group raids against guerrilla camps in Mozambique might lead Mozambique to request Cuban troops to aid in air defense, including both anti-aircraft weapons and fighter aircraft.

There are different views concerning the number of Cuban troops in Somalia from 30 to 2,000. The _Christian Science Monitor_ quoted State Department sources that 500 Cuban troops were being transferred from Angola to Somalia. (Efforts are being made to get more precise information through various means of collection.)

2. _Disengagement_

Mobutu progressively decreased the level of his demands for indemnification of a Fokker-27 aircraft on charter from Air Zaire. He first asked for a replacement in the form of a Boeing 737 aircraft, then for $2 million and, more recently, seems amenable to $600,000, which would be a fair indemnification. In view of the amount and its implications for disengagement process, the DCI requested that the House Appropriations Committee be consulted.

The House Appropriations Committee staff was briefed on 23 March. Chairman Mahon of the Committee expressed great concern that CIA was expending funds on Angola so long after the Tunney Amendment had passed and requested an explanation. Chairman Mahon appeared to hold the view that any expenditures after 9 February 1976 were illegal. He also stated that all expenditures should have ceased immediately upon House passage on 27 January 1976 of an amendment similar to the Tunney Amendment.

All further expenditures have been suspended pending clarification of the funding problem with the House Appropriations Com-
mittee. The Surveys and Investigation Staff of the House Appropriations Committee is now investigating the issue.

The position of the CIA Legal Counsel is that under the Tunney Amendment expenditure of the full $31.7 million approved from earlier appropriations is legal and that the disengagement plan as approved by the Operations Advisory Group is also legal. No new programs have been undertaken, but funds within the existing program were shifted to facilitate disengagement.

The disengagement plan as approved by the Operations Advisory Group provides for the following termination payments:

- To UNITA [dollar amount not declassified]
- To FNLA [dollar amount not declassified]
- To satisfy final claims of air carriers [dollar amount not declassified]
- To wind up administrative expenses [dollar amount not declassified]
- Returned to Agency reserve fund [dollar amount not declassified]

The plan also provides that the eighteen SA–7 missiles are to be turned over to Zaire. This has been done.

**French Technicians**

Of the twenty French military technicians, two may have been killed (names and details are not yet known). Eighteen were evacuated to Runtu along with some stray mercenaries including an American named Perez. Four of the French have since left Runtu. [2 lines not declassified] The technicians expressed dissatisfaction with the UNITA troops for fleeing under attack by MIG aircraft. Savimbi is unhappy with the technicians for departing Angola.

**3. Political Developments**

**Position of Zambia**

The UNITA Fokker-27 has been released. The UNITA Viscount will probably be released. The Fokker-27, formerly a TAAG aircraft, could be impounded by Zambia for turnover to the MPLA if it continues to fly to Zambia. In his talks with the MPLA, President Kaunda stated that the presence of Cubans makes Zambian recognition of the MPLA difficult; discussions ended on friendly terms. Zambia continues to be discreetly friendly and sympathetic to Savimbi, but closed down the UNITA office in Lusaka. UNITA claims that it is still able to operate resupply trucks from Zambia to Angola.

**Position of Zaire**

Both UNITA and FNLA offices have been closed. Gendarmes broke into the FNLA office and damaged equipment. Mobutu con-
continues to provide some discreet support to the FNLA and UNITA. Mobutu is concerned about the political implications of the bombing of the Air Zaire F–27 at Gago Coutinho after he had given his word to Neto that he had stopped support to UNITA and FNLA. While the plane and its identification have been completely destroyed, the plane will likely be noticed as missing from Kinshasa.

Position of South Africa

South Africa is negotiating the pull out of its forces from the Cunene area of Angola by 27 March. The Soviets appear to be advising the MPLA not to push hard on the issue. Plans are underway at the United Nations to have the MPLA appear for "consultation" about Angola rather than a more formal action. Runtu continues to receive UNITA and other refugees from Angola.

MPLA Overtures to USG

The MPLA expects Gulf Oil to resume operations in Cabinda. It will take four months for Gulf to reactivate its operations. Gulf has set aside about $101 million in royalties for the government of Angola, through the efforts of Nigeria as an intermediary. Another payment of $31 million for taxes but not royalties, is due on 31 March.

The TAAG Boeing 737 aircraft have been released for export. Boeing technicians expect to be in Angola for a year to work on an air traffic control system being installed in Cabinda, Luanda and Nova Lisboa.

The MPLA is applying for membership to various international and UN agencies. The USG will probably oppose such applications until it recognizes an MPLA government. The MPLA application to join the UN is expected to be presented to the Security Council in August 1976.

4. Status of Political Action

The propaganda campaign against the Soviets and the Cubans has been temporarily suspended, because of the Congressional action (Tunney Amendment).

5. Intelligence

A report has been prepared on the poor overall performance of the SA–7 missiles. Apparently nearly 30 SA–7’s were expended without success. Further information is needed on any transfer of MIG aircraft to Mozambique from Angola and on the wave of Cuban trainers, pilots and troops to Mozambique for use in the conflict with Rhodesia. ZANU is currently being supported by the PRC and ZAPU by the USSR.

6. Recommendations

The Working Group discussed the various methods to provide UNITA with the funds totalling [dollar amount not declassified] as author-
ized by the Operations Advisory Group. The Working Group recommended that consideration be given to passing funds for UNITA through President Kaunda. Thus, our moral obligation to UNITA could be fulfilled without entailing a possibly longer term involvement in direct payments to UNITA.

187. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Bush to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)


Dear Brent:

Enclosed is a summary of the position I am taking on the current impasse involving termination payments under the Angola program. Hopefully, I will be given an opportunity to present it to the Defense Subcommittee prior to the Easter recess.

In that connection, if the occasion presents itself, it would be most helpful if the President could cover this matter with any of the members of the Subcommittee. (Membership list attached).

We are in the process of pulling together the total listing of all obligations involved. A detailed report on our finding will be transmitted as soon as possible.

In the event I am unable to persuade the Subcommittee of the merits of our position, it may be necessary for the Administration to proceed without their approval. There appears to be no question of the legality of such action and it is imperative that we fulfill our obligations.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 3, General Subject File, Central Intelligence Agency, Communications (20). Secret.

2 The membership list is attached but not printed.

3 An April 12 memorandum, transmitted by Bush to Scowcroft on April 13, provided details of the termination costs for the Angola covert action program. Costs were broken down into categories of debt owed: within the United States, to foreign organizations and individuals with earlier contracts (involving transportation, supplies, and foreign personnel), and termination payments to foreign leaders and individuals (for liberation movement leaders to “disengage and resettle themselves and their followers”). The total cost for termination amounted to $6,280,615. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 104, Geopolitical File, Angola Chronological File)
I would welcome any suggestions on the attached draft.

Sincerely,

George Bush

Enclosure

STATEMENT ON AGENCY EXPENDITURES FOR ACTIVITIES IN ANGOLA

As you know, this is a matter that I stepped into while it was in mid-stream. I mention this only to explain that since I had no personal knowledge of this covert action program as it originally developed, it was necessary for me to be briefed on it and the developments leading up to the enactment of the Tunney amendment after I was nominated to the position of Director. We have, of course, taken some steps since I took office, and I have been assured that the steps which we have taken during my tenure were proper and not inconsistent with the Tunney amendment or any other provision of law.

I think we are all generally familiar with the thrust of the Tunney amendment, Mr. Chairman, but let me read the exact language since we are being held to a strict interpretation of precisely what the Tunney amendment stated or implied. As enacted, the amendment states:

“$205,600,000, none of which, nor any other funds appropriated in this Act may be used for any activities involving Angola other than intelligence gathering . . .”

I think it is clear from this wording that this amendment applies only to funds appropriated under the Defense Appropriation Act for FY 1976, the bill to which it was a floor amendment.

Let me point out that eight Committees of Congress, including this Subcommittee, were briefed (in accordance with the Hughes/Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act), on the President’s Finding with regard to Angola and the fact that the Agency had committed funds in furtherance of that authority and determination. It was stated in those briefings that the funds involved included $31.7 million from the Agency Reserve which had been approved for expenditure in furtherance of that Presidential determination. Those funds were taken from the Reserve account prior to the enactment of the Tunney amendment and therefore certainly were not funds appropriated under the Department of Defense Appropriation for FY 1976.

Bush signed “George” above his typed signature.
As a matter of fact, I have reviewed the House and Senate debate on the Tunney amendment and there were numerous references in that debate to the fact that funds had already been committed, including the $31.7 million, to that program. I think it is clear from that debate that the issue was whether any additional funds should be expended for that program. You will recall, it had been proposed that [1 line not declassified] for future activities in Angola and this was a central issue in the debate on the Tunney amendment. It became clear that the Congress wished to terminate the program without those additional funds being reprogrammed and spent, and, of course, that reprogramming action was never taken. However, I am not aware of any suggestion, in the discussions in the floor debate or in Director Colby’s meeting with this Subcommittee on the 22nd of January of this year that enactment of the Tunney amendment would require withdrawal of any of the $31.7 million. In fact, I believe those discussions made it clear that the $31.7 million had been committed or designated for that program.

As I believe you know, we have spent no funds beyond the $31.7 million that was under discussion at that time. In fact, we were able to divert some of those funds from military support, for which they had originally been designated, to pay for necessary expenses involved in the termination of our covert action program. It is our opinion that our actions have been within the letter and spirit of the Tunney amendment, and I have been so advised by my General Counsel all along the way. As a matter of fact, in diverting some of these funds from the purposes for which they had been committed or designated, we have not only used them for terminating the program in Angola, [1½ lines not declassified]

We will be happy to review with the Subcommittee the precise expenditures which have been made and committed from that $31.7 million, but my greatest concern in this whole matter is the question of our credibility with this Subcommittee. I don’t want any dispute or misunderstanding between me and our oversight committees if it is humanly possible to avoid it. I regret that such a situation has developed and I want to resolve it as quickly as possible. We have issued instructions that no further expenditures are to be made pending a determination on the matter with the Subcommittee. As you know your Investigations Staff is reviewing this issue and our Reserve account generally. I am anxious to know their findings. We will do everything we can to facilitate that review.
188. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Application for UN Membership by Angola

The Problem

The MPLA, as the Government of Angola, has submitted an application for UN membership to UN Secretary General Waldheim. The application has been forwarded to the President of the Security Council for consideration (France became Security Council President on May 1), and the members of the Council are expected to be asked to meet to consider the application as early as Tuesday, May 11. If the Council approves the application, it would then be submitted to the UN General Assembly this Fall and Angola would be formally admitted to the UN at the time of the General Assembly concurrence.

In view of the application, Ambassador Scranton needs your instructions on how the United States should vote in the Security Council. There are three options: to support, veto, or abstain.

Discussion of the Options

A. Vote for MPLA application for membership

Our vote would not constitute an act of recognition and Ambassador Scranton could so state. There is adequate precedent for concurring in UN membership for states with which we do not have diplomatic relations, for example, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Nevertheless, an affirmative vote would be generally interpreted as a shift in US policy of withholding recognition of the MPLA given the continued presence of Cuban troops there. We could, of course, give an affirmative vote while at the same time calling for the departure of the Cubans. While this is a theoretically feasible option, it would represent such a sharp departure from our present posture that I strongly recommend against its consideration.

B. Veto the MPLA application

A veto would dramatically emphasize our position of non-recognition of the MPLA and would be consistent with our posture toward Cuban presence. Our act could be accompanied by a statement that the continuing presence of Cuban forces makes Angola less than

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1 Source: Ford Library, Staff Secretary's Office, Presidential Handwriting File, Box 6, Subject File, Countries, Angola. Confidential. Sent for action.
independent, thus underscoring our opposition to that presence. A veto, however, would be heavily criticized in the Council and in Africa, and would be considered inconsistent with the positive achievements of Secretary Kissinger’s recent trip to Africa. It would contrast sharply with the overwhelming support the application is expected to receive by the non-aligned and even by our European allies. While the veto would point up the Cuban role in Angola, it would highlight that all members of the Security Council except the United States are willing to accord UN membership to Angola despite the Cuban and Soviet role there. Since it would prevent MPLA membership, it would maintain this issue in high profile over the coming months.

C. Abstain on the MPLA application

An abstention would be consistent with our position of non-recognition of the MPLA. It would also be consistent with the statement that Secretary Kissinger made in Monrovia with regard to Angola: “We are willing in principle to open discussion with the Angolan authorities with a view toward normalizing our relations and seeking means of cooperating—including on economic development. We wish Angola well as a unified and independent state. But before we can go far down that road, we want to know Angola’s intention with respect to the presence of foreign forces on its soil.” An abstention would probably avoid a bitter debate which a veto could provoke and in which the Cubans and Soviets could gain propaganda advantage. Ambassador Scranton could be instructed to make a tough statement pointing out our continuing non-recognition of the MPLA and our insistence on the Cuban withdrawal from Angola. An abstention, however, could be criticized as being inconsistent with our strong position on Cuban presence in Angola. We could be accused of shifting from pressing for military measures against the MPLA to allowing them to enter the UN, without any change in the objective situation. The current estimate is that the only company we might find in an abstention would be the Chinese communists, although they have reportedly told the French UN Mission they have “no problems” with the application.

Recommendation:

Given Secretary Kissinger’s recent trip to Africa, what he said about Angola in Monrovia, and our desire eventually to normalize relations with Angola, I recommend that Ambassador Scranton be instructed to abstain, with a tough statement reiterating our uncompromising opposition to the continual presence of Cuban troops.

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3 There is no indication of Presidential action on the memorandum, but see footnote 5, Document 189.
If you disapprove the above, that you authorize Ambassador Scranton to veto the MPLA application for membership in the UN.

189. Note From the White House Staff Secretary (Connor) to President Ford


Mr President:

Application for UN Membership by Angola

Jack Marsh made the following recommendation on the attached memo from Brent Scowcroft:

"Veto but subject to approval by withdrawal of Cuban troops when and if withdrawal occurs."

We are attempting to obtain a reaction on this subject from Tim Austin but this has not been received at this writing.

We have just been notified by the NSC that UN will begin discussion of this subject at 10:30 this morning, therefore, this paper requires immediate action.

Jim Connor

1 Source: Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, Presidential Handwriting File, Box 6, Subject File, Countries, Angola. No classification marking.
2 Document 188.
3 See footnote 4, Document 191.
4 Another note from Connor to Ford, May 11, reads: “Just heard from Tim Austin—the feeling from his area is they concur in the recommendation to abstain.” (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, Presidential Handwriting File, Box 6, Subject File, Countries, Angola)
5 A note from Connor to Scowcroft, May 11, reads: “We have been informed the President gave Ambassador Scranton verbal orders to veto.” (Ibid.)
6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
190. Telegram From the Embassy in Sweden to the Department of State

Stockholm, September 1, 1976, 0955Z.

4734. Subject: Message from President Neto of Angola. Ref: Stockholm 4731.\textsuperscript{2}

There follows the text of President Neto’s message as translated from the French and furnished to us in writing late August 31 by Pierre Schori of the Prime Minister's staff:

\textit{Begin text}

Message from President Neto.

1. Angola is very interested in having relations with the United States. They should be of the same character as relations with other countries, i.e. be normal and be built on respect for each other’s national independence.

2. Angola is no satellite to the Soviet Union. Angola has a cooperation with Cuba which is motivated by the state of war within the country. The Angolan Government is firmly resolved not to be subjected to foreign influence of any kind.

3. The Cuban presence has no aggressive intention; there are no ulterior motives. Angola needs the Cuban help, particularly in the areas of technical assistance and military training. The Angolan army must learn to use advanced weapons. The enemy has this knowledge and the border areas near Zaire and Zambia are still very sensitive. In the area of health the Cubans are making tremendous efforts to help. The language similarities make it possible to help quickly and effectively. When the Portuguese left Angola there were only 69 Angolan doctors.

4. Cuba’s presence is not directed against US interests. President Neto wants to give the US Government his guarantee that the Cuban presence is solely motivated by Angola’s wish to strengthen its national independence.

5. Angola has a great interest in becoming a member of the United Nations. Unnecessary delay will cause irritation among the Angolan people and within the MPLA.

\textit{End text}

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

\textsuperscript{2} In telegram 4731 from Stockholm, August 31, Ambassador Smith reported on his meeting with Schiori who read Neto’s message to the U.S. Government, promised to provide an English copy in writing, and asked Smith to pass the message to Washington. (Ibid.)
6. There is a great future for the bilateral relations between Angola and the United States.

End text.

Smith

191. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Department of State

En route to Tanzania, September 13, 1976, 1525Z.

Secto 27003. Subject: Suggested Reply to Angolan President Neto (S/S 7619221).

1. Secretary approved modified text of the proposed reply to Angolan President Neto. Please translate text into Portuguese and instruct AmEmbassy Stockholm to deliver both English and Portuguese texts to Schori or another appropriate official in the Prime Minister’s office, with the request that they deliver both to the Angolans.

2. Begin text of message to Palme: Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I appreciate your assistance in developing the groundwork for an eventual dialogue with the Government of Angola. The message from President Neto which your office sent on to us on August 31² contained some positive elements, and may provide an opening to further discussions. We would appreciate it if the enclosed statement could be transmitted directly to President Neto by secure means.

3. Meanwhile, we will be watching closely to see whether Angola reduces substantially the number of foreign troops stationed on its soil and whether Angola is prepared to play a constructive role during the current delicate phase of our negotiations to bring majority rule and independence to Namibia and Zimbabwe by peaceful means. In this connection I note Neto’s attendance at the recent Dar es Salaam conference convened by President Nyerere.³

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Zurich. Kissinger was traveling to Tanzania to meet with Nyerere regarding Rhodesia and Namibia.
² See Document 190 and footnote 2 thereto.
³ Presidents Neto, Kaunda, Khama, Machel, and Nyerere met in Dar es Salaam September 5–7 to attempt to reconcile the differences among the Rhodesian black nationalist leaders.
4. Given the respect accorded Sweden throughout the Third World, your cooperation in pursuit of both of these objectives is both helpful and very much appreciated. Best regards, Henry A. Kissinger. End of text to Swedes.

5. Begin separate text to the Angolans: The United States Government has read with interest the remarks of President Neto and shares his expressed desire to improve the relations between our two countries. American officials have repeatedly stated that the US has no quarrel with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, and we have sought to make this clear through our actions on certain commercial matters over the past six months. We maintain good and cooperative relations with many states whose ideology is different from ours.

6. Our concern since before independence has been that Angola should emerge as an independent, sovereign state which would be spared convulsions of civil warfare. We believed that only through some form of national reconciliation between the liberation movements could independence and peace emerge. The unfortunate history of Angola since independence speaks for itself.

7. We think that it is in the interests of both our countries to promote stability and peace in central and southern Africa. The presence of large numbers of foreign military personnel in Angola does not contribute to this goal.

8. The United States for its part wishes to make clear that it is neither encouraging nor supporting dissidents within Angola.

9. The US can appreciate Angola’s interest in entering the United Nations this fall. We hope, in turn, that President Neto can comprehend our concern over the continued presence in his country of a large army of a non-African power, which is notable for its hostility to the US and its apparent belief that the road to progress lies through armed confrontation rather than dialogue. Our position on Angola’s future admission to the UN will be considered in the context of the continued withdrawal of Cuban forces and Angola’s attitude toward ongoing efforts to promote a peaceful transition to genuine majority rule in southern Africa.4

10. In this regard, we have been encouraged by the recent indications given to US officials by the Angolan Representative to the UN that the Cuban forces would confine their activities within the boundaries

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4 Voting against U.N. admission June 23, the United States emphasized the presence of Cuban troops in support of the People’s Republic of Angola. When the issue came before the Security Council on November 22, the vote was 13 in favor, none against, with the United States abstaining. The General Assembly voted to admit the People’s Republic of Angola to membership in the United Nations December 1. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1976, pp. 305–308)
of Angola itself. A policy of non-intervention in the affairs of neighboring territories will contribute to the goal we all seek of a peaceful transition to majority rule in southern Africa. Angola is in a position to play constructive role in the delicate process evolving in southern Africa.

11. The US Government would welcome President Neto’s views about how we could best develop our contacts in a constructive way and about the situation in southern Africa. We look forward to the time when we can have amicable relations with Angola. End Text to Angolans.

12. Begin Portuguese text to the Angolans: (Department please have text above translated into Portuguese, inserted as paragraph twelve etc, and transmit immediately to AmEmbassy Stockholm to pass to the Angolans.)

13. For Zurich: Please reproduce this telegram in five copies and have ready for Mr. Passage upon arrival this evening.

Kissinger
Independence Negotiations

192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, March 21, 1976, 0252Z.

68649. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Message to Foreign Secretary Callaghan.

1. Please have the following message from me to Foreign Secretary Callaghan delivered directly to the private office: Begin text:

2. March 18, 1976: Dear Jim: I have had the best of intentions about calling you the past few days. You have been in my thoughts too, particularly since Tuesday’s surprise. I find myself much as Socrates did in conducting his own defense, knowing it would be undiplomatic of me to wish you every possible success in the leadership sweepstakes. As you might imagine, I have very ambivalent feelings about the possibility of your winning.

I am most grateful for the excellent long piece on southern Africa you sent me. Peter and I had a good chat about the situation last night, and I’m sure you will have his report by now, including my agreement to associating us in urging South African action on troop withdrawal in response to the assurances conveyed by the Angolans through the Soviets and yourselves. If Vorster accepts, it should take care of the immediate Angolan problem.

I find myself basically in agreement with your analysis of the rest of the situation in southern Africa and its implications. And I appreciate the pressure on you at home. Frankly, I think we diverge only slightly in the tactical area. If I have been a bit hesitant regarding your initiatives, for example, on Rhodesia, it is only because I think we must not let continued Cuban presence serve as a form of blackmail which stampedes us into hasty moves. Such action could be perceived by our moderate African friends (and others around the world) as being a direct result of Angola and the continued Cuban presence, which could

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 16, United Kingdom—State Department Telegrams, From Sec- State—Nodis (5). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen W. Worrel (EUR/NE); cleared in C, EUR, and AF; and approved by Kissinger.

2 On Tuesday, March 16, Harold Wilson resigned as British Prime Minister and endorsed Callaghan as his successor.

3 Summarized in Document 193.

4 See Document 184.
lead others into the radical camp. We are trying to discipline ourselves to tread the thin line between public USG support for majority rule in Rhodesia and firm public opposition to further Cuban/Soviet interventionism. Although there are indications of success on the latter, I am not as optimistic from your reports about the possibilities for a settlement in Rhodesia. Let’s do keep in close touch on all this.

I am planning, by the way, a wider European tour in May in connection with the NAC and CENTO meetings, and will be arriving in London the evening of May 25 from Luxembourg. Although I will of course see the British Foreign Secretary across the table in Oslo, I look forward very much to a talk with you in London, in either capacity. I also wanted you to know that I have accepted Christoph Bertram’s invitation to give the inaugural Alastair Buchan memorial lecture at the IISS in London probably the evening of May 27. Warm regards, Henry.

End text.

Kissinger

5 Ford’s March 13 statement to the Chicago Sun-Times expressed his administration’s commitment to majority rule in Rhodesia and concern over how that goal could be achieved. “It’s one thing to have the Rhodesian blacks take the reins of government; it’s another thing to have the Soviet Union and Castro move in and take the reins in Rhodesia.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff Secretary Files, Box 4, Chronological File, June 1976)

193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, March 23, 1976, 2259Z.

70264. Subject: Callaghan’s Message to the Secretary on Southern Africa.

1. Following is summary of long message from Foreign Secretary Callaghan to the Secretary on southern Africa, received via British Embassy March 15.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 16, United Kingdom—State Department Telegrams, From Secretary—Nodis (5). Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Stephen W. Worrel (EUR/NE); cleared in EUR, C, and S; and approved by Sonnenfeldt.

2 The letter from Callaghan is attached but not printed.
2. The Foreign Secretary restated his belief that indigenous influences would operate to reduce the internal consequences for Angola of Soviet/Cuban intervention. This in no way meant that he did not feel as strongly as we did about the wider effects of Soviet/Cuban intervention. Although the success of their intervention in Angola may encourage them elsewhere in southern Africa, Callaghan thought that given the differing circumstances elsewhere, there was not necessarily any immediate danger of such adventurism. The principal worry, however, is that African perceptions of any efforts we might make that appear to prop up Ian Smith or South Africa would be colored by the black/white aspect of the problem to the complete exclusion in the Africans’ view of any concern with Communist intervention.

3. The task then is to preempt the possibility of further Communist involvement so that the problem is never faced. The three danger areas are Angola, Rhodesia, and Namibia. In Angola, the continued presence of South African troops and the ensuing possibility of action in the Security Council against South Africa could leave HMG in the position of having to go along with a resolution calling for South African withdrawal. The important step is to remove the cause of the possible actions by pressing for complete South African withdrawal, and HMG to this end is making it clear to SAG that it would not have their support in the SC. HMG is also joining its EC partners in a forceful démarche to the SAG concerning withdrawal.

4. On Rhodesia, HMG was told in recent discussions with Mozambique’s FonMin Chissano that the GOM believed the point was past where majority rule could be attained through negotiations. While accepting material and technical aid from the Communists for the guerillas, Chissano said the GOM would not permit the presence of foreign troops unless there was foreign intervention on Smith’s side. Callaghan thought this line of GOM thinking should be encouraged and mentioned HMG’s interest-free loan on pounds five million to help offset sanctions losses in this regard.

Even though the odds are turning against it and Smith seems as cagey as before, Callaghan thought it more important than ever that something be done to reach a settlement based on early majority rule. HMG has made clear to Smith that there is no possibility of British support for him. Callaghan is considering the options available for further HMG involvement in the search for a settlement. The four Presidents seem resigned to guerilla activity. When he saw Banda, the Foreign Secretary told him he would be willing to visit Nyerere (their chairman) if he and Banda thought it worthwhile, to try and devise a package of

3 Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana.
proposals based on early majority rule. To date, no reply had been received from either.

5. Namibia is the third danger area. Even if South Africa is persuaded to withdraw its troops from Angola, the larger problem of Namibia itself remains. In Callaghan’s view, the essential thing is to get the SAG to accept that the transfer of power to the Namibians must come sooner rather than later—in his opinion, in six months rather than the three to four years the SAG seems to be thinking of.

6. Callaghan mentioned our recent démarche on aid to Zaire and Zambia,\(^4\) noting that HMG had decided to give an additional pounds five million to Zambia and pounds one million to Zaire. He also said HMG had raised the subject with its EC partners.

7. The Foreign Secretary took the occasion to point out that HMG will probably offer some money to the Angolans for reconstruction in the belief that this would help restore the traditional European position in Angola and serve to offset Communist influences.

Ingersoll

\(^4\) See Documents 179 and 180.

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194. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Dar es Salaam, April 25, 1976, 7:05–8:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanzania
J.W. Butiku, Private Secretary to the President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[The Secretary arrived and waited a few moments for Nyerere to arrive. Nyerere then appeared. There were warm introductions all around, while photographers took pictures. Nyerere introduced the

\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, January–April 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held at Msasani, the President’s residence. Kissinger visited Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Kinshasa, Monrovia, and Dakar April 24–May 6. He attended the UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi May 3–6. Brackets are in the original.
Secretary to his mother and family. Nyerere then took the Secretary into his private office for this private conversation.

Kissinger: I am really delighted to have this opportunity to meet you, because there are not many people in this part of the world who can philosophically shape events. It is easy to deal with the practical immediate issues. But without a philosophical grasp, you only solve the immediate issues.

Nyerere: Fine.

Kissinger: I’m at your disposal. But before you give me the benefit of your view, there are two things I want to mention.

You have seen reports of my motives for coming here—to set up an American-sponsored liberation movement, or to support the white Rhodesian regime. With respect to the latter, I am prepared to put the power of the United States behind the liberation of Rhodesia, in unmistakable terms, so Smith and Vorster cannot possibly misunderstand. Second, we do not want to see blocs in Africa. The Soviet Union and the United States should not seek blocs in Africa because if we do it, Africa will be the battleground of foreign conflicts.

I don’t like to come on goodwill trips, but I like to see results. I am willing to admit the mistakes of the past. We have had Vietnam, the Middle East, Watergate; it was not possible to do everything simultaneously.

But I am here now to do something.

In the Middle East, many Arab countries were extremely suspicious of U.S. motives until ‘73, when President Sadat saw that in confrontation with the United States, it was not possible to do anything, and in cooperation with the United States much was possible. Now we’re giving $1 billion to Egypt in aid and he has got more territory back than any other Arab leader.

I like to think we can do the same with Africa on a cooperative basis, and work with you. This is not to say you can’t work with others. You have your own national interests.

Nyerere: Mr. Secretary, we are very, very grateful to have this opportunity to meet with you. We will meet again tonight and I will have an opportunity to say it formally with my friends. We very much welcome the opportunity to discuss with you privately our problems.

We have problems. Liberation on the continent. You are celebrating your 200th year; we are in the process of liberation. We are celebrating our 14th year—Tanzania and Zanzibar. It will be 15 years in October. So really the continent is in the process of liberation.

The problem is classical colonialism as in Rhodesia, or with our friend Vorster, racialism. It is our big headache. We live with it. We try to solve it. We can’t do it without the assistance or at least the under-
standing of the big powers. And for a continent like Africa, liberation isn’t enough; we need economic development. I think we in Tanzania are really the Fourth World when they put us into categories!

We have sometimes our problems; sometimes the problems of work, and for a country like Tanzania, it is sometimes very difficult for us to achieve independence. And we need and we value the help and at least the understanding of the great powers. So we really value this opportunity.

Kissinger: What help do you have in mind?

Nyerere: In Southern Africa. We will explain our view. Things are changing. What was needed in ’75 might not be needed now. We want pressure on the regime in Rhodesia; we want pressure on Vorster regarding Namibia, and ultimately for change in South Africa. We can’t live with South Africa as it is.

As to what you can do, sometimes the things we ask are extravagant for you within the limits of the old system. You might not be able to give us arms, but what can you give us? We hope you will answer that question, within the limits not of your power, but of your system.

Kissinger: We are certainly prepared to give the understanding, and we are prepared to do more than this, to see what help can be given. It is my purpose to establish contact with leaders like yourself so we can see it more naturally. I don’t know the nuances. We have to see it from the point of view of the Soviet Union; you have to see it in terms of independent Africa. But I’m here to learn. We believe that without majority rule, there can’t be peace and independent African development. Other countries can certainly participate. Leaders like you know how to use the big powers for your needs. But in cases like Angola where foreign armies actually appear, it is a problem for us. But our aim should be to prevent situations like that from arising.

The regime in Rhodesia can’t survive if we all behave with unity and dedication. And Namibia too. Certainly, the problem of South Africa is harder.

Nyerere: This has always been my view. Southern Africa has always been a whole—Portugal, South Africa—but we can’t tackle the whole problem together. We can define it all together—as we tried in 1969 in the Lusaka Manifesto. We were accused of being racialists in reverse; we were accused of wanting violence for the sake of violence. Fighting had already started in Angola.

So we had to define what it is we are trying to do—a group of countries of whom my country was a part. We didn’t make a distinc—

\[2\] See Document 9.
tion. We gave South Africa the fact that it was an independent state—but we didn't make a distinction between Namibia and the others.

Our priorities are Rhodesia and Namibia. South Africa is harder. The cases of Rhodesia and Namibia are clearer. You and the Soviet Union and China really all agree the South Africans should not be there.

Kissinger: That is right.

Nyerere: So there is this clarity at least in those cases. Those are the priorities, and in any case, South Africa is harder. I am not sure personally that Africa has given itself much thinking. Africa understands the colonial issue; but it has not fully understood the problem of South Africa and fully thought about how to solve it.

When Vorster gives independence to the Transkei and we have [Paramount Chief] Matanzima coming to the UN to seek membership, there will be confusion.

Kissinger: If Transkei becomes independent, what would be the balance in Southern Africa? The blacks still would be the majority.

Nyerere: Yes. But if we accept it, we would be accepting that the solution is partition, not majority rule.

Kissinger: We have not decided yet with respect to the Transkei. The present inclination is against it.

Nyerere: Some say it is not the same as Rhodesia, but it is. Smith may say to Vorster: “You fortunately declared your independence in 1905, and we did it in 1965. It is an accident that your independence is recognized and ours isn’t.” Maybe he hasn’t said it. But I’m sure Smith at least thinks of saying this to Vorster.

Recognizing that South Africa is a tougher nut to crack, we would still be saying the objective in South Africa, as in Rhodesia, is majority rule.

Kissinger: I plan to say this in Lusaka. I hope I will be saying things you agree with. I’ll give you a copy. You will see I treat Rhodesia in greater detail than Namibia, and Namibia in greater detail than South Africa.

I read in some African papers that I need this trip—for domestic reasons. That is not true. I am being attacked by the conservatives. We have to do what is right.

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3 Kissinger delivered an address that focused on southern Africa at a luncheon on April 27 in Lusaka. For the text of this speech, as well as other speeches and public statements made during his Africa trip, see Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1976, pp. 657–710. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 40. The text of Kissinger’s April 27 speech in Lusaka was also printed in The New York Times, April 28, 1976, p. 16.
We are coming out of it. But we have these two right-wing candidates. But they will lose. What I can do is state certain principles that will develop their own momentum, and implement certain policies that will develop their own momentum.

You know revolutionary movements better than I do. But to me it has always seemed partly a psychological problem—at some point the minority gives up. Next Tuesday, Smith will have no way to believe we will help. As long as no non-African countries get involved. But you and your colleagues have said they won’t.

I will call on neighboring countries to close their border with Rhodesia. What do you think?

Nyerere: This is a first class idea. First class. Seretse [Khama, President of Botswana,] is calculating the costs.

Kissinger: I’ll call on them—not by name—to do it, and pledge U.S. assistance.

Nyerere: First class.

Kissinger: I’ll say that South Africa can prove it is an African country by not supporting Rhodesia. And I’ll talk about giving assistance to African countries.

Nyerere: First class.

Kissinger: What do you think of President Machel? I wanted to meet with him, but what about meeting him at UNCTAD?

Nyerere: You will get to meet some of their people at UNCTAD.

Kissinger: It is no use to me, but I thought it would be demoralizing to Smith if I had visible contact with black leaders. I’ll be in Nairobi on the 4th, 5th, and 6th. Senior people—the President or whoever. They wouldn’t have to say they are there to meet me.

Nyerere: I’m not sure I can get their President, but I’m sure I can get their senior people. You have mentioned three things, which are very important.

Kissinger: I’ll have given the speech.

Nyerere: Right. But these three things you said: The minority regimes can’t expect support from the US. You have already said that. Second, that the US is not trying to build its own “leadership group.”

Kissinger: Exactly.

Nyerere: That is very important.

Quite frankly, for us and Zambia and Mozambique, this is the new fear. Not so much that you will support the white regimes, but that you

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4 April 27.
are trying to build up something of your own—I said this to the British—to say “it’s ours.”

Kaunda even met with Vorster personally. We knew what the African reaction would be. We knew what South Africa wanted—a friendly buffer if a settlement is achieved. We knew this, but we wanted majority rule. The objectives weren’t the same but we wanted majority rule. But it failed because Smith isn’t ready. Now we support the liberation fighters. But we are the same people. Don’t think now we are enemies of the British. I said this to the British.

Kissinger: What I would appreciate from you, Mr. President. I may not understand everything that happens, or everything that you are told by others. So if anything happens that you have a question about—we will set up a channel. The sort of thing this Observer correspondent says is childish [See Tab A].\(^5\) We have no interest in backing one group against others, or against you, and we won’t do this.

In Angola we got into a situation where, quite frankly, it seemed to us that the Soviet Union . . . If the Soviet Union had given the freedom fighters support, we would have done nothing. But when it came to massive equipment and outside forces, we had to view it as big power bases. I had the impression you weren’t happy. You don’t have to answer.

Nyerere: Oh, I’ll answer. We don’t want the big powers in Africa, entrenching themselves. When one does, the other will.

Kissinger: Inevitably.

On Southern Africa, we will be influenced heavily by your thinking. We will have to do it one step at a time. First, Rhodesia, then Namibia, and only then can we take on South Africa. We need their help on Rhodesia, and their toleration in Namibia. But in my speech I’ll say we look to the end of discrimination in South Africa at a definite date—even in South Africa.

You were summing up your three points.

Nyerere: Second was the United States is not going to support factions.

Kissinger: Peter [Rodman]. Add this to the speech. There’s something in there already, but we’ll sharpen it.

Nyerere: Third is calling for countries surrounding Rhodesia to close their borders.

Kissinger: Yes.

Nyerere: This is first class.

Kissinger: You won’t tell our press tomorrow? Because . . .

\(^5\) Tab A is not attached.
Nyerere: No. I won’t give your speech!
Kissinger: We’ll get it to you on Tuesday morning.
Nyerere: Those three will make me very happy.
Kissinger: I’ll say we will work to repeal the Byrd Amendment, on chrome.6 And we’ll give help for the refugees.
Nyerere: Very fine.
Kissinger: We have a ten-point program. I won’t speak for you, but I can say we discussed it.
Nyerere: Tomorrow [at the press conference], I will express our position fully—so it’s understood by you and your colleagues. Our fears and our hopes. I won’t expect you to say in your answer things you’re saying in Lusaka.
Kissinger: You are meeting our press tomorrow, and I’m delighted. It would be helpful if it doesn’t look like my speech is yielding to you. It’s better if it’s our free decision.
Nyerere: First class. I understand.
Kissinger: You can say you’re satisfied, or you’re hopeful, or whatever.
What about Mozambique?
Nyerere: We helped build Frelimo. It was us and China.
Kissinger: And you noticed we never opposed it.
Nyerere: Our relations are very friendly. We don’t have the same system as they do. We didn’t fight a guerrilla war. We agitated a little—it was very British. [Laughter] They don’t fully understand what’s happening in Mozambique.
Kissinger: Nor do I. [Laughter]
Nyerere: But we get on very well with them. They very much respect the Chinese for building Frelimo.
Kissinger: We respect the Chinese.
Nyerere: But you see we disagreed with the Chinese on Angola. The Chinese Ambassador was sitting right here. I said we have to disagree. It is very painful for friendly countries to disagree. We differed with Zambia too. It was very painful.
Kissinger: Of course, we agreed more with Zambia.
Nyerere: Yes, you agreed with my friends more than I did! Can we still remain very friendly, even if we disagree? We disagreed with Zambia and the Chinese, but we move on.
You spoke of my friend Machel. Their system isn’t ours.
Kissinger: You said you’d send a message to Mozambique.

6 See Document 56.
Nyerere: I'll send a message, and the message might be actually your statement in Lusaka. I'll say they should send someone—the Foreign Minister.

Kissinger: It should be a political person, even though the meeting is . . .

Nyerere: . . . economic.

Kissinger: I'm giving a speech [at UNCTAD] because this is the only way to give impetus to it, and in our government. I could have sent the Economic Under Secretary, but I wanted to do it.

Nyerere: I'll make a proposal to the Foreign Ministers in Mozambique, in Zambia, and in Botswana—and to make it easier, my Foreign Minister Ibrahim—could be in Nairobi.

Kissinger: Your Foreign Minister?

Nyerere: Oh, yes. My Foreign Minister will be with me [in Europe]. I'll send someone else.

Kissinger: It would be very helpful if after I've made this speech . . . How will it happen?

Nyerere: I'll let Mr. [Ambassador] Spain know.

Kissinger: Good. To let you know, I can do it Tuesday afternoon or all day Wednesday.

Nyerere: So you'll speak on Tuesday? On Tuesday I'll contact the President in Zambia and Mozambique and say that in view of your statement, wouldn't it be useful to meet with you on the following Tuesday? It will be the first visible sign of a response.

Kissinger: Excellent.

Nyerere: I'll let Mr. Spain know.

Kissinger: So we don't have to approach them.

Nyerere: You don't have to approach them. Good.

[Everyone gets up to leave.]

Kissinger: I can't tell you how much I've wanted to meet you.

Nyerere: The feeling has been mutual.

[At 7:58 they proceeded to the large meeting room, where Nyerere introduced his colleagues to the Secretary's party. Everyone is seated. Nyerere offers wine, but the Secretary demurs.]

Nyerere: You're a teetotaler!

Kissinger: Yes. I almost never drink.

Nyerere: I was a teetotaler. Until the victory in Mozambique. I never dealt with Portugal. I never knew Portuguese wine. Then Samora

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7 Kissinger delivered a speech on global economic development on May 6 in Nairobi. (Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1976, pp. 657–672)
[Machel] discovered stacks and stacks of wine in cellars there. He sent it to me. So they’ll serve it to you. [Laughter]

Since Samora sent it to me, I call it “Samora.” [Laughter] I always say: “Bring me Samora.” [Laughter]

Kissinger: How did Frelimo get started?

Nyerere: How did it get started? I used to go to the United Nations as a petitioner. This country was a trust territory under the UN, administered by the British. Twice I came to the United Nations. On one trip I met Dr. Mondlane. He had been teaching in the United States, but was then working for the UN. And we discussed liberation. I said: “Why don’t you come to Dar es Salaam, instead of working for the UN, and work for the liberation of your country?”

So he came in 1962. There were several organizations. [The President’s colleagues recite a number of names]. Mondlane helped put them together into a front for the liberation of Mozambique—FRELIMO. It was really a coalition of small parties. They started with agitation. That was all we knew, from our experience. They tried it, but it wasn’t enough. Then they started fighting—a year after the formation of the OAU.

Kissinger: But where did Machel come from?

Nyerere: Machel was one of the freedom fighters. When they came together, Machel was there. He was a hospital assistant—a dispenser. He escaped and came here and was recruited and came into the Army, and became the leader of the armed force. When Mondlane was assassinated.

Kissinger: Oh, Mondlane was assassinated?

Nyerere: He was assassinated here. The same thing happened with Cabral.

Kissinger: Do you have any idea who did it?

Nyerere: It was planned by the Portuguese, with infiltrators.

When he was assassinated, they came together to find a new leader. They were divided, as the politicians now fighting in Rhodesia. But at the Congress, the fighters came, so they chose Machel.

Kissinger: Senator Percy, whom you met, and who met Machel, was very impressed.

I’m seeing Nkomo in Lusaka, just to show the symbolism of meeting with someone from the Liberation Movement. I tried to meet the Bishop.8 He requested the appointment, and now he’s made a statement [denouncing me].

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8 Abel Muzorewa.
I’d be delighted to meet him, or Sithole. We’re not interested in pitting one faction against another.

Nyerere: We have the same interest. We tell them we don’t support factions.

Kissinger: The Bishop is in the United States now.

Schaufele: He’s there for two weeks for a Methodist Conference.

Nyerere: Maybe he’ll meet you in Washington! Maybe after you made your speech, you’ll be more acceptable. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Maybe he’ll recruit me into his movement. [Laughter]

Nyerere: That will be the first sign that your statement was acceptable. Or he’ll reprimand you.

Kissinger: What sometimes happens is people meet me privately for a very friendly conversation and then reprimand me publicly.

Nyerere: Not only me!? [Laughter]

Kissinger: In Latin America, one leader told me very privately he was very concerned about Cuba. Then the next day he said the opposite on television.

Nyerere: They’re very democratic in that hemisphere. They have to say different things in public and in private. Here we’re not so democratic. We say the same thing publicly as we say privately. [Laughter]

Actually, Brezhnev has it easier than Ford.

Kissinger: Not really. Ford has a problem this year, but he’ll win. Brezhnev has 15 colleagues he has to worry about, and maneuver. [Laughter] Reagan is a former movie actor; he doesn’t know what he’s saying, but he says it effectively. [Laughter]

Spain: He could be a very good Ambassador. [Laughter]

Kissinger: So he’ll just read his instructions. [Laughter]

Any Ambassador who wants to get even finds a cable—they’re all signed by me—that they leak to the press.

Nyerere: Sometimes I read in the papers—“President Nyerere sent a message.” I don’t remember sending any message!

Foreign Minister Kaduma: At least you have confidence in us. [Laughter]

Nyerere: There is nothing that I do that isn’t in the newspapers. Now you will have dinner with the Foreign Minister. He’ll make a speech at you.

Kissinger: Will it be very revolutionary?

Nyerere: [pauses]: Not very. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I’ll see you tomorrow.

Nyerere: Tomorrow we’ll watch a parade. It will not be very long—40–45 minutes. Then we’ll meet at the State House. I think I’ll have one or two of my colleagues.
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Kissinger: Very good.
Nyerere: And you can tell us all about American policy. We always want to know what worries you.
Kissinger: And we'll have our economic minister [Robinson] tomorrow. Thank you very much.
[The meeting ended.]

195. Memorandum of Conversation

Lusaka, April 27, 1976, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia
Elijah Mudenda, Prime Minister
Rupiah Banda, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Seteke Mwale, Zambian Ambassador to the U.S.
Grey Zulu, Secretary General, U.N.I.P.
Mark Chona, Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs
Peter Kasanda, Deputy to Mark Chona
Ruben Kamanga, Chairman, Sub-Committee on Political, Legal, Constitutional and Foreign Affairs United Nat'l Independence Party Central Committee
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Charles W. Robinson, Deputy Secretary of State
Jean M. Wilkowski, U.S. Ambassador to Zambia
William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Harold E. Horan, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council (Notetaker)

Kaunda: I want to welcome you, Mr. Secretary, to Zambia, and I know that my colleagues had the opportunity to extend their welcome yesterday on your arrival. We would like you to know that this is a very welcome visit. You are the second Secretary of State who has visited here, and we also had a visit by Vice President Humphrey.

Kissinger: How long did he speak? (Laughter)

Kaunda: Quite a short time. (Laughter) Mr. Secretary, when I was in Washington last year and met your President, I said that southern Africa was at a turning point and that the situation was very worrisome.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 99, Geopolitical File, Africa, Trips, 1976, Apr.–May, Resource Book. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Horan. The meeting was held at State House. Brackets are in the original.
2 See Document 103.
indeed. We have been operating as a team cooperating on two common
programs, and I will explain in more detail in our enlarged meeting. I
will confine myself here to what I see of the solutions your Government
might wish to participate in.

As far as Rhodesia is concerned, we don’t see any solution to the
problem as long as Smith is there. His record shows that we have to get
Vorster involved because he is Smith’s colonial master in the area, but
still the only solution is for Smith to get out. But how do we do this? We
don’t know, but we have to work together to find a way. We have to
fight and the African countries are backing the liberation groups to the
hilt. Smith depends very much on the white settlers, and we would like
to believe that the Western Governments can support moves to erode
that support. If the British, French, West Germans and others would
help to underwrite the certain financial losses that some of the settlers
might suffer, this would accomplish an outflow of the settlers if they
would then see they could go to places like Australia to begin a new
life. We would also like to believe that the United States could pressure
Vorster to be more cooperative now that Mozambique has closed its
borders. South Africa is the key to Rhodesia. I know that your Govern-
ment fears Russian and Cuban interference in Rhodesia, but I also
know of no African leader who has spoken of this possibility. We do
not want to see outside interference at all, and we would not like to see
outside support for factions in Rhodesia. They should be left alone; that
is the only way to avoid an Angolan situation in Rhodesia. Once the
United States Government understands the problem clearly I see no
chance of outside interference.

On Namibia our stand is clear, and the role the U.S. should play is
most important. In defying the United Nations, Vorster is saying that
Namibia is his. We do not want Bantustans in Namibia but one gov-
ernment, nor do we want to see interference from the outside there, but
the delays in independence make that possible. The role you can play is
to put pressure on South Africa to respect the decision of the United
Nations. Your influence on South Africa is important, and you could
use it to make Vorster see sense. If he does not, there will be fighting
and dying.

South Africa itself is an independent African state which is not a
colonial power, and we accept that fact. We do not, however, accept
apartheid, and we support those who are struggling to change apart-
heid. Once again, the United States has a great deal to do with changing
the situation in South Africa. South Africa exists because of western
commerce and investment.

Whether in Rhodesia, Namibia or South Africa, African leaders
have never said they were chasing away anybody. We are all Africans,
and the whites in South Africa have their own right to live in their own
country. But the issue of southern Africa is a question of life and death. For you, Mr. Secretary, the question for your decision is what you want to do to make life more meaningful for all. Your decision to come here shows that you want to find solutions to the southern African problems.

Kissinger: Thank you for your kind remarks. The warmth and friendship that you and your delegation have shown me has meant a great deal to me. You are admired in my country for your courage and wisdom. We remember well your remarks in Washington on the principles of equality and your call on us to live up to these principles.

We have come through a difficult period in the United States, but we have made our decision. I don’t make ceremonial visits, and I am here to develop a program. A few years ago it was said that we have no Middle East program, but events belie that statement. While it is true that within the United States there will be resistance to my speech today, we have made our decision. We are totally behind majority rule, and we will work with the four presidents. You appreciate, of course, that we cannot make public statements calling for armed struggle. In any case, I hope you agree that any struggle must end in negotiation.

We will use our economic and diplomatic pressures on Rhodesia. My speech appeals to Vorster to bring an end to apartheid and set a timetable for the independence of Namibia. I hope that African leaders will find an opportunity to emphasize the positive in our position so that we will not be caught in a crossfire of criticism.

As for Zambia, we respect you as one of the intellectual and political leaders, and we appreciate the cooperation we have received in certain matters. We want to assist in your development, and after I return to Washington we will look at new programs of assistance to Zambia.

If foreign intervention is kept out of southern Africa, the United States can give you its maximum support. I appreciate your idea of the need to help the settlers find new homes, and we are prepared to assist economically in such a program. It is important for the four presidents to refer to minority rights and for any constitution to protect those rights. This will not keep many settlers from leaving, but it is important for us psychologically. We have told the British, by the way, that we will cooperate in any resettlement effort. There is no longer any ambiguity. We support you.

We see it as a practical matter. The first problem to tackle is Rhodesia, then Namibia and lastly South Africa. We need South Africa’s help in solving the other two problems, although I have stated in

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3 See footnote 3, Document 194.
my speech that apartheid must end. Of course, we have no problems with you or your Government, Mr. President.

We are prepared to have normal relations with Mozambique, and I hope to see a representative of that country in Nairobi. There is no organized hostility against Mozambique in the United States, although some see it as a Soviet satellite.

Let me thank you once again, Mr. President, for receiving me and my delegation and for your warm hospitality.

196. Memorandum of Conversation

Grafenau, West Germany, June 24, 1976, 9:30 a.m.–1:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

South Africa:
Balthazar Johannes Vorster, Prime Minister
Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Berndus Gerhardus Fourie, Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Roelof Frederik Botha, Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the U.N.
Gen. Hendrik Johannes Van Den Bergh, Director, Bureau for State Security and Security Adviser to the Prime Minister
Amb. Sole, Ambassador to the FRG

U.S.:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Helmut Sonnenfiedt, Counselor of the Department
William E. Schaufele, Jr. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Amb. William Bowdler, Ambassador to South Africa
Robert L. Fusethe, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, and Spokesman of the Department
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[The Secretary and the Prime Minister conferred privately from 9:30 to 11:36 a.m., while the other members of the two delegations held

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, June–July 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held at the Hotel Sonnenhof. Brackets are in the original.
discussions on the subject of guarantees. At 11:36 a.m., the principals joined the delegations.

Kissinger: The Prime Minister and I—if I may sum up our discussion—reviewed the situation with respect to Rhodesia, along the lines of our discussion yesterday and at dinner too. That is, whether we can put together a package that reasonable people might consider just and honorable with respect to the economic prospects of the white community in Rhodesia; and if we can do this, the Prime Minister might be prepared to use his influence with the Rhodesian Government to see what can be achieved. We will work with the black African governments. We will also see if we can have an international meeting for considering the question of guarantees, in which the South African Government could participate, at least at the preliminary stage.

This is where the Rhodesia matter stands.

Vorster: That is right.

Kissinger: I assured the Prime Minister that there would be no surprises. We can’t keep secret the fact that we’re putting a guarantee package together, but we can keep secret your role in it and what will happen afterwards. We should do it in the next month. Speed is of the essence.

We will be meeting in Puerto Rico next week with the British, French and Germans. The Japanese I don’t know. I suppose we want their money.

Schaufele: We’ll go slow with the Japanese.

Kissinger: We’ll start with a small group. Only Schaufele in the Department.

On South-West Africa, I have suggested to the Prime Minister that the constitutional convention be moved to somewhere else from Windhoek. The participants will be decided later, but the site should be moved. My impression is this was a proposition the Prime Minister did not reject.

Vorster: Yes.

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2 The rest of the delegation’s discussions are in a memorandum of conversation, June 24, 9:30–11:36 a.m. (Ibid.)

3 Kissinger met with Vorster alone from 4:30 to 6:30 p.m., and with the entire South African delegation at a dinner meeting from 7:10 to 9:05 p.m. at the Hotel Bodenmais, June 23. (Memoranda of conversation; ibid.)

4 On March 22, Callaghan publicly proposed three guarantees for Rhodesian whites: a clause in the constitution protecting minority rights; a return of British nationality for those who lost their citizenship because of Smith’s unilateral declaration of independence; and financial guarantees for those who left Rhodesia after majority rule. (Background paper on Rhodesia, June 17; ibid., Box CL 90, Geopolitical File, Africa, Chronological File, June 23–24, 1976)
Kissinger: And we will keep open the possibility of a later meeting this summer. There will have to be concrete results if there is a second meeting.

It will be helpful if we come to some conclusion on South-West Africa before the UN debate. If we can reach some conclusions which are reasonable, we can do our utmost to avoid a condemnatory debate.

Since no one knows we’re doing it, failure won’t be a problem.

Is that a fair statement, Mr. Prime Minister?

Vorster: Yes. The conference has said three years. Six months have elapsed, so 1978 is the deadline.

Kissinger: That’s correct.

Vorster: But I said to the Secretary of State that the composition will be determined by the conference itself.

Kissinger: But I said to the Prime Minister that the same intelligence that said he was a slow talker told me he’s not without influence on the conference. [Laughter] I believe the latter more than I believe the former.

Vorster: [To Botha:] If you can tell the Secretary about the historical development, what would happen if it were a unitary state.

Botha: If the UN or anyone tried to enforce a unitary state, it would just be murder. It was always divided.

Kissinger: I couldn’t care less whether it’s unitary or federal. Whatever is internationally accepted, we’ll accept.

Botha: It’s 47 per cent Ovambo.

Kissinger: We have no fixed ideas about how the constitution is drafted, as long as it leads to independence. If you look at the black African states, one comes to a melancholy conclusion about what’s likely to happen. But that’s not our problem.

Muller: The Prime Minister and I and Botha have said all the options are open.

Kissinger: We have three objectives—the place of the conference, the terminal date of the conference, and the composition of the conference. The first two can be done this year. The composition can be left for the conference.

Vorster: We don’t have the means of supporting a conference; nor do the other parties.

Kissinger: What role are you prepared to have the UN play in this?

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5 The Turnhalle Constitutional Conference convened in Windhoek beginning in 1975 to draft a constitution for Namibia.
Vorster: We made an offer to the Secretary-General to appoint a person. Escher was named, and he was fired by Waldheim.\(^6\)

Kissinger: Why?

Schaufele: He lost the confidence of the black Africans.

Vorster: We’ll accept a personal representative of Waldheim.

Kissinger: That’s all we need.

Schaufele: If the composition is settled, we can do it.

Vorster: I’ve frankly lost confidence in Waldheim.

Kissinger: Would you like Echeverri?

Vorster: He couldn’t be worse.

Kissinger: Oh yes. We’ve worked well with Waldheim.

Vorster: Our policy is that we are prepared to receive a representative of Waldheim. We are prepared to receive representatives of the Africans to visit on the spot. They haven’t taken us up.

One man I won’t have anything to do with, aside from my friend from SWAPO, is this Irishman—Sean MacBride.\(^7\) Incidentally, his father fought on the Boer side against the British in 1899–1902.

Botha: And was shot by the British.

Muller: It came to our notice there has been some talk in the Nine to send a fact-finding mission to South-West Africa and South Africa.

Schaufele: Right.

Muller: When they didn’t have unanimity, they thought of this. We saw this as good. But they’re less interested recently.

Vorster: Any Ambassador is welcome to come and see for himself.

Kissinger: As I said to the Prime Minister, the issue unfortunately isn’t abstract justice. The blacks in Rhodesia almost certainly won’t be as well off under independence as they are now. The issue is international realities which have to be faced. It’s an unwinnable situation: somewhere along the line it will be lost. The question is not to lose it under pressure.

The tribes in one part probably don’t know the tribes in the other part. Whoever heard in history of Sao Tome and Principe, or Cape Verde? If in each of these states someone had taken over—if the Belgians had had more coastline, they would have cut up their territory into six states like the French, instead of having Zaire. It’s a series of historical accidents.

If the Prime Minister and I meet again, we might meet on the Ascension Islands. [Laughter]

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\(^6\) See Document 73.

\(^7\) Sean MacBride, U.N. Commissioner for Namibia.
Independence Negotiations

Vorster: It would be within easy reach of South Africa, and we wouldn’t need wobblers [babblers]!

Kissinger: We’ll discuss it. We will keep you informed. We will put this package together next month. To be useful on South-West Africa, we need a formula by the end of August. If we are to avoid a confrontation [in the UN].

Fourie: Should we agree on a press line?

Vorster: Yes, otherwise the press will have their own line.

Kissinger: We can say we had a very detailed review of all aspects of southern Africa, that you are going back to South Africa to think about it and I am going back to report to the President, and we will keep in touch and follow it up.

Fourie: “The Prime Minister and Secretary of State had a detailed review of all aspects of southern Africa.”

Vorster: “A discussion in depth.”

Fourie: “… on all aspects of southern Africa.” Then, “the Prime Minister will give these matters further thought, and the Secretary of State will report to the President.”

Kissinger: “We will pursue these matters further through diplomatic channels.”

Botha: These aspects.

Vorster: “Pursue,” or “follow up?”

Kissinger: Which do you prefer?

Vorster: “Follow up.”

Kissinger: Just say, “we will keep in touch about these matters.”

Botha: If I may, I think “follow up” is a better concept.

Kissinger: That’s what it says.

Fourie: “They will follow up on these matters and keep in touch about them.”

Kissinger: I’m giving a press conference in Munich. I’ll be asked by the German press whether I raised my views of South Africa. I’ll say what I said to you: I may do it in three different forms, but I won’t go further. I’ll be asked if we discussed Rhodesia; I’ll say yes. I’ll be asked if we discussed South-West Africa and I’ll say yes. I’ll be asked if we discussed South Africa and I’ll say yes.

Vorster: I will too.

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8 Kissinger held a press conference at Furstenfeldbruck airport in Munich on June 24. For the text of his remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, July 19, 1976, pp. 95–97.
May I say, Mr. Secretary, my colleagues and I are sincerely grateful for these discussions, and we trust that good will come out of it, for southern Africa and for the West.

Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, we appreciate the openness of these discussions, and we too hope it will be of benefit to southern Africa and the world.

Vorster: We hope it will not be another thirty years before we meet again.

Kissinger: If we succeed, there will be a need for another meeting.

Vorster: Because at 90 I won’t be able to attend a conference. [Laughter]

Kissinger: But you’ll still be the Prime Minister. [Laughter]

Vorster: God forbid.

Kissinger: We’ll just say it orally, not issue a statement. I’ll just say to the press that I can’t go into detail. I will say I’ll send Schaufele to see Nyerere, Kaunda, and a few of the others. Because I don’t want to do it in cables. Because if we’re going to bring it off we’ll have to do it fast and with discipline. Especially with this OAU meeting.

Vorster: As I’ve said many times, if it is useful for me to meet with the black African leaders, under your auspices or other auspices, I’m perfectly prepared.

Kissinger: It may be useful at some point.

Vorster: And the same applies to Callaghan.

Kissinger: He’s a good man.

Vorster: I had a good talk with him last year.

Kissinger: Once we put the package together, we have to talk to them in great detail. But in the meantime we have to say something to them. The OAU starts when?

Schaufele: Monday.9

Kissinger: We’ll give them the message that I’m sending you and they shouldn’t do anything irrevocable.

[The conversation ended. The Secretary escorted the Prime Minister to his car at the front door of the Hotel.]

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9 June 28.
197. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 8, 1976, 3:40–4:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

United Kingdom:
Anthony Crosland, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Sir Anthony Duff, Deputy Under Secretary Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Ewen A.J. Fergusson, Private Secretary to Mr. Crosland
Richard C. Samuel, Counselor, British Embassy

United States:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Kenya; UN Security Council; Rhodesia; Namibia

[Rhodesia]

Kissinger: [takes out the UK draft on guarantees, Tab A] The trouble I have with this paper is I wish I could tear it apart and prove how superior . . . Basically it’s what we have in mind. I have a few practical points.

You seem to think Smith has to be replaced first, before negotiations. My view is the longer he stays in place before things start unraveling, until the blacks are organized, the better it is. Things could unravel.

My impression is Vorster would go to Smith first and to David Smith only if it didn’t work. If this were essential to your plan . . . But I don’t think it is.

Crosland: Let’s go through the timetable to see how the procedures are.


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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, June–July 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original.

Paragraph 14, really, first. These are things we’ve got to decide ourselves over the next 3–4 weeks. First, we must agree on elements of a program and do some joint planning so it’s not unilateral.

Kissinger: Good.

Crosland: Then we’ll need broader ministerial authorization. The Cabinet.

Kissinger: Can it be kept secret in London?

Duff: At this stage, and with ministers if it’s a small group.

Kissinger: You seem to think this program requires $1.5 billion over a 20–25 year period. £1.3 billion. South Africa’s estimate is $1.3 billion. But I would assume it will last over 25 years. There may be a stampede.

Duff: It may be irregularly phased, with peaks and troughs.

Kissinger: The larger the appropriation in any one year, the bigger the domestic problem.

Crosland: There should be joint planning.

Duff: We should get, in the next few days, the State Department, and some economists.

Kissinger: The man who is the most ingenious at this is Robinson.

Habib: I’m afraid he won’t have the time to do it. Rogers will be back by the end of the week.

Kissinger: All right, Rogers. But he’ll be very ingenious at coming up with financing schemes.

So, we authorize joint planning. We’ll give Rogers the responsibility but see what Robinson can come up with.

Crosland: Then, who else do we talk to?

Kissinger: I’ve discussed it generally with the Germans.

Crosland: We have too.

Kissinger: They are more willing to help in Namibia.

Crosland: That is my impression exactly. Then the Germans and French.

Kissinger: Not until our plan is ready.

Crosland: That’s what I wondered. We have this European Council, and Jim and I could pull Schmidt and Giscard off to the side.

Kissinger: Not all the Nine.

Crosland: No. The Prime Minister will do it. That’s number two.

Kissinger: So the British and we will work out an inducement scheme, and they will talk to the Germans and French.

I’ve promised to keep the South Africans informed. I’ll tell them a little less than we’ve told the French and Germans—that we’re working out an inducement scheme but it’s not ready yet.
Crosland: When do we actually unfold the scheme to Vorster? Hopefully the end of July.

Kissinger: Yes.

Crosland: We can encourage them in the meantime, but at the end of July you—in other words, an American—would go to them and unfold the plan and hold him to the pledge he gave you.

Duff: I’m told they have an Ambassador here . . .

Kissinger: He was present at all the meetings.

Duff: So you could give your encouragement through him. The bigger scheme . . .

Kissinger: They are eager to get me to go to South Africa. I’m willing to do it if they can assure me he’ll accept. I won’t go there for a failure.

Duff: I heard that Vorster didn’t want to associate the next step in Namibia with your meeting.

Kissinger: With the meeting in Germany. On the next phase they do want to associate us. We do, as you say, have to move with speed. Because the Soviets, Ian Smith, and the radical Africans will all have an incentive to destroy it.

Tony, should you and I do something jointly in putting a package together to the blacks? I don’t want to be the one who deals with the whites while you deal with the blacks.

Crosland: That suits me fine! [Laughter] It seems to me that talking to the blacks should be immediately after putting it to Vorster.

Kissinger: There is something to be said for doing it simultaneously. To go to the blacks first, then to Vorster, then to the Africans again.

Duff: Schaufele is there now.

Kissinger: Presenting the concept. As Jim suggested, we’re urging them to ask you to do something. You are relatively in the clear as far as the black states are concerned.

We’ll keep you informed. And if we can know what you’re doing . . .

Duff: We have done nothing yet.

Kissinger: We are just telling them the concept—that there is opposition in the U.S. but it can be handled if we move rapidly; that issues like the Byrd Amendment³ can be handled if it’s settled; and third, the idea of guarantees should be explored. And if it’s agreeable, we’ll go to you.

³ See Document 55.
Schaufele is instructed to talk only with the heads of governments. And without our Ambassadors.

Where should the planning be? Washington is easier for us.

Duff: London is easier for us, but we’ll do it here.

Habib: Rogers will be here Saturday.\(^4\) We should start Monday.

Duff: We wanted to start next week.

Crosland: The timing of the approaches . . .

Kissinger: My idea is as close to simultaneous as possible.

Crosland: That is a point of disagreement. We were considering approaching the blacks and Vorster at the end of July, but not have it completed until the end of September.

Duff: Tactics depend on how to approach the white Rhodesians. Our concept was that it would be only the incoming Rhodesian government that would get the goodies.

Kissinger: I have to rely on what Vorster told me. He felt confident he could sell it to Ian Smith. And if it didn’t work he was sure he could get David Smith to do it. I don’t have the sense that Vorster is one who talks idly.

Duff: No.

Kissinger: It would be easier domestically for us with Smith.

Crosland: It would be easier for us the other way.

Duff: The key is what will work best with the Europeans in Rhodesia. It used to be the wisdom that only Ian Smith could do it. Lately, we’ve changed. The problem is that anything associated with Ian Smith will stink in African nostrils.

Lord: The British weren’t sure David Smith had the stomach for it.

Duff: Could our two services get together to work on it?

Kissinger: To get information, or to undermine Smith?

Duff: Both. I’m not sure we want to undermine Smith.

Kissinger: If turmoil begins in Rhodesia while we are putting this together, the black Africans will have no incentive to settle it.

Crosland: A new government will come in only if there has been a change in opinion, which this package is precisely designed to bring about.

Kissinger: Why would it hurt domestically if Ian Smith turned it over to you?

Crosland: Our party will note that the financial inducements going to a small group of whites are more than to the rest of the world. There is deep mistrust and hatred of Smith.

\(^4\) July 10.
Kissinger: It will be hard to convince black Africa that Smith means it. No question about it.

Duff: Once the constitutional principles are agreed on and we come in, the governor will form a mixed government in a transition period to majority rule. Will Ian Smith be in it?

Kissinger: No, no. Smith won’t be in it. The only difference is the nuance of whether the agreement by which he is replaced is signed by him or by someone else. If it is someone else, it would look like a coup.

Crosland: The appearance of a coup will have enormous advantages in Britain—and would change the political atmosphere.

Kissinger: Smith is an obstacle but is also a bargaining chip. If they think he’s hard to dislodge, they have an incentive to agree. If he’s replaced by someone who has no stomach for fighting, they may decide to keep the war going.

Crosland: It’s the problem of deciding the fate of a country which one knows bugger all about.

Kissinger: Yes. We’ll see. Maybe when I see Vorster he’ll say it can’t be done with Smith.

Lord: The psychology of the white Rhodesians is important.

Kissinger: In a way I’m a prisoner of Vorster’s judgment. He says he’ll get Ian Smith to accept it and if not he’ll get David Smith to. With David Smith we will need even more speed [to keep it from unraveling].

Crosland: We can decide these two options at a later time.

At the moment, white Rhodesian opinion has no idea these inducements are being offered. But the government is to be changed before these are offered.

Kissinger: I personally think getting an agreement signed is more important than who signs it. Because in either case, he leaves. So the question is whether in order to get an agreement, we have to get rid of Ian Smith.

Crosland: Yes.

Kissinger: In which case, we will need more time. It may be we have no option, and what you have here is the only way to go.

Crosland: I see the point. But it may be the other way around. The next stage is the Prime Minister of Rhodesia—Smith or whoever—goes to Nkomo and says, “I accept the terms I rejected last year on that—whatever the name of that bridge.”

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5 A reference to the Victoria Falls Bridge, which linked Zambia and Rhodesia. The meeting was held in late August 1975 on a train positioned to allow the Rhodesians to negotiate in Rhodesia and the ANC in Zambia.
Duff: But can he be trusted?

Kissinger: Why do we care? If he accepts all the terms. Once the agreement is signed, a new government is constituted. It is that government which organizes the elections, not Smith. To be plausible, it will be headed by a black.

Duff: But the agreement should lay out the principles on which majority rule will be done—majority rule within two years, entrenched rights. Would there be an intermediate stage, where Smith says he recognizes what has to be done and urges his fellows to accept and then resigns?

Kissinger: I don’t mind that.

Duff: That could be one way to do it.

Kissinger: I think it’s very important to keep the threat of Smith’s resistance to get this done. It’s the prospect of a five-year guerrilla war.

Crosland: That’s with the three peaceful Presidents.6

Kissinger: Yes, with the three peaceful Presidents. Machel, one doesn’t know. He may not be so tough but one has to assume it.

What is your present best estimate on the financial side? What do we have to commit to per year?

Duff: £50–60 million a year over 20 years. It depends on how much in fact one has to pay out in pensions. For the people who stay, the Rhodesians can pay the pensions. I think £2,000 million total.

Kissinger: How much will you be expected to assume?

Crosland: Whatever we can’t persuade you and the Germans to assume. [Laughter]

Kissinger: We’ll have a hell of a time in the Congress.

Lord: How many countries will be involved?

Crosland: The Germans will contribute a bit. The French may do a token bit, just to establish their standing.

Kissinger: The Germans will contribute in Namibia—it will help—but their contribution won’t be spectacular in Rhodesia.

Duff: South Africa will contribute.

Kissinger: No. He said he would not. Not money.

Duff: But many are Afrikaners.

Kissinger: Maybe it was not his last word, but I didn’t press him.

Crosland: The trouble is, we have to make these expenditure cuts for no objective reason—because of that fresh-faced young Harvard man of yours.

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6 That is, Kaunda, Nyerere, and Khama.
Independence Negotiations

Kissinger: Parsky! First of all, he’s Princeton [Laughter]. I don’t think we can do more than 50 percent of it.

If you can give us your best estimate of how that curve will run.
Duff: We don’t have to tie it to requests. We could limit it per year.
Lord: But wouldn’t it be front-loaded?
Kissinger: But their scheme is designed to increase the funds if they stay. But there might be a mass exodus.
Duff: Less money, more quickly.
Lord: Then it is geared to certain groups.
Duff: We may have to come off that.
Kissinger: Would Canada contribute?
Crosland: The white Commonwealth might contribute, certainly if resettlement became a problem. Certainly at that point. Whether they would contribute to the initial fund, I don’t know.
Kissinger: Let us know what the Germans and French say.
Duff: We will. Through the Embassy.
Kissinger: Do it through the State Department people here.
Crosland: When does Schaufele get back?
Kissinger: The end of next week. But we will give you interim reports.

We will have something from [his meeting with] Kaunda tomorrow or Saturday. I’ll let you know on the yacht.

Namibia

Crosland: Anything else, Henry, on this? Or have we taken it as far as we can?
Kissinger: Namibia. You know what we are doing on Namibia.
Crosland: I don’t know if we have a total meeting of the minds.
Duff: We are a little worried about Vorster’s proposition. I told this to Bill Schaufele. Our feeling is that moving the Windhoek Conference to Geneva won’t be sufficient to get SWAPO.
Kissinger: This grew out of Nyerere’s letter. He said we should move it to Lusaka and he would see to it that SWAPO dropped its claim. So we put it to Vorster. He agreed, but not to Lusaka.
Duff: We are not sure.

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7 Telegram 1750 from Lusaka, July 8, reported on Schaufele’s meeting with Kaunda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840083–0723)
8 Telegram 2093 from Dar es Salaam, June 6, transmitted Nyerere’s letter to Kissinger. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, Box 26, June 6–13, 1976, Latin America Tosec (1))
Kissinger: What else would have to be done?

Duff: Probably call it a different conference. I agreed with Bill Schaufele that we had 2 different perceptions. We will hear from Schaufele next week.

Kissinger: It is not an American scheme. I think it will be difficult to sell another conference to Vorster, at least until the end of August.

Duff: We have an official in Windhoek who has been trying to soften them up there. He’s in fact talking to Schaufele today in Lusaka.

Kissinger: What does your official say?

Duff: He reports cautious interest among the ethnic groups in Namibia. There is one thing that does bother us—that this same official was told that the South Africans are working on a statement for use in the UN in August. We feel that August would be too late.

Kissinger: I agree. But I don’t think Vorster has told too many of his people. Of course, Namibia and Rhodesia don’t have to be done together. But certainly before the UN debate.

Duff: Probably you are right, sir. The South African Foreign Ministry doesn’t know all that is in their Prime Minister’s mind.

What have you told the French?

Kissinger: I’ve discussed it with Giscard, who told me explicitly not to raise it with the Foreign Office. At Puerto Rico, when the President tried to raise it with Sauvagnargues present, Giscard steered it away. Which means Jim should raise it with Giscard . . .

Crosland: Without Sauvagnargues.

Duff: On Namibia, we have always acted tripartitely.

Kissinger: On Namibia, I have told them very little, only that there is an idea to move it. Nyerere has raised it with a number of the EC–9 countries.

Duff: Yes. This is where we got a number of different interpretations.

Kissinger: Giscard didn’t know the subject very well. So we discussed it only briefly. Perhaps because he wanted to talk with Sauvagnargues first, or because he wanted to discuss it without Sauvagnargues.

The President and Giscard had a breakfast, and when the President raised it he pointedly steered it away. We have not gone into it with the French in such detail.

Crosland: Okay?

Kissinger: Okay.

Crosland: Thank you very much.

Kissinger: You like short meetings.
Crosland: This is short? An hour?
Rodman: An hour and ten minutes.
[The meeting concluded.]

198. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass on to you the following report of his meeting with Prime Minister Callaghan. 2

“I had a breakfast and meeting Thursday with Callaghan for almost two-and-a-half hours at Number Ten Downing Street. We talked mainly about Southern Africa.

“Callaghan told me he praises you to every American who comes through London, and he expressed confidence you would win. He was confident also about his own domestic economic situation. He will announce tomorrow that Britain has cut its inflation down to 12.8 per cent (roughly in half). I told him his new economic program was a courageous decision. He felt that with this program, with the unions’ continued cooperation, and with the on-schedule development of North Sea oil, they would be on their feet.

“We then turned to Rhodesia. Callaghan thought we were up against heavy odds; Britain had been living with the problem for over ten years. But he was ready to cooperate. America’s active involvement and South Africa’s cooperation were two big new factors on the positive side. He repeated the British fear that Ian Smith was a hard man to crack, and quite skilled in maneuvering and evasion. I said that for this reason we all had to move fast. Callaghan agreed.

“We then worked out the following scenario:

—First, we will complete work on the economic package that U.S. and British experts have been putting together, the guarantees to induce the whites to stay in a majority-ruled Rhodesia. This should be finished early next week.


2 Scowcroft received the report in a telegram from London, August 5. (Ibid., Box CL 266, Cables File, Kissinger, Henry, May 26–August 6, 1976)
—Secondly, the British will draft necessary legislation to assert British authority over Rhodesia. The South Africans regard some transitional period and some British presence as essential. Callaghan is fearful of a formal British authority that implicitly commits him to use British troops if necessary to back it up; he is, however, willing to have Parliament confer legal authority on a council of interested parties in Rhodesia to negotiate the way to independence and majority rule, with a civilian British presence to monitor the negotiations.

—Third, we will draft documents which will secure African, South African and international agreement to the new political arrangements.

—When these are complete, which should be in about two weeks, I will send Bill Rogers and Bill Schaufele to give Nyerere and Kaunda a general idea and obtain their overall agreement. The British will send a team of their own to Africa with the same purpose, shortly afterward.

—With the Black Africans lined up, I will take it to Vorster early in September. With his approval, we will then proceed to put the arrangements into effect rapidly with the Black Africans.

“We reached general agreement also on Namibia, i.e., to move the Constitutional Conference from Windhoek to Geneva, invite SWAPO, and give a terminal date for independence. The British, having no responsibility, would like to move faster. But this is the maximum Vorster will take now. The British have agreed to keep at least silent on their preferences.

“Callaghan and I agreed our two countries would proceed jointly on these issues from here on.”
199. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 16, 1976, 2:25–2:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Amb. R.F. Botha, Ambassador of South Africa
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Frank G. Wisner, Country Director for South Africa
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Kissinger: Two things. You expressed some doubts about meeting in Europe.

Botha: That’s correct, sir.

Kissinger: Let me express my view. I agree with you the thing won’t be settled unless I talked to the top people there. But it also won’t get settled if the blacks think they can drive me crazy. If I go to Africa and go to Pretoria first, then they’ve got me, because—if it fails—they’ll have me in the position of having put myself at the mercy of the racist Vorster. That’s what they’ll say. If I meet you elsewhere, and then go to black Africa, and then Pretoria—that way it is in the course of negotiations. And if it’s going to fail, I can send Schaufele. You will have put forward a good proposal.

As for where to meet. Maybe Switzerland, Berne. Geneva. Geneva doesn’t have particularly good meeting places.

Botha: Zurich is very nice.

Kissinger: Some mountains.

Botha: The Matterhorn!

Kissinger: That’s a little high. [Laughter.] Maybe Rio.

I don’t know what the Brazilians would think.

Botha: The climate is always warm there.

Kissinger: This is winter. It would be pleasant. It’s a little frivolous for Afrikaners. [Laughter.]

Botha: Mr. Secretary, I think my Prime Minister was a bit upset. The ball is starting to roll. He is worried about the time. He thought you could go directly to the Africans.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, August 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. All brackets, except as noted in the footnotes below, are in the original.
Kissinger: I don’t exclude it; it depends on whether they are accommodating to Bill. If they say, “For God’s sakes, let’s do it.”

Botha: That’s all the Prime Minister wanted to know.

Kissinger: But it puts you at a disadvantage. If they make demands you can’t meet, you are put in the position of breaking up the negotiations.

Botha: We wonder whether you are putting too much stock in what the black Africans are saying. It’s a lot of bluff with these fellows usually.

Kissinger: Just don’t lose your cool. I can’t understand nervous Afrikaners. The meaner you are, the better.

Botha: Can I show you this? [He shows the Secretary a summary of a *Le Monde* interview with Machel, Tab A.]²

Kissinger: We got a message too from Machel.³ He too is worried about this Rhodesian raid⁴ and wants us to get the negotiations moving. Not bad.

Botha: You told us not to convey to the British anything. It’s been done [answer conveyed to the British], but in words that we have to study it first.

Kissinger: Good. Here [Tab B] is the paper we are thinking of. They [the British] have the idea the white minority should have a veto over constitutional changes. We shouldn’t get so precise when we are in exploratory negotiations. We won’t show this to the blacks, because they will start bargaining from it. I can’t exclude that the British won’t. Bill will be instructed to say that if there is a discrepancy between what the British say and what we say, ours is governing.

Botha: It is not good if you and the British are selling different things.

Kissinger: I’m worried about the British.

Botha: You must pardon my emphasizing this, Mr. Secretary, but if the British try to sell the Africans something different, it is bad.

Kissinger: I agree.

Botha: It won’t work, Mr. Secretary.

² Attached but not printed. Samora Machel told *Le Monde*: “South Africa needs us as much as we need it—I do not spend sleepless nights over our relations with South Africa.” Machel expressed concern that South Africa might cut its links to Mozambique in retaliation for FRELIMO activities against Rhodesia.

³ Telegram 917 from Maputo, August 14, transmitted Machel’s comments on the Rhodesian raid. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840123–0595)

⁴ *The New York Times* reported that on August 10 Rhodesian troops crossed into Mozambique and killed 300 guerrillas in a camp used to launch attacks against Rhodesia. (“Rhodesia Says It Attacked Rebel Site in Mozambique,” August 11, 1976, p. 1)
Independence Negotiations

Kissinger: This paper will be the same. This is agreed. But the British may tell them more of the details than we do.

Botha: As for the possibility of our exerting pressure on Machel, the answer is yes, we have leverage but it is a two-edged sword. If we use it, we forfeit it. So we shouldn’t use it easily. That is something for you to discuss with my Prime Minister.

Kissinger: Yes, and Bill may see Machel.

Botha: It would be good if you see Kenyatta. Your relations are good.

Kissinger: Excellent. I saw a report he likes me better than any Westerner since Duncan Sandys. [Laughter.] Maybe Bill can see Kenyatta.

Botha: If it prolongs his trip . . .

Kissinger: I want him back.

Wisner [to Schaufele:] You’re going through Nairobi.

Kissinger: But it is senseless to see that half-witted Foreign Minister.

Schaufele: Our Ambassador is seeing Kenyatta.

Kissinger: All right, we’ll send a letter from me.

Botha: If they think Dr. Kissinger is coming, that they like.

Kissinger: For a practitioner of apartheid, you are throwing me in with a lot of blacks. [Laughter.] I’ll have to go to the Ivory Coast, Nigeria.

Botha: Nigeria. In the middle of Angola, the previous head of Nigeria sent a man to us and asked for a document from us. We stuck to our deal, and they didn’t.

Kissinger: What was the agreement?

Botha: If we would consider withdrawing our troops, they would exert a strong influence to get the Cubans out. We were prepared, but they did nothing. They just hammered us publicly.

Kissinger: This document—you should let us know in a day or two whether you think it’s a reasonable basis for proceeding. It won’t be communicated to anyone else.

Then the two Bills will go to Tanzania, Zambia, and maybe Mozambique.

Then I’ll trigger the whole thing. I’ll meet your Prime Minister. If they react favorably to Bill, I may go directly to black Africa.

Botha: Right, sir.

[Secretary Kissinger and Amb. Botha conferred alone from 2:45 to 2:55 p.m.]
SUMMARY OF THE RHODESIAN PLAN

The plan which has been developed for Rhodesia spells out a comprehensive strategy to bring an end to the crisis and lead that country to majority rule. It provides political and economic incentives to the European minority sufficiently persuasive to encourage that minority to stay in post-majority rule Rhodesia. The plan aims at establishing under the most propitious conditions a moderate black African government. It sets forth those steps necessary to launch an independent Rhodesia on a course of political stability and economic progress, thereby removing the causes of Soviet intervention.

Although, in the interest of flexibility, some points of detail remain to be worked out, the plan proceeds from the participation of and a commitment to its success by the British government, the strong and determined backing of the United States, most reasonable prospects for generous international support in developed countries and the understanding and likely acceptance of those of black Africa’s leaders most directly involved as well as Rhodesia’s moderate nationalist leadership.

In addition to the promise of independence under majority rule, the plan provides Rhodesia’s black population a real economic stake in the future and spells out mechanisms for bringing development assistance to Rhodesia, which would be directed into ways most likely to rapidly improve black incomes. The plan addresses those conditions which are most likely to encourage Rhodesia’s white minority to stay. In this regard:

(a) The plan addresses compensation for those who may wish to or be forced to leave as well as economic incentives for those Europeans who choose to remain.

(b) It calls for the formation of a Rhodesian Parliament in which the European minority would have a sufficiently strong voice to make sure unacceptable constitutional changes do not occur.

(c) It foresees the organization of a moderate black government, preferably with Joshua Nkomo as the Chief Minister, which could hold European support and confidence.

(d) It predicates an orderly transfer of power so that the discipline of Rhodesia’s security forces and civil service is maintained.

(e) British political representation in Salisbury is provided for in order to add stability to the process of transition. Britain’s political presence would remain long enough—eighteen months to two years—

Bracketed insertion by the editor.
to give white Rhodesians a chance to make a reasonable estimate of their future and prospects.

(f) Finally, the plan foresees the lifting of economic sanctions and the active encouragement of private foreign investment.

Scenario

—The plan for bringing Rhodesia to majority rule spells out those steps which will lead up to independence. In summary, these steps include:

(a) The present regime would accept the principle of majority rule and give way to a caretaker government. The Rhodesian Legislative Assembly would be dissolved.

(b) The caretaker government would begin negotiations with black Rhodesians and the governments of African states would declare their support for the process.

(c) The Parliament of the United Kingdom would pass enabling legislation and appoint representation.

(d) The caretaker government would give way to an interim administration in which Joshua Nkomo would serve as Chief Minister. At this point, economic sanctions would be raised and the insurgency brought to an end.

Political Understandings

_Political Assurances._ The assurances contained in the plan are general and are designed to provide the basis for further negotiations. Once a caretaker government and Rhodesia’s black nationalists, with British representatives present, sit down at the bargaining table, the details will be negotiated in a manner which meets the realities of the present situation.

—Whatever the precise outcome, the political understandings would be based on a constitutional declaration of rights protecting every individual regardless of color, race or tribe.

—Loss of property without compensation would be prohibited.

—An independent judiciary would be established; its authorities would be protected under the constitution.

—An independent electoral commission would draw electoral boundaries but the precise form of the franchise would have to be negotiated.

—in organizing the legislature, it is understood that European Rhodesians would have a sufficiently strong voice to make sure that unacceptable constitutional changes do not occur.

_Interim Government._ The transitional administration would be legalized by Britain and would be formed with British cooperation.
—Britain would appoint a representative in Salisbury and Parliament would pass a new act which would give the British government the powers it needs to carry out its responsibilities.

—The act would contain provisions to protect officers of the present government from prosecution or civil suit for acts retrospectively determined illegal.

—The precise form of interim government remains to be worked out; to an important degree it will have to be negotiated between the present regime and the African nationalists. However, it is understood that Britain will play a role in the government; the interim regime would include both blacks and Europeans.

Economic Incentives and Assurances

The economic section of the plan defines the undertakings of the international community as well as those of the future Rhodesian government. The plan, moreover, addresses the country’s future economic development, public and private investment, and the economic security of the European community.

—It is understood that no third country contributing resources to the Rhodesian economic program would do so until those resources had been approved under normal constitutional processes.

—The system of economic assurances as it relates to the future of the European community is designed to maximize incentives for white Rhodesians to stay rather than leave, to improve prospects that the new government will honor its commitments, and to guarantee the security of new investments, both foreign and domestic. The assurances are based on the fundamental principle that the new government will be committed to the respect of private property or fair value compensation, should property be nationalized.

—The plan spells out a program of special arrangements for the European community in four important areas:

(a) Pensions. The existing terms of public service with respect to pensions and severance pay would be maintained for all pensionable officials, police and members of the armed forces.

(b) Household Property. To maintain the value of household property, stand-by purchase arrangements would be made which would provide 30 percent of the 1975 value of a house if it were sold in the first year of Rhodesian independence and 75 percent if it were sold in the fifth. To guard against inflation, house values would be index-linked. Transactions could be carried out under a special residential property holding corporation.

(c) Farm Lands. A new agricultural land commission would be established to repurchase agricultural properties being vacated by Euro-
peans. Compensation would take place along the lines similar to that designed for the repurchase of houses. However, payments would be spread over a longer period of time.

(d) Transfer of Assets. The new government would permit a reasonable flow of remittances. A European deciding to leave immediately could convert and remit 10 percent of his liquid assets or a lump sum of, for example, RH $5000 in the first year and an additional 10 percent in each year thereafter. Incentives would be designed to encourage Europeans to keep earnings, savings and profits within Rhodesia by providing for larger remittances in future years.

—The international community would be organized to underwrite the special assurances of the new government to its European community and a mechanism in the form of an internationally managed trust fund would be set up. While acquisition of lands, homes and pension payments would be financed from internal Rhodesian sources, the trust fund would back up government commitments and provide seed capital. The fund would also provide the Rhodesian government with the foreign exchange necessary to enable it to maintain remittances.

—The British Government would assume responsibility for bringing together the international trust fund. The United States Government would assist the British Government in this regard. The size of the fund is yet to be decided.

—Special attention is given in the plan to the generation of foreign investment resources for Rhodesia’s development—particularly in the most promising sectors of the nation’s economic activity, national [natural?]

6 Bracketed insertion by the editor.

7 The Lome Convention, signed on February 28, 1975, was an agreement between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries (ACP) group and the European Community that aimed at supporting the ACP states’ development efforts.
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200.  Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 17, 1976, 2:45–3:03 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
  Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
  Charles W. Robinson, Deputy Secretary of State
  Amb. Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
  Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
  Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
  Frank G. Wisner, Country Director for South Africa
  Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Schaufele: We have the British beef. [He gives the Secretary Frank Wisner's report, at Tab A.]²

Kissinger: [Reads it:] I didn’t know Sir Anthony Duff was going to Fourie.

Schaufele: We just found out yesterday.

Kissinger: The British perception is 100% the opposite of ours. They want to tie up the South Africans totally before any other move.

Schaufele: And they want more traditional negotiations.

Lord: Two out of three of their gripes are hogwash. Obviously the time frame has to be short, and obviously they’re not bound unless the others are.

Kissinger: Their method will lead to a stalemate. Fourie will say no; that immediately stalemates their efforts in black Africa.

Wisner: The Duff mission was first meant to backstop yours, and to show it has British full faith and credit.

Kissinger: Bullshit. It’s our full faith and credit that’s important to South Africa.

Lord: If you give the South Africans the full text, they’ll nitpick.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 347, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, Internal, August 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initiated by Rodman. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. Brackets, except those that indicate corrections, are in the original.

² Tab A is a memorandum from Wisner to Schaufele, August 17, summarizing British reservations about a summary (Tab B to Document 199) that Kissinger gave Botha on August 16. The British reservations were that the summary implied the British would assume responsibility for Rhodesia during the interim period; that the summary did not emphasize that majority rule had to be reached within one and one-half to two years; and that the summary did not stipulate that the plan had the full financial and political support of the British Government. The British wanted Botha to have the full text, not just the summary.
Kissinger: No, I gave them only the summary because the full text was too favorable to the whites. I’m afraid we won’t be able to deliver it all.

Get Samuel in and tell him: We’ll make absolutely sure the South Africans understand it’s a summary. Second, we agree it should be under two years; in fact we think it should be one year.

Third, we urgently disagree with passing the full document because once that’s accepted, it deprives us of all flexibility in the negotiation. Once we get off it, it’ll lead to massive difficulties.

In addition, their method won’t work. Support [Suppose] Fourie says fine; Duff will run up to Dar and give the document there. It will explode.

Maybe they think they’ll conduct the negotiations.
Schaufele: They know the South Africans don’t trust them.
Kissinger: They may think that with the South Africans signed up, they can do it.

My objection was that the document was too favorable to the Rhodesians and deprived us of flexibility. We want their general agreement so we can wrap it up in one final assault. Instead of this stately process.

Robinson: Is there any difference between the summary and final document?
Schaufele: I don’t think so. The qualifiers aren’t there, though.
Kissinger: The inconsistency is between what we want and what they want. They want to topple Smith; we want a solution. They think they can conduct the negotiation.

Robinson: Did they accept the text?
Kissinger: It’s their text.
Wisner: They have a domestic problem with overextending their responsibilities. They can say to Parliament this is as far as they can go.
Kissinger: They misread the South Africans. And if they go to the blacks and say it’s accepted by the South Africans, they certainly won’t accept a South African plan. We’ll give the blacks even less.

Wisner: That’s their assumption. Samuel knows that.
Kissinger: Why should we give to the South Africans now, to hang onto, the concept of three rolls?
Tell Samuel I’ll meet with Vorster in Europe and then I’ll give him the full text. If he jumps off, that’ll give us a safety margin.

When he says, “His government,” that means Duff.
Schaufele: And Rowlands, the Minister of State.
Rodman: Duff is a nitpicker.
Schaufele: Here is something in Tanzania. [He hands the Secretary the report of his meeting with Tanzanian Ambassador Bomani, Tab B.]3
Kissinger: Did you tell him we haven’t agreed with Vorster on anything?
Schaufele: Yes.
Kissinger: The whole point of the exercise is to get his agreement. What did you say about factions [point 2 of Bomani’s complaint]?
Schaufele: I said the whole point was to avoid another Angola.
Kissinger: And on the third point?
Schaufele: The third point is Namibia. I told him we were doing it.
Kissinger: [Turns to talking points drafted for Schaufele/Rogers trip to Africa:] These talking points are inadequate.4
Don’t make it liberal bullshit about bloodshed. They don’t mind bloodshed.
Lord: Make it in terms of a rapid settlement versus a protracted one.
Kissinger: Yes, put it in terms of a protracted conflict with its increasing possibilities of outside intervention: I need the backing of the Africans; I’m not going there to produce a South African solution. But we have to prepare the ground.
If Duff wants to leave the paper there, OK. But I think it could be embarrassing to the South Africans. Tell Samuel they have our absolute assurance that if we fall off the paper, if anything it’ll be more onerous on the Rhodesians. They’re so beaten up by Ian Smith they think we’ll use the latitude to strengthen the restrictions.
We’re trying to create the conditions where South Africa can bring pressure. We’re asking them to bring pressure on Namibia and Rhodesia too, and there is a limit to what the traffic will bear.
And hint here [in the trip talking points] that the British role isn’t that crucial.
Robinson: Will these be reviewed with Duff?
Schaufele: No. Later, yes.
Kissinger: Say, I want to review the concept with them. Don’t give them the 1978 date yet. We’ll do it later. I don’t even want to give it to the British.
“We know there are reservations.” Shall I send a violinist along? We’re not paying people to stay. We’re creating incentives to stay—they get paid only for leaving, but they get paid less if they leave ear-

3 Not attached.
4 Not attached.
lier. The reason for this is, one, domestic reasons in the United States; two, domestic reasons in South Africa; three, domestic reasons in Britain, whatever these pantywaists say; and four, the economy of Zimbabwe.

Habib: Give them something about the time frame.
Kissinger: Say it has to be rapid.

201. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Bush to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

[less than 1 line not declassified] Talks between Prime Ministers Vorster and Smith on 13 June 1976

1. [less than 1 line not declassified] a conversation between Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and South African Prime Minister B.J. Vorster on 13 June. [4 lines not declassified]

2. [less than 1 line not declassified] trying to elicit from Prime Minister Smith some arguments in favor of the Rhodesian government’s position, arguments which Vorster presumably could use in his then projected meeting with Secretary Kissinger. [less than 1 line not declassified] does not show Vorster making any threat to cut off military supplies to Rhodesia, but [less than 1 line not declassified] does show Vorster encouraging Smith to take some steps to get negotiations started with the black Rhodesian leadership. In particular, Vorster pushes Smith on the issue of accepting black-white parity in a future Rhodesian parliament.

3. Among the more notable points of interest [less than 1 line not declassified]

—Smith’s first priority is to clearly establish authority in the security field as this is vital and basic to successful negotiations. In this regard, Rhodesian security depends a great deal on the concept of the

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 91, Geopolitical File, Africa, Chronological File, August 16–20, 1976. Secret; Noforn; Not releasable to contractors or consultants. A copy was sent to Scowcroft.

2 The meeting on June 24; see Document 196.
“Fire Force” which utilizes helicopters both to track terrorists to their camps and to direct ground forces to seek out and destroy these camps.

—According to Smith, FRELIMO has been firing 122mm rockets against Rhodesian targets for some time, necessitating a Rhodesian offensive which knocked out the positions and destroyed ammunition in Mozambique.

—FRELIMO has so many internal and factional problems that they are killing one another “by the day, by the dozen”, according to Rhodesian estimates.

—Smith believes that Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo are still Rhodesia’s best bet, not necessarily a good bet but the best bet. Nonetheless, Smith alleges that Nkomo has been acting “irresponsibly” and Smith is under pressure within his party to remove him. If there are ZAPU guerrilla attacks from Zambia, Smith will have no option but to “neutralize him”. In response to Prime Minister Vorster’s objections to such a course of action, Smith said he has withstood these pressures thus far, but with Nkomo consorting with the terrorists it is difficult to argue against the proponents of “neutralization”.

—Speaking of Nkomo’s standing with the blacks in Rhodesia, Smith said he is in the minority. Bishop Muzorewa, although out of the country, still has a surprising amount of support within Rhodesia. According to Smith, Muzorewa’s faction has indicated that if there are going to be more talks, they would like to be in, and not out, this time. Smith attributes this to the government’s efforts to convince the tribal chiefs and, through them, their followers that the best thing to do is to cooperate and work with the Rhodesian Government.

—Smith’s political objective is gradually to mobilize more support from the blacks, particularly urban blacks, in order to be in a position to say that he has the support of blacks, as well as whites. In response to Vorster’s query regarding Smith’s conception of ultimate majority rule, Smith said his aim is the best possible government, “irrespective of color”. “What we aim to do is to have certain standards”, but he did not “believe that the path to majority rule was something that could be measured in terms of the clock or the calendar”.

—In response to Vorster’s comment that American interest has introduced a new dimension into the Rhodesian situation, Smith said he believes this is an advantage—the more that countries like America, France and West Germany can be implicated, the better. “It can only strengthen our hands”. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) will oppose any solution to the situation, even a reasonable one, and the support of these Western countries will be valuable.

—Smith said communist terrorism in Rhodesia must be stopped and, in this regard, he sees a chance for a breakthrough in what he un-
derstood to be the American decision to suspend support for Mozambique as long as terrorists continue to operate from Mozambique.

—Vorster noted that the West was frightened by the possibility of a communist or Marxist takeover in Rhodesia similar to that in Angola, but at the same time the West believed that to prevent such a takeover, the non-Marxist and even non-militant blacks must be advanced politically. The West, Vorster said, is wedded to the idea of one man, one vote—they don’t look upon Rhodesians as black and white; they look upon them as people.

—Vorster feels certain that President Ford will not be reelected, and that Jimmy Carter is the next man with whom the South Africans will be dealing. Foreign Minister Muller said Secretary Kissinger was believed to be on his way out as well, but that if he could be given something (some evidence of progress), he might make a special final effort to be of assistance, not only to improve his image but to give the Ford administration something to show to the public before the election.

—In Smith’s view, the compelling argument to be used in discussions with the Americans or other Westerners should be that they do not want a repeat of Angola and Mozambique, that is, a communist takeover of Rhodesia. In Vorster’s view, should the Soviets and Cubans move into Rhodesia tomorrow in full force, apart from shouting to high heaven, nobody is going to lift a finger to stop them. Before the West will listen, Smith must offer some concrete evidence that he is prepared to move toward majority rule.

—In talking to the West, Vorster said South Africa has a similar weakness in the South West Africa issue—“you can’t talk [take?] the timetable question out of their heads, yet the question of a timetable is entirely in the hands of the South West African peoples. South Africa is not prepared to specify a schedule and will not allow the United Nations or anybody else to lay down a schedule.”

—Smith told Vorster that in pressing him for a firm statement about ultimate intentions, the South Africans are asking the Rhodesians to “sign our death warrant and to put a certain time limit on it. We are going to try to get the maximum time and we want to leave ourselves in the best possible position to maneuver and to negotiate. Smith would have to discuss any such statements with his colleagues in Salisbury, as he had during the negotiations with Nkomo. When the talks with Nkomo broke down, his colleagues in the Rhodesian Front heaved a sigh of relief and said well thank God, we worked through that one and we are now back to where we were.”

—Smith would make no promises regarding parity in Parliament, and said it would be a very difficult concept for him to persuade his colleagues to accept. Moreover, there is a hardening attitude in the Rhode-
sian Front Party against settlement, against compromise—many have told Smith that he has already gone too far in bringing so many blacks into the government.

—Then, all we can tell Secretary Kissinger now, said Vorster, is that you are more determined than ever to face the escalating terrorism; you are prepared to face the economic problems which are ahead; and you are no longer sure that you can agree even to parity. In response Smith said, “We must go on for majority rule but this must be evolutionary as opposed to revolution; I believe I’ve the majority of black support in this—not only white support.”

4. The overall impression is that Smith is dodging and hedging and shows little inclination to accept Vorster’s recommendations.

5. A copy of this memorandum and the attachment are being made available to the Honorable Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

George Bush
202. Memorandum of Conversation

London, September 4, 1976, 10:40 a.m.–12:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

UK:
Anthony R. Crosland, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Edward Rowlands, MP, Minister of State
Sir Michael Palliser, Permanent Under Secretary
Sir Antony Duff, Deputy Under Secretary
Dennis Grennan, Special Adviser on African Affairs
Patrick Laver, Head of Rhodesia Dept.
Sir Peter Ramsbotham, British Ambassador to the United States
Richard Dales, Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

US:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
William D. Rogers, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Under Secretary for Management; Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations and Spokesman of the Department
Ronald Spiers, Chargé d’Affaires
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Southern Africa; Cyprus

Crosland: How would you like to start this? Should we discuss how to talk to Vorster, or compare notes on our respective travels?

Kissinger: Why don’t we do the latter?

Crosland: Most of what came out wasn’t unexpected.

Kissinger: (to Rowlands:) You just came back?

Rowlands: Five hours ago.

Crosland: What needed underlining was the passion about Smith, getting him out at the earliest stage.

Number two, the increasing unlikelihood of getting a moderate regime with an uncontested Nkomo. Nkomo’s role is steadily declining. It will have to be more widely based.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 345, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September 4–14, 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating corrections or omission of unrelated material, are in the original.
Number three, very strong feelings by Nyerere and Machel hoping that there will be no British colonial role. As you know, the most would be a diplomatic role.

Kissinger: Nyerere tells us he gives you credit for resisting American pressure. (Laughter)

Crosland: Number four is our impressions of Machel.
Rowlands: I don’t know if Bill agrees, but we thought Machel was most impressive and had stronger insights.

Kissinger: More than Nyerere?
Rowlands: Because his experiences are more recent. And he is pragmatic. Because he fears an armed struggle on his territory.

Kissinger: Fears?
Rowlands: Yes. He fears internationalization of the struggle. He is perceptive about the transition period. He feared an undefeated white army, and a police problem.

Kissinger: Did FRELIMO really win, or did the situation in Portugal collapse?
Duff: FRELIMO history is that they defeated Portugal.

Kissinger: But what are the facts? Our impression is neither FRELIMO nor the Angolan groups were gaining much until Portugal collapsed. But it’s irrelevant, because it’s the myth.

Rowlands: He feared a divided security situation with the Rhodesian army and his forces intact. So he felt it should be telescoped. He thinks he can win by peaceful means anyway: If the guerrillas participate in the negotiations, he feels his people can win.

He was also extremely suspicious about our approach—thinking we’re trying to put in a Western-based government, a puppet.

Kissinger: He’s right!
Rowlands: He’s afraid we’re trying to perpetuate a colonial system. He’ll be more critical of the guarantee scheme.

Kissinger: You didn’t give him the scheme.
Rowlands: No. We said something like this might be important for the economic development of Zimbabwe.

Crosland: Their impressions were, number one, personal—his intelligence—and number two, that he doesn’t want an internationalization of the war. And number three, he is genuinely sympathetic to our proceeding on these lines.

Rowlands: He was extremely shaken by these attacks from Rhodesia. He hadn’t expected that.

Kissinger: That impression coincides with ours. He approached us after the attack, and expressed a real interest in what we were doing.
Rowlands: He was the only one who had a brief, and had read into it.

Crosland: (gesturing at the Secretary’s lack of a briefing book:) That’s not a terribly tactful thing to say. (Laughter)

Kissinger: We briefed you, as you did us, on a daily basis. Our impression substantially coincides with yours.

With respect to Rhodesia, the various leaders including Machel wish us well in the effort, but have confused and slightly disagreeing notions of how to bring it to a conclusion.

All of them distrust Smith. All of them give you credit for rejecting our proposal for colonial rule. (Laughter) All of them agree the government won’t be headed by Nkomo but must be more broadly based.

But the question is what they mean by these general formulations. They’re all, except Machel, totally mystified by how they’ll unify the Zimbabwe nationalists. It is easier to blame the white governments than themselves.

I have the impression, which may be wrong, that they are scarcely less terrified we won’t deliver Smith than that we will deliver Smith.

Secondly, these leaders—again except for Machel—are uncertain what they can deliver. Nyerere and Kaunda, if alone, would be fairly responsive to the kind of plan we have, and willing to take two risks—that Smith will not accept, or that Smith will accept and they will be accused by Machel of selling out the others. So they are torn between fear of failure and fear of success.

Machel knows what he is doing. He wants a Rhodesian government as analogous to his as he can get, and achieved by methods as analogous to his as he can get.

The formula they have all hit on as a way out of this is to put in a transitional government now, with a black majority, and after that they will unify the Zimbabwean nationalists.

Rogers: It’s Kaunda’s view.

Kissinger: And Machel’s.

Grennan: What Machel wants overridingly is a peaceful settlement. The other is secondary.

Kissinger: The problem we have—I don’t know about the U.K.—I don’t see how we can put in a black government unconditionally without any prior assurances of what it will be like.

Duff: We haven’t seen that.

Kissinger: No, we haven’t any proposals like this. They say it orally: if the transitional government is put in, their fear of Smith’s duplicity disappears.
Duff: With us, they all accepted the interim stage to negotiate a new government. He said to us: who is going to be the negotiator with the Zimbabwean nationalists?

Kissinger: There are two possibilities: A white government different from Ian Smith negotiates majority rule with British non-colonial assistance. The second situation is they insist a black majority government is put in immediately, with some white participation, and that negotiates a constitution.

Rowlands: Nowhere did we have difficulty with the idea of a white caretaker government to negotiate with the blacks. Machel kept asking who will be the “new force” the Zimbabweans would negotiate with? We said the caretaker government. Machel didn’t demur at that.

Kissinger: For how long would it be?

Rowlands: A very short time.

Kissinger: Our people say 10 days to two weeks.

Duff: “A matter of weeks.”

Kissinger: I can see a white government without Smith negotiating. It’s not for us to say how long, but ten days to two weeks means in effect immediately. A serious negotiation for guarantees wouldn’t be years but at least months.

Rowlands: I think without Smith, they would be more flexible—ten days or three months.

Kissinger: We don’t mind if they settle. But is it a serious negotiation, or an immediate handover?

Rowlands: We weren’t sure how far we could go in our initial soundings. We both fudged it because we didn’t want to unveil the package.

Kissinger: The experience of the two Bills was that whenever they discussed the package, the Presidents said: “This is mechanics.”

Rowlands: Yes. They said: “Smith must go.”

Kissinger: Your conclusion is: Number one, Smith must go. Number two, there must be a negotiation between a successor white government and a black negotiating team. They will then agree on a provisional government. Independence comes into being some stated period thereafter. Full independence, Bill?

Rogers: You have come away with a clearer impression than we did of a serious negotiation.

Kissinger: Our impression is they are really saying to us: “Hand over power first, and we will sort out the unity of the Zimbabwean nationalists.” Nyerere is saying: “Let’s first sort out the unity of the Zimbabwean nationalists and then hand over power.”

Frankly, this would greatly affect my discussions with Vorster.
Independence Negotiations 531

Duff: Nyerere didn’t want to get into the mechanics, but he said: “Maybe with a new white government, that in itself would be a catalyst for the blacks to get together.”

Kissinger: Caretaker means a white government?
Rogers: Yes. “Caretaker” means a non-Smith white government.
Kissinger: Not Ian Smith.
Rogers: Non-Ian.

Palliser: One element is the very deep suspicion of these Africans of Smith, Vorster, and your relationship with them. We think if it is clear Smith is for the birds, the other difficulties will go.

Kissinger: They ask us to use our influence with the South Africans; then when we do it, they are suspicious.

Rowlands: Their suspicions would grow if they see no results, if Smith hangs around. If they see results, I think the problems will disappear.

To summarize: Kaunda is not willing to talk about beyond stage one, but I think if Smith is delivered, he’ll go along.

With Nyerere, we went over the caretaker government. He didn’t demur; he said it’s mechanics which we could talk about. His concern is he couldn’t organize the blacks. The blacks would come in; we would legalize it; and he would be left holding the “hot baby,” as he put it.

With Machel, I went over the caretaker idea. Then the interim government I said would be responsible for the security situation. Then he said it would be short.

Kissinger: What about guarantees?
Rowlands: He’s against it.
Grennan: Implicitly against it.
Kissinger: So he’s for expulsion of the whites.
Rowlands: The other two will accept it and influence him.
Kissinger: So it will all depend on who controls the interim government.

Rowlands: Yes.

Crosland: Your fear is we may end up with a black government that may drive out the whites. If we proceed down this road, this is one risk we have to take. This looms larger than five weeks ago. The question is, do we proceed?

Kissinger: To describe the worst thing that can happen: A white government that comes in under massive American pressure. The blacks then break apart, and war breaks out, and you have an Angola in Rhodesia.

Rowlands: But they are all against it.
Kissinger: But the question then is, why did it have to be us? Americans would rather, I think, see the blacks overthrow the whites than see us do it.

Crosland: It wouldn’t come to that. The blacks would not have the power to drive them out.

Kissinger: After my Lusaka speech,² I received 1800 letters, 23 of which supported it. After months of public education, I have received 120 letters of which 36 support it. So I have moved from 99% against to 66% against.

Crosland: My experience is the same. My constituency in Grimsby is restrained by illiteracy, and most of the mail concerns whether I wear white tie with the Queen.

But there will be a military confrontation in Rhodesia, because the whites will fight.

Kissinger: Would David Smith be able to fight?

Grennan: Fight against what?

Kissinger: Would he fight, as the successors to Caetano?

Palliser: There would be a pro-Ian Smith reaction.

Kissinger: Would David Smith fight?

Duff: No. But he would be replaced by those who could.

Grennan: The four Presidents would be eager for a political settlement.

Kissinger: Will they remain united?

Rogers: I don’t think so.

Schaufele: Nor I.

Kissinger: Can any black President take a position less radical than any other?

Rowlands: Only if the end is in view.

Kissinger: So we’re back at the position of before: The British view is that the removal of Ian Smith unlocks everything. My view has been no, but I’m open minded.

Rowlands: We couldn’t tell them how Smith would be got to yield. Neither I nor Bill could tell them how. So they weren’t focusing on beyond that.

Kissinger: Are they saying this because the problems are so overwhelming on their side that they want to blame it on the whites, or is it what they really believe? Really the reason I ask is that they send us imploring letters not to move “on the ground” because they’re not

² See footnote 3, Document 194.
ready. From this I conclude they think we’re ready to deliver and they’re not.

Crosland: They’re ambivalent. If we take your main fear—that the outcome of this initiative may not be our peaceful plan but a black take-over—if we do nothing, won’t we be worse off?

Kissinger: But are we better off?

Now to my problem with Vorster. Basically the only way we can proceed, on your analysis, is for the United States to ask Vorster to overthrow Smith.

Crosland: Yes.

Kissinger: And we can’t tell him anything that will happen. We can’t tell him guarantees, we can’t tell him anything. Is his domestic situation strong enough? Especially because some in his country can plausibly say his getting into this negotiation has weakened his situation in South Africa. In June my argument to him was that this would buy him time for his own problems.3 I can’t tell him this now.

Crosland: He’ll say he can’t agree until he knows whether the blacks will sign on to the guarantee program.

Grennan: We think you can get it from the black Presidents if you can promise them Smith’s head.

Rowlands: Yes, because we could never put the whole package to them. The guarantees are part of the whole package.

Kissinger: We’re now at your first question: What can I say to Vorster? If I ask him only to deliver Smith’s head, can I say we will support his successor in the request for guarantees? [Assent from the British side.] The successor to Ian Smith says he will agree to majority rule under conditions of guarantees.

Rowlands, Grennan: Yes.

Kissinger: Then the blacks have lost their excuse, or the reality, of their suspicions. Will the blacks agree to guarantees?

Crosland: Yes. But which comes first?

Kissinger: I’m willing to say Smith’s head goes first.

Vorster has never said he’ll deliver Smith’s head. Can we tell him we will support the guarantee package?

Crosland: The purpose of your visit to black Africa was to say: If you can agree to a guarantee package, then the British and the US will give their backing.

Kissinger: Yes, exactly right. That hasn’t changed.

3 See Document 196.
Crosland: Smith has to go, and guarantees. You would also say to him that neither we nor he will agree unless the blacks agree to guarantees in a more definite way. It depends on the four Presidents.

Kissinger: Do they have a veto? Will we be driven to accept anything they ask? Or there is a point where we say: “From here on you get it for yourselves.”

Crosland: For the British it is a precondition of going forward that the four Presidents accept.

Kissinger: It’s reality. Without the four Presidents, it’s not possible. The only differences between what we said before our two missions and now are: We are saying now that Ian Smith has to go before the negotiations, and secondly, guarantees will have to be worked out in the negotiations between his successor and the blacks.

Duff: No. In the first place, the incoming caretaker government will have to have knowledge of, and make public knowledge of, the guarantee schemes, if it’s going to get public support. We’ll have to back it. This in turn means we’ll have to discuss guarantees, both political and economic, with the African side up to a point, so they don’t reject them out of hand. The escape route for us is if they fail to agree, the whole thing is off.

Kissinger: The second one is that the Zimbabwean national team is a less attractive one than we thought a few months ago.

I don’t think the American national interest, or yours, is served by another Angola in Rhodesia. I’d rather have it come from the logic of events.

Crosland: Presumably something will come out of this meeting [in Dar es Salaam] this weekend.4

Kissinger: On the one hand, I welcome the meeting. It is the statesmanlike way of proceeding. Because of the missions we sent, which saw them all separately, there is no other way for them to give [get?] a consensus.

The danger is when they start blowing smoke at each other, no one will dare to be realistic. They’ll get into fight talk and state unrealistic demands.

When our people discussed Namibia, we heard the maximum position and we were told that modifications were possible. If we were negotiating with Lusaka, the negotiations could get started and it

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4 Neto and the Front Line Presidents met in Dar es Salaam September 5–7. The meeting led to continued support for the Rhodesian African nationalists; there was no resolution of the conflict among the rival groups. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1976, p. 28041)
would fall together. Once eight parties get together, there is no way to
tell what will come out of it.

This is why I’m going back. Is this what you would have
recommended?

Rowlands: No.

Kissinger: And none of us knows what Neto will do.

We briefed you as soon as we decided. Our problem is if we didn’t
tell the press then, it would look like Vorster wasn’t cooperative. That
would be disastrous in Africa.

Rowlands: Your problem with Vorster is you need to tell him the
Africans will accept this package. Our problem in Africa was we
couldn’t make this offer to them—we couldn’t say we would deliver
Smith if they accept the guarantees.

Kissinger: I can handle it this way. I can ask Vorster: If he is willing
to remove Smith, I’ll put it conditionally to the Africans. Then when I
go to Africa, I can tell the four Presidents that I can deliver Smith if
they’ll accept the guarantees. Then I will tell Vorster, “You now deliver
Smith.”

Rowlands: Yes.

Kissinger: From our domestic point of view, it would be better if
the caretaker government in Salisbury initiates the negotiation, rather
than Dar. That isn’t more difficult. Whether Vorster will agree, I can’t
imagine.

Rowlands: The advantage of this is you can say to the blacks: “This
is what Vorster will do if there are guarantees.” If they go along with it
firmly, we’re in business.

Kissinger: We have given the South Africans the summary paper. They
have accepted it in principle, or nearly. Then on Friday I gave
them the whole package. I didn’t want a formal presentation because it
almost certainly will be modified in the negotiations, and we would be
accused of duplicity.

All right, I understand the problem.

Crosland: I suppose there is nothing to be said for your sending
telegrams to the five in the course of this meeting, saying it would be
helpful to have a more collective negotiation, assuming your meeting
with Vorster goes all right. It would be better than meeting separately.

Kissinger: I had concluded that it would be better if I didn’t com-
municate with them while they are meeting. They think—errone-
ously—that we need this for electoral reasons. The blacks will vote
Democratic anyway; the whites in favor of it are liberal Democrats. It

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5 See Document 199, Tab B.
will alienate those who fought the President before. So it will be a net loss; if we break even, we will do all right.

Nyerere told us—I think you know—"If we give you Namibia, is that enough?" [Laughter]

Most Americans think Namibia is a soft drink. [Laughter] So I don’t want to be importuning them.

The problem is if this fails, nothing can be done for six months.

Rowlands: Yes.

Kissinger: So this is the only way it is affected by the elections. If there is a change of Administration on November 2, nothing could be organized until March. That’s too late for Rhodesia.

Do we want to let it drift?

Crosland: But you can’t change horses in midstream.

Kissinger: I could screw up my negotiation with Vorster.

Grennan: There is no way to turn the tap off once the next round of warfare begins. It’s the rainy season. We know they’re planning kidnapping and killing of white women. The South Africans will see their first television war. There will be volunteers going up there.

Kissinger: You’re saying we have to move now.

Grennan: We have to move now.

Kissinger: I have felt this meeting of theirs would last until Tuesday.6 I wanted to send Bill [Schaufele] down, to tell them of the Vorster meeting and hear about their meeting. I proposed to come back the following week.

Can we brief your Ambassadors there?

Duff: They are all informed.

Kissinger: Bill can brief your Ambassadors. He should report to us, and we’ll brief [Richard C.] Samuel [Counselor in the British Embassy]. But he can brief them. And you can send someone down there if it’s necessary.

Duff: Yes.

Crosland: Just a word about this meeting of the five. Who took the initiative?

Kissinger: Nyerere.

Crosland: Why?

Kissinger: He reflected on his dilemma: I would come down and ask him for commitments, and he couldn’t deliver. And the others would be in the same position. So it was actually the wise way to proceed.

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6 September 7.
The first we heard was Thursday night.
Rowlands: He had already decided when we were there.
Kissinger: The question is: Should we write him a letter and ask him to form a five-power negotiating team? Or leave it to them how to handle it?
Grennan: Their instinct is to leave it to the Zimbabweans to negotiate.
Kissinger: My instinct is to leave it alone.
Bill?
Schaufele: That’s my instinct.
Kissinger: You’ve got a brilliant career ahead of you. [Laughter]
Rowlands: The problem is that they not come up with a new list of demands.
Kissinger: I have no objection if your Ambassador did this. Anything they get from me, from today on, they’re liable to think was affected by my meeting with Vorster.
Crosland: I agree. They’re likely to think that.
As for our Ambassador, I don’t think it’s a good idea. They’re not novices; they know what the problem is.
Rowlands: We’ll just have to take a chance.
Crosland: We’ll just have to take a chance. One is whether they will add public demands. Second is they will just leave it to the Zimbabweans.
Grennan: The whole purpose of the meeting is to put together a credible Zimbabwean nationalist team.
Kissinger: My nightmare is they’ll publish a program we can’t accept.
Grennan: I would be surprised if they did that.
Kissinger: If they did?
Grennan: If they did. I don’t think they see unity in those terms. They want operational unity.
Kissinger: I see the meeting as positive. If they can find unity or not. If not, it’s better to find out now.
On getting rid of Ian Smith, I’m willing to take that up with Vorster. And I’ll tell him if he agrees, we will put it to the four Presidents that if they agree to the guarantees, he will do it.
It will be a pleasant meeting. The Dutch Reformed don’t have confession, do they? [Laughter]
Crosland: Where are you meeting?
Kissinger: In our hotel. They can’t meet on Sundays. So we invited them to tea. [Laughter] The South Africans announced they wouldn’t
meet on Sunday; so our press concluded it was to protest against the Philadelphia speech.\textsuperscript{7}

Crosland: On Rhodesia, a question about this fund. Because we have published our expenditure. A question also about your visit to Paris. Should we express support for Giscard’s African fund\textsuperscript{8} and link it to this?

Kissinger: I think we can get the Germans to put money into Namibia, either through that fund or directly. I suspect we’ll have massive problems getting the South Africans to put money into Rhodesia.

Crosland: Really.

Kissinger: He made that clear in June.

Palliser: There are a lot of South Africans living in Rhodesia who would benefit.

Duff: 55,000–60,000.

Kissinger: Are they Afrikaners or British?

Duff: Afrikaners.

Schaufele: Vorster described them as having rights of residency.

Duff: Does he want them back? They wouldn’t vote for him.

Kissinger: I didn’t sense an enormous desire on Vorster’s part.

Can I speak to him on the basis of that scheme?

Crosland: On the basis of it.

Kissinger: That is what we will take to the Africans.

Crosland: Yes. You will be back here Monday\textsuperscript{9} to talk to the Prime Minister. Of course, we’re not committed formally to anything as a government. If the omens are good on Monday . . .

Kissinger: I’m, of course, assuming you’re prepared to proceed on a jointly prepared paper.

Crosland: It is virtually certain. But I can’t tell what the Prime Minister will do.

Kissinger: The paper is the same.

Duff: The new Annex C deals with the Interim government.

\textsuperscript{7} Kissinger delivered a speech entitled “The Challenges of Africa” on August 31 before the Opportunities Industrialization Centers in Philadelphia, in which he criticized apartheid and South Africa’s continued involvement in Namibia. (Department of State Bulletin, September 20, 1976, pp. 349–357)


\textsuperscript{9} September 6.
Kissinger: Can you give us Annex C? If we agree with it, we can give it to the South Africans.

Duff: Yes. (He gives the Secretary Tab A)\(^{10}\)

Kissinger: Can we talk about Namibia?

Crosland: Yes.

Kissinger: I see no essential differences between the two positions.

Schaufele: No.

Kissinger: I appreciate that our two delegations spoke to the Africans in practically identical terms.

Crosland: Yes.

Kissinger: I appreciate it. On both Rhodesia and Namibia.

As I see it, the issue is to have the Windhoek Conference moved to Geneva, and have SWAPO participate, and some UN involvement. And maybe get some prisoners released. What may not be possible is to turn the Geneva Conference immediately into a SWAPO–South African negotiation.

We get two signals. One is that one side can call it one thing and the other will call it another. That doesn’t bother me. The other signal is that we will get more demands—that South Africa immediately withdraw its troops.

My feeling is that once the Conference is assembled, it will be the outcome of independence. But I think there is a limit to how far Vorster can go in the first round. So this is the area of uncertainty.

We can probably figure out some way for South African participation. We need some way to get this Conference going. Once it gets going, it will develop its own logic. If it were just one, we could say this. But when they’re all together, what Neto advises them no one knows.

Grennan: I don’t think there will be problems on these others, but the basic precondition was unstated—that South Africa participates. I don’t see how SWAPO can participate in the Conference, call it what you will, if South Africa demonstrably refuses to participate.

Kissinger: We’ll see. The problem is what we got is what Nyerere asked for in June. And we got a date for independence, which he didn’t ask for.

Grennan: Probably Nyerere got it wrong and assumed the South Africans were there, at the Windhoek Conference. Kaunda said it didn’t make any difference if the tribal groups, the “racist puppets,” were there—because the South Africans were. The other preconditions would drop away.

\(^{10}\) Tab A is an undated British discussion paper entitled “Rhodesia: Possible Constitutional Arrangements for the Period of Transition.”
Kissinger: I feel that too, unless these guys lock themselves into something in Dar.

What will Neto do? The Soviet Ambassador made an attack on us—he lumped us together.

Ramsbotham: I wonder if it is worth considering whether a British message to Nyerere, urging them not to tie themselves to something . . .

Kissinger: I’m more worried about what they say publicly.

Schaufele: I’m more worried about what they say publicly on Namibia than on Rhodesia.

Crosland: We could say that after the visits of Duff and Rowlands, it would be useful if they don’t make any public statements. We are keeping the door open and we think they should.

(To Schaufele:) You still oppose it?

Kissinger: He was against our doing it. If you told him it was your judgment, based on your conversations, or your impression of our attitude, that they shouldn’t commit themselves to anything . . .

Schaufele: Not to Kaduma.

Lord: There’s some advantage in doing it today, before you see Vorster.

Kissinger: They know we’re meeting.

We settled Africa. Now to the rest of the world.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia and Namibia.]
203. Memorandum of Conversation

Zurich, September 6, 1976, 8:30 a.m.–12:06 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

South Africa:
Balthazar Johannes Vorster, Prime Minister
Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. B.G. Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Gen. H.J. Van den Bergh, Director, Bureau of State Security, Security Adviser to the Prime Minister
Amb. R.F. Botha, Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the UN

U.S.:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
William D. Rogers, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Under Secretary for Management; Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations and Spokesman of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Amb. William Bowdler, Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[The Secretary and the Prime Minister conferred privately in the Secretary’s suite from 8:30 to 9:00 a.m.

[At 9:00 a.m., they were joined by Mr. Rogers and the members of the South African delegation.

[After a few minutes the South African Prime Minister and delegation went to the adjoining room to confer on the documents for Rhodesia and Namibia.

[At 9:35 a.m., the other members of the U.S. delegation joined the Secretary and Mr. Rogers.]

Kissinger: Win, my instinct tells me your darlings are going to kick me in the teeth. Have you seen the Dar newspapers? They are debating whether to “invite me” to Africa to continue the negotiations. They are saying the blacks will never be party to anything that “perpetuates imperialism in Africa.”

It’s the Soviet line. It is what the Soviet Ambassador in Zambia was saying. They are determined not to allow what happened in the Middle East to happen again. Especially because in Africa we have no cards.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 345, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September 4–14, 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held in the Dolder Grand Hotel. Brackets are in the original.
[Fourie comes out of the side room.]

Fourie: All right, we are ready.

Kissinger: I want to speak to the Prime Minister alone for a few minutes.

[At 10:02 a.m., the full meeting began downstairs in the meeting room:]

Kissinger: To me, the amazing thing in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations is that both sides are nearly identical in their approach to negotiating. Yet each one thinks it is morally superior to the other.

I got a massage in the hotel in Jerusalem. The masseur said he prayed for me every night. I said “How many kilometers are you willing to give up?” He said: “Kilometers? None!” [Laughter]

Gentlemen, Mr. Prime Minister, we have to discuss two things: the substance of where we are going, and the contingencies that may arise and the procedures we would follow.

On substance, we have three papers.

—One, the paper Britain handed us on Rhodesia [“Annex C” at Tab A].² My estimate is it is substantially agreed, allowing for the margin of negotiations.

—Second, the document on economic and political guarantees for Rhodesia as agreed between Rogers and Fourie [Tab B].³

Vorster: And the period.

Kissinger: That is in the document.

Vorster: The period for this interim government. That, gentlemen, you must just accept from me: It’s in the interest of both blacks and whites that it be as long as possible.

Kissinger: But as we agreed privately—I will state it as my view—what will determine the outcome of the negotiation is not what is in the interest of whites and blacks but the power relationship.

Vorster: The blacks will have their view, but they will want it as long as possible. I don’t mean the Dar blacks but Nkomo and Gabella. I am sure.

Kissinger: We won’t oppose a longer period, but we can’t be for more than 18 to 24 months. If the Rhodesian blacks want it, in a manner that can express itself, we won’t oppose it. In the formal plan, it will be 18–24 months unless both parties agree to extend it.


³ Attached at Tab B is a paper entitled “International Economic Support for a Rhodesia Settlement,” drafted by Rogers on September 5 and designated “Rev[ision]—2.”
Vorster: Who is “both parties”?
Kissinger: Whoever negotiates for the whites and blacks.
—Then we have the document on South-West Africa [Tab C].

On Rhodesia: The first one [Tab A], the British already have, since they wrote it. We will also give the economic one to the British.

As I understand it, Duff is visiting you in Pretoria this week. My strong recommendation is to say these papers were indeed worked out here; they are under serious consideration, but there can be no final decision until I have come. Because if you say you’ve accepted it, he will immediately run to Dar. And on the political paper too. Say you are sympathetically considering it.

Vorster: Agreed. There is one thing: [Reads from Tab A:] “Appointment of a Council of State by the Queen on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs …” Will the British be the sole judge of this? So there is no misunderstanding.

Kissinger: According to this paper, yes. We can modify it.
Vorster: Suppose they appoint someone totally unacceptable to the whites? Like former Prime Minister Todd, who is in disgrace.
Kissinger: Shall we say “in consultations with both communities”? Vorster: All right.
Van den Bergh: “In consultations” still leaves them the final say.
Kissinger: It gives us something to talk about [with the British] this afternoon.
Vorster: If it’s not acceptable to the whites, it will fall down immediately.
Kissinger: The British will say “in consultation” anyway.
Vorster: As long as they realize there is a reservation here that they must take into account.
Kissinger: The Ambassador will honor us Wednesday?
Botha: Yes.
Kissinger: We will give you the results Wednesday. You don’t need it before then.
Muller: As soon as possible.
Kissinger: Wednesday. Because I want it in as little cable traffic as possible.

Any other problems with that paper?

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4 Attached at Tab C is an undated paper on Namibia entitled “Basis for a Proposal.”
5 No memorandum of conversation from this meeting has been found.
6 September 8.
Shall we go through the rest of it?

Vorster: [Reads over Tab A:] In this paper, what will be the position of the civil service, the army, and police? Because that is a clue to the whole thing.

Kissinger: In the interim government?

Vorster: Yes.

Kissinger: Also, let’s put down what you said: Although the time is 18–24 months, it can be extended by agreement of both parties.

The army, police and civil service are under the interim government, correct?

Rogers: Yes.

Vorster: And the independent judiciary also.

Kissinger: All these things we will confirm with your Ambassador Wednesday morning.

So much for the political paper. I am not trying to rush you, just to find out.

Vorster: I’ve said to you there is merit in this but it is not binding on the Rhodesians.

Kissinger: I understand. It will be urged on the Rhodesians.

Muller: Whether there are three or two, that will make it easier.

Kissinger: The question is, one, whether the whites have a voice in the selection of the people appointed by the Queen. Second, what happens to the army, police, and judiciary in the period of the interim government. And three, whether the period can be extended by the agreement of both parties.

Rogers: And the civil service.

Kissinger: Right.

Then there are two contingencies to consider.

Vorster: I must warn that the composition of the Council will be shot down by Dar es Salaam and Lusaka.

Kissinger: I agree with you.

Vorster: It will be shot down in flames immediately.

Kissinger: Therefore we should leave some room for flexibility.

Van den Bergh: And the local authorities.

Vorster: That can be left for the interim government.

Kissinger: The whites have a majority on the Council and the blacks have a majority in the Cabinet. Since it is a British proposal, why not let them try it?

Vorster: This ought to be acceptable to them.

Muller: Especially if they are consulted in the selection of the three.
Kissinger: What is the Council?
Botha: It is the dictator. It is the government, the executive authority.
Fourie: The British will argue: You get the power later.
Schaufele: The Cabinet is the legislative power and the Council is the executive.
Botha: But the Council has legislative power too.
Vorster: The British must not change this for the worse; they can change it for the better.
Kissinger: If the British judgment of what they can sell were correct, they would still be governing in East Africa.
Rogers: And North America. [Laughter]
Vorster: I am willing to urge this on Rhodesia. If the British keep their side of the bargain, and if they don’t go wild on 8(i). And the five is better than the three.
Botha: A man like Nkomo might accept it if he can make the selection.
Muller: We must assume their Minister of State has been to Africa and sounded them out. Rowlands.
Kissinger: No, no, no. One rule I have learned in eight years is never underestimate the incompetence of bureaucrats.
Once I read a long report of a Russian-American conversation on strategic arms, of a complexity and subtlety I’d never seen a Russian use. I asked the Soviet Ambassador. He looked into it and he found out it was our fellow who proposed all of it and the Russian said he would consider it!
Will the blacks accept this?
Rogers: If there is a time limit.
Van den Bergh: They might agree to it if there is an 18-month to two-year time limit.
Vorster: Eighteen months to two years has been bandied about as a British proposal, or a British fiat. If it is three years, it will be so much better.
Kissinger: I doubt it. We must be realistic.
Vorster: From our discussions with the Africans.
Kissinger: That’s a year ago. Now, with the Russians in full opposition...
Fourie: They may need time for their own unity.
Kissinger: That is an important factor.
Botha: They may need time.
Kissinger: Now let us take the two contingencies—that Dar will tell me to go ahead, and that Dar tells me not to go ahead.

If Dar tells me to go ahead, you should keep your agreement private until I arrive in South Africa. I will meet with Smith and his Cabinet in Pretoria, to add our weight to what has been said. Then it will be announced—two weeks after I return to the United States, so I can manage the situation.

I would not give all this to the blacks. I would give the general outline that I would work with you and Smith. I wouldn’t ask their approval of any detail, because if they say no, we are in an endless negotiation.

If—which I consider to be a 50–50 chance—the Dar meeting makes intransigent demands, I think it is an even more important reason to put this forward. Because the only way to resist enormous African pressures is to say that the substance of the problem has been solved and the only question is the method. It has to be done in a timeframe close to what is in effect a declaration of war. The only way to avoid panic is for Smith to announce this fairly rapidly. Then we will take position in the U.S.—we can’t take a position in support of Smith but a position that the negotiation was on the point of succeeding and the total program was accepted, but the radical blacks, urged on by the Soviet Union, insisted on a violent solution.

What we can’t have is that the blacks turn us down, and there is a five-week debate on whose fault it is, and no one will remember who proposed what.

We can say it was rejected by the radicals and the Communists and we will go no further.

Larry, you are the expert. Will this be understood?

Eagleburger: I agree.

Kissinger: If we can get answers to the three questions you asked, these are the two papers on the basis of which we will proceed.

If I go to black Africa, I will keep it confused. If I go to Pretoria, I will meet with Smith and his Cabinet. Two-three weeks after, he will announce it as his program. Then we’re in a negotiation, and it will have to be a matter of goodwill.

Botha: What about the Security Council debate?

Kissinger: This is on Rhodesia.

Botha: It may spill over.

Kissinger: Then it will be useful to do it in a timeframe relevant to the Security Council debate.

Botha: They will raise one and then the other.

Kissinger: We will try to drag out the debate, but this has to appear as early as possible to avoid appearing to yield under pressure.
Vorster: If Dar says no, you won’t go to Africa.
Kissinger: No.
Vorster: Then you won’t come to South Africa.
Kissinger: No, I regret it.
I would not worry about Dar if it weren’t for the Soviets. They are unhappy and remember the experience of the Middle East.
Schaufele: This has been their line all along. But it has stepped up in intensity.
Kissinger: It’s pretty intense now?
Schaufele: Yes.
Kissinger: My worry about Dar was not to be in the air for 15 hours while they are beating up on the United States. I wanted to know where I was going. Because in America, if there is any difference between the Secretary of State and a black leader, I am wrong. Not just a black leader, but the Democratic leadership. But if this comes off, it will have wide support.

When is the Security Council debate?
Botha: 21–22 September.
Schaufele: I am not so worried about the spillover on Rhodesia.
Kissinger: I will tell you what we will say: It’s now clear that a peaceful solution existed—majority rule in short period of time. It failed only because the radical elements, assisted by the Soviet Union, insisted on violence. The most they ever asked for, had been achieved.

Botha: Can we delay it?
Kissinger: It depends entirely on what they decide in Dar.
Vorster: If Dar turns it down, Smith has nothing to lose.
Kissinger: If Smith can be induced to put this forward, he can’t put in 800 escape clauses. The simpler the better.
Vorster: I understand. That is my business.
Kissinger: He shouldn’t put in a Council of State, etc. He should say: I am prepared immediately to have an interim government with a black majority, and negotiate immediately. It shouldn’t be in detail.
Schaufele: We haven’t told the Africans such detail, and they will resent it.
Vorster: He will have to put in the Council of State because he needs that to get European support.
Kissinger: But this is after a breakdown.
Vorster: If you are on the trip, you will see him.
Kissinger: If it fails, the necessity is to get on the table as soon as possible terms as favorable as possible. If the people surprisingly say
yes, he can then put forward the details—as long as the general proposal was not misleading.

I would put forward the Council of State in the context of success; not in the context of failure.

The interim government should be described in ambiguous terms but leaving the implication of majority participation by the blacks.

Muller: In the interim government.

Kissinger: We will find a formula: “The interim government will be set up with the blacks, the whites and the British.”

Schaufele: “Interim arrangements . . .”

Kissinger: In case of a failure, I can go myself to the Security Council and say we worked for five months and achieved all we said we were for. I can cite the announcement on Namibia and the Smith announcement on Rhodesia.

The only thing we were against was violence. “This body can’t be for violence.”

Muller: This final statement if Smith should be cooperative—is this the final push for a solution?

Kissinger: What I will suggest to the President, and my colleagues, is that we generate some resolution that supports a peaceful solution in terms of the proposals that have been made. If it fails, we will veto sanctions and probably veto a contrary resolution.

I will have to discuss it with the President, because it will probably be a major event in the election. It will probably help him to take a strong stand, but I am not sure. In any event, you will know by Thursday. The chances will be nine out of ten he will go along with the strategy I have outlined. I personally think it will help him. I am practically certain it will be accepted. But I do want to get the President and Scranton aboard.

All right. Shall we talk about South-West Africa?

Schaufele: This is the South African position on these items. [He gives the Secretary Tab D.] 7

Kissinger: [Reads] What is the meaning of number Six?

Vorster: The meaning of Six is the question of United Nations supervision which we have constantly rejected, which is a major political issue in South Africa.

Kissinger: What I have in mind here, Mr. Prime Minister, is not United Nations supervision of the negotiation but United Nations supervision of the election after the process is completed.

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7 Attached at Tab D is a draft paper entitled “South Africa’s Position,” September 6, 10 a.m.
Vorster: What I have in mind, as I told to Senator Percy, is I am not prepared to recognize, as the South African Government, UNO supervision. But if the Conference wants it, it is none of my business and I won’t stand in their way and it is not my business.

Kissinger: This point Seven is still not the way I wanted it. The first paper [Tab C–1] I thought was badly drafted.

Fourie: The sequence follows the first paper, but the wording isn’t exactly the same. It’s been married with the second paper [Tab C–2]. “Which any of the participants wish to raise,” or “to which the participants agree.”

Kissinger: “May wish to raise” has the advantage of suggesting that any side can raise any issue it wishes. It’s tactically very important.

Vorster: “To which they agree, or may wish to raise.”

Kissinger: “May wish to raise” is tactically much better. We can tell the Africans: “Anything you want to raise you can raise. It may not be agreed, but it will be discussed.” If it has to be agreed, you have a veto over what is discussed.

Vorster: Why not both?

Kissinger: I think “may wish to raise” is simpler.

Vorster: “Which any of the participants may wish to raise.”

Kissinger: That is fine. “Which any of the participants may wish to raise.”

Muller: That is very wise.

Kissinger: We’re talking as much about propaganda as about substance.

Can I go to the South African position on point One? [He reads over Tab D.] My problem is the less we can say things have already been done, even if in fact they have already been done, the more impressive it will be to world public opinion. It is better to say “the date for independence will be . . .” than to say “the Constituent Assembly has already announced the date will be . . .” Because millions of people don’t know it has already announced it.

[The South African side confers.]

Botha: We have a proposal.

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8 Tab C.1 is Tab C as given to the South Africans on September 4.
9 Tab C.2 is a revised “Basis for a Proposal,” on Namibia given to the South Africans. Point 1 reads “The Constituent Assembly will be moved from Windhoek to Geneva to conduct further talks on independence.” Point 6 addressed the date for independence.
Fourie: “The South African Government has indicated it accepts the proposal of the Constitutional Conference that independence will be achieved by December 31, 1978.”

Kissinger: I like your second point. Can you say, “The South African Government indicates”—instead of “has indicated”—“that it accepts any such proposals?”

Can we go back to the original order? “The South African Government indicates it accepts any such proposals.”

I am trying to put you in the best possible light. If it fails, I want to be able to say “Here is the forthcoming South African position,” so we can block sanctions.

I would do this. [He marks up a change of order.]

Six rephrased: “The South African Government accepts the proposal of the Constitutional Conference that the date for independence will be December 31, 1978.”

I understand some of these points you have to raise in South Africa. I just have to put them in the order in which I want them.

[He marks up the draft.]

The only one we have not formulated yet is the one on free elections under United Nations supervision.

We will get it typed up so there is a minimum of confusion.

[The Secretary, Fourie, Rogers, and Schaufele go off to arm chairs to discuss the new order of points and mark up the draft. They confer from 11:07 to 11:26. Then all return to the table, except Rogers who goes upstairs to get the new draft typed up.]

Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, the thing I implore you is there be no further leaks out of the Conference. These points have to be taken up with the Conference, and I am concerned that these points will come out.

Vorster: There will be no leaks from this side of the table.

Kissinger: Of that I am confident.

Vorster: But candidly, from the Conference I can’t be sure.

Kissinger: Why don’t you wait, then?

Vorster: All right.

Kissinger: But you will put your weight behind these?

Vorster: With no question.

Kissinger: Leaks this week would be dangerous out of all proportion.

If you know I am coming to Africa, then wait until a day or two before I come. If you know I am not coming, then you can do it because you have to publish this paper as soon as possible.
I am assuming your voice will carry a lot of weight.

Vorster: With the whites, yes. But with Kapuuo and his American adviser, I don’t know.

Kissinger: Who the hell...?

Vorster: Swartz, a Wall Street lawyer. If you want a shrewd guess, it is the British who are behind it.

Kissinger: I owe you an apology. I was going to ask you at lunch to say grace but I forgot.

Vorster: I said it silently for you.

Kissinger: Thank you.

Vorster: And Endicott and Swartz, I don’t know what they are up to.

Kissinger: Who is Endicott?

Vorster: A Britisher.

Kissinger: Kaunda in a conversation a few weeks ago said the same as you: that some foreign powers are interested in the uranium and are for independence too. And he said: “And I don’t mean the Americans.”

Vorster: We think the American was brought in to have a facade of American involvement.

There are only two possibilities: Either Swartz is in your pay or the British pay, one or the other.

Kissinger: We are in the lucky position that with eight Congressional committees involved, there is nothing that can be done without everybody knowing about it.

He is not in our pay.

Vorster: If you say so, I accept it.

Botha: His senior partner, Burns, testified before the Fraser Committee which you were supposed to testify to. Burns was asked who is paying him? He made it clear he wasn’t being paid by the American Government or the South African Government. But a South African paper quoted him as saying it was the South African Government.

Vorster: I think it would be worth your while to investigate Mr. Swartz and Mr. Endicott.

Eagleburger: We will.

Vorster: Because it is a shady business they are up to, and there is a lot of talk about mining deposits.

[Mr. Covey comes in.]

Kissinger: Anything wrong, Jock?

Covey: No, sir. It is 11:30.
Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I had scheduled a press conference.\textsuperscript{10} I hope I do it as skillfully as yours yesterday.

[Mr. Rogers enters with the revised and agreed copy of the document on Namibia, Tab E.\textsuperscript{11} Further corrections are discussed.]

Kissinger: We refer to “Geneva talks,” “Geneva meeting,” “Geneva conference.” Why don’t we refer to “Geneva Conference” throughout, so they don’t think it is three different things?

Vorster: Fine.

[The Secretary hands Prime Minister Vorster a marked-up copy of Tab E.]

Vorster: We can live with this.

Kissinger: This is a good program. If you weren’t Dutch Reformed, I’d say this is damned good. [Laughter]

Vorster: I can live with this, but I have to run the gauntlet.

Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, let me sum up. On South-West Africa, if Dar asks me to proceed, I will go to Dar and Lusaka prior to coming to Pretoria, sticking to the three points they gave us but receiving some of their ideas which will include some of these. You will take it to the Conference before I go. Then we will take it back and say “Take it or leave it.”

If I don’t go to Dar, you will publish it as soon as possible—the middle of next week—so we can be ready before the General Assembly.

On Rhodesia, we will operate on the basis of the two papers you have, the political and economic. In fairness we have to say the British made a mistake in that Council, because it will have to be adjusted in a negotiation. We showed our good faith by presenting it to you without examining it carefully.

If I go to Dar, I won’t give it to the Africans but I will go to Pretoria to get you to get Smith to propose it. You will get Smith to agree 99%, and I will tell him, to explain our moral position—that I, who don’t want to do it and who resisted doing it for seven and a half years, now think he has to do it.

If this document is put forward under conditions in which I am not taking a trip, it should not be put forward in such detail. It should be a two-page document which can be put forward simply. But it should be put forward quickly so we have a platform.

\textsuperscript{10} For the text of Kissinger’s September 6 press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, September 27, 1976, pp. 377–382.

\textsuperscript{11} The retyped agreed copy and the revised copy with Kissinger’s revisions are attached at Tab E.
Smith will have to put it forward anyway. In this situation, he will put it forward knowing we will use it as the basis for resisting violence. And we will veto sanctions.

All this is subject to my confirming by Friday the position of the President. I am 90 percent certain—the only uncertainty is the elections.

On Namibia, this proposal is for independence and a unitary state. If it is rejected, it can only be because of the radicals and the Soviets. The same on Rhodesia. We cannot be in the position of supporting the white minority governments, but we can be in the position of opposing violence.

In South Africa, I will say there is not a South African-U.S. program. I will say I was asked by the African leaders to open contact with you; I was asked to present some ideas. After two missions to Africa, I can say we made considerable progress at this meeting.

Vorster: Will you use that word?
Kissinger: “Progress.”
Botha: “Substantial progress.”

Kissinger: It cannot be a South African-U.S. program. We cannot afford it in America—as painful as it may be to you—that it appears there is a quid pro quo we gave to South Africa. And in fact there is no quid pro quo; none was asked for.

Vorster: No.
[Botha and Vorster confer.]

My Ambassador tells me we cannot ignore the question of normalization of relations between South Africa and the United States.
Kissinger: You can say what you want. You did not ask for it.
Vorster: I did not and I will not.
Kissinger: But it may result in the normal course.
Vorster: The question will be put to you at the press conference, and I want to know what you will say.

Kissinger: I will say no quid pro quo was asked.
Vorster: No, not on that.

You will be asked if you will go to South Africa.

Kissinger: I will say that if I go to black Africa, in the normal course it may be impossible to conclude it without going to South Africa.

Vorster: They will ask if you will see Smith.

Kissinger: I will say it’s premature to discuss and there are no present plans.

Vorster: Because you can’t ignore the Rhodesians. If you ignore them, they will take it amiss. Can you say: “It is not impossible”? Kissinger: No. You can tell Smith.
Vorster: And if he blows it?

Kissinger: Then you’d better not tell him. Nyerere and Kaunda may say they won’t deal with anyone who met Smith.

I will say I have had no contacts with him and there are no present plans to meet him. If they ask: “Do you absolutely rule it out?” I will say I don’t know what the future will bring.

If I leave any indication I will meet Smith, all hell will break loose in America, and it will fail on the worst possible grounds.

But I will meet him.

Vorster: You can play it as you want.

Kissinger: We’ll leave it open whether we announce it after or during, or whether there is a picture.

Now, Mr. Prime Minister, an embarrassing subject. I will be asked if we discussed the situation in South Africa. I will say what we discussed.

Vorster: Will you tell my colleagues what we discussed?

Kissinger: I will say, if they ask me, that we discussed it. If they ask what I said, I’ll say I said what I said in my Philadelphia speech.\footnote{See footnote 7, Document 202.} That doesn’t lend itself to television.

Muller: There was an article in the \textit{Sunday Telegraph} by Peregrine Worsthorne on the riots in Capetown, which their editor experienced himself.

Kissinger: I like him. I don’t have it.

Muller: We will get it to you.

Kissinger: If I am asked if I’ll see the black leaders in South Africa, I will say I will meet people of different points of view.

Vorster: You can go further; you can say you will meet whomever you want. There are no holds barred.

Kissinger: No, then the black leaders will make demands on me of whom I should meet.

I will say I have been assured I can meet people of varying points of view.

Vorster: Anyone but the Black Parents’ Association, which is a front group.

Kissinger: [Reads over Mr. Eagleburger’s list of likely questions]\footnote{Not found.} What about the UN debate? I won’t say we will veto any resolution.

They will ask about Namibia. I will say it was one of the questions discussed.
On paying the white Rhodesians, I will say there are misconceptions; there are programs and the question isn’t about buying people to leave the country but to promote the development of the country.

Vorster: I would hammer on that because it can’t get abroad that you are buying out the whites.

Kissinger: For our own reasons too, Mr. Prime Minister.

Eagleburger: I have checked the press items, Mr. Secretary, and there is nothing interesting. [He hands some recent tickers to the Secretary.] “Tanzanian officials say one of the issues being discussed is whether to accept your trip.”

Kissinger: That is what I have been telling them.

Mr. Prime Minister, I want to say, I appreciate these discussions and consider them useful, more useful than I can say to the press. It is a very difficult time for your country and I know it is not easy.

Vorster: I appreciate it too. Our policy is an open door as in the past. I hope to see you in South Africa.

Kissinger: I am looking forward to it.

Vorster: And you will be most welcome.

[The Secretary escorted the Prime Minister out through the lobby to the front door.]

204. Memorandum of Conversation

Dar es Salaam, September 15, 1976, 5:01–5:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania
Bernard Muganda, Director, Europe and the Americas Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Joseph W. Butiku, Private Secretary to the President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Kissinger: Just to show you I don’t only have problems in Tanzania. [He shows the President a cable from Pretoria.]
Nyerere: [Reads:] They are distributing leaflets in South Africa accusing the U.S. Secretary of State of being a Soviet spy. [Laughter]
You must be doing well.
Kissinger: I’m unifying Africans in their common dislike of me!
Nyerere: [Reads:] “. . . quoted South African Minister of Defense Botha as saying Henry Kissinger was a long-time member of organizations with Communist traits . . .”
Kissinger: I should be invited to the next nonaligned conference. [Laughter]
Nyerere: As a fellow traveler, don’t tell Vorster everything. [Laughter]
Kissinger: Let me talk briefly on Namibia. Since you attach great importance to South Africa being at the Conference and South Africa attaches great importance to not being there. So intellectually there are two types of problems. The problems about the internal organization of Namibia—these can be taken care of by a South African statement that they will accept the results of the Conference. There is a second class of problems which involve South Africa—withdrawal of the police, the army. I wonder if it can be satisfied by having a South African representative there who can be the point of contact for the first class of problems and a negotiator for the second type of problems.
Nyerere: It is a matter of the definition of a conference. Say to the South Africans: “President Nyerere said the conference is you, SWAPO, and the United Nations.” If they say no, we rule them out. So what is this conference? SWAPO and the Chiefs. Who would call this a Constitutional Conference? How can I call this a Constitutional Conference? How can I say it to my fellow Presidents? SWAPO is saying “Pull out your troops.” And I say no, this is for negotiation. What else is there to negotiate with the South Africans? They are not serious.
We ask them to be there because although legally they are not there, in fact they are the colonial power. We must talk to the de facto authority. If not, we will have to ask the legal authority to take over, which is the United Nations. Then we have to take SWAPO’s position and ask them to leave.
Kissinger: I am trying to deal with the internal arrangements where the South African acts as an advisory person. With respect to the second class, South Africa has a person there to participate—I’m trying to save face for them. They are locked into this.
Nyerere: I understand. They are saying those are matters for Namibians to discuss and they accept whatever is the outcome. But other matters—Walvis Bay, troops—this I accept.
Kissinger: You accept?
Nyerere: Yes, I accept.
Kissinger: I’m not certain I can do it but at least to have a defined aim.

Nyerere: The key is whether South Africa is a participant in that conference. They are an essential participant. The specific issues they discuss, and what issues they leave to Namibians . . .

Kissinger: You see, I have the impression it is easier for Vorster to put Namibia aside so he doesn’t have a decision to make every day.

Nyerere: Then isn’t it better to leave it to SWAPO and the United Nations? Wouldn’t SWAPO then insist they pull out before they go? And we turn it over to Geneva.

Kissinger: If we can get the South Africans to designate a point of contact, to maintain a figleaf, is that acceptable?

Nyerere: No. South Africa is the real power. They should go whole hog and leave it to the United Nations and SWAPO. They can’t have it both ways, and be in but not in.

Kissinger: But they haven’t said that yet.

Nyerere: I know.

Kissinger: Based on that misunderstanding, I have been working on getting them to agree to move the Windhoek Conference to Geneva, and invite SWAPO. It was not easy to get done. But it was, with great pressure. And to set a firm date for independence. They have done those three things.

Nyerere: How does SWAPO accept a conference which is not clearly a conference between South Africa and the people of Namibia? I know one can argue about who is in South Africa’s delegation. But South Africa must be there.

Kissinger: Supposing South Africa said ahead of time it will accept whatever is decided by this group?

Nyerere: Then why are they in there?

Kissinger: They can say, presumably, that if the group asks them to withdraw, they will withdraw.

Nyerere: But that is why we are doing this, because South Africa won’t get out.

This is a very difficult matter for us too, because a Constitutional Conference is between the colonial power and the people of Namibia. I assumed the argument would be who are the people of Namibia.

Kissinger: I would assume members of the Windhoek Conference plus SWAPO.

Nyerere: We would say SWAPO plus . . . [Laughter]

Kissinger: Did I understand correctly this morning? You said if South Africa is there, there is no need for the UN to be there?
Nyerere: I said the UN presence could be symbolic, provided the Secretary-General accepts this and comes. He can say, “I’m glad you’re getting together.” And he can leave. He could leave someone there, for all I care. We could agree beforehand on a neutral chairman.

Kissinger: In Zurich, Vorster would hear nothing of South African participation.

Nyerere: Then he doesn’t want to settle.

Kissinger: In Germany [June 23–24] I had urged him to accept moving the conference to Geneva, so we didn’t put great weight on it.²

Nyerere: He might have said no.

Kissinger: But I added it only when I became aware of the feeling of the black Africans.

Nyerere: A Constitutional Conference must involve the colonial power. If they don’t come, leave it to the United Nations. I think they would like this less than the first. It is we who should be embarrassed by this. If they are embarrassed, we can say “Get out—the UN can take over.”

Kissinger: My understanding is they are not participating in Windhoek right now.

Nyerere: No. It is my misunderstanding too; I thought they were. I discovered later the South Africans say they are not in there. So both of us were misled. I’m sorry.

Kissinger: That’s not the point. In a serious negotiation no one can mislead anybody because it will come out.

Nyerere: We assumed all the time the South Africans were there. It turns out they were not.

Kissinger: All right. I understand the problem. I don’t know what I can achieve. We will have to see when I come back.

Now on Rhodesia, just to clarify my thinking:

It is my understanding, when we talk about these various guarantee schemes, this is not an issue in black Africa.

It is a little more complicated than buying out the whites. It is a fund to put money into the economy, and also for the whites. I have got confirmation from Britain, Germany, France—and Callaghan is in Canada.

Nyerere: This idea is my child! I told Mr. Wilson they would only be deciding where they go.

Kissinger: It’s easier for us domestically if we say it is to make them stay.

² See Document 196.
Nyerere: I understand completely.

Kissinger: It is better if they don’t all go at once. You personally have no problem with it?


Kissinger: The third issue is: You said a Chissano Government is all right.

Nyerere: Yes. What I précis as a Chissano Government.

Kissinger: That was a white High Commissioner.

Nyerere: Yes.

Kissinger: This is instead of one white governor; it’s a body that has three whites but some black participation. We can leave it to the British.

Nyerere: I’d go easy on that one. Let’s leave it to the British. What they want is a formula that restores their authority, their presence, before independence.

Kissinger: They could do it with the Governor; it makes no difference.

Nyerere: In Maputo, the High Commissioner had his own staff and Chissano had his own staff.

Kissinger: And it avoids a white panic.

Nyerere: I understand completely. The British can do it how they want.

Kissinger: So there is a misunderstanding.

Nyerere: During the transition.

Kissinger: During the transition we need a white presence that gives confidence to the white community and we don’t have to decide how to do it—one man, or one man with advisers, or a body. The Constitutional Conference can do it.

Nyerere: The British have lots of experience with it.

Kissinger: I understand.

Let me see if I have any other questions. [Looks at folder and checklists.]

Okay, I think that’s all the substantive issues.

Let’s decide what we say to the press. I’ll say we had good talks. I’ll be asked “Was progress made?” I’ll say “This isn’t the place to make progress. I came here to get ideas to take to the other side. But the attitude was constructive and in this sense, the talks were useful.”

I’ll be asked if President Nyerere approves the guarantee plan. Can I say this is between the outside powers and the settlers? Or can I say there is no objection?

Nyerere: I have no objection on my part. You can say that.
Kissinger: That is the easiest.
What are the procedures?
Nyerere: It depends on whether Rhodesia will accept majority rule.

Kissinger: On Namibia, if we can avoid going into too much detail. I can say I understand what President Nyerere considers the essential requirements, and we have to see what Pretoria considers its essential requirements.
Nyerere: No problem.
Kissinger: I can say the United States believes SWAPO has to be represented.
Nyerere: No one will ask me about the presence of South Africa because the press assumes they will be there. If they ask me, I’ll say so. But I think I’m going to be quite safe.
Kissinger: To follow you is no easy task. You’re a master!
Nyerere: If I have no answer, I just smile. [Laughter]
Muganda: You said you wanted our press to ask a question.
Kissinger: About SWAPO participation. I’ll say our position is it should include all significant groups and SWAPO is one. I can’t say now that SWAPO is the only one. But you can.
Nyerere: I will. But I really won’t. Because I don’t want to prejudice the South Africans’ decision.
Muganda: What excuse does Vorster give for not talking with SWAPO?
Kissinger: Because he thinks they are a bunch of gangsters. [Laughter] But he says there was a time when SWAPO didn’t want to talk to him.
Nyerere: But they changed! South Africa will change.
Kissinger: The question is whether we can organize the conference before South Africa changes. Because I think once the conference begins, world public opinion will be on the side of SWAPO. The outcome is inevitable.
Nyerere: I agree.
Kissinger: So I see the convening of the assembly as the decisive step.
Nyerere: I take your point. I agree.
Kissinger: Because South Africa probably won’t agree right away. South Africa will say it is Windhoek plus SWAPO. You will say it is SWAPO plus Windhoek. But reality will take over. Why should Namibia be the only state in Africa organized by tribes and not by national movements? The U.S. has no interest. This, incidentally, is a better as-
insurance than anything I can give. Because a new Secretary of State could change his mind.

In Zurich he said no, he wouldn’t come in any capacity, so it may be theoretical. In Zurich, he said he wouldn’t pay for the conference. That is what he said.

Nyerere: The United Nations can pay for it.
Kissinger: I told him not to worry about it; someone would pay. Maybe Nelson Rockefeller would pay for it.
Nyerere: Or Lonrho. The uranium companies.
Kissinger: Who gets the uranium?
Nyerere: The British and the Germans.
Kissinger: Giscard said: When you ask Schmidt, he will say Provision 114 (b) of the Constitution prohibits it. I asked Schmidt. He said “Provision 114 (b) of our Constitution prohibits it.” I asked him about Namibia, and he said that there it was possible.
I’ll tell Kaunda on the 22nd. He told me he would come back. Can you be there?
Nyerere: I’ll talk to him.
Kissinger: Probably Vorster will agree to all your points—UN participation, SWAPO participation, South African participation.
Nyerere: South Africa is the colonial power. The UN can be symbolic.
Kissinger: I appreciate my talks with you, Mr. President.
Nyerere: I hope you will get these two conferences going.
Kissinger: I received a message from President Asad: He thinks the South Africans must be advising the Lebanese because they are so stubborn. [Laughter]
Nyerere: I wish you luck.
I’ll see the press.
Kissinger: In Rhodesia, there is one issue: Will Smith agree? If he doesn’t, we fail. In Namibia, the issues are more complicated. We will know when I come back.
205. Memorandum of Conversation

Lusaka, September 16, 1976, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Kaunda
Foreign Minister Mwali
Mark Chona, Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Peter Kassanda
Secretary Kissinger
Under Secretary Rogers
Assistant Secretary Schaufele
Assistant Secretary Reinhardt
Mr. Wisner, Notetaker

Kaunda: Welcome, Mr. Secretary of State, to Zambia. You are on a difficult but important mission.

Kissinger: I want to thank you, Mr. President, for a truly warm welcome and your gracious words. The general atmosphere which you have set is particularly helpful after the events of yesterday in Tanzania. You know that the press has reported President Nyerere is hostile to our undertaking. Press reports of that sort encourage all of the wrong forces in the United States. You will recall after my speech in Lusaka all hell broke loose in the southern states. I really appreciate the friendly reception. Mr. President, this entire initiative started here in Lusaka. It was based, in fact, on your visit to the United States when you brought to our attention the problems of your region. You are on the front line and you have made courageous efforts to achieve peace. We are now learning how difficult peace can be. We are beginning to understand the cast of characters with which you are so familiar. Your advice and assistance has been invaluable. Which of the two problems we need to discuss would you like me to address first?

Kaunda: I have brought in several colleagues who can add their comments on the events of recent weeks.

Kissinger: There are really three problems. Namibia, Rhodesia and finally the situation in South Africa. With regard to Zimbabwe, it is my observation that the procedure is quite easy, but substantively the problem is difficult. If the Salisbury authorities accept majority rule, we can organize a conference which will work out the steps leading to in-

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 345, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September 15–17, 1976. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at State House.

2 See Document 103.
dependence. In Namibia, there are procedural problems, but the substance is rather less difficult.

I have made clear to Vorster that if he wants African nations to accept his country, he must separate himself from Rhodesia. Vorster must show cooperation and make concrete steps which will bring Rhodesia to majority rule. He has not fully committed himself and has only said he wanted to talk to Smith. In general, he has made a commitment to majority rule but has not given us a final word on how that will be accomplished. Vorster knows that if I go to Pretoria, I must have results. He has to choose between taking those steps which will lead to a settlement of the Rhodesian problem or letting the situation deteriorate. If he decides to pursue a positive course, we can move forward. You know Nyerere’s proposal for a constitutional conference.

Kaunda: No, he has not worked that out with us.

Kissinger: Basically, he suggests that Britain call a constitutional conference which would include the black nationalists as well as those members of the Salisbury regime prepared to work out an arrangement.

Kaunda: At which stage would such a conference be called?

Kissinger: Nyerere’s letter on the subject is more eloquent than precise. If the constitutional conference should take place before our initiative has produced results, there could be endless delays. When he wrote the British, he suggested that a constitutional conference could be called before or after majority rule is an accepted fact. I believe that the white Rhodesians should accept the principle of majority rule first and then a constitutional conference could be held. Do you agree with this approach?

Kaunda: I did not know about it earlier, but I am not opposed to the idea.

Kissinger: We will not know until next week if it is possible to persuade the white Rhodesians to accept majority rule. Vorster has suggested that I meet Smith. If you hear that I have met Smith, you can be optimistic about the chance of reaching a settlement. I will only meet him if I have assurance that there will be majority rule in two years. Otherwise, there will be no meeting. Perhaps Smith will resign which is another possibility.

Kaunda: Let me warn you to be most careful with Smith. He is slippery and extremely dangerous. If you should meet him and nothing happens, it would be very bad.

Kissinger: If I meet him and nothing happens, we will attack him publicly. I have no intention to meet him for general conversation or a

3 See footnote 8, Document 197.
general review of the conditions of a settlement. I have told Vorster that I will only meet Smith on condition that Smith is prepared to make a commitment. Will I be able to reach you here in Lusaka?

Kaunda: No, I will be away at my party meetings, but you can always contact me through my colleagues here.

Kissinger: It’s too bad I can’t be here. You know how much I like to come to your party congresses.

Kaunda: Please be careful with Smith. If you meet him and do not get a commitment, the man will emerge in Rhodesia even stronger politically.

Kissinger: I have no firm plan to meet him now. If Vorster tells me that Smith accepts our program in its entirety and all Smith needs is to tell his own people the Americans—in addition to the South Africans—demand he comply with the program, then I will meet him.

Kaunda: I hope you can rely on Vorster’s assurance. Mark Chona met Smith at South African urging and nothing happened. There must be no question of recognizing him.

Kissinger: Recognizing him? That’s out of the question. The only purpose of my meeting with Smith would be to facilitate a transfer of power. The announcement of that transfer would have to come in a short period—say two weeks. I will not explore possibilities with him or engage in general discussion. Either he agrees to accept majority rule or I won’t meet him.

Smith must accept basic principles—a commitment to majority rule in two years, a provisional government which has a black prime minister and a black-dominated cabinet with only a few white members—then we can talk.

In this regard I can foresee a government structure during the period of transition which would include a Council of State. The Council would serve the same capacity as a governor or a high commissioner would in colonial territories. In Rhodesia the Council would have more whites than blacks. The Council would disappear with full independence.

Kaunda: How long would that take?

Kissinger: From 18 months to 2 years. The United Kingdom, perhaps the United States and maybe the OAU ought to guarantee the execution of the program. Let me reassure you the Council of State would have the same functions as a high commissioner or a governor general. Administrative authority and executive control would be in the hands of a cabinet which will have a black prime minister.

Kaunda: I am concerned by the powers of the Council of State. If the Council of State controls the armed forces, the police and the civil service, it may not be possible for the guaranteeing powers to keep the
Council under control. After all, the guaranteeing powers are outsiders and far away. Their very distance could lead to a dangerous situation.

Kissinger: How do you think we should proceed? I have an open mind.

Kaunda: If you have United States, British and OAU guarantees, how could we be sure that these guarantees would be effective?

Kissinger: If the Council of State ever violated its authority, we would demand that South Africa apply total sanctions. South Africa can bring Rhodesia to heel in a matter of weeks.

Chona: What would happen if South Africa refused to cooperate?

Kissinger: We would have to consider sanctions against South Africa. The situation really is quite different from that which existed when you tried to negotiate a settlement for Zimbabwe. You were most courageous and took a chance. We have real leverage and can bring it to bear.

Kaunda: You must understand me, Mr. Secretary of State. I am trying to think of all possibilities. If the conditions were presented the way you described them, we must be sure we have looked for all the flaws. Interfering in another nation’s internal situation is difficult. We would not interfere in your country’s internal affairs. Moreover, what if all of us accepted your scheme and President Ford lost the election?

Kissinger: I wish you could give us technical advice on how to run an election campaign. A few of your party workers would be most effective. I understand you, however.

What I am going to tell you I will not say in the larger meeting. I have been in touch with Governor Carter via Dean Rusk. Carter has let me know that he supports my undertaking on the condition that the African Presidents support it. Of course, he cannot say this publicly.

Mwale: This is tricky.

Kissinger: What would you recommend?

Mwale: Coming back to the President’s point. If Ford is elected, that’s fine. But another President may have his own advisers and his own policies. They may be more radical.

Kaunda: Or the other way around.

Kissinger: I don’t see the practical difference. If white Rhodesians agree to majority rule, what difference would it make who is in office in the United States?

Mwale: Mr. Secretary of State, that depends when majority rule comes.

Kissinger: Let’s say in two years.

Mwale: It really depends on how the liberation movements see it.
Kissinger: Would they accept a proposal like the one I have described, Mr. President?

Kaunda: Given their past experience, the program you propose would have to be very tight. This is why we must continue to fight and at the same time support the liberation struggle.

Kissinger: We haven’t asked you to stop your support.

Kaunda: What I am trying to say is that the liberation movements must have a very tight offer. Otherwise, if they stop fighting and are betrayed, there will be no end of difficulty. The United States Government is making the third, or is it the fourth, try at securing majority rule in Rhodesia. All previous efforts have failed. Before we try to put pressure on the liberation movements, we must have a solid guarantee of success.

Kissinger: Our idea is quite simple and it springs from the Callaghan plan. We foresee a commitment to majority rule, the convening of a constitutional conference, the organization of a provisional government which has a black Prime Minister and a Council of State. We and the British would organize a consortium. That consortium would set out the guarantees which you have criticized. We are simply not prepared to set out such a bold plan if we were ready to see it violated.

Nyerere asked me whether we were ready to support the freedom fighters if the current process of negotiations broke down. In the abstract, we can’t give an answer to that question. If the understanding was violated, our word would be called into question.

You realize that the issue is not a political one at home. I briefed 47 senators—some Republicans and many more Democrats—and I got their full backing. I even obtained the support of Southern Democrats. Look . . . I am prepared to consider other guarantees. Do you have any to suggest?

Kaunda: Not for the moment. But let’s turn to Namibia.

Kissinger: Good. In June before my first meeting with Vorster in Germany, Nyerere sent me a letter in which he said that the Africans wanted two things. First, a transfer of the Windhoek conference to Lusaka and, second, the inclusion of SWAPO. I put these two points to Vorster. He did not agree. Under additional pressure, he concurred in the conference moving to Geneva. I will have to reconfirm these points when I visit Pretoria. SWAPO is not exactly his favorite institution, but he has now come around to agreeing that SWAPO should participate. Then we obtained a firm date for independence. In addition, based on

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4 See footnote 4, Document 196, and Tab B to Document 199.
your last letter, we succeeded in convincing the South Africans to take into consideration the problems of their own relationship to the Geneva talks, the political prisoner issue, United Nations responsibilities, military forces, and so forth. These are extra considerations, many of which can be settled in Geneva. There are three basic points and your objectives in each of the three cases have already been realized. First, there is a date; second, a mechanism; and third, SWAPO is participating.

It seems to me that SWAPO is in a good position. It enjoys international recognition. Both the United Nations and the OAU have made that point clear. Since it has international backing, SWAPO’s position at the Constitutional Conference will be strong. There is no other Namibian group which has the support of the African states. Must every condition be met before the Conference begins or can we negotiate the other points?

Kaunda: What is the date for Namibia independence you mentioned?


Chona: Isn’t that the date that SWAPO has rejected?

Kissinger: Even if SWAPO fights, they can’t possibly achieve independence before 1978. They simply do not have the means.

Chona: Is it possible to advance that date?

Kissinger: It is only with the greatest difficulty I obtained a date. Last June I thought I would get nothing. I have succeeded in including SWAPO in the process. We have a date and the Conference may take place in Geneva. How many more conditions must I negotiate before the Conference can begin?

Kaunda: First, a correction on what happened. When William Rogers and William Schaufele came here, I told them that I had reviewed the question with SWAPO and that SWAPO felt there were additional features which they required.

Chona: At the time it was not clear that Geneva was in play.

Kissinger: No, no. I agree you have added no new conditions.

Kaunda: What would be the level of South African participation?

Kissinger: I am glad you raised this because I wanted to discuss it. Frankly, this is a difficult question to answer. I am not sure South Africa is prepared to send a representative.

Kaunda: What you say cuts two ways. Suppose SWAPO joins conference in Geneva. What assurance do we have that South Africa will accept the results of the conference?

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5 Kaunda’s letter was transmitted in telegram 2277 from Lusaka, September 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840083-0072)
Kissinger: Either South Africa attends the Conference or it agrees in advance that all conclusions of the Conference will be accepted. In my view—I must emphasize not in the South African view—South Africa will have to be present to negotiate or it will have to agree to the decisions of the conference.

Kaunda: This would make the whole process a lot easier. Vorster maintains that Namibia is an internal affair.

Kissinger: Suppose I got Vorster to write me a letter in which he obligates himself to accept the results of the Constitutional Conference?

Kaunda: That's interesting. I must make clear, though, that the UN has to have authority.

Kissinger: We agree with you. I have said that repeatedly in my speeches. I intend to approach the South Africans saying that the conference should take place in Geneva. If they agree I will offer them two alternatives. On the one hand they can participate directly or the South Africans can agree to accept the results of the conference. It would be one or the other, in my view and I would be prepared to support either outcome.

Kaunda: It would be most unfortunate if the conference met, came to a decision and then the South Africans rejected the decisions and demanded renegotiation.

Kissinger: I agree. We have to take up the three basic conditions of a settlement with Vorster. We will also discuss the political prisoner question. As to the issue of a South African association, I am prepared to recommend one solution or the other but we will not support a constitutional conference if two years later the South Africans refuse to accept the results of the conference. That outcome would not be acceptable from our point of view.

Chona: What about a relationship with the United Nations?

Kissinger: Well . . . you know how the South Africans regard the United Nations. How important would it be to have a UN connection?

Kaunda: It seems to me that the United Nations must be associated. The world community has agreed that Namibia is a United Nations’ responsibility. The UN cannot be left out. You, like we, are members of the United Nations.

Kissinger: If you think it is important, I will try to negotiate it.

Kaunda: Yes, I believe it is important. The United States should also be present at the Geneva conference.

Kissinger: No. No . . . I hear there is a tribe in Namibia called the Bastards. We can supply from the United States several tribes to join them. The United States can give advice and it can even help in the event of a deadlock. But if we attend the Soviet Union would also want to be there.
Kaunda: I understand. However, there must be some guarantee against breakdown.

Kissinger: Conceivably we could write you a letter spelling out the conditions or we could write a letter to all the front line presidents. Not to Neto, of course, but to the others. In the letter we would state our views of the understanding. Alternatively, Vorster could write us a letter and we could transmit it to you. How do you believe we should proceed?

Kaunda: I am not sure. I would like to think about that.

Kissinger: I am not sure who would call the constitutional conference.

Kaunda: You could call it.

Mwali: Namibia is coming up for debate in the Security Council.

Kissinger: It is not certain that the question will be fully settled by then. Maybe you have a point. The Security Council could issue a resolution calling for the conference. It is also possible the United Nations could offer its facilities without actually taking charge of the conference.

Mwali: Yes, but this would be difficult. In the case of Namibia the United Nations has recognized authority. The Council of Namibia . . .

Kissinger: Do you mean Sean MacBride?

Kaunda: No. The Council of Namibia is chaired by Zambia.

Schaufele: How long will it hold the presidency?

Kaunda: We will keep it for another year.

Kissinger: What is the Council of Namibia exactly?

Schaufele: It is the United Nations administrative arm for Namibia but South Africa has not recognized it. As a result, it has not been effective.

Kissinger: How can we get the conference organized?

Schaufele: The United Nations could provide facilities. But the Foreign Minister’s question is of a different nature. The United Nations cannot step in and replace the Namibians who must determine themselves how to organize an independent government.

Kissinger: It is going to be a big step for South Africa to agree to shift the conference from Windhoek to Geneva and include SWAPO. SWAPO plus Geneva plus some sort of UN relationship is a lot to expect. I think it would be desirable to convene the conference quickly. That is the most rapid path to independence.

Kaunda: SWAPO has leaders under sentence of death in South Africa.

Kissinger: They have? Please give me a list of their names. I will ask Vorster that the sentences not be carried out. If you don’t have the
names, it is not important. The South Africans probably know them. We have already mentioned the prisoner issue to Vorster but it would be helpful if you could give us a list. There is one the South Africans don’t want to release.

Kaunda: Who is that?
Schaufele: Herman Toyvo Ya Toyvo.
Kaunda: Who is he?
Chona: He is quite important to SWAPO. For that reason he may also be important to the South Africans.

Kaunda: There is another point I would like to make. We have gone along with you and have accepted most of the conditions which will result in the opening of a conference. But if South Africa is not there that will be difficult. Moreover, your approach and that of President Nyerere will run into difficulties if the death sentences are carried out before the conference is convened.

Kissinger: I don’t have the names. You must tell me what you want. If I understand you, we need to get prisoners released and the death sentences lifted. Concerning the conference itself, you also want a UN relationship. You also wish to have South African participation. I am prepared to back either South African participation or an agreement that South Africa will accept the conclusions of the conference.

You also want SWAPO to be included. We agree with you and I have said so publicly. Indeed, I am prepared to meet with SWAPO leaders. Are those the principals involved? Is that a fair summary?

Kaunda: Yes it is. The troop withdrawal issue can be part of the Geneva conference.

Kissinger: I don’t think the United States should take part in the Geneva conference but we could write you our understanding of the conditions. Alternatively, we could ask Vorster to write you.

Kaunda: It would be better if Vorster wrote you and you sent us the letter.

Kissinger: We could give his letter of understanding to you or to Waldheim. I may not be able to achieve everything you ask. Vorster is in a difficult position, but I will raise these subjects with him when we meet in Pretoria. When I return here I hope to have more concrete results. I plan to arrive in Lusaka on Sunday night or Monday morning.  

Chona: We all know Vorster’s dislike of the United Nations. Let’s accept that. There is even an advantage in their position. Why not let the Namibians go to Geneva and whatever happens in Geneva would be the responsibility of the United Nations. In that fashion South Africa

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6 September 19 or 20.
would not have to associate itself with the Geneva discussions. UN par-

ticipation will lend the conclusions respectability.

Kissinger: I have learned since I began dealing with Africa that the

most logical approach is not always the most successful. What Mark

says is reasonable. Since the South African Government won’t go to Ge-

neva, why not let the United Nations take charge.

Chona: Why was Geneva selected?

Kissinger: I suggested Geneva since there is no other place outside

of New York where the United Nations has an equivalent presence.

These are the principal items. How do we go forward? When I re-

turn from Pretoria, I will know what is possible in Rhodesia. If nothing

is possible, then we have a problem. We should discuss future steps. If, on

the other hand, I obtain satisfaction in Pretoria, the United Kingdom

could call a constitutional conference.

Kaunda: Yes. I go along with that approach.

Kissinger: What is your view about the Nationalist movements?

Kaunda: Essentially the problem lies in their disunity.

Kissinger: I remember vividly what you told President Ford and

me about factionalization. You were talking about Angola. Remember, you

referred to Jonas Savimbi.

Kaunda: If you are successful in Pretoria that will help us unify the

nationalists.

Kissinger: We will accept whatever advice the front line Presidents

give us about dealing with the nationalists. We will be influenced by

your decision.

Kaunda: I hope you meet with success but really I don’t know.

Kissinger: When I got involved in the dispute between Israel and

Syria I said that I would never be so involved again. But look, here I am

and we have the same sorts of intractable problems. If you sit in Wash-

ington and look at the situation here the basic principles are clear but in

their application the process becomes complicated.

Kaunda: I really appreciate your policy. It is an important break-

through for Africa.

Kissinger: Would you be willing to meet our press? It would be

very useful. If you could mention the thought you just had—our under-

taking is in Africa’s interest . . .

Kaunda: All right . . . I agree . . . We will do it here at State House. I

may also use Vorster’s own words. Do you remember that he said,

“The alternative to success is too ghastly to contemplate”?

Kissinger: If there is no settlement, what will happen?

Kaunda: The liberation struggle will go on and we will give it our

full support.
Kissinger: Let me be clear. We are asking for nothing from you until a provisional government is formed. We are not asking you to stop your support.

Kaunda: As I warned you when we met in Washington, we have had to turn to the Soviet Union and China for arms. This was essential. Our boys could not fight without arms. You are kind to remember what I said during my visit to your country.

Kissinger: We have had many visitors visit Washington since you came but I remember your visit particularly. You predicted the future and few are able to do that.

Kaunda: I can’t take much credit for my vision. We live here and must know how to analyze our situation. The evolution has been painful and the future will be worse. Your bombing of Southeast Asia—we criticized you—one doesn’t know if the destruction won’t be worse here.

Kissinger: You don’t mean American bombing here?

Kaunda: No. I mean the general destruction in the area could be worse than what happened in Southeast Asia.

Kissinger: I greatly appreciated your courtesies to my wife. You know I visited Victoria Falls during my last stay but the boat I was on almost went over the Falls. I would have never given my speech. Victoria Falls was one of the most awe-inspiring sights of my life.

(Tea is served.)

Kissinger: If I could make a personal observation. There have been special moments in my life. One was the first time I shook hands with Chou En Lai. Another was when you stood up after my speech in Lusaka. This gesture came so much from the heart. You could not have planned it.

Kaunda: That was indeed a special moment.

Kissinger: Were the same trees in flower when I was here in April?

Kaunda: No. These come out during the dry season.

Kissinger: They are perfectly lovely. If we get the two conferences underway, I will only have to visit you on ceremonial occasions . . . or attend your party congresses. We should have asked your advice before our primaries. Does your party meet every year?

Kaunda: The seminars for top leaders which are presently in progress are the first since independence. These seminars last three to four days and in addition to senior party leaders they include representatives of state and private enterprise.

Kissinger: Do they talk about Zambia?

Kaunda: Yes, primarily about developments since independence. I have had to spend two and a half hours replying to various criticisms which arose in the debates. It is a good struggle.
Chona: We have too much democracy in a one-party state.
Mwale: The emphasis is on participation.
Kissinger: It is a good opportunity to find out what people have on their minds. I love the sky here. The difference between Lusaka and Dar es Salaam is striking. Here the air is so clear.

Let me ask you a procedural question. If I came here on Monday and then went to Dar—I have to be back in the United States on the 24th. You know we are the “host” country for the United Nations. Foreign Ministers from all over the world visit. If I am not there we will have problems. What is your thought? Will you require consultations with the other Presidents before or after I leave Africa? After I see you on Sunday or Monday I will visit Mobutu. I could come back here on the 22nd. You said you might be in Lusaka if that proved to be necessary. Let me leave it up to you to consult with the other Presidents. If you think you should seek the opinions of the Nationalist leaders, that too would be all right. You could bring them here and I would be happy to meet them separately or together. We will take no initiative but you think about it. I will wait for your signal.

What should I discuss in the larger meeting which you have called? You should take the lead.
Kaunda: All right.
Kissinger: I am a former Harvard professor. Just give me an audience and I will take the floor. How much detail do you want to get into? I prefer to let you take the lead and I will reply.
Chona: The press will be there for the preliminary remarks. Once those are over they will leave.
Kaunda: We will not begin our meeting until the press has left.

206. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

September 20, 1976, 0745Z.

Hakto 22. Deliver in sealed envelope; retain no file copies; destroy all tapes.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Trip Files, Box 29, South Africa/London, Hakto (1). Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger was presumably en route to Lusaka (see footnote 2, Document 207).
1. Please pass following report to the President on my Sunday talks in Pretoria.

2. Begin text: After seven painful hours of meetings with Ian Smith and his senior colleagues, they have substantially accepted our proposals. They have agreed to:

—Majority rule within two years (i.e., the Callaghan plan);
—Immediate negotiations with black representatives to create an interim government for the two-year transition;
—A structure for the interim government that shares power, giving blacks a majority of the Cabinet but giving whites the safeguard of a 50–50 split on a key executive body, the Council of State. The Council of State will supervise the drafting of the new constitution.
—The British Parliament will enact enabling legislation, reasserting their authority, and the Rhodesians will then pass necessary legislation effecting the changes.
—The Rhodesians will insist that when the interim government is formed, UN sanctions and guerrilla warfare will end. The US and UK will support this position diplomatically.

3. Smith is returning to Salisbury, to push this through his Cabinet on Tuesday and his party caucus on Wednesday and Thursday. If all goes well, he pledged to me to announce the program, as a Rhodesian offer to the blacks, in a radio-television speech on Friday.

4. In the meantime, I will show it to the blacks and insist upon their acceptance. The delicacy of the next phase makes it vital that we prevent leaks until it is finished. If it comes out in an uncontrolled way, we could be beaten to death, particularly by the radicals and Soviets who now have definite interest in derailing it.

5. The Rhodesians have also accepted in outline the economic guarantee scheme drawn up by us and the British. This is now for negotiation with the blacks, but the blacks have all told us they have no objection to it.

6. Smith and Vorster are fully aware of the disastrous consequences—to them above all—if Smith fails to fulfill his commitment. The international pressures will become massive—on both of them—and the United States, appearing to have been double-crossed, will

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2 Kissinger held two meetings in Pretoria with Ian Smith, September 19. The first meeting with Smith and his delegation was held at Ambassador Bowdler’s residence, 10 a.m.–2 p.m. The second meeting included the South African Prime Minister in addition to the Rhodesian delegation, and was held at the Prime Minister’s residence, 5:55–8:46 p.m. Memoranda of conversation are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 345, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September 18–19, 1976.

3 September 21.
have no choice but to join the pressures or at best let nature take its course, as they are both engulfed by widening violence.

7. Vorster understands this completely, and I must say both he and Smith have behaved honorably with me thus far. Smith and his colleagues asked many questions, groped for alternatives, but came around inevitably to understand the necessity of what we proposed. Smith, too, wants a rapid solution (A) which boosts the chances for moderates like Nkomo to take charge of the black government, and (B) which insures conditions that will give the 270,000 whites decent future and incentive to stay. He and his colleagues acted with dignity and intelligence—contrary to all the predictions given to me.

8. This outcome gives me no pleasure. It is extremely painful for me to be the instrument of their fate—which could turn out to be disastrous. That they have accepted with good grace only makes it harder. I believe we must do all we can to see it through with care and make it work, for the sake of both communities.

9. After my seven hours with Smith (four hours in mid-morning and three hours in the afternoon), I spent two hours with Vorster. We had dinner, and went over the finishing touches on the Namibia program. We have obtained from the South Africans what I would think is enough to conclude this issue too. A Geneva conference including SWAPO and some South African plus UN presence should take the Namibia issue off the international agenda. But this is Africa, and one can never count on anything until it is completed. End text.

10. Warm regards.

Kissinger

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September 21, 1976, 0720Z.

Hakto 27. 1. Please pass following report to President.

2. Begin text: From Pretoria I flew to Lusaka, Zambia, Monday to report to President Kaunda what I had obtained from Vorster and Smith.2

3. I went over with Kaunda in a three-hour private meeting the Rhodesia program that Smith had accepted—the five points I reported to you yesterday, for majority rule in two years and an immediate provisional government. I told him this is what they had been seeking for eleven years and now was the time to move.

4. Kaunda was speechless, and I think it took him a while to absorb what I was saying. After a long pause, the first question he asked was what guarantee we had that this would be carried out. I told him that Smith could have no illusion about what it would mean to doublecross the U.S. and South Africa. He brought some of his ministerial and party colleagues into the room and I went over it again.

5. Kaunda expressed gratitude. As I expected, he said that of course he would have to consult his fellow presidents. He sent three of his closest advisers to make an immediate tour of neighboring capitals. We agreed that after I saw Nyerere on Tuesday, I would come back to either Dar or Lusaka to talk with them again.

6. Then I went over the Namibia concessions I had obtained from Vorster—moving the Windhoek conference to Geneva, inviting SWAPO to participate, allowing UN involvement, and pledging South Africa to accept the results. On this Kaunda was even more positive. He expressed satisfaction and believed this procedure would succeed. “We can see light here.” If we could arrange that Waldheim would simultaneously call a Geneva conference, so the blacks could call it a new conference, SWAPO would probably go along. SWAPO is based in Lusaka, so Kaunda is attuned to SWAPO’s thinking.

7. I came back for a small dinner with the President and Chona. We went over the Pretoria meetings, the opportunity presented to Africa if Smith indeed announces on Friday his support for the plan, and the

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 266, Cables File, Kissinger, Henry, August 7–September 23, 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger was presumably en route to Dar es Salaam.

2 Kissinger met with Kaunda September 20, 1:45–4:43 p.m. at State House in Lusaka. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., CL 345, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September 20–23, 1976.
need for strong support from the African presidents for the peace initiative in that event. He gives every appearance of having decided to push it, and is turning his attention most seriously now to lining up his fellow heads of state. Evidently he shares my sense that Nyerere is the question mark; if he will go along, the others will, too.

8. I will be in Dar es Salaam today, and we will know the answer.³

Kissinger

³ Kissinger met with Nyerere at State House in Dar es Salaam on September 21, 12:20–1:45 p.m. The Secretary briefed the President on negotiations with Vorster and Smith. Nyerere expressed concerns with arrangements for both conferences, and argued that (a) the British should convene a constitutional conference for Rhodesia before choosing an interim government and (b) the Namibian constitutional conference could not be an extension of the Windhoek conference. Nyerere was adamant that conference participants include South Africa (the de facto power), Namibia (represented by SWAPO), and the United Nations. Kissinger suggested Nyerere meet with Kaunda to resolve any issues of concern and clarify their position. A memorandum of conversation is ibid.

208. Memorandum of Conversation¹

London, September 23, 1976, 10:02–11:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.K:
James Callaghan, Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
Anthony Crosland, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Denis Healey, Chancellor of the Exchequer
Michael Foot, Lord President of the Council
Lord Elwyn-Jones, Lord Chancellor
Sir Antony Duff, Deputy Under Secretary
Tom McNally, Political Advisor to the Prime Minister
Tom McCaffrey, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister
Patrick Laver, Head of Rhodesia Department, FCO
Patrick Wright, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 345, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September 20–23, 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at Number 10 Downing Street. All brackets, except those noted in footnote 6 below, are in the original.
SUBJECT

Southern Africa

[Prime Minister Callaghan greeted Secretary Kissinger outside Number 10. They answered some press questions and posed for photographs before going inside. Tab A]²

Callaghan: You are looking very fresh after your trip. I don’t know how you do it. I do thank you very much for undertaking it.

Kissinger: I told Tony it was a combination of arrogance and ignorance that got me into this.

Callaghan: No, it is because you saw the necessity. I told Elwyn it was a fateful meeting. He said, yes, I have seen it before, on the Tiger and the Fearless. He’s been to many fateful meetings. [Laughter]

Tony, how do you think we should proceed?

Crosland: I think we should ask Dr. Kissinger to sum it up, and to tell us what role he sees for Britain in the weeks ahead.

Kissinger: You are familiar with my talks with Smith. All we have heard indicates he will put forward the five points that I put to him.

I told him he had three choices: accept the five points as I put them to him; put forward new ones—in which case he would be on his own; or to reject them—in which case he would also be on his own. The one thing he could not do was accept them in principle and then haggle.

Fourie and our Ambassadors there tell us he is in fact putting them forward.

He will also say that studies are going forward on the economic side—not sums, because there are none, but the categories.

Assuming he does this . . . I have briefed Nyerere and Kaunda about this, and about the two white ministers. Kaunda made mild noises for about two minutes; Nyerere listened and said “Fine, we have a basis for a conference.”

² Tab A is attached but not printed.
Now, there are differences between Kaunda and Nyerere. Kaunda wants the scheme we have worked on, an interim government that then draws up a constitution. Nyerere seems to think the five points are the basis for a Constitutional Conference.

My fear is this will play into the hands of both Smith and the radicals. Because one of the things Smith suggested was—for which we told him he was on his own—was just to call a conference, without any of the safeguards of this Constitutional Conference.

Callaghan: Your approach is the right one. Smith should sit down with them and set up an interim government. They then should get on with a constitution.

Kissinger: Everyone there agreed—indeed volunteered—that the British had to be there in some form. Even Kenyatta. They all agreed there had to be a British role—to answer your question, Tony.

The British role is to provide the intellectual and legal framework for the negotiations. Kaunda said that when Smith speaks, Jim Callaghan should call Nyerere and set it up.

Callaghan: Would Smith himself, having made his declaration, call the Africans in to discuss the framework?

Kissinger: I don’t think they will come to a conference he calls. This is where you may have to play a role.

Callaghan: But Nkomo and Gabella met him on the railway coach.

Duff: Nkomo met him in the railway coach six months ago; earlier he met with Gabella.

Kissinger: Nyerere said he would get in touch with you immediately after Smith speaks—about a constitutional conference. All the blacks asked us. First, we have no legal responsibility; second, the constitutional forms in which this is couched are foreign to us. For an American diplomat to be doing it would be strange.

Callaghan: You are doing all right!

Kissinger: Stealing your ideas.

Third, it would get us in a Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. You have a legal responsibility to create a framework for an interim government.

There are differences among the black Presidents regarding where it should be.

Crosland: And when.

Kissinger: All of them want it rapidly.

Nkomo and Kaunda prefer to have it in Livingstone. Nyerere wants a Constitutional Conference in London.

I told him I tried it on Smith and it is inconceivable Smith would go to London. He said, “Then any other place they agree on.”
There seems to be some jockeying among the nationalist groups. I think if you called Nyerere and Kaunda, or just Nyerere, and told him it is up to them—not you—to field a black team and that when they notify you of the team, you could supply a diplomat to facilitate the negotiations. This is the most helpful thing you could do. Otherwise, there will be a host of black rivalries and super power problems.

We would back you up.

This is what is needed, as soon as possible after Smith speaks.

Crosland: I see no reason for us to be far apart on this. There is no reason for us to be involved with a Governor or whatever. They don’t want it.

Kissinger: There is no disagreement.

Smith tried with me the idea that they just go back to the 1961 Constitution. I said: “You can try it on the British, but the British would just get rid of it and you could be back in the same position.”

Crosland: We could send out a British diplomat once there is a black negotiating team. [To Callaghan:] This is implied in your statement of 22 March.3

Callaghan: I said we would be prepared to play a helpful role. You see it as a two-stage thing? You think, once the blacks field a team and Smith fields his team, then we say “you get together and form your government.” Then when the second stage is completed, there is a formal Constitutional Conference.

Kissinger: That is what I think would work effectively.

I think the radicals want to prolong the process; the moderates want a conclusion fairly rapidly. Nyerere can be brought to that point.

They want you in as soon as possible after Smith speaks because that marks the formal end to Rhodesia’s independence, and it’s the way all of them achieved formal independence.

You could call Kaunda and Nyerere and say you are ready to facilitate the process and they should tell you who are the black negotiators. You could then call a conference for wherever they can agree on.

It is not reticence on our part. We will help you wherever we can. But if the United States starts putting it together, it has a completely different cast in African eyes, in Soviet eyes. It is perfectly natural for the British to do it. You have done it in several places. All the Africans take it for granted.

Callaghan: It is important that you say you will put full weight behind it.

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3 See footnote 4, Document 196.
Kissinger: You can count on it.

Callaghan: We have some skepticism, perhaps because, as you say, we are prejudiced.

Kissinger: With respect to the Europeans [in Rhodesia], we will use the mechanism of Vorster and hold him responsible for European performance. We have been fairly brutal with him. We can also work with the blacks.

Callaghan: You can work with Kenneth and also Nyerere.

Kissinger: But it is a lot easier for them to work with the British, and it avoids problems. Because for us to get actively involved would work against all our theories that superpowers shouldn’t be in Africa. It’s not an attempt to evade.

As we discussed, the objective should be to create as close to a Kenya situation as possible. You are in the best position to do it.

Callaghan: I hope to speak with you in all candor, Henry. In our Cabinet, there is marked reluctance to get involved, because we have been caught before. For us, the Rhodesian problem is a debt of honor. There is no interest for us except to settle the issue.

You can imagine, in our present economic situation and lots of other problems, there is no great rush in the Cabinet to get into the process again. The great difference now is Smith will have made a declaration, and you will be willing to help. On that basis I will be glad to recommend to the Cabinet to go along.

Kissinger: There is no overwhelming demand in America either. [Laughter]

I told Tony that after my Lusaka speech, I received 1,800 letters, of which only 23 were favorable. Then I gave my Philadelphia speech and the favorable letters went up to 30%.

We did this because we foresaw an increasing prospect of foreign intervention.

Callahan: This is where we started.

Kissinger: Yes.

Callahan: May I ask about the guerrillas? Last time, they called it off, and they complain that Smith took advantage of it.

Kissinger: We have not asked them to call off anything until an interim government is formed. They have not agreed to call off anything. Once there is a black Prime Minister, the whites—even the white Ministers—have no white structure to defend. There is nothing Smith can take advantage of.

When I talked to Smith, he understood that their interest is in rapid creation of a moderate government.
Crosland: The moment to ask formally that the guerrilla war be called off is when the interim government is formed. It would be an irritant certainly if whites were being killed on the TV screens. So some de-escalation perhaps.

Kissinger: We—and you—were asked by the Rhodesians. But we should work together on this.

Callaghan: There are reports that Smith asked for more than two years.

Kissinger: He asked, but we rejected it. When the press asked, I didn’t answer. So they concluded . . .

Callaghan: The Africans never questioned it?

Kissinger: No, the only question raised was about the two ministries. But Nkomo rather liked the idea that a black Prime Minister would have these resources at his disposal. He didn’t object on moral grounds but on how he could sell Machel on these aspects.

Callaghan: What about Machel?

Kissinger: When Schaufele was there, Machel expressed an interest in getting the war ended. Then he, like Nyerere, asked about the mechanics.

Until I saw today his Vice President said something in Lusaka.

Duff: Yes.

Kissinger: But our intelligence said he wanted a peaceful solution, and Kaunda and Nyerere thought Machel was manageable.

Healey: I have one or two questions. This two years—what are the termini?

Does it start from Smith’s speech, or when an interim government is formed?

Kissinger: A good question. I haven’t thought about it. One could make a good case either way. An interim government might be set up in four to six weeks.

Healey: Yes.

Kissinger: I have the impression Smith’s ministers want to do it fast.

Healey: Because the war ends.

Kissinger: And sanctions are lifted.

Elwyn-Jones: You see the setting up of an interim government is the key moment. When Smith was on Tiger and Fearless, he talked about a Constitutional Conference but absolutely refused to deal with the active fact of talking with the Africans. So I notice in your five statements, the initial point—which I very much agree with—is the active participation, indeed the initiative, of the black Africans.
Kissinger: The moment when it becomes irreversible is when an interim government is formed. The constitution is suspended and the white structure is dismantled.

My worry about a protracted negotiation on a Constitutional Conference before an interim government is that it plays into the hands of both Smith and the black radicals.

Elwyn-Jones: I agree completely.

Kissinger: Nkomo and Kaunda want it. Nyerere wants to keep his options open.

Healey: Would a Kenyan meeting place be possible?

Kissinger: I didn’t try it. I think no African country could afford to have Smith’s representative there.

Callaghan: I think Livingstone is it.

Kissinger: The Foreign Secretary would enjoy it.

Crosland: What country is it in? [Laughter]

Kissinger: Zambia!

Foot: At what point do you see the British response?

Kissinger: I think there will be a vaccum when Smith speaks. So, some approach by the Prime Minister to Kaunda and Nyerere.

Callaghan: And perhaps Seretse [Khama, of Botswana].

Kissinger: Yes, if just for his ego. They will all be in Gaborone Tuesday for his celebration. Tony could follow it up, and the Government could make a formal declaration Monday, just so they know what the terms of reference are.

I repeat, we are in a more awkward position than you.

Callaghan: I agree. The Soviets would be unhappy, and some of the people in Dar es Salaam.

Kissinger: And some of the people in Dar es Salaam. This would be clearer that we were trying to install our government in an area where we have no traditional responsibility.

Elwyn-Jones: One of the problems is we have a legal responsibility but no political power. This has been our agony.

Kissinger: Insofar as we have political power, we will back you up. It would be a defeat for us if either Smith used it or it became chaos.

Crosland: What if there is a change of Administration?

Kissinger: I would like to talk about this in a smaller group, because I have been taking some precautions. But if there are further disquisitions on sexual habits . . . [Laughter].

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4 September 27.
Callaghan: Are there any other points?

Crosland: Many of them.

Healey: If Smith announces this . . . Incidentally, is the matter of the brackets cleared up [i.e., the bracketed phrase about a white chairman with no special vote, on the Council of State]?

Kissinger: Yes, we told them they could include it because no one raised the slightest objection.

Healey: We would send a representative to help structure the negotiations toward an interim government.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Healey: Then—you are right—there is a whole different ball game, and you get into a dicey situation.

Kissinger: Definitely.

Healey: Then the inducements to the white community could become crucial. It could take a long time, especially in your country, even two years.

Kissinger: I think a new President, if he put himself behind it, could do it in his honeymoon period, perhaps in the first months. I know President Ford would do it immediately when Congress reassembles.

Healey: Would you give it priority over the support fund?

Kissinger: I haven’t thought about it in those terms. We could perhaps do both. We got our Middle East money in a few months when we could demonstrate that peace there depended on it. And I have some assurance from the Democrats so I am not just speculating.

Healey: You might get an even more irresponsible Congress.

Kissinger: You can’t get assurances from the Congress, but from the candidates. We have had a very chaotic situation in the last 18 months.

Healey: But it could be the same result as before.

Kissinger: But an elected President would have, first of all, a more disciplined Administration, unlike the recent time when the President had to worry about the Republican structure.

Callaghan: But this is an area where you have no responsibility.

Kissinger: We can’t afford to let it happen. Paradoxically it is easier for us if you are in charge, than if we have to explain why we are butting in in an area . . .

We have suffered setbacks before.

I briefed forty-seven Senators before I left. Mike Mansfield announced, on the day before Congress left, that I would be available. He expected ten to show up; 47 came and I received the most unanimous backing I have received since 1974.
I didn’t give magnitudes but I told them exactly what they would be expected to do. No one said: “Wait a minute; this won’t fly here.” Bill was there.

Rogers: And your breakfast too.
Kissinger: Of course, I also told them the odds were against it then. So it was easier to approve. [Laughter]

Healey: My concern is should we accept some form of responsibility—that the position between UDI and independence is a British responsibility—and it goes sour in that period. Either the money isn’t available, or the blacks break up, or radicals challenge it. Then it is the hardest time. I must say it is most imaginative attempt to break the deadlock yet, but if it breaks down, we need some assurance we are not just landed high and dry. And we have other commitments in Northern Ireland.

The money to the whites is to persuade them to stay; before, when we thought about money it was to get them to go. As you know, half of them came there since UDI—and most are Southern Europeans, South Africans.

But the rationale is perfectly sensible. But we must have your absolute firm backing.

Kissinger: The rationale is the trust fund produces funds for investment, and the increase is available for the whites. If it works perfectly, there is no problem.

Healey: If it breaks down . . . it looks like an incentive for the black government to nationalize.

Kissinger: Except then they won’t get the investment.

Healey: But they don’t always think like economic men.

Kissinger: I think President Ford will make this a high priority and we can get the Democratic candidate to take the same position. And Congress I can’t believe will take on a new President on a foreign policy issue.

Healey: What reaction have you got from the other contributors?

Kissinger: Giscard said they would, but he gave no percentages. Helmut . . .

Healey: Quoted some provision of the Bundesbank.

Kissinger: Article 134(a) of the Constitution. [Laughter] He never said no. They’d be willing to do more in Namibia.

Healey: We have decided we had to limit ours to 20 percent, or 15 million\(^5\) a year over five years.

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\(^5\) Duff confirmed afterwards that this was Pounds Sterling. [Footnote is in the original.]
Kissinger: We haven’t studied it.

Callaghan: We have other things we have cut.

Healey: I shall resign and seek refuge in Washington if the contingency reserve is cut.

If there is any shortfall anywhere else, we would go down pro tanto; we wouldn’t make it up.

Kissinger: I understand that any figure you give is your total contribution, that you can’t make it up.

Callaghan: I spoke to Trudeau, and he said he would recommend it favorably to his Cabinet. But again I have no idea how much.

Kissinger: Smith said he wasn’t too anxious for too much money to be available in the first two years, because he was interested in keeping people there.

Callaghan: Did he feel confident?

Kissinger: He said it would depend on whether he could retain those two ministries.

Callaghan: In full independence?

Kissinger: No, he recognizes that in full independence most ministries—in fact all the ministries—would be black.

Callaghan: Did you discuss the integration of the security forces and black forces?

Kissinger: We didn’t discuss it.

Crosland: What do you think made Smith make this quantum jump? South African pressure, the guerrilla warfare?

Kissinger: All of those factors. I think the guerrilla war is pinching more than I had thought; economic sanctions are biting, especially the port of Maputo. And I told him he could not count on any contingency where he could count on American support. And the morale problem among his young people, who wonder why they should die indefinitely . . .

Callaghan: How did he strike you?

Kissinger: I had heard all your accounts, but frankly he behaved with dignity. They had to convince themselves they had no alternative—but frankly they behaved like men.

Elwyn-Jones: That is our experience—until the point of final agreement. I remember on HMS Tiger, we had him agreed to sign a document, and we were all about to dine together with the Admiral. We waited for him to come and we asked: Any news from Smith? The answer was: He’s taking a tour of the boat; he has decided not to sign.

Kissinger: Any explanation?

Elwyn-Jones: He had to go back to the Cabinet and caucus.
Kissinger: We had the same situation on Sunday: We had told him we wouldn’t negotiate—and we had the presence of the South African Prime Minister, who we said we would hold responsible.

Lord: Plus his Cabinet.
Kissinger: You had only Smith.
Callaghan: Yes.
Kissinger: We had three other Cabinet members.
Elwyn-Jones: Plus you gave a new framework.
Kissinger: That is a big difference.
Healey: What future is there for him?
Kissinger: Maybe he could ask for a ministry, but I doubt the Rhodesians would put him forward. But I deliberately stayed away from personalities.
Callaghan: Yes. When they agree on formation of an interim government, could they also agree on a date for majority rule?
Kissinger: We wouldn’t object to that.
Callaghan: It would look different if it’s the 25th of December 19 . . . whatever.

What about Machel?
Kissinger: We would be glad to get in touch with him.
Crosland: I think you should.
Callaghan: There should be some coordination of what should be said.

Kissinger: We won’t drop out of this. We didn’t do it just to have a [study?].\(^6\) I agree with Denis it could blow up in a lot of ways, but it is mathematically certain to blow up if we don’t take this step. The flight of the whites, civil war among the blacks.

Crosland: [To Callaghan:] Tomorrow morning his officials and mine could prepare a draft statement of what is to be said if the answer is yes, and a program of communications.

Healey: Is Smith going to tell anybody before he tells the Rhodesian people, after the caucus?

Kissinger: We are on the same communication channel as you. We sort of assumed he would tell the South Africans, who would tell us. For all we know he might go on television and read the weather report. [Laughter]

Having come this far, I think it is irreversible. We hear he’s already briefed his military people. If he reversed himself, he would have to

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\(^6\) Bracketed insertion by the editor. The original is illegible.
face the same situation in six weeks, and we would have nothing to do with him.

Healey [looking around]: We have four separate notetakers.

Crosland: It shows great trust!

Kissinger: And all reporting to different places. [Referring to Rodman]: He’s reporting to the White House . . . [Laughter]

Callaghan: You remember last year in Brussels when you and I sat down with a map of Africa and planned a tour?

[The large meeting ended at 11:10 a.m. Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Callaghan conferred alone upstairs until 11:20 a.m.]

(The Secretary and Prime Minister spoke briefly to the press outside. See Tab B)7

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7 Tab B is not attached. On the following day, September 24, Kissinger and Crosland held a news conference in London to discuss proposals for a Rhodesian settlement. See Department of State Bulletin, October 25, 1976, pp. 521–527.

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209. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to Secretary of State Kissinger en Route to Washington1

Pretoria, September 24, 1976, 1810Z.

4367. Subj: Smith’s Speech.

Following is text of Ian Smith’s speech as furnished by Harold Hawkins: Begin text:

Z.173. Prime Minister’s address to the nation, Friday 24th September, 1976:2

As you are all aware, I have recently had a series of meetings in Pretoria, firstly with the South African Prime Minister, then with Dr Kissinger and finally with Dr Kissinger and Mr Vorster together.3

At these meetings the position of Rhodesia in relation to the rest of southern Africa, and indeed to the Western nations, was discussed in

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 93, Geopolitical File, Africa, Chronological File, September 24–25, 1976. Confidential; Cherokee; Flash; Nodis.


3 See Document 206.
great detail. It was made abundantly clear to me, and to my colleagues who accompanied me, that as long as the present circumstances in Rhodesia prevailed, we could expect no help or support of any kind from the free world. On the contrary, the pressures on us from the free world would continue to mount. Dr Kissinger has been working in close consultation with the British Government and he has the full support of the other major Western powers.

Dr Kissinger assured me that we share a common aim and a common purpose, namely to keep Rhodesia in the free world and to keep it free from Communist penetration. In this regard, of course, Rhodesia is in a key position in southern Africa. What happens here will inevitably affect the entire sub-continent. Although we and the Western powers have a common purpose, we differ from them in how best to achieve this. I would be dishonest if I did not state quite clearly that the proposals which were put to us in Pretoria do not represent what in our view would be the best solution for Rhodesia’s problems. Regrettably, however, we were not able to make our views prevail, although we were able to achieve some modifications in the proposals. The American and British Governments, together with the major Western powers, have made up their minds as to the kind of solution they wish to see in Rhodesia and they are determined to bring it about. The alternative to acceptance of the proposals was explained to us in the clearest of terms, which left no room for misunderstanding. Since our return Cabinet have examined in great detail and in all its aspects the choice which faces us and we have done this in full knowledge of the heavy responsibility which we carry for the welfare and the safety of all Rhodesians, white and black. In the light of this assessment, Cabinet had decided to accept the proposals put to us in Pretoria and the Parliamentary caucus of my party, which met all day yesterday, has endorsed our decision.

Before I spell out these proposals in detail there are some general comments I should make. The proposals represent what, in negotiating parlance, is usually called a “package deal”, which means that some aspects are more readily acceptable than others. Firstly, on the positive side, as soon as the necessary preliminaries have been carried out, sanctions will be lifted and there will be a cessation of terrorism. Dr Kissinger has given me a categorical assurance to this effect and my acceptance of the proposals is conditional upon the implementation of both of these undertakings.

In the light of previous experience there will be some understandable scepticism regarding the undertaking that terrorism will cease, but on this occasion the assurance is given, not only on the authority of the United States Government, but of the British Government as well.
Since the weekend meetings we have reiterated to Dr Kissinger and those who are working with him our concern over their ability to fulfill their undertaking to halt terrorism, and we stressed the responsibility which they carry in this regard. They have reaffirmed to us their conviction that they will be able to ensure the implementation of this condition. Nevertheless, if we are realistic we must accept that terrorism cannot be halted at the drop of a hat and it will therefore be incumbent on the security forces and all those living in the affected areas to act accordingly. Indeed, it is likely that there might be an immediate and temporary increase in terrorist activity.

It is also necessary for me to issue a warning with regard to sanctions. It is essential that the security of commercial information should be strictly preserved in the coming months and all those concerned are urged to be particularly careful not to reveal any information bearing on the breaking of sanctions.

Secondly, together with the lifting of sanctions in all their forms there will be an injection of development capital which will provide an immediate stimulus to the economy. Thirdly, because the Western powers are mindful of the need to retain the confidence of the whites, there will be other far reaching financial provisions. I shall deal with these more fully later in my statement.

Turning now to the constitutional aspects, the proposals provide for the setting up of an interim government comprising a Council of State and a Council of Ministers. The Council of State will be the supreme body and it will have equal numbers of white and black members with a white chairman. As is customary in the Cabinet system, decisions will normally be reached by consensus, but where a vote is necessary, a two-thirds majority will be required. Its first duty will be to appoint the Council of Ministers. However, the most important function of the Council of State will be to draw up a new constitution. Its deliberations will therefore be of vital significance for the future of our country and all of its people. Its decisions will determine whether Rhodesia remains a stable, democratic and progressive country. It is important to note that this constitution will be drawn up in Rhodesia, by Rhodesians, and will not be imposed from outside. I am confident that in these circumstances and, given good will and realism on both sides, the right decisions will be taken. It will be a majority rule constitution and this is expressly laid down in the proposals. My own position on majority rule is well known. I have stated in public many times, that I believe I echo the views of the majority of both black and white Rhodesians, when I say that we support majority rule, provided that it is responsible rule.

The Council of State will be given two years to complete its task of producing a constitution and undertaking all the detailed work neces-
sary for elections on the basis of that constitution. Some may regard this as too short a period, but I believe there are advantages in aiming at reaching finality as soon as possible.

Having given you the general background, I shall now read the actual terms of the proposals put to me by Dr Kissinger. Paragraph six relating to economic aid is an agreed summary of a longer paper: Quote

1. Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years.

2. Representatives of the Rhodesian Government will meet immediately at a mutually agreed place with African leaders to organize an interim government to function until majority rule is implemented.

3. The interim government should consist of a Council of State, half of whose members will be black and half white with a white chairman without a special vote. The European and African sides would nominate their representatives. Its function should include: legislation; general supervisory responsibilities; and supervision of the process of drafting the constitution. The interim government should also have a Council of Ministers with a majority of Africans and an African First Minister. For the period of the interim government the Ministers of Defence and of Law and Order would be white. Decisions of the Council of Ministers to be taken by two-thirds majority. Its functions should include: delegated legislative authority; and executive responsibility.

4. The United Kingdom will enact enabling legislation for this process to majority rule. Upon enactment of that legislation, Rhodesia will also enact such legislation as may be necessary to the process.

5. Upon the establishment of the interim government sanctions will be lifted and all acts of war, including guerilla warfare, will cease.

6. Substantial economic support will be made available by the international community to provide assurance to Rhodesians about the economic future of the country. A trust fund will be established outside Rhodesia which will organize and finance a major international effort to respond to the economic opportunities of this country and to the effects of the changes taking place. The fund will, inter alia, support the internal and external economic circumstances of the country and provide development assistance, guarantees and investment incentives to a wide variety of projects. The aim will be to expand the industrial and mineral production of the country, to enhance agricultural potential by suitable land utilization and development programmes and to provide the necessary training and educational facilities to provide the essential flow of skills.

Pension rights, the investment of the individual in his own home and/or farm and the remittances overseas of an individual’s liquid resources within levels yet to be stipulated will be guaranteed by the interim and subsequent governments. These particular measures will be
underwritten by the trust fund thereby giving a firm international base to the government guarantee. Unquote.

That was a brief outline of the proposed support measures which have now to be worked out in detail. As I have said, the measures, in particular the trust fund, are aimed at giving both the European and the African certainty as to his future in a multi-racial society and to demonstrate not only that the economic and social stability of the country will be maintained but that every individual can look forward to continued rising standards of living.

In our discussion in Pretoria, my colleagues and I made it clear that Rhodesians were not enamoured of schemes to buy them out—they were looking for a solution which would mean that they could go on living in their homeland. We were assured that the other parties to the proposal strongly supported this contention. Accordingly, whatever plan is produced to assist those who decide to leave, the incentive should be aimed at making it worthwhile for Rhodesians to stay.

Those are the proposals which were put to us in Pretoria. With the agreement of Cabinet and with the support of caucus I have sent a message to Dr Kissinger indicating my acceptance of the proposals, subject to their being accepted by the other parties involved, and as I stated earlier, subject to the lifting of sanctions and the cessation of terrorism.

The next stage will be the meeting between government representatives and African leaders to set up the Council of State, as the first stage of establishing the interim government. This, I hope, will take place as soon as possible, because once the decision is taken it will be in the best interests of Rhodesia to proceed without delay.

I have given you the more important parts of what transpired during these negotiations. Were I to continue talking for the next two hours, I would not be able to tell you everything, and unfortunately there is much which cannot be disclosed in public. I hope you will derive some reassurance from the fact that my Cabinet, and my caucus, came to the clear and positive conclusion that, on the evidence before us, this is our best choice.

What I have said this evening will be the cause of deep concern to you all, and understandably so. But we live in a world of rapid change and if we are to survive in such a world we must be prepared to adapt ourselves to change. We have the satisfaction of knowing that, in spite of the odds against us, we Rhodesians of all races have built up a magnificent country where the prospects are second to none in Africa. I hope and believe we shall be able to keep it so.

Despite the stresses and strains imposed by terrorism the relations between the races in our country remain friendly and relaxed. We are moving steadily towards the removal of racial discrimination and this will be seen to an increasing extent as the recommendations of the
Quenet Commission are implemented in the coming months. I believe that it is incumbent on all of us, white and black alike, to act with dignity and restraint in the testing time which lies before us, and to create the right atmosphere to enable those charged with the drawing up of our new constitution to proceed expeditiously with their important task.

Clearly, this agreement doesn’t give us the answer which we would have liked. However, it does present us with an opportunity which we have never had before—an offer to Rhodesians to work out amongst themselves, without interference from outside, our future constitution. The Council of State has been charged to do this within two years, which should be more than ample time. As I have already indicated, the Council of State will be composed of equal numbers of white and black Rhodesians. They will be chosen by Rhodesians. I hope they will be the best, the most responsible we can find. It will only be at the conclusion of this exercise that we will know whether this whole operation has succeeded or failed. I hope all Rhodesians will join with me in dedicating themselves to ensure that there can only be one answer—success.

Meanwhile, I believe it is important that we maintain our morale and our confidence. It would be unworthy of us, after all we have been through, after all the sacrifices which have been made, to allow ourselves to fall into any premature despondency. There is no doubt in my mind, that the great fighting spirit of Rhodesians over the last decade has earned great respect from the rest of the world, and had it not been for this, the proposals which are now before us would not have been so favourable.

For myself, I hope to share the privilege of continuing to play a part in helping to guide the destiny of Rhodesia. I remain dedicated to the ideal of doing all I can to ensure that Rhodesia remains a country in which all of us, of whatever race or colour, can live and work and prosper together in peace, harmony and stability. I have been tremendously gratified and encouraged by the messages of support which so many Rhodesians have sent me in the last week. I am confident that the spirit and determination of Rhodesians remain undaunted and that we shall go forward together towards our goal.

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210. Message From President Ford to British Prime Minister Callaghan

Washington, September 24, 1976, 2331Z.

WH 61359. Deliver at opening of business.
Presidential message to Prime Minister Callaghan.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have just received the news of Ian Smith’s announcement in Salisbury and want to let you know how pleased I am with the progress we have made. The plan which you designed and your advice throughout the negotiations made it possible for us to do our part.

If the process we have launched is to lead to the conclusion we seek, it is essential that the negotiations which will produce an interim government for Rhodesia take place without delay. You may be assured of our support during the negotiations and you have my resolve that the United States will make its contribution to a final settlement, and, consistent with our constitutional process, participate in the economic program which our governments are discussing.

The settlement which has been advanced and the accomplishments of the past six months are a tribute to the vitality of our long standing and close friendship and alliance. I am glad that we have been able to work together, profit from your wisdom and experience and contribute to the settlement of an issue of such importance to Britain and the world at large. You have my best wishes in the decisive weeks ahead.

With warmest regards,
Gerald R. Ford

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2 In Callaghan’s reply, September 25, he thanked Ford for his remarks and congratulated Kissinger for “having brought matters to this point.” He agreed with Ford on the need for continued cooperation and to move forward with negotiations for an interim government. (Ibid.)
211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia

Washington, September 25, 1976, 2056Z.

239414. Subject: Message for President Kaunda.

1. Please pass the following message to President Kaunda.

2. “Dear Mr. President: I understand that you and President Nyerere will be meeting very shortly to discuss the Rhodesian situation, Ian Smith’s statement and the next steps in a settlement. I also understand that Prime Minister Callaghan has been in touch with you.

3. “There are several points, in my judgment, that all of us must keep in mind as we consider what Ian Smith said. First, Smith’s remarks were addressed to an audience which could only receive the news with the deepest sense of shock. He therefore used language we would not have recommended but which has to be understood. Second, the Salisbury authorities are now irrevocably committed to majority rule within a two-year period. Third, they are also committed to the principle of a black majority interim government. Fourth, the sixth point in Smith’s announcement—the economic program—is a matter for discussion with the members of an international consortium and not a subject on which the front line presidents need take a position. Fifth, the specificity of Smith’s proposals is due in large part to our pressure. We feared that a general proposal would only encourage him to procrastinate later.

4. “There are aspects of Smith’s announcement which will have to be developed in greater detail. I would like to share with you my thoughts on the principal subjects:

—I do not believe that a meeting to negotiate the formation of an interim government need take place in Salisbury or anywhere else in Rhodesia. Nor do I believe that it would be advisable to hold such a meeting in London. We are prepared as you and I discussed to back the convening of the negotiations in any other place mutually convenient to all the parties involved.

—There is no possibility that, under the proposals, Smith can run the show. Indeed, once the interim government is formed, the present structure in Salisbury would disappear.

—It should be understood that each side in the negotiations will be free to nominate its community’s members to the Council of State. Even

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Niat Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Wisner, cleared by Rogers, and approved by Kissinger.

2 See Document 209.
though the Chairman of the Council of State would be European, it is our understanding that he would have to be selected with the approval of the other members. In short, his selection could only be based on a consensus of the members at large.

—The United States will promote no individual or faction on the African side. That responsibility falls to the Rhodesian nationalists and in this matter you and President Nyerere have an important role to play.

5. “I believe that the other questions raised by Ian Smith’s statement are subject to negotiation. It is my judgment, however, that an ungenerous response to Smith’s statement at this point will give him the chance, which he may wish, to back away from his commitment. We must avoid such an eventuality at all costs. The proposals which we advanced to Smith are a distillation of the consultations we had with you and the other front line presidents and the United Kingdom.

6. “We have done everything possible to bring matters this far and cannot be expected to continue our efforts if the framework which the Smith announcement offers does not lead to negotiations. A breakdown in the settlement at this point could only lead to continued and escalating violence, so a decision not to accept the opportunity now offered would be a serious one. What is needed now, in short, is a positive response which will maintain momentum. A positive response is needed from the African leaders now because we recognize that continued US pressure may be necessary to keep the Rhodesians to the execution of the conditions in the proposals. This we pledge, if the African response enables negotiations to go forward.

7. “Your wisdom and foresight has been vital in bringing the process thus far and I completely share the views you so eloquently expressed that there may not be another opportunity and matters may take their inexorable course. It is my earnest hope that the momentum towards a settlement and peace can be maintained and that the parties to the negotiations will meet without delay.

8. “I look forward to having yours and President Nyerere’s and President Khama’s views. With warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger”

Kissinger
212. **Telegram From the Embassy in Zambia to the Department of State**¹

Lusaka, September 27, 1976, 1842Z.

2599. Subj: Letter to Secretary from President Kaunda.

The following letter addressed to the Secretary was delivered to me this way.

Your Excellency,

Your message of Sunday, September 26, 1976² came at a most opportune time as it reached me in the midst of our summit. It clarified a number of points which have been a source of worry to us and helped in facilitating the discussions. Our conclusions were reached in the light of the continued commitment which you have shown in this important programme.

I therefore want you to know, once again, that we genuinely value your efforts. We can only urge you to continue. As you say, so much has been gained and success appears so near.

As Ambassador Low will have reported to you, the summit was unanimous in its conclusions that a breakthrough has been made. We were, of course, concerned, as we believe you were, about the manner in which Ian Smith presented the proposals which raised some doubts as to whether or not he could not once again upset the apple cart. With our knowledge of him and his colleagues, it is necessary to proceed in this exercise with caution while maintaining the momentum in the implementation of the Anglo-American programme. Our tactics must, therefore, be correct.

To this end, it is essential that Smith should not himself call the meeting since he has earned such a bad reputation. In order to speed and maintain credibility right from the beginning, it should be clear to everybody that it is not Smith who has the power to organise and manage the meeting of the representatives of the nationalists and the whites. I need not mention that Smith’s performance in this respect in the past left a good deal to be desired.

We, therefore, resolved to call upon Britain to organise and chair the meeting. The purpose of the meeting should be:—

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¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 8, Zambia—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (5). Secret; Cherokee; Niatc Immediate; Nodis. A typed note at the end of the telegram requests that it be passed to Gaborone for Schaufele.

² See Document 211.
(A) to discuss the structure and functions of the transitional government;
(B) to establish an African majority transitional government;
(C) to discuss the modalities for convening a full constitutional conference to work out the independence constitution;
(D) to establish the basis upon which peace and normalcy can be restored in the territory.

We believe that these requirements are within the general framework of the Anglo-American proposals and that there is no contradiction between what you put forward and our stand in this connection.

During our meeting we found some problems in the emphasis given by Smith to the Council of State. We were happy though to note that the selection of the Chairman would be based on the consensus of all those involved. This would remove Smith from the scene; and this is important to the nationalists. It would certainly remove the possibilities of a break-down in the negotiations to establish the transitional government.

The Council of State will certainly cause some anxieties. British presence in the Council of State would be a source of confidence to the nationalists and I believe to the whites as well. You should, therefore, consider the possibility of parity between nationalists and the Rhodesian Front in the Council of State, but the Chairman being a Briton appointed by the British Government. In this case, the smaller the size of the Council of State, the better.

Another problem is the allocation of portfolios. At the moment, all the military commanders and police are white and will presumably remain so throughout the period of transition. The political head does not appear to be an over-riding factor in a situation like this one. It should, therefore, not come as a surprise if the nationalist side demands a more realistic approach in this matter and asks for slight adjustments to reflect the situation which will exist after the transitional period. We believe that after confidence has been built up between whites and blacks and there is an acceptance of the transitional government, the whites could possibly be made to realise that there would be greater security in making this readjustment at this time.

When the details are being worked out, it is problems like these that are bound to arise, and it is in this context that you should read our penultimate paragraph in the statement issued by the five heads of state at the end of their summit in Lusaka on 26th September, 1976.\(^3\)

Against this background, I therefore urge you to put maximum pressure on the British to organise the meeting to establish a transitional government very quickly indeed. I also urge you to pressure the

South Africans to ensure that the whites in Rhodesia understand that they should go to the conference with an open mind to establish peace and stability. The question of the cessation of the guerrilla war and the lifting of the sanctions will automatically follow the agreement to establish the transitional government. The point is that we should form a transitional government with the degree of credibility that enables it to actually call upon the guerrilla fighters to cease fire.

Once again, I want to say how timely your letter was. I also greatly appreciate the message. I have received today giving me your reaction to our statement. I want to assure you that all our efforts are directed towards achieving the objectives we discussed.

With greetings to President Ford and warmest personal regards to you.

Yours sincerely,
Kenneth Kaunda
President of the Republic of Zambia

Low

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4 In telegram 239446 to Lusaka, September 27, Kissinger categorized the statement by Front Line Presidents as being “on the whole a positive step forward.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840105–0489)

213.  Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Pretoria, September 30, 1976, 1629Z.

4458. Subj: Personal Message from Ian Smith.
1. At meeting convened by Brand Fourie in his office at 5 p.m., Rhodesian representative Harold Hawkins gave to Fourie, British Ambassador and me the following personal message from Ian Smith addressed to Secretary Crosland, Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Vorster. Hawkins made it clear that this is a secret communication for

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 6, South Africa—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis. Secret; Cherokee; Niatc Immediate; Nodis.
the addressees and not to be released to the press. Comment follows in septel.\textsuperscript{2}

2. Begin text:

In my address to the nation on 25th September I indicated that my acceptance of the proposals had been forced on me by the Western powers who had made it clear that in our fight against terrorism and in our economic problems the present Rhodesian Government could expect no help or support of any kind from the West but that, on the contrary, if I did not accept the proposals the pressures on Rhodesia would be progressively increased.

I have frequently warned in public statements and in exchanges with governments that a rapid handover to black rule in Rhodesia would lead to chaos which the Communists would be quick to exploit and which would cause the great majority of whites to leave the country. These views are by no means confined to members of my government. They have been stated repeatedly to British Government representatives by my political opponents and by a wide range of Rhodesian industrialists and businessmen.

In forcing me into the position where I had no alternative but to accept the Anglo-American proposals, the Western governments concerned have discounted my own views and those of the responsible Rhodesians whom I have mentioned. This places on the shoulders of these Western governments a heavy responsibility for what now ensues in Rhodesia.

Despite my misgivings I have gone out of my way to try to make these proposals acceptable to white Rhodesians and to encourage them to believe that it will be possible to establish responsible majority rule by a government which would realise the importance of the white people in maintaining the stability of the economy and the defence of the country and which would go out of their way to encourage them to stay. In some quarters my efforts were greeted with scepticism, but I persisted in the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement we reached in Pretoria. My statement to the nation was couched in language designed to encourage white people—and, indeed, moderate black people—to believe that there would be a secure future for them in an independent Rhodesia.

The immediate response to my speech was one of cautious support coupled with determination to make the best of the altered circum-

\footnote{In telegram 4459 from Pretoria, September 30, Bowdler reported that public acceptance of Smith’s plan was “steadily eroding” following statements made by black leaders at the Lusaka meeting September 26 regarding the transition to majority rule. Smith expressed concerns about Mugabe, and appeared on the verge of “renouncing” his position; however, the “South Africans persuaded him to stand firm.” (Ibid.)}
stances. I must inform you, however, that in the last two days there has been a marked change in public opinion. This has been caused mainly by the militant and the intransigent attitude of certain black presidents and by the statements of nationalists such as Mugabe of which you are no doubt aware. The inclusion of President Neto at this late stage has contributed to the disillusionment felt here, for he has nothing to gain from a Rhodesian settlement and is unlikely to exercise a moderating influence on Rhodesian Africans. The failure of the latter to reach any agreement among themselves is a forewarning of coming power struggles.

I have to tell you that I am becoming increasingly concerned about the situation. If a man such as Mugabe is put forward by the black presidents as a leader of the African nationalists, the effect on public opinion, both among whites and among blacks, will be extremely serious. This man has a long record of Communist affiliation and he is now emerging as the apparent spokesman of the terrorists based in Mozambique. His recent statements and those of the terrorist leaders can leave no room for any doubt as to their real intention, which is to establish a Marxist-type military dictatorship in Rhodesia on the model of that in Mozambique. It appears that in this aim they have the full support of President Machel.

In the last two days I and my colleagues and other persons in authority or in touch with African opinion have received numerous expressions of real fear on the part of ordinary peaceful Rhodesian Africans who owe no allegiance to the terrorists and who give them no support other than that which is extracted by intimidation. These people are imploring us not to hand over the Government of Rhodesia to the Mugabes and their like. They are intelligent people—businessmen, farmers, teachers and, indeed, politicians—who have the education and the background knowledge to appreciate what it would mean if men like Mugabe came to power.

On Friday afternoon I addressed a meeting of the top civil servants in the country. I urged them to take the view that it was their duty as civil servants to do all they can to ease the transition to majority government and I assured them of my confidence that it would be a responsible majority government which would give all public servants reasonable prospects of a satisfying career in a country in which they would be happy to have their children grow up and be educated. I met with a favourable response. However, again in this field the situation has changed drastically this week. Public servants at all levels are now questioning the validity of my assurances and there are strong indications that many of them will want to leave the country. They have noted the reported words of President Nyerere to the effect that the economic aid provided by the Western world should be used to en-
courage the whites to go and not to stay and they have noted similar remarks by President Machel and Mugabe. They are now asking that the government should make special provision for them to be able to leave before independence with terminal benefits to compensate for loss of career.

Other important categories in a similar position are members of the armed forces and the staffs of statutory bodies such as the Rhodesia Railways and the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation. The latter have skills which would be in high demand elsewhere and their departure would be a crippling blow to the Rhodesian economy.

I am particularly concerned about the need to maintain morale and motivation in the security forces during the period of the interim government because so far there is no indication of any intention on the part of the Mozambique Government or of the terrorists operating out of that territory to halt their attacks. On the contrary, I anticipate that the latter will endeavour, with Communist support, to establish a firm foothold in a sector of Rhodesia adjacent to the Mozambique border.

I feel that I must warn you that, unless steps are taken urgently to reverse the current trend of loss of confidence among white Rhodesians, the position will continue to deteriorate and there will be a real danger of a collapse of the economy and of the whole complex structure of government and of the security forces. If this should happen the Western powers who have forced Rhodesia into this situation will bear a heavy responsibility. End text.

Bowdler

214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa

Washington, October 1, 1976, 0515Z.

243197. Subject: Secretary’s Response to Personal Message from Ian Smith. Ref: Pretoria 4458.
1. You should get hold of Fourie and convey to him following response from Secretary to Ian Smith:

2. “Dear Mr. Smith: I have just received your message in which you express your concern about the situation which has developed in the aftermath of your courageous public declaration. I can understand your concern and I appreciate the fact that you have remained steadfast in the face of the difficulties which have arisen. We are aware of the pressures under which you are operating.

3. “I must stress, however, that we reject the proposition that we forced you into making the announcement which you made on September 24.\textsuperscript{3} It was clear to me from our discussions in Pretoria\textsuperscript{4} that you understood, as I do, the realities which Rhodesia faces are the compelling reasons behind your decision. It is my firm judgment that had you not taken the wise decision the objective facts in one year would have compelled you to seek a settlement under worse circumstances. Our offer gave an opportunity—but not a guarantee—for a moderate solution. I want to repeat what I told you in Pretoria. If you prefer to fight rather than to negotiate the decision is up to you. Whichever course you choose will have no consequence for the United States. I must remind you, however, that you can expect no help from us.

4. “I share your concerns about the radicals. It may well be their strategy as well as that of the Soviets to delay the convening of the conference and the installation of moderate African leadership in order to improve their military position. We should not allow that strategy to succeed and the best way to do so is to insure that an interim government under moderate leadership is installed rapidly.

5. “We did not know the Angolan Prime Minister would be present at the Lusaka meeting\textsuperscript{5} and were as surprised as you. Nor did we appreciate the rhetoric used in Lusaka. I have made it clear to the front-line presidents that certain of the public statements made in other African capitals have not contributed to progress towards a negotiated settlement. It is important, however, to remember that the front-line presidents have their own political constituents.

6. “In our judgment the way to a negotiated settlement is open. We have studied carefully the statements which the presidents made in Lusaka. There has been no significant rejection of the five points. Nor, in fact, has there been a conclusive rejection of the two ministries being held by the Europeans.

\textsuperscript{3} See Document 209.
\textsuperscript{4} See Document 206.
\textsuperscript{5} See footnote 2, Document 213.
7. “We believe that the final shape of an interim government will emerge in a manner much more acceptable to you through direct discussions with the Rhodesian nationalists than if we and the British try to negotiate the subject with the front-line presidents before the conference begins. As you know, the British, with our strong support are moving quickly to call the conference. They have done this on the understanding that this was something you thought would be helpful.

8. “It is in all of our interests to organize rapidly a meeting which will set up an interim government. The Rhodesian nationalists who wish to participate in the interim government have different purposes. I suggest you defer your judgment on the positions they will take until we have a chance to see what proposals they will put forward.

9. “If we are to continue to be helpful, we cannot do so unless the misrepresentations and press leaks cease immediately. Newsweek has given me a report based on Salisbury sources of my conversations in Pretoria. The Newsweek article is highly tendentious and misleading.

10. “Assistant Secretary Schaufele, accompanied by Rowlands, will come to Salisbury in the next few days and go through in greater detail our perception of the settlement. They will share with you and your colleagues our assessment. In our view the essence of point 3 in the proposals we advanced to you can form the basis for a solution.

11. “I look forward to hearing from you further after Assistant Secretary Schaufele has had an opportunity to share with you my views. Best regards, Henry A. Kissinger.”

Kissinger

215. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Rogers) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, October 6, 1976.


Yesterday and this morning we had a full day and a half of talks with the British on the details of an international economic fund for support of a Rhodesian settlement. We met with Ambassador Botha of

South Africa and the British over lunch and a working session this afternoon. Norman Aspin of the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office led the discussions for the British, and Chuck Frank was present for our side during all the conversations. I sat in on a number of the sessions as did Bob Hormats of the NSC and Phil Birnbaum of AID.

The talks covered a very wide ranging and detailed agenda. Remarkable progress was made in defining the issues and problems, exchanging data and technical analysis and in developing a plan for the next diplomatic steps to organize the Fund.

The British indicated that the conference for organizing the interim government might take place in the next ten days or two weeks. They do not want to discuss the economic plan at the conference. We both recognize, however, that Smith may want to discuss it in order to provide a rationale for accepting some of the political concessions that he may have to make. He may also want to test nationalist willingness to consider such a plan. Thus, we ought to have gone as far as we can in lining up support from potential donors and in defining the basic purposes and modes of operation of the plan. We both agreed that the potential impact that the economic plan might have on the success or failure of the conference ought to be the standard against which we measure the desirability of any immediate actions on the plan. In our meeting in New York with Ivor Richard, we might discuss these issues with him.

Our tentative strategy is the following:

First, prepare a short paper stating the purposes and functions of an international economic fund for Rhodesia. This paper could be a common basis for bilateral approaches to potential donors and, possibly, for Richard to use as he sees desirable in the conference discussions. The short paper might have some more detailed annexes that would be illustrative of the kinds of programs that the international fund might support. We have reached agreement on the major contents of such a paper. We will work on a draft this week and hope to agree on a final text in London next week.

Second, we would communicate this text at the highest levels to potential donors, possibly at the same time mentioning some illustrative amounts that we feel might be appropriate for each donor.²

Third, we might send a joint British-U.S. diplomatic team or bilateral envoys to major donor capitals to follow-up on the high-level communication, discuss concrete numbers, and answer questions on details.

² See Document 234.
Fourth, we could issue a call for a donor conference to meet sometime this fall to pledge amounts and discuss draft articles for the fund.

This plan should be flexible as to timing in order to maximize its positive contribution to the success of the political conference chaired by the British.

We discussed total financial support for the international plan with the British and a formula for burden sharing amount donors. We thought that total funding in the range of $900 million to $1.3 billion would be a reasonable target, depending on the number of other donors we might attract. This amount fits in roughly with what the British estimate might be the total requirements for external assistance on concessional terms. Part of this total might be attributable capital lent by bilateral aid agencies on concessional terms. A large portion, however, would be paid in directly to the international fund. All of it would be additional aid since there is no aid presently going to Rhodesia. In addition, we would expect a large amount of private capital to flow on commercial terms to Rhodesia. Part of this might be government supported through Export-Import Bank loans and OPIC investment guarantees. Thus, total government supported capital from participants in the fund could be of the order of $2 billion. For now, however, we wish to concentrate donor attention on the concessional aid component of the fund.

A very rough and tentative donor contribution schedule was discussed (see Tab A). We think it may be possible to meet a major part of a U.S. contribution of $100 million per year within levels of aid for Africa already programmed for Africa for FY 78 and FY 79. The British feel that they would have to strain to get their contribution up to $40 million a year. South Africa is not on the list of primary donors. We talked, however, of the possibility of a separate bilateral agreement between South Africa and either the Zimbabwe Government or the Fund to bear part of the expense of resettling emigrants to South Africa.

The British seemed to like the idea I proposed to them that the Fund would be managed by the World Bank, using existing World Bank staff as much as possible and existing executive directors with a separate voting arrangement for purposes of the Fund. The British agreed that we should make an approach to McNamara when he returns from Manila to get his reactions to the possibility of Bank involvement.

After we conclude our meetings with the British and the South Africans, and before we take off for London, I plan to put together an in-

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3 Attached but not printed.
teragency working group to begin to bring other agencies along. I have already talked to Ed Yeo and Jim Lynn about this group.

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216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva

Washington, October 26, 1976, 2228Z.

264172. For Wisner only. Subject: Smith’s Comments about Annex C.

1. You should request an urgent appointment with Smith and hand him the following memo.

2. Quote: There have been a number of comments from Rhodesian authorities about American commitments. We want to give you our recollection of events which is what our policy is based on. On September 19 in Pretoria after the original five points had been presented to you but before you accepted them and after you were informed that the U.S. would use Annex C as a basis of its policy. We provided Annex C to your representative the same night.

3. Neither Annex C nor the five points, as of September 19, included the provision for a white chairman and two white security ministers. When you raised these points you were informed that they had not been discussed either with the UK or the African presidents. Subsequently, after consultations with the UK and the African presidents, you were informed that these two issues would be difficult but perhaps manageable and could be included as modifications of the original five points.

4. This sequence of events clearly demonstrates that these two points, which have become indeed difficult, were added later and were not included in the original five points as they were presented to you in Pretoria. Unquote.

5. Orally you should make the following points to Smith:

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2 See Document 206.
—It seems to us that he should not be exposing himself to the press or allow himself to be led into discussion of details.

—The U.S. is appalled that he has made public reference to Annex C (which has not been given to the Africans) despite requests from us directly and through South Africa and Great Britain that he not do so.

—The end result can only make it more difficult for his own position in the conference.

—The U.S. cannot be put under pressure by public statements.

—If it continues we will have to wash our hands of our efforts and Smith will have to do what he can on his own.

—However, you may tell him that we continue to stand behind Annex C and will not push him beyond it as stated in your original instructions.

—You may also inform him of the Secretary’s high personal regard for Smith, his desire to work with him, and the great sympathy he has for him and his population in these circumstances.

Kissinger

217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva

Washington, October 27, 1976, 1543Z.

264569. For Wisner only. Subject: Rhodesia Conf: Five Points. Ref: State 264351.2

1. Per Wisner-Edmondson telecon, following is text from your file of five points labeled “unofficial version” and dated 21 September. Text has typo you mentioned.

2. Begin text. “Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years.

3. “Representatives of the Rhodesian authorities will meet immediately at a mutually agreed place with African leaders to organize an interim government to function until majority rule is implemented.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 13, Switzerland—State Department Telegrams, From SecState—Nodis (4). Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Edmondson, cleared by Seelye, and approved by Kissinger.

2 Telegram 264351 to Geneva, October 27, informed Wisner that Kissinger concurred in Richard’s request to distribute copies of the five points to conference participants. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
4. “The interim government should consist of a Council of State, half of whose members should be African and half should be European with a European chairman without a special vote. The European and African sides would nominate their representatives. Its functions should include:

—legislation;
—general supervisory responsibilities; and
—supervision of the process of drafting the constitution.

The interim government should also have a Council of Ministers with a majority of Africans and an African First Minister, decisions of the Council of Ministers to be taken by two-thirds majority. For the period of the interim government the Defense, and Law and Order Ministers would be European. Its functions should include:

—delegated legislative authority;
—and executive responsibility.

5. “The United Kingdom will enact enabling legislation for this process to majority rule.

Upon enactment of that legislation, Rhodesia will also enact such legislation as may be necessary to the process.

6. “Upon the establishment of the interim government, sanctions will be lifted and all acts of war including guerrilla warfare will cease.”

End text.

Kissinger

218. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, October 27, 1976, 1606Z.

8428. For Schaufele from Wisner. Subj: Rhodesian Conference: Discussion with Smith. Ref: State 264172.2

1. Ian Smith, accompanied only by his private secretary, received me at 12:30 local time and read slowly and carefully the written mes-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 13, Switzerland—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (9). Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2 Document 216.
sage which I delivered. He took immediate issue with the sentence which reads “subsequently after consultations with the UK and the African presidents, you were informed that these two issues would be difficult but perhaps manageable and could be included as modifications of the original five points.”

2. While he did not want to pick a fight with the United States, Smith argued forcefully and returned to the point frequently during our meeting that the message of assurance he had received through our Ambassador and his representative in Pretoria was quite categorical and did not have the same meaning. Without our message of assurance that the Africans had accepted the five points, he would not have attempted to sell his acceptance to the Cabinet or his people. During the conversation he repeated several times that this exercise would never have begun without Secretary Kissinger’s assurances as contained in the message from Pretoria.

3. Smith said that he had the message with him in Geneva and could “substantiate” his point if necessary. He did not say or give the impression that he planned to take the extreme step of making it public. (John Snell told me after the meeting he wanted to send to me the text of the message as Smith received it from Pretoria). Smith stated that “we must try to clear this up” and that he would be most upset if it were thought that he had misrepresented Dr. Kissinger.

4. I then asked Smith’s permission to complete my oral instructions which he accepted calmly and stonefaced. He regretted the public discussion of Annex C but felt he had been driven to mention it because Richard had referred to Annex C so frequently in his meeting of Oct 23 and had made clear to Smith that he regarded it and not the five points as the document under negotiation. Smith said that in their first meeting Richard “had almost pooh-poohed the five points” and had said “we are working to Annex C”. By the second meeting, Smith said Richard had “changed his tune” somewhat and had said that the British would try to work with the “five principles”. He had also been forced to mention Annex C because he understood from his press officers that the British had leaked the fact of its existence to the press. His delegation had received inquiries from reporters who said the British had done so. In short he had been forced into his position by the “antics of the British.”

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3 In telegram 8348 from Geneva, October 25, the Mission reported on the meeting between Richard and Smith. Richard stated the British “regarded Annex C as a reasonable basis and would do what we could to achieve it.” He noted that “the British Government could not however be committed to all details without negotiations.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 13, Switzerland—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (9))
5. Smith’s defense was not logical. I told him that the first we had heard about the press interest in Annex C was after his press conference. I also told him that while I could not speak for the British I understood the British were giving the five points a hard run with the Africans and would wish at an appropriate time in the negotiations to work for the best outcome possible drawing from everything available including Annex C. I reiterated that we view the difference between the two documents as his margin of safety which he must do all necessary to defend.

6. His only other comment on the instructed oral points was his defense of his speaking out in public and to the press. He had to reassure his people on the issues of the conference. He laid great emphasis on the need to not lose his support at home. If the people feel he had lied to them, he’d be laughed out of office. “If I don’t reply when the British claim I misrepresent the understandings, then I had better get out of my present job.” If white Rhodesians become upset, “we will lose them”. “Our lives are at stake; we must be careful.” I told Smith we did not question legitimate self-defense but saw no reason in his discussing detailed negotiating positions and issues in public. I urged specifically to make no further reference to Annex C.

7. Smith returned to the categorical nature of the Secretary’s assurances which he described as a “firm contract” and said only our word had convinced the Rhodesian people that the presidents would stand by the agreement as they promised. He said “I could only convince my colleagues by assuring them of Dr. Kissinger’s prestige and power and the power of the United States as the greatest nation.” I told Smith, as a personal observation, that as a man with long African negotiating experience he must accept the fact that the five points are a political and not a legal document. He said he appreciated this point but feared the negotiations were heading for the same fate as those which took place at Victoria Falls where the African nationalists went back on “categorical” agreements that had been reached between Vorster and the African Presidents. He said “I hope I am wrong but we may be heading in that direction.” I urged steadiness and repeated the Secretary’s appreciation for his difficult position and our willingness to work with him. Smith reciprocated and urged I transmit his sincere regrets for the misunderstandings.

9. Smith was off balance and defensive throughout the meeting. His justification for mentioning Annex C was not convincing.

Catto
Rhodesia: Possible Constitutional Arrangements for the Period of Transition

1. It is postulated that:
   A. Any interim administration must be legalized by the British Government;
   B. Britain would appoint a British Government representative in Salisbury.

2. In British domestic law, Rhodesia remains a British colony and the Queen (as Queen of the United Kingdom) is the sovereign of the territory. This would remain the legal position until the time came to grant independence.

3. In order to legalize the situation in Rhodesia, following agreement on a constitutional settlement, it would be necessary for the British Parliament to pass a new act. The 1965 Southern Rhodesia Act does not confer powers to suspend or revoke the Rhodesian constitution of 1961 or to amend that constitution out of all recognition. But the 1961 constitution would not provide an appropriate framework for the period of transition.

4. The new act would be an enabling instrument, i.e., it would empower the British Government to impose constitutional change in Rhodesia by orders in Council (which would probably have to be subject to an affirmative resolution by both houses of the British Parliament). A bill to enact an amendment to the 1965 legislation could not be introduced in the British Parliament until it reassembles in mid-October (unless it were to be recalled earlier for that special purpose).

5. It would in any case take time to prepare the necessary consequential legislation. One major technical problem is posed by the need to determine which of the post-UDI enactments of the Rhodesian Parliament should be retrospectively validated and which should be annulled or amended. It would also be necessary to provide for a political...
amnesty which would, on the one hand, free political detainees and prisoners from Rhodesian restraints and, on the other, protect members of the administration against prosecution or civil suit for past illegal acts.

Legislative and Executive Authority in Rhodesia

6. The new act would have to vest legislative and executive authority within Rhodesia in local organs of government. We envisage the formation of a two tier system, comprising a “Council of State” and a “Council of Ministers” and providing for internal checks and balances, designed as far as possible to be self-regulating and to obviate the need for the British Parliament to intervene in the Government of Rhodesia during the transitional period.

7. While the form of any interim administration would be partly a matter for the British Parliament, its composition would be a matter for decision by the Rhodesians themselves. The responsibility for choosing the members of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers must lie in Rhodesia, even though the formal appointment of members of the former will have to be made by the Queen of the United Kingdom. At the same time, the allocation of responsibilities set out below must be based on the assumption that the members of the organs of government during the interim period would, by and large, have been chosen from among those who genuinely subscribed to, or acquiesced in, the aim of a rapid and orderly transition of majority rule.

The Council of State

8. For the Council of State, we could envisage the following:

I. Composition: The Council would be composed of between 5 to 7 members, with a pre-determined ratio, which would have to be maintained throughout, between the European and the African members. The members of the Council would elect their own Chairman. He would be primus inter pares and would have no special status. The ratio of membership could be 3 to 2 or 4 to 3 in favor of the Africans; or there could be parity but in that event it would be laid down that the Chairman of the Council would be African.

II. Appointment of members: By the Queen of the United Kingdom, formally acting on the advice of her Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but the latter would have no power of choice: he would endorse local Rhodesian choices.

(A) The composition of the first Council of State would be decided in the course of negotiations between the European caretaker government and the African nationalists. In the event that they were unable to reach consensus, the European and African sides would both have the right to nominate the number of representatives to which they were respectively entitled. Neither side could veto the choice of the
other: all those nominated would have to take an oath binding themselves to work for a rapid and orderly transition to majority rule. An additional safeguard (and this would point to a 7—rather than a 5 or 6 man Council) would be to provide that the Europeans and Africans would have the right to nominate one member of the other race.

(B) Subsequent appointments would be by co-option, requiring at least a two-thirds majority. The only proviso would be that a departing member must be replaced by someone of the same race or that, where a departing member had been initially nominated by the other side, the choice of the replacement would lie solely with the members of that other side.

III. Voting: The decisions of the Council would normally be taken by consensus: where a vote was necessary, at least a two-thirds majority should be required, except that a decision to dismiss the Chief Minister or the Chief of Staff of the armed forces would have to be unanimous.

IV. Legislative authority: Full legislative authority would be vested in the Council: it alone would have power to enact primary legislation, though it could delegate its powers in respect of subordinate legislation to the Council of Ministers or to individual ministers. Responsibility for initiating proposals for legislation would rest with the Council of Ministers though, in the spheres mentioned in (V) (A) below, the Council of State would have power to amend the former’s proposals and elsewhere to suggest amendments. These latter would stand unless overridden by a vote of a pre-determined size in the Council of Ministers.

V. Executive powers:

A. The Council of State would have ultimate authority in matters related to the implementation of the programme for progress to majority rule and (see also VI below) to defense and internal security. In both spheres, it could issue directives to the Council of Ministers to individual ministers or to officials.

B. It would have the right to be kept informed of the proceedings of the Council of Ministers (one possibility would be to arrange for a joint secretariat to service both Councils).

C. The Council would be responsible for the appointments and dismissal of all members of the Council of Ministers, at its discretion alone; other appointments and dismissals, and the allocation of portfolios, would, however, be made only after consultation with the Chief Minister, whose advice would be binding.

D. The Council would also be responsible for the appointment and dismissal of: members of the judiciary (whose dismissal would, however, be subject to the usual safeguards); the chiefs of the armed forces
and of the police; and the senior members (down to a grade to be determined) of the public service.

E. The Council would also exercise the prerogative of mercy.

The Council of Ministers

9. For the Council of Ministers, we could envisage the following:

I. Appointment of members: See paragraph 8 (IV) (C) above.

II. Composition: The Council would be composed of a Chief Minister, who would be an African, and would contain a majority of African members.

III. Voting: Normally, under the doctrine of collective responsibility, no vote ought to be necessary but, where there was a clear division of opinion, it might be necessary to provide for a vote to be taken. In such an event, it would be important to ensure that a mere majority did not suffice; for that could, theoretically, lead to a situation in which the European members were permanently outvoted. One possibility would be to provide for a two thirds majority to be required as the norm and, where this could not be achieved, for the decision to lie with the Council of State.

IV. The quorum: It would be necessary to make provision for a quorum, perhaps of at least half of the African and half of the European members.

V. The Council’s business: The initiative for proposing the agenda would lie with the Chief Minister, but every member of the Council would be entitled to propose items for agenda and should have the right to insist on their being discussed.

The British Role

10. The organs of government would have authority for a predetermined period perhaps not exceeding two years.

11. Britain would remain responsible for external affairs during the interim period and there would be a British Government representative in Salisbury. He would not be a representative of the Queen. His function would be quasi-diplomatic: to monitor the programme of progress to majority rule and, where necessary, to make available his good offices to mediate in any matter affecting the carrying through of the programme.

Robinson
220. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, November 3, 1976, 1732Z.

8710. For the Secretary from Schaufele. Subject: Rhodesian Conference: British Game Plan.

1. My consultations with Richard lead me to conclude that the British plan at Geneva, for the present, consists of confirming a date of independence and majority rule and then moving to the question of an interim government. With respect to the date for independence, Richard plans to attach to a confirmed date specific conditions. These may include an assurance no final date will be settled until the constitution is drafted.

2. Richard will avoid any discussion of the franchise and work to make sure that question is raised only after the interim government is formed. He will hold out until a much later date Geneva consideration of Britain’s role during the period of transition.

3. Once the independence date issue is resolved, the British will resist further African suggestions that preconditions be set and undertake immediate discussion of the structure and functions of an interim government. As I noted in Geneva’s 8688, the British have asked each delegation to submit proposals; only Muzorewa has done so and his is not a satisfactory discussion paper. These proposals developed by each delegation will be circulated to the other delegations and comments will be solicited.

4. Richard wishes to maintain his tactical flexibility. He will pursue the negotiations in a variety of fora. Depending on the situation he will meet privately with delegation principals and their key subordinates. He will reinforce his meetings with the nationalists through informal sessions with the observers. Once consensus on a given issue has emerged, he plans to hold confidential inter-delegation meetings like the one he chaired yesterday, i.e., without observers and with limited number of advisors for each delegation. Richard will convene more formal plenary sessions only when agreement has been achieved and when the needs of public perception so dictate. This method of opera-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.

2 In telegram 8688 from Geneva, November 3, Schaufele reported on his meeting with Richard, Duff, and Grennan to discuss the results of the inter-delegation meeting on November 2. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 14, Switzerland—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (12))
tions conforms to Richard’s informal, personal style. He is at greater ease and more effective in this setting. The method has many advantages—principally the discouragement of African public rhetoric.

5. Tactically Richard will open discussion of specific items and if a consensus does not develop will move on to new issues returning to the unresolved ones at a later point.

6. Even though the British have refused to be “nailed to the five points” and the Africans have rejected them categorically, the five points have emerged as the conference’s informal agenda. The first point—Independence and majority rule—is under consideration now. The second point has been met. The framework of point three has effectively been accepted by all delegations as the basis for the next round of negotiations.

7. We will keep you informed of any changes in Richard’s game plan. He has requested no American intervention beyond asking us to encourage Smith to show greater flexibility on the independence date issue. He greatly appreciated my approaches to Smith.

Catto

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221. **Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State**

Geneva, November 12, 1976, 1821Z.


1. If, as British hope, the date of independence issue can be resolved or finessed, and this is not certain, the conference will then move on to discussing the structure and functions of the interim government. Some African delegates continue to believe that once the independence hurdle is overcome the remaining path toward an interim government will be relatively smooth. This is wishful thinking. Future substantive and symbolic issues will provide a continuing source of pitfalls which

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 14, Switzerland—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (15). Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
can be skirted only by skillful negotiating, firm British chairmanship, greater flexibility than the participants have evidenced to date, a more constructive front line role, and almost certainly increased American involvement.

2. To the present, the conference principals and their immediate advisors have focussed their attention almost exclusively on the date of independence issue. Though no formal positions have emerged on other, even more thorny topics, there has been considerable corridor talk and speculation, some of which has come to our attention. No positions have changed radically. Nevertheless, interesting nuances are appearing as simplistic rhetoric is confronted by an exceedingly complex reality.

3. The Africans’ original intent to engage in serious negotiations, as expressed in the opening speeches of the four delegation leaders, remains firm, though Mugabe may be having difficulty holding this line within his own delegation. Their insistence on a true transfer of power to the African majority during the interim period and, consequently, their opposition to continued Rhodesian control of the sensitive ministries (including Defense, Law and Order, Finance and Information) also remain fixed.

4. The British and Rhodesians appear to be hewing closely to their original game plans. The British are still intent on reaching an agreement as close to Annex C as possible, though their original insistence on avoiding a substantive role during the interim period is wavering. The Rhodesians are sticking like adhesive tape to the five points and have not developed any well-thought-out fallback positions. They prefer to let the British force the nationalists to show their cards before revealing their own position further. There is also the lingering hope among the Rhodesians that the nationalists may fail in their attempts to forge a unified position and begin a dissolution process which might prove favorable to further independent initiatives by the Smith regime.

5. The observers have not tried or been able to exercise much control over the nationalist delegations. As a group they seem to often be operating without instructions, perhaps at cross purposes, and with little coordination. Some, certainly Mogwe and Chona, stand by their original intention to guide the conference into discussions of matters of principles and institutions, but in confidence, have dejectedly admitted that it will be impossible to avoid issues of personality and more troubling specifics.

6. Among the issues which are bubbling to the surface and offer significant potential for further fouling the conference’s progress are the following:

   A. Structure of the interim government—the Rhodesians’ insistence on a two tier interim government in strict accordance with point
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three continues to elicit a negative response from the African delegations. However, no consensus of an alternative structure has emerged from the African side. As Salim, the Tanzanian representative told Ivor Richard on November 11, the nationalists and observers want a one tier government. The Africans want a black majority Council of Ministers to have all real authority and they see no role for the Rhodesia Front. There are indications that while the Africans continue to oppose the Council of State concept as enunciated by Smith, with its implicit white veto, the idea of a body above the Cabinet to referee what will almost surely be fierce black-white and black-black rivalries may prove more acceptable as negotiations wear on. Chona has privately floated the idea that the Council of State could serve as an advisory body to a British Governor General. The idea has not taken hold but may be resuscitated in another form. As the British delegation’s legal advisor points out, there is precedent for a “privy council” in colonial governments of transition.

B. British responsibility—intertwined with the issue of the structure of the government is the role the British will play in the interim government. Though the nationalist delegations made clear even before the start of the conference their insistence upon Britain resuming its colonial responsibilities in Rhodesia, it is probable that they had little more in mind for the British Governor General than acting as a legitimizing and protective authority. It is possible that the nationalists might be shifting slightly on this issue as their own internal differences become manifest. Their position is still undefined but a growing desire to use the British as a guarantor against Smith’s usurpation of power mandates, at least theoretically, a more substantive role in the political and security process. Nyerere and Kaunda have been in continual contact with Callaghan over the past ten days and have urged a larger and more specific role for the British during the transitional period including, according to Nyerere’s Nov 10 Martha Honey interview, the holding of specific portfolios—Defense and External Affairs. The utility of a meaningful British presence to the nationalists for protection from one another is also obviously an important factor, more so, of course, to Sithole and Muzorewa than to Nkomo and Mugabe. These sentiments are counterbalanced by an unspecified uneasiness about possible “British recolonization” of Rhodesia. For their part, the Rhodesian delegation has made it clear that they see no substantive role for Britain during the interim government; they claim to seek a solution which permits Rhodesians—black and white—to work out their future in Rhodesia, free from foreign influence. Gaylard said the other day that Rhodesian officers would simply not take orders from a British ap-

2 The British delegation’s legal adviser was Henry Steel.
pointee whether he is a Governor General or an armed forces commander. He argued that Rhodesian Front members will continue to exercise this power during the interim government including the retention of the sensitive security portfolios. Even making allowance for rhetoric, Gaylard’s analysis reflects the current state of Rhodesian thinking.

C. Military: Beyond their insistence that the crucial security portfolios be in black hands and that ZIPA take control of the security apparatus during the transitional period, there has been no further suggestions from the African side as to how this might be accomplished. The Rhodesians are not even discussing the matter. Gaylard darkly assumes “terrorists will be disarmed” as they re-enter Rhodesia. Whether the issue of how the respective armed forces will be dealt with formally surfaces at the conference or not—and in the interest of the conference’s success, it should not—the possibility of internecine fighting between the liberation armies obviously weighs heavily upon some of the nationalists and observers who are haunted by visions of another Angola. Despite his political motives, Nkomo should be taken seriously when he says he is trying to reconstitute ZIPA in order to avoid civil war. Implausible as it might appear at first glance, there is a possibility that for reasons of their own, each of the nationalist leaders might, in addition to looking toward Britain for assistance in this field, also modify their attitude toward the Rhodesian army to the point where they might welcome it playing a role in keeping the peace. One perceptive onlooker here asserts that the initial rhetorical vituperation against the Rhodesian military is softening. Even elements in Mugabe’s delegation have admitted privately to others that order must be maintained by a disciplined security force as the period of transition begins. At least one ZANU (Mugabe faction) delegation member reports he has less of a problem with white security forces than he would have with Smith’s black units. African thoughts on this topic are of course still highly ill-defined and speculative, but as the conference progresses, more attention will be given to how to keep the two black armies and the one white army from each others’ throats during the interim period. A precarious balancing act of the three with some judicious juggling by the British—perhaps backed by the Commonwealth—may eventually prove to be a solution. No specific African proposal on how to integrate liberation forces and divide security responsibility with the Europeans has surfaced since Nkomo mentioned the possibility of creating a third security ministry.

D. The franchise—despite Muzorewa’s early attempt to inject the issue of elections into the conference, no open discussion of the franchise problem has taken place here. It appears that even Muzorewa has backed off his original plan, at least for the present, and the other na-
tionalist leaders are more than content to continue ducking the issue. The Rhodesians have been warned to avoid bringing up the topic in Geneva and may indeed not do so. There seems to have developed a fairly clear consensus that the composition of the electorate is more appropriate topic for a constitutional conference organized by the interim government. This consensus could however crumble if one or more of the delegations sense a draft in the structuring of the interim government which they view as inimical to their overall strategy and interests.

E. Cutting the pie—there are, of course, two conferences going on in Geneva. The more visible one involves the Africans, British and Rhodesians in an attempt to bring majority rule to Rhodesia. The less visible, but perhaps equally important conference involves the black battle for leadership of an independent Zimbabwe. The conflicting ambitions of the four African leaders is reflected in every tactical decision they make. Though it would undoubtedly be to the conference’s benefit to avoid discussion in Geneva of questions of who will assume specific powers in the interim government and, particularly, who will be Prime Minister, it is clear that the African leaders are not so inclined. Each of them continues to view himself as Zimbabwe’s logical first Prime Minister and their delegations agree. Proposals such as the one which would have an apolitical black Rhodesian serve as Prime Minister during the interim government fall like lead balloons for the moment. The Rhodesians seek to avoid making a tough choice by claiming that they cannot think of anyone who might fill the bill—though they wish to split Nkomo and Mugabe; the nationalists contend that such an individual would not have sufficient authority to lead the country during the difficult transitional period. One observer, Botswanan Foreign Minister Mogwe, suggests that the British could fulfill the function by designating the Prime Minister, and by dividing the other portfolios equitably among the four groups. However, he offered no hope that the front line states, or more importantly the nationalists, would guarantee to go along with the British decision. In this issue, as in all others, the nationalists seem to be looking to the British to solve those questions they think are impossible to resolve.

F. Rhodesia Front role—while the Africans are jockeying amongst themselves for position, the Rhodesian delegation remains firmly committed to propounding its own central role in the interim government. As Gaylard expressed this recently, the blacks must realize that the whites, not the British, control power in Rhodesia, and that the Rhodesia Front will continue to exercise that control during the transitional period, and implicitly, in a measurable way in an independent Zimbabwe. This belief in their own centrality has no doubt been increased by their military successes in Mozambique and what is per-
ceived to be an encouraging shift in Western, and in particular South African public and governmental opinion, toward their favor since the conference’s inception. For their part, the Africans remain implacably distrustful of Smith and his cohort and can be expected to dig their heels in deeply to avoid giving the Rhodesia Front any meaningful power during and beyond the transitional period. Their position may be best reflected in Nyerere’s November 10 statement in Dar that the transitional government should be “a government of national unity, a government of consensus of Africans and whites who are acceptable to the majority of people . . . If I were a Rhodesian nationalist, I would not want a racist to be in my government. I would not mind including whites in an interim government as long as they had all along been against Smith and what Smith stands for.”

7. The above enumerated pitfalls are only a few of several that could debilitate the conference. Even wider and more fundamental cleavages separate the basic outlooks of the white and black delegates. One factor favorable to the conference’s ultimate success, however, is a real appreciation on the part of most of the participants, and particularly the old line nationalist political leaders, that this is their last best chance for a negotiated settlement in which their own political aspirations might be served. Nothing that has happened since the outset of the conference has changed that perception.

8. To date the United States’ role at the conference has been generally low key and suitable to the nature of the discussions which have taken place. However, given the fact that all of the participants, for disparate reasons, view the United States as a critical player in the negotiations, it is inevitable that pressure will build for more active participation on our part. Botswana’s Archie Mogwe noted recently, in bemused disappointment, that we have “religiously avoided involvement in the independence date dispute”. Every delegation knows, however, that we believe the principal purpose of the conference is the organization of a government of transition. Assuming the date of independence problem is solved, the conference will have overcome two major hurdles and avoided deadlock and breakdown. As a result, the timing and manner of our involvement will have to be carefully judged. The British, including Richard, continue to be extremely sensitive to any hint we are trying to second guess British management. We have an invitation to join Richard in planning a negotiating strategy to deal with the interim government and we should accept. Tactical decisions concerning our engagement in the other issues of interim government can only be made as the conference’s proceedings bring problems to the fore.

Abrams
222. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, November 15, 1976, 1256Z.

9068. For Schaufele from Wisner. Dept pass London. Subject: Rhodesia Conference: Chairman’s Statement Nov. 15. Ref: Geneva 9023.2

Following is text of statement which Rhodesia conference chairman Richard read at brief Nov. 15 morning session. Statement has not been made public and was given to us by Richard’s office. Statement does not differ in any substantive way from previous draft submitted reftel, though preambular paragraph has been puffed up a bit. Begin text

Statement by the Chairman

This conference has now spent well over a week trying to work out a time-table for bringing independence to Rhodesia. The discussions have been detailed, far-reaching and useful. They have concentrated on the various constitutional and administrative processes which must be completed before independence can be granted. There is an encouraging identity of views both on what these processes are and also—and I stress this—on the fact that independence should take place as soon as they have been completed. But there is a continuing difference of view on how long it will take to complete these procedures. Following upon the discussions of last week and the intensive consultations which we have had since then, the position which we have reached is as follows:

We have agreed that the date of independence shall be the date when the necessary constitutional and administrative processes have been completed.

We have agreed what those processes are.

We have agreed that the carrying out of those processes will be largely the responsibility of the transitional government and that their timing and pace is therefore essentially for the transitional government to determine.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 14, Switzerland—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (16). Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2 In telegram 9023 from Geneva, November 12, Wisner reported on the November 11 meeting among the British, Nkomo, and Mugabe. The Africans advanced an alternative to the original British proposal (Annex C). Many elements of this proposal were incorporated in Ivor Richard’s position as stated on November 15. (Ibid.)
The British Government is pledged to work with the transitional government in this task so as to ensure that the processes are completed at the earliest possible date.

On the best judgement we can make of what will be involved, the British Government’s view is that the necessary processes may take up to 15 months from the successful conclusion of this conference. We do not think it would be prudent to count, definitely, on their taking less. Therefore, assuming the conference reaches agreement by 30 November 1976, Britain will grant independence not later than 15 months from that date, that is to say not later than 1 March 1978.

However, the nationalist delegations have expressed the view that the processes can be completed within a year, and probably within nine or ten months. On this basis, assuming a successful conclusion of this conference by 30 November 1976, independence would come by 1 December 1977. If the processes are in fact completed within 12 months Britain will grant independence within 12 months.

I believe that what I have just said takes this matter as far as we usefully can at this stage. Before I say more, are there any delegations who wish to take the floor? End text.

Abrams

223. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, November 19, 1976, 1736Z.


Summary: Mugabe and Nkomo remain locked in conference trying to decide if they will accept the latest British statement. The prolonged wrangle over the independence date has eroded confidence in the outcome of Geneva and hardened the positions of all participants. My consultations during the past several days have confirmed gloom and un-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 14, Switzerland—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (18). Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.

2 Reinhardt arrived in Geneva on November 17.

3 See Document 222.
certainty in all quarters. I remain convinced nevertheless that Geneva offers the only viable forum for achieving a Rhodesian settlement. We need to consider acting in London, Africa and here if the participants are to understand how serious the situation is and how strongly we feel a change of style is required. End summary.

1. Before I proceed to Nairobi this evening, I am attempting here to give an appraisal of Geneva proceedings as gleaned from numerous talks, which are likely to continue until departure time about midnight. I have talked with all of the Geneva luminaries except Chissano and Salim and have no reason to believe that they would subtract much from the pervasive gloom. As my reports on these meetings indicate, gloom and doom and bleakness prevail in Geneva, ranging from the vitriol of Mugabe to the soft unreality of Mogwe, but including the sternness of Chona and the other-worldliness of Van der Byl and Squires.

2. The problem: The British have thus far presided over an incredibly poor conference, but I am no longer certain that the inept performance has been entirely of their own making. In retrospect one can conceive of certain formulations that may have overcome the date problem, but it now seems probable that no matter what Richard said at the beginning, the nationalists to a man were determined to pin down a date, “an act of faith and trust,” as Chona put it to me. Richard has been the victim of his or someone’s bad decision to allow the date issue to erode confidence and prevent movement; of basic London decisions; of Mozambican intrigue; of Nyerere’s cunning; of the lack of front line cohesiveness; of Nkomo’s seeming impotency; and of an unyielding and influential (in Geneva at least) Mugabe. Whatever the causes, Richard is or soon will be at a Geneva impasse. He has not panicked but is considering inchoate schemes which may only deepen his problems. I do not think that he will adjourn the conference sine die, as he was contemplating yesterday, but he is likely to return from London Monday and seek or probably announce a recess for a specific period, barring of course an Nkomo-Mugabe cave-in. A “recess” is far better than an “adjournment,” but it is not at all clear what he hopes to accomplish during a short recess. Still, as he assesses alternatives, he will have no other choice, largely because he cannot continue talking with the Muzorewa and Sithole factions without arousing intolerable suspicions.

3. Even if the date problem is miraculously overcome, the very prolonged discussion of this issue has created uncontrollable dynamics and dimmed prospects for progress on more substantive matters: the

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4 November 22.
nationalists, particularly the Mugabe crowd, have run wild; all parties are proceeding as if the Rhodesians were not present in Geneva; there’s an unspoken British assumption that somehow, some way Washington in the end will handle Salisbury and Pretoria; it’s difficult to detect any intention on the part of the nationalists to share power, even unequally, during a transitional government; threats of protracted armed struggle are rife; the observers have become a part of the problem rather than a mechanism for seeking solutions; and I have the uneasy feeling that we are heading for a point when we will be asked to put together and sell to Salisbury and Pretoria an Annex D or E or F.

4. The most reasonably contented contingent in Geneva is the Salisbury group. Their dire prediction has been buttressed: you can’t do business with this crowd. And already Van der Byl and company are pushing hard for their dangerous alternative. Muzorewa is looking better and better to them, and later, as they court respectability, perhaps even Sithole may be asked to join other “moderates” to carry out “the Kissinger plan.” It won’t work, of course.

5. The final element of the problem is the predicted and even projected Nkomo-Mugabe split. No one doubts that eventually, perhaps even at the formation of a transitional government, this split is likely. What is not known is whether a separation becomes a viable alternative or simply another layer of the problem, for there is still a prevailing attitude among Mugabe’s more extreme subordinates that the new Zimbabwe should rise phoenix like from the ashes of Rhodesia to which they set fire. Nyerere’s gyrations help propel along those who wish to travel this bloody trail.

6. Date war results. I want to repeat: the casualties of the prolonged wrangle over the date of independence are numerous, and the divisions which have emerged will make the next phase of the conference, if there is one, more difficult to negotiate.

7. To the extent that there was ever external support for the conference, it has diminished. On the Africa-wide scene, the fragile consensus among the front line Presidents and their observers in Geneva has been at least temporarily broken and may not reappear except on the basis of

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5 In telegram 9210 from Geneva, November 18, Reinhardt reported on his meeting with the Rhodesians. Van der Byl proposed that Smith “should carry out the Kissinger plan on his own, and organize a government of moderate blacks within Rhodesia,” and sought the support of the United States and Britain to back the plan. Reinhardt told them the plan would “meet stiff opposition” and “urged them to continue to consider the problem within the Geneva context and not outside of it.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 14, Switzerland—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (18))
more extreme demands. The Mozambicans first, followed by the Tanzanians, have played separate hands, seemingly never reviewing the bidding, and have forced their colleagues to follow suit. Nigeria, in the person of a clever diplomat operating under Commonwealth cover, is now a full-fledged observer of conference business, and its unhelpful influence has already been felt. Chona, as I saw yesterday and as the British confirm in detail, has begun to play his own game with little effective discipline being exercised by Kaunda. Persuaded of ZIPA’s importance, the observers have embraced the more extreme, Mugabe-spouted militant demands. Undercut by unilateral Mozambican and Tanzanian moves, a moderate like Mogwe feels and is powerless.

8. Equally on the external front, it seems to us from this distance that the South African public support for Geneva may have slipped. The South African press over the past two weeks has regularly highlighted black intransigence, and the shift in South African opinion must limit Vorster’s ability to obtain concessions from Smith.

9. The British have been bruised and burned by their experience as conference host and chairman. They seem to be more convinced than ever that Geneva under present rules will not produce a settlement and that Britain will be mired in a long, costly and probably inconclusive process. The nationalists’ decision to press Britain at the outset for a clear indication of Britain’s responsibilities has reinforced British fears. The experience of the independence date debate may have taught the more faint hearted among the British that their interests are served by settling to the strongest bidder. Nationalists’ pressures have forced the British to believe that the only way out is through significant concessions to African positions. For the moment they too have all but forgotten that Smith is an actor on the Geneva stage and seem to believe that we can produce Smith and the South Africans on call. They vow that they will die at the altar of Annex C, but they have not convinced me, nor Wisner all along, that their heart is in the fight. Finally, we must remember that since the Pearce Commission, the British have been blacker than the blacks, and there will be no rush to assume pre-Pearce stances.

10. The nationalists’ position has also deteriorated during the debate. “The wild men” have almost succeeded in deadlocking the conference. They know their power. They are aware that intransigence over time will result in substantial front line and other African support. Nkomo’s alliance with Mugabe has become a clear impediment to progress. As he seeks to build his political position in Rhodesia and

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6 Presumably a reference to Eleazar Chukwuemeka Anyaoku, Assistant Secretary General for the Commonwealth Secretariat.
avert civil war, Nkomo has been regularly outmaneuvered by his more radical colleagues. Muzorewa has reacted with increasing alarm to the Patriotic Front’s maneuvers. The chancy understanding which seemed to be developing among the nationalists at the beginning of the conference has eroded, and growing public exchanges between Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front portend ill for the future.

11. Smith could well conclude that he has emerged the victor in this round. His new confidence may mean that he will be more difficult to deal with if negotiations over the interim government commence. Through his restraint in the face of African provocation, Smith probably feels that he has won points with Western and South African opinion. His reported military successes should also serve to increase his confidence. The debate over the independence date has pitted Britain against the nationalists, and Smith may conclude that his leverage with the British is greater than at any time in the past. Van der Byl’s November 18 démarche to Richard, reminding him that Salisbury would stand by the “Kissinger package,” was an indication of what Smith has in mind. An earlier date for independence may not bother Smith as much as most Africans think. He cares far more about the power he will exercise in an interim government. In fact, the earlier the date of independence, the more authority he will expect during the transition. Thus, Smith may have concluded that British concessions on the date have played right into his hands.

12. **Recommendations:** First, I cannot emphasize too much that even if the date issue is resolved, the future course of the conference is likely to be rocky. Any resolution of this issue will at somepoint be accompanied by or accelerate an Nkomo-Mugabe split. The consequence for the conference and Zimbabwe over the long run will be severe. The following are, in my judgment, minimum USG requirements, some of which resemble biting bullets without teeth:

A. Until and unless we conclude that our objectives are unobtainable, the Geneva conference must be preserved. When the British speak of “adjourning and repackaging,” to use a Dennis Grennan phrase, they have no plan in mind and some British may really mean abandoning and cutting losses. It will not be possible in the foreseeable future to put together a new conference if Geneva dissolves. Neither we nor the British will be able to convince Machel, Nyerere or the radicals to reconvene on terms of moderation. Smith and the South Africans will be hard to hook again.

B. Still, we need the British, whatever the leverage we must expend in holding them in a rigorous position. While the nationalists and the

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7 Reported in telegram 9227 from Geneva, November 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840099–0938)
front line are now pressing and occasionally vilifying the British, the UK represents their only fall-back instrument in a transitional government. After more emotion is spent in Geneva, the only arbiter during transition is likely to be the UK.

C. Sweet reasonableness no longer seems to be the appropriate message for Nyerere or even Kaunda. Further talk about irreversible courses and the avoidance of violence will only result in messages similar to the one from Ibadan. I think that you should write to each and in a rather tough tone to Nyerere point out that he seems to have abandoned the consultative process begun last April with the resultant near collapse of Geneva; at least you would have expected him to be in touch before taking actions which were predictably unhelpful. Soften the tone with Kaunda but leave no doubt that he is playing with fire, the fire of civil war that may engulf him as well as Rhodesia. Neither man should be left to doubt that we are unhappy, disappointed but still willing to work with them if we can. Each should know that “compromise” is a word that should enter their vocabulary of negotiation. They must understand that intransigence plays into Smith’s hands and sharply reduces our ability, directly or through Pretoria, to apply pressure.

D. While Geneva is not the best place to make an appraisal, I have tried to point out indications of shifts in South African opinion. If we have not, we should take early steps to measure what Geneva has done to Vorster. We know and have stated what it has done to Smith’s representatives. You might ask Botha to give you a frank account of Pretoria’s thinking.

E. At some early date we need to get a tough message to the nationalists, especially Nkomo and Muzorewa, that we cannot produce Salisbury if they remain intransigent. We have some sense of what sort of interim government they want, but we see no indication that they make any distinction between power sharing and power grabbing.

F. We need to work closely with the British in designing next steps. We should find some way to contribute to the Crosland-Richard November 22 talks rather than receive announcements and decisions after the meeting.

G. The moderate Africans need to know that Geneva will fail unless their front line colleagues and the nationalists act with greater responsibility. You might consider letters to Mobutu, Houphouet, and Senghor filling them in on the climate of opinion in Geneva and asking

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8 See Document 228.
9 See Document 224.
them to use their influence with their African brethren. You might remind them that if a transfer of power is to take place in Rhodesia, a negotiated outcome which involves power sharing during transition is required.

13. I will await instructions in Nairobi. If these include future Africa/Geneva ventures, I request: (1) as early indication as possible so that I can gauge UNESCO work; (2) and the daily sitreps in order to stay abreast of developments.

Abrams

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224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, November 21, 1976, 2040Z.


1. Rhodesia conference chairman Ivor Richard is in London this weekend and will be consulting with Foreign Secretary Crosland, FCO colleagues, and possibly Prime Minister Callaghan on Monday, November 22 prior to returning to Geneva for meeting with Patriotic Front that evening. While his consultation is being described as a routine fortnightly report, it is clear that conference is at impasse over issue of independence date and cannot proceed to other issues until this one is disposed of to the satisfaction of both the British (acting through the chairman) and the Patriotic Front. Divisions within the Front between Nkomo and Mugabe are very great, but there is danger that an effort either to split the two or to carry on negotiations with the other delegations without the Front would risk complete rejection of the process by the important front-line presidents.

2. In the gloomy atmosphere of Geneva it appeared at one point that some of the British advisors considered the possibility of adjourning the conference, either indefinitely or for a short period, although the latest indication is that the British may be inclined to send

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Schaufele and Edmondson and approved by Kissinger. Repeated to Geneva.
Richard back with instructions to soldier on with the independence date issue a while longer.

3. The British probably have no clear plan for solving the current issue or dealing with the situation that will result if it cannot be solved. While we wish to keep abreast of their thinking and share with them our own thoughts and concerns, we do not want them to feel we are pressing them to adopt a particular position on the independence date, which is an issue affecting the British role and British political sensitivities. Nonetheless, in view of the obvious problem at hand, we believe it important to express our concerns and explore certain questions with them at this time.

4. Accordingly you are instructed to get in touch with Crosland, Rowlands, or Palliser in the FCO and say you have been asked to seek an appointment if possible to consult jointly with them and Mr. Richard to exchange views on the conference and any steps we should be taking to keep the negotiating process going. In so doing you should use the following talking points.

A—We admire the skill and patience with which the chairman has handled the troublesome issue of an independence date.

B—It has been our hope that this issue could be bypassed so that the conference could move on to the business of arranging a transitional government which would provide the mechanism by which the transfer of power, establishment of majority rule, and independence would be made effective.

C—The approach which the nationalists, particularly the Patriotic Front, have taken on the independence date illustrates the problem of taking one issue at a time and being forced to settle each point before moving on. If the procedure continues to be followed further blow-ups will be inevitable.

D—If it is possible, we believe the best strategy is to keep all issues open until nearer the end of the conference, when the time comes to put a final package together. That way one maintains opportunities for negotiating trade-offs between different positions on different issues.

E—How can we convey the wisdom of this negotiating approach to the delegations in Geneva?

F—We note that the Patriotic Front has mentioned elections in their latest statement about an independence date. This raises the danger of the nationalists opening up another extraneous debate on a single issue before getting to the substance of a transitional government, since the organization of elections, including the franchise, is one of the important and difficult questions that the transitional government is to deal with. We hope the nationalists will not insist on discussing these constitutional questions before agreeing on a transitional government, or there will never be a transition.
G—We are concerned, as we know you must be, that the present impasse does not force a break-up or even adjournment of the Geneva conference.

H—We believe that adjournment would run the risk of handing initiative over to the more radical front line leaders who will encourage return to the conference table, if at all, only after they have worked out a package of nearly unconditional surrender terms that neither Smith could accept nor the South Africans support. And without some hope of the latter two elements, negotiations become impossible and escalating warfare inevitable.

I—In order to keep the conference going we wonder if we should seek to point out to key front line presidents that adjournment over the independence date issue will be more damaging to the African cause than to Smith. In this connection we are prepared to send Ambassador Reinhardt to see Nyerere and Kaunda again, although Nyerere and through him, Machel, may be the most difficult and important to convince.

J—Should we not, perhaps, reiterate that Smith accepted Callaghan’s outside time of two years and so did the front line presidents? Within that framework, Smith has already accepted the goal of majority rule, leaving for negotiation only the question of how and exactly when, within the time he accepted, this was to be accomplished.

K—Adjournment over the issue of an independence date strikes us as potentially more damaging than over substantive issues involved in reaching agreement on a transitional government.

L—We believe that none of the delegation leaders who are currently negotiating in Geneva will have an opportunity to play a role in future Zimbabwean government if the present conference breaks up or adjourns without an early resumption.

Kissinger
225. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, November 22, 1976, 1659Z.


1. We were unable to arrange for the Ambassador to see Crosland November 22 because of conflicting schedules. Minister and Embassy officer, therefore, called on Ted Rowlands who was joined by Ivor Richard and Philip Mansfield. The three had just emerged from a long session on Rhodesia with the Foreign Secretary.

2. We made the points in our instructions, emphasizing the dangers we foresee in an adjournment of the conference and saying that Reinhardt is prepared to see Kaunda and Nyerere again. We also stressed the concern that, if the obstacle of the independence date can be surmounted, the conference should proceed to negotiate a package for the transition and that the package should keep distinct those functions which are the responsibility of Geneva from those which are the responsibility of the interim government.

3. Richard took the lead in responding. He said there were two immediate considerations affecting the British stance on the independence date issue. First, Parliament would simply not accept a formula for Rhodesian independence which did not provide for elections. Second, if Britain is to follow the pattern of previous decolonization processes as the front line presidents are insisting—then the procedure Britain is now following is the traditionally proper course. We asked if the British had considered getting off the independence date issue by instead setting a firm date for elections. Rowlands said they had just discussed this possibility with Crosland and that Richard would be prepared to put forward that idea in Geneva at the right time if necessary.

4. Richard then described the political considerations which seem to dominate British thinking on the date question. The issue itself, he said, is getting less important than the struggle now going on within the Patriotic Front. A crunch between Mugabe and Nkomo was bound to come sooner or later, and sooner is probably better. It is important that Nkomo win this unfolding showdown with Mugabe, Richard said. Although it is difficult to get “a good feel for this war of nerves,” the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2 Document 224.
British have received signals that their firmness on the issue is helping Nkomo assert his authority within the Front. If Nkomo gives the private impression that he wants the British to remain firm, they will; if relaxing the British stand will benefit Nkomo, Richard is ready to go more in the direction of a definite date, perhaps using a formula which calls for elections by January 1, 1978 leading to independence by March 1. In any event, the British are prepared to play the independence date issue flexibly in whatever manner is most advantageous for Nkomo vis-à-vis Mugabe.

5. Richard said that he expects to tie up the date question within the next day or two. If he fails to do so, the British will call for a short adjournment of perhaps ten or fourteen days. Asked if adjournment would not in fact work against Nkomo rather than for him, Richard answered somewhat vaguely that Nkomo would use the adjournment to organize people who would then put pressure on Mugabe. Rowlands added that if the conference is bogged down on the date issue, a temporary adjournment would be the only way to break the impasse. He then said that if the issue is resolved by specifying a date for elections, the US might have to put pressure on Smith to accept the agreement or at least note it and move on to other points.

6. Richard and Rowlands reacted positively to a Reinhardt mission to Lusaka and Dar es Salaam. Both agreed that some “gentle disapproval” expressed by the U.S. to Kaunda and Nyerere “would do no harm”. Richard said he had no good explanation for Nyerere’s about-face on the independence date other than the unhelpful influence of the Nigerians.

7. Richard said he fully intended to proceed with the remainder of the conference on a package basis. He plans to solicit ideas from each delegation on the whole structure of an interim government. Nkomo, he understands, is already working on detailed proposals. When all plans have been put to the British, Richard will then devote one day to discussions with each of the delegations followed by a plenary session to discuss the basic issues. Ultimately, he said, when all views have been aired, he will table something similar to Annex C.

8. Rowlands said the UK is entirely conscious of keeping separate those issues which ought to be taken up in Geneva and those which should be left to the interim government. He nevertheless fears that any discussion of elections, even in the context of setting a date of independence, could lead to a discussion of franchise. It will be difficult to prevent the nationalists from introducing one-man, one-vote as a definition of elections, he said. The British will insist, however, that franchise falls within the purview of the interim government.

9. Comment: Richard is going back to Geneva with his confidence intact and with the immediate tactical goal of playing his cards in what-
ever manner most supports Joshua Nkomo. He assumes we agree and that we will take what steps we can to strengthen Nkomo's position. If the date issue cannot be resolved, however, the British have already decided on adjournment as the next best move.

Armstrong

226. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, November 27, 1976, 1100Z.

9460. For Schaufele from Wisner. Dept pass London. Subject: Rhodesia Conference: Date of Independence Settled.

1. The Patriotic Front called on Ivor Richard at 6:30 p.m. local time on November 26 to say they would accept the latest British formula for settling the date of independence if the British would agree to two minor modifications. The British, after looking at the changes, accepted. Nkomo, presumably to fully commit his colleague, suggested that minutes be drawn up and agreed to.

2. The text, as finally accepted, reads as follows. The modifications are underlined.2

Quote: Having consulted a number of delegations, I have found a general wish for the conference to set itself a target date for the successful conclusion of its work. I have therefore decided to organize the remainder of the work of the conference, in consultation with the other delegations, in such a way as to finish by 20 December 1976. So far as the British Government are concerned, fixing that target date will not prejudice the date of independence. It is the British Government's firm position that all the agreed processes in Rhodesia will be completed in time to enable independence to be granted by 1 March 1978. The British Government therefore fix 1 March 1978 as the latest date by which Rhodesia will become independent, and on this basis independence could come even by December 1, 1977. Before the conclusion of the conference and after agreeing on the establishment of the interim gov-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 14, Switzerland—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (20). Secret; Nodis.

2 The original has neither underlining nor indication of underlining.
ernment, the conference will revert to the question of fixing a date for independence so that a firm date can be agreed upon. Unquote.

3. Richard then suggested that the Front join without delay in discussions of the formation of an interim government. Mugabe demurred and said that he would need more time. In the course of the conversation, which lasted almost an hour, Mugabe refused to state his reasons for needing more time and hinted that there might be other matters which required discussion before interim government talks could begin. At one point he suggested “the way we do business” might have to be discussed. He also said he was expecting unnamed visitors from Africa. Both he and Nkomo disingenuously told Richard they had been so preoccupied with the question of the dates that they had not had time to study fully the chairman’s note on the interim government.³

4. Under pressure from Richard, Mugabe reluctantly allowed he would attend a bilateral meeting on November 29. Asked how he would spend the weekend, Mugabe said, “I plan to go skiing”.

5. The exchange with Mugabe over next steps left the British quite uneasy. It was not clear whether Mugabe was being difficult in order to save face or whether he seriously plans to raise extraneous issues like the conference’s work program or the franchise. Quite possibly Mugabe’s visitors include ZIPA figures from Mozambique and he will need to renew his mandate and plan his strategy with them before proceeding with substantive discussions.

6. In view of Mugabe’s resistance to continuing talks the British are taking the weekend off.

Brungart

³ According to telegram 9105 from Geneva, November 15, Richard’s note to the delegations requested a meeting with each head of delegation to discuss the form and structure of the interim government, the British role in the government, and other general questions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
227. Memorandum for the Record


[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa, Latin America, Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee Files, Rhodesia 1974–76. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page not declassified.]

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia

Washington, December 6, 1976, 1819Z.

296386. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Rhodesia Conference: Message to President Kaunda.

1. Please pass following message to President Kaunda from the Secretary.

2. Dear Mr. President:

—I read with considerable interest Ambassador Reinhardt’s report of his meeting with you of a week ago. I always admire your candor and openness, and I greatly value your views. You have given generously of your time in receiving my emissaries.

—I must tell you very frankly that I was disturbed by the implication of your remarks to Reinhardt with regard to the two-tier arrange-
ment for the interim government. As you will recall, not only did I discuss this concept with you during my first meetings with you in September, but there were four preceding missions, American and British, which had already discussed with you the basic structure of the proposed interim government. While there may have been some questions concerning the composition of the interim government, especially of the Council of State, the concept of a sharing of power on the basis of a two-tier system was never challenged. In addition, I want to stress that at no time was there any suggestion that there should be an immediate transfer of power to majority rule. This had never been a consideration in our discussions, and it could not have been because it is not workable or acceptable.

—It is important to remember what the exercise we are engaged in at Geneva is all about. We are in Geneva to try to reach a settlement that transfers power in Rhodesia from the hands of whites who now hold it to Africans who rightfully deserve it.

—We are in Geneva to get a solution that offers the rest assurance of a smooth transition to a moderate and responsible government, one that can bring stability and prosperity to Zimbabwe, and one that would not pose a threat to the stability of its neighbors, most notably Zambia.

—We are disturbed by what we perceive to be a growing sense of unreality in Geneva, not only among some of the nationalist delegations, but also among the observers.

—Somehow, there appears an increasing tendency to ignore some of the fundamental realities of the Rhodesian situation:

—The first of these realities is that Ian Smith and the Rhodesia Front hold de facto power in Rhodesia, not the South Africans, not the British, and certainly not the United States. No matter how much we may dislike that situation, it is not something that can be wished away.

—The second, there are limitations on the degree of influence that external powers can effectively exercise, especially for a settlement that does not insure minority rights.

—The third point concerns those understandings which persuaded Smith to accept, for the first time in his 12 years in power, the principle of majority rule and the implementation of that principle within a fixed time frame. Whatever one chooses to say about the five points of Smith's Sept. 24 speech, and particularly point 3, there can be

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4 Telegram 9102 from Geneva, November 15, transmitted the text of a British paper circulated to the conference participants outlining a proposal for the structure of the transitional government that called for separating the Council of Ministers from the legislative body, creating a two-tier system. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
no disagreement over the fact that they were understood to form the basis for negotiations. They can be altered in the course of a negotiation but they cannot simply be discarded in toto. Nor can there be any argument over the fact that the concept that underlies the five points and that made possible Smith’s acceptance of them—as well as that of his party—is the concept that Rhodesian whites would be assured of a meaningful voice and role in the political decisions in the transition period that will affect their future in Zimbabwe. Moreover, the five points in concept were discussed repeatedly with the front line presidents before they were put forward.

—We have heard the view expressed by several persons in Geneva that Smith and the Rhodesia Front may now be ready to abandon the concept of shared power in the interim government in exchange for vague and ambiguous promises or understandings. We have also heard it said that the United States can deliver Smith upon demand and get him to accept any alternative set of proposals that might be put forward at the conference. With regard to the first point, nothing Smith has said or implied since the opening of the conference offers any suggestion that he is prepared to abandon the concept that Rhodesia whites must have effective and clearly defined powers within the interim government. With regard to the second, anyone who thinks that we can persuade or coerce Smith into accepting a settlement on terms that do not even take account of the five points fails to understand the situation.

—Our assessment is that Smith and the Rhodesians are fully prepared to fight on and to resist all forms of pressure if they do not get the kind of settlement that they feel meets their minimum requirements. We are especially concerned about the very evident erosion of support in South Africa for a settlement, which could tie Vorster’s hands and prevent him from continuing his positive contributions not only with respect to Zimbabwe but also Namibia.

—If there is no settlement, it is not the United States that will suffer most directly from the consequences of that failure. Those who will suffer most will be the Zimbabweans, who face the prospect of having a whole generation of youth chewed up in needless bloodshed, and whose only reward will be a country ravaged by war and destruction.

—Zambia would pay a heavy price if the war is allowed to drag on, and not merely in economic terms. Zambia already knows what it means to have foreign armies living in armed camps on its soil and how difficult it can be to control them. The Lebanese experience stands as an example to all of how disruptive a force these armies can become.

5 See Document 206.
—You must also understand that if continuing violence leads to foreign intervention, the United States cannot ignore it.

—We can understand your concern of ZIPA and your desire not to provide those who wish to see the conference fail with the excuse they are looking for. But we fail to comprehend how Zambia’s interests, or Zimbabwe’s either, would be served by a solution that merely places power in the hands of the militants without imposing any discipline or restraint on the exercise of that power.

—Nor do we understand the argument for giving in to ZIPA’s demand for instant majority rule, which seems to us to be contrary to Zambia’s own interests, and which will also destroy any chance of getting a settlement.

—Transition means just that, not an instantaneous and total reversal of existing power relationships but an irreversible movement towards it in a limited span of time. Obviously Smith will have more power at the beginning of the transition than at the end.

—The United States is committed to a solution that results in the effective transfer to the African majority by the end of that already agreed interim period. For a solution to be acceptable to us, it must also be a solution that can be supported by the front line presidents and sold to the OAU. In other words, Zimbabwe’s victory is assured, and any talk about a second UDI is baseless and absurd. We will oppose any such move sharply and can count on South African support in this regard.

—However flawed the institutional arrangements outlined in the five points may appear, we must remember that they were the basis on which Smith was hooked into the process of surrendering his own position and power.

—The name of the game is to keep him hooked and not make it possible for him to wiggle off.

—There is a lot the British can do to make the structure of the interim government function more smoothly and effectively. We believe they are prepared to play a role, and we are prepared to push them in that direction. But we cannot expect the British to assume responsibilities in Rhodesia that they have never had and for which they lack the authority to back them up. They are willing to bridge the gap, but you must be very precise and very realistic about what you expect of them. They can provide the additional margin of assurance for both sides; but in the final analysis, the British role cannot take the place of a basic agreement among the parties themselves which defines in clear and unambiguous terms the powers that each will exercise in the interim period.

—Throughout the course of our common effort to find a settlement, no nation has had clearer vision than Zambia. No nation has a
greater stake in a successful outcome, one that brings a moderate, pragmatic and responsible government to Zimbabwe. We believe that other nations will recognize and accept the fact that Zambia faces greater risks than anyone else if our efforts fail; and as a result, we believe that your word will be needed and accepted by the other front line presidents and by African leaders generally. It is up to Zambia, being closest to the problem, to remind the others of how dangerous the situation can become if a settlement based on compromise is not achieved.

—It is important that the Patriotic Front rethink its position and negotiate proposals which provide for power sharing with Rhodesian Europeans during the period of transition.

—The framework which the Patriotic Front appears to be advancing does not meet this criteria and cannot, therefore, enjoy our support.

—I apologize for the length of this letter but I consider it important at this delicate phase of the negotiations that we analyze carefully and fully what is involved. I trust that you will use your influence to bring the Patriotic Front around to a more realistic approach. If you succeed, you can count on us to work behind the scenes with the other parties.

—I look forward to hearing from you. Warmest regards, Henry A. Kissinger.

Kissinger

229. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, December 8, 1976, 1925Z.


1. I called on Richard this afternoon to find out what happened in London and what decisions were reached. Richard was accompanied by Robin Byatt and Robin Young. He said that his guidelines from London called for him to finish out this week of consultations with the various delegations in order to clarify as much as possible their views

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
and positions. Richard will also try to test Smith’s willingness to accept a new framework which would allow him to stay in the game. This will allow London time to draw up a range of options with regard to British responsibilities in the interim government which will then be presented to the Secretary and Callaghan this weekend. Richard will be present for the talks in London.

2. If the Secretary and Callaghan conclude that the conference cannot be held together during the next week while the parties, including the front line presidents and South Africa are sold on a new package of British responsibilities, then Richard would return to Geneva next week and adjourn the conference for the Christmas period. During that time, we and the British would try to sell a new package, based on expanded British involvement, in Africa and then would try to reconvene the conference. (We understand separately that the package of options on British responsibilities being prepared in Whitehall will be sent info to Washington.)

3. Richard told me in strictest confidence and asked that we hold the information closely, that Crosland believes the mandate he has received from the Cabinet is broad enough to develop whatever degree of British responsibility may be necessary, and he would not need to return to the Cabinet for a decision. Military involvement is, of course, not in the mandate.

4. Richard does not think he can carry the conference through next week without a new negotiating framework. The nationalists, he said, are predisposed to a recess, particularly Nkomo and Muzorewa who would like to adjourn this week. Both want to campaign at home. The British understand that it will not be easy to put Geneva back together following a recess. They recognize that nationalist demands may escalate and positions harden but British do not see that they have many choices.

5. Immediate prospects depend on Smith’s attitude, which Richard will begin to probe this evening in a quiet, private session. I urged Richard to find any way possible to convince Smith that the UK is sympathetic to his problems and to overcome some of the suspicion, verging on hostility, that has developed between Smith’s delegation and the British. Richard said he would consider the suggestion but stressed that if Smith insisted on continuing his public attacks on the British, he could not expect any improvement in the treatment he receives in return. Neither we nor the British have any indication of Smith’s plans and even his own delegation is very much in the dark. At present, the only indication we have is what the press is carrying, which contains both positive and negative signals. While reiterating that he regards the five points as a firm contract, Smith indicated some possible flexibility by saying upon departing Salisbury, that “we have
to keep ourselves in a position where we can move and play things off the cuff.”

6. Richard said that if Smith sticks to his so-called “contract”, the conference will be in dire peril and even a new package would not make any new difference. He reiterated what he had said to Assistant Secretary Reinhardt, that Annex C, for all intents and purposes, is dead. He would be reluctant to propose to Crosland that the British try to table a package of UK responsibilities until they have had a chance to get some indication from the Africans and South Africans that such a package might be acceptable.

7. When I asked Richard about the current mood in London concerning the talks, he replied that in general the attitude was good, principally because the British had finally become comfortable with the idea that it would take a more active British role if a settlement is to be achieved. He noted that many had not expected the conference to get as far as it has. Not only has the conference held together, but the parties have spelled out their positions in clear detail and we now have a better assessment of where the gaps lie and what will be necessary to bridge them. The gaps remain wide and it is clear that the nature of UK involvement will have to be much greater, to include voting participation in a body like the Council of State and perhaps a tie breaking role in the Council of Ministers as well. Some UK involvement in the security aspects would also have to be contemplated. But he believes the British by and large are better prepared to accept such responsibilities now than at any time since the negotiations began.

Catto

230. Telegram From the Embassy in Tanzania to the Department of State

Dar es Salaam, December 9, 1976, 2000Z.

4533. Department pass Secretary. Subject: Rhodesia and Namibia: President Nyerere’s Reply to Secretary’s Letter of December 6. Ref: State 296389.2

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Niat Immediate; Nodis.
2 See footnote 1, Document 228.
Following is letter from President Nyerere received 10:00 p.m. local Dec 9:

"Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Thank you for so quickly following up on my discussions with Mr. Reinhardt in your letter of 7th December—and indeed for sending him to Dar es Salaam in the first place.

Until early in September I was urging the British Government ‘to do nothing until there has been time for the pressures of guerrilla warfare and sanctions to deliver Smith to London’. I persistently argued that Smith cannot be begin underline converted, end underline he can only be begin underline forced end underline to accept majority rule. Thus, for example, on 28th August, I had two meetings with your emissaries.3 I called for the second meeting to make quite sure that they understood that I was asking the U.S.A. and the U.K. to ‘do nothing’ about Rhodesia until guerrilla pressures, the sanctions, and now the declared American policy in favour of majority rule, had forced Smith to face reality. On 29th August I argued the same case to the British emissaries.

But the British argued that the situation had changed, because a new factor had emerged. That new factor was American power. They mapped out a scenario which could follow: Smith would fall, a caretaker government would take over, and that caretaker government would announce the acceptance of the Callaghan terms for a Rhodesia settlement.

There was no misunderstanding between us. I received a message from you dated 1st September.4 It included the following: ‘You are aware of the framework I propose for a settlement. It involves (A) the withdrawal of the present government in favour of a black majority government of transition; (B) the drafting of a constitution which includes basic protection for minority rights; (C) full independence under majority rule in 18 months, two years, or earlier.’ Then on 3rd September I received your response5 to my ‘do nothing’ message. It says, inter alia, ‘I have just received the message that you asked be passed to me. I have carefully considered the points you made and appreciate your reasons for saying that you need more time to prepare the ground for a Rhodesian settlement. You have asked that nothing be undertaken with respect to Rhodesia until conditions are right’.

That then, was my position until early in September. I changed. I changed because, and only because, of the British and American insist-

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3 Reported in telegrams 3136 and 3138 from Dar es Salaam, August 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
4 Transmitted in telegram 216022 to Dar es Salaam, August 31. (Ibid.)
5 Telegram 218974 to Dar es Salaam, September 3, transmitted Kissinger’s response. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840084–0454)
ence that the American entry on to the Rhodesian scene in support of majority rule provided what was lacking before—i.e. power. For America represents power; I know this as well as Smith does. But even when we met on 15th September\(^6\) I was still worried, and again expressed my concern about Smith's capacity to survive, together with his minority rule. You reassured me with the words 'yes, but he has never been up against the U.S. before'. And you went on to say in effect (I do not have your actual words) that what you had in mind was to get Vorster to get rid of Smith and then the new man would accept the Callaghan proposals.

You saw Vorster and Smith\(^7\) and I became confident that you had 'pulled it off'. For although you had decided that Smith should himself be forced to say that he accepted majority rule, it was still obvious from his broadcast that he had accepted it only because he had no alternative; he was confronted with American and Western power. So American power was being used in support of majority rule.

With this background you will appreciate why I feel slightly irri-
tated to find now that Smith's power, together with American, British, and South African combined 'powerlessness', is being advanced as the reason why the front-line states must ask the nationalists to abandon their legitimate demands.

For let me repeat: I changed my approach in early September be-
cause I had been brought to believe (as I have continued to believe until now) that American power would be brought to bear, and maintained as long as necessary, in support of a transfer of power from the minority in Rhodesia. This support was limited in action to support for a transfer by peaceful means; but it was still without question support for a definite transfer of power to the majority. It has been on that basis that my colleagues and I have been acting from September until now. But after receiving your letter yesterday I am now a little worried that this U.S. commitment is being reconsidered. I hope I am wrong, and that such a worry is without foundation.

When we met on 15th September,\(^8\) we were talking in terms of a solution in Rhodesia without Smith. I specifically said that I liked the American suggestions that Smith would be pressured to resign, and that an interim government would be worked out between the nationalists and a caretaker government. I was, however, pessimistic about the chances; and you did mention Vorster's idea that Smith should be the one to announce acceptance of majority rule. But whoever accepted

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\(^6\) See Document 204.
\(^7\) See Document 206.
\(^8\) See Document 204 and footnote 1 thereto.
the Callaghan proposals, I stressed that the rest of us should keep out once the negotiations had started; that we cannot deal with the details—although I did add that the “Council of State” you mentioned would not be acceptable to the nationalists.

After you had seen Vorster and Smith you outlined your ideas, and what you thought you had achieved.\(^9\) Frankly, I ignored the details; I had always insisted that details must be left to the conference. I certainly did not realise that you were committed to a Council of State which would be supreme, and to white ministers for Defence and Law and Order. I thought these matters would be the subject of negotiation. What I was happy about was your statement that Smith had accepted independence on the basis of majority rule in two years, and a conference to work out the interim government, although you will remember that I doubted the procedures, and said that the nationalists could not meet Smith in Rhodesia. It seemed to me then that Smith had realised that he could not withstand American power on top of the other pressures on his regime.

Smith’s broadcast was a shock to me.\(^10\) But I was concerned to save what I regarded as your achievement. This is, his commitment to accepting independence on the basis of majority rule in two years, and to negotiations about an interim government. It was for that reason that my colleagues and I urged the British to take over the arrangements, and to call a conference themselves. We accepted Geneva rather than London as a compromise; we accepted the absence of a British minister in the chair as a second compromise. For our purpose was, and is, to use that conference to get an interim government; that is, one which would, in your own words, provide ‘a transition during which the whites could adjust to the changes taking place and either be assured of their personal safety and well-being or withdraw’.

But, as I thought you had understood very early in our discussions, there could be no question of Smith or the white minority controlling Rhodesia during that interim period. In my letter to you of 5th October\(^11\) I explained again that a transfer of power by easy stages is not possible in 1976. The nationalists cannot share power with the Rhodesia Front; many of them have spent ten years in Smith’s jails and their friends and colleagues have been ‘executed’ by his illegal regime. Too many previous attempts to settle this matter peacefully have been manoeuvred by Smith into serving the strengthening of his cause. The nationalists are very suspicious. So am I. I have been working actively

\(^9\) They met on September 21; see footnote 3, Document 207.

\(^10\) See Document 209.

\(^11\) Transmitted in telegram 3718 from Dar es Salaam, October 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
for NIBMAR—majority rule before independence—since 1964, and have watched Smith out-maneuver the British, the international community, and finally myself and my colleagues, when each of us in turn thought we had got him to agree to a phased transfer of power. I warned that he would use another conference for the same purpose; and there is plenty of evidence that he is doing just that.

The nationalists and the front-line states do accept the principle of an interim government, in which adjustments can be made by individuals affected. That is why, despite our many disagreements with the British Government about Rhodesia in the past, we are demanding that the British Government should participate in the interim government. I do not understand your opposition to British participation.

The first of our two reasons for insisting upon active British involvement is a legal one. During the transition period Rhodesia is not independent. There are certain functions which will belong to Britain as the sovereign state. Those 'residual powers' are defense, external affairs, and constitutional affairs. If Britain does not exercise those powers during the interim, who would exercise them on her behalf?

The second reason is political. You had apparently agreed that Defense, and Law and Order, should be under the control of the Smith forces. This is clearly not acceptable to the nationalists—it could not be. But in all these matters one must try to find a compromise. The possible compromise is that Defense (but not Law and Order) could be held by a white minister who is appointed by Britain in consultation with the Prime Minister. This would be done by the British 'Resident Commissioner'. But if Britain does not agree to accept responsibility for these residual powers, how do you compromise on the demand that Defense be held by a nationalist without leaving it in the hands of the supporters of minority rule?

It is obvious that the person appointed by Britain to be 'Resident Commissioner' would have to be someone the nationalists can work with; it would be no use appointing Patrick Wall or Enoch Powell. But I do not understand why you say that the British official representative would be chosen primarily by the nationalists and dismissed at their will. I have never heard that suggested by anyone until now.

To avoid continued misunderstanding let me also make it clear that no one, to my knowledge, has suggested that there should be no whites in the interim government, apart from this British participation of a kind that all ex-British colonies are familiar with in the last stages before independence. As I have said to you before, I expect—and I know the nationalists do—that it will be necessary to be so far racial in
the interim government as to ensure that there are some white ministers. But they will be in a minority; and they will have to be people who are committed to Zimbabwe, not to minority rule in that country. I am confident that white Rhodesians do exist to whom these things are acceptable, and who recognise that anything else is impossible after the experience of the past eleven years.

So what is the difference between us? The conference at Geneva is proving even more difficult than I had anticipated. But it could still succeed, provided that full pressure is kept upon Smith and his minority regime. If, however, there is still a reality in the possibility of Smith getting outside support, either from South Africa or from America, then it will fail. Because Smith will make it fail. And then there will be no other recourse except guerrilla war until the end, regardless of the effect on the front-line states. You ask me whether we can control their source of arms. They have no choice. They will continue to get them from the Communists.

We are committed to independence on the basis of majority rule. For the sake of a peaceful transfer of power, and an end to the horrors and political dangers of war, the nationalists and the front-line states are prepared to accept an interim arrangement even at this date. But it has to be one which marks a transfer of power from the minority in such a way that they can never recover it.

Believe me, Dr. Kissinger, I do appreciate your desire to see this conference brought to a successful conclusion quickly. I too get impatient at the way it is dragging on. But what matters is not the manoeuvring, but the ultimate success, and I think we must be prepared for day-to-day frustrations and disappointments. If it does finally succeed, the initiative you took will be vindicated. If, unfortunately, it does not succeed, and that failure cannot be attributed to a withdrawal of pressure on Smith, than your initiative will still have been a brave and historic attempt.

Let me now turn briefly to the question of Namibia.

Here it may be that we have got into a communications muddle. In your letter of 4th October, when you said that the Windhoek conference would only send a representative delegation to a conference at Geneva, you also said that you would take no further action until you heard from my colleagues and myself. But I was under the impression that we had cleared this matter up through my discussions with Ambassador Spain, and that you were going to ask Dr. Waldheim to call a conference which we would get SWAPO to attend. Now, in your letter of 7th December, you say that this is not good enough because of Sam

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12 Transmitted in telegram 246530 to Dar es Salaam, October 4. (Ibid.)
Nujoma’s pre-conditions. These, as I understand it, are that he should be assured that the people he needs on his delegation will be released from South African controlled prisons, and that he would be negotiating with South Africa as the de facto government of Namibia, and the U.N. as the de jure government. But there is nothing new in this? These are the same conditions we talked about twice in September. So I have to ask what new thing is it that you feel is necessary as a result of the ‘problems we have run into at Geneva’? I cannot consider whether there is anything more we can do to help until I understand the problem myself.

Is the problem still the status of the Windhoek conference people? I thought we had understood each other on that. They are a group of people called together by South Africa, under South African auspices, in a territory under de facto South African control. Even if you do not say—as we do—that they are merely the puppets of South Africa, surely those other points are incontrovertible. I had told you that they could go to Geneva as part of the South African delegation. I thought that is what you meant in your letter of 4th October.

For as I said on 21st September, it is not for SWAPO to select the South African delegation, any more than it is acceptable for South Africa to select SWAPO’s delegation—which is why the question of SWAPO people in prison is also relevant. What is necessary is that the discussion should be between fully authorised delegations from (A) SWAPO, and (B) South Africa, under U.N. auspices. The persons in each delegation are a matter for the respective authorities to decide. I am sorry if I seem dense, but I cannot see what is so difficult about this, and why you do not now feel able to ask the U.N. Secretary-General to convene a constitutional conference.

Dr. Kissinger: Our letters inevitably concentrate on difficulties and disagreements because it is they which require our thought, and perhaps action. But I do want to emphasize my very great appreciation of the efforts you have made this year to get a settlement on the basis of majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia. That there has been movement on the non-military front in southern Africa during 1976 is due in very large part to the initiatives you have taken, and these have demanded a great amount of time and travelling and negotiation (perhaps not always easy or pleasant) on your part. We do not yet know whether, when this vortex of negotiation has settled, we shall have reached the objective; we are dealing with questions of long-standing which have become even more difficult as time has passed. But whatever happens I want to stress that I do appreciate your efforts, and I do hope that you will not allow any disappointments (temporary or otherwise) to lead to doubt either about the validity of
this attempt, or about the cause of majority rule in southern Africa for which we have been working.

This letter therefore comes to you with my very warm personal good wishes once again. I am sure we shall have further contact in the future—after January as well as possibly again before the change in the American government.

Yours sincerely,

Julius Nyerere"

Levin

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231. **Telegram From the Embassy in Zambia to the Department of State**¹

Lusaka, December 9, 1976, 2135Z.

3292. Department pass Secretary. Department of State for Schaufele. Subj: Kaunda Reply to Secretary’s Letter.²

Following is text of letter to the Secretary given me Thursday night by Pres Kaunda at end of conversation reported septel.³

Dear Mr Secretary,

I have received your letter of 7th December, 1976. I must say that this was a most surprising letter to say the least. I was greatly disturbed by the inference and insinuations that appeared to cast doubt on our good faith relative to the Anglo-American proposals on the resolution of the conflict in Zimbabwe. Your message was couched in terminology which is manifestly unacceptable.

I want to make it quite clear, Mr. Secretary, that threats from whatever quarter make no impression on us. In a way it was good that this

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Cherokee; Niat Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 228.

³ Telegram 3293 from Lusaka, December 9, reported on Schaufele’s meeting with Kaunda. The President apologized for betraying a confidence by showing Nkomo the five points. He then expressed frustration with Kissinger’s point that “the US could not ignore foreign intervention,” and said it was not “necessary to make the point to him.” Finally, he said “he would only work to establish the mechanics of a constitutional government and that he felt he had a sacred trust not to influence things in another country by trying to choose its leaders.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
letter came through to us at this time because it has revealed that we have, after all, been working at cross purposes in this exercise.\(^4\)

You mention that the concept of sharing power on the basis of a two-tier system was never challenged. I wish to state with equal frankness and unequivocally that neither the words two-tier system nor power sharing on this basis were ever mentioned at any one time during our conversations.

Further, your emissaries had assured me and you, yourself, said later that the 5 points which you now refer to were merely talking points. They could never be considered on a take-it or leave it basis; this is the impression we gained. Frankly, this was not our understanding and this could not have been the spirit of your message of 31st August and 26th September, 1976.\(^5\) However, I consider that the matters at hand are so grave and the stakes so high that I should set out the basis upon which Zambia got involved in the present exercise.

First, I want to say that we have always acted in good faith. We agreed to co-operate in the finding of a peaceful solution even though we were already on the road to armed struggle. I informed you about this during your African tour.\(^6\) Indeed, on the 27th of April in Lusaka during a luncheon which I gave in your honour, I embraced you at the end of your speech out of respect for what you had said. My embrace was not a matter of ceremony but a demonstration of the depth of my feelings which grew with every conversation and communication we had on the matters at hand.

Second, the conversations which we had with your officials, Under Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Schaufele on the various occasions left us with the clear impression that the Smith government would withdraw in favour of a caretaker government which would in turn announce its acceptance of majority rule and call for discussions on how to implement majority rule with the nationalists. Prior to your departure for Pretoria we warned you that Smith was a very slippery character who had defeated every major effort by successive British governments to find a solution to the problem of Zimbabwe. We cautioned about any meeting that would give respectability to Smith. You assured us that you did not come to fail and that if we heard that you had

\(^4\) In telegram Secto 32060 from London to Lusaka, December 11, Kissinger attempted to clear up any misunderstandings with Kaunda. He assured the President that the United States was “committed to the achievement of majority rule.” Kissinger expressed hope for increased British involvement in the process and for continued association and friendship with Kaunda. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 96, Geopolitical File, Africa, Chronological File, December 10–11, 1976)

\(^5\) For the September 26 letter, see Document 211.

\(^6\) See Document 195.
met Smith it should be considered good news. On your return, however, we noticed that you appeared to have given to Smith certain undertakings which it is clear from your letter prompted Smith to accept the Anglo-American proposals.

The third point is that the conversations which we had with your emissaries and the clearly encouraging picture which emerged was further buttressed by your letter of 31st August, 1976, in which you clearly stated:

(A) There would be withdrawal of the present government in favour of a black majority transition;
(B) The drafting of a constitution which includes a basic protection for minority rights and;
(C) Full independence under majority rule in 18 months, 2 years or earlier.

This set against the background of the clear picture we had gained with your emissaries earlier about the seriousness of your proposals clearly increased credibility that you had chosen a path that was worth our support.

It was sincerely on this basis and out of faith in your ability to honour your word once you gave it that we agreed to give our co-operation to the Anglo-American proposals.

Our confidence was further increased by the reassuring message which you sent on the 26th of September, 1976, following Smith’s broadcast two days earlier. At this time the presidents of the frontline countries were meeting in Lusaka. Again when we combined your reassuring statement of 26th September with the scenario that had emerged with your emissaries, we were satisfied that there was a clear and irrevocable commitment to the road which we believed we were traversing together. This gave us faith and provided further ground for our maximum co-operation. Indeed, only recently at the opening of the Geneva conference the British Chairman Ivor Richard in his opening remarks said among other things—“we are not concerned with whether there will be majority rule in Rhodesia, we are concerned with when and how. We are not discussing whether power will be transferred to the majority, we are discussing the modality of that transfer.”

Very little have we known that there has been a grave misunderstanding about the interpretation of the cooperation which we have given all along in this exercise until my conversation with Ambassador Reinhardt and now your letter of December 7. I must now and equally

7 See Document 205.
8 The letter was transmitted to Lusaka in telegram 216314, September 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840096–1632)
9 Document 211.
frankly say that we have ground to believe that we were misled. We were convinced that we were talking the same language when in fact this was not so. We have been talking on two different wavelengths.

It is not my impression that the nationalists in Geneva are being unrealistic. In fact their proposals are very reasonable. They have asked for a unicameral arrangement supported by a British presence which together would give confidence to all the races and build a foundation in the transitional government upon which people of all races in Rhodesia would work together to build peace on the basis of equality. We are now being told that the nationalists’ attitude does not provide guarantees. But there are guaranteed seats for whites in the transitional government. The reality of the Rhodesian situation itself including the judiciary, civil service, economy and other strategic areas in the Zimbabwe society will ensure that the white community will continue to have a meaningful voice and protection not only in the transitional period but in the period afterwards.

We are being told that ZIPA should reconsider its position. Frankly we believe that the proposals being put forward by the nationalists are realistic. What surprises me is that when you do not like anything it is being labelled unrealistic. Anything else that the nationalists offer is unrealistic and ambiguous. When you assert that you want a moderate and responsible government in Zimbabwe and one which would not pose a threat to Zambia, I must say that we do not need any guidance about what our interests are or what is best for us. Who are we to choose a government that will govern Zimbabwe? This is the sacred right of the six million people of that country.

In all frankness, I am not yet convinced that we are now being led to believe that your present attitude is reminiscent of the past posture of successive American administrations on the problems of this area. We had warned about this, a warning which you, yourself acknowledged. But we are now definitely worried that again and in spite of all that has been done already the United States may end up backing the wrong horse.

If the programme that we believe would guarantee peace and security for all is now being labelled unrealistic then we are quite happy to go along the path which we had chosen before and that is the path of armed struggle. We are not unaware of the risks that are involved in the struggle. But we in Zambia have known no peace and our life has been dedicated to serving that which we consider to be right and just.

We operate on principles as you know, Mr. Secretary, but I must tell you that Zambia will go down fighting on the side of right. We would like to die as noble men and women. This is why I said earlier that threats do not impress us. We seek a solution that ends the war not half-measures. The global problems in the context of southern Africa
demand that a solution that meets the legitimate interests of the oppressed people be found and found quickly. That is the solution that would end the present conflict. If now the United States Government do not appear to share our conviction in this problem they will end by fighting on the wrong side. This will not be in the interests of the United States and of world peace.

Let us therefore not deal with the past, there is a problem to be resolved at the moment. We need a formula that does not insure the place of the white community in the transitional government but that which provides protection and safety for them for all time in an independent Zimbabwe. The British Government has now indicated their preparedness to establish a presence in the interim government. They will need all the support.

Warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
Kaunda
President of the Republic of Zambia

Low

232. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, December 9, 1976, 2255Z.

9825. For Amb Schaufele from Wisner. Subj: Status of Rhodesia Conference: Recommended Briefing Memorandum for the Secretary’s Meetings in London.

I. Rhodesian State of Mind.

A. Smith’s attitude has improved somewhat since his arrival yesterday and it now looks as if he will not pull out of the conference before the Secretary’s meetings in London this weekend. The Secretary’s instructions for my initial meeting with Smith and subsequent mes-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 14, Switzerland—State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (26). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
sage² seem to have had the desired effect, and for the moment, no further action is necessary.

B. Smith’s sense of having been betrayed both by us and especially the British is real. He is convinced that the bargain has not been adhered to. He claims he expected the nationalists would be held to a discussion of the five points, and he is not prepared at present to see the negotiations continue on any other basis. Given his perception of the British performance to date, he will not be easily moved toward acceptance of an expanded British role in the interim government as a substitute for power being retained in white Rhodesian hands.

C. Nevertheless, he has at least indicated a willingness to consider alternative proposals and has signalled that he will not for the time being strike out on his own or seek a settlement outside the Geneva framework. He is probing for African support of a non-Geneva settlement but cannot realistically hold out real hope in this respect. He will be looking to the results of the Secretary’s meetings in London and, following this, a clear signal from us on what the next steps should be.

II. Reactions to Letters to the Front Line Presidents.

A. The word is now out in Geneva about the Secretary’s letters to the front line presidents.³ Their effect, as communicated by the observers here, has been both shocking and sobering. The British here share our view that such an approach was needed to halt the slide into unreality, which had been reflected here in growing insistence on the part of both the nationalists and the observers on instant majority rule. As a result, both the nationalists and the observers are more aware that we cannot, and will not, attempt to press their extreme demands upon Smith or the South Africans, and there may be better recognition that a settlement must be based on compromise.

B. The Secretary will be meeting both Mark Chona and Sonny Ramphal in London.⁴ His meeting with Chona will provide an opportunity to both soothe ruffled feathers and restate our views of what is required to achieve a Rhodesian settlement. The Secretary should:

—Reiterate his high regard for President Kaunda and the importance we attach to his sensible and constructive role.

—Emphasize that we wish there to be no misunderstandings between us and that none is necessary given the common goal we seek.

² Telegram 9789 from Geneva, December 9, reported on Wisner’s meeting with Smith. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

³ See Document 228.

—Stress our desire to concentrate on the present and future and not the past.
—Reemphasize our firm commitment to independence under majority rule in Zimbabwe.
—Seek Chona’s views on what he and Kaunda believe is necessary to break the deadlock.
—Reiterate our conviction that Europeans must have a clearly defined role in the transition and that the concept of power sharing must be respected.
—Discuss with Chona how the British might play a role in the interim government and what would be required to get the front line presidents to agree to support this concept.

C. While we do not know all that Ramphal intends to discuss on behalf of Obasanjo, we know from Nigerian observer Anyaoku that he will be outlining a proposal (which we assume was authored by Anyaoku himself) for a repackaging of Geneva based on expanded UK involvement. If this is the case, we believe that the Nigerians should also be reminded of realities and encouraged to put their weight behind compromise.

III. The British Role.

A. All of the Geneva observers are now convinced that active British participation in the interim government is an essential element to any successful negotiated outcome. While none of them has yet been able to specify what that role should be, all believe that new settlement package based on an expanded British role can be sold to the front line presidents, who can in turn gain nationalist acceptance. The British delegation here indicated that their government is now prepared to consider responsibilities far greater than any it was prepared to assume at the outset. The Geneva delegation, including Richard, indicates it expects decisions to be made this weekend in London for consultations with the front line presidents and Rhodesians and the South Africans.

B. As previously noted, however, Smith remains deeply distrustful of the British, whom he regards as being both weak and indecisive and in league with the Africans, and is therefore extremely skeptical about British involvement in the interim government. Therefore, we will have to give careful thought to how and how much British involvement we might be prepared to press upon Smith in order to achieve a settlement in the coming days.

IV. The Recess Issue.

A. A conference recess is inevitable since there is no way that a settlement can be achieved by December 20. The Rhodesians would like to see an adjournment as soon as possible. Richard’s preference is that the conference adjourn as early as December 14, following your meetings
in London. All, including the observers and the nationalists, agree that the way in which the conference adjourns is more important than when. It will be essential to end the conference on the most positive note possible if there is to be any chance of getting the parties back together after the holidays. This may prove to be the only way out of the current impasse. The British in particular must be ready to make a major effort in this regard. The Secretary may wish to press them to develop their ideas on how the recess should be engineered.

B. The Secretary might also press the British to fix a date for reconvening the conference. The shorter the recess the better, otherwise energies will dissipate and momentum will be lost. We believe that the recess should not exceed three to four weeks. We will also need to plan carefully how the interim is to be used. The British have proposed a shuttle of their own to consult in various African capitals. We should hold them to this while giving consideration to how we can complement their efforts.

C. Both the nationalists and the observers have raised objections to reconvening in Geneva. While their objections have not been specific, we imagine that cost is at least one factor. While we suspect that some—not all, including Sithole and Muzorewa—would prefer to meet in an African capital, they can probably be brought to recognize that no African site would be acceptable. Smith also objects to Geneva because he believes it encourages the nationalists temptation to grandstand and escalate their demands. In the final analysis, we believe these objections are of little importance if an acceptable basis for continuing the negotiations can be found, particularly one to which the nationalists and the front line states are to some degree committed.

Catto
233. Memorandum of Conversation

London, December 10, 1976, 4:10–5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.K.:
C.A.R. Crosland, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Amb. Ivor Richard, Permanent Representative to UN and Chairman of Geneva
Conference on Rhodesia
Edward Rowlands, Minister of State
Sir Michael Palliser, Permanent Under Secretary
Sir Antony Duff, Deputy Under Secretary
Patrick Laver, Head of Rhodesia Department
Ramsey Melhuish, Head of North America Department
Dennis Grennan, Special Adviser on Africa
David Lipsey, Political Adviser to Mr. Crosland
Ewen A.J. Fergusson, Private Secretary to Mr. Crosland

U.S.:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Amb. Anne Armstrong, Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s
Amb. John E. Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Frank G. Wisner, Director, Office of Southern African Affairs
Raymond Seitz, Political Counselor, American Embassy
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

Southern Africa

Crosland: I thank you very much for coming, and if you agree, the first thing is to ask Ivor to explain what has changed at Geneva in the last three weeks.

Kissinger: Good.

Richard: The main thing since the argument on the date, which was a marathon confrontation, is that since then the Africans have conducted themselves in a rational way.

Two things are very clear. One is that Annex C as such is not a starter. It is very hard to see how if it was tabled as a conference document, or if Smith tabled it, it could bridge the gap. Basically the nationalists all say there can be no Council of State or anything that smacks of it.


2 See Document 219.
There have been a number of hints out of Salisbury which seem to indicate that Smith’s objective in this exercise is to buy time for himself and that he’s not serious about the transfer of power.

We have to bridge that gap. One way is if we can get Smith himself to agree to a date for independence and to produce a definition of majority rule. I raised this with him and he agreed to do this, but his proposals were ludicrous. His position now is he’s not prepared to discuss the composition of the Council of State or the definition of it. Before he sits again, he wants me and the African delegates to agree the purpose of the conference is to appoint the Council of State. Second, Smith believes it’s all the Chairman’s fault. He feels I should have made all the delegations start with five points. He’s in an angry mood.

On the other hand, there was something very hopeful. He said if the British Government were to call an adjournment and come up with some new proposal, he would consider it and consider it very seriously.

The Africans want an adjournment too. Sithole says the ZIPA leaders are approaching him in Geneva. Mugabe wants it. Joshua Nkomo is quite happy to have an adjournment; he wants to get back to Rhodesia and organize his support. The Bishop (Muzorewa) is already back there.

Kissinger: How long a recess?
Richard: To the end of January.
Kissinger: They don’t speak of the dead. (Laughter)
Armstrong: They’re being very tactful!
Crosland: We frankly thought of January 20.
Kissinger: The only trouble is all the world press on that date would be filled with a picture of me being carried out in my chair. I think you should choose a date either before or after, not January 20.
Richard: But it is clear that Annex C is not a starter. We will need a new package.
Crosland: Ted, give them our ideas on the adjournment.
Rowlands: First, when we announce the adjournment, it should be on a positive note.
Kissinger: I agree.
Rowlands: Seeing it as a hopeful moment in the conference. Ivor and Dennis would put together a new shuttle to work out a new package which would have a broad measure of agreement. We want the agreement of the four Presidents to the definition of the British role.

3 See Document 217.
We would hope to get at least the acquiescence of Smith that Annex C isn’t going to work.

Kissinger: My understanding is that Smith was going to put forward Annex C but we urged him not to do it.

Wisner: His staff proposed it to him but he didn’t want to do it.

Crosland: He should because it would be embarrassing if the conference broke up without anyone putting forward Annex C.

Wisner: He is convinced that in the present mood it would be shot down. He was very categorical.

Kissinger: I wonder if Smith should do it and if we should pay the price for it. If he were eager to do it, I’d let him do it.

Rowlands: It’s water under the bridge now.

Richard: (Reads from own notes) “He felt in his view it would only create an explosion.”

Kissinger: Then we’d better leave it as it is, because if we urged it we would be committed to back it.

Richard: He’ll blame me for not putting it forward and would have blamed me for not having the opportunity. He can’t say he had no opportunity, but he will say we didn’t try to sell it.

Crosland: We now seem to have a very detailed Cabinet agreement.

Kissinger: The question is whether it is really Cabinet agreement. (Laughter)

Crosland: Although there is a gap, it seems the gap is no longer unbridgeable between what we can do and what the more reasonable of them are willing to take.

Where should we go from here?

Kissinger: You’re recessing when?

Crosland: Next Tuesday.4

Armstrong: May I ask a question about the semantics of recess and adjournment?

Richard: I gather there is a difference in America.

Kissinger: Recess implies a certainty of reconvening; adjournment does not.

Armstrong: Yes.

Crosland: We can use both.

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4 December 14.
Independence Negotiations 661

Kissinger: A purely tactical point: I don’t think I can get my letters to them until Sunday or Monday. How do we ensure to have it end on a slightly upbeat note?

Richard: We hoped to do that by announcing at the same time that Dennis Grennan and I would begin the shuttle.

Kissinger: Secondly, if you have a new proposal, you will need us to put it over with the South Africans and Rhodesians. Therefore, the date of reassembly should be before we leave office, otherwise we have no weight at all. So a date like January 16.

Richard: The 17th is a Monday.

Kissinger: Fine. Just so it doesn’t break up before January 20. (Laughter)

Richard: My original instructions were not to break it up before November 2. (Laughter)

Rowlands: We would make clear we were optimistic.

Kissinger: We can brief the press that this is a process that will go on.

Palliser: You will be asked point blank today whether there is an adjournment.

Crosland: I will say Ivor is going back for consultation and I will speak to it on Tuesday.

Kissinger: However we phrase it, and particularly in light of these exchanges, it doesn’t look like it’s breaking up.

Second, on substance, what sort of proposal do you have in mind?

Rowlands: We would substitute for the Council of State a British Resident Commissioner. Below it will be a Council of Ministers chaired by the Resident Commissioner. Each of the five delegations will choose five members and the Resident Commissioner will choose five. So there will be 30 ministers.

Kissinger: Ten will be white?

Rowlands: Ten will be white. The Rhodesians’ five and the five chosen by the Resident Commissioner. The advantage is to avoid having to choose a Prime Minister, because that could be one of the biggest bustups ever. The Council would have legislative and executive authority. The Heads of the delegations would be a Privy Council.

Kissinger: You replace the Council of State with a British Resident Commissioner. The heads of delegations form a privy council around him.

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5 The letters to Kaunda and Nyerere were delivered on December 11. The texts were transmitted in Secto 32060 from London to Lusaka and Secto 32061 from London to Dar es Salaam, both December 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Rowlands: An advisory privy council around him.

Crosland: Just to clarify something, I’ve approved none of this. I just saw it an hour ago. But it is a promising approach.

Rowlands: Then the portfolios—we’ll have a National Security Commission of the five Privy Council ministers and one Minister chosen by the Resident Commissioner, and the Chiefs of Staff of the police chosen by the Resident Commissioner.

Kissinger: Nyerere says he can live with a white defense minister.

Crosland: That’s external defense. The other is law and order.

Rowlands: The concept of the National Security Commission was mooted when we discussed Annex C.

Crosland: I don’t think it is inconsistent.

Kissinger: (Reads over Nyerere’s letter.)

Rowlands: Powers will be vested in the Resident Chief Commissioner.

Crosland: We have that agreed.


Kissinger: How many will be whites?

Rowland: The Resident Commissioner is white. There are four blacks in the Privy Council and one white. One non-white minister that he has appointed would be on the National Security Commission. And three chiefs of staff.

Kissinger: What would they be?

Rowland: We see them chosen from outside Rhodesia. They could be Commonwealth.

Grennan: For presentational purposes, we might want the Chief of Police white and the Chief of Law and Order black from the Commonwealth.

Crosland: I think the notion of inserting Commonwealth people will be a very important point.

Kissinger: How do you propose proceeding with your shuttle? How will you sell this plan?

Crosland: Ivor will do the shuttling.

Kissinger: Procedurally, how do you plan to do it?

Richard: We would start with the Presidents. We would start with Kaunda because he seems the most reasonable. Then Nyerere. We’ll explore it with the Nationalists simultaneously.

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6 Presumably a reference to the letter transmitted in Document 230.
Kissinger: When would you talk to the Rhodesians?
Richard: After.
Kissinger: Will you say the United States is behind it?
Crosland: We won’t explore it; we’ll sell it. We hope the United States will be for it.
Kissinger: Do you want to sell it to the blacks and then turn it over to us and say it’s our job to sell it to the whites? Or should it be something that has been explored with the whites so it’s not a new idea?
Richard: We wouldn’t object to that.
Crosland: Wait a minute. They’re all suspicious of the United States and Great Britain. They think we’re doing this to avoid majority rule.
Kissinger: But if we explore it first with not the Rhodesians but the South Africans . . . It would be helpful if at the time you try to sell it to the black Africans we know the South Africans will be helpful.
Crosland: We can’t do a lot of bargaining with the South Africans on what we will try to sell.
Kissinger: You have to have enough discussions so they feel convinced they want to support it.
Crosland: (Pauses) Let’s pursue this. As Ivor tells it, we want to get into a take-it-or-leave-it situation. Suppose we get something that safeguards white interests? We’ll have to put it on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Kissinger: Then you don’t need us.
Crosland: But we would want support.
Kissinger: We won’t oppose it. Frank had an idea.
Wisner: Which is pretty close. It had a second tier but I admit it will be hard. Perhaps there is some hope in running a two-tier system—the top tier you would chair and be the tie-breaker. And a Council of Ministers.
Richard: What powers would it have?
Wisner: The original legislative powers in Annex C. There are a lot of presentational advantages in this structure.
Crosland: Parity can’t be sold anymore.
Richard: That’s dead. But I think we could sell a kind of blocking mechanism.
Kissinger: But that’s a veto.
Crosland: It depends on whether it’s British or Rhodesian.
Wisner: How do you see this Privy Council?
Rowlands: A two-thirds majority wouldn’t work. A balance of the Council of Ministers would mean the Africans have a two-thirds majority.
We’re substituting for parity a Resident Commissioner. He would have authority for defense and law and order. Power may be vested in him.

Kissinger: My fear that you may be going too fast is two-fold.

I wrote to Nyerere to make clear there was a possibility of a breakup, that there was a limit beyond which things couldn’t be pushed. His reply was conciliatory. I don’t take that argument about their suspicion we’re not really for majority rule, all that seriously. That is their specialty—to make us constantly apologize. I think our interest is to keep the limits clear.

Second, we got it to this point by combining our power with South African power. If we don’t bring the South Africans into it, what you work out with the blacks won’t mean anything. I’d hate to see you and blacks agree on something we couldn’t deliver.

This is the first hearing. I’d have to see it on paper. But this is a drastic change and the Rhodesians will possibly see it as total surrender to the blacks. I’m not saying it is.

My instructions to my people were to talk about Annex C, not about getting rid of Smith.

Crosland: We spent a lot of talk about this, Henry. We talked about a transitional government without Smith. After your talks with Vorster, we switched to the idea that Smith would sell it but then disappear. But this hasn’t happened. The five points would have to be modified. It’s been changed because Smith is still there; there will have to be a change on the other side.

Kissinger: The easiest way to get rid of Smith is to set up a transitional government.

Richard: But the Rhodesian delegation at Geneva assumes Smith will still be there.

Kissinger: I would separate the setting up of a transitional government from the membership of Smith. I was afraid the immediate elimination of Smith would create a collapse of the whole structure.

Rowlands: The question now is what assurances do the whites need?

Kissinger: Your proposal can have two purposes. One is to put something forward that you know will be rejected. We’re not there yet. If it isn’t that, then we have to see what the South Africans can go along with. We don’t have to let it be known it’s been discussed with the South Africans. They’ve kept secrets.

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See footnote 1, Document 228.
Crosland: We’ve talked with Fourie. We all have the impression what they want above all is a settlement.

Kissinger: But I believe Nyerere will buy a better deal than what you propose, which is what the nationalists want.

Grennan: The whites want a structure that allows them to continue to run the country. But a Resident Commissioner will always be able to block majority will and run security affairs.

Kissinger: We don’t have to settle it now.

Crosland: We’ll refine these ideas further and then put it to you.

Kissinger: I know what you’ll do. If you don’t put it to the Cabinet, it has no standing; if you do put it to the Cabinet, it can’t be changed!

If we do come to agreement on what may be saleable to both sides, then we—you or we, probably we—should go to the South Africans to see what you’re up against when you do sell it to the blacks.

Crosland: The nationalists now at Geneva are a lot less likely to take the fire from the front-line Presidents. A lot has changed in the balance of power since September.

Richard: This was clear in my talks with Nkomo.

Kissinger: But if the conference breaks down, Nkomo is finished, and also Sithole and the Bishop.

Palliser: They might not share your view.

Kissinger: One thing that has impressed us is their highly developed instinct for their survival. There is no chance they’d survive a guerrilla war.

Reinhardt: What is the timing of this?

Richard: We would start out on the 28th.

Reinhardt: For ten days or so.

Richard: No, two weeks. They would have time to form a view.

Kissinger: The best way to find out their view is to ask them.

I would suggest that Frank (Wisner) and Jack (Reinhardt), who know more about what’s happened at Geneva than any two people we have, meet with any people you designate once you have a paper.

It’s an ingenious scheme. The trick is to convince the South Africans it’s not a total sell-out.

Crosland: It has to be saleable to both.

Richard: It’s really going back to a British presence.

Kissinger: My first idea was a British presence.

Richard: That’s right. I’m just saying . . .

Kissinger: Smith once proposed going back to the Constitution of 1961. Would you, under that Constitution, have authority to implement all of this?
Grennan: No, we wouldn’t.

Rowlands: Parity is dead, so the question is how to give assurances and balances by other means than simply looking at the color of the faces around the table.

Kissinger: What the whites fear most is—they’re not determined to prevent any action—but that the system after it’s set up, will be overthrown, as all other systems in Africa.

Crosland: This is what the blacks fear, too.

One idea is Commonwealth presence. The Chairman of the Commonwealth is keen on this; he’s talked to the Canadians. We are afraid of getting into an Ulster situation when in effect we have only one chap out there. This would be much harder for either side to bust up.

Kissinger: I’d like to see it on paper, with all the suitable disclaimers. (Laughter) Can we see it, with full understanding that it’s a think piece?

Crosland: Yes.

Kissinger: When do you think it’ll be ready?

Crosland: Wednesday.

Kissinger: Then Frank and Jack will come back Wednesday or Thursday.

Crosland: The objective is to have something that can win the acceptance of the South African Government but will be acceptable to the blacks.

Kissinger: The whole point is to liquidate the Rhodesian problem.

Crosland: The blacks are getting stronger and stronger every day. All intelligence reports indicate it.

Kissinger: Yes. The South Africans are looking for an honorable way to get out. Their definition of honorable is something that appears as a logical evolution from the earlier discussions.

Richard: Smith wouldn’t see this as a logical evolution from the previous.

Kissinger: But the South Africans kept their secrecy scrupulously before.

By the end of next week, we will have some kind of agreement. Then we’ll discuss it with Fourie. You’ll have their reaction before you go. I wouldn’t say they have a veto over your trip.

Rowlands: There is a great and growing consensus in favor of a British presence.

Kissinger: It’s a very important step, your willingness to undertake this.

Your statement Tuesday will give some hope?
Crosland: Oh yes. It will be a hint of a British solution.8
Kissinger: It is interesting that the Nigerian observer spoke of a
60–40 split.
Wisner: Ten bottles!
Kissinger: Ten bottles, of which four could go to the whites. He
didn’t say which four.
Crosland: We’re proposing 66⅔ and 33⅓.
Wisner: What assurances would you give to the blacks on your
shuttle?
Crosland: We would make clear our commitment to the British
presence is conditional on a cessation of guerrilla war when the internal
government is formed, and the lifting of sanctions. And making it clear
we won’t stand for being stuck there in a civil war. There will be the
strictest conditions.
Kissinger: You judge what the Nigerian statement is worth.
(Reads:) “We shouldn’t take too seriously the rejection of a two-tier
structure. We should get away from the term though not the concept of
power sharing. The term suggests to them Smith’s idea of parity.
Picking up on a metaphor earlier, Anyuoko said if there were ten
bottles, four could go to the whites.”
Rowlands: That’s not bad.
Crosland: We want to agree on this fairly quickly because time is of
the essence.
Kissinger: We’re not proposing any delay. You’re proposing to
leave on the 28th. Our suggestion is that Jack and Frank talk with you
next week. Our capacity to develop British constitutional forms is in
any case limited.
Crosland: But it’s greater than it was three months ago. (Laughter)
Reinhardt: How do you end the conference on a note of optimism?
Richard: We’ll say that we will develop possible proposals to put
forward and we will consult.
Reinhardt: Will that bring Mugabe back? Some observers think
Mugabe won’t come back and Nkomo won’t be able to.
Kissinger: That problem exists anyway.
Richard: We’ll have talked to them all, the front line Presidents and
the nationalists.

8 In telegram 20257 from London, December 15, the Embassy provided excerpts of
Crosland’s December 14 Parliamentary statement on Rhodesia in which he discussed ad-
journment of the Geneva conference to permit further consultations in southern Africa.
He also mentioned a direct British role during the Rhodesian transitional period which
“would not include British troops.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy
Files)
Crosland: Is there anything else we can try and clarify?

Kissinger: No. Frank?

Wisner: No.

Kissinger: Win?

Lord: No. I’d like to get a better feel for how the numbers work out, in the blocking.

Crosland: It’s not blocking for the Rhodesian Front.

Lord: In this National Security Council.

Kissinger: There is a very real danger that we agree with you and you agree with the blacks and it’s two different things. We’ll be in a never-never land.

Crosland: And you and the South Africans. Two never-never lands.

Rowlands: We tell the blacks: What are you worried about? The blocking mechanism is in law and order. The British Resident Commissioner will handle it. It’s not a matter of numbers.

Kissinger: If we violently disagree, you can do it in your own. We certainly won’t oppose it.

Palliser: The fundamentals haven’t changed since we first met at that Air Force base near the Secretary of State’s (Crosland’s) constituency (in April). The blacks will win. The only question is whether they win soon, by a moderate solution, or slowly by violence. It’s still in our interest to bring it about in the best possible circumstances.

Kissinger: Our predisposition is to support it. This reasoning got us into it in the first place. Our predisposition is to come up with a proposal that you believe is saleable and that we can support.

Crosland: It was just your use of the phrase “blocking mechanism.”

One other point. How do we stand on the fund?

Duff: The proposal is that you and Dr. Kissinger should approach potential donors. That should be as soon as possible because it may be useful to Ivor to throw this card in once in a while, with both sides.

Kissinger: (Looks over his papers on the Rhodesian Fund.) I haven’t read the letter. If our officials agree, I’m sure I’ll agree. What is the disagreement?

Duff: It doesn’t give enough information to potential donors about the nature of the scheme it is. There is an annex—which I am glad to say is Annex 2, not Annex B or C—which gives more information about the

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9 Not attached and not found.
projects. We would like to see it accompany the letters.\textsuperscript{10} Your people would like it to be followed up later.

Kissinger: I haven’t studied it. My inclination is to get these out as soon as possible. If there is any objection, I’ll let you know Monday.

Duff: If we type like mad, we can get the signatures of the two important gentlemen tomorrow to send with or without Annex 2.

Rowlands: If it leaks out and it’s a letter and Annex One, it will look like we are reneging on the details of the assurances.

Crosland: Is it proper to have an annex that refers to “blacks?”

Wisner: They call themselves “Africans.”

Crosland: Shall we both look it over? It looks rather detailed to me.

Kissinger: I’ll see Fourie Wednesday.\textsuperscript{11} I’m sure he’ll be delighted.

What shall we say to the press?

Crosland: That we had a good discussion, that you’re here mainly to see football and go to the theatre. (Laughter)

Fergusson: What about adjournment? You’ll be asked.

Crosland: It’s not a matter for today. I’ll be speaking on Tuesday.

We will say we discussed the whole thing and Ivor Richard is going back Tuesday.

Kissinger: And you and we will be talking tomorrow morning and we can’t have reached a conclusion.

Crosland: I don’t want to talk about this tomorrow morning!

Kissinger: But we don’t have to say that!

Crosland: After seeing the hideous scrum outside last time, I thought we should have a regular press conference here now.

Kissinger: I’m going out with a bang, two press conferences in one day!

Crosland: Well, thank you very much. It’s the last time perhaps we’ll see you here as Secretary of State. In spite of your insistence not to learn our constitutional structure, and your telegrams that you send from the worst places in cannibal-land, you’ve been a great friend of this country.

(“Hear, hear,” from all the British side.)

Kissinger: Thank you.

\textsuperscript{10} See Document 234.

\textsuperscript{11} Kissinger held a breakfast meeting on December 15 with Fourie in the Monroe-Madison room at the Department of State, 8:10–9:30 a.m. A memorandum of conversation is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 346, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, November 1976–January 1977.
(The meeting ended at 5:30 pm and Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Secretary proceeded down the hall to their joint press conference. The text is attached.)¹²


234. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, December 17, 1976, 2306Z.

306303. Subject: Texts of Letters and Documentation on Zimbabwe Development Fund. Ref: State 304674.²

1. Embassies of action addressee capitals will be receiving by pouch the following documents:
   —a joint paper presenting the proposal for the fund;
   —Annex 1 to the proposal entitled, The Zimbabwe Economy; and
   —Annex 2 to the proposal entitled, The Zimbabwe Development Fund: Possible Program Areas.

2. Instructions for presentation of these documents are contained in septel to action addressees. Parallel presentations of some documents by the British will take place in Ottawa, Canberra, and Wellington. In case documents do not arrive in time for presentation, we are transmitting via this cable the text of the four documents. No repeat no presentation or discussion with governments should occur, however, unless and until instructions are received.


² In telegram 304674 to the same posts, December 16, the Department of State provided instructions and talking points for action addressees to promote the Zimbabwe Development Fund. The initiative was to be presented to potential donors as a “critical element” of the Rhodesian settlement and “extremely helpful in avoiding the political and economic chaos and the human suffering that sometimes accompanies transfer of power.” (Ibid.)
Begin confidential.

3. Begin text of joint letter: Dear (use appropriate title):

—Recent events lead us to believe that a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian problem is now possible. The acceptance of majority rule by the Smith regime and the convening of the Geneva conference were major steps forward. While there are still major problems to overcome, we are hopeful that agreement on an acceptable settlement can be reached.

—There can be no doubt that the alternative to a negotiated settlement is increased racial tension leading to further bloodshed. A civil war in Rhodesia is unlikely to be confined to that country. A Rhodesian conflict would be a threat to peace and stability in the whole of southern Africa.

—A successful negotiation would open up many opportunities to improve the general welfare and economic security of the people of Rhodesia. We believe that an international economic effort supported by the world’s major powers, can make a vital contribution to the programs of the interim and independent governments of Rhodesia, enabling them to realize development opportunities and conduct an orderly restructuring of the economy. Such an effort would be designed to impress both Africans and Europeans that they have much to gain in cooperating in the future development of Zimbabwe.

—The United States and the United Kingdom have been engaged in discussions to elaborate this proposal for an international fund. It would seek to draw together international financial support to assist a future Zimbabwe government to promote economic and social development, expansion of training and employment opportunities for Africans, and economic security for all sectors of the Rhodesian population. We enclose a description of the proposed fund with an account of the areas in which it would function. You will see that paragraph 9 deals with the contributions to the fund which will be made by our two governments. We envisage that any contributions by participating governments would be dependent on both the interim and the independent governments of Rhodesia accepting responsibility for honoring their international financial obligations.

—We are approaching a limited number of governments to contribute to the important political and economic purposes in mind, on a basis taking account of historical connections with Africa, relative gross national product, ability to find the necessary resources, and readiness to contribute to the solution of the economic problems of the developing world. We therefore very much hope that your government will seriously consider participating in this fund. We are sure that this will greatly increase its effectiveness and enhance its appeal to a future government of Zimbabwe. (Note to typists: the sentence that follows “Zim-
Approaches are being made in parallel to the following governments: the member states of the European Community, Australia, Canada, Iran, Japan, Kuwait, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates.

—We should like, if this is acceptable to you, to follow this letter as soon as possible with more detailed discussions with your government, through the diplomatic channel or by means of a special mission to your country.

—We would of course welcome any suggestions you may have as to how the proposals for the fund might be improved. At a later stage we have in mind that it will be necessary to convene a meeting of potential participants to discuss how the fund should be established.


End confidential.

For Paris: His Excellency Louis de Guiringaud, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Paris. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a share of the order of ten percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Tokyo: His Excellency Zentaro Kosaka, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a share of the order of ten percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Bonn: His Excellency Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a share of the order of ten percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Luxembourg: His Excellency Gaston Thorn, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Luxembourg. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a contribution to the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Brussels: His Excellency Renaat van Elslande, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of Belgium, Brussels. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a share of the order of two percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Rome: His Excellency Arnaldo Forlani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic, Rome. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to
consider a share in the order of three percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Jidda: His Royal Highness Prince Saud al-Faisal bin abd al-Aziz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Jidda. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a contribution in the order of ten million dollars per year to the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Copenhagen: His Excellency Knud Borge Andersen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a share of the order of one percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Oslo: His Excellency Knut Frydenlund, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Oslo. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a share of the order of one percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Abu Dhabi: His Excellency Ahmad Khalifa al-Sawaydi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a share of the order of one percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

For The Hague: His Excellency Max van der Stoel, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, The Hague. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a share of the order of two percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Kuwait: His Excellency Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, Kuwait. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a share of the order of one percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Tehran: His Excellency Dr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Tehran. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a contribution in the order of ten million dollars per year to the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Dublin: His Excellency Dr. Garret FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Dublin. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read: “We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a contribution to the fund. Approaches . . .”

For Stockholm: Her Excellency Karin Soder, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Stockholm. Sentence in paragraph 5 should read:
“We would like to think your government would be willing to consider a share of the order of two percent in the total of the fund. Approaches . . .”

Begin confidential.


—A political settlement in Rhodesia, involving first an interim government and later an independent government of Zimbabwe, would remove a source of acute conflict and help establish a climate conducive to economic development in central and southern Africa. A political settlement, however, will set in motion an economic transition which will be most effective if accompanied by measures designed to realize the growth potential of the economy and rapidly improve opportunities for all the population of Zimbabwe. The responsibility for the necessary economic measures after independence will rest primarily with the new government, but it is already evident, in spite of the sparse detail at present available about the present state and future prospects of the economy, that substantial international economic assistance and external private investment will be needed. (A brief assessment of the state of the Rhodesian economy is at Annex 1.)

—When a political settlement is achieved, the lifting of sanctions, combined with aid, will provide both Zimbabwe and its neighbors with new development prospects. Different trade and transport patterns will be established. African Zimbabweans should have expanded access to better jobs in mining, industry, commerce and the public service. More balanced patterns of ownership for farms, houses and businesses will emerge. External assistance can help the people of Zimbabwe effect the social and economic changes required to take advantage of these new opportunities for a more prosperous and balanced economy.

—The ability of an independent government of Zimbabwe to raise the living standards of the poor majority depends not only on the development of the traditional sector but also on effective administration and a high level of output in the modern sector, which accounts for the greater part of Rhodesia’s export earnings, internal revenues, domestic production of consumer goods, and wage employment of African Zimbabweans. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance to find ways to facilitate the economic transition while minimizing its disruptive effect on the potential for economic growth. It is crucial that skilled workers and managerial personnel are encouraged to continue to contribute to the welfare and prosperity of the economy.

—The United States and Great Britain have, therefore, agreed to cooperate in helping to organize an international economic effort in support of a Rhodesian settlement. They propose the establishment of a
Zimbabwe Development Fund. The purpose of this fund would be to assist the new government to promote:

(I) balanced economic and social development in Zimbabwe;
(II) rapid expansion of economic opportunities for and skills of the African majority;
(III) basic economic security for all sections of the population so that they might continue to contribute their skills and enthusiasm to the development of the country.

—The different ways in which the fund could assist in these objectives are described in more detail in Annex 2. In brief, however, the fund would respond to requests from the Zimbabwe government to support specific proposals for development projects and programs, for example, in agricultural and land reform, education and training, and social and economic infrastructure. Its efforts should encourage commercial capital flows, especially in extractive, processing, and manufacturing industries, supported as appropriate by national export credit and investment insurance agencies. The fund should be prepared to provide balance of payments support during a period of economic transition, especially to enable the gradual return to normal external relations after the lifting of sanctions. The fund could also provide support for, and take into account the balance of payments implications of, programs designed to encourage skilled labor and managerial personnel to contribute to Zimbabwe development and to effect a smooth transition to a more balanced pattern of access to ownership of farms, houses, and businesses.

—The fund should be established as soon as possible after the establishment of an interim government in Rhodesia. Even before it began to be funded to any considerable extent, the fund could begin working with developmental institutions, either already existing or to be established by the Zimbabwe government. The fund could assist both the interim government and the independent government of Zimbabwe to plan development projects and programs consistent with the political changes which will have taken place without disruption of the economy. The fund could, in the initial period, also coordinate bilateral development assistance, especially in the training of Africans in technical and administrative skills.

—Since specific development projects and programs for an independent Zimbabwe are not yet available, a precise quantification of the resources needed by the fund is not possible. A preliminary assessment, however, suggests that contributions, on concessionary terms, from those governments willing to participate in the fund should be at a minimum approaching one billion dollars and at a maximum rather less than one and a half billion dollars. The fund’s objectives, and the fact that experience shows that economic development projects take a
long time to mature, will make it necessary to envisage a fairly long period of disbursement of the fund's resources. It is suggested, however, in order that the management of the fund can plan its operations in the knowledge of the total amount of its resources and so that it can meet extraordinary balance of payments demands on its resources during an economic transition, contributions by participating governments should be made over a five-year period with the likelihood of a longer period of actual disbursement in mind.

—Flows of bilateral concessional aid could, it is suggested, be counted as part of their contribution to the fund, but the greater part of each country’s contribution, at least during the first five years of its operation, should be direct to the fund. On this basis, initial finance envisaged for the fund might be say two-thirds over a five-year period in cash or in promissory notes, and say one-third on call if the management of the fund should require it for the fulfillment of its longer-term objectives. The method by which the contributions were made can be discussed between governments and need not necessarily be uniform: for example, some governments might prefer to contribute cash at regular intervals in equal installments. Others might prefer to make available promissory notes for encashment as disbursements by the fund require, a method permitted in replenishment of the resources of the International Development Association. The questions of the currencies in which the contributions should be made, and the degree and structure of any arrangement for tying of procurement in the participating countries and provision for the local costs of development projects can be the subject of intergovernmental consultation. The nature of the economic assistance extended by the fund should be such that the contributions of participating governments would be expected to qualify as official development assistance in accordance with the criteria of the Development Assistance Committee.

—On this basis, the Government of the United States would, subject to the authorization and appropriation of funds by the U.S. Congress, be prepared to contribute 40 percent to the total resources of the fund up to a maximum of $520 million, the major part a direct contribution to the fund and the rest in the form of bilateral assistance; and the Government of the United Kingdom would be prepared, subject to Parliamentary approval, to contribute 15 percent of the resources provided directly to the fund, up to a maximum of 75 million pounds, and in addition to provide 41 million pounds of bilateral aid, over a five-year period. The U.S. and British contributions would be conditional on each other and on contributions being forthcoming from other countries on an equitable basis.

—The fund will also facilitate action by agencies of donor countries to make appropriate non-concessional loans and guarantees to en-
courage commercial trade and private investment flows to Zimbabwe. These would be additional to the concessionary contributions discussed above.

—Voting arrangements for policy decisions should be related to financial contributions but would not necessarily be directly proportional to them. It is not envisaged that the fund would need a managerial staff of its own; it would draw on the capabilities of existing multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and other United Nations agencies. The fund could also provide support for regional development projects and take part in any consortium or consultative group established to coordinate development assistance to Zimbabwe and relate it to development aid to the southern Africa region as a whole.

End text of joint proposal.
End confidential.
Begin confidential.


—Zimbabwe is well-endowed with natural resources and despite the dual nature of the economy the long-run prospects, based upon more balanced development and opportunities for all sections of the population, are good. The present state of the Rhodesian economy, however, is critical and the sustaining of the economy in the immediate future, together with the realization of its potential, will require careful economic management, the formulation of an appropriate national development strategy, and substantial international development aid to assist in its implementation.

—The population of Rhodesia consists of 6 million Africans and 275,000 of other racial origin, including about 10,000 Asians, 30,000 of Portuguese extraction who fled from Mozambique, and a significant Greek population. The separate education system for Africans has effectively limited their opportunities at all levels. Access to technical education and training is particularly limited and the practice of job reservation means a marked absence of Africans in skilled and managerial positions in both the public and private sectors. Many African graduates remain abroad. The bulk of the African population resides within the tribal trust areas although, since about 1 million Africans have wage employment in the modern sector, there is considerable separation of families and a lack of adult males in these areas.

—The Rhodesian economy consists of a large modern sector (including public administration, commercial agriculture, basic services, mining and manufacturing) which generates over 80 percent of recorded GNP, and provides substantial wage employment, domestic consumption goods, and the principal sources of foreign exchange earnings, and a traditional, largely subsistence, agricultural sector suffering from considerable land pressure and inadequate services.
—Associated with the imposition of sanctions the modern sector has undergone some restructuring, with greater emphasis on import substitution and diversification. The share of the manufacturing sector in the economy has risen since 1965 and commercial agricultural production has been broadened from its previous concentration on tobacco to include cattle, maize and wheat. The volume of mineral production has almost doubled.

—Despite the resilience and growth which the Rhodesian economy showed until 1974, it has since been seriously affected by sanctions (including the closure of the Mozambique border in 1976), the world recession (particularly as it affects South Africa), and the escalation of violence. Detailed data are not available, but the proportion of public expenditure diverted for defense purposes has increased considerably and taking account of loans to the para-statal sector the government has sustained an overall budget deficit throughout the 1970’s.

—While Rhodesia has continued to achieve a net surplus on merchandise trade, there has been a marked reduction in the volume and value of trade in relation to national income. The deficit on invisibles has worsened in recent years with the loss of revenue to Rhodesia Railways from Zambian copper exports (since 1973) and with increased trade costs for Rhodesian imports and exports which now must be carried exclusively through South Africa. The current balance has been increasingly in deficit since 1972.

—No improvement in factors affecting the current account can be expected during 1976. Foreign indebtedness has increased and foreign exchange reserves are thought to be low. Increasingly stringent import controls have been imposed to contain the situation, which has not only reduced the availability of imported consumer goods but has prevented domestic industry from obtaining sufficient supplies of raw materials, spares and replacement machinery, with which to maintain production levels and efficient services.

—While the economy and balance of payments will benefit from the lifting of sanctions and restoration of economic relations with the rest of the world, it should not be assumed that this in itself will produce an early and dramatic improvement in the situation. The re-opening of traditional and cheaper trade routes and the ability to buy and sell overtly in world markets will benefit the terms of trade, although to what extent the invisible deficit will be reduced, for example by the resumption of transit traffic, is not clear given the development of new communications systems in the region over the last decade. It may be assumed that manufacturing industry established in recent years will continue to be afforded some degree of protection and the manufacturing sector should be able to increase exports to neighboring states. However, the demands of the economy for additional imports
will be considerable both for the re-equipment of industry and for public investment. In addition, the structural changes that are likely to take place over the next few years could well result in other calls on foreign exchange.

—It is evident that a new Zimbabwe government will have serious short term problems in trying to avoid a further decline in domestic economic activity, while at the same time having to face the challenge of formulating and implementing a national development strategy to provide new opportunities for all sections of the population and ensure a wider distribution of the benefits of economic development. Considerable emphasis will have to be placed on education and training for the African majority. A major effort will be necessary to develop the traditional rural sector and integrate it with the rest of the economy; this will require, inter alia, the maintenance of an efficient public administration and essential infrastructure services. Any failure to maintain the production of the modern sector, in particular output both for domestic consumption and also for export from lands at present farmed by Europeans, would seriously undermine the economy and an independent Zimbabwe government’s ability to implement a major economic development program.

—The realization of Zimbabwe’s economic potential and the future welfare of the bulk of the population suggests that there should be no early large-scale replacement of European skills, but rather a deliberate change in manpower composition as rapidly as the African majority is able to acquire and deploy the necessary skills. Land reform, following the repeal of the Land Tenure Act, will necessarily be an important feature of a rural development strategy for Zimbabwe. A well-administered and orderly land transfer program will not only facilitate the resettlement of many of those presently confined to the tribal trust and African land purchase areas, but it will also provide the European commercial farming sector with sufficient confidence to encourage them to continue farming in Zimbabwe in a manner that will maintain production and asset values.

—The absence of a development plan makes the quantification of the likely resource gap over the next few years impossible at this stage. Investment will clearly have to be expanded considerably. There will probably be some improvement in public sector savings and in the overall allocation of resources following a settlement (with a reduction in defense expenditure). Private capital can be relied upon in some sectors (e.g. mining and manufacturing) and within Zimbabwe’s debt service capacity, commercial capital inflows have a role to play. While it is appreciated that the strength of the economy and its growth potential can produce substantial resources for improving the life of all Zim-
babweans, there is no doubt that it will also require substantial concessional aid flows in the years ahead.

End text of Annex 1

End confidential.

Begin confidential:


—The Zimbabwe Development Fund would give support, and help mobilize support from other institutions, for a balanced development program for Zimbabwe. It would work with the Zimbabwe government and other Zimbabwe institutions, bilateral and multilateral development assistance agencies, foreign government agencies that issue or guarantee trade credits or insure private investment, and other appropriate agencies.

—Details of specific programs that the fund might support can be finally decided only after much more information has become available and after consultations with the Zimbabwe government. It may be desirable for the fund to support an international assistance mission, organized by the World Bank, and drawing on the capabilities of bilateral aid agencies and existing multilateral institutions. This mission could assess more accurately Zimbabwe’s economic development prospects and identify projects and programs that the fund and the international community might support. Those program areas of likely interest to the fund include:

(I) public administration and institutional development;
(II) agriculture and land reform;
(III) commerce, industry and mining;
(IV) education and training;
(V) social and economic infrastructure; and
(VI) international finance.

—Support by the fund in these areas might be direct support of specific projects and programs or it might be indirect through general balance of payments support that will enhance the broad capabilities of the Zimbabwe government to undertake projects and programs.

Public Administration and Institutional Development

—Public and parastatal institutions will have to perform effectively during the transition if the significant development opportunities outlined in Annex I are to be realized. There will be a need to expand rapidly job opportunities for African Zimbabweans in the public sector. Yet much of the existing skilled and managerial personnel may have to be retained, at least for a while, as the demands on an effective functioning civil service are likely to expand during a transition period.
—Training will be a critical element to sound public administration. While discussed generally in a later section of this Annex, training requirements for the public service and parastatal organizations will probably be a first priority of the new government. Institutes of public administration organized by a new government and other forms of institutional support may merit support from the development fund.

—Another requirement will probably be to provide job security and benefits for those civil servants willing to stay and contribute their skills. The Zimbabwe government would be expected to honor existing arrangements for employee benefits, including pensions. General support provided by the Zimbabwe Development Fund should enable the Zimbabwe government to meet the expenses of job security and benefit programs associated with a restructuring of the civil service.

Agriculture and Land Reform

In Rhodesia there are parallel modern and traditional agricultural sectors. The new government will undoubtedly revise the Land Tenure Act of 1969 with a view to a more balanced and more economic allocation of land, while sustaining production in the modern sector and improving productivity in the traditional.

The fund might want to support government programs to increase productivity in the tribal trust lands and the African purchase areas. These lands presently constitute about 45 percent of the area in Rhodesia. They are often dry, endowed with poor soils, over-populated, far from major markets, serviced by inadequate transport links and farmed without modern techniques. Government programs can be envisaged to improve farm practice and technologies; to expand and invigorate extension services; organize the distribution of seed, fertilizer and pesticides; improve transport and marketing facilities; and intensify agricultural research.

—The Zimbabwe government will also want to increase the land area farmed by Africans. The 45 percent of the area now reserved for Europeans is much more sparsely settled and not cultivated or grazed as intensively as the tribal trust lands. This should provide opportunities for resettlement. A critical problem to be faced by the new government will be to enhance opportunities for African farmers to acquire and use land in areas formerly reserved for Europeans while at the same time production, exports, and internal revenue derived from the agricultural sector are kept resilient.

—The transition to a new ownership structure of land could take a number of different forms. For example, African farmer opportunities could be enhanced through resettlement schemes in which large areas were purchased, subdivided, and reallocated to African farmers. Resettlement schemes of this sort might be accompanied by infrastructure projects for new access roads, villages, health, education and other so-
cial services; new agricultural processing facilities; and purchase and production loans for new African farmers.

—Another way for Africans to be given enhanced opportunities is through government-financed mortgage schemes in which Africans are given loans to purchase farms in areas now reserved for Europeans. There may be a variety of schemes proposed to effect an orderly process of land transfer and the Zimbabwe Development Fund should be prepared to support a number of them. Projects supported by the fund, of course, would be evaluated in terms of their contribution to economic development and would be expected to provide opportunities for existing owners of farm assets to sell at fair valuation.

Commerce, Industry and Mining

—Manufacturing, mining, modern commerce and a range of modern service sectors employ over half a million African Zimbabweans and generate over 80 percent of recorded GNP. The growth of these sectors is essential to provide employment opportunities and increased income potential for Africans.

—The Zimbabwe Development Fund might want to support projects for training of African managers and technical staff; technical advice and support services for African-owned small businesses; and loans to African individuals to purchase existing business establishments.

—A substantial portion of the investment needed in modern industry, mining, and commerce, however, is likely to be provided by foreign private capital. The Zimbabwe Development Fund, at the request of the Zimbabwe government, could work with public agencies and private sector groups to facilitate the flow of private capital to an independent Zimbabwe. For example, the fund might work closely with the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank group and the Berne Union Association of Public Agencies that provide export credits, guarantees and investment insurance.

Education and Training

—Historically, immigration has been the primary source of semi-skilled and managerial labor. Majority rule should bring a large expansion of opportunities for African Zimbabweans in skilled and managerial posts, particularly in the public sector but also in private industry. There are, however, many African Zimbabweans with university degrees who reside out of the country and who may be expected to return home after a settlement. Nevertheless, lack of skilled labor is viewed by many Rhodesians as the primary constraint on rapid economic growth. This constraint could be intensified as the country moves toward majority rule.

—Redressing the imbalance in the formal educational system is likely to be a priority concern of the new Zimbabwe government. Sup-
port from the Zimbabwe Development Fund may be requested to help redress imbalances in pupil/teacher ratios and in the quality of and facilities for instruction. Support may be requested for a reorientation of the system to give more emphasis to priority areas such as agricultural, vocational and technical skills training.

—Informal training might also be strengthened. For example, incentives for on-the-job training and apprentice programs could be supported by the government through taxes or direct subsidy.

—The international community could move rapidly to support programs in education and training after the Zimbabwe Development Fund is established. Initial efforts may have to concentrate on a crash program of training in public administration and management.

Social and Economic Infrastructure

—Social infrastructure programs are likely to receive considerable attention by an independent Zimbabwe government. For example, there will probably be emphasis on expanding health and nutrition programs for Africans in both rural and urban areas. Community centers and adult education facilities may be expanded.

—Another area of importance will be housing. Government-sponsored programs of low cost housing and site and services projects may merit support by the Zimbabwe Development Fund.

—As Zimbabwe moves toward independence, Embassies will be established, foreign business firms will seek opportunities for investment, and technicians and representatives of international agencies may come to Zimbabwe. This may increase sharply the demand for residential housing, despite fears of some that housing values would be threatened by a transition to majority rule. In order to enable Zimbabwe Africans to have access on reasonable terms to housing in residential areas now exclusively occupied by Europeans and to preserve a stable and orderly housing market, various government programs may be required. This might include a facility to provide home mortgages for Africans. The facility might also provide opportunities for home owners to sell, on a basis of valuation to be determined, during a transition period.

The maintenance and continued development of Rhodesian economic infrastructure is vital to the country’s economy and critical to the economies of neighboring countries. It will be particularly important to assess the current structure in terms of the economy after transition. Previous imbalance may suggest new trunk road development, for example, but will certainly suggest major investment in feeder roads, rural electrification and village water supplies. The requirements associated with agricultural settlement will be particularly important and immediate.
With regard to the transport structure, it may be necessary to import new supplies of rail and road equipment and spare parts. The lifting of economic sanctions should allow Zimbabwe to reestablish import and export routes now closed, in particular through Mozambique to Beira. Development efforts may be directed at enhancing capacity to use these.

International Finance

During the period 1968 to 1974, the Rhodesian economy was remarkably strong. Real GNP grew at an annual rate of 8.3 percent. Inflation was held to under 4 percent per year. While there has been greater inflation and little or no growth in the last two years, the growth potential of the economy continues to exist. Assuming transition to majority rule will bring a reopening of Zimbabwe’s borders, without major dislocation, a return to a high growth pattern seems likely. Opening of the borders should stimulate the economy through easier and cheaper transportation and the opening of potential export markets for her new consumer and intermediate and capital goods industries.

Although domestic saving rates have been exceptional, foreign exchange availabilities have been limited because of sanctions. With the lifting of sanctions, demands will be made for the input of foreign capital and resumption of normal remittances. The provision of substantial concessional assistance by the fund could assist the Zimbabwe government in restoring a more normal international payments and trading regime, thereby enabling it to take full advantage of the lifting of sanctions and the restoration of economic relations with the rest of the world and to honor its international financial obligations.

The measures described earlier in this annex should themselves provide a large measure of economic improvement and security for the African communities. It will be no less important for the fund to take into account the balance of payments implication of such measures designed by the Zimbabwe government to encourage skilled elements of the population to remain in an independent Zimbabwe to help to sustain and expand the economy. In particular, the restoration of a more normal international payments and trading regime would itself permit the government to maintain an appropriate foreign exchange remittance facility. Thus, the experienced farmer or worker who had decided in the light of the measures proposed, to remain in the country for a number of years should be able to do so in the confidence that if he eventually decided to depart, his savings could be remitted abroad at least over a specified period.

End text of Annex 2.

End confidential.

Kissinger
235. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 21, 1976, 1:35–3:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

UK:
Ivor Richard, UK Permanent Representative to the UN and Chairman of Geneva Conference on Rhodesia
Dennis Grennan, Adviser on Rhodesia, FCO
William Squire, Counselor, British Embassy
Richard J.S. Muir, First Secretary, British Embassy

US:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Charles W. Robinson, Deputy Secretary of State
Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Amb. John E. Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

Southern Africa

[The Secretary and Mr. Richard exchanged small talk about football—European and American—over cocktails, and moved to luncheon at 1:40. Discussion about football continued.]

Kissinger: How should we conduct this discussion, Ivor?
Richard: I should lead off.
Kissinger: You should?
Richard: You should.
Kissinger: But you’re going on the trip!
Grennan: Oh, we took enormous care.
Kissinger: We thought it was substantially the same as the earlier paper.
Richard: The voting mechanism now gives them a blocking third.
Schaufele: Unless the Resident Commissioner votes with the others.
Richard: If it’s a special thing, there will then be 31 people entitled to vote, and it will take 21 votes to carry. If he doesn’t vote, it will take 10 votes to block it.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 346, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, November 1976–January 1977. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The luncheon meeting was held in the Monroe-Madison Room at the Department of State. Brackets are in the original.

² Not further identified.
We’ve also looked at the way the Resident Commissioner will preside and not preside, to make it nearer to the Council of State. Also, the right to call for a special vote.

There is one gap—to deal with economic side, the assurances—to make them the subject of a special vote. So they can have a blocking vote on things like nationalization with compensation, major changes in land tenure.

Reinhardt: Unless the Resident Commissioner votes with the black side.

Kissinger: Or some whites.

Richard: I don’t see how you can have ten members of the Rhodesian Front.

Reinhardt: Can you check them with the Rhodesian Front?

Grennan: We also have to think of an independent Zimbabwe. There are a lot of whites who will want to stay, and non-Front people. We will have to think of some way for them to be represented.

Kissinger: You are assuming no Rhodesian Front people will stay?

Grennan: No, but they [the others] should have some representation.

Kissinger: But the question Jack asked is whether some should be checked with the Rhodesian Front.

Richard: Checked, but no veto.

Grennan: The people from the Rhodesia Party are 18% of the vote.

Kissinger: How would they vote?

Grennan: The Rhodesia Party’s view is the blacks should have the politics and the whites should have the privilege, to put it crudely. So they’d likely vote with the Front.

Kissinger: Let me ask. Full independence will come the 1st of March 1978. You can’t get it set up by the end of February 1977.

Richard: We can’t. We’ll need five or six weeks to get the necessary legislation passed.

Kissinger: I think you’ll take longer in Africa than you think?

Richard: I think so.

Kissinger: So you won’t reassemble until after our inauguration. Assuming everything went splendidly in Africa—which would be an historic first—[laughter] you’re setting up this cumbersome thing. You won’t get it set up until April.

Richard: That’s the date set now. But we may or may not be able to get it into ten or eleven months. They’ll have elections.

Why do you say the machinery will be cumbersome?

Kissinger: You’ll have to replace the Chiefs of Staff . . .
Richard: That won’t take long. They will be all lined up first. It won’t be so hard to set up the Council of Ministers, the Advisory Council, and National Security Council.

Grennan: I think the 1st of March date is unrealistic. We’re running into lots of problems. There will be a great deal of horse-trading, politics, which will be of critical importance.

Richard: You find the structure unwieldy, unbalanced?

Kissinger: Let me explain what our problems are—which we approach from the point of view of being helpful, as facing a common problem. It may sound strange coming from me, but I feel we have a point of honor here. We’ve had occasions in the past when we made a promise to someone and were not able to carry it out because circumstances prevented it. But I’ve never actually made a promise and never tried to carry it out.

I told them I’d never push them beyond Annex C. Maybe I shouldn’t have, but Annex C seemed so compatible with what the Africans were willing to accept. Even the five points. Nyerere, Kaunda— and even Nkomo. They wanted a little adjustment here, a little adjustment there. Maybe one instead of two ministers.

It disintegrated for many reasons, including the disunity of the Africans.

This is why it will be hard to go back to the South Africans and claim we tried Annex C.

Richard: Why? We were trying to sell Annex C in all our bilateral conversations.

Kissinger: Well … The second problem is what will happen to your plan even if it is accepted. Will it create an Angola-type situation? Will it require such massive pressure that there will be a white exodus? This isn’t a criticism of your plan.

Grennan: It depends, first, on the willingness of the four Presidents, whether they will support it. Second, and perhaps more important, is one’s estimate of ZIPA. I just don’t believe Chona’s analysis that they’ve got 4–5,000 well-trained men and only 1,000 will go back.

Richard: They are school children and will go back to school.

Grennan: They’re not the MPLA, who have been fighting for ten years.

Squire: Are they battle-hardened Marxists really, the negotiators at Geneva?

Richard: I see your Angolan point. But it all depends on the four Presidents. Either you’re saying they will agree to something they won’t enforce …

Kissinger: It won’t be the first time.
Richard: If you don’t get their full backing, nothing will work. If you do get their backing, there will have to be fairly cast-iron guarantees on both sides.

Kissinger: What is your plan of procedure? I see you helpfully wrote our talking points for the South Africans.°

Richard: You asked us to!

Kissinger: But what will you tell the black Presidents?

Richard: I’ll tell them the nationalists need reassurance that the process will be irreversible, that the whites need reassurance that it will be orderly. That we see no way to do this without a British presence, with a Resident Commissioner in charge of drafting of the constitution, etc., that he will hold the balance of power between the two sides. I don’t see how they can object since it is what they’ve been asking us for years.

Kissinger: [laughs:] On my first trip to Africa, Nyerere said “Just get Smith to declare for majority rule—the Callaghan transition, two years.”

Schaufele: Or more.

Kissinger: Or more! Now they’ve got 500% more.

Richard: But they still think Smith isn’t committed to it. When Smith steps out and says “The only purpose of this Conference is to choose the Council of State.” That’s ridiculous.

Kissinger: We told him not to submit Annex C because it would be rejected.

Richard: Sure. But they genuinely don’t believe he’s committed to it.

Kissinger: Is this true, or a tactic?

Grennan: I think it’s true.

Richard: I think it’s true.

Kissinger: [to Reinhardt:] Is it?

Reinhardt: It’s probably true.

Kissinger: We went through the same on Namibia. We got 1000% of what they asked.

Richard: They told me they want a commitment to majority rule—an irreversible transfer of power—if not one man one vote. We presented this to Smith and Smith said fine. We got our lawyers to draft something like this. We presented this to Smith and Smith rejected it, and said the only purpose of the Conference is to name the Council of State. There was no attempt at all to bridge the gap.

° Not further identified.
You feel he’s been misled. I fear that we and you have been misled because he’s not really interested in majority rule within two years. Because he’s done damn all for it.

Grennan: He goes back to Rhodesia and winks at his supporters and says “We’ll try this but in the interim we get sanctions lifted, and arms.”

Kissinger: In Pretoria, I thought he acted for nine hours as a man who knew his days were numbered, and who wanted to get the best transition possible.

Richard: Then why did he act as he did in Geneva?

Kissinger: I can’t say. He felt two years was too short. When the first issue, which was unambiguously stated—the Callaghan plan, two years—slipped off, he probably figured everything he agreed to would slip away.

Grennan: This is the way he always acts. He slips off a hook and you have to get him on another.

Kissinger: Suppose the Africans say they don’t accept this?

Richard: It depends on what grounds.

Kissinger: They don’t want a blocking veto.

Richard: We’ll say a veto for the British Commissioner.

Kissinger: Suppose they say they want majority rule now?

Richard: They can’t have it. We’re not prepared to give majority rule until after elections. We’re prepared to transfer power now away from the Rhodesian Front to a British Commissioner.

Kissinger: In Pretoria—unless he and his men are the greatest actors—they acted as people whose structure was broken.

Robinson: But we’ve now weakened the interim government to the point where it’s no assurance.

Richard: The British Commissioner is there.

Kissinger: But, to put it crudely, that depends on how they see the British Commissioner. If they see it just as another black vote . . .

Richard: They’ll have to bite that bullet.

Grennan: They have to face the reality.

Squire: It’s a matter of Ivor Richard. If Lord Home were in the Foreign Office, they’d like it better.

Kissinger: True.

Richard: But there is no likelihood that will happen for some time!

Grennan: They are going around telling people: “Don’t worry. It will all come out right. We’ll get the sanctions lifted.” That’s not good faith.
Kissinger: It is not the first time a political leader sells a program to his people—to keep them calm—with arguments that wouldn’t be too attractive to blacks.

Richard: I understand that. But he accepted majority rule, genuinely or not.

Kissinger: He understands that he accepted it under duress.

Richard: All right. He now would want to create the maximum orderly transition. So, he could respond to one proposal with proposals of his own. The original wasn’t acceptable.

Kissinger: Whether or not it was a Cabinet paper! We’ll give you more support than you gave to your own paper!

If I had stayed there, if I had to do it over again, I would have got the frontline Presidents signed up. Maybe not the nationalists. But they told us this was what they wanted. We’re doing the same on Namibia now.

Richard: If he genuinely wants it, he should come forward with alternative proposals for the same result.

Kissinger: You’ll go to the frontline Presidents first.

Richard: Two of them.

Kissinger: You’re seeing Botha tonight. What will you say?

Richard: That those proposals were drawn up as a substitute for a British presence. You remember how it was drawn up. So it’s clearly a change.

Kissinger: My advice is to show this to the South Africans—not to the Rhodesians. Our intelligence is that they didn’t show the five points to the Rhodesians for some time. If you go around Africa without telling the South Africans what bill they’ll be presented with, you’d face insuperable obstacles.

Richard: We thought you would present it to the South Africans.

Schaufele: [to Richard:] I was at Geneva with you. I saw some pitfalls in your approach. He was prepared for majority rule in two years. Then, the issue that was undisputed was watered down.

Richard: That’s a debating point, but I really don’t think there is any substance in it.

Kissinger: Why not?

Richard: We gave nothing away. The date doesn’t mean anything because it’s agreed that the constitutional processes have to be finished.

Kissinger: What if the blacks kick out the Resident Commissioner?

Richard: We won’t give independence. We don’t have to sanction it.

Kissinger: But the reality is at some point you will sanction it.
Squire: The risk is there. The blacks can cheat and so can the whites.

Grennan: ZIPA isn’t such a problem.

Kissinger: Then why should Smith negotiate?

Grennan: Because he’ll lose in the long run.

Squire: Like with the Israelis, casualties for them are serious.

Kissinger: But the Israelis don’t think they’ll lose.

Richard: You asked him if his situation would be any better in six months. That’s still true.

Kissinger: The South Africans certainly saw it this way. Their pressure was the decisive factor. But the might decide this is a game they don’t want to play again. We don’t give a damn about Rhodesia. The only reason we got into it is to set a pattern for the rest of Africa.

Richard: You still can do that. There are a lot of moderates sitting around who can take over Rhodesia.

Kissinger: When will you present your plan to the South Africans?

Richard: Not today.

Kissinger: When will it be presented?

Richard: It can be done through David Scott in Pretoria. Shortly after you.

Kissinger: Or shortly before us.

Richard: We’re perfectly prepared to do it before you!

Squire: As long as we get US support.

Kissinger: We’ll give you as much as your High Commissioners gave to us!

Squire: That’s not enough! [Laughter]

Richard: Today with Botha I can lift the veil a bit.

Kissinger: I don’t care whether you do it through Scott in South Africa or through Botha here. The advantage of doing it here is you can explain it better than Scott can. I thought Scott was excellent; this is no reflection on him. We were worried about how to instruct our Ambassadors following you around. We despaired of explaining to our Ambassadors all the aspects. So we might send Edmondson.

Richard: No problem. There is no room on the plane unfortunately, because it’s a small plane.

Kissinger: A small plane or a large party?

Richard: A small plane!

Kissinger: We won’t tell the Rhodesians what not to accept. You can tell the South Africans we support it. Whether we’d be prepared to impose sanctions is another matter. If there is any trouble with the
South Africans, I don’t want it said we didn’t present the plan properly. So I think it should be presented by the authors.

Richard: All right!

Kissinger: I don’t think the South Africans should be asked to press it on the Rhodesians now. The best argument is what Michael Palliser said, that it will certainly be worse without this. The considerations we had in September haven’t really changed.

Schaufele: When will you have your exact itinerary?

Richard: I’ll know when I get back to London next week.

Kissinger: We’ll have to charter a plane for Edmondson.

Schaufele: Not every place.

Kissinger: [to Richard:] We’ll make sure it’s a smaller plane than yours. [Laughter]

Squire: Suppose Ivor were to talk to the South African today on the basis of the talking points you’ve seen. When would you be prepared to follow up?

Kissinger: Friday. 4 I’ll be out of town tomorrow. Then you can’t be accused of running off with consulting them.

I predict they’ll neither accept it nor reject it.

Richard: They’ll send it back to Vorster and think about it.

Kissinger: When did you think of getting to South Africa?

Richard: The 9th or 10th. Not with a paper, just ideas.

Reinhardt: At any time will you leave a paper?

Richard: The second time around.

Reinhardt: Will you see the nationalists?

Kissinger: Where will you find them?

Grennan: They have all indicated they want to see him.

Schaufele: I think it’s very important that you not get into the position where you’re talking about the least that the Africans will accept. You have to leave some maneuvering room.

Reinhardt: There is this four Presidents’ meeting next week.

Kissinger: Will you go there before?

Richard: They want me to.

Kissinger: Are you going to?

Richard: No. They’ll just knock it down. I was thinking of going there while the Presidents were meeting.

Kissinger: It’s risky. When is that meeting?

Grennan: Between Christmas and Ivor’s arrival.

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4 December 24.
Richard: It would be quite monstrous if in the end the Patriotic Front came out in top when the Bishop has the votes. There is no question the Bishop has the votes.

Grennan: This is how Chona is talking. They’re wrong.

Kissinger: Kaunda wants Nkomo. Why does Nkomo deal with Mugabe then? One thing I’ve learned is they usually know how to take care of their own survival.

Grennan: He hasn’t got any guerrillas of his own. And it’s a misreading of the situation.

Richard: One result of the date row was that Mugabe’s position was weakened. He said he had to go back to Mozambique to get “new instructions.”

Kissinger: Isn’t Nkomo in Saudi Arabia?

Grennan: He’ll be back. We’ll have to go to Mozambique. They will never meet except together.

Kissinger: Kaunda could probably produce him in one of his back rooms.

The problem is how the black leaders will see this. Whether it looks like our final position, or whether it will be another Annex C.

Grennan: They never saw Annex C, did they?

Kissinger: But I thought that on every mission we talked the substance of Annex C.

Grennan: The substance. That’s right.

Richard: Smith told me several times he had never seen the text of Annex C until after he left Pretoria.

Kissinger: That’s technically correct.

We told him the five points were a summary of the paper, and it was a joint paper between you and us that we would stand behind. He went back to Salisbury and left his man there for a day to work on the economic paper. We gave it to him that evening. So Smith got it by Monday morning, before his caucus meeting. He never said “I’ve read Annex C and it’s unacceptable.”

He wanted those two Ministers and the white chairman. After talking to Nyerere, I figured Smith should put it in rather than surface it later when it would look like a secret deal. Nyerere looked at it and said, “It’s a miracle. You’ve done it. It’s over!” [Laughter]

So I cabled Smith that in my opinion he could put it in. I didn’t say we’d back it; I didn’t say Nyerere had accepted it. Kaunda was anguishied and had some problems but on things like the ministers. Nothing major.

Richard: One other question that has cropped up. Smith tried to get you to say “responsible” majority rule. He said you agreed.
Kissinger: That’s not correct. I don’t even think I said it to Smith.
Schaufele: I think you did.
Kissinger: I must have.
Richard: I asked Van der Byl: How many white voters are there?
He said 90,000. I said “You can’t enfranchise 100,000 blacks and call it
majority rule.” He said “what about 150,000?” This is how he’s
thinking.
Kissinger: How many would Annex B enfranchise? 5
Richard: Oh, three million.
Kissinger: I may have said it wouldn’t be more than Nkomo’s plan.
But no further.
Are you going to Salisbury?
Richard: Yes, before Pretoria.
Kissinger: Before?
Grennan: We wanted the South Africans’ advice on this. At this
moment they’ve suggested this. Because of the Christmas holidays.
Kissinger: But I think it’s a lot better to let the South Africans
present it to Smith, or prepare Smith.
Richard: Some softening-up process would be good.
Squire: This is where we would want Pik Botha’s views.
Do I understand it: On the first round what you said to Smith was
critical, after talking to the South Africans. On this round, should we
put it to Smith?
Kissinger: No, we didn’t deal with Smith. I refused to talk to him
until the South Africans had prepared him.
Richard: You’ll put this to the South Africans and urge them to
support this?
Kissinger: Yes. But I wouldn’t talk to Smith first. Tactically I think
you’re better off seeing the South Africans first.
Richard: I’d like to see Smith. I’d also like to see the Bishop in
Salisbury.
Squire: [to Richard:] You’ll have a free day before Salisbury to
allow a South African input.
Richard: Yes.
Kissinger: Are you going to Gabarone?
Grennan: Yes. Maybe Joshua will come there.
Kissinger: I think Kaunda, if you put it to him, will produce
Nkomo.

5 Annex B of the British paper given to Kissinger in September concerned proposals
Grennan: Yes. But we don’t want early on to give the impression we’re trying to split him from Mugabe.

Richard: I saw Joshua alone, between us, about four times in Geneva. On the whole, you’re a lot better off seeing him alone; he’s reasonable.

Kissinger: The Africans have impressed me with their cold-blooded appreciation of power. I wouldn’t assume he’s made a mistake; I’d ask what it is that makes him think it’s in his interest.

Grennan: He assumes he can control Mugabe. That’s I think his mistake.

Kissinger: That I agree.

You will brief Edmondson?

Richard: Yes, every day. We’ll show him everything.

Kissinger: You’ll see Cy Vance?

Richard: Yes, tomorrow.

Kissinger: He may not want to take a position. We didn’t have these papers when he was in town.

Richard: But he can see them as far as we’re concerned.

I saw Andy Young.

Kissinger: How is he?

Richard: Fine, but he will have problems. As soon as he gets instructions to veto Chapter VII sanctions, as he sure as hell will, it will be a problem.

Kissinger: I wouldn’t say he “sure as hell will.”

Grennan: [laughs] From HMG’s point of view, he’d better.

Richard: I’ll tell him the new element is to inject a British presence.

Squire: Ivor, did you want to ask the Secretary about public guidance?

Richard: I think it should be much the same as you and Crosland said in London.

Kissinger: And you gave me your impressions on your trip.

Squire: And when he sees Cy Vance, would it help to talk about continuity of policy?

Kissinger: You’d have to ask him. I have no objection whatever.

Richard: It would be very helpful.

Squire: It would help allay some suspicions.

Kissinger: I have no problem with that.

[The luncheon broke up. At Amb. Richard’s request the Secretary autographed and inscribed a copy of World Restored.]
236. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 24, 1976, 8:35–10:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador R.F. Botha, South African Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

Kissinger: Where are you going to spend Christmas? Here in town?
Botha: Yes. My mother is here in town.
Kissinger: Really? What does she think of this heathen country?
Botha: She thinks it’s big.
Kissinger: So is South Africa.
Botha: But the dimensions seem greater.
Botha: I spoke to my Prime Minister the day before yesterday. He sends his regards.
Kissinger: Yes.
Botha: And Brand Fourie also.
Kissinger: When you speak to both of them, give them my best wishes for the New Year.
Botha: Thank you.
Kissinger: Did Richard present his ideas?
Botha: Yes. He wants to see my Prime Minister. My Prime Minister will see him on January 3. But he’ll have to go down there.
Kissinger: To the Transkei. [Laughter]
Botha: The way he put it to me, I must say, wasn’t as bad as I thought it would be.

Kissinger: Let me tell you the history of it. They had something which was as bad as it could be. Then we sent Reinhardt, Wisner and Edmondson there to work on it.

It’s now as far as I think we can push them.

A lot depends on what the British Resident Commissioner will in fact do. Whatever they call it.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 346, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, November 1976-January 1977. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The breakfast meeting was held in the Monroe-Madison Room at the Department of State. Brackets are in the original.
Rodman: Interim Commissioner.

Kissinger: Is that what you understood? If the Resident Commissioner votes with the whites, there is a blocking vote.

Botha: I asked him where the power would be. He said: Although we can’t say it publicly, it’s this guy.

Kissinger: It’s more or less true. First, these Ministers will be a mess. Each delegation picks four. In the plan they gave us, the judiciary and civil service stay in place, and the military, except for some senior officers. It votes by majority, except when someone asks for a special vote. Any of the communities, or the Resident Commissioner, can ask for one.

Botha: Who can call for it?

Kissinger: Any of the communities. When there is a special vote, the council becomes 31. So the Resident Commissioner, by abstaining or voting with the whites, can block it.

Botha: This is far worse.

Kissinger: Than the Council of State, which no longer exists.

Botha: But the Council of Ministers.

Kissinger: That required a two-thirds vote. Theoretically, the whites could block it.

Botha: He didn’t give me these details. [Laughter]

Kissinger: What did he give you? I don’t believe in playing around.

Botha: He said there was a blocking third. He didn’t tell me they have it only when the Commissioner votes with you.

Kissinger: He said theirs could be five members of the Rhodesian Front. Then the Resident Commissioner appoints five more whites. First it was required that they be non-Rhodesian Front. We protested this, and now it’s three Rhodesian Front. So it depends on whether the whites stick together.

Botha: They won’t. If they pick people like Todd, they’ll vote with the blacks, with the powers that will be.

Kissinger: This is how they presented it. On the basis that the non-Rhodesian Front got 20 percent of the vote.

Don’t go back to Richard with these.

Botha: I won’t be seeing him.

Kissinger: Then there is the National Security Council, composed of five ministers who represent the five delegations in Geneva, plus the Resident Commissioner, plus the three Chiefs of Staff. They’ll be British. They would proceed by majority. Here the whites have a blocking majority.

Botha: How?
Kissinger: There are three Britishers—the Chiefs of Staff—plus the Resident Commissioner, plus the Rhodesian Front man. Five to four.
Botha: Do you count him? Just because his skin is white?
Kissinger: That’s how they present it.
Botha: These Chiefs of Staff . . .
Kissinger: . . . will vote with the Resident Commissioner.
Botha: Sure. Did we define who these chiefs of law and order will be [in the Five Points]?
Kissinger: No, we never did. We just said they had to be European. This is 300 percent better than what they presented. They wanted the Chiefs of Staff to be from the Commonwealth, with one Indian, one Nigerian, and one Canadian.
Botha: It would have been useless.
Kissinger: Now they can be British.
Botha: This would be the body with the power.
Kissinger: Defense and law and order.
Botha: That’s all?
Kissinger: Yes.
Sanctions would be lifted and the guerrilla war would end. That’s still in the plan. And the Army wouldn’t return to Rhodesia in the interim period.
Schaufele: They would be demobilized and go back to school.
Botha: They can’t return to Rhodesia.
Kissinger: No, not in the interim period. That’s the whole point of the scheme.
Botha: Formerly, the Council of State had the power.
Kissinger: Now it’s the Council of Ministers. There are reserved powers—law and order, defense and foreign affairs, and the constitution.
Botha: How is the constitution drafted?
Schaufele: A Constitutional Committee will be named by the Resident Commissioner after consultation with the parties.
Botha: And a referendum.
Kissinger: The British insist on this. Given the African propensity for free elections . . . [Laughter]
Botha: The smaller factions know they can’t win. They’ll fight any concept based on one man one vote.
Kissinger: The Rhodesians too.
Botha: Not if they’re sincere in accepting majority rule, if they know the man they want, Muzorewa, will win. They’ll side with Muzorewa.
Kissinger: We won’t quarrel with that.
Botha: The question is if it busts half way.

Kissinger: That’s right. I told Richard—contrary to the public mythology, I believe in telling everyone the same thing—that I was concerned about two things. One, we had given our word on Annex C, and in eight years in public office I’d never broken my word. Second, we were afraid if it broke down, it would be an Angola-type situation.

He said he had tried Annex C in bilateral talks and failed. And he’s of the view it couldn’t be resurrected. This is the view of Frank Wisner also. Wisner believes if the British had gone immediately to the heart of the problem and avoided the date issue, Annex C could have been accepted. But he believes that it now can’t be accepted.

As for an Angola situation, Richard believes it could break down. He says, with respect to the former, he’s done all he can. With respect to the latter, he says he’ll get ironclad assurance from the Presidents that there will be no factional strife.²

Schaufele: And that is pretty deeply imbedded in the British attitude.

Botha: Mr. Secretary, we have one major problem as I see it. I have not given this to my Prime Minister. I was afraid he would refuse to see him. I couldn’t tell him telephonically. I told him “just listen to it.”

Kissinger: That’s the best thing.

Botha: The problem is: Smith was on the point of accepting Annex C at Geneva.

Kissinger: Look, Geneva was massively mismanaged. I don’t know why they picked the one issue that was never ambiguous and never challenged.

Botha: He said to me—Richard—the blacks are suspicious of Smith, because he always says things that alarm them.

Kissinger: It’s probably true.

Botha: And that he doesn’t really intend to do it.

Kissinger: They got hold of a document that has him saying to his caucus: Just go through this for two years, then we’ll have a new UDI. If he said that, he’s a fool.

Botha: We were prepared to act not as witness but as . . .

Kissinger: . . . guarantor. I don’t believe Vorster would go as far as he did and not hold him to it.

Botha: We would have made him go through with it.

² See Document 235.
But we’ve now been robbed; he can now tell us this was the agreement.

Kissinger: You have to make your decision on the basis that this is the best that can be achieved. And that is the basis of what Smith should decide. This isn’t a debating course in high school.

Botha: What do you see as the basis?

Kissinger: I told Richard we would give support, but no pressure, for this plan.

The basis is: The whites plus the Resident Commissioner have a blocking vote. And a majority on the National Security Council. Law and order can also be taken care of by splitting the ministries between them.

As late as early November, the blacks in my view would have settled for a British chairman of the Council of State and splitting the ministries. With some consultative mechanism.

Schaufele: Yes.

Kissinger: But then the British weren’t ready for a role, and they raised the issue of the date.

Botha: So the basis is there is no better alternative.

Kissinger: Right.

Botha: But he can say this isn’t what was agreed.

Kissinger: But what are Smith’s alternatives?

Botha: Mr. Secretary, they don’t believe us.

Kissinger: They believe they can win.

Botha: They believe they can withstand any black onslaught. They have 20,000 men in reserve, which they haven’t touched yet. They think they can do it unless there is massive Soviet-Cuban intervention. Which they think is unlikely, or that you would intervene.

Kissinger: If I were here, yes, but I wouldn’t count on it with my successors.

I sent scorching letters to Kaunda and Nyerere. Which probably I shouldn’t have—because it made me the villain.

They now don’t want to convene while I am in office.

But it had some good. Kaunda sent Chona to me, with some weepy ideas.

Botha: Like what?

Kissinger: That’s when they came up with this idea of keeping the judiciary and civil service in place, and keeping the guerrillas out.

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3 See Document 228.
4 See footnote 4, Document 232.
Botha: They gave you this in writing?
Kissinger: No, orally.
Botha: He came to Washington?
Kissinger: No, London.
Botha: I’ll be going back to South Africa next week. I’ll be seeing Mr. Vance on Thursday. I had a lot of trouble getting to him. I told him you had said no objection, and I’d be going back to South Africa and my Prime Minister would be asking me if I’d seen him. So he said all right.

So, as far as you know, it’s part of the plan to retain the civil service and the judiciary unaltered.
Kissinger: Yes.
Schaufele: And the economic system.
Kissinger: Those are additions we managed to get into the plan.
Botha: May I ask: Can’t we call this National Security Council by another name, or give it additional powers?
Kissinger: You can have ideas of your own.
Botha: Because I’d like to get it back as far as possible to Annex C.
Kissinger: That’s been my intention.
Botha: Because he’ll tell us he was willing to cooperate on the basis of Annex C. If we can now tell him: the Council of Ministers is the same; the judiciary and civil service are in place. So we’re as well off, or better.

I think Ivor or the man with him . . .
Schaufele: Dennis Grennan.
Botha: . . . said the Chiefs of Staff could also be Rhodesian.
Kissinger: I don’t know.
Botha: Or they could be seconded.
Kissinger: Yes.
Botha: So the Rhodesians would pay them.
Kissinger: That I don’t know.
Botha: I told Ivor we had to make it look like Annex C, not like a new plan.
Schaufele: I heard on the radio that Smith has already rejected the “four alternatives” he [Richard] announced in his press conference.5
Kissinger: He spoke too damn much.

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5 Richard held a press conference in Washington on December 22 during which he outlined alternatives for administering the defense and justice ministries in the interim government. (“Briton Lists Rhodesia Alternatives,” The New York Times, December 23, 1976, p. 3)
Schaufele: I have to say, Pik, about this National Security Council, given the British unwillingness to have the troops there, and their love of law and order, they’ll be more objective on the National Security Council than elsewhere.

Kissinger: I agree with Bill on that. They’ll play around perhaps on political issues.

Botha: He said there would be assurances against factional strife?

Kissinger: Yes.

Botha: They don’t have the power.

Kissinger: Don’t you think Nkomo, Sithole, Muzorewa and Mugabe will sit down together? [Laughter]

Botha: They’ll be after each other, bribing and fighting.

Kissinger: Really? [Laughter] Don’t they just want what is the best for their people?

Botha: My Prime Minister will say it’s a new Angola situation.

Kissinger: I’ve come reluctantly to the conclusion this is the best that can be gotten. Any more will make us the fall guy and not change the plan.

Botha: He’ll say to my Prime Minister: You told me you wouldn’t push us beyond Annex C. We’ve kept saying it.

Kissinger: Then he’ll have to fight. And against us too.

He’s obviously briefed Clark and Diggs.

Botha: Can I tell my Prime Minister you would have stuck to Annex C?

Kissinger: Yes. But that’s not the issue. If I were still in office, I would have taken over the negotiation.

Botha: If Mr. Ford had won, you’d have pushed Annex C.

Kissinger: We did anyway. I’ll show you the letter I wrote to Kaunda.

Botha: What do they say when you say this was the basis?

Kissinger: They evade it. They say it was all on the assumption that Smith would be overthrown. Which I never told them.

Schaufele: Richard says there is no assurance of irreversibility with Smith there.

Kissinger: Let’s go down to my office and I’ll show you my letters to Kaunda.

Botha: May I ask you, Mr. Secretary? Ivor told me they never were committed to it.

Kissinger: Bullshit. Excuse me.

Botha: I said really? Ivor said: You’re putting me in a difficult position. His man, Squire then answered. He said they weren’t carrying the
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ball then. I said: You mean you never consulted with the Americans? Ivor said yes, we and the Americans developed it, but it always had on top of it: “Paper for discussion.”

Schaufele: They’re still saying it.

Kissinger: When I went to Zurich, I stopped in London and they gave us this paper. I gave it verbatim to your Prime Minister. Even the spelling was British.

Botha: That’s right.

Kissinger: Your Prime Minister had some comments on it and I went back to London. I met in the Cabinet Room with Callaghan and Crosland. They had problems which I immediately transferred to you. They wanted equality on the Council of State. We ended up with that and with a black majority on the Council of Ministers.

It’s a totally dishonorable procedure. I am willing to go along with the idea that, however we got here, it’s no longer possible to negotiate Annex C.

Botha: That’s another question.

Kissinger: That’s right. But they can’t now claim they had nothing to do with it.

I am not amused by what the British are saying.

I want to show you my letters. So you know we made a massive effort.

[The Secretary took Ambassador Botha to his office where they conferred alone from 9:42 to 10:20 a.m. The Secretary showed Botha his letters of December 6 to Nyerere and Kaunda and their replies. The meeting then ended.]

237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia

Washington, January 7, 1977, 0220Z.

3466. Lusaka for Ambassador only, Dar for Edmondson only. Subject: Message to President Kaunda.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Niacl Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Wisner, cleared by Schaufele, and approved by Kissinger. Repeated Immediate to Dar es Salaam.
1. Please pass the following message from the Secretary to President Kaunda.2

2. “Dear Mr. President: I have been in frequent communication with the British Government and have followed closely Ambassador Ivor Richard’s mission to southern Africa. I continue to hope that he will be able to develop with you, your colleagues the front line presidents, the Zimbabwean nationalists, the Salisbury authorities and the South Africans an acceptable basis for reconvening the conference in Geneva and proceeding to a settlement of the Zimbabwean question.

3. I need hardly tell you that the United States retains an intense interest in a solution to the problem of Zimbabwe. We remain committed to the rapid achievement of majority rule within the period agreed to at the Geneva conference. As I wrote you from London on December 11,3 we support the formation of a transitional government which will have majority African representation. Britain’s willingness to play an important role during transition is the new element in the settlement which you have sought. I understand Ambassador Richard is describing in detail British views on this subject. The British have our full backing and will continue to receive our support.

4. The British proposals, which you are considering, are nevertheless a substantial departure from the framework we originally developed which brought Smith to Geneva. Some means to bridge the gap between the new British position and the original framework must be found if we are to achieve rapidly the settlement we all seek. The information available to me indicates that one way to bridge the gap could be a commitment that once an interim government has been formed and installed in office the war would come to an end. An indication of this nature, I believe, could help to improve the atmosphere in Pretoria and Salisbury and may make it easier to elicit the acceptance of the new British proposals. A guarantee of this nature would make it easier for us to use our influence in Pretoria and Salisbury and work towards an acceptance of a new framework for a Zimbabwean settlement.

5. In the days ahead, and especially at the time the front line presidents meet in Lusaka, great importance will be attached to public statements which follow your deliberations. An indication that the search for peace underlines all our objectives would be helpful.

6. I understand that you and your fellow presidents will also be discussing the Namibian situation. The United States remains firmly

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2 Telegram 49 from Lusaka, January 7, reported that Kissinger’s message was given to Chona that day. Chona emphasized the importance of sending a similar letter to Samora Machel. The letter was sent to Machel January 7. (Ibid.)

3 See footnote 5, Document 233.
committed to a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question and an outcome which will guarantee the full independence of Namibia. Much time has passed, but I believe the proposals I have discussed with you in the past still offer an acceptable basis for an agreement. I continue to hold to the view that the South African Government could be persuaded to accept a firm date for Namibian independence, a meeting under UN auspices of Namibian parties, including SWAPO at an acceptable international site and a substantial release of political prisoners. As I have told you before, the present Windhoek conference would only send a representative delegation and South Africa would send a representative who would negotiate all issues concerning Namibia’s relations with South Africa. It is my hope that the President of SWAPO and your colleagues will give these proposals serious consideration. They will, in my judgment, lead inevitably to Namibian independence and secure SWAPO’s position. If you, the presidents and SWAPO agree this is the course to pursue, the United States will use its influence to make sure these vital objectives are achieved.

7. I look forward to seeing Mark Chona in Washington⁴ and would appreciate at the time of his visit or before any further views you wish to send.

8. With warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger.”

Kissinger

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238. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 15, 1977, 11:05 a.m.–12:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Amb. R.F. Botha, Ambassador of Republic of South Africa
Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Frank G. Wisner, Director, Office of Southern African Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

Southern Africa

[The Secretary and Ambassador Botha conferred alone for two minutes and then admitted the others.]

Kissinger: I just thought before I left we could have a brief discussion. Where do we stand?

Schaufele: Richard is in Nairobi. Nkomo hasn’t got back from West Africa.

Wisner: Ghana.

Kissinger: What is your assessment, Mr. Ambassador?

Botha: Have you been informed of what transpired between my Prime Minister and Richard?

Kissinger: I’ve heard three versions. Richard’s version to our people, Richard’s version to London, and yours by phone. Could we have the correct version now?

Botha: Mr. Fourie and Dr. Muller were there, and I informed my Prime Minister fully on our last meeting, the breakfast we had before Christmas.2 I made it clear to my Prime Minister that you had sent messages to Nyerere and Kaunda trying to remind them of what they had said. I made it very clear you did what you could, but when President Ford lost the election, you no longer could affect the situation.

The Prime Minister asked me about the policy of the new administration. I told him I’d seen Mr. Vance but it was too early to tell. He said they were still studying. He did say—I won’t read too much into it—that they would take positive note of any constructive role we played on Rhodesia and South-West Africa.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 346, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, November 1976–January 1977. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. Brackets, except those that indicate omissions, are in the original.

2 See Document 236.
Kissinger: That’s a good position for him.
Botha: That’s what I told my Prime Minister.
I was in a position, from what you and Ivor told me, to tell him the
outline of the plan.
Kissinger: Did he present the outline of the plan I gave you?
Botha: Yes, the same plan. He didn’t deviate from it. He even im-
proved on it a bit.
Kissinger: In what way?
Botha: The powers of the Resident Commissioner, the powers of
the National Security Council. He gave the impression that once you
get down to those details, there was scope for negota-
tion.
The Prime Minister didn’t react as if he, John Vorster, had to give
an opinion on the merits, but he gave the Rhodesians’ reaction. He told
Richard the Rhodesians would not easily accept the fact of a British
Commissioner. Also the Council of Ministers was a weakening of the
previous position.
Kissinger: I didn’t think it was all that different. It has a blocking
mechanism.
Botha: Now you need the Resident Commissioner to vote with the
whites to have a blocking mechanism.
Schaufele: Yes, the outline.
Kissinger: The second point is how it evolved and how it was han-
dled. We gave it to the British High Commissioner every day.
We did permit Smith to add the two white ministers and a white
chairman. Because from the reaction of Kaunda and Nyerere, we
thought it was negotiable and it was better for him to come out with it
then and not surface it later at Geneva and break up the conference and
have the United States accused of making secret deals.
Botha: Richard, in the course of the conversation, confirmed that
you had sent messages to Kaunda and Nyerere.
Kissinger: However we got there, I think we’re now at the point
where Annex C is not achievable.
Botha: My Prime Minister told him straight that Geneva was badly
handled. He also told him he was very upset by the United States,
Britain and France’s vote in the Security Council on the charges
brought by Lesotho.3
Kissinger: Was it factually incorrect?

3 Reference is to Security Council Resolution 402, adopted by consensus on De-
Botha: It was.

Schaufele: The dispute lies largely in the Lesotho interpretation of the border arrangements, and they don’t recognize Transkei. There is no dispute really over the facts, but over the interpretation.

Botha: They claim their supply lines were cut. This is untrue. They can cross the border; they don’t want to submit identity documents to Transkei officials. They don’t recognize South West Africa either, but we have Zambians in the hospital there. Nowhere in the world is it a big thing to show identity documents. They want money at our expense.

My Prime Minister said, “Why couldn’t we have a fact-finding mission?”

Kissinger: It was never brought to my attention.

Botha: He told Richard: “Any black African state can say anything and you believe it and that is it and you’ll even pay. If that is so, my constructive role in Southern Africa is over.”

I’m afraid that sole incident really contributed very negatively to that discussion. In the end, Ivor asked my Prime Minister: “If I go north and get certain commitments and achieve something that achieves what Dr. Kissinger had in mind—majority rule in two years and assurance for the whites, and that the war will stop—will you listen again to me and talk again to Smith?” My Prime Minister said he would seriously consider it but couldn’t commit himself at this stage.

Kissinger: Didn’t he say “bankable assurances?”

Botha: Here are the notes: “Richard: ‘Suppose I get assurances from the frontline Presidents that the war is off, would you go to Rhodesia again?’ Prime Minister: ‘I will seriously consider it but can’t commit myself at this stage.’”

Kissinger: Ivor was going to go to Maputo, then Salisbury, then Capetown. We told the British this was insane because Smith would almost certainly turn him down and that would make it harder for the Prime Minister—assuming your Prime Minister wants to.

Botha: My Prime Minister hasn’t spoken to Smith.

Kissinger: Your Prime Minister is handling Smith right. The time to see Smith is when everyone else has agreed.

I saw Mark Chona yesterday.4 He claims it is British hesitation and cautiousness that got us into this mess, and I’m inclined to agree. He says the blacks have accepted this plan as a basis for discussion at Geneva, but have not accepted a document. They’ve not accepted the National Security Council and the powers of the Resident Commissioner.

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4 See footnote 4, Document 237.
Schaufele: And the absence of a Prime Minister.
Kissinger: They accept the preamble. [Laughter]

He repeated yesterday that the war would stop when the Interim Government is established. They justify their recognition of the Patriotic Front on the ground that only that way could they assure the war would stop.

Botha: What does this mean, this recognition?
Kissinger: Mark said they’re not cutting Muzowera out of the political process.

Schaufele: Or out of Geneva.
Kissinger: But they say he has no standing for making a ceasefire because he has no troops. But Muzorewa “can participate in the political process.” Probably from jail! That is sufficient assurance—for him to get out of the country.

Schaufele: He can participate in elections—and Sithole—but only Mugabe and Nkomo can negotiate a ceasefire.
Botha: This will have no chance whatsoever of ever being considered. Never ever.
Kissinger: By whom?

Botha: By Smith. With due respect, it is nonsense. It means a man who has a few troops out in the bush is tantamount to majority rule. This is nonsense. It’s immoral. I don’t believe this country would ever stand for it. Because Mugabe has a few boys with guns, he’s the government.

Kissinger: The British are drafting a new plan which is a combination of Annex C and their latest ideas. I’ll give you a copy informally. That plan isn’t essentially different.

Schaufele: Right.
Wisner: It provides for the possibility of a Prime Minister.
Kissinger: We have no objection to a Prime Minister.

Schaufele: It depends on the blacks being able to agree on the Prime Minister, but leaves open the possibility of no Prime Minister if they can’t agree on one.

It would be hard to leave Muzorewa out of the consultations.

Kissinger: The British insist on elections. [To Schaufele:] Will the British give Nkomo the paper?

Schaufele: That’s the intention. But they can’t locate him.

Kissinger: The South Africans can’t negotiate if they don’t know the substance.

The Africans said they couldn’t react to Richard because he didn’t formally present a plan. So now Richard will hand to them, as a “study
paper, a document which is substantially what we’ve discussed. I don’t know what a “study paper” is.

Then presumably he’ll go to your Prime Minister and say if that paper is acceptable to the blacks, will your Prime Minister support it? (We’re not talking about the Patriotic Front.) That is when you have to make a decision.

I’ve come reluctantly to the conclusion that the paper is the best you’re likely to get.

But if the blacks accept it as a “basis of discussion,” where are we then?

Botha: But they’ve already moved away from that paper.

Kissinger: The British haven’t moved away from it; the Africans have.

What Richard is trying to sell now is the paper you’ve seen. It’s the paper you saw at the end of December, with minor modifications, which we’ll tell you.

Botha: How Richard will talk them out of support for Patriotic Front, I don’t know.

I’ll be frank with you, at the end of your term. I don’t see how this can be accepted. I don’t see how the American people can accept this sort of thing. It is patently unjust.

Kissinger: Don’t kid yourself. The American people won’t understand it. It may be unjust.

Botha: The newspapers have been against the trend.

Kissinger: Which?

Botha: The Star.

Kissinger: The Star . . .

Let’s distinguish two things. Let’s distinguish between the paper and recognition of the Patriotic Front. Richard won’t ask you to support the Patriotic Front. Is it better for you to support that paper and then have the Africans reject it? Or have the onus on you? The problem at Geneva is no one has talked to them to say there is a limit. I’ve sent letters, which they didn’t like, but then they tried to conciliate a bit.

Botha: I have to say, in the confines of this room, that I detected on the part of my Prime Minister the attitude that he’s prepared to fight it out in Southern Africa. He’s concluded—partly because of the Lesotho incident—that the West, including you, is not prepared to stand up. There is no indication on the part of the West, including you sir, that you are willing or have the means to do something. And there is every indication the new Administration will make it even more difficult for us economically. I say this to you because of the relationship we’ve had over the last few months. We will have to go it alone.
Kissinger: I wouldn’t say that. I think it’s premature.
Botha: It’s not my opinion; it’s my government’s.
Kissinger: You may come to that conclusion, but it’s not the conclusion you should come to now. Let this string be played out.

If Richard then submits to pressures to go beyond this paper, you may conclude you can no longer be helpful. So my recommendation is to give Richard one more chance.

He has not deviated from his program. He was violent with the Africans for their recognition of the Patriotic Front, and has not modified his program to reflect that recognition.

I think it’s a very serious matter for South Africa to reject it. You’ll be subjected to massive pressures.

If you go along—if your conscience permits it—and the Africans then reject it, then it’s different.

Nothing has happened since we discussed it in the last two or three weeks.

Botha: With this Lesotho thing, with your term coming to an end, with the statements coming out from the new Administration, we think we’ve got to do it alone.

Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, a country that fought the British for four years won’t be defeated that easily. I’d recommend you give it a little more of a chance before deciding to fight. It’s not a decision I’d advise you to make.

Botha: Two years ago, no liberal would have conceived we would agree to a policy on South-West Africa that ends apartheid, scraps the Bantustan policy, gives independence and a unitary state, and what we’ve done on Rhodesia. We’ve done it—but look what happens—new demands. It’s over.

In Rhodesia they will turn power over to Mugabe straight.

Kissinger: You can always reach that conclusion. But I wouldn’t advise it now.

I asked for this meeting, not you, so we wouldn’t have heard this if I hadn’t.

Let me sum up. I think Richard’s plan is probably the last tolerable limit of what we set out to do. I think Richard’s plan, with assurances that the civil service, judiciary and economy remain in place, is the last tolerable evolution.

I can tell you if we had been running the negotiation, it wouldn’t have reached this point. Even Chona said that yesterday. He volunteered it.

So give Richard one more chance.

Now, South-West Africa.
Botha: My Prime Minister told them [the Windhoek Conference] they’ve got to move. He told them he wouldn’t face all this international pressure.

Kissinger: I regret what has happened here. Your Prime Minister—I say this to everybody—has behaved honorably. He took tremendous risks. Last year Nkomo asked for considerably less than we got him in September. In November, through mismanagement . . . I don’t think, when we’re changing administrations, the South African government should announce it’s decided on a policy of war.

Botha: We won’t do that.

Kissinger: Or act that way. Let them force you into it.

Botha: We feel like a sitting duck.

Kissinger: Give them a chance. Wait two or three months.

Your Prime Minister was willing to talk to Richard. It will be this plan. I know he’s a just man and will decide it carefully. He’s a South African patriot. I believe there is more than a 50–50 chance the Africans will turn it down. But it’s better if it happens there than in Capetown.

Now, South-West Africa. We finally got an answer from Nujoma.

[He gets up to get the letter from Kaunda.]5

Here, you can read it. [He gives him the letter to read.]

Botha: May I ask, what were the conditions?

Kissinger: [Hands him Tab A]:6 You can just initial them, and we’ll call a conference.

[Botha reads it.] I told them in my view you’d probably accept this, but just in case you raised some points . . . [Laughter] Was I right?

First of all I said: Are they going to insist on this? He [Chona] said that’s what SWAPO is going to say, but he left the impression it was negotiable. He wanted us to call a conference. I said we weren’t going to call a conference if we were going to have a repetition of the first Geneva experience. I said I’d give this to the South Africans and I’d recommend to my successors that they wait for the South African reply.

My view is the seven points we agreed on I’m prepared to defend. I’ve never asked you to go beyond them. Maybe some modifications. For example, prisoners. I’ve never told them you would release them; I’ve told them it was my impression you’d be prepared. Now they want my “assurance,” instead of my “impression.”

I’d suggest you study it and let me have a point-by-point response. Bill?

5 Not found.
6 Not attached.
Schaufele: Only on the first point. On all that gobbledygook—let them call it what they want.

Kissinger: The only point I think will be difficult is Point 4. They want it to be South Africa, SWAPO, and United Nations.

Botha: On Point 1, Point 2—they say “should,” “insists,” “has been and is still ready.” There are no demands made. Maybe I’m reading too much into it.

Kissinger: My impression from Chona is it’s softer than before. He said these are just SWAPO ideas. All of this.

I don’t recommend we call a conference. I recommend we keep stonewalling until they give us an agenda we can live with.

Botha: There is a contradiction between Point 3 and Point 4. This doesn’t tally.

Kissinger: I don’t know if you’ve met Nujoma. I don’t think precision of thought is the quality that brought him to his present eminence. Even though he treats me with more respect than you do. [Laughter]

Botha: Could there be an informal meeting of the U.S. and the four Presidents? To clarify the points.

Kissinger: Certainly. You could ask questions, which we could present as our own. I don’t think the meeting would be helpful.

I think we’ve handled this issue well. They’re getting no publicity out of it; this is softer than before.

Botha: If we come out with this . . .

Kissinger: We shouldn’t go public. Neither of us.

Botha: I haven’t consulted with my government. But what if there was a private meeting between you, us and the frontline Presidents? To clarify the points.

Kissinger: It would be a disaster. First, they wouldn’t agree to meet with you. Second, if they did, it would force the frontline Presidents to take a public position and it would be the most extreme SWAPO position. And third, the new Administration should be given a chance to get some experience before they take a public position. If not, they’d be taking a position on the basis of their previous experience.

Schaufele: I would add one more: If the Presidents agreed to meet with you, they’d insist SWAPO be present.

Botha: It was just a question.

Kissinger: All right. Can I meet with you alone for a minute?

My colleagues here are entering an era where this is the last Saturday they’ll be working. [Laughter]

[The Secretary and the Ambassador conferred privately from 12:20 to 12:35 p.m.]
239. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 19, 1977, 6:15–7:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Kissinger
Secretary-designate Vance
Dr. Brzezinski
Mr. Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Ambassador Schaufele, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Ambassador Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Congressman Young, Ambassador-designate to the UN
Ms. Holloway, Ambassador Young’s office
David Passage, Notetaker

SUBJECT

Southern Africa

Mr. Vance: May I talk about the practical problems we face in Southern Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: Sure.

Mr. Vance: I talked to Peter Ramsbotham. He said Ivor Richard is in South Africa today and will be going to Salisbury either today or tomorrow. He said he thought it would be very helpful if we could say something encouraging to help Richard’s mission.

Secretary Kissinger: (Turning to Schaufele) Did Botha call you on Monday?2

Ambassador Schaufele: Yes, he sent this over (referring to the AF briefing memorandum on the South African note—Tab A).3 It’s not a very encouraging message; they are very unhappy about Namibia.

Mr. Vance: The South Africans are apparently being very difficult with Richard saying the new Administration is not behind the initiative.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is your watch now. But by all means tell Bill what you want and we will be glad to do anything we can to help.

Mr. Habib: Richard is there now?

Mr. Vance: Yes, and he will be seeing people tomorrow. Andy, why don’t you give us your views.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 97, Geopolitical File, Africa, Chronological File, January 15–20, 1977. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Initialed by Passage. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.

2 January 17.

3 Not attached.
Congressman Young: Well, I think if we could just sit and talk a bit, there are so many questions coming at us. I have been winging it too often. We need the benefit of your views.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me say first that I have asked Jack Reinhardt to join this group. Jack has been in on the initiative from the very beginning. I have sent him in addition on a number of missions to Africa. He has, I think, participated in just about every conversation with Kaunda.

Let me start by giving you a brief description of how we got to where we are.

After Angola, it seemed to me that if we did not take some definite action in southern Africa, events would soon get out of control. The moderates upon whom the continent depends to prevent radicalism from overrunning what democracy there is would be under increasing pressure to adopt guerrilla means in order to achieve majority rule throughout the southern portion of the continent. When we took our first trip, all the Africans wanted was our support for majority rule. I then delivered a major speech in Lusaka, which, I might note, did not get the unanimous approval of the Republican Party, but which had a very salutary effect in Africa. Most people thought we were just talking, but then we set out to implement the policy we had enunciated. We arranged for a meeting with Vorster in Germany. After coming to an understanding of the position he felt he was in and getting some feel for the room which he thought he had for maneuver, we then contacted all of the (Front Line) African Presidents. Up until that time, they had been operating solely in terms of the Nkomo/Smith meetings of last February—that is, within the general context of majority rule. They told us, “We, the African Presidents, think that Rhodesia is insoluble. We don’t believe Smith will ever agree to majority rule. We strongly advise you to try to get Namibia out of the way.”

We intended to get Nyerere behind us, then go to Lusaka, then have a conference, and then independence. This was the basis upon which I met Vorster.

When I first met with Vorster, I explained to him that I saw two possibilities for the unfolding of events in the southern part of the continent. The first was that the problems would simply be solved by force. Matters would be taken out of the hands of those leaders who preferred moderate solutions, and would gravitate towards the hands of the radicals. Sooner or later, foreign forces would probably appear. Or, there could be negotiations.

Vorster asked me what my ideas were. I said I had no solutions. I gave him Nyerere’s proposals on Namibia. He agreed. He said he could not go to Lusaka, but would be willing to go any place in Europe. He said he’d also consider SWAPO participation.
I then went from Germany to Britain and met with Callaghan and Crosland in the Cabinet Room. The British, you should know, have a new theory on the conduct of international relations. It is that once they have prepared a paper and handed it over to you, they feel they still have the right to completely disavow it on the grounds that it has not been cleared by the Cabinet. Callaghan prepared a paper which he handed over to me in the presence of Crosland and several others of their senior people. The two papers that they prepared were, first, one setting forth the constitutional arrangements for the evolution of power in Rhodesia, and second, the economic arrangements. I then sent Schaufele back to Africa. He was generally well received. Nyerere quite frankly didn’t think that Rhodesia would work out, but he agreed to give it a try. There were three annexes, A, B, and C—the first two of which were relatively inconsequential. The first related to protection for minorities; Annex B were some proposals for the composition of Parliament and voting qualifications. Isn’t that right, Phil?

Mr. Habib: Yes, I think so.

The Secretary: Anyway, Annexes A and B were relatively inconsequential. Annex C was what I proposed in Pretoria. You have Annex C I believe, don’t you.

(Mr. Vance nods affirmatively.)

The British then sent a team here to Washington, where we tried to polish up a few of the details. We then sent two of our people to London to try to make the thing more acceptable. Then Schaufele and Duff went off with Annex C to Africa. The basic proposal was for a Council of State, a Council of Ministers, and two years to independence. Bill (to Schaufele), is it correct to say that all of the essential elements were presented to the presidents.

(Schaufele nods assent.)

We gathered that Annex C would be generally acceptable to the South Africans and to the Presidents. Schaufele and Duff returned to London. I then arranged a meeting with the South Africans in Zurich. On the way to Zurich I stopped in London. Crosland handed me a revised Annex C which, that evening, I handed to Vorster. You have that Annex C in your files.

Vorster accepted this version of Annex C. He undertook to sell it to Smith and said that he would threaten to cut off aid to Rhodesia if they didn’t accept it. He said he would see to it that Smith would not wiggle out of it. The British had said in that draft that the Council of State would have a majority of whites. Vorster said he didn’t think the blacks would accept that, so Callaghan changed it that night to a black majority. This was done in a hasty exchange of cables with London. We then said we doubted that Rhodesia would accept a black majority on the Council of State. We agreed to leave things slightly indefinite. It
was against this background, then, that we went to Africa. First we met with Kaunda and Nyerere. Nyerere’s attitude was very clear. He said, “If you think you can perform miracles, go ahead. But I can tell you now it won’t work. Smith won’t accept it.” Kaunda had no major objections to Annex C. They all preferred a Governor General, but no one objected to a Council of State.

Reinhardt, I should tell you, pulled one of his more outrageous stunts on this trip by pretending to be one of the soul brothers of the African tribes. (laughter)

Kaunda raised a number of practical problems, which were relatively inconsequential. He suggested that the timetable for independence be shortened. He also suggested that the Council of State have a British chairman. These were minor problems—nothing of any particular consequence. Regarding Namibia, Kaunda was absolutely delighted. Vorster had accepted precisely what he wanted; all the Africans wanted was a United Nations role and some South African participation.

We then went off to South Africa, and I must say we had a bit of a rough time with Vorster, persuading him to accept the revised proposals. But the most painful negotiations I have spent in my eight years in Washington were the seven hours with Smith. It was really painful. I don’t think I will ever be able to describe exactly how painful it was. For him and his colleagues, there was no question that this represented the end. We were asking them to accept the destruction of everything that they and their fathers had built. They were being asked to sign their own suicide pacts. It may well be that they are actors [omission in the original] were there thought that they were acting. Smith saw major problems in selling this to his people. He thought that perhaps if the chairman of the Council of State could be white and if the Defense and Law and Order ministers were white, he would have a slightly better chance. I said I would undertake to try to sell it to Kaunda and Nyerere.

I then went back to Nyerere and said that the proposal was for a Council of State of five ministers with a white chairman and two white ministers. Nyerere was absolutely ecstatic. He said, “My God, you’ve performed a miracle. There is no need to go through all the details; we’ll work them all out at the conference.” Both he and I held a press conference that same afternoon, and he said essentially the same thing. After Nyerere, I saw Kaunda and I told him that I wasn’t really very confident. I sent a message to Smith that evening through the South Africans, telling him what I had learned about Nyerere’s and Kaunda’s thoughts on the Council of State. After the two meetings with Nyerere and Kaunda, we (referring to those who were on the trip) met to discuss what had taken place. We decided to pass a message to Smith to go ahead and put in the proposal for a Council of State of five with a
white chairman and two white ministers. Our thought was that if that were the opening negotiating position, we could then fall back to a black Council of State.

I then returned to Washington through London, and then a strange thing happened. The British totally disavowed their own paper. Crosland told me it had not been submitted to the Cabinet and therefore it had no standing. Now I must tell you, Cy, that in my own discussions I never asked an ambassador whether his papers were cleared within his own government. I simply assume it. Anyway, there in the Cabinet room they disavowed their own paper. Frankly, I must tell you, Cy, I will believe to my dying day that if Smith had gone off to the conference and had proposed the essence of Annex C with a Council of State with five ministers, a white chairman, and whites in the Law and Order and Defense ministries, and independence in two years, that the blacks would have accepted it on the spot. Mark Chona as much as told us so here in Washington last week.

But what happened next was that the British wasted an incredible three weeks in Geneva on the most trivial of issues—in fact, one which was not an issue when Geneva began—the timing of independence. No African had ever objected to two years. Then we saw further internal haggling among the Rhodesians which made the Patriotic Front look positively organized. But it was Ivor Richard’s show. When Richard collapsed on the independence issue, which was the one non-controversial point, everyone having agreed on two years, that simply made everyone think that he’d collapse on anything. And it came apart from there.

On Namibia you’ve seen the seven-point proposal. We have letters from both Kaunda and Nyerere saying that it’s okay. We never surfaced the seven points, however, because we didn’t want two conferences going at the same time. But the second reason was that if we ever put out the seven points, then you’d simply end up in the same sort of situation that we’ve had over Rhodesia. There would be a Front-Line Presidents’ meeting and they would have to reject it. It is a proposal on which everyone agrees. But the minute it is surfaced, each side will take it as the maximum demand from the other side, and they would have to reject it or haggle endlessly over it.

But frankly, I’ve never accepted that Namibia was a difficult problem. The South Africans want rid of it. Vorster won’t talk directly to SWAPO, but beyond that, there are no real substantive problems.

Frankly, Richard’s odyssey through Africa baffles me. He has absolutely no one lined up on anything. He is selling bits and pieces of paper to people, but nothing concrete, and nothing that everyone can agree on. Your problem is going to be to try to reestablish coherency. You have some things going for you. No one wants war to start up
again. The Front Line Presidents are united in their desire for a negotiated solution. On Namibia, I think Nujoma will probably come around. What I would recommend would be to organize another conference and find a solution to this problem. Once you have a solution to this problem, the implication will be that you can resolve the other problem.

Mr. Vance: I talked to Chona and the Tanzanian ambassador earlier this week. They were eager of course for some word about what our policies would be. I told them first that the policy was under review. Second, that we placed the highest priority on a negotiated settlement. Third, that we strongly support the British effort to find a solution to the problems, and fourth, that we will maintain the closest possible contact with the Presidents (of the Front-Line states). Regarding Namibia I told them we would maintain our role as an interested observer. Secondly, that we attach highest priority to a peaceful settlement. And third, that we would be in touch with Kaunda as soon as we finished our policy review. My own feeling, very strongly, Andy, is that we should say nothing more until the review is finished. I don’t think anything could possibly be worse than to give the impression of lack of confidence in the British efforts or of some change in our own policy. I talked to Peter Ramsbotham at lunch and he said that they had just put Richard’s proposals into writing. He (Richard) is going to try to get Vorster on board. Regarding Namibia, the Tanzanian ambassador said Nyerere still thinks it’s the easier of the two problems to resolve.

Secretary Kissinger: Me, too. The fact that the South Africans said they’d send someone to the conference gives Vorster a fig leaf, which is important since Vorster said he would never meet with SWAPO. And SWAPO says the Windhoek people have to be part of the South African delegation, which is also probably acceptable.

Mr. Vance: Chona said that today. I asked him whether it was realistic. He said yes, he thought it was.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I’d firm up the seven points. They’re so close together now, there should be no problem at all. The basic essentials are independence by 1978; the points introduce SWAPO into the conference; since SWAPO is recognized by the OAU, there should be no further problem there; it gets the South Africans into the conference; and it binds the South Africans to the results of the conference. If we can bridge these relatively small differences, the South Africans tell us that there should be no further problem from their standpoint. All we’re talking about are minor semantic differences. I’ve told the Africans I think the South Africans will release the prisoners that SWAPO wants.

Mr. Vance: Yes, SWAPO wants some of those people on their delegation, don’t they?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. There is one, of course, the South Africans say they’ll never release. But what you have to do is define the frame of reference adequately.

I have to tell you I think the UK has mishandled the whole thing. By giving up right away to the Africans in their insistence on raising the timeframe for independence—which was a non-contentious point—they wasted time and they created the impression that nothing was sacrosanct. Now no one is prepared to believe that the British will hold to anything. The British position is too close to that of the Patriotic Front. In every decision that they have had to make, they have come down on the side of the blacks. That could hardly have been calculated to inspire confidence in either Vorster or Smith that the British can be counted upon to be fair and objective.

Richard is now running around like a travelling salesman. As I see it, you have two options. You can either get the whites to agree to your proposals and then go to the blacks and say “the whites have agreed to this—will you sign?” Or you can get the Africans to agree to a set of proposals, and then you go to the whites to say “here is what the blacks agree to—is this acceptable?” What Vorster’s nightmare is, is that he will agree to a set of proposals and then the Africans will reject it. Is that a fair description, Jack (to Reinhardt)?

Ambassador Reinhardt: Yes, it is. I personally just don’t think it (referring to the Geneva conference) will work. There is now too little confidence on both sides.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. (Turning to Mr. Vance) But please tell Vorster that whatever he would like me to do, I will agree.

Mr. Vance: The one thing I don’t want to do is pull the rug out from under Richard. I don’t think we can do anything else (except support him).

Secretary Kissinger: No, and the most important thing is, you can’t let it be said that Richard’s effort failed because you did not give him support.

Mr. Vance: Should we say anything to Smith?

Secretary Kissinger: I never said anything to him. My tactic was to be active all around him to increase his nervousness, to get everyone else signed up, and then to tell him what I wanted.

Mr. Vance: I saw in the paper that he said the incoming Administration didn’t support the United Kingdom proposals.

Secretary Kissinger: We never told him what we would do or what we would not. We told him we didn’t think he would be pushed beyond Annex C, and I think if you tell him now that you’re fully behind Richard’s proposals, you’ll get an explosion. Why not just wait to see what Richard gets. Why should the new Administration rush to get it-
self into a bind. I think it’s a waste of time to talk to Smith right now. Get Vorster’s agreement to a set of proposals, then get the Africans behind it. Then tell Smith what you’ve got. If you go to Smith now, he can only reject it. He will claim—I can see exactly what he will say. I can give you a perfect script. If you go to Smith now, he will be forced to reject it. He will claim betrayal. He will quote you Annex C and he’s absolutely right.

Congressman Young: Smith has some sort of private communications channel through Andrews of Allegheny Ludlum Steel, doesn’t he?

Mr. Habib: He’s been in.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I personally believe there is no sense in talking to Smith now until you have a concrete program which you want him to agree to—to which you want a yes or no. If you go in now, Vorster will simply say in Pretoria that he will study it and he will study it to death. In my view, Richard should say to Vorster, look, I’m not asking you to approve this. This is what I’m thinking of. If I get black approval, will you accept it?

Mr. Vance: I think I understand. He should give the proposals to all of them and then he goes home.

Secretary Kissinger: It is mathematically certain that Smith will reject it if Richard goes to Salisbury now. He has no other choice. My advice is to stay out of it.

(Universal agreement)

Mr. Vance: Okay. First we’ll go to Vorster through Botha and say that we understand that these are the proposals and we’re studying them.

Secretary Kissinger: Richard can say to Smith, “I don’t have a consensus yet.”

Mr. Vance: We could say this through Peter (Ramsbotham).

Secretary Kissinger: Especially since he hasn’t seen Nkomo and Mugabe yet.

Ambassador Schaufele: If he’s insistent on going to Salisbury, we could of course ask the South Africans to advise Smith not to say anything, publicly at least.

Secretary Kissinger: Basically, I fundamentally do not believe in diplomatic trips where you believe failure is certain. After I got Vorster signed up, I gave him two weeks to work on Smith. I said I wouldn’t agree to meet with Smith unless Vorster could guarantee that Smith would agree. Even if Vorster agreed to Richard’s proposals tomorrow, he’s still got to work on Smith. Vorster isn’t going to agree to Richard’s proposals right away. What kind of position does that leave him in vis-à-vis Smith?
Congressman Young: One thing that could be pointed out to Vorster is that there has been some progress in putting together a coherent black leadership group. Up until this time, it seemed as though the Front Line nations had no control over the nationalists and there was no unified leadership. As of the most recent Lusaka conference, at least they have now agreed to deal through the Patriotic Front, and the Patriotic Front appears to be in control of the military situation. They simply couldn’t back Muzorewa. Now, at least, Vorster would be agreeing to someone who had some military control. As I understand it, they’re not committed to the Patriotic Front as the ultimate government, but only to the Front as a negotiating instrument. Muzorewa can always, of course, participate or even recover power through elections. But at last there is some organization in the black ranks. This is the first time this has been the case in 15 years, so if Vorster wants some element of control, this may well be better.

Ambassador Schaufele: Mugabe?

Secretary Kissinger: He’s out of control. He’s absolutely untrustworthy. Even though Mugabe has some authority over guerrillas outside Rhodesia, Mugabe has no power inside Rhodesia. That, at least, is the perception of the South Africans, and probably of Smith.

Ambassador Schaufele: It certainly is.

Secretary Kissinger: If I could have picked someone from the beginning, it would have been Nkomo. Muzorewa has been all over the map. First he was on the side of the guerrillas, now he’s on the side of the peacemakers. He’s certainly no great hero. Nkomo is the best. What I don’t understand is, is he just a figurehead for Mugabe or does he have power of his own?

Congressman Young: Chona at least seems to feel that once agreement is reached, the guerrillas can be dealt with by sending one battalion to Tanzania, one to Zambia, and so on and so you can get rid of them.

Secretary Kissinger: Look, if Chona can deliver and you can hold elections without a guerrilla threat, that’s the ideal script. But the trouble is, as soon as you get the Africans to agree, then they raise the ante.

Congressman Young: I believe Kaunda and Nyerere and even Machel believe they can keep the Patriotic Front supported and under control.

4 The Front Line Presidents, meeting in Lusaka January 8–9, issued a communiqué supporting the Patriotic Front headed by Mugabe and Nkomo. (“Five Black African Countries Back Patriotic Front in Rhodesia Dispute,” The New York Times, January 10, 1977, p. 3)
Independence Negotiations

Secretary Kissinger: My own judgment is that if you could go to Vorster and say here is a concrete plan; I have the black Presidents and the Patriotic Front agreed to it. The civil service will stay in place; Vorster will agree. But if you give him nothing, he’ll simply recite a long series of betrayals, dig himself in and you’ll get nothing.

Congressman Young: The Nigerian role was interesting. Garba says he’s never heard of Mugabe; that Mugabe is a plant.

Secretary Kissinger: (laughing) Is he our plant? (Turning to Vance) I never did get AF under control.

Mr. Habib: Mugabe may be a bit more responsive to control by Nyerere and not so much by Kaunda.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s a bit like dealing with the Harvard faculty.

Ambassador Reinhardt: He certainly has no following inside the country.

Congressman Young: My own feeling is that Muzorewa and Nkomo basically had no following with the guerrillas and no feeling for what they wanted.

Secretary Kissinger: If someone could plausibly tell Vorster that the Patriotic Front is only an instrument for arranging for a ceasefire and an interim government and will then be disbanded, my guess is that Vorster would probably go for it. I think there’s about a 60–40 chance. But if this is simply put in some sort of vague form, Vorster is not going to agree.

Congressman Young: Chona has a plan to disperse the mercenaries.

Dr. Brzezinski: The white mercenaries?

Congressman Young: Yes. I don’t know precisely how it will work.

Mr. Vance: Well, as I see it, we have a couple of things to do. First, I’ll talk to Botha and tell him what we’ve agreed to. Then I’ll ask Peter Ramsbotham whether they really want to go forward.

Congressman Young: I would think the British must be getting awfully tired of this by now.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and you watch. They’ll try to stick us with failure. Frankly, I think Richard should go home after he sees Vorster.

Ambassador Schaufele: My own fear is that the British will say look, we’ve got the nationalists on board, now you produce South Africa. The British, you know, haven’t always kept us very well informed about what they’re up to. We don’t have any real idea what they’re telling the nationalists.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in my own view, the convincing argument why Richard should not go to Salisbury now, or even in the fore-
seeable future, is if you’re going to depend on Vorster to bring pressure on Smith, it’s going to be harder if Smith is already on record as having rejected your proposals.

Mr. Habib: Publicly.
Secretary Kissinger: Publicly.

Congressman Young: I just can’t see Ivor Richard with enough energy to push anything through right now. He should go home and rest.

Secretary Kissinger: My strong advice is I didn’t have enough firepower in the remaining days of this Administration to compel either the nationalists or the Rhodesians to be sensible. But I think a halt has to be called to the nonsense. You put together a package that the blacks can agree on, you then can go to Vorster and say this is what we have gotten them to agree to. The white judiciary and civil service and defense will stay in place for the interim government. You tell the Patriotic Front if the whites don’t get this, they don’t agree. Chona recommended that they agree. I have no reason to believe that they would not agree.

Congressman Young: Is there any financial responsibility, Mr. Secretary, that we might have to take to Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: No, there is none apart from the Zimbabwe development fund, which you know about. We have commitments from a number of countries.

Congressman Young: Are we talking about very much—perhaps a billion dollars?

Secretary Kissinger: No, we’re only talking about three or four hundred million and that over a period of five years.

Congressman Young: Would this be administered only by ourselves or could it go through an international institution such as the World Bank?

Ambassador Schaufele: The World Bank is interested in it.
Secretary Kissinger: We have no fixed ideas.
Mr. Vance: What’s the best way out of this?
Secretary Kissinger: I should stay out of it.
Ambassador Schaufele: I’ll talk to Botha and Peter Ramsbotham. Shall I refer to this meeting?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but just make sure that it’s understood that it comes from Cy.
Mr. Vance: Yes, that’s fine.

Congressman Young: We can say there’s been a meeting of the two Administrations and a review of the policies to see where we are now. We can say we’re encouraged by the progress shown so far.

Mr. Habib: I think they are simply waiting it out.
Mr. Vance: Yes, but if they know we’re both behind it, it would be an encouraging sign.

Ambassador Schaufele: The South Africans, you know, are being very “iffy” about this. The latest note is very negative.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I’m surprised and frankly, I gave Botha hell the other day.5

Ambassador Schaufele: He was quite negative on Namibia too. Maybe they’re just posturing. I think the South Africans are just afraid the new Administration is going to be very hard on them.

Mr. Vance: Phil?

Mr. Habib: Part of the message to Botha might well be that Richard is going to fail and that they, the South Africans, should not drop the effort to find a negotiated solution just because Richard fails.

Secretary Kissinger: Now wait a minute. The message should be that the new Administration is behind the British effort and will do everything possible to help it succeed.

Mr. Vance: Yes. We want them to know that we will continue to be supportive.

Mr. Habib: And the second part would be not to leave the impression that Richard should go to Salisbury.

Mr. Vance: Oh, no. This is their decision that they have to make. We’ll simply say that we believe that with good will and serious intent both sides can find a reasonable solution.

Secretary Kissinger: (laughs at the reference) You know, did I ever tell you the great one that Le Duc Tho played on me? He came up to me at the end of one of the Vietnam meetings and looked me in the eye and said, “You know, I want to talk to you with good will and serious intent—frankly, sincerely, open-heartedly—you’re a liar.” (great laughter)

Mr. Habib: What should we say to Ramsbotham?

Secretary Kissinger: Tell him exactly what you told the South Africans so they (the British) can’t stick you with not having kept them fully informed. Secondly, you can say that we seriously question whether Richard should go to Salisbury because if he does go to Salisbury, Smith will simply reject it and it will complicate the burden Vorster will have of trying to sell Smith.

Ambassador Schaufele: There is an additional problem. If Andy Young goes to Zanzibar, he’s going to get stuck with all sorts of questions.

5 See Document 238.
Congressman Young: I think I should simply say that I’ve been sworn in less than a week. I’m there to listen. I’m not there to make policy.

Mr. Vance: That’s absolutely right, Andy.

Secretary Kissinger: What’s going on in Zanzibar?

Ambassador Schaufele: It’s the tenth anniversary of the Declaration of Arusha.

(Meeting ended at 7:30 pm.)
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