THE UDF AND THE CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1980S

(summary of research proposal
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Introduction

The nature of the conflict in South Africa is a widely discussed issue in the existing literature on the apartheid state. Several salient features make South Africa a distinct case on the African continent. On the one hand the long tradition of resistance, which can be traced with some continuity from the formation of the African National Congress in 1912; on the other hand the persistent durability of a minority regime which, in spite of all predictions, has thus far managed to survive the wave of decolonisation in the sub-continent. The ANC is Africa's oldest liberation movement; after the decolonisation of Namibia South Africa remains the last bastion of white minority rule.

A study focusing on the latest episode of resistance -the 1984-1986 revolt- hopefully can contribute something towards a better understanding of both phenomena.

In this period the United Democratic Front manifested itself as the largest and most influential legal resistance movement inside South Africa, although the total scale of anti-apartheid resistance involves a wide variety of organisations. This research concentrates on the emergence, composition, organisational structure and operational modes of the UDF, assuming that this perspective will provide a view into the internal dynamics of black South Africa, and more in particular of the resistance against apartheid. A study of this period can hopefully also contribute towards an explanation of the second phenomenon: the surprising stability of the apartheid state, which -for the time being- has managed to survive this latest period of confrontation.

Interpretations of the nature of the apartheid system vary greatly. Is apartheid policy motivated primarily by economic or by ideological factors? Are racial, ethnic or ideological factors of decisive importance, or is the conflict in South Africa fundamentally determined by opposing class interests? Did a process of ethnic mobilisation among Afrikaners enable them to capture state power, and subsequently to extend their influence in other spheres of society? Or is there rather a symbiotic alliance between the state and mining capital, big industry and commercial farming? Are apartheid and a free market economy, involving a free flow of capital and labour, fundamentally opposed; or is apartheid basically designed to serve the interests of capital, or perhaps fractions of capital?

The debate on the nature of the conflict has a number of practical implications for strategy and tactics of resistance movements such as the UDF. What kind of alliances can be forged in the struggle against the apartheid regime? Is national liberation and non-racial majority rule the primary objective, or is the struggle about a socialist transformation of society? Or are these two phases, to be realised in a two stages-strategy? The objective of non-racial majority rule allows for the mobilisation of an 'all-class alliance' or 'popular front', but a socialist revolution would rather demand a 'united front', led by the (black) working class.

How cohesive is the resistance movement? What are the prospects for cooptive policies by the state, aimed at the incorporation of relatively privileged sections of the black population?

Throughout the better part of 20th century South African history this has been a recurrent issue: are the interests of the black majority best served by a mobilisation along class lines or along racial lines? This debate also continues between and within ANC, UDF, AZAPO (Azanian People’s Organisations) and the black trade union movement. The role of sympathetic whites also remains a bone of contention.

In the black trade union movement this debate is reflected in the opposing views of 'populists' and 'workerists'. 'Populists' favour a 'popular front', a broad 'all class alliance', which can include white liberals and allows for tactical cooperation with progressive sections of business. 'Workerists' stand for a 'united front', an alliance of 'organisations of the working class and of the oppressed'. Business, white opposition parties such as the PFP or presently the Democratic Party -the 'political arm of liberal capitalists' - cannot be partners in the struggle against apartheid: they belong to the enemy's camp. 'Workerists' fear that the 'petty bourgeoisie' can use its position in a 'popular front' to hijack the revolution for its own benefit, a lesson learned from experiences in other African countries.
The UDF, as an 'all-class, all-race alliance', is a prime example of a popular front. This study of the UDF in the context of the crisis of the 1980s hopes to contribute to our understanding of the nature of the apartheid system: 'how the system works'. It also aims at describing some of the internal dynamics of black society, thus far a rather neglected part of the story in much of the existing literature. Which means and methods are used by resistance movements: 'how to work the system?'

The context: the crisis of the 1980s

Several authors (Saul and Gelb 1986, Murray 1987) have characterised the 1980s as a period of 'organic crisis', a crisis affecting the roots of the system, thus leading towards a pre-revolutionary situation. The economic crisis began around 1974, followed by the Soweto-revolt in 1976, and deepening into an organic crisis in the 1980s. An organic crisis cannot be controlled by repression only. Such a crisis demands 'formative intervention': a new set of rules is required to ward off a more fundamental reversal of the power structures. The state experiences a crisis of legitimacy and attempts to strengthen its base by coopting new partners. The new rules of the game require that these partners be given a 'stake in the system'.

An important 'organic' development, thoroughly changing the arena of struggle, has been the growth of a permanent urban working class. Industry requires a stable, skilled workforce and expansion of the consumer market, which in turn requires an increase in black purchasing power. But higher wages can only be paid when labour productivity can be increased, thus necessitating a conversion from a 'labour-intensive, low-wage, low-productivity economic system to the capital-intensive, high-wage, high-productivity system which characterizes the advanced industrialised countries'. (Anglo-American's director Harry Oppenheimer, quoted in Saul and Gelb, p. 81).

While in the 1950s and 1960s partners for cooptation were recruited among the bantustan bureaucracies and in the very modest private sector which supposedly would be stimulated in the bantustans, the cooptive strategy of the 1970s and 1980s is targeted at segments of the urban black population. The strategy of the reformist vanguard of big business and of the 'verligte' section of the Afrikaner political elite aims at "moderate adjustment and building up a black labour elite and middle class which will have a stake in stability and provide a counter to the process of radicalism". (Financial Mail, quoted in Saul and Gelb, p. 99).

This strategy results in a higher degree of social differentiation among the black population and a sharper distinction between 'urban insiders' and 'rural outsiders'. Mass unemployment in urban areas will wherever possible be exported to the already overpopulated homelands.

Elements of 'formative intervention' can be found in the reform policy of the 1980s: the implementation of the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission and the Riekert Commission, and the 1983 constitution.

Riekert's recommendations on manpower, published in 1979, aim at promoting the development of a stable, skilled black working class. 'Urban Blacks' are henceforth to be considered as permanent inhabitants, not any more as temporary workers in 'white' South Africa. This means the abandonment of one of the central fictions of apartheid, that eventually there would be no black citizens of 'white' South Africa because all blacks would exercise their political rights in the bantustans. But more security for 'urban blacks' would be achieved at the expense of rural Africans, notably in the homelands. Riekert favours a strict system of influx control from the rural areas to the urban centres, with labour bureaux ensuring that labour is only released from the homelands in response to demand in the white areas.

These 'urban insiders' need somehow to be politically incorporated. A first step is the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act, providing for the election of town councils in the urban townships. During the 1984-86 revolt these councillors were frequently branded as sell-outs and became a target of popular anger.

Wiehahn's report on labour legislation aims at the incorporation of black trade unions. If unions remain outside the system of institutionalised bargaining, they are likely to get involved in wholesale opposition against the economic order of free enterprise. The liberalisation of labour legislation paved the way for the rapid growth of independent black unions, which in the 1980s have become a potent force for change. In spite of the range of control mechanisms provided for in the new labour laws, unions have managed to use this new space to recruit a rapidly increasing membership and to strengthen their position against the employers. Measures intended to frustrate unions from becoming vehicles of political activism, have not prevented the growth of a politically militant trade union
movement. Strikes, stay-aways and other union activities in support of political demands made a significant contribution to the massive scale of resistance in 1984-1986.

Labour reforms thus far have been more far reaching than political reforms. The 1983 constitution is an exercise in cooptation aiming at two other groups, situated in an intermediary position in the racial stratification: 'Coloureds' and Indians. The exclusively white parliament was transformed into a tricameral parliament, with separate chambers and cabinets for whites, 'Coloureds' and Indians. The new constitutional dispensation has sufficient build-in guarantees to ensure that final control remains firmly in white hands. The African majority remained excluded from political power at a national level. Initiatives for the political incorporation of 'urban blacks' on a national level are thus far limited to vague proposals for a National Statutory Council, where further constitutional reforms could be discussed. The UDF was launched in 1983, initially to campaign against the new constitution. Subsequent boycott campaigns against the 1984 elections have significantly contributed to the mobilisation of a mass movement.

The 1980s are frequently characterized as a period of 'repressive reform' or 'coercive cooption'. The reforms discussed above fit in with a policy aiming in the long run at replacing the racial stratification in South Africa by a new social stratification.

The social stratification of black South Africa

What does a social map of Black South Africa look like? Who constitute the vanguard of resistance against the apartheid state, and what is their goal? Adam and Moodley (1986) argue that the militant vanguard is made up out of a frustrated black bourgeoisie, while Saul and Gelb picture the black working class in the leading role. Is there a revolutionary potential in the bantustans and among the rural black population of 'white' South Africa?

Adam and Moodley emphasize the nationalist character of movements such as ANC and UDF: "Like Afrikaner nationalism, which used the state to seize its share of wealth from English imperialism, so Black nationalism, on the whole, aims at capturing capitalism for its own benefit rather than overthrowing it." (Adam and Moodley, p. 198). Saul and Gelb, on the other hand, argue that the basic issue is not national liberation only, but a socialist transformation as well.

The 'class map' of black South Africa, as described by Saul and Gelb, can be a useful point of departure, without necessarily following them all the way in their conclusions. They distinguish workers permanently settled in urban areas, migrant labour, unemployed, an old and new 'petty bourgeoisie'. In present-day South Africa, with its eroded, overpopulated bantustans, conditions for the survival of an independent peasantry have largely ceased to exist. In the early 20th century subsistence agriculture in the reserves served to subsidize the wage bill of the mines, but in recent decades this 'articulation of modes of production' has made a turn-about: wages, earned in 'white' South Africa, are now needed to subsidize agricultural production in the bantustans.

Lodge (1983) describes some examples of peasant revolts in the bantustans between 1940 and the mid-1960s, but concludes that in later years conditions for this type of rural resistance have disappeared. "The resilience of rural reaction depended on the survival of at least a residual peasant mode of production. By the mid-1960s, under the impact of the state rural resettlement policies (...), even a caricature of this had disappeared in many parts of the countryside". (Lodge, p. 290)

Migrant workers no longer have an economic fall-back position in the bantustans, thus becoming permanent migrants, workers in border industries or 'illegal' workers and work-seekers. Additionally, there is the increasing army of unemployed, being expelled in vast numbers from the cities and the white farms. They have no peasant existence to return to, but are being dumped in overcrowded resettlement areas. These marginalized 'rural outsiders' are not peasants, but perhaps a kind of rural sub-proletariat.

In principle, the upper stratum of settled urban workers forms one of the targets of coptive strategies, but Saul and Gelb reject the idea that this group could be tempted towards an identification upwards, as junior partners in an alliance for the maintenance of the status quo. This group is 'unequivocally to be considered a proletariat', not a potential 'labour aristocracy'. (Saul and Gelb, p. 148).

The 'old petty bourgeoisie' consists out of bantustan-elites and an urban entrepreneurial component. The 'new petty bourgeoisie' (white collar workers, professionals, clerics) presently provides the most eloquent and visible spokesmen for the aspirations of black South Africans, apart of course from the
black union leaders. Finally, a unique role in the struggle is played by youth and students, but this generational group can hardly be qualified as a 'class'.

The UDF: protest movement or resistance movement?

The United Democratic Front was launched in 1983 to coordinate opposition against the new constitution, which extended the vote to 'Coloureds' and Indians, but explicitly excluded the African majority. A second reason was resistance against the 'Koornhof bills', a complex of bills extending a limited measure of autonomy to black township councils while also formalising the controversial distinction between 'urban blacks' and 'rural blacks'. These bills, implemented with a number of modifications, resulted from the recommendations of the Rieker Commission.

The UDF is a loose alliance of about 700, mostly local, organisations. In some respects, this organisational form resembles the Congress Alliance of the 1950s. Among the UDF's affiliates are the Natal Indian Congress and the Transvaal Indian Congress and a number of trade union organisations, but the bulk of its affiliates are local organisations with a high degree of autonomy. The relationship between local groups and regional and national executives and the link between local struggles and national struggles is one of the proposed subjects of this study.

The launch of the UDF almost coincided with the formation of a second umbrella grouping: the National Forum, with AZAPO as its leading force. While the UDF places itself in the non-racial tradition of the ANC, the roots of AZAPO can be traced to the Africanist current in the resistance. But AZAPO differs from its predecessors - the Pan Africanist Congress, the Black Consciousness Movement - that it strongly emphasizes class analysis and socialist goals. AZAPO criticizes the 'petty bourgeois nature' of the UDF, while in turn UDF-followers frequently dismiss AZAPO as a debating club of intellectuals without mass support.

In its composition the National Forum is also an alliance of 'working class and middle class', but it rejects the multiracial ideology of the UDF. The 'national question' is a bone of contention between UDF and National Forum, but it is equally debated within each of these groupings. A central issue is the role of ethnically based organisations, such as the Natal Indian Congress, but in a more general sense the debate also centers around the question of whether a future South Africa should accommodate a kind of 'group rights' or whether there can only be one South African nation.

The UDF was successful in its immediate goal: to organise a boycott of the tricameral elections in August 1984. The mobilising effect of this boycott campaign and the organisational structures then created proved to be important for the course of events in the popular revolt which broke out in September 1984.

While the inauguration of the tricameral parliament seemed the immediate cause, the revolt gave expression to numerous grievances. Early in 1984 students had already organised school boycotts and protests against 'Bantu Education'. The extension of more autonomy to township councils under the Black Local Authorities Act implied that townships, more than before, were now required to generate their own income from housing, transport and other public services. Town councils were charged with the unenviable duty of collecting rents, electricity bills, etc. On the other hand, they now possessed more power, an own police force and new opportunities for patronage, such as the issuing of licences and the distribution of housing.

Black councillors in many instances became obvious targets for popular anger. The spark igniting the explosion in the Vaal triangle was a rent increase of 15 percent, coming on top of rising food prices, an increase in GST with 10 percent, rising transport costs, deteriorating public services and increasing unemployment. Under the slogan "we don't want to pay for our oppression" a period of massive protest set in, with boycotts and increasing violence as prominent features.

Local community organisations, 'civics', played a central role in organising rent boycotts. These civics, sometimes evolving into an alternative structure of authority in townships, are an important component in the UDF structures. The rent boycott also provided a strategic occasion for joint action with the unions. Early in November, unions, UDF-affiliates and civics organised a massive stay-away lasting two days.

The 1984 revolt in the Vaal triangle, subsequently extending to other regions, was qualitatively different from the 1976 Soweto revolt. While Soweto ‘76 was primarily a student revolt lacking organisational structures, the 1984-1986 revolt expressed the grievances of workers in the townships. This time organisational structures (UDF, unions, civics) were available to coordinate a wide range of grievances into a political offensive against the apartheid state. An analysis of the events in the PWV-region can shed some light on mechanisms of mobilisation in this revolt, on the relationship between top and grassroots in the UDF and on the links between local and national struggles. Mobilisation implies a one-way street, but in this case an interaction between organisations and spontaneous grassroots action seems a more adequate concept. When the ANC in exile called on the people to make the townships ungovernable, that process was already in full swing.

The 1984-1986 episode was a phase of resistance against the apartheid state of unparalleled scale and intensity: more massive, sustained, violent and more nation-wide than previous uprisings. The UDF experienced a massive growth. The question arises whether organisational structures, strategy and tactics were adequate for such a massive challenge. In a critical examination of its own operations the National Executive of the UDF concluded in 1985 that its organisational structures were not able to keep up with spontaneous popular resistance, resulting in a lack of discipline in mass actions. As stated by UDF spokesman Terror Lekota, echoing some criticisms of high profile leadership: "The struggle must be placed in the hands of the people. We are not here to struggle on behalf of the people, but with them." But of course state intervention also severely debilitated the UDF leadership: two years after the launch of the UDF three quarters of the membership of regional and national executives was eliminated by death or detention.

Is the UDF a protest movement or a resistance movement? Protest politics makes use of such means as boycotts, stay aways and more symbolic activities (Black Christmas, prayer meetings, burning candles). Some remarks in Tom Lodge’s account (1984) of the ANC in the 1950s seem equally valid for the UDF: the ANC leadership was socially heterogeneous and ideologically eclectic in its composition; the campaigns had a strong moral dimension; much energy was spent on convincing sections of the white population in the hope that the white bastion could split.

What was at stake in the UDF campaigns: to conquer the moral high ground, to conquer power or to establish counterstructures of popular power in the townships, in order to force the government to the negotiating table? Did the 1984-1986 revolt have the potential to undermine the very foundations of the apartheid state?

In order to contextualize the UDF in the history of resistance in South Africa a comparison must be made with previous periods of revolt. In my research I propose to limit the comparison to the post war period: the 1950s and the Soweto revolt. These earlier episodes are well documented in Lodge’s Black Politics in South Africa (1984) and in several monographies of the Soweto revolt.

A certain affinity between the UDF, operating legally until its restriction in February 1988 and the banned ANC is unmistakeable: just like the ANC, the UDF has adopted the 1955 Freedom Charter as its basic principles. Numerous people who in the 1950’s were involved in ANC campaigns, have become active in the UDF. But the UDF also has its own distinct features. For example, it includes quite a number of former Black Consciousness activists from the 1970s, who after their prison terms joined up with UDF affiliates. An other part of this 'Robben Island generation' found a political home with AZAPO.

This research project aims at presenting a picture of the own characteristics of the UDF and of the characteristic features of the 1984-1986 revolt. For this purpose, this study will also look into the role of trade unions in relation to the UDF, students, churches and church organisations, the role of intellectuals and of whites, the relationship between affiliates and between top and grassroots.

The UDF has placed great emphasis on lobbying abroad, frequently invoking moral arguments to influence politicians and public opinion. This belief in the importance of international pressure on South Africa has certain effects on the operations of the UDF itself; on the one hand the intense international interest for South Africa had a stimulating effect; on the other hand the risk of raising false expectations looms large.
The 1984-1986 period is also distinct from earlier episodes of resistance in that, for the first time, violence broke out between rival anti-apartheid groupings: initially between UDF and AZAPO and later between UDF and Inkatha.

Elements of a generational conflict were less pronounced than in 1976, but not completely lacking: youthful 'peoples' courts' judging the behaviour of elders; comrades who sometimes resorted to drastic measures to enforce consumer boycotts. Youth played a prominent role in the revolt and probably also pushed more reluctant leaders and groupings into more militancy. Students were the most visible actors on the youth front; but what was the role of unemployed youth?

In comparison with previous episodes South Africa has undergone some important changes. The level of education of the urban black population has increased considerably, but so did unemployment in urban areas. Between 1960 and 1984 the number of African students in high schools rose from 45,000 to more than one million. While in 1960 717 African students passed their matric, by 1984 this number had increased hundredfold to 86,873. In 1960 South Africa had 1,871 African students at university level; by 1984 36,604 Africans studied at university. Secondary and tertiary education in 1960 was the privilege of a tiny elite, while high school education had, by the 1980s, become a mass phenomenon. It bears emphasizing that in spite of these remarkable figures, the gap between Africans and other population groups remains wide. In 1980 35 percent of black youth in the age of 15-19 went to high school, compared to 77 percent for 'Coloureds' and 86,4 percent for whites in the same age group. But school leavers enter a shrinking labour market: roughly two out of three unemployed blacks are under the age of 30. (figures in this paragraph are from Bundy 1987b)

Estimates of the total percentage of unemployed vary – depending on the criteria used – from 15 percent (excluding homelands) to 40 percent (including homelands and a part of the informal sector) or more. For bantustans, but also for Soweto figures of around 50 percent are mentioned. The 1980s saw a rapid rise in unemployment.

Another distinct feature of the 1984-1986 revolt is the wide geographical spread of unrest, also covering the countryside and bantustans such as KwaNdebele. The UDF proved to be a nation-wide organisation, notwithstanding significant regional differences and differing patterns of link-up between local and national struggles.

Several of the questions raised above can be summed up in a central question regarding the social profile of the UDF. What are the components of the heterogeneous coalition under the UDF umbrella; what kind of program, or discourse, was used to handle possible divergent interests; what kind of social order is considered desirable for a post apartheid South Africa?

Because of their central role, attention will also be paid to the civics, the rapidly multiplying community organisations. Some of these civics trace their origins to social and welfare activities of Black Consciousness groups in the 1970s. Among the UDF affiliates are also numerous women's groups, church groups, youth and student organisations, community unions, etc.

Does the social stratification of the UDF coincide with the self image of the UDF? Does the UDF indeed represent 'the people of South Africa'? An example of a self-definition can be found in a UDF pamphlet, distributed for a protest march intended to bring a letter to Nelson Mandela in Pollsmoor prison: "We, the people of South Africa, represented by the UDF, university students, school pupils, academics, teachers, lawyers, doctors, clerics and other concerned citizens". (UDF pamphlet, Aug. 1985, quoted in Adam and Moodley, p. 92) On this and similar evidence Adam and Moodley conclude that the most important constituency of the UDF consists out of "the more secure and better-off urban Blacks, including professionals and a growing bourgeoisie in the Indian and Coloured segment".

A more detailed look at the UDF at local level hopefully can result in a contribution towards a provisional history of the UDF in the context of the revolt in the 1980s.
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