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Zimbabwe’s guerrilla veterans have burst into the international media as the storm troopers in Mugabe’s new war of economic liberation. In this book, Norma Kriger gives the unfolding contemporary drama a historical background, and shows continuities between the present and past. Between 1980 and 1987, guerrilla veterans and the ruling party colluded with and manipulated each other to build power and privilege in the army, police, bureaucracy, and among workers. Both relied chiefly on violence and appeals to their participation in the anti-colonial liberation war as they sought to vanquish their then political opponents. Today, violence and a liberation war discourse continue to be salient as Mugabe’s party and its guerrilla veterans struggle to maintain power through land invasions and purges of a new political opposition. This study gives a critical review of guerrilla programs and the war-to-peace transitions literatures, thus changing the way we view post-conflict societies.

Norma Kriger was on the political science faculty of the Johns Hopkins University for twelve years. Since then she has been an independent scholar. Her first book, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge University Press, 1992), drew attention to the widespread use of guerrilla violence to mobilize peasants who were more interested in their own agendas than the nationalistic agenda of the guerrillas.
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Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe

Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980–1987

Norma J. Kriger
To my late parents, Solly and Sheila, and to Steve and Saul.
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Strangers, colleagues, friends, and family have all demonstrated tolerance and generosity at every stage of this endeavor.

In gathering data, Zimbabweans and British Military and Training Team members took time to answer my questions. In Zimbabwe, George Chiweshe arranged interviews in the army, Judith Todd gave me access to private archives, and Irene Staunton facilitated useful introductions. The Department of History and the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies at the University of Zimbabwe provided me with affiliation on different visits. Judith Mashinya assisted with parliamentary materials and nudged an inert bureaucracy to produce a research permit. At Johns Hopkins University, graduate students – Martha Bishai, Amelia Kalant, Jason Phillips, and Linda Hedrick – helped clip newspapers and file parliamentary debates. More recently, Sara Rich Dorman at the University of Oxford helped to keep me current.

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On the home front, Steve Wilson has been a supportive and critical listener and reader. Saul, an infant when this project began, has grown into an enthusiastic participant with technical skills to offer.

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Chronology (1889–1980)

1889 The British South Africa Company (BSAC) obtains a Royal Charter granting extensive rights over present Zimbabwe and Zambia.

1890 The BSAC Pioneer Column occupies Mashonaland.

1893 The Ndebele in Matabeleland revolt against BSAC occupation and administration.

1896–7 The Ndebele and Shona rebel against white settlers and the BSAC administration. The scale and impact of rebellions exceed any other early rebellion in tropical Africa.

1898 The BSAC designates Southern Rhodesia (SR) and Northern Rhodesia (NR) as separate entities. A Legislative Council (LC) introduces representation for white settlers in SR. By 1908 elected settlers outnumber the BSAC nominees.

1922 A majority of settlers vote in a referendum against union with South Africa and in support of full self-government.

1923 Britain annexes SR as a colony; responsible government is established. A British governor replaces the BSAC administrator and a Legislative Assembly (LA) replaces the LC. Britain reserves the right to block legislation and limits the LA’s competence to internal matters, excluding certain reserved constitutional clauses pertaining to African affairs. In practice, the LA and its prime ministers gradually broaden their range of competence and the British government never vetoes any legislation. Nowhere else in its African colonies, except South Africa, does Britain give self-government to white settlers.

1930 The Land Apportionment Act passes. The BSAC had introduced Native Reserves which were restricted to African communal occupation, but outside the Reserves, there were no restrictions on land ownership. The Act extends racial land segregation to the rest of the country. Africans can buy or lease individual plots only in the Purchase Areas (7.7 percent of the country), whereas the tiny European population can buy land anywhere in the much larger
and superior European Areas (50.8 percent). Most Africans live in
the communally owned Native Reserves (22.4 percent). The Act
and its amendments lead to massive forced evictions and
resettlement of Africans and become the centerpiece of racially
discriminatory laws affecting every sphere of life.

1953 SR, NR (later Zambia), and Nyasaland (Malawi) are brought
together in a self-governing Federation, dominated by SR settlers.
SR retains its LA and governor, and sole responsibility for its
African affairs, local government, police, and economy.

1957 The Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (ANC) is
founded with Joshua Nkomo as president. The ANC engages in
non-violent protests against discriminatory legislation and
demands universal suffrage.

1959 The government declares a State of Emergency, arrests some 500
ANC leaders, bans the ANC, and soon passes the Unlawful
Organizations Act, enabling the arrest of any person associated
with a banned organization.

1960 The ANC re-establishes itself as the National Democratic Party
(NDP). The acting president, Michael Mawema, and other NDP
leaders are arrested for their alleged membership in the banned
ANC. The NDP organizes urban demonstrations against the
arrests; police repression provokes violence. The government
introduces a draconian Law and Order (Maintenance) Act which
becomes a primary means of suppressing African nationalist
activity. Joshua Nkomo becomes the NDP president.

1961 A new constitution provides for African representation for the first
time but for African majority rule only in the distant future.
Britain gives up its reserve powers over local legislation. The NDP
is banned at year end but re-emerges as the Zimbabwe African
People’s Union (ZAPU) days later.

1962 The Rhodesian Front (RF), a settler party, is founded and wins the
election. The government bans ZAPU and arrests all its officers,
except Nkomo who is out of the country.

1963 The Federation collapses under African pressure for independence
in NR and Nyasaland. In SR, the African nationalist movement
splits into two organizations when the Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU) is formed under Ndabiningi Sithole and
other former ZAPU leaders, such as Robert Mugabe.

1964 Ian Smith, the RF leader, comes to power. The government bans
ZAPU (which then exists under a different name) and ZANU, and
most African nationalist leaders are arrested and spend the next
decade in prison. The Zimbabwe African National Liberation
Army (ZANLA) is founded as the military wing of ZANU to wage guerrilla war against the government. NR gains independence as Zambia.

1965

The Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) is founded in Lusaka, Zambia as ZAPU’s armed wing. Smith declares a State of Emergency, and then a Unilateral Declaration of Independence to pre-empt British pressures for movement toward African majority rule. A new constitution is introduced and the country is called Rhodesia. Britain responds with economic sanctions. ZANU establishes itself in Lusaka, Zambia, under Herbert Chitepo.

1966

ZANLA guerrillas engage Rhodesian security forces at Chinhoyi (formerly Sinoia) in the northeast. Constitutional talks with Britain fail. The UN imposes selective mandatory economic sanctions.

1967

ZAPU and the South African ANC send guerrillas into the northwest. At this stage, ZAPU has a larger, more active army than ZANU.

1968

The UN imposes comprehensive mandatory sanctions. Further constitutional talks with Britain fail.

1969

A new constitution is introduced. The Land Tenure Act replaces the Land Apportionment Act. The government seeks to expand European agricultural land, despite massive underutilization of land. Agricultural and settlement land is divided as follows: Europeans (40 percent), African communally owned land which is now called Tribal Trust Land (41.4 percent), Purchase Areas (3.8 percent). More Africans are evicted from European land.

1970

Rhodesia is declared a republic. Internal feuding occurs in ZAPU/ZIPRA in Zambia.

1971

ZANLA steps up war in northeast from bases in Portuguese-controlled Mozambique. ZAPU/ZIPRA feuding leads to losses of personnel to ZANU/ZANLA and to a new organization, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). Britain requires a British–Rhodesian constitutional settlement to obtain African approval. Africans are permitted to organize and Bishop Muzorewa forms the African National Council. ZANLA becomes the more active and larger of the two guerrilla armies, both of which fight a rural-based war. ZANLA recruits chiefly from the Shona and ZIPRA from the Ndebele, reflecting also their respective operational areas.

1972

Britain’s Pearce Commission reports that Africans oppose the proposed constitution.

1973

The Smith–Muzorewa constitutional talks fail.
1974  The formal transition to majority rule in Mozambique starts. ZANU leaders in prison in Rhodesia remove Sithole as leader and replace him with Robert Mugabe. The Organization of African Unity forms the Front Line States (FLS) Presidents’ Committee. ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI announce agreement to form an umbrella organization under Muzorewa’s leadership. There follows a ceasefire, plans for constitutional talks, and the release of African nationalists imprisoned since 1964. The Nhari rebellion/mutiny creates a crisis in ZANU/ZANLA.

1975  Herbert Chitepo is assassinated in Lusaka, Zambia. Zambia blames internal party feuds and detains ZANU/ZANLA leaders in Lusaka, and Tanzania and Zambia close training camps. ZANLA field commanders in Tanzania and Mozambique agree to accept Mugabe as their leader. The Victoria Falls constitutional conference fails. Smith and Nkomo hold talks. Mozambique agrees to the formation of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), a guerrilla army uniting ZANLA and ZIPRA, to restart the stalled war.

1976  Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, and Smith meet in Pretoria. Smith later agrees to African majority rule in two years. Nkomo and Mugabe form the Patriotic Front (PF) under FLS pressure to present a united front at the Geneva constitutional talks, which fail. ZIPA is dismantled. ZANLA no longer operates from Zambia; it shifts to Mozambique. Rhodesian retaliatory attacks into Mozambique begin.

1977  ZANU elects Mugabe as president. ZIPRA’s Jason Moyo is killed by letter bomb in Lusaka, Zambia. There is a new Anglo-American constitutional initiative to end the war. Smith initiates “internal settlement” talks with Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chief Chirau. ZANU has some 3,000 guerrillas inside Rhodesia, and ZAPU a mere 100–200.

1978  The internal parties reach agreement, which the PF and the FLS reject. The agreement provides for a transitional government, universal franchise elections under a new constitution, and amnesty for guerrillas who lay down arms. Nkomo and Smith hold secret talks. The Rhodesian security forces attack Zambia. The war escalates. Guerrillas inside the country number some 9,000, 85 percent belonging to ZANLA.

1979  With sixty-four percent of the African vote in a separate election from Europeans, Muzorewa’s United African National Council (UANC) wins fifty-one of the seventy-two African seats; the RF wins all twenty-eight seats reserved for whites, and Muzorewa
becomes prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Whites continue to control the executive (and importantly, the military) and the judiciary. Muzorewa’s government fails to win international recognition and the lifting of sanctions because the guerrilla movements did not participate in the settlement. The war intensifies. An estimated 28,000 guerrillas (20,000 ZANLA) are inside the country at the ceasefire, with many thousands more outside. Commonwealth leaders meet in Lusaka and agree to conditions under which Britain should seek a constitutional resolution and an end to the war. Britain convenes the Lancaster House conference. Muzorewa’s team and the PF agree to a new constitution, a transitional government, and a ceasefire.

1980

ZANU contests the February election as ZANU(PF) and wins a majority; the RF wins all twenty seats reserved for whites. The guerrilla armies remain intact. The economy is still in white hands. Racial inequalities in wealth and income make Zimbabwe a world leader in inequality.
Abbreviations

ANC  African National Congress
BMATT  British Military Advisory and Training Team
BOGR  British Observer Group Report (on the 1980 elections)
BSAC  British South Africa Company
CADEC  Catholic Development Commission
CC  Constitutional Conference
CCJPZ  Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
CFU  Commercial Farmers’ Union
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency
CIO  Central Intelligence Organization
CMF  Commonwealth Monitoring Force
COG  Commonwealth Observer Group
COGR  Commonwealth Observer Group Report (on the 1980 elections)
CUSO  Canadian University Services Organization
DN  *Daily News*
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRPs  demobilization and reintegration programs
*FG*  *Financial Gazette*
FLS  Front Line States
FROLIZI  Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
HAD  House of Assembly Debates
IBA  International Bar Association
JHC  Joint High Command
LA  Legislative Assembly
LC  Legislative Council
LGPO  local government promotion officer
LRF  Legal Resources Foundation
MDC  Movement for Democratic Change
MP  Member of Parliament
NCO  non-commissioned officer
NDP  National Democratic Party

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-government organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCCZIM</td>
<td>Organization of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Mozambique</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
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<td>PSU</td>
<td>Police Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>Posts and Telecommunications Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PV</td>
<td>People’s Voice</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>Rhodesian African Rifles</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Rhodesian Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEED</td>
<td>Soldiers Employed in Economic Development</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>SM</td>
<td>Sunday Mail</td>
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<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>Sunday News</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organization</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>The Chronicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>TH</td>
<td>The Herald</td>
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<tr>
<td>UANC</td>
<td>United African National Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU(PF)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZBC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZESA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZHR</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZI</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Independent</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMFEP</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZINTEC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Integrated Teacher Education Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIPA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZMPC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Marketing Producers Cooperative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNWLWVA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZP</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZS</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Standard</td>
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<td>ZTV</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Television</td>
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This study examines the construction of a new political order in Zimbabwe through the prism of veterans of the war of liberation. My previous work, *Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, focused exclusively on rural people’s experiences of the guerrilla war. I remained curious about the guerrillas because I knew them only through the accounts of rural people in which they figured as both benefactors and brutal bullies. My interest was further piqued by what seemed a puzzle. On the one hand, the image of the guerrillas in the Zimbabwe media, especially from 1988 when their voices first became prominent in the public arena, was of “forgotten and neglected heroes” of the liberation war. On the other hand, political actors, including the regime and the former guerrillas themselves, consistently invoked their war credentials to legitimate their claims. How, I wondered, could a regime which based its legitimacy on the war of liberation treat the liberators so scandalously?

The puzzle of revered but neglected ex-combatants, this study will argue, was a manifestation of internal politics. The veterans’ lament that they were ignored and forgotten war heroes was both an important symbolic resource and a strategy to seek privileged access to state resources. Moreover, veterans’ claims to have been forgotten concealed how those who belonged to the ruling party had already benefited, often at the expense of guerrilla veterans of a minority party. The ruling party’s symbolic appeals to the war originated in its need to build power and legitimacy following the grim legacy of the peace settlement. Appeals to the liberation war as well as intimidation and violence were crucial resources for veterans and the ruling party as they collaborated and engaged in conflict with each other in pursuit of their agendas. This dynamic between war veterans and the ruling party persists in contemporary Zimbabwe. The party and veterans manipulate each other, quarrel and cooperate, and draw on a war discourse and violence to advance their agendas.

When I began this study of guerrilla veterans, there was no obviously relevant body of literature. Today, some ten years later, ending civil wars and rebuilding war-torn societies, collectively known as peace-building, are established international policy and scholarly concerns. More specifically, peace-building refers to operations that aim to prevent violence from reigniting after the initial
termination of hostilities – demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform, and social and economic development. As one commentator observed: “Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization.”

A product of the post-Cold War era, academic and policy interest in peacebuilding reflects at least two major changes. First, so-called intrastate or internal wars, comprising over 80 percent of all wars and casualties since the end of World War II, rose noticeably after the end of the Cold War. Second, no longer divided by superpower rivalries, the United Nations (UN) Security Council approved UN peacekeeping operations in these internal wars. Between 1988 and 1995, the UN established twenty-five peacekeeping operations compared with only thirteen in the preceding forty or so years of its existence. In the 1990s, the major sites of peace-building, as for civil wars, have been on the periphery of the international system – Namibia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola – but also in Bosnia and parts of the former Soviet Union. International relations scholars whose main staple had been interstate wars and superpower rivalries also shifted their attention to internal wars.

Indicators of the spectacular growth of interest in peace-building include donor-sponsored research, new scholarly publications and specializations, and shifting aid patterns. In 1992 then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali first identified peace-building as a UN priority and coined the term “post-conflict peace-building.” The UN Research Institute for Social Development has a War Torn Societies Project on “post-conflict,” the UN Institute for Disarmament Research had a Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project on demobilization, disarmament, and the proliferation and control of small arms after intrastate conflict, and UNESCO has a Culture of Peace program. The International Labor Organization is concerned with employment and training aspects related to ex-combatants’ reintegration. The World Bank produced influential studies of demobilization and reintegration in 1993 and 1996, and in 1995, James Wolfensohn, its president, declared that a Bank priority was to anticipate and organize for “post-conflict” economic development programs. In 1997 the World Bank established a Post-Conflict Unit within the Social Development Department and a Post-Conflict Fund. Think tanks and research institutes have climbed on the bandwagon too. The Peace Research Institute in Oslo directed a two-year collaborative project, Disarming Ethnic Guerrillas. The Bonn International Conversion Center sponsors studies of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. For scholars, the rising significance of peace-building may be measured by the proliferation of new
specialized journals, such as Civil Wars, International Peacekeeping, Global Governance, Journal of Peace and Development, Small Wars and Insurgencies, and academic posts for specialists in civil wars, post-conflict studies, and peace studies. The structure and size of international aid also reflects the new concern with war termination and post-war reconstruction. In 1994 total foreign aid to victims of internal wars reached an annual high of $7.2 billion. By 1996, emergency relief assistance had increased to 10 percent of global official development assistance and one-half of the UN aid budget at a time of shrinking aid budgets.

Peace-building is widely seen as made up of two phases. Studies of war-to-peace transitions focus on the first phase of peace-building. This covers negotiated settlements and/or settlements imposed through military victory. The “typical” post-Cold War settlement focuses on combatants, providing for full or partial demobilization, disarmament, and military integration. Reluctant donors and non-government organizations (NGOs) were pushed to broaden the recipients of their assistance from refugees and internally displaced people to include former combatants. The second phase of peace-building is referred to as the post-transition or peace consolidation phase. It begins after the implementation of the settlement, whether imposed or negotiated, and entails continuing efforts started during the transition to reform political institutions and the security sector and to pursue economic and social recovery, development, and change. Peace consolidation includes the reintegration of ex-combatants and other war-affected groups. Indeed, studies of demobilization and reintegration programs, which typically cut across the first and second peace-building phases, conceive of reintegration and demobilization as essential for peace-building. Peace-building studies, above all, seek to identify the conditions, determinants, or strategies for successful peace-building. Consequently, the literature is evaluative and prescriptive.

This book shares common terrain with, but also departs from, peace-building studies. Concerned with the peace settlement which formally terminated the guerrilla war for political independence and with programs for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (military and civilian) of ex-combatants, the book covers the familiar turf of studies of transition and peace consolidation. Its main point of departure from peace-building studies arises from its lack of interest in the conditions, determinants, or strategies of successful peace-building. Hence there is no attempt in this study to evaluate the success of the settlement or ex-combatants’ reintegration. Indeed, this study seeks to demonstrate how the evaluative orientation in peace-building studies is an obstacle to understanding the politics and outcomes of settlements and ex-combatant programs. Another difference is that while the peace-building literatures are preoccupied chiefly with the role of external actors, this study is concerned primarily with domestic political actors.
The study is organized around three major questions. First, how did the legacy of the settlement which formally terminated the guerrilla war for political independence shape post-war politics? Second, what strategies, resources, and agendas characterized the relationship of the war veterans and the ruling party after formal independence? Third, what were the political outcomes of their engagement for the ruling party, the veterans, and the society more generally? Insofar as this study focuses on actors’ resources, agendas, and strategies, its approach is similar to recent work on post-Cold War civil wars or “new” wars.23

I argue that the peace settlement was a harbinger of continued armed conflict and set the stage for the politics of guerrillas’ incorporation. The settlement had left intact and legitimated three rival armies – the Rhodesian forces and the two guerrilla armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA, which had fought for independence but also battled each other. It had also left undisturbed the Rhodesian-controlled bureaucracy and a white-controlled private sector whose African managers and workers were also deemed loyal to the Rhodesians. To build and legitimate power, the ruling party turned to the already powerful guerrillas and to symbolic appeals to the liberation war. At first, official programs treated both guerrilla armies equally. But the ruling party, ZANU(PF), and its ZANLA guerrillas could not conceal their preference for building power on an exclusively ZANLA guerrilla base and for using only ZANLA’s guerrilla struggle for legitimacy. Between 1980 and 1987, the new regime sanctioned and instigated violence and intimidation in collaboration with ZANLA ex-combatants as they both sought power in the army, the civil service, the private sector, and cooperatives. Both also used symbolic appeals to the war of liberation to justify their actions. By 1987 ZANU(PF) had consolidated its power. For their part, ZANLA guerrillas had won privileged access to resources. Among the ex-guerrillas of both armies, though, there was a sense of victimization, discrimination, and neglect by society and the party rather than privilege. Whether colluding or clashing with the ruling party, the guerrillas appealed to their war contributions to justify their quest for power and privilege. The outcome of this dynamic between the ruling party and its guerrilla veterans was a new violent and extractive political order. At the very least, the perpetrators of violence and the beneficiaries of extraction differed from those of the colonial period.

The argument I am making shares much in common with Frederick Cooper’s discussion of how African labor in the 1940s and 1950s used successfully the French and British colonial governments’ legitimating discourse of them being “industrial men” to justify their own demands for European wages and standards for labor conditions. After independence, when the independent African governments ceased to participate in this discourse, the dynamic of ever-expanding benefits gradually ceased.24 There is a parallel in the Zimbabwe study. Guerrilla
veterans were labeled “soldiers.” Both the settlement and the new regime endorsed the idea of the guerrillas as “soldiers” even though the constitution acknowledged the Rhodesian armed forces as being in charge of law and order. Guerrilla veterans often made successful use of the new regime’s legitimating discourse of them being “soldiers” to justify their own demands for the salaries and benefits accorded Europeans in the former Rhodesian army. In addition, guerrilla veterans used with some success the regime’s legitimating discourse about rewards for war sacrifices to justify their own demands for state benefits. At the time of writing, the war discourse and the cycle of expanding guerrilla veterans’ benefits persist. The ruling party and veterans invoke their war sacrifices and war goals to legitimate their continued struggle for economic justice, including the right to take white-owned land without compensation. Though the chief opposition party rejects rewarding war sacrifices, it invokes the war of liberation to justify its struggle for democratization.

The findings of this study contribute to a revisionist interpretation of Zimbabwe’s “peace-building” experiences and draw attention to inherent limitations in peace-building studies more generally. Studies of Zimbabwe’s settlement celebrated the political transition in 1980 as a triumph. Studies of military integration lauded its success whereas studies of integration programs for the demobilized tended to deplore their failure. Focused on evaluations in terms of subjective peace-building measures, these studies missed how the settlement set the stage for subsequent violent conflict and how veterans’ programs were characterized by a central political dynamic in which the ruling party and its liberation war veterans collaborated to establish power and privilege in ways that built a violent and extractive political order. The Zimbabwe study highlights how the orientation in peace-building studies toward evaluation in terms of externally imposed criteria produces unreliable evaluations and misses how settlements, politics, and power agendas may shape political outcomes antithetical to peace-building.

The limits of peace-building studies

The discourse of peace-building used by international organizations and NGOs has permeated the academic literature on peace-building. The most trenchant critiques of the peace-building discourse have come from students of the dynamics of “new” wars. They portray these conflicts as posing particular challenges for international actors engaged in war termination and reconstruction. In “old” wars, such as the anti-colonial struggles for independence, the contending sides were reasonably cohesive and well disciplined, the rebels’ goals were to capture and transform the state, and war termination was unambiguous. In contrast, “new” wars occur in the post-Cold War period in conditions
of rapid globalization and in weak states that lack efficacy and legitimacy. The warring actors engage in violence less to win or retain state power than to satisfy immediate and local security, psychological, and economic agendas. Leaders have limited control over their unpaid or under-paid fighting forces; military opponents often collude with each other to advance their economic interests; and regional and international economic networks help to sustain violent conflict and its beneficiaries. The structures and relationships that make it possible for some elites and non-elites to secure profit, protection, and power through violence persist after peace operations, underscoring how war and peace are not discrete events. Analysts of “new” wars point to the need for outside actors to recognize these special features of contemporary warfare if they are to terminate wars and reconstruct states and societies.

The portrait of Zimbabwe’s war and post-war politics in this volume suggests that the differences between “old” and “new” wars are overstated. This chapter will draw attention to collaboration and violent contestation between and within the African nationalist movements, thus underscoring the limits of ideological cohesion and leadership control. Elsewhere I argued that rebel violence in Zimbabwe’s war of independence served not just to win state power but also to advance local and immediate purposes, such as youths’ power against elders, women’s quest to end marital violence, non-ruling lineages’ resentments toward chiefly lineages, and youths’ and guerrillas’ extraction of resources from civilians. Moreover, this study shows that the transition, despite its much-heralded success, did not mark an identifiable break between war and peace. After independence, the elite and the guerrilla veterans who fought under the banner of state transformation often used violence and the fact of their war participation to demand and legitimate their privileged access to state resources. These dynamics of an anti-colonial war and post-war politics have some commonalities with “new” wars.

The critique of peace-building studies in this chapter is distinctive in two ways. It derives from the examination of an “old” war and it investigates two arenas which have received almost no fundamental criticism: studies of war-to-peace transitions and studies of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. The critical analysis of peace-building literatures in this study of an “old” war resonates with many of the general objections raised by those who study “new” wars. Both concur that peace-building discourse conceals the politics and history of wars and also the agendas of international actors and/or scholars and practitioners who participate in the peace-building discourse. However, the specifics of the critique differ. How peace-building studies rely on subjective and arbitrary criteria for evaluations of success and how this predisposes them to miss important dimensions of politics is demonstrated for both studies of transitions and studies of programs to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants.
Studies of transitions

Subjective, arbitrary, and externally imposed evaluative criteria

Analysts use a variety of criteria to measure the success of transitions. These subjective and arbitrary criteria cannot provide consistent measures and they impose external peace-building agendas on domestic actors. A common measure of a successful transition is the end of the war. This measure is itself subject to different criteria – ending multiple sovereignty and/or reducing the number of battle deaths. When analysts specify the maximum number of battle deaths that are permitted for a transition to be considered a success, their thresholds often differ as do the time periods over which they require these declines in battle deaths to prevail. Other measures include a successful negotiated settlement, compliance with “free and fair” elections, or full compliance with all the settlement provisions. Some criteria of success are more demanding and require democratization that goes beyond merely “free and fair” elections. As shown below, the application of each measure requires analysts to make further subjective interventions. Given the subjectivity of the exercise, it is miraculous that there is ever agreement on which transitions have been successful. In this regard, the Zimbabwe case is intriguing: it has been almost universally hailed a success.

Analysts who agree to measure the success of a transition by when a war ends often differ on what criteria to use. For Roy Licklider a civil war ends, whether through negotiated settlement or military victory, when one of two criteria is met. There must be either an end to multiple sovereignty or fewer than 1,000 battle deaths in each of five consecutive years. Following Charles Tilly, Licklider defines multiple sovereignty as the population of an area obeying more than one institution. Licklider quotes Tilly: “They pay taxes [to the opposition], provide men to its armies, feed its functionaries, honor its symbols, give time to its service, or yield other resources despite the prohibitions of a still-existing government they formerly obeyed.” Because it is possible that the battle deaths may stem from a different war, Licklider distinguishes between ongoing wars which have the same sides and issues and wars with different sides or issues. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis use different criteria for identifying when a war ends. They specify a lenient measure of peace-building following civil wars, whether they end in negotiated or imposed settlements: “an end to the war and to residual lower-level violence and uncontested sovereignty” for two years. Leaving aside the different battle death numbers which they require for a conflict to be labeled a civil war and hence for a war to end, their criteria differ from Licklider’s in the two years for reduced violence (rather than five years), and the necessity that multiple sovereignty end (rather than be an alternative measure of a war’s end). Like Licklider, Doyle and Sambanis also must decide when battle deaths are part of an ongoing or new war.
Our rule of thumb for coding separate war events was the following: If a war ended in a peace settlement and then restarted after a period of peace, we coded a separate war event. Other rules of thumb for coding separate war events were the following: If a different war started while a previous war was ongoing in the same country, we coded separate war events (e.g., the Tigrean and Eritrean wars in Ethiopia). If the parties and issues to a war changed dramatically during an ongoing conflict, we coded a separate war events [sic] (e.g., the Afghan war before and after Taliban). We collapsed two or more war events in other data sets in a single observation if the parties and the issues were the same; if less than 2 years or other substantial period of peace intervened between the first and second event; if large-scale fighting continued during the intervening period, and if the case-study literature treats those wars as a single war.35

Analysts also provide different criteria for when negotiated settlements of civil wars can be said to effect a successful transition. For Walter, removing multiple competing armies to end the war is “one of the main objectives of any peace treaty.”36 As she puts it: “The key difference between interstate and civil war negotiations is that adversaries in a civil war cannot retain separate, independent armed forces if they agree to settle their differences.”37 Thus she differs from Licklider, for whom eliminating multiple sovereignty is not essential for a war to end. Walter offers three criteria for successful negotiated settlements. First, a treaty had to be jointly drafted by all combatants through give-and-take bargaining. Second, the agreement had to keep the opposition intact as a bargaining entity. Third, it had to end the war for at least five years. If a formal peace treaty was signed but broke down within this time period, it was considered a failed attempt.38

Walter codes a war as having experienced negotiations “if both sides had enough bargaining power to elicit important concessions from each other, if factions actually held face-to-face talks, if issues relevant to resolving the war were discussed, and if talks appeared to be undertaken in good faith.”39

Fen Hampson’s measures for a successful negotiated settlement have similarities and differences: “in the short term, if societies are to make this transition [from war to peace], the key considerations are these: Did civil strife and violence end? And did the parties fulfill the commitments they agreed to under the settlement?”40 Like Walter, Hampson seems to believe that it is important for the parties to an agreement to have face-to-face talks. He asserts: “it is absolutely essential that all the warring parties have a seat at the negotiating table and are directly involved in discussions about the new constitutional and political order that will be created after the fighting stops.”41 Establishing whether parties comply with a settlement is itself obviously subjective. For example, some analysts evaluate the Truth Commission in El Salvador as a failure,42 while others consider it to have been a success.43 Hampson evaluates El Salvador’s negotiated settlement as a success because the violations were not serious enough to upset the peace process or to undermine the elections.44

Compliance with settlement provisions to hold “free and fair” elections is a common measure of successful transitions. The evidence does not support
either Samuel Huntington’s claim that free and fair elections provide “a single, relatively clear . . . criterion” of democracy or Gisela Geisler’s belief that one can establish clear standards of free and fair elections to enable international observer election teams to avoid subjective and inconsistent evaluations. Where most others have seen democratic transitions in the 1980s, an analyst argues that few third world countries actually meet the conditions for liberal democracy because of violence and official restrictions on participation and representation in elections. Some judge the UN-supervised Cambodian elections of 1993 to have been a triumph and the mark of a successful transition. Others point to factors that undermined “free and fair” elections. It has recently been suggested that “free and fair” elections set too high a standard for democracy in the inauspicious context of implementing peace accords, that a better standard would be the promotion of reconciliation among the warring parties, and that its measure of success be the contenders’ acceptance of the election result.

Some analysts use more demanding measures of peace-building than ending a war, a successful negotiated settlement, or compliance with some or all settlement provisions. Doyle and Sambanis propose a stricter peace-building measure which requires a minimum standard of democratization for two years. It is also the measure they prefer “because it reflects a higher order of peace but requires only a minimum standard of political openness.” Pauline Baker criticizes conflict management which makes ending the war a priority and proposes criteria for success which parallel the distinction Doyle and Sambanis make between lenient and strict peace-building. According to Baker, since the end of the Cold War, “peace is no longer acceptable on any terms; it is intimately linked with the notion of justice. Conflict resolution is not measured simply by the absence of bloodshed; it is assessed by the moral quality of the outcome.” This includes “the need to bring human rights abusers to justice, establish political legitimacy, establish the rule of law, and build new state structures that can earn the confidence and trust of the people.” Fen Hampson makes a similar distinction. Though he uses a lenient measure of a successful transition, he remarks that for a peace settlement to be durable, institutions and support structures must be put in place so that the parties are discouraged from taking up arms again. “The ultimate success of the peace-building process in situations of civil conflict is thus directly related to a society’s ability to make an effective transition from a state of war to a state of peace marked by the restoration of civil order, the reemergence of civil society, and the establishment of participatory political institutions.”

There is nothing novel in the claim that evaluative criteria are subjective and arbitrary, though war termination analysts often hide behind appeals to the “consensus of experts.” Some war termination scholars draw attention to the subjective standards used to evaluate transitions without critiquing the orientation of war termination studies toward evaluation in terms of externally
imposed criteria. A student of war termination alerts readers to the subjective and arbitrary nature of what counts as a civil war and when it can be said to have ended. Moreover, he warns of the pitfalls of using battle-death counts to determine when a war ends. However, his point is that subjective criteria vitiate against any single formula for war termination. Similarly, the introduction to Keeping the Peace provides an excellent overview of the range of criteria to evaluate transitions. Perhaps reflecting the belief among many war termination scholars that they are engaged in objective evaluation, the study of peacekeeping in El Salvador and Cambodia reports as a major finding the existence of multiple standards of evaluation:

the very concept of success and failure is ambiguous in these complex operations. It can signify the successful implementation of the mandate detailed in the initial Secretary-General’s report. It could also mean the successful implementation of the peace agreement which . . . may not be identical to . . . the mandate the Secretariat drafted. Success can also be measured against the fundamental purposes – long-term peace, democratization, human rights, the rule of law, social and economic development – which may be reflected in the peace agreement. But even if those principles are not specifically reflected in the treaty, there are underlying purposes of the United Nations itself that should govern the actions of the peacekeepers . . . And lastly, success may be measured against much more pragmatic standards: did the peace operation reduce the pre-existing level of violence, promote a modicum of stable centralizing government, permit citizens to return to something resembling their pre-war lives? Sometimes, achieving success along one measure may require bending another. We will try to be clear as we discuss success and failure in each instance, but we aware [sic] that there is more than one standard against which these difficult operations should be measured.

As is evident, the study endorses the variety of standards and does not find the subjective nature of peacekeeping evaluations reason to question their merit.

Leaving aside the many interpretive issues which scholars of success and failure must confront, it is noteworthy that some violate both their own criteria and seemingly indisputable facts. A few examples will suffice. Recall that Barbara Walter makes the removal of multiple sovereignty a prerequisite of a successful negotiated settlement and coded a war as having experienced negotiations if both sides had enough bargaining power to elicit important concessions from each other, if factions actually held face-to-face talks, if issues relevant to resolving the war were discussed, and if talks appeared to be undertaken in good faith. Zimbabwe’s peace settlement did not meet many of these requirements, but it does not interfere with her judgment that the transition was a success. The Lancaster House settlement did not end multiple sovereignty and factions did not hold face-to-face talks. At the end of the war, the three major competing armies remained intact. Britain was thrust into the role of mediator during the negotiations because the factions refused to talk to each other. Indeed, there is little in her analysis of the conditions for Zimbabwe’s “success,” and thus
her theory of credible commitment, that can withstand scrutiny. Contrary to her claims, the warring parties did not agree to any military power-sharing (let alone “extensive power-sharing”), and Britain was not willing to use force to punish violators of the treaty. Though Hampson, like Walter, makes face-to-face talks a requirement for a successful settlement, he does not allow SWAPO’s exclusion from the Geneva Accords of 1988 to interfere with his evaluation of the Namibian settlement as a success. Sometimes he alludes to SWAPO’s exclusion from the talks; mostly he overlooks their absence from the negotiations. Like Walter, he makes much of the importance of power-sharing in settlements. But the Cambodian settlement, contrary to his claim, did not provide for electoral power-sharing. A final example comes from a recent study by Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis. They identify two wars in Zimbabwe, one between 1972 and 1979 and one in 1984. At odds with almost all evaluations of the transition in 1980, these authors judge peace-building after Zimbabwe’s liberation war a failure and peace-building after the 1984 war a success. Yet they acknowledge that their coding for the two wars “differs from the guidelines” for lenient peace-building. For example, the low level of violence and the return of sovereignty after the liberation war should lead them to evaluate the transition a success. Instead, they note: “After the end of the civil war, there was continued violence against civilians, both by the government and by the Rhodesians. We therefore code this as a PB [peace-building] failure. However, the remaining violence was small and the government was sovereign and normalization policies were implemented. By the country’s standards, therefore, this case should be judged as a PB success.” Doyle and Sambanis do not explain why they disregard their own criteria in evaluating lenient peace-building. Equally disconcerting, contrary to their claim, the government was not sovereign for most of the first two years after the settlement but contended with three competing armies. The failure of some war termination authorities to apply their own criteria or establish conditions of success in accordance with what might be regarded as straightforward facts underscores the inconsistencies that bedevil studies of transition.

Suppressing actors’ power, politics, and history
Oriented toward evaluating success in terms of externally imposed criteria, studies of transition suppress power, politics, and history. Measuring success requires ignoring important dimensions of politics. By looking more closely at the implementation of measures of the end of war and of settlement compliance, it will become apparent how the act of measurement inevitably distorts and suppresses politics and history. In particular, transitions deemed “successful” privilege peace-building agendas over domestic actors’ war agendas, and foreclose ongoing inquiry into how settlements may be used as instruments to advance domestic actors’ war agendas or how the war past and the legacy of the
settlement may loom large in post-settlement politics. The divorce of these measures of success from the history and politics of wars and settlements must also jeopardize the validity of evaluations of transitions. The dichotomy between war and peace which underpins studies of transition can only be sustained by ignoring evidence.

Labeling wars by type and declaring when a war ends, two independent problems which affect evaluations of transitions, come together in the case of Zimbabwe and illustrate how evaluations inevitably simplify complex histories. Calling Zimbabwe’s war of liberation in the 1970s a racial or identity war, at the crux of most evaluations of the country’s transition as a success,66 eclipses the struggle for power among African nationalists, including the two guerrilla parties. Atlas and Licklider’s analysis illustrates the point. They depict the liberation struggle as a “black–white civil war” which ended through a negotiated settlement. They label a subsequent war (allegedly from 1983 to 1984) as “a black-on-black armed conflict between former civil war allies” who “had fought to bring Ian Smith’s Rhodesia to an end.”67 Atlas and Licklider explain the outbreak of a new war between former war-time allies in psychological terms. During civil wars, the demonization of the other “helps hold allies together in their wartime coalition” but after a settlement, “the fundamental us/them dichotomy begins to break down, the cohesiveness of groups on either side dissipates, and disputes among allies who are now more cognitively aware of their differences and conflicting interests can easily result.”68 But Atlas and Licklider themselves refer to the war-time relationship between the two guerrilla parties and their leaders as lacking cohesion. “From the beginning, the two organizations differed ‘over strategy, tactics, and purpose, which persisted into independence. Neither the common enemy nor the shared overall objective of liberation could bridge the divide.’”69 That the two guerrilla movements failed to unite during the liberation war alone suggests that the war was always more complicated than a race-based war, and that it cannot be divorced from the subsequent “black-on-black” armed conflict.70 Atlas and Licklider’s evaluation of the transition in Zimbabwe as a success depends on ignoring their own evidence that the liberation war also involved struggles for political power among Africans. Omitting such historical complexities about the war must reduce the reliability of their evaluation of a successful transition in Zimbabwe. At the same time, declaring the transition a success forecloses examining how actors used the settlement to further their own war agendas and how those agendas and the settlement shaped post-war conflict.

Simplifying complex war histories enters the evaluative project that dominates war termination studies in other ways too. Some war termination scholars merely differentiate civil wars from interstate wars, thus downplaying significant differences among civil wars.71 Steven David is right to criticize studies of internal war for treating all internal wars as if they are alike, and thus of being too generalized. But he is wrong in his proposed solution. “Better to concentrate
on differentiating internal wars by type and seeing what kinds of contingent generalizations can be produced. Categorizing internal wars by origin is a good first start... Making these distinctions will be difficult and scholars will have to be scrupulous in applying objective criteria over the range of cases.”\textsuperscript{72} Some war termination scholars, as already noted, do distinguish civil wars according to type.\textsuperscript{73} They would do well to heed Chester Crocker’s warning that labeling wars inevitably simplifies complex histories, and that even the purest cases of ethnic conflict conceal many other important factors.\textsuperscript{74} The following example highlights how labeling wars obscures more than it reveals. When Licklider examines whether some types of wars are more amenable to negotiated settlements than others, he divides civil wars “rather crudely” into those primarily driven by ethnic-religious-identity issues and those “driven by other concerns (primarily socioeconomic).”\textsuperscript{75} He identifies both Zimbabwe’s liberation war and the Matabeleland war as identity wars,\textsuperscript{76} just as he does in a later co-authored study comparing four settlements which dissolve in war. In this latter study, Atlas and Licklider contradict the classification of the Matabeleland conflict as an identity war when they acknowledge the importance of distributive issues.\textsuperscript{77} All this demonstrates not only how arbitrary the distinction between identity and socioeconomic wars is and how inconsistent war termination scholars often are, but also how labeling wars requires suppressing politics and history.

When analysts assess compliance with select or all settlement provisions as a measure of successful transition, they subordinate the politics of settlement implementation to peace-building. Declaring adequate compliance inevitably requires privileging instances of actors’ cooperation and consent (or at least the appearance thereof) over conflict. Some examples may be illustrative. Those who reject the view that the Cambodian elections were “free and fair” point to factors which positive assessments of the elections must suppress. In particular, the governing party refused to recognize its opponent’s electoral victory and international pressures finally resulted in the two forming a coalition government.\textsuperscript{78} Also, three major parties alleged that there had been electoral fraud, the Khmer Rouge boycotted the election, and citizens could not enjoy freedom of movement and freedom from fear.\textsuperscript{79} Analysts of Zimbabwe’s settlement who use compliance as a measure of success invariably highlight the holding of “adequately” free and fair elections and the fact that the ceasefire held, thereby overlooking widespread non-compliance with settlement terms by all parties: Mugabe’s party’s infiltration of thousands of guerrillas after the start of the ceasefire; his party’s rampant violence and intimidation in the countryside during the election campaign by guerrillas who should have been in assembly places; the concealment of arms by both guerrilla parties; and Rhodesian regime force violence and intimidation.\textsuperscript{80}

Evaluations of compliance also often conceal the role of external actors’ power and politics. Bertram acknowledges: “The claim that there are objective standards of human rights and of democracy to which all parties may be held
without prejudice may be ethically and theoretically compelling. But in the highly politicized context of creating or re-creating a state’s institutions, it is politics and power that dictate who will interpret such standards and how.”

Similarly, Stedman highlights the politics of the Cambodian settlement being declared a success.

Akashi [UN secretary-general’s special representative in Cambodia] believed that compliance on most of the dimensions of the peace process, including demobilization and disarmament, and human rights protection, was secondary to compliance with holding an election. The election became a “holy grail” for UNTAC; Akashi defined the mission’s success solely on the basis of achieving it, and the myriad goals of UNTAC’s mandate – promotion and protection of human rights, disarmament and demobilization, and administrative control during the transition – were made subservient to this quest. In the end, this even included rejecting a “strict adherence” to the results of the election; Akashi and UNTAC did not insist that the political outcome of the election accurately reflect the electoral outcome, for fear that it would undermine the triumph of holding the election.

Evaluating a transition as a success in terms of compliance means adopting a perspective of settlements as instruments of peace and disregarding how they may have been used as instruments to advance actors’ war agendas. Acknowledging the difficulties of the task, Stephen Stedman counsels the UN to identify those warring actors who really threaten the peace, the spoilers, and to prevent them from undermining settlements.

The custodians of peace must constantly probe the intentions of warring parties: they must look for evidence that parties who sign peace agreements are sincere in their commitment to peace, and they must seek and make good use of intelligence about the warring parties’ goals, strategies, and tactics. Custodians must also judge what is right or wrong, just or unjust, and fair or unfair in peace processes.

But the foregoing demonstrates that objective and politically neutral assessments of settlement compliance are chimerical.

In summary, evaluating success is an important part of studies of transitions. First, the measures of success are subjective, arbitrary, and impose peace-building agendas, thus compromising scholars’ ability to make sound evaluations and capture actual outcomes. Second, because studies of transition evaluate peace-building in terms of externally imposed criteria, they neglect power, politics, and history and so diminish further the reliability of evaluations. The use of compliance and the end of a war as criteria of success plays a critical role in forcing analysts to submerge politics and history in their evaluations. It is difficult to accept an upbeat in-house disciplinary assessment that “there is lots of interesting work going on in a field which did not exist a few years ago.”

Scholars of all disciplines need to liberate the study of transitions from its evaluative straitjacket and to generate new paradigms that encourage analysis
that is more grounded in the study of history and power. This study is not directly concerned with evaluating transitions. However, its findings suggest that evaluations of whether actors’ agendas have shifted from war-making to peace-making should emerge from an open-ended examination of what actors do and say and from the resulting political outcomes rather than from imposing “peace-building” criteria.

Rather than seeking to evaluate the settlement as an instrument of peace, this study shows how domestic and external actors used the settlement to promote their own agendas. Ex-combatants and their party and military leaders are shown to have distinct though often overlapping agendas. Actors’ violations of, as well as compliance with, settlement provisions provide insight into their agendas and strategies. The findings of the study also illuminate how the settlement itself changed the terrain of future political conflict and shaped the domestic actors’ strategies and resources. Ex-combatants were born powerful at independence because the settlement left them armed and concentrated. The new leadership further empowered its own ex-guerrillas by making the war and their war contribution central to its legitimation, as it sought to build its own power which the settlement had curtailed severely. The ruling party’s guerrilla war and its war veterans became important assets to the leadership. But the guerrilla veterans of the chief opposition party continued to constitute a threat to the leadership’s quest for exclusive power. The struggle for power between the two guerrilla parties which had bedeviled efforts at a united effort against white minority rule during the liberation war persisted through the implementation of the settlement and shaped the first seven years of the post-war period. The bloodshed of these years cannot be divorced from the bloody fighting between the two guerrilla armies during the liberation struggle.

**Studies of demobilization and reintegration programs**

*Subjective, arbitrary, and externally imposed evaluative criteria*

Measures of reintegration include the achievement of stability and/or attainable project goals, the elimination of material and/or non-material differences between combatants and non-combatants, and the emergence of social stratification among ex-combatants. For demobilization, some measures include disarmament and disbandment while others focus solely on disbandment. These measures are clearly subjective, arbitrary, and impose analysts’ preferences on domestic actors. Different measures of reintegration and demobilization may alter the evaluation of programs, underscoring the extent to which program evaluations are hostage to analysts’ preferences. Moreover, analysts often apply these measures in ways that are inconsistent with their own criteria or evidence. For these reasons, evaluations of demobilization and reintegration lack utility.
The definition, goal, and sometimes also the measure of reintegration is generally the attainment of a stable, consensual society. Whether reintegration requires a return to an allegedly better past or movement toward a better future has been contentious. Some demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) studies, like some studies of refugees,\textsuperscript{85} rightly object that reintegration implies the society to which ex-combatants and other displaced groups return has not changed or does not need to change. A report evaluating a program for ex-combatants in El Salvador complains that the Salvadoran government and USAID accept uncritically that pre-war society had been integrated. “The term ‘re-integration into the agrarian sector’ is nothing more than an empty phrase. All that remains of this sector is the product of a series of disastrous agrarian policies that, since 1932, have had a collective impact that was quite possibly as great as the havoc of the civil war.”\textsuperscript{86} Similarly, a study of the social and economic integration of war-affected people in Namibia notes that reintegration can be taken to imply that the social and economic environment to which people return has not changed since they left: it is the returnees who have changed and they who have to adapt back to what they find. In practice, whether the migrant has been away for a few weeks or many years, there will have been sufficient, sometimes intangible and invisible changes in physical and social environments so that both stayers and returnees have consciously to learn new ways to co-exist.\textsuperscript{87}

The Namibian study also criticizes the erroneous implication that there was once integration in “southern African dependencies and the coercively repressed societies they contained.”\textsuperscript{88} These objections to reintegration are analogous to criticisms of the terms “rehabilitation” and “reconstruction” of war-torn societies, both of which also imply the desirability of returning to pre-war conditions.\textsuperscript{89} To allow for change in the society and the returning group, critics prefer the term “integration.” Similarly, critics of “rehabilitation” and “reconstruction” of war-torn societies posit that the goals should be reform and construction.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite these criticisms, the concept and often the measure of (re)integration retains the core ideas of stability and consent. The study of reintegration of war-affected people in Namibia in 1993, referred to above, defines reintegration in terms of states’ desire for a self-regulating social stability.

In post-war society, the rural poor, for example, do not see their daily struggle as part of an integrating process. To the state, however, their unaided success in this as individuals, families and communities, even to levels which keep them among the most marginal of social categories, is taken as evidence that something called integration is being achieved. In this, it can be said that there is integration when, regardless of social status, people work through their lives with sufficient tolerance of each other to contain differences as they arise, without a general collapse of social order.\textsuperscript{91}

In a 1997 article on integration in Namibia, the same author again makes stability the chief goal and measure of integration,\textsuperscript{92} though it now depends critically on
government intervention. William Zartman understands political integration of ex-combatants to entail their inclusion in the political system which previously excluded them, the result being non-violent politics and stability. For the World Bank, economic reintegration “implies the financial independence of an ex-combatant’s household through productive and gainful employment.” Recognizing that this goal, even in a favorable macroeconomic environment, may be unattainable, the Bank proposes a lesser goal for reintegration that requires not the outright eradication of poverty among ex-combatants but merely the avoidance of strife, meeting the basic needs of the most vulnerable, and improving conditions for long-term progress. A study of Eritrean reintegration endorses the desirability of measuring success in terms of a project’s realizable objectives and rejects measuring achievement in terms of whether programs fulfill the aspirations of their beneficiaries. “It is the inclination of people to aspire to more than they have, making it difficult to measure achievement in terms of feelings expressed. Results will inevitably be disappointing unless aspirations are realistic. It is more appropriate to gauge achievements in terms of a project’s realizable objectives.” Stability, non-violence, consent, and avoidance of strife all have prominence in these concepts (and sometimes also measures) of reintegration.

A common measure of the success of reintegration is the elimination of differences between ex-combatants and non-combatants. Reintegration programs tend to focus on ironing out material distinctions between ex-soldiers and non-combatants. To evaluate ex-soldiers’ reintegration in Ethiopia, a recent study asks: “to what extent are they [ex-soldiers] similar or dissimilar to the rest of the population. [sic] ... Do they have a similar standard of living? Do they have access to similar resources and assets? What support did they get to help their reintegration?” A study of reintegration of ex-combatants in Mozambique uses a similar measure of reintegration: “reintegration is considered to be complete when fundamental factors distinguishing ex-combatants from other members of their communities cease to exist. Consequently, an assessment of the current state of reintegration, more than evaluating eventual results of reintegration programmes, has to be based on contrasting local communities and their ex-combatants.” This is perhaps the most popular measure and one to which international agencies often subscribe. Rather than measuring integration in terms of closing material gaps between ex-combatants and non-combatants, the narrowing of non-material differences may also be part of the measure of integration. A study of Namibian ex-combatants’ integration refers to the containment of gender, political, and ethnic differences in the army and police as an indicator of successful reintegration.

Still others prefer to measure the success of integration in terms of widening wealth differentials and the fulfillment of ex-combatants’ expectations rather than basic needs. The authors of a study of ex-combatant integration in
Mozambique directly take on those who define and measure reintegration in terms of reducing visible difference between the demobilized and non-combatants among whom they live. First, they say it is difficult to identify a social norm against which to measure the relative integration of the demobilized since the recent decades of war in Mozambique have resulted in such widespread dislocation and accompanying changes in demographic profile and patterns of livelihood. Second, they object to the focus on removing material differences because it excludes other important differences which relate to the demobilised’s experience and are relevant to their sense of being “reintegrated”. These include a deeply felt need for compensation for the direct suffering they experienced during the war as well as for the opportunity cost of being involved in it, and a need for non-discriminatory recognition by the government in the form of pensions and other benefits. In this sense, the demobilised do not want “reintegration” if that means going back to the status quo ante.

Third, they draw on literature on relocation which suggests that absence of difference may indicate lack of integration and which sees widening wealth differentials, growing social stratification, and the emergence of a class structure as an indicator of reintegration.

The measure of demobilization also varies, depending on whether it is defined to include disarmament. Demobilization is often understood as a process “by which the armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces such as guerrilla armies) either downsize or completely disband.” At the individual level, demobilization refers to “the process of releasing combatants from a mobilised state.” Another understanding of demobilization includes the assembly and disarmament of combatants: “Combatants are in the process of demobilizing when they have reported to an assembly area or camp, have surrendered their weapons and uniforms, but are awaiting final discharge.”

Different measures may produce divergent evaluations, underscoring how much assessments of success are hostage to analysts’ preferences. Two studies of reintegration in Mozambique in 1997 illustrate how different measures of reintegration may produce different evaluations. Where reintegration was measured by a shrinking difference between the problems of former combatants and non-combatants, reintegration was found to be successful. Where reintegration was measured by the government’s responsiveness to the demands of ex-combatants for compensation in the form of pensions, ex-combatants were found to be a threat to future stability. When demobilization is understood to include disarmament, Borges Coelho and Vines find the UN-supervised demobilization in Mozambique to be a success. A few years later, Vines defines demobilization as distinct from disarmament, and declares disarmament during the Mozambican settlement a failure. In particular, he criticizes the UN mandate
for not distinguishing between disarmament and demobilization, for not spelling out what disarmament should entail, and for not providing criteria for the success of disarmament. He implies his preferred criteria. “For ONUMOZ to have disarmed all armed individuals would have been an impossible task, but the weapons it did obtain and which were earmarked for decommissioning could have been destroyed.”

Analysts’ criteria are often contradictory and shifting, and they do not always apply their criteria in ways that are consistent with their evidence. In the above-mentioned studies of Namibia, measures of integration include self-sustaining stability, government strategies to contain differences, and the need to take into account the expectations of ex-combatants for compensation and recognition of their war services which would surely create differences. Insofar as containment of differences is the measure of success, the author finds evidence for it within the army and the police, but refers to division being created between the guerrilla veterans in the security forces and their former colleagues outside the army and police. First, it is unclear that the differences in the security forces are being contained as opposed to being eliminated through resignations of those whose grievances remain unaddressed, such as women veterans and former members of the South African forces. Second, while containment of differences seems to be the initial measure of successful integration and necessary for stability, the conclusion suggests that stability actually depends on the government maintaining status differences between ex-combatants inside and outside the security forces.

The encouragement given to those within the forces of law and order to disassociate themselves from former colleagues excluded from them, including those participating in the containment schemes, confirms the intentionality of the process of status differentiation between the two groups. Ultimately, it ensures that the former will restrain the latter, as and when it becomes necessary, so as to keep the peace.

Those who advocate that measures of reintegration ought to take into account how ex-combatants’ war experiences have shaped their expectations fail to acknowledge how ambiguous their evidence is on the legacy of the war for ex-combatant aspirations. Dolan and Shafer impute the following desires to Mozambican ex-combatants: “They want to be part of a wider process of reconstruction in a way which reflects their personal transformation, justifies their losses, and acknowledges their role in bringing about democracy.” The demobilized feel that they are owed compensation in the form of pensions and employment opportunities, the latter indicating “a desire to work for a living, not a desire to be paid off and sit idle.” Yet other evidence suggests serious limits on the extent to which the demobilized want the opportunity to work and contribute to reconstruction and democracy. We learn that they desire formal employment, not for the salary which is too low to provide a living
wage but for “opportunities to generate extra income, whether through bribe-taking or the use of company resources. It is these opportunities rather than the salary itself which make formal employment so attractive.”\textsuperscript{119} Also, ex-combatants are often loath to accept minimum wage employment, especially where such work “injures his dignity and view of himself.”\textsuperscript{120} There is a similar ambiguity about how war experiences have shaped ex-combatants’ ideas about integration in the 1997 Namibian study, insofar as the study recommends that the government heed ex-combatants’ expectations. Ex-combatants who fought for SWAPO “expected deferred compensation, in terms of work and housing, for the contribution they had made to Namibia’s independence. They looked to the state to provide it.”\textsuperscript{121} Frustrated veterans also make demands for government assistance “to realise their potential and contribute usefully to reconstruction.”\textsuperscript{122} However, not only the government but also the veterans emerge as uninterested in training which might enable veterans to make a contribution. In the new army, SWAPO veterans displayed “a pervasive reluctance” to train, and those who joined Development Brigades had little interest in “self-initiated project development” but “expected the government to assume indefinite responsibility for their welfare and employment.”\textsuperscript{123} In these studies of Namibia and Mozambique, ex-combatants talk about wanting to participate in reconstruction but their behavior suggests a strong sense of entitlement.

\textit{Suppressing politics, power, and history}

The measures of reintegration and demobilization, and indeed the very notion that DRPs are essential for peace-building,\textsuperscript{124} necessarily ignore politics, power, and history in ways which further undermine the soundness of evaluations. More specifically, measures of reintegration and demobilization usually disregard domestic actors’ agendas, have scant regard for their political resources to achieve their goals, and are insensitive to how specific war histories and settlements may shape domestic actors’ agendas and resources. Taking different measures of successful DRPs, these shortcomings will be demonstrated.

The conception of reintegration and demobilization as essential for peace-building in studies of DRPs conceals the post-Cold War ideology of international agencies. It is reasonable for governments and ex-combatants who do not seek to threaten peace to oppose demobilization. Governments may fear that demobilization itself will be a threat to peace. The federal government of Nigeria resisted demobilizing the vast numbers of men it had mobilized to fight a civil war because it claimed the country needed a large army to deter future threats to its sovereignty and survival and allegedly saw the demobilization of large numbers of soldiers who were unlikely to find alternative employment to be a political threat. From the government’s perspective, the political risks
of rapid demobilization made the heavy economic cost of supporting a large army in peace-time worthwhile. Only years after the war did the government begin a staggered demobilization of its forces.125 Uganda’s delayed demobilization after its civil war, though it has been used to point to the necessity of demobilization sooner or later, also illustrates rationales against immediate post-war demobilization.126 The military victors of the Napoleonic wars did not impose demobilization on the defeated forces in the peace settlement because they feared the demobilized men would engage in banditry and threaten the stability of the restored monarchy whose rule they wanted to support.127 Analysts of DRPs are themselves often mindful of how demobilization may create problems of crime and banditry. However, they merely assert the need for reintegration programs to contain such threats to security.128 Post-revolutionary and post-war regimes have often opted to demobilize armies,129 but they have also often viewed military mobilization as an engine of long-term progressive social transformation.130 In Zimbabwe, the government initially resisted demobilizing guerrillas, and only agreed to demobilize under strong British pressure. At least the military leader of the ruling party’s guerrilla force wanted all its members integrated into the new army. The presumption that full or partial demobilization is essential for peace-building has more to do with analysts’ beliefs about the relationship between demilitarization and development than with past and recent experiences.

Measuring success in terms of the attainment of realizable goals of DRPs runs into the problem of distinguishing between publicly expressed or formal program goals and hidden agendas. Governments, especially when DRPs provide a source of scarce funds, may subscribe to the ideals of reintegration and demobilization for peace-building purposes but pursue their own agendas. The findings of this study demonstrate the gap between public rhetoric and actual practice. The Zimbabwe government claimed that the creation of a professional, apolitical army was its goal, that the cooperative programs for the demobilized were to aid economic transformation and development, that demobilization funds were to help ex-combatants return to civilian life, and that all programs were to adhere to the principle of reconciliation.131 Yet while paying lip-service to these goals of professionalism, development, and reconciliation, the government infused almost all its programs with its power-building and legitimacy-seeking agendas which were antithetical to its official pronouncements. Creating instability, rather than the goal of stability, was often a means of building power on an exclusive political base. Few would dispute the need to probe official claims of intent against practice, including analysts of DRPs. However, using a project’s goals as a measure of success presumes rather than tests the sincerity of official goals. Employing this evaluative criterion has the effect of discounting the role of politics.
Measures of success which are predicated on closing or widening differences, material and otherwise, between ex-combatants and non-combatants also fail to address crucial politics. The more popular measure of successful reintegration is a narrowing of the material gap between combatants and non-combatants. This measure grows out of a perspective which identifies ex-combatants as materially vulnerable, having “needs” which must be met, but also having unrealistic expectations which must be discouraged. Proponents of this measure often make the case that ex-combatants ought not to be privileged because they fought and suffered in war; civilians also participated and suffered as much. Outside the mainstream is the measure of successful reintegration in terms of expanding wealth differentials in the population. This measure is rooted in a perspective which acknowledges the legitimacy of ex-combatant expectations for material and status recognition for their war services, and which believes government owes it to ex-combatants to meet their aspirations. Both measures, however, fail to take into account that decisions about who gets what are determined by politics, resources, and power rather than by either “needs” or “expectations.” In Zimbabwe, the ex-combatants used armed power (itself a legacy of the settlement), the ruling party’s dependence on them to build its power (also a settlement and war legacy), and powerful symbolic appeals to their war participation (a readily available war legacy) to back up their demands. Guerrilla veterans’ expectations were shaped partly by their ideas of justice, which themselves were historically formed by their concept of racial equality.

The Zimbabwe study shows the folly of using externally imposed measures of successful reintegration which neglect politics, power, and history. Despite lip-service to professionalism, development, and reconciliation, the ruling party used reintegration and demobilization programs to build power on its ex-guerrilla base. Its guerrillas came to be privileged vis-à-vis civilians and their guerrilla opponents, as they expected, because the ruling party sought to build power on them in the army, the civil service, and the economy. Their privileged position in the ruling party at independence owed much to the settlement legacy which left them with armed power, and the only potential power base for the relatively weak ruling party. They secured further privilege through powerful appeals to their war participation and the use of violence. Not all ruling party guerrillas were equally privileged, though. Guerrilla programs often discriminated, both intentionally and unintentionally, on the basis of education and gender. Guerrillas’ aspirations were shaped by European privilege, something the ruling party tried to resist, despite its acceptance of privileging guerrillas. Most benefits – assembly pay, food rations, army pay, and demobilization pay – were based on treating ex-combatants as African (rather than European) soldiers. To understand guerrilla privilege, and the differential impact
of programs on even those who were privileged, it is necessary to take into account the history and politics of the war, the settlement, and the post-war period.

Zimbabwe: the war and post-independence (1980–7)

This introduction to Zimbabwe has three goals. First, it is an opportunity to introduce the two guerrilla-based parties more fully. Second, it draws attention to a pattern of collaboration and often violent contestation in the relations between the guerrillas and their leaders during the war. Since a major theme of this study is that guerrilla veterans were both assets and threats to the leadership in the independence period, this background suggests important continuities between the war and post-war years. Pointing to disunities within nationalist guerrilla movements also hopefully will help to counter a growing literature that distinguishes ideologically unified nationalist guerrilla wars from less coherent post-independence or post-Cold War internal wars. Third, it provides a brief introduction to the dominant political struggles of the period which affected all the veterans’ programs. I begin with an introduction of the guerrilla-based parties, then move to the relationship between the guerrillas and their leaders, and finally offer an overview of post-independence political strife in the first seven years of independence.

The guerrilla-based parties

Led by Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU was a continuation of the first African mass nationalist movement in the country. ZANU formed as a breakaway party in August 1963 under the leadership of Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. In 1964 both parties were banned, their leaders were detained and imprisoned, and the organizations relocated to Lusaka, Zambia. Both parties had already begun to train guerrillas. ZAPU had started training guerrillas before the split with ZANU but the latter’s army, ZANLA, had the first major engagement with the Rhodesian armed forces in April 1966. ZAPU was spurred to military action. In 1967 and 1968, ZAPU guerrillas combined with South Africa’s African National Congress guerrillas in the first large-scale operations of the war. These sorties proved disastrous and ZAPU halted its guerrilla war. From late 1971 to the ceasefire at the end of 1979, ZANU’s army took the military initiative.

The two movements had many differences. ZANLA infiltrated guerrillas in far greater numbers than ZIPRA. One estimate is that ZIPRA never deployed more than 2,000 troops inside Rhodesia, keeping 8,000–10,000 in camps in Zambia and Angola. Other accounts suggests that by mid-1979, Nkomo had built a regular army of nearly 20,000 in Zambia, of whom
2,900 were inside the country. A further 5,000 were believed to be under training in Angola and Zambia and up to 1,000 were attending advanced or specialist courses in Russia. In contrast, ZANLA had 13,000 guerrillas in Rhodesia by mid-1978 and a total of 40,000 guerrillas in that year. Another source gives a figure for April 1979 of 13,500 trained ZANLA guerrillas, of whom 9,500 were inside the country. A further 12,000 were in training in Tanzania, Libya, and Ethiopia. A still different estimate is that ZANLA had a total of 30,000 guerrillas under arms at the time of the ceasefire. A British and a ZANU(PF) source concurred that no more than 30 percent of ZANLA troops were inside Rhodesia at that time. In 1980, the combined guerrilla forces were estimated to be 65,000. These conflicting data not only support the greater military contribution of ZANLA but also that most trained guerrillas, regardless of political affiliation, did not fight.

The two armies had different strategies, reflecting their different sponsors’ ideologies. Dependent mainly on Chinese aid (which was always inadequate), ZANLA relied on political mobilization to create and sustain a grass-roots party infrastructure. ZIPRA was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union which kept it well supplied with arms and equipment and influenced its emphasis on conventional training. Indeed, ZIPRA came to be composed of guerrilla units and a regular army. It has also been argued that ZIPRA operated in ZAPU strongholds, where it could rely on existing ZAPU committee structures. The armies also comprised recruits from different regions and ethnic groups. ZANLA guerrillas came chiefly from the east and were predominantly Shona speakers; ZIPRA members came mainly from the west and were overwhelmingly Ndebele but also Kalanga speakers. Analysts differ on whether or not the two movements were “tribalist” and regionalist.

**War-time collaboration and contestation between guerrillas and their leaders**

**Collaboration**

The guerrillas were assets in their respective parties’ struggles against white minority rule. Inside the country, the guerrillas mobilized civilians on behalf of their parties’ nationalist agendas. In exile, the guerrillas helped to train fresh recruits and defend their base camps and their parties’ refugee camps. The role of guerrillas in advancing the nationalist struggle, especially in rural mobilization against the white settler state, has received widespread attention.

The guerrillas were also party assets in inter-party feuding. A critical example is the fate of ZIPA, a unified army of ZANLA and ZIPRA, whose formation began in November 1975. Its goal was to resume the war which had come to a virtual halt after the March assassination of Herbert Chitepo, leader of ZANU’s external wing and coordinator of the armed struggle. Who killed Chitepo and
why is the subject of much controversy but the devastating consequences of his assassination for ZANLA’s armed struggle are undisputed. Following his assassination, the Zambian government imprisoned for twenty months and tortured almost the entire ZANLA High Command and ZANU’s Supreme Military Council (DARE). Zambia and Tanzania banned ZANU and ZAPU, and the guerrillas were effectively restricted in camps in these countries and Mozambique.  

Into this vacuum of power stepped the new united force, ZIPA. It had the support of the imprisoned ZANLA and ZANU leaders and the presidents of Mozambique and Tanzania, all of whom wanted to revive the armed struggle. In January 1976 ZIPA resumed the armed struggle from Mozambique. Rex Nhongo, the most senior ZANLA military commander outside prison, became the leader and Alfred “Nikita” Mangena, ZIPRA’s commander, his deputy. ZIPA soon became an almost all ZANLA affair after ZANLA guerrillas with the support of the Tanzanian Defence Forces disarmed and massacred a significant number of ZIPRA guerrillas in joint training camps in Tanzania and evidently demanded that others denounce ZAPU and its leadership. This incident illustrates the powerful guerrilla loyalties to their parties.  

Contestation  
Alongside guerrilla–party collaboration were also intense and frequently violent conflicts between guerrillas and their leaders. The guerrillas, themselves often internally divided, were critical players in internal leadership struggles. The reasons for these conflicts are themselves often highly contentious, but they encompass ethnic competition, ideological and strategic differences, and guerrillas’ perception of leadership neglect or ineptitude. Both guerrilla forces also suffered from general lack of discipline and failure to conform to leadership commands. Again, scholars differ on why and when discipline deteriorated. Whatever the causes, guerrilla conflicts with the leadership often threatened the latter’s control over their forces. I discuss each guerrilla movement separately.  

ZANLA/ZANU. In December 1974 Thomas Nhari (nom de guerre), a senior ZANLA commander and General Staff member, with the support of eight other General Staff members, led a rebellion against ZANU’s Supreme Military Council (DARE). Nhari had been sent by ZAPU for training in Moscow in 1967 and defected to ZANU in 1971. Joined by a number of military commanders and their troops, the rebels complained that their leaders were living in luxury in Lusaka and Maputo while they were languishing in the bush with poor arms and supplies. They contended that the DARE had fallen under Chinese control and was blocking ZANU’s access to superior Soviet weapons and training. Nhari wanted to swap Chinese aid for Soviet arms and training, and opposed the Chinese emphasis on protracted guerrilla war. The rebel leaders wanted the entire High Command changed, called for younger leaders, and sought to
install themselves as the new High Command. During the month-long rebellion, the rebels captured military and political leaders in Lusaka, Zambia and at Chifombo base on the Mozambique–Zambia border. Allegedly, the rebel leaders had been manipulated by Rhodesian military intelligence who sought to end the armed struggle and promote a negotiated settlement which was then a possibility. ZANLA’s leader, Josiah Tongogara, and another ZANLA commander crushed the rebellion using newly trained troops “dubbed Gukurahundi, which means literally the first rains of the season that sweep away the rubbish.”

The following account demonstrates the guerrillas’ power to affect the outcomes of leadership disputes. In December 1974 Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, like Robert Mugabe and other ZANU central committee members, had been released from many years of detention in Rhodesia to participate in talks to unite the nationalists prior to negotiations with the Rhodesian regime. While in prison, ZANU detainees had made Mugabe ZANU’s leader in place of Sithole. However, the Front Line States (FLS) – Botswana, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, and Tanzania – involved in the task of uniting the nationalists prior to negotiations, accepted Sithole as ZANU’s leader. FLS pressure also resulted in the nationalist parties forming an umbrella organization, the African National Council. Its compromise leader was Bishop Abel Muzorewa, whose own party of the same name had no army. The negotiations collapsed in August 1975. But Muzorewa, Sithole, and James Chikerema, leader of a small movement, FROLIZI, all claimed control over ZANLA guerrillas in the camps and established their own army command. While the former ZANU detainees still rejected Sithole’s leadership, the guerrillas expressed support for Sithole but not for his army hierarchy. Because he refused to meet their demands, he and Muzorewa were denied access to the guerrilla camps. In September 1975 ZANU leaders in prison in Zambia apparently held secret talks with young ZANLA commanders. The latter were told to report to the guerrillas that ZAPU and ZANU had agreed to military unity, that Sithole was no longer ZANU’s leader, and that they should accept Mugabe as their leader. In October 1975 forty-three guerrilla commanders at Mgagao camp in Tanzania signed a declaration. It committed them to armed struggle and rejected any talks with Rhodesian premier, Ian Smith, spurned Sithole and various other political leaders, hesitantly accepted Mugabe as “a middleman” and the only political leader they were willing to talk to, and requested Mozambique and Tanzania to allow them to resume the armed struggle. Other ZANLA camps endorsed the declaration. The guerrillas thus contributed in a critical way to Mugabe’s ascent to political power and to the decline of the power of Muzorewa, Chikerema, and Sithole.

There were new leadership battles involving ZIPA guerrilla leaders in late 1976. In October, Zambia released its ZANU/ZANLA prisoners to attend another round of negotiations to end the war. ZANU’s version of events is that
many ZIPA leaders (but notably not Rex Nhongo) refused to recognize the authority of the political and military leaders who had been in prison and were intent on a coup. After the failure of the Geneva negotiations, President Machel’s armed forces assisted ZANU to recapture control by imprisoning these rebellious leaders until the end of the war.\textsuperscript{153} Imprisoned ZIPA leaders offer a different account.\textsuperscript{154} They deny they were planning a coup but depict Mugabe and the former detained leaders as threatened by the great strides they had made in instilling political and ideological (Marxist-Leninist) training in the camps, in encouraging political debate, and in adopting a less coercive approach on the front and in the camps. Henry Hamadziripi, one of the ZANU detainees in a Zambian prison, claimed that for nine months the “old guard” struggled to reimpose their control over the guerrillas. Meanwhile, Tongogara used brute force and summary executions to remove ZANLA dissidents.

In January 1978 a similar scenario exploded. Another group of ZANU/ZANLA cadres was accused by the party of plotting against it. These men included people such as Hamadziripi and Rugaro Gumbo who had been detained in Zambian prisons for their alleged involvement in Chitepo’s assassination. Gumbo described how Mugabe presided over a kangaroo court and found them guilty of trying to overthrow the party.\textsuperscript{155} They claimed they had seen the merit in ZIPA ideas. For three to four months they were kept in pit cells.

On the front, discipline seems always to have been a problem. Indiscipline included violence against innocent civilians, sexual relations with civilian girls and women, and other policy violations. Analysts differ about when and why discipline deteriorated. A commander (subsequently a ZIPA leader) who operated on the front between 1972 and 1974 attributed guerrilla coercion against reluctant rural supporters in those early war years to lack of ideological training.\textsuperscript{156} Still another view is that guerrilla discipline deteriorated from 1976 because of the lack of political ideology in the party in the rear bases and the growing numbers of guerrillas in the operational areas.\textsuperscript{157} Another observer argues the years of greatest guerrilla indiscipline were in 1976 and 1977 when junior commanders took over during the detention of senior ZANLA commanders in Zambia.\textsuperscript{158} One analyst identifies a serious decline in guerrilla discipline from 1978 and blames it on \textit{mujibas}, the male youth who provided logistical support to the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{159} My own explanation for what seemed to rural civilians in a district in the northeast to be often arbitrary guerrilla coercion was the guerrillas’ inability to create a liberated zone and relatedly a sense that they had never secured reliable peasant support.\textsuperscript{160} Another analyst, studying part of northern Nyanga district, argues that as the area became more free of security force incursions in 1979, relations between guerrillas and people grew more strained. There were more guerrillas to feed in a drought year, the guerrillas lacked any ideological resolve to transform rural society, and the retreat of the white settler state diminished the potency of their Shona cultural nationalist appeals.\textsuperscript{161}
The general problem of guerrilla violations of party policy and military codes speaks to leadership problems of controlling the guerrillas.

**ZAPU/ZIPRA.** The guerrilla army was a critical player in ZAPU leadership disputes. The following cursory account of some of these disputes draws on one source. While its interpretation is surely contestable, the claim that ZAPU was often in danger of losing control of major sections of its military seems convincing. From the outset, Joshua Nkomo was a compromise political leader because he was from the minority Kalanga group in a predominantly Ndebele organization, which also included Shona speakers. While he was detained from 1964 to 1974 in Rhodesia, the Kalanga and Shona became embroiled in factional strife revolving around ideological, strategic, and personal differences. The “radical” Kalanga faction, centered on Jason Moyo, was closely associated with ZIPRA, and favored stronger Soviet ties and an escalation of the armed struggle. The “moderate” Shona faction, centered on George Nyandoro and James Chikerema, ZAPU’s acting president, was trying to create political unity between ZAPU and ZANU, and favored negotiations with the regime. The numerically dominant Ndebele in ZAPU remained divided. In 1970 these tensions gave rise to armed uprisings in the camps in Zambia. Subsequently, Shona “moderates” leaders defected, though not to ZANU, and many well-trained ZIPRA guerrillas joined ZANLA. Among the defectors was James Chikerema, the external ZAPU leader. He was succeeded by Jason Moyo, a leader of the “radical” Kalanga faction and chief military leader. Moyo brought a number of “radical” military leaders, including Dumiso Dabengwa and Alfred “Nikita” Mangena, to prominent positions in ZAPU. Shona “moderates,” however, remained in control of ZAPU decision-making till 1976.

Then, apparently with Joshua Nkomo’s support, the “radicals” seemed to be increasingly in control of ZAPU. ZIPRA had begun to step up its infiltration of guerrillas after years of very low level activity. In January 1977 Jason Moyo was assassinated, leading to a big decline in the “radical” faction. In late 1977 Mangena reportedly led an uprising in three ZIPRA camps in Zambia. Several hundred dissidents carried out a series of raids on ZAPU headquarters in Lusaka. Allegedly, they were not attempting a coup but were seeking to reassert the diminishing power of the “radicals” within ZAPU following Moyo’s assassination. Soon after, Mangena himself was wounded in an assassination attempt. Four ZAPU members were tried before a military court, found guilty, and executed. In mid-1978 Mangena was assassinated. The “moderate” faction, now led by Joshua Nkomo, were again firmly in control.

Inside the country, ZIPRA guerrilla indiscipline, as for ZANLA, was a problem. One detachment refused to work under the ZIPRA High Command from 1976 until the ceasefire. ZIPRA accounts attribute this indiscipline to the unit’s problematic relationship with the High Command, its high casualty rates
after a Rhodesian security force attack, and anger that the leadership in Zambia was enjoying a comfortable lifestyle while it suffered inadequate supplies.\textsuperscript{166} A ZIPRA leader’s view is that this was an unusual episode and that once the regular army entered Rhodesia, many guerrillas from the rebel detachment deserted to join it.\textsuperscript{167} The leader of a Rhodesian elite counterinsurgency unit offers a different view of the rebel detachment. He attributes its refusal to obey its High Command to tensions between ZIPRA guerrillas inside the country and the ZIPRA regular army. Moreover, he claims that dissident ZIPRA guerrilla groups became commonplace, and that the guerrilla units absorbed the regulars and thus dismantled their new organization.\textsuperscript{168} A study of Shangani in Matabeleland found widespread guerrilla coercion in violation of military and party policy.\textsuperscript{169}

To recapitulate, the war-time relationship between the guerrillas and their leaders was one of collaboration and contestation. Alongside collaboration with their respective parties, the guerrillas often became embroiled in leadership disputes, sometimes as critical arbiters. Moreover, on the front, the guerrillas were often their own bosses, and routinely flouted leadership injunctions. Images of nationalist unity often conceal guerrilla discontent against their leaders and their participation in leadership conflicts. Consequently, they ill prepare us for understanding guerrillas’ roles as both assets and threats to their leaders after wars.

\textit{Zimbabwe: 1980–7}

The 1980 elections held in terms of the Lancaster House-imposed constitution resulted in a triumphant victory for Mugabe’s ZANU(PF), as the party was renamed at the start of the election campaign.\textsuperscript{170} Mugabe declared a policy of reconciliation. Despite its parliamentary majority, ZANU(PF) formed a cabinet which included Rhodesian and ZAPU representation. Also, the new ruling party declared support for military integration of the three previously warring armies. But ZANU(PF) anxieties about Rhodesian and ZAPU/ZIPRA loyalties, often with good reason, remained high. Links between Rhodesians (black and white) who were retained in state agencies after independence and South African agents (often ex-Rhodesian army, police, and intelligence personnel who left the country voluntarily or were demobilized at independence) provided opportunities for breaches of security, which were a problem throughout the first seven years of independence. Problems of guerrilla order in 1980 and 1981 were also significant. Press reports suggest quite high levels of guerrilla crime against civilians – robberies, shootings (often in tiffs at bars after drinking), and carrying arms illegally. ZIPRA dissidents attacked government agents and projects in Matabeleland and the Midlands, while ZANLA members were engaged in attacks on police and police stations in the east and northeast.
Government concern was chiefly with ZIPRA dissidents in this period. Given the war-time history of political rivalry between the two guerrilla-based parties, ZANU(PF)’s focus on ZAPU/ZIPRA was not surprising.

Fears of internal disorder and anxiety that South Africa might seek to destabilize a new black majority government were the main rationale for the initial renewal of the state of emergency. Introduced by the Rhodesian regime just prior to its illegal declaration of independence from Britain in 1965, the state of emergency remained in force until July 1990. Under the Emergency Powers Regulations the state could curtail personal liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, freedom from discrimination, and freedom from arbitrary search or entry. The state had powers of arrest and could order detentions without trial for indefinite periods, ban political parties and meetings, and order curfews.\(^{171}\)

From 1982, the government used its emergency powers chiefly against ZAPU/ZIPRA. In February, after the disarmament and demobilization of the guerrillas who had not integrated into the new army, the government announced the “discovery” of ZIPRA arms caches. ZAPU leader Nkomo was removed from the cabinet, along with most other ZAPU cabinet ministers. In March Dumiso Dabengwa, ZIPRA’s intelligence chief, Lookout Masuku, ZIPRA’s commander, and four others were accused of treason for plotting to remove the government. Despite the acquittal of all but one of the accused, the government ordered the re-detention of the men. These events, and the government’s subsequent heavy-handed response, fueled the number of ZIPRA dissidents. The dissidents never reached more than 400 at their peak, and suffered very high rates of attrition (about 75 percent) through deaths, desertions, and casualties.\(^{172}\) This estimate includes not only ex-ZIPRA guerrillas but also criminals and other civilians. Especially from 1983 to 1984 the South African government recruited ex-ZIPRA guerrillas and refugees, often from Dukwe refugee camp in Botswana, and armed and trained them before infiltrating these ZIPRA-led units into Matabeleland South. In sharp contrast to the other dissidents, these South African-trained units, known as Super-ZAPU, never lacked for arms.\(^{173}\)

Whereas most ZIPRA dissidents in 1980–1 were politically motivated, researchers argue that ZIPRA dissidents from 1982 were primarily concerned with self-preservation, won little civilian sympathy, and, as ZAPU leaders also said, were ignoring their political and military leaders’ opposition to their return to arms. The government argued that ZAPU was behind the dissidents in Matabeleland and that the dissidents enjoyed popular support. Hence it responded with massive force and draconian measures against civilians, dissidents, and ZAPU. In 1982 integrated army units were sent to deal with the dissidents. Until 1987, dissidents were dealt with chiefly by the four brigades of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), the Police Support Unit (PSU), the Central Intelligence
Organization (CIO), and a specialist ZNA force, the Paratroopers. In contrast, the government offensive against the ordinary civilians of Matabeleland was assigned to 5 Brigade, also referred to as the Fifth Brigade.

The Fifth Brigade was recruited chiefly from ZANLA guerrillas, whereas the other four brigades were composed of ZANLA, ZIPRA, and Rhodesian soldiers. Mugabe himself had first hinted at the idea of a guerrilla unit to be trained to combat “malcontents” who were “unleashing a reign of terror,” in a speech in August 1980 on Heroes’ Day (held to celebrate those who died fighting for Zimbabwe’s freedom). The Fifth Brigade was trained and armed by the North Koreans, beginning in August 1981. In contrast, the other brigades had already been merged and were being trained by the British. While there was an effort to assert the loyalty of the four brigades to the state, the Fifth Brigade repeatedly asserted it was responsible only to Mugabe, who christened the unit *Gukurahundi*. The Fifth Brigade also had distinctive uniforms and used AK47s. Led by ex-ZANLA guerrilla Perence Shiri, 5 Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland between 1983 and 1985 and went after ex-ZIPRA guerrillas, ZAPU officials, and basically, all Ndebele who were portrayed as dissident supporters. It has been held responsible for most atrocities of this period. These include thousands of deaths – 2,000 civilian deaths in six weeks alone in 1983 – mass beatings, disappearances, mass detentions, torture at camps, and rapes. These atrocities far exceed the extremely brutal murders, rapes, and robberies committed by the dissidents.

In the July 1985 parliamentary elections, ZANU(PF) expected to trounce ZAPU in its Matabeleland stronghold. Despite pre-election violence against ZAPU supporters, which seemed often to have government approval, ZAPU won all fifteen seats in Matabeleland but lost five seats elsewhere. ZANU(PF) was angry. A spate of violence against ZAPU supporters followed the election, spurred on by Prime Minister Mugabe’s advice to his supporters to “go and uproot the weeds from your garden.” High-level ZAPU and former ZIPRA members in the army were detained on charges of treason but the state was unable to prove its case. ZAPU rallies were banned in June 1987 and ZAPU offices closed in September 1987, effectively banning the party. Meanwhile, since 1986 the ruling party had also been pursuing a strategy of co-opting ZAPU into ZANU(PF). The two parties reached an agreement on “unity” in December 1987. The merged party retained ZANU(PF) as its name.

**Methods, data, and organization**

The case study, once a respected “scientific” technique in political science, is now in disrepute in mainstream political science. Holding theory to be the most highly valued enterprise, the discipline’s gatekeepers allege that case studies cannot contribute to theory building. Case studies have come to be associated
with data gathering and description, both activities which have low esteem in the profession. The practice of science which mainstream political scientists seek to emulate involves data gathering, theory building, and theory testing. This case study participates in all these activities, particularly insofar as theory building requires both data and theory testing.

The Zimbabwe study provides an ideal case to test peace-building studies. First, the peace settlement that formally terminated the liberation war has become an important case in efforts to understand the conditions, strategies, or determinants of successful transitions. There has been wide consensus among scholars and diplomats that the war-to-peace transition in 1979–80 was a success. Because successful transitions are few, each case heavily influences theorizing. If the Zimbabwe transition, on closer inspection, does not conform with such positive evaluations, it points to the need to revise existing theory-building efforts. Similarly, Zimbabwe’s military integration program and more ambiguously its programs for the demobilized have become part of the record of successful peace-building programs. Insofar as these programs are found to have flaws, core ideas underpinning these peace-building studies will require revisiting. Weaknesses in the basic infrastructure of peace-building studies will also affect policy prescriptions. Second, the Zimbabwe study offers an unusual opportunity to examine integration programs in the military and civilian sectors, and thus provides a breadth of coverage. Many societies emerging from internal wars do not have programs for ex-combatants in the military and civilian sectors. For instance, Ethiopia and Eritrea had no military integration programs because their wars ended in military victories, and Nicaragua and Cambodia did not pursue military integration because it was not provided for in their peace settlements. The Namibian settlement provided for the demobilization and disarmament of combatants but not for their reintegration. Only later did the Namibian government introduce integration programs. Even when societies have integration programs in both military and civilian sectors, it is common practice to examine them separately, perhaps reflecting academic specializations in military and security studies on the one hand, and civilian and welfare issues on the other.

I assembled data from a variety of sources. During a five-month visit to Zimbabwe in 1992, I interviewed over one hundred government and non-government personnel and ex-guerillas. Ex-combatants are a diverse group, incorporating ethnic, party, gender, generational, educational, socioeconomic, and rural–urban differences. I captured much of this diversity but spoke chiefly to the employed and to those residing in the two major cities, Harare and Bulawayo. I was fortunate to obtain access to the private archives of a number of organizations involved in ex-guerilla projects. Newspapers and parliamentary debates were valuable, as were British sources. In August 1994 I interviewed (in England) British Military and Advisory Training Team (BMATT) personnel
who had assisted in creating the new military from the two guerrilla armies and the regime’s forces. British regimental journals and official British documents (published and unpublished) provided useful material on the peace settlement and military integration.

For the most part, this study deals with the period between 1980 and 1987. By 1987, the official understanding was that the demobilization and reintegration programs for ex-combatants had ended. The government felt it was time for this group which owed its origins to the liberation war to lose its special status as a focus of government programs. This did not happen. Guerrilla veterans persisted in their quest for recognition and state resources. However, their main sites of struggle came to be over government provisions of pensions, land, and support for starting businesses. Even so, the demobilization and integration programs continued to be a source of bitterness for many, and demands for employment and training continued. Ex-combatants’ increasingly embittered relationship with the ruling party over demobilization and employment in the decade after the party unity agreement is taken up in an appendix. The epilogue moves to the campaign period for the parliamentary elections in 2000 and ends in the midst of the presidential campaign in 2001.

The chapter organization of the book is as follows. The next chapter documents how the peace settlement brought both continuities and changes with the war past and shaped the political arena in which the post-war relations between government and guerrilla veterans would occur. The peace settlement became the site of conflict and a political weapon for actors to achieve their own agendas. The settlement also established state institutions as the future sites of conflict and bequeathed powerful political and military resources to the guerrillas by having recognized their de facto equality with the Rhodesian soldiers, and their right to bear arms and assemble. The settlement thus presented the new rulers with guerrilla veterans who were simultaneously potential threats and assets.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 show how the rulers sought to build power and legitimacy out of these inauspicious beginnings, and how the veterans were crucial actors in that unfolding drama. For each program, I try to tease out the separate and overlapping agendas of the ruling party and the guerrillas, show how the war discourse was a powerful resource and strategy for both party and guerrillas, and identify the political outcomes for party and veterans. Chapter 3 is organized around programs – food rations, assembly pay, housing – intended to help keep the guerrillas under control while they were awaiting military integration. Within the confines of these programs, the ruling party strove to treat ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas even-handedly. But the tensions between the parties and guerrilla armies exploded, and the Rhodesian security forces demonstrated their loyalty to the ruling party in helping to contain the violence. The ruling party then changed its initial plans to incorporate all the guerrillas into the new army, and it embarked on disarmament and demobilization programs in which its
ZANLA preferences were transparent. Chapter 4 examines political struggles over the terms of military integration among the three armies (the Rhodesian forces and the two guerrilla armies), between the two guerrilla armies, and within the guerrilla armies. Chapter 5 follows the demobilized guerrillas into a variety of civilian employment and training programs in the public and private sector and cooperatives. The concluding chapter revisits the main themes and arguments in the book.

The epilogue turns to the contemporary political scene in Zimbabwe to show the remarkable similarities in the political dynamic between veterans and the ruling party. The collaboration and often simultaneous conflict between veterans and the embattled ruling party are evident in the army, the private sector – in labor relations in white-owned companies and in invasions of white-owned farms – electoral politics, and attacks on the judiciary. The contemporary setting adds some new social and political actors to the cast but the joint and independent purposes of the veterans and the ruling party, their violence, and their legitimating appeals to the liberation war are reminiscent of the founding years of independent Zimbabwe.

Zimbabweans who were interviewed for this project often contrasted favorably the political atmosphere in 1992 with the more repressive 1980s. Few were concerned about me using their names in a publication. However, given the contemporary political climate, I have given most interviewees pseudonyms. Generally, I have not changed the names of those with high state positions. For a list of pseudonyms, please see p. 284.
The chapter focuses on the warring actors’ agendas, strategies, and resources through the phases of the settlement: negotiations, implementation, and the aftermath of the election. The key actors’ agendas remained stable but their strategies and resources changed as their political environment shifted. Throughout the negotiations and implementation of the settlement, all the key domestic actors sought to maximize their power and formed and dissolved alliances expediently. During the settlement implementation, the warring parties (and the British) used the settlement as a valuable resource to attain their political agendas and abandoned alliances formed for negotiating purposes. Actors’ compliance with and violation of provisions were part of their strategies to maximize power. During the implementation of the settlement it is possible to glimpse not only the leadership’s interests but also rank-and-file guerrilla concerns with power, status, and privilege. After the election, the newly elected ruling party had to pursue its power-building objectives in the inauspicious political context created by the settlement. Confronted with three competing armies, white-controlled state institutions, and a white-owned private sector, the ruling party turned to the guerrillas and their war of liberation to build and legitimate power.

The chapter departs from studies of Lancaster House which seek to evaluate it in terms of externally imposed criteria and thus miss how domestic actors’ interests and strategies played out during the different phases of the settlement. Most analysts celebrate the settlement as a success, the most common measure being the settlement’s achievements of its basic goals: a ceasefire (which largely held), the transfer of power to a black majority through an all-party election (the outcome of which was unaffected by campaign violence), and a democratic constitution. These externally imposed measures inevitably suppress the importance of violations of the settlement and focus only on the racial war at the expense of the rivalry between the guerrilla parties, thus accepting the Lancaster House definition of the civil war. The settlement’s few detractors point to its failure either to embrace the revolutionary objectives of the armed struggle or to prevent subsequent predictable ethnic violence. They ignore the fact that the domestic actors had no interest in addressing the political struggle between the
guerrilla parties and that the objectives of the armed struggle were secondary to the guerrilla parties’ quest for power. By tracking domestic actors’ agendas and strategies across the phases of the settlement, the chapter highlights the actors’ persistent quest for power, their use of the settlement as an instrument of power, and the influence of the war and the settlement provisions on the newly elected ruling party’s post-election strategies and resources for power building.

Lancaster House negotiations and settlement

An overview

The Lancaster House conference began on September 10, 1979 in London under the chairmanship of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, who was also the leader of the British team. The British delegation was initially composed of Foreign and Commonwealth Office career diplomats and later also Ministry of Defence representatives. By chairing the conference, Britain was asserting its legal power to decolonize Rhodesia, whose white minority had declared unilateral independence in 1965. Britain conveniently viewed the conflict as an anti-colonial struggle for “genuine” African majority rule. It thus invited only two teams: the Rhodesian government and the coalition of the two guerrilla parties, the Patriotic Front. This definition of the conflict was strongly endorsed by other powerful actors: the United States, the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, and the Front Line States (FLS) (Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola). Some believe Britain’s main objective was to rid itself of “the Rhodesian problem” which had soured its relations with the Commonwealth and black Africa since the white rebellion in 1965. Proponents of this view reason that while Britain preferred an all-party settlement, it expected the guerrilla parties to walk out of the talks, making likely a “second-class solution” – a settlement with only the Rhodesian government. Others claim that Britain’s primary interest was to ensure that the Rhodesian government emerged the victor.

Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa led the Rhodesian team. Having lost his bid to control the exiled guerrilla forces in the mid-1970s, Bishop Muzorewa returned to Rhodesia, built up his own auxiliary forces to oppose the guerrilla armies, and along with three other African leaders, negotiated an “internal” agreement with Prime Minister Ian Smith in March 1978. The guerrilla movements had refused to participate in the negotiations and opposed the settlement. The result of the “internal” settlement was a new constitution which provided for the first universal suffrage elections. In the April 1979 election, Muzorewa emerged as the first African prime minister with 64 percent of the popular vote and fifty-one of the seventy-two African seats in parliament. The turn out, according to official Rhodesian figures, was 62 percent. Election observer groups
differed on whether the election was “free and fair,” with some focusing more on guerrilla intimidation to prevent electoral participation and others on government coercion to get voters to the polls. The Muzorewa team believed the 1979 elections had ended colonial rule and saw the continuing conflict as a nationalist power struggle.

Muzorewa’s team went to Lancaster House expecting to amend the existing constitution and to win international recognition and the lifting of sanctions, and thereby the resources to end the war. The team hoped the British would conclude a settlement with it and not with the guerrilla parties, and Muzorewa and many in his team believed not only that this was what the British desired but that it was the most likely outcome. While the British knew that they would have to govern during a transition, the bishop was determined not to relinquish power which he had so recently won. None the less, Muzorewa expected that he would win a fresh election, and his team strove to ensure that the settlement favored his electoral victory. Muzorewa’s team contained many divisions, drawing as it did on his government of national unity. Four of the twelve men were white cabinet ministers, led by the former prime minister, Ian Smith (who was opposed to a settlement and was ultimately moved aside by his own Rhodesian Front [RF] party supporters); the others included men from Muzorewa’s UANC party as well as his opponents such as Reverend Ndabiningi Sithole. The whites in Muzorewa’s team wanted to preserve white power and privilege whereas privately the blacks in his team were eager to use the conference as an opportunity to remove constitutional provisions which entrenched white power. The white minority was the most powerful component in Muzorewa’s team, given its continued control of state institutions, including the military. Indeed, real power in the Rhodesian team rested with the military commanders and their representatives at Lancaster House: Ken Flower, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) head, Air Vice-Marshal Harold Hawkins, and the Rhodesian representative in South Africa. Prior to the start of talks, they “made clear that the breaking-point for the commanders would be any interference with the structure of their forces before the elections were held.”

The PF, representing ZANU and ZAPU and their military wings, existed as a coalition for international diplomacy. The guerrilla movements’ unity was important to their claims, and those of their supporters, that the conflict was about the removal of colonialism and imperialism rather than also involving competition for power among nationalists. The PF and its supporters took issue with the Muzorewa team’s claim that the 1979 elections had solved the problem of white minority rule. Having boycotted that election and fought a diplomatic battle to ensure its results were not internationally recognized, the PF argued that the 1979 constitution provided for only symbolic African majority rule—a black prime minister, a black-dominated parliament, and black cabinet ministers. Real power, the guerrilla parties asserted, still lay in the white-controlled state
institutions: the public service, the police, the military, and the judiciary. Both parties believed they had earned the right to control or at least predominate during the transition and thus ensure that elections for independence were not stacked against them. This had been their negotiating stance since 1976 when the PF was first formed under pressure from the FLS.

Mugabe and Nkomo were under pressure from their primary hosts, Mozambique and Zambia respectively, to negotiate. These countries had great leverage over the guerrilla parties because they supported their war effort, allowing military recruits through their countries and permitting military bases and training camps. Their economies were now devastated, as the Rhodesian military retaliated against their support for the guerrillas by attacking not only guerrilla camps but also general infrastructure. Certainly Mugabe’s preference was for a military victory. Reports vary on Nkomo’s preference for negotiations over continued war.11 Like Muzorewa, the PF believed the conference was unlikely to produce an all-party settlement. However, it did not want to give Britain the chance, which it believed Britain wanted, to recognize the Muzorewa regime. The PF believed that it could win an election provided it was not rigged against it.

At the outset of the conference, Britain obtained agreement from the warring actors to an agenda. The negotiations would address, in sequence, constitutional issues, an interim administration, and a ceasefire. Until the participants had agreed on constitutional issues, they could not proceed to talk about the interim administration, and only after an interim administration agreement could they move on to discuss the ceasefire. In setting the agenda in this way, the British hoped to overcome a weakness in previous negotiations which had begun with and become bogged down in details of an interim administration and a ceasefire. Just as Britain won consent for its agenda, so too its proposals on a new constitution, an interim government, and a ceasefire prevailed in the final settlement with only a few concessions to the warring actors. Significantly, the warring actors refused to negotiate directly with each other throughout the talks and relied on British mediation.12 Frequently hailed as a critical ingredient of the “success” of the negotiations, Britain’s role as mediator might be viewed instead as a serious weakness. Despite all odds, an all-party agreement was signed at the end of 1979. The settlement comprised agreements on a new constitution, a transitional government, and a ceasefire.

The new constitution removed the most offensive aspects of the 1979 constitution but retained intact existing state institutions – the civil service, the police, the defense forces, and the judiciary – and protected property, including land and pensions, as inalienable rights.

The transitional government agreement provided for a British governor to assume full executive and legislative authority and to govern with the help of the Rhodesian administration. His chief task was to organize and hold elections and
to ensure that the campaign and the elections were free and fair. These included
the freedom of all parties to conduct peaceful political activity; freedom of
movement, assembly and expression during the campaign; the parties’ lawful
conduct of political activities; and measures to ensure the security of all parties
taking part in the election campaign. A Commonwealth Observer Group (COG)
would determine whether the campaign and the election were free and fair. The
Rhodesian civil service, the police and the defense forces, and the guerrilla
forces all had to comply with the governor’s directives.

The ceasefire agreement provided for a Commonwealth Monitoring Force
(CMF): 850 British troops, 159 Australians, 75 New Zealanders, 51 Kenyans,
and 24 Fijians.13 Cross-border movements by the armies were to stop as soon as
the ceasefire was signed on December 21, 1979. The Rhodesian forces could no
longer attack guerrilla camps in neighboring countries and guerrillas in these
camps could not enter the country. From December 29, 1979 the guerrillas
were to assemble with their arms at designated rendezvous places, where they
would meet the monitors who would be accompanied by a guerrilla liaison
officer. By January 4, 1980 they had to be in designated assembly places where
they would live with the monitors or be held in violation of the ceasefire. A
Ceasefire Commission composed of representatives from each army and chaired
by the governor’s military adviser, General Acland, who was also the CMF
commander, was to investigate reported ceasefire breaches. Should there be a
threat to law and order during the interim administration, the British governor
could call on loyal forces, whether these turned out to be the Rhodesian police
and defense forces or the guerrilla forces. The British recognized some planning
for the future of the forces would need to occur during the interim period and
offered assistance. They also volunteered to provide future military training
should the new government request such assistance. The British also proposed
demobilization assistance, should the new government request it, for those
soldiers, regardless of affiliation, who wanted to return to civilian life.14

Settlement provisions and actors’ agendas

The terms of the settlement are to a considerable degree the product of the
warring actors’ quest to retain a military option and to try to maximize their
electoral advantages. The “triumph” of reaching an agreement should not con-
ceal these struggles and agendas, all the more so because they persisted into
the implementation phase. The following discussion highlights how the actors
sought to impose their preferences during the negotiations. The focus is on
those settlement terms that became important in the implementation phase and
in shaping post-election politics: the retention of white-controlled state institu-
tions; the protection of property; the guerrilla forces’ de facto equality with the
Rhodesian forces; and the preservation of the two guerrilla armies, with their arms, under their commands, and in assembly places.

Retention of state institutions
The new constitution provided for only gradual Africanization of state institutions. Whites would no longer monopolize the separate service commissions (for the public service, police, defense forces, and judiciary) which appointed and promoted state personnel, but their membership requirements ensured disproportionate white influence for several years. The prime minister, in consultation with the commissions, could appoint a few top army, police and civil service personnel, but new Supreme Court appointments could only be made when judges retired or died. The most important lever for Africanizing state personnel was the provision for the president, acting on the prime minister’s advice, to issue a directive that future hiring and promotions in the government services should contribute to racial balance. Opening the service commissions to Africans, presidential powers to issue directives to Africanize state institutions, and the prime minister’s power to appoint senior members of the army, police, and civil service, were the major constitutional routes to Africanize state personnel.

In the constitutional negotiations, the PF opposed the constitutional protection of white minority interests. It objected to the service commissions’ composition which guaranteed white control over state appointments and promotions for some time. The guerrilla parties, anxious to enhance their power during the election period, fought for immediate changes in state personnel. The PF proposed that a Governing Council, which it would dominate, hold executive authority until the end of the transitional period. The Governing Council would appoint committees to begin to build a new army and police, to supervise the ceasefire and the maintenance of public order, and to liaise between the Governing Council, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force, and the UN Civilian Police Force. Judges and magistrates would vacate their offices. Addressing the issue of the composition of the police and army in the PF proposals, Mugabe said:

It was necessary to start as soon as possible to determine what force should constitute his country’s army and police in the interim period. Those forces which had fought for liberation naturally wished to be established as the army of the country. The other side . . . would also have their point of view. The police force must not be an instrument in the hands of those who in the past had resisted the process of liberation. He proposed that there should be a completely new police force comprising Patriotic Front forces and elements from the other side.

During the interim administration negotiations, the PF remained anxious to control state institutions before the elections. The PF promoted a variant of
police and military integration which it had pressed unsuccessfully during the constitutional talks. Despite PF efforts, the interim administration agreement did not provide for integration. PF concern about Rhodesian control of state institutions during the interim period resurfaced in the ceasefire negotiations. The PF proposed disbanding the military and paramilitary units which had been mobilized specifically for the purposes of fighting against its forces, and disarming Rhodesian private citizens. All were presented as a threat to a stable ceasefire and as PF enemies. The PF persisted with its earlier proposal to integrate the police, this time with a Commonwealth element. Departing from both the PF’s formal ceasefire proposals and the PF’s focus on the need to control state institutions during the elections, Nkomo again expressed the need to begin to integrate “the two armed forces,” the PF and the Rhodesian forces, to prevent a resumption of war after the elections.

The British saw the terms under which the state institutions would be retained as consistent with their support for two important principles: “genuine” majority rule and reconciliation toward the white minority. Hence, the new constitution removed both the white minority’s ability to block legislation and its entrenched control of appointments and promotions in state institutions, and also protected the state jobs of white personnel. The British offered many reasons for opposing military and police integration, and more generally, reforming state institutions: “the purpose of the interim period was to allow the parties to put their case to the people under fair conditions” and “should not be concerned with the transfer of power or the remodelling of the institutions of Government”; restructuring institutions in the transitional period resembled the failed Anglo-American proposals of 1977; and as “there should be a very short period which would be taken up in contesting an election, the idea that a process of power sharing could go on at the same time was unrealistic.”

The protection of property
The two crucial provisions for the protection of property were stipulated in sections 16 and 52 of the constitution. Section 16 prohibited the government from the compulsory acquisition of property, the main exception being for “underutilized” land required for resettlement or other public purposes. If property was compulsorily acquired, “adequate” compensation had to be paid “promptly,” and if requested, in foreign exchange. In addition, the amount of compensation could be reviewed by the courts. Because property was made an inalienable right, it was protected in the Declaration of Rights. Section 52 stipulated that the Declaration of Rights could not be amended for a period of ten years from the date of independence, except by a unanimous vote of the House of Assembly and the votes of not less than two-thirds of the Senate. Since another constitutional protection for whites guaranteed them twenty parliamentary seats for seven years, unless amended by a unanimous House vote, the whites effectively
had veto power over constitutional guarantees affecting them. The net effect of these constitutional provisions was that government was restricted to acquiring only underutilized land for land redistribution or, alternatively, had to pay the full, market value for the purchase of land on the “willing buyer, willing seller” principle.\(^{27}\) Pension rights were also defined as property and protected by the Declaration of Rights.\(^{28}\) These provisions for property acquisition and pension protection were unusually stringent compared with other independence constitutions negotiated with Britain.

Britain presented these and other constitutional provisions as safeguards for the white minority, the objective being to assuage their fears and prevent their mass exodus and the economic collapse of the country.\(^{29}\) The PF rejected the property provisions. It argued that state pensions had been earned by serving an illegal regime which Britain had instructed civil servants to reject, and it opposed the special protection of pensions.\(^{30}\) Similarly, the PF argued against the restrictions on land acquisition. It wanted to be able to acquire land compulsorily, determine compensation on a discretionary basis, and not have to pay compensation in foreign exchange.\(^{31}\) To secure PF consent to the constitutional agreement, Lord Carrington announced that the British government would be prepared, within limits imposed by Britain’s financial resources, to assist land resettlement, with technical assistance and capital aid. Also, Britain would support efforts by the Zimbabwe government to obtain international assistance from other foreign investors for land resettlement.\(^{32}\)

**De facto equality of the three armies**

During negotiations on the transitional government, PF contention focused on the initial British proposals that “all public officers and authorities in Rhodesia, including the civil service, the police and the defence forces” comply with the governor’s directions.\(^{33}\) The PF sought *de facto* equality of their forces and the Rhodesian army. Mugabe protested:

> The role of ensuring the security of the state in the interim period had been restricted to the Rhodesian forces... They could not accept a position of inferiority in a situation where they were moving towards victory – although victory might take time... They were not prepared to lay down their arms... if they were to lose political status. This was a crucial area... He was not saying that the Patriotic Front had to be assisted to power but rather that they had to have similar conditions to those accorded to the other side, whether administrative, military, political or legal.\(^{34}\)

*De facto* equality was crucial for the PF under the interim administration which would preside over the election. Davidow explains why: “it related to their concern that if law and order deteriorated to the point where it could not be restored by police action alone, the governor would... rely solely on the Rhodesian military for help. Those forces would, in turn, use their operational
freedom to the Patriotic Front’s disadvantage.”35 “The actual and symbolic content of the issue was no less important to the Rhodesian military,” according to Davidow:

In the view of the white officer corps, the granting of equal status to the guerrilla armies would prejudgethe election process, giving de facto and de jure power to entities that, it could be argued, had not electorally proven themselves to have popular support. More importantly, the Salisbury delegation as a whole feared that equal status would be misused, become a pretext for freeroaming deprestations of the local population, and, not incidentally, panic the white community.36

The issue was resolved in favour of the PF and was regarded by the British delegation and observers as a minor concession.37 Davidow agrees, but explains that it was “something of a victory” for the PF who “had been unable to convince the British to delete or add a word to the final constitutional proposals.”38 The issue of de facto equality of the military forces would arise again in the ceasefire agreement, as the next section shows.

**Preserving the guerrilla armies**

Military integration, though proposed by the PF, was seen as a non-starter.39 The Rhodesians refused to have their military structures tampered with prior to elections, the two contending guerrilla armies had failed dismally to integrate their armies during the war, and the British recognized that restructuring state institutions prior to elections was doomed to fail. According to General Sir Martin Farndale, a key British military official during the negotiations and the implementation of the settlement, the British would have liked to disband all the armies and form a new army, but this was politically unacceptable to all sides. The Rhodesian delegation privately raised the issue of British assistance for guerrilla demobilization but Britain knew this would be unacceptable to the guerrilla parties who would not give up their armies as long as the Rhodesian forces existed.40

Assembly places, the British solution to military integration and demobilization being non-starters, were not easily accepted by the two opposing sides. The PF favored the use of UN forces that would position themselves between the opposing sides and thus keep them apart.41 It saw assembly places as death traps. Ariston Chambati, a ZAPU member of the PF delegation, said “the suspicion... was very, very rife... that this was a plot to disarm our people and bomb them into submission.”42 The PF claimed control of “substantial areas” and was not prepared to surrender them.43 Also, to assemble all its forces already inside the country made it extremely vulnerable should the ceasefire fail: it would be difficult to restart the war from assembly places; the nature and success of guerrilla warfare required dispersed forces; the Rhodesian forces were making no similar sacrifices. They could not accept the PF forces had to
be confined to assembly points while the Rhodesian forces, even though they would be monitored, would be free to move around. The PF sought equivalency, pressing for the Rhodesian forces to be confined too. For different reasons, the Muzorewa delegation opposed assembly points. Its members believed that allowing guerrillas to assemble inside the country gave them a military strength they had been unable to win on the battleground. Labeling the guerrillas “invading forces,” the Muzorewa team proposed they return to their initial bases of operation in Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique and that the incumbent forces be confined within their own borders. The guerrillas, they said, could enter Rhodesia as unarmed refugees after the ceasefire. The British knew the PF would reject this proposal, it being tantamount to the guerrillas surrendering the military advantages they had secured in the war.

The British offered concessions to both teams to secure agreement. To induce the PF to accept the concept of assembly, the British delegation recognized that allowing their guerrilla armies to keep their arms and equipment would be “necessary.” Given the guerrilla armies’ fears and mistrust of the ceasefire process, they would never have assembled – even in the inadequate numbers they eventually did – had they not been able to take their arms with them. Recognizing the military situation, the British also left the guerrilla armies, like their Rhodesian counterparts, subject to their own command structures but responsible to the British governor. A crucial concession to the Rhodesians, who would otherwise not have accepted the guerrillas assembling inside the country with their arms, was that their forces would be free to move around the country whereas the PF forces would be restricted to their assembly places. The Rhodesian delegation saw it as vital that its law and order forces have as free a hand as possible to control the security situation and in particular deal effectively with any violations which it was convinced the PF would perpetrate. According to the British Ministry of Defence’s report on the CMF (henceforth referred to as the British report on the CMF), this concession was critical to the ultimate settlement because it was argued that unless the armed forces were seen to be maintaining the old order and thus reassuring the white population that they were still in control, there was a strong danger that both the black and the white population would interpret the new order as a victory for the Patriotic Front.

To placate PF concerns about military equivalency with the Rhodesians under the transitional government, the agreement provided for the British governor to be free to call on loyal forces to restore any breakdown in the ceasefire. The British report on the CMF claims “it was fairly obvious that the treatment of the two sides would be unequal” but the wording was left sufficiently loose so that each delegation could believe that it had got what it wanted. Lt.-General Walls, Minister of Combined Operations, was so certain the PF would violate the ceasefire that he consented to the governor having the option of choosing
from loyal forces. However, the monitors, the press, and the PF never wholly excluded the possibility of PF participation in security operations. 48

The opposing sides also contested the location and number of assembly places, reflecting their concerns about military advantage and status. The PF wanted its guerrillas to assemble in the heartland where it claimed they had operated and could influence voters. 49 The Rhodesians, whose views the British proposals reflected, insisted the assembly places should be on the periphery of the country where Walls believed the guerrillas were concentrated. The PF also protested against confining the guerrillas to a mere fifteen assembly points in remote areas while the Rhodesian security forces were allowed more than ninety visible bases, because it would suggest to the population a Muzorewa victory and make them lose confidence in the PF’s military and political capacity. 50 The PF also claimed it had too many guerrillas for only fifteen assembly places. The PF eventually won two ZANLA and two ZIPRA assembly places in the center of the country and a sixteenth assembly point, with the promise of more if they were needed. 51 The number of assembly points proved adequate, and as the British report on the CMF noted, guerrillas who did not stay in the assembly places rather than those who assembled had political influence on voters. 52

To sum up, the debates over settlement terms in large measure reveal the anxiety of the warring actors over the structure of power during the critical election campaign. Each team wanted to create rules which favored its electoral odds, and to preserve a military option should it fail to win the election. These preoccupations with maximizing power are important and recur, as discussed below, in the implementation phase, underscoring the fragility of consent to the agreement. Scholars’ positive evaluations of the settlement center on the domestic actors’ commitment to peace or democracy. Analysts’ negative evaluations of the settlement focus on British imperialism as an obstacle to PF socialist goals. These evaluations, resting on externally imposed criteria of success – peace, democracy, socialism – obscure the actors’ concern with power.

Settlement implementation: preferences, strategies, resources

No sooner had a settlement been signed than the negotiating teams split. Mugabe’s party, renamed ZANU(PF), ended its alliance with Nkomo’s party; Muzorewa’s team divided into his UANC party and the white minority RF party. These actors used the settlement flexibly to pursue their agendas. For the parties and their armies, the settlement was a resource to win electoral and military power; for the guerrillas, their own power, status, and privilege were also important. Generally, ZANU(PF) resisted the settlement and the British whom it portrayed as pro-Muzorewa’s UANC. ZAPU largely adhered to the settlement and cooperated with the British. At times both ZAPU and ZANU(PF) called on the British to uphold the settlement, particularly those provisions which
would empower them. The Rhodesian forces used their privileged status in the settlement – the British governor’s dependence on them and the Rhodesian administration – to their advantage. The British themselves used the settlement to pursue their own goals, foremost of which was to win international support for an election that would end its responsibility for Rhodesia. Viewing the settlement as a political resource highlights how the warring parties and the guerrillas sought power and privilege. In contrast, evaluating the settlement as an instrument of transition buries these domestic agendas and strategies.

**Electoral power**

Each actor used the settlement to maximize its electoral power. ZANU(PF) believed it could win an outright majority. In a hung parliament, Nkomo hoped to form and lead a coalition. ZAPU expected to sweep Matabeleland, divide the Midlands, and win several seats in Mashonaland including Salisbury. Expecting Muzorewa to win twelve to fifteen of eighty African seats, ZAPU believed a coalition with Muzorewa would deny ZANU(PF) a parliamentary majority and enable Nkomo to lead the country. The Rhodesians were counting on Muzorewa, with his lavish South African support, to win the election or lead a coalition government with Nkomo and the whites, who were guaranteed twenty of the hundred seats.53 Muzorewa, too, expected to win a majority. According to Robin Renwick, Governor Soames’ political adviser during the transition, Britain thought Mugabe’s party would win the largest number of seats but not a majority.54

As party strategy, ZANU(PF) and its ZANLA forces violated major settlement provisions to promote their electoral campaign and to preserve their military power. They violated the provision to stop cross-border movements after the ceasefire. As many as two-thirds of ZANLA’s 30,000 guerrillas entered from Mozambique after the ceasefire, taking advantage of the late deployment of CMF border monitors.55 ZANU(PF) also violated the ceasefire provisions by infiltrating women fighters as refugees, thus exploiting the right of refugees to enter the country after the ceasefire.56 Interestingly, Nhongo-Simbanegavi, who had access to ZANLA archives, says “women fighters were extensively deployed, especially in those areas where the men were under pressure to leave for the assembly places.”57 She explains further that ZANU(PF) “calculated that women campaigners would be crucial in the bid for victory in the elections.”58

ZANU(PF)’s illegal cross-border infiltration of ZANLA forces was probably linked to its decision to keep forces outside the assembly places. All guerrillas were supposed to assemble by midnight on January 4, 1980. ZANLA commanders ordered their most seasoned fighters not to assemble but to go to the rural areas to maintain the army’s logistical structures, display ZANLA power, and campaign for elections. These were, as the British observer team emphasized,
armed groups who were assisted by civilian activists. Should the ceasefire collapse, those outside the assembly places would be able to resume the war and escape annihilation which Mugabe’s party (and Nkomo’s) feared might occur in the assembly places. Estimates of ZANLA guerrillas who did not assemble vary – 9,000–10,000, 40 percent of all ZANLA forces, according to Emmerson Munangagwa, ZANLA’s intelligence chief; 4,000 according to the official British estimate, and 7,000 according to Robin Renwick. Interestingly, the COG accepted Mugabe’s denial of having a deliberate strategy to keep a significant number in his army outside the assembly places.

To ensure that their forces would gather in the numbers they had claimed at the conference and to provide the appearance of adhering to the settlement, ZANLA not only relied on the forces it brought from outside the country after the ceasefire but also pushed mujibas (young male civilians who provided the guerrillas with logistical support) and women into the assembly areas. Nhongo-Simbanegavi refers to how ZANU(PF) had to send to the camps at least some of the women fighters whom it infiltrated as refugees to mobilize the electorate “to avoid the embarrassment of having none at all, especially after all the claims ZANLA had made during the war that women were fully involved as combatants.” General Walls carped that ZANLA sent to the assembly points only a “few old men and women… their mujibas… with a few ant-eaten old muskets and a few rusty old weapons that couldn’t possibly have been the terrorists’ weapons…and meantime the terrorists mingled with the population and made damn certain which way they were going to vote.” The official British report on the CMF agreed. Of the 1,000 alleged ZANLA guerrillas who passed through a particular rendezvous point, the report maintained 20 percent were young mujibas under sixteen and another 20 percent were female camp followers.

The unassembled ZANLA guerrillas, especially in the eastern part of the country, conducted an election campaign of violence and intimidation, thus violating the provision that elections be free and fair. The extent of ZANLA political violence was disputed. The COG was preoccupied with Rhodesian security force and auxiliary violence, and “experienced difficulty in assessing the validity of the many allegations that were made concerning the part played during the election campaign by the guerrilla forces who remained outside the Assembly Places.” The COG report acknowledged acts of guerrilla violence that had little or no political significance were being attributed to ZIPRA, and even more to ZANLA, and found allegations against ZIPRA and ZANLA to be exaggerated. It concluded:

We do not seek to minimise the blame attaching to ZANLA and, to a lesser degree, ZIPRA. That some of their members were guilty of acts of intimidation is incontrovertible. Nevertheless, it is our view that intimidation by the guerrillas was by no means as
widespread or as brutal as official spokesmen claimed. It was also hard to judge where the line was being drawn between political activism and intimidatory behaviour. It is also our view that the one-sided picture projected by the Authorities, and reflected by the media, which attempted to attribute blame for intimidation solely to ZANLA and ZIPRA and their political allies, was grossly misleading and must be corrected.  

In contrast, the British election observers cite Governor Soames’ spokesmen’s claim that about one-third of the rural areas fell in “closed” or “grey” areas. The former were effectively no-go areas for all parties except the dominant party; in the latter, parties other than the dominant one could electioneer only with difficulty and at some risk. The British observer team blamed ZANLA for most of the violence in these areas, “whether or not they were acting on instructions of their political leaders…” In their report, the observers note:

The methods adopted in the attempt to coerce voters in the ZANLA areas were particularly repugnant and sufficiently verified to satisfy us that they had occurred…their range deserves attention. They extended from brutal “disciplinary murders” as examples of the fate awaiting those who failed to conform; to generalised threats of retribution or a continuance or resumption of the war if ZANU(PF) failed to win the election; to psychological pressures like name-taking and claims to the possession of machines which would reveal how individuals had voted; and to the physical interdiction of attendance at meetings. The universal longing for peace, and the ambience of recent violence, made the threats of general retribution or a continuance of the war a potent weapon even in the hands of unarmed activists, since it was independent of the secrecy of the ballot.

In general, ZAPU and ZIPRA cooperated, hoping Governor Soames would favour Nkomo to head a coalition government if ZANU(PF) failed to get a majority of seats, or even better, was disqualified from participating in the elections for settlement violations. Some evidence suggests ZAPU, like ZANU(PF), implemented a secret scheme to infiltrate women fighters as refugees. There were no serious ZIPRA cross-border breaches. During the negotiations, though, ZAPU tried to get as many men as possible across the Zambian border in anticipation of either a settlement or the need to intensify the war should Mugabe decide to renege on their alliance. All but 1 percent of ZIPRA guerrillas were ordered to enter the assembly places. According to Dabengwa, ZIPRA intelligence chief, the exceptions were primarily political commissars who “remained in certain areas…looking after some strategic arms that were left outside the assembly camp…(acting) as a liaison between the camps and the population and the rear base in Zambia…(and) spell(ing) out…our ideas…” There were allegations of ZAPU/ZIPRA intimidation: occasional no-go areas and armed electioneering. But these were not ZAPU/ZIPRA strategy, and both the COG and British election observers reported less intimidation from ZIPRA than from ZANLA. Importantly, there were significant numbers of ZIPRA men who refused to assemble, citing fear of being bombed by the Rhodesians or opposition to the negotiated settlement, and some who entered did not stay
for the duration of the ceasefire because of tensions with their colleagues and the Rhodesian forces. ZANU(PF)/ZANLA’s image as a violator, and ZAPU/ZIPRA’s as obedient, and the tendency to reduce these differences to the former’s indiscipline and the latter’s discipline, is well captured by the Commonwealth monitors’ assessment of how the guerrillas would respond to different electoral outcomes. “[E]ven in a situation of a ZANU(PF) victory . . . there were dangers, apart from drunken revelry and resultant negligent discharges, of ZANLA assuming they were in control of the country and setting off to disarm the police or ‘liberate’ villages.” The monitors repeatedly told their leader, Brigadier Learmont, “that ZIPRA would obey orders and not over react to any result but that ZANLA was unreliable, ill-disciplined and unpredictable.” Such characterizations of ZANLA and ZIPRA, whatever their merit, risk obscuring the extent to which their behavior reflected their respective parties’ strategies to promote their own agendas. Moreover, the view of disciplined ZIPRA guerrillas overstates the control their military leaders exercised over them (see chapter 1). A Rhodesian perspective on ZIPRA guerrillas during the war is astonishingly unflattering and reverses CMF images during the ceasefire and the British Military Advisory and Training Team’s (BMATT’s) views after 1980. “Generally, and certainly compared to ZANLA, all ZIPRA internal terrorist activity had been haphazard, unco-ordinated and thus fairly ineffectual.”

The Rhodesian security forces and the Rhodesian administration also used the settlement to advance their own interests. The extent to which Rhodesians violated the settlement was also contentious. Most controversy centered on the Security Force Auxiliaries. The auxiliaries had initially been recruited as the political armies of Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole. When Muzorewa became prime minister in April 1979, they were incorporated into the Rhodesian army in an auxiliary role to bring them under discipline and control. There were many allegations of auxiliary violence and intimidation on behalf of Muzorewa’s UANC. The British election observers do not make much of auxiliaries’ violations. The observers reported:

We are in no doubt that some auxiliaries were guilty of activities and acts of intimidation in support of the UANC. Many of the accusations against them were in general terms. Specific allegations were investigated . . . and many were discovered to be inventions . . . The worst complaints we heard were of beatings, and the most common that of preventing attendance at other parties’ meetings. We found no consistency in the behaviour of the auxiliaries . . . Their activities were certainly under closer scrutiny than those of ZANLA and ZIPRA activists in the rural areas, if only because they were immediately identifiable by their uniform and were accountable to the Government.

The observers further note:

we did find a widespread belief that in a variety of ways the machinery of government, and in particular the Army, was used with partiality against the activities of those political
parties whose accession to power was most deeply feared by a white community greatly concerned for their future. While not condoning such activities, we found no sign that such departures from the political neutrality of Government agencies as there may have been were having any significant effect on the opinions or polling intentions of the Common Roll Voters [Africans].

The British report on the CMF endorses these conclusions. Reinforcing the claims of British monitors of the Rhodesian forces, this report denies rampant auxiliary intimidation of voters and attributes such allegations to the auxiliaries being the targets of the PF’s “biggest propaganda exercise.” Moreover, the report maintains that “[T]he Rhodesian army, equally keen that their units should receive good reports, had no compunction in taking disciplinary action against offenders or by sacking bad leaders.” The report suggests that the PF focused on the auxiliaries because it was virtually impossible to hold the Rhodesian forces guilty of violating the ceasefire rules which favored them. None the less, the report refers to the Rhodesian forces trying or contemplating all kinds of action to prevent a Mugabe victory. The military commanders wanted Governor Soames to disqualify ZANU(PF) for its ceasefire violations and threatened otherwise to cause a breakdown in the ceasefire. Some in the Rhodesian forces appeared to make their own efforts to assassinate or discredit Mugabe. After voting, when a Mugabe victory seemed likely, Rhodesian commanders wanted the election declared null and void because of intimidation. Walls sent this request to Prime Minister Thatcher. When she refused the request, Walls and other commanders had to persuade Rhodesian senior military officers against a coup. The Selous Scouts unit in the army, often disguised as guerrillas, committed atrocities to damage the guerrilla parties, and especially ZANU(PF). The Rhodesians also violated the settlement by patrolling too close to the assembly places, their goal being to provoke the guerrillas into violating the ceasefire. After the extension of the deadline for assembly, to which Lt.-General Walls had agreed, Governor Soames had to contend with Walls issuing unauthorized instructions to his security forces to go after unassembled guerrillas.

The British report on the CMF also discusses how the Rhodesians used the settlement to further their own agendas. The Rhodesian military took full advantage of Governor Soames’ dependence on it and the Rhodesian administration to implement the settlement. The Rhodesian security forces issued their own security reports accusing especially ZANLA of ceasefire violations and used the Ceasefire Commission to make such allegations, hoping that the governor would act against the guerrilla parties. The Rhodesian security forces also used the guerrilla amnesty provisions, a hangover from the Muzorewa regime, to assert their authority over the guerrillas. For guerrillas who had failed to assemble by the extended deadline, the only way to legalize themselves was...
to seek amnesty. Under these provisions, the authorities could disarm, interrogate, and detain them for thirty days. The Rhodesians used these powers, making amnesty a most undesirable and tense process.92

The COG reported the abundance of allegations of political activity, of coercion, and of intimidation made against the auxiliaries. “We were satisfied that, as with allegations against ZANLA, the activities of the Auxiliaries were not as bad as the charges against them claimed. At the same time their activities were very much worse than government spokesmen were ever prepared to admit.”93 The report was also critical of Governor Soames for using the auxiliaries to enforce “law and order.” “We were persuaded that the failure to control the Auxiliaries was a major factor in the ensuing level of intimidation.”94 Unlike the auxiliaries, the COG reported that the regular security forces “were not the subject of criticism as being a political army. However, the high profile they maintained in many parts of the country may have provoked at least some breaches of the Agreement.”95 The list of breaches covers similar territory to those listed by the British report on the CMF.96

The conduct of international actors during the election suggests that they too used the settlement provisions flexibly to further their own interests. The huge gap between the British observer team report and the COG report on the election underscores the different biases and interests of these monitors. While the British report may have understated Rhodesian violations, the COG report was partial to the guerrilla parties. Though Rice provides an overwhelmingly positive evaluation of the role of the Commonwealth, and more specifically the COG, in the transition, she alludes to how the COG bias against the UANC and in favor of the guerrilla parties led it to miss entirely ZANLA’s intimidation and violence in critical election areas and its deliberate strategy of keeping a significant number of armed guerrillas outside the camps.97 Further, she notes how the COG bias against Muzorewa damaged its relationship with him, thus denying itself “both an important source of information and an opportunity to represent more equitably the interests of the parties.”98 Moreover, the COG missed how the provisions to allow refugees into the country after the ceasefire deadline were manipulated by the guerrilla parties in order to infiltrate trained men and women.99 Curiously, neither report mentions the massive ZANLA cross-border infiltrations at the start of the ceasefire.

Despite their differences, these two observer reports, along with a host of others, declared the election legitimate because it served their different interests.100 For the British, it is difficult to resist the view that even more than blocking Mugabe’s rise to power, they wanted to be rid of responsibility for Rhodesia. Despite evidence of ZANLA intimidation, and Muzorewa’s and Nkomo’s pressure on Governor Soames to proscribe ZANU(PF), the British report on the CMF suggests that British strategic interests took priority over its concern with “free and fair” elections.
...it would have been a brave man sitting at Government House being watched minutely by every foreign ministry in the world and by a press corps in Salisbury of nearly a thousand, who could have risked the whole strategic objective of the settlement by doing what the NJOC [National Joint Operational Command of the Rhodesian forces] wanted. Indeed it is quite clear that had Mugabe or even part of his party been proscribed, not only would much of the world have refused to recognise the election but also the war would, almost certainly, have started again.\textsuperscript{101}

One could ask of the COG the same question that Anthony Parsons, the British representative to the UN during the transition, asked rhetorically of the UN, that is “whether the United Nations would have been prepared to confirm any other result than an outright ZANU victory or whether any other result would have been regarded in New York as being neither free nor fair regardless of circumstances on the ground.”\textsuperscript{102}

On February 27–29, 1980, Africans voted overwhelmingly for Mugabe’s party. On March 4, 1980, Governor Soames announced that ZANU(PF) had won fifty-seven of the eighty common roll seats, giving it a majority in the hundred-member legislative assembly. The twenty seats reserved for whites had been won by Ian Smith’s RF party. But the election results were never fully accepted by ZANU (PF)’s key rivals who felt the party’s intimidation had paid off. In West Nicholson, ZIPRA and ZANLA shared Juliet assembly place but for a fence dividing them. A ZANLA ex-combatant recalled how ZIPRA guerrillas refused to attend a military parade and to raise and salute the flag on independence day.\textsuperscript{103} John Nkomo, then a high-ranking ZAPU politician and now national chairman of ZANU(PF), believed that “[W]e cannot rule out the possibility that the elections were rigged.”\textsuperscript{104} Senior ZAPU politician Cephas Msipa believed that the elections were less than free and fair in the rural areas, that the people were tired of the war, and that “to end the war maybe they voted ZANU(PF) because they had more people in the field.”\textsuperscript{105} Years later, Joshua Nkomo still believed the election was a sham.

After the count, the used ballot papers were flown specially to Britain, not to be stored as historic documents, but to be burned. It’s hard to believe that that would have been done if there were nothing to hide . . .

That my party should have won not a single seat in Salisbury, and only twenty seats in the whole western strip from Kariba right down to Beitbridge, I could not believe and still do not believe. Even the known and massive campaign of intimidation could not have achieved that. That the first elections in free Zimbabwe failed to reflect the people’s will is something of which I am sure.\textsuperscript{106}

Nkomo relates bitterly how two days before the poll Governor Soames summoned all the party leaders to Government House, told them that ZANU(PF) intimidation in the eastern provinces made free and fair elections impossible, and agreed with Nkomo’s proposal to postpone elections in such areas only to renege on that commitment. “I [Nkomo] am convinced that his conduct was
wrong, and can only be explained by Lord Soames’s wish to get clear of the situation as soon as he could— a position, as noted, that is supported in the British report on the CMF. Asked in 1989 if he thought the 1980 election had been free and fair, Muzorewa expressed similarly critical views.

Definitely not. Everybody knows that including the Commonwealth Observers. Someone has to convince me that we actually lost the votes. But to say the least, I don’t believe we lost the election, but we lost the verdict. There’s no way we could have gone from 65 percent of the vote [in 1979] to three seats. The British thought that the best way to stop this [war] was to let the people with the guns in [to power].

These domestic sentiments are important not because the election outcome did not reflect voters’ preferences reasonably well but because they meant that the first independent government’s legitimacy was questioned from the outset by its most important rivals.

Military power

Competition for military power, inextricably related to the electoral contest, is evident in at least four arenas: the guerrilla parties’ concealment of their arms, the Rhodesian army’s reluctance to administer the assembly places, the attitudes of each toward military integration, and the guerrilla armies’ quest for recognition as the de facto equals of the Rhodesian soldiers. In each arena, the actors used the settlement and the British attempts to move toward military integration (which were not part of the settlement) to attain their own goals. Their compliance with and violations of the settlement and their cooperation or non-cooperation with the British reflected their strategies to maximize their military advantages.

Concealment of arms

ZANLA and ZIPRA leaders both hid arms, not just in case the ceasefire collapsed and they needed to resume the war against the Muzorewa government but also as an insurance policy against whatever new political dispensation would emerge from the election. ZANLA commanders Josiah Tungamirai and Dominic Chinenge described this practice of hiding arms as “tactical deceit”: each army revealed no more about its numbers, weaponry, and contingency plans than it thought necessary for the success of the ceasefire. Presumably with ZAPU knowledge, the Soviets escalated, rather than ceased, their arms transfers to ZAPU. During the transition period, the Soviet Union reportedly supplied ZAPU with arms valued at US$60 million. The escalation of Soviet aid, which continued after the election too, fueled rumors that if Nkomo did not play a significant role in the new government, a Soviet-backed invasion by ZIPRA’s well-armed conventional forces would be imminent.
Rhodesian reluctance to administer the assembly places

The first British scheme to move toward integration required, in General Acland’s words, that the Rhodesians, “possessing the paraphernalia of government and administration, would have to take over the running of the Assembly Places from the Commonwealth Force.” The British hoped the Social Welfare Ministry would replace the monitors as quartermasters of the assembly places. The British report on the CMF remarked:

Not a hope; not only did the management in Salisbury feel it was beyond their means but they even suggested that it was our fault that there were 22,000 in the assembly places and that we should remain responsible until they were empty…Part of it was due to a genuine lack of suitable officials owing to the call up of reserves for the elections, but most of it was due to a built in fear that a white Rhodesian official would be shunned in such a place and also the feeling of “why should we do anything to help those ‘ters.’”

Failure to provide administration of the camps might contribute to a breakdown of the ceasefire, which the Rhodesians would welcome.

The British had little more success in trying to persuade Rhodesian security forces to participate in joint patrols with the guerrillas as a prelude to establishing a military presence in the camps. The British report on the CMF noted:

It may seem almost unbelievable that no one in Comops or the police hierarchy were capable of giving a straight and single order for this to happen. Such orders as were issued were confused and muddled and often left the final decision to local police commanders with the result that sometimes in some places they turned up and in others, inexplicably [sic], they didn’t…Even where we achieved success on this front, Comops were to attempt to ruin the whole point of the exercise by being pedantic about interpretation of the idea of joint patrols of the boundaries of the assembly places.

Transferring camp administration to the Rhodesians became more urgent after General Acland, fearing for the monitors’ safety, decided to withdraw them from the assembly places before the election results were announced. The next day, February 19, 1980, Acland appealed to the Ceasefire Commission representatives to personally seek authority from their respective leaders – Walls, Mugabe, and Nkomo – for an initiative to resolve the problem of the looming administrative vacuum in the camps. The representatives returned a day later with the necessary approval. With the election only six days away, Acland presented his plan for handing over the administration of the assembly places to the Rhodesians. “The Cease Fire Commission was to have the full authority to order the Rhodesians to produce an immediate presence of effective and adequate size to take over from the Monitoring Force in each Assembly Place and the PF guerilla commanders were to accept, and cooperate with, such a presence.” On February 22–25, 1980 the Ceasefire Commission, either as a whole or in two halves, visited every assembly place with Acland’s message that “while a country can have any number of political parties, it cannot, if it
is to remain at peace, have more than one Army.”117 The plan was to move in Rhodesian police, an army liaison officer, and then soldiers.118

ZIPRA camps cooperated whereas ZANLA camps resisted. ZIPRA’s receptivity to Acland’s message is portrayed by a ZIPRA camp monitor. He described how political leaders, touring the assembly places for a second time to preach reconciliation and the need for integration, arrived at Romeo assembly place to find that a joint patrol of ZIPRA forces and the Grey Scouts, a much-detested cavalry unit of the Rhodesian army, were apprehending and disarming “dissident terrorists” (ZIPRA guerrillas).119 The experience with ZANLA camps was different. A monitor observed: “All along, ZIPRA had demonstrated a greater willingness to stick to the rules and their camps were impressively well-disciplined . . . The ZANLA camps were a much more tricky affair. Less-disciplined, more political and with a tenuous chain of command to PF HQ in Salisbury, ZANLA were much more deeply suspicious of RSF [Rhodesian security forces] motives and progress was slow.”120 ZIPRA’s compliance was consistent with its desire to be seen as cooperative and benefit from British favoritism. ZANLA’s resistance reflected its suspicion of the British and the Rhodesians and its unwillingness to be under their military power. The British report regarded the exercise of replacing monitors with Rhodesian forces as “the greatest single contribution to the maintenance of peace in Zimbabwe” and described each assembly place prior to the start of voting as “a comparatively happy mixture of monitors, PF, RSF and BSAP [British South Africa Police].”121 This upbeat assessment belied the fragility of the arrangement – in a very short time each guerrilla group would control its own assembly places and forbid the constitutional forces of law and order entry.

Joint military training

The other British effort to begin military integration before handing power to a newly elected government was to embark on joint training schemes for ZIPRA and ZANLA under the authority of Rhodesian forces and the CMF. The settlement did not provide for military integration but the British had offered to assist steps toward it as part of the settlement. Just prior to the election General Acland secured agreement from General Walls, head of Rhodesian Combined Operations, Nkomo, and Mugabe for training 600 ZIPRA from Lima assembly place and 600 ZANLA from Foxtrot assembly place. General Acland regarded the experiment as “an important psychological gesture because the guerrillas who went to the camps laid down their arms and for the first time thus expressed their trust in the Rhodesian army.”122 British self-congratulations aside, the training experiment revealed the different strategies of each side, including the British, to maximize its advantages.

The British report describes how the pro-Nkomo bias of the Soames administration and the Rhodesian army led to a ZIPRA battalion receiving the offer
of training first, although a British spokesperson at the time blamed ZANLA for being slow to accept an offer (which ZANLA denied) made to both forces simultaneously. Also, ZIPRA guerrillas went to Essexvale, an established training center for the Rhodesian army near Bulawayo. ZANLA guerrillas were to be trained at Bravo assembly place, which was emptied for that reason, but on Rhodesian advice, they were taken to Rathgar, a white-owned farm in Mutoko district. “Rathgar was a hopeless place for a training camp because not only was there little water and no sanitation, but there was no training area. A massive amount of work had to be done in the place before it became habitable.”

The Rhodesians cooperated with the plan to train the guerrillas, after General Walls abandoned his strong opposition to including ZANLA in the training scheme. The British report remarked that “once a firm decision was made to go ahead, the Rhodesians could not have done more to make sure the necessary preparations were made…” Indeed, Governor Soames’ spokesperson claimed that the idea of training the guerrillas had come from the Rhodesian security forces, though General Acland attributed the idea to discussions with Lt.-General Maclean, army commander, and Nkomo. The Rhodesian commanders continued to assume that the future army of Zimbabwe would change only cosmetically, with a few black officers absorbed among the whites, and regarded the guerrillas as grossly inferior irregular forces, which would have to disband as soon as the elections were over. A British monitor described the Rhodesian military hierarchy’s notion of integration as: “We’ll produce the sergeants. You produce the men. Our men will shout at your men.”

ZIPRA was eager to cooperate with military integration. A British official involved in later discussions about military integration observed: “Nkomo needed to integrate in order to achieve some influence. For that reason his people were more cooperative. Mugabe didn’t need to – he knew he’d win the election.” Nkomo repeatedly urged the governor to make an immediate start to integration with the Rhodesian army and made this appeal at campaign rallies. On February 10, 1980 he told a rally that the nucleus of a Zimbabwean army composed of Rhodesian security forces and guerrillas – something he said he had been calling for since his return – would start taking shape “within the next few days.” Interviewed years later, ZIPRA’s intelligence chief, Dumiso Dabengwa, claimed ZIPRA had been anxious to proceed with military integration and eager to compete on the basis of ability for places in the new army of Zimbabwe. To this end, ZIPRA had provided its crack battalion, never tested in battle, but trained by East Germans in conventional warfare. According to New Zealand monitors who were in charge of Lima assembly place, these soldiers “had effective discipline and their drill and basic soldier standards appeared to be reasonably high.” But ZIPRA had hidden agendas. Nkomo saw his army as superior to ZANLA’s “ragamuffin forces,” as did the British, competition
Based on merit would enable ZIPRA’s numerically smaller forces to dominate a new army. Also, ZAPU and ZIPRA officials’ public support for joint training of ZIPRA and ZANLA and their equal treatment contradicted their private hopes. When ZANLA complained that its forces were being discriminated against, the British report on the CMF commented that “although publicly Nkomo had to say that they should be treated equally, privately he made it quite clear that he hoped they would not and furthermore he was averse to ZANLA sharing the same camp.”

Expecting to win the elections, ZANLA/ZANU(PF) had no interest in integration. According to the commander of the CMF’s New Zealand contingent, Rex Nhongo, who had become head of ZANLA after Josiah Tongogara’s death in a car accident in Mozambique on December 26, 1979, “was heard on more than [one] occasion to say that there would only be one army and it would be composed of people from the ZANLA Army and that the ZIPRAs and the whites would not figure in his plan.” ZANLA felt that militarily it had earned the right to comprise the forces of the newly independent government since it had provided the overwhelming number of guerrillas inside the country and had borne the brunt of the war whereas ZIPRA had held back large numbers of its troops. Robin Renwick, a key political adviser to Lord Carrington during the negotiations, believes Mugabe would never have allowed his guerrilla forces to be tampered with until the outcome of the election was clear because he was convinced that the British would rig the election against him. Presumably, Mugabe also feared British bias (which the British report acknowledges) in favor of ZIPRA over ZANLA in a military integration exercise. Reflecting ZANLA’s negative attitude to military integration and its suspicions, it was slow to respond to the British offer of training and sent its least experienced guerrillas to Rathgar training site.

British officials who were involved in negotiations with the new government about military integration after the elections but prior to independence found the three armies continued to have quite different ideas about the future composition of the new army. Most of the CMF left in early March 1980 before the election results were announced; CMF head, General Acland, left with his remaining staff on March 20, 1980. Soon after the election results were announced, General Ken Perkins, Assistant Chief of Britain’s Defence Staff came to Zimbabwe for exploratory talks about integrating and training the new Zimbabwean army. He recalled how “a lot of whites were hardliners.” At a party in the capital, Army Commander Maclean swore at him, and said: “How dare you come out here and interfere? We could have won this war.” He was the Army Commander. With this type of attitude it was not surprising there was not much integration.” Of Lt.-General Walls, he said: “He seemed to understand, to accept, but he was between a rock and a hard place. His subordinates didn’t accept.” The Rhodesians still hoped to be able to have a small regular army and believed...
they could limit the recruitment of guerrillas by setting high entry standards. Of ZANU(PF)/ZANLA, Perkins remarked: “Mugabe’s people reckoned they were entitled to spoils, which one way or another they got.” According to Robin Renwick, the British team wanted to bring as many ZIPRA as possible into Rhodesia before independence, but ZANU wanted them to return without their arms. Nkomo refused. It was agreed with Walls that ZIPRA should be allowed to retain personal weapons but heavy equipment had to be handed over to the government or the Zambians. “It was thus possible to get most of the 8000 ZIPRA in Zambia back before independence…” ZIPRA/ZAPU continued to see integration as a means of achieving military influence. On March 20, the day Acland and his team left, Major-General Edward Fursdon, Director of Military Assistance Overseas, and his deputy, Lt.-Colonel Tony Ling, arrived to assess the situation and to advise ZANU(PF) what it required to form a new Zimbabwe army and what assistance the British army could offer. This small team would also take control of the approximately thirty-six British monitors who had stayed behind as instructors for the guerrilla armies. According to Fursdon, “the problems were formidable indeed”; “they all certainly had their own ideas – one had to be careful to appreciate everything from their point of view.” “Those four weeks between the practical end of Operation Agila [the name the British gave to the CMF operation] and independence,” according to the British report, “were sometimes very difficult ones indeed” but were rewarded “by a remarkable demonstration of unified military ceremonial at the independence celebrations.”

Military status: de facto equality

Actors’ interests in military power and status are difficult to disentangle. Both the guerrilla parties and the guerrillas wanted put into practice the de facto equality of the Rhodesian and guerrilla forces provided for in the agreement. The parties and their guerrilla armies appealed to the de facto equality of the forces when Governor Soames called on only the Rhodesian forces to impose law and order, thus leaving unassembled guerrillas at their mercy. The guerrillas also invoked their de facto equality with the Rhodesian forces in two other contexts: to resist disarmament under the amnesty rules, and to demand meat rations which they had been promised. The agreement stipulated that in the event of more general or sustained breaches of the ceasefire, Governor Soames would have to decide what actions to take with the forces that had accepted his authority. Early in the transition, Soames announced that PF ceasefire violations were so severe that the police needed military assistance to maintain law and order. On December 30, he deployed the Rhodesian security forces along the Mozambican border near Umtali to pursue 600–700 ZANLA guerrillas who were said to have entered the country illegally. When the extended assembly phase had ended, he ordered the
The peace settlement

general deployment of the Rhodesian forces and the auxiliaries to act against PF soldiers who had stayed outside. From the PF perspective, this reflected the governor’s bias against the guerrillas. The guerrilla commanders urged the governor to utilize PF troops as well as the Rhodesian forces in maintaining law and order. Dabengwa spoke for both ZIPRA and ZANLA when he said: “We are willing to send out our forces. If our men are responsible [for violations] we are fully prepared to place them in order. That is our duty. Our forces are part of the legal forces of the country. We listen to the British Governor who happens to be our Commander-in-Chief. If it means a shoot-out with unruly elements, then we will do it.”146 But Soames rejected the PF offer. First, he was under pressure from the Rhodesian forces to give the order to take action against the guerrillas who were in violation or they would do so anyway.147 Second, Soames saw ZANLA guerrillas as part of the problem. As already discussed, the behavior of the Rhodesian forces, including the auxiliaries, became a major issue in the interim administration.

Monitors reported on the guerrillas’ conviction that they had earned the status of belonging to legitimate armies. A Commonwealth monitor in a ZIPRA assembly place observed: “They were proud of what they had achieved and were very conscious of their status as a legitimate Army under the ceasefire arrangements.”148 For ZANLA, the sentiments were no different.149 The guerrillas’ sense of being members of legitimate armies is also apparent from their responses to the amnesty rules. The guerrilla liaison officers’ efforts to persuade their men to disarm, as the amnesty provisions required, were not received kindly. One monitor described how his ZANLA liaison officer battled to get a group of guerrillas to disarm.

It took him five hours to explain the terms of the amnesty and why they had to be disarmed and even then we had to agree to a pride-salvaging compromise whereby the guerrillas were allowed to carry their weapons while they walked the twelve kilometres to where the buses were parked; the guerrillas would not accept the loss of face involved if they had had to walk through the Tribal Trust Lands, to be seen by all the Africans to have been disarmed.150

Often the persuasive powers of the liaison officer failed, and senior ZANLA and ZIPRA officers from Salisbury had to be flown to the scene to give clear orders to the guerrillas. Of the guerrilla commanders, the British report says that “even they themselves jibbed at giving unpopular orders” and that “Rex Nhongo, the ZANLA commander, would argue for hours in his stuttering, illogical way that . . . it would be ignominious for the ‘victors’ to be disarmed. Many of these negotiations lasted more than 48 hrs whilst really bolshy bush leaders refused flatly to hand over their arms.”151 These perceptions strengthen the view that guerrillas were as interested as their parties were in them being recognized as members of legitimate and even victorious armies.
Another instance in which the guerrillas demonstrated the importance to them of *de facto* equality with Rhodesian soldiers related to the issue of rations. British negotiators in London had promised to feed and accommodate the assembled guerrillas but no such arrangements had been made. Already responsible for having to feed the monitors, the one hundred CMF logisticians were confronted with the daunting task of supplying the more than 20,000 guerrillas who ultimately assembled. Several camps – especially Romeo, Kilo, and Foxtrot, the largest camp holding some 6,000 guerrillas – faced severe drinking water shortages. CMF engineers and the Rhodesian water authorities addressed the problems of water shortages by reopening boreholes closed by the war, acquiring steel drums and jerricans, and transporting water from the nearest large towns in water bowsers. About 80 percent of the goods were locally obtained and the rest were imported, all at an estimated cost to the Foreign Office of over £2 million. Food and water supplies often had to be airdropped while roads were being demined.

The guerrillas’ rations were supposed to be equivalent to those for black Rhodesian soldiers and to include meat. But meat was in short supply. The war had eroded the numbers and health of cattle, and according to the British report on the CMF, Rhodesian claims of beef shortages may have had an element of “we’re not going to give our meat to those ‘ters.” The guerrillas were told they were not getting meat because there was none in the country. At the same time, they watched meat and generally lavish rations being airdropped to the white British soldiers who were monitoring their camps. They also saw locals with cattle herds, which they were willing to sell, but which the CMF feared might have anthrax and would not buy. From the guerrillas’ perspective, “the monitors were deliberately trying to starve the guerrillas, forcing them to return to the bush and hence to be blamed for the failure of the ceasefire. At one time the guerrillas gave an ultimatum that unless meat arrived within 12 hours they would return to the bush. An emergency supply of kapenta [a dried whitebait] brought in by Puma helicopter just persuaded them to stay.” Generally, though, the guerrillas rejected protein substitutes provided by the CMF. They regarded the soyabees as fit only for cattle and were similarly dissatisfied with the kapenta. A cull of elephant only briefly mitigated the problem. They demanded beef and threatened to leave the assembly places if they did not get it. Eventually, the CMF arranged for imported beef from South Africa at a cost of half a million pounds.

The threat to the ceasefire over rations did not end with the provision of beef. Guerrilla grievances about their rations seem to have involved more than a battle for *de facto* equality with Rhodesian soldiers. One peculiarity of the demand for promised meat rations was that they seemed to be an issue for ZIPRA rather than ZANLA guerrillas, raising questions about what other factors were at work.
The guerrillas also demanded an increase in official rations. The British report on the CMF provides a number of reasons for this demand.

It was [also] very difficult for the monitors to apply strictly the official ration when numbers were changing so rapidly, hangers-on were taking advantage of our benevolence and many of the Patriotic Front were literally undernourished and needed a great deal more. In some assembly places rations discipline was good; in others vast quantities of food disappeared without the numbers to support it . . . We eventually had to increase the ration to keep the peace [my italics].

Even then, rations remained a volatile issue for ZIPRA at Papa assembly place, where the guerrillas took the monitors hostage “in anger over a lack of meat.” In 1989 Dabengwa, ZIPRA’s intelligence chief, gave his version of this episode:

Our men had surrounded the Monitoring Force camp, and they threatened that, if they did not get their demands met, they were going to wipe them out. We had to divert and instead of getting to Harare we had to get to this camp. When I got there the Monitoring Force was completely shaken . . . they had been waiting in positions to defend themselves or to try and find a breakthrough for almost twenty-four hours. I had to talk to [the guerrillas] . . . and find out exactly what their problems were and . . . respond to their demands.

According to the British report on the CMF, this was not a demand for “the correct scale” but “what became referred to as a ration mutiny.” The next day, January 29, 1980, Dabengwa was flown to Papa
to grip the situation; this he did in no uncertain manner and had everybody jumping about in no time. The ringleaders were disciplined and probably put on short rations and his number three, Ben Mathe, left behind to instil a higher state of discipline on the camp and a more cooperative attitude to the monitors. There was no further trouble after that.

The battles over rations suggest the power of the principle of de facto equality of the forces and the determination of the guerrillas to make the British live up to their promises. Inter alia, they show, too, a rations indiscipline and a willingness to use the power of the gun to obtain their preferences. A monitor joked that to both the Rhodesian forces and their guerrilla opponents, “HM Government became somewhat synonymous with hand outs.” After a Rhodesian rocket attack on a bus-load of ZIPRA guerrillas who were moving to the assembly places, albeit after the deadline, the British government was presented with a bill for R$27,000 (Rhodesian dollars) to pay for the burnt-out bus. Similarly, when some ZIPRA guerrillas commandeered some R$400 worth of food and drink from a store, “they instructed the owner to charge it to the British Government as it was their responsibility to feed them.” The guerrillas’ threatening and extractive behavior had manifested itself during the war when guerrillas
demanded from civilians not just basic supplies but luxuries such as meat, and then only certain parts, and money for cigarettes. During the ceasefire, the burden of provisioning the guerrillas shifted from rural civilians to the British Foreign Office. The CMF monitors, rather than rural civilians, also became the victims of guerrillas’ insecurity, sometimes being taken hostage or abducted but more usually threatened with death or capture.

In summary, formal agreement at Lancaster House did not alter the actors’ preferences for maximizing power and status during the implementation phase. The settlement became a potent resource which the players used flexibly in their strategies to enhance their power. Even actors’ compliance with the settlement was a strategy to pursue their own agendas. Leaders’ preferences did not always coincide with those of their subordinates, as General Walls experienced with many of his officers who challenged the settlement and wanted to prepare a coup rather than accept a ZANU(PF) government. Even when leaders and followers shared interests, as was often the case with the guerrilla parties and their rank-and-file, the followers had their own independent concerns, as the guerrillas’ concerns with diet and security during the ceasefire suggest. Studies of the settlement implementation, oriented toward evaluation in terms of peace and democracy, miss how actors used the settlement to pursue the same power-building and military insurance agendas they sought during the negotiations. Focused primarily on leaders, these studies also give little attention to followers’ independent or overlapping agendas.

**Post-election impact of settlement: strategies and resources**

The compromises of the settlement had an important bearing on ZANU(PF)’s immediate strategies and resources without altering its desire to maximize its power. If anything, the acute fragmentation of power embedded in the settlement intensified ZANU(PF)’s concern with building and consolidating its power. The three armies each claimed legitimacy. The Rhodesian army invoked its constitutional status; the two guerrilla armies appealed to their status in the settlement as the *de facto* equals of the Rhodesian soldiers. The other state institutions – the bureaucracy, the police, and the judiciary – were all white-controlled. To build and legitimate power, the ruling party turned to the guerrillas and also appealed to its heroic participation in the liberation struggle. It also invoked the guerrillas’ *de facto* equality with soldiers. Studies of the settlement, focused on evaluation in terms of externally imposed criteria such as peace and democracy, neglect the impact of the war past and the settlement on post-election politics. These studies thus miss how the guerrillas and symbolic appeals to the war became vital assets in the ruling party’s power-building strategies.

The ruling party’s strategy to cope with the settlement’s legacy of fragmented power and especially multiple sovereignty was to use the guerrillas to transform
Rhodesian-controlled state institutions. It had to use both ZIPRA and ZANLA; to use only ZANLA, which it preferred, would guarantee the outbreak of civil war which it wanted to avoid. On March 4, 1980, moments after being appointed prime minister, Mugabe announced his policy of reconciliation, itself a strategy to build and legitimate power. In state institutions, reconciliation involved integrating guerrillas into the police, the military, and the CIO. Lt.-General Walls, former head of Combined Operations, Peter Allum, Commissioner of Police, Air Marshal Frank Mussell, head of the Air Force, and Ken Flower, head of the CIO, were all asked to stay in power though Mugabe had the constitutional power to make his own political appointments. As observers have noted, this was a shrewd move to reassure whites in the armed forces, the police, and intelligence, and thereby forestall a coup possibly supported by South Africa, and to facilitate an anticipated partial demobilization of the Rhodesian forces. That same day Mugabe also told a news conference that the CMF/Rhodesian initiative to integrate guerrilla forces and the security forces had to continue. “There have been no resignations. As we take over we must use the institutions that are there. We will have to use the structures that we find.” He authorized Walls to work with the ZIPRA and ZANLA commanders on integration. In a meeting with General Acland, the CMF head, hours after the election results had been announced, Mugabe also

expressed the wish that the British Government and Ministry of Defence should assist with the task of amalgamating and training the armies and unequivocally stated that he looked to Britain to help them through a difficult period since the existence of three armies and more than 25,000 guerrillas in the Assembly Places was potentially the most dangerous factor for destabilization in the country.

Mugabe also persuaded Governor Soames to remain in the country until formal independence on April 18, 1980. On March 7, 1980 the Ceasefire Commission was dissolved. It was replaced on April 15, 1980 by the Joint High Command (JHC). Like its predecessor, the JHC maintained three separate chains of military command. Chaired by Lt.-General Walls, its task was to preside over military integration, train the new army, and determine its size and shape.

ZANU(PF) also invoked reconciliation when it formed a government of national unity, with key ministries for former RF and ZAPU ministers. Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU leader, was appointed Minister of Home Affairs, with jurisdiction over the police and law and order. To ensure ZANU(PF) had some control over law and order, however, the ruling party moved police intelligence to the State Security Ministry, which ZANU(PF)’s Emmerson Munangagwa controlled. Mugabe also appealed to whites to stay in Zimbabwe and assured them a role in the new Zimbabwe. Mugabe appointed Denis Norman, a former RF leader, as Minister of Agriculture to reassure whites that their land was secure.
Despite reconciliation, the loyalty of ZAPU/ZIPRA and the Rhodesians remained a source of anxiety. After the elections, the Soviet Union began airlifting its arms directly into Zambia rather than first sending them to Angola. Nkomo allegedly met twice with South Africa’s military leaders to determine their reaction to a ZAPU coup. He also began buying land in a number of strategic points around the capital, allegedly for the eventual purpose of stockpiling weapons. Before being discovered in April 1980, seven truckloads of arms had been brought into Zimbabwe by ZAPU from Zambia. The ruling party also feared a coup or sabotage of government policy by Rhodesians in state institutions.

Treatng the guerrillas as the equals of the Rhodesian military was an important strategy for legitimating the guerrillas and the war and for providing the terms on which they would be retained in assembly places, demobilized, and integrated into the army. The *de facto* equality of the guerrillas and the Rhodesian soldiers established during the negotiations counteracted the impression that the constitutional authority of the Rhodesian forces implied a Rhodesian victory over the guerrillas. Not only did the guerrilla parties have their own need to recognize the guerrilla forces as legitimate but also the guerrillas themselves would have threatened the fragile peace if they were denied the status of their former Rhodesian enemies. Treating the guerrillas as soldiers provided the base-line for guerrillas’ assembly pay, demobilization pay, assembly rations, and army pay, and became the justification for moving guerrillas from assembly places to local government housing. Guerrillas thus were inevitably privileged over most civilians. The discourse of guerrillas as soldiers also led to contestation over the meaning of guerrilla equality with Rhodesians.

The official celebration of the guerrilla war and the war dead were central to the ruling party’s legitimation of the new order it sought to construct. Two new national symbols, Heroes’ Days and Heroes’ Acre, demonstrated the new rulers’ use of the war to legitimize themselves and the new nation. Under the Public Holidays Act, in June 1980 parliament approved the introduction of Heroes’ Days which were designated to be on August 11 and 12, dates which had no historical significance. Minister of Home Affairs Joshua Nkomotold parliament that the nation would celebrate Heroes’ Days, “to remember those who fought and fell in the struggle for our freedom and the recognition of our Independence by the whole world.” In mid-1980, the ruling party promised to build Heroes’ Acre, the first new national monument, on fifty-seven hectares on Warren Hills, about seven kilometers west of Harare. Heroes’ Acre became the site for the official national annual commemoration of Heroes’ Days and for the burial of those posthumously declared official national heroes.

The war was central in identifying national heroes. According to an official brochure published several years after independence, two categories of people qualified for burial at Heroes’ Acre. One group included “national leaders,
freedom fighters and the dedicated supporters of the national liberation who participated in or undertook revolutionary activities that contributed directly to the final victory of declaring independence on April 18, 1980.” The other group included “contemporary and future sons and daughters of Zimbabwe of the same calibre as those fallen heroes whose dedication and commitment to the new nation of Zimbabwe will justify their burial at this sacred spot.”180 These two groups of fallen heroes shared in common a subordination of “their individual interests to the collective interests of Zimbabwe as a whole, cherishing qualities such as loyalty, dedication and patriotism”; ideals of “comradeship and love”; “an unwavering support for the cause of freedom and justice for which they accepted and endured pain, suffering and brutality with fortitude”; a refusal “to surrender on matters of principle”; commitment to “a new socio-economic order based on egalitarian, democratic and socialist principles”; and abhorrence of “tribalism, racism and oppression.” Official heroes were symbols of “the indefatigable collective will of Zimbabweans to be the makers of their own history” and of “the glory of the final victory in unity,” and were an inspiration to especially the youth to emulate the heroes’ ideals, values, and actions.181

The official brochure describes how the major different structures at Heroes’ Acre, constructed with North Korean technical, artistic, and financial assistance, symbolize these values.182 The Eternal Flame, moved from its location on the Kopje in Harare, signifies that “Zimbabwe shall live forever” (through “the souls of its fallen heroes” and also “the collective will of the masses”) and the eternal desire for freedom. The Eternal Flame points the way forward and beckons the people to work hard “for the higher cause of nation-building.” The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, a statue of three figures, represents the freedom fighters and “freedom-loving people” who died during the armed struggle, and seeks to convey that they “possess some kind of dynamism and vitality.” On either side of the tomb, a mural depicts the various stages of the liberation struggle from the 1960s, and rows of graves exist for national heroes. Their bodies would be “far from their homes and families because they now belong to the large family of Zimbabwe, the whole nation.” The National Museum which will document the history of the struggle and provide information on national heroes remains to be built. To date, some fifty official national heroes lie buried at the official shrine.

**Conclusion**

The warring actors’ pursuit of power remained constant throughout the negotiation and implementation of the settlement and into the immediate post-election period. Their strategies and resources, however, changed as the political environment altered. During the negotiations, alliances of expedience were formed and actors defined the nature of the conflict differently. These alliances
dissolved after the negotiations, exposing in particular the ZANU(PF)/ZANLA and ZAPU/ZIPRA dimensions of the conflict. During the implementation of the settlement, all the actors used the settlement as a resource to promote their own agendas, sometimes complying and cooperating and at other times violating the provisions and withholding cooperation. Guerrilla preferences, for power and privilege, became discernible. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, the ruling party’s strategies and resources were shaped by the war and the settlement. The existence of three mutually hostile armies, each able to claim legitimacy, and of white-controlled state institutions propelled the ruling party to turn to the guerrillas and the war of liberation to build and legitimate its power. Studies of the settlement, whether laudatory or critical, are so oriented toward evaluation in terms of externally imposed criteria that they are ill equipped to trace domestic actors’ strategies, resources, and agendas. They miss how actors used the settlement as a political resource in the transition and how the war and the guerrillas became critical resources for the ruling party and its chief opposition in the post-election period. Moreover, their top-down perspectives bypass the dynamics among rank-and-file guerrillas. The next chapter examines the ruling party’s strategies of building and legitimating power during the prolonged post-independence assembly phase, and guerrilla preferences and resources in their relationship with the ruling party.
3 The assembly phase

The guerrillas were both assets and threats to the new regime as it sought to establish control of the armed forces and to end multiple sovereignty. To build and legitimate its power in the assembly phase, which coexisted with military integration, the ruling party pursued dual and contradictory strategies. It treated the two guerrilla armies as the *de facto* equals of Rhodesian soldiers. Simultaneously, the ruling party systematically favored ZANLA over ZIPRA guerrillas in a strategy that came to dominate. The guerrillas sought to enhance their privileges and power, relying on violence, fraud, and appeals to their war contribution. The ruling party often collaborated with the guerrillas but came into sharp conflict with them when it imposed disarmament and compulsory demobilization in abrupt policy reversals. At the end of the assembly phase, the demobilized guerrillas were established as a privileged group, largely stripped of their armed power but with a potent resource in their symbolic status as liberators and fighters. The ruling party had created a single army from the three warring forces and had thus removed a major threat to its survival. But in the process of forging a single army, the party had supported guerrilla violence and fraud and guerrilla challenges to the constitutional forces of law and order. War-time mass military mobilization was neither an unambiguous asset to the post-war revolutionary regime, as Theda Skocpol has proposed, nor an unambiguous threat, as peace-building studies tend to assume.

Studies of Zimbabwe have missed how the guerrillas and the ruling party collaborated and were at odds with each other in the assembly phase, as well as what their shared and independent goals were. Students of post-war military or security issues have paid surprisingly little attention to the assembled guerrillas and their importance in the ruling party’s effort to build exclusive power out of multiple sovereignty. Studies of official programs for assembled ex-combatants – these included the provision of rations, pay, housing, Operation Soldiers Employed in Economic Development (SEED) which sought to induce ex-combatants to perform agricultural work, and ultimately disarmament and demobilization allowances – focused chiefly on evaluating them in terms of their purported goals. For example, these studies generally concurred that Operation SEED had failed but differed on whether demobilization allowances
had been too low to meet ex-combatants’ basic needs or too “generous” and therefore a disincentive for ex-combatants to find work. Missing from these evaluative analyses of programs, however, is an understanding of the guerrillas’ and the ruling party’s undeclared objectives, the strategies and resources they used to attain them, and their effectiveness. This chapter examines first the ruling party’s strategies and resources, then the guerrillas’ preferences, resources, and interactions with the party, and finally the outcomes for the guerrillas and the regime.

**Ruling party strategies and resources**

The ruling party’s power-building strategy to overcome the legacy of multiple sovereignty was two-pronged. One strand involved strict adherence to the *de facto* equality of the three armies to appease the guerrillas who expected to form the new army, to prevent a civil war if ZANLA were favored over ZIPRA, and to oppose the Rhodesian forces’ constitutional monopoly of armed power. This strategy inevitably challenged the constitution which recognized only the Rhodesian forces of law and order. The other strand of party strategy consistently privileged ZANLA and ZANU(PF). Privileging ZANLA over ZIPRA incited violent competition between the two guerrilla armies, and privileging ZANLA over Rhodesian forces undermined the constitution. The tension between these contradictory strategies came to a head after serious guerrilla faction fighting at Entumbane in Bulawayo in February 1981 during which the Rhodesian army showed its loyalty to the ruling party. ZANU(PF) recalculated the benefits of absorbing the guerrillas still in camps into the new army against the threat of continuing to keep guerrillas, and especially ZIPRA, armed and grouped in camps. The party decided to disarm and demobilize ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas still in camps, thus breaking its promise to offer a place in the new army to every guerrilla.

**De facto equality of forces**

The strategy of *de facto* equality of the three armies manifested itself in two ways. First, the guerrillas in the assembly places were paid and fed as if they were regular Rhodesian African soldiers while they awaited their guaranteed positions in the new army. When those still in camps were demobilized in a policy reversal, their benefits were based on the pay and rations of regular African soldiers in the Rhodesian army. Second, the guerrillas were treated as state administrators. They were responsible for law and order in their camps and administered most guerrilla programs. Treating the guerrillas as soldiers legitimated and empowered them and simultaneously undermined the constitution which recognized only Rhodesian forces.
The assembly phase

Terms of service: rations, salary, and demobilization pay

After the election, former guerrillas in the assembly places were fed, as they had been during the ceasefire, as if they were African soldiers in the Rhodesian army. An inter-party parliamentary public accounts committee reported in January 1981 that “evidence taken from various Assembly Point commanders confirmed that the quality and quantity of rations supplied were always up to standard and delivered on time. In fact, the only complaint expressed was at the lack of variety in the rations . . .”7 “[It] was sadza [a type of porridge], nyama [meat] and beans every time,” said ZANU (PF) member of parliament (MP) Mr. Bassoppomo.8 The tender document for the next contract period – from March 3, 1981 to March 2, 1982 – prescribed more varied rations.9 A female ZIPRA commander at Sierra assembly point, a women’s camp, commented favorably on the food:

We were getting very good food: meat, mealie meal, rice . . But the problem was we didn’t know how to make a good meal out of it. Some of the food we were giving to civilians if it was plentiful. I think they were even cross when they saw the assembly point moving. Especially some of us, we grew [up] in the rural areas. We didn’t know some of the foods [e.g. gem squash, kiwi fruit] we were getting from the government.10

Mr. Landau, committee chair, told parliament in January 1981 that there was always abundant food because the numbers of people in the assembly places ordinarily were substantially below what they were on pay day. “This resulted in large amounts of food going to waste. There are to this day, I am told, mountains of food in various parts of this country which remain uneaten, going rotten or are being stolen. There has been very little control of the amounts supplied, and even at this moment in time I would go so far as to say the wastage in this respect is still tremendous.”11 Though some remote camps experienced erratic food supplies initially,12 Joshua Nkomo’s claim that ZIPRA camps “were often without adequate food and supplies”13 and the UANC Youth Director’s claim that “nothing has yet been done to offer them [assembled guerrillas] either the necessary facilities or good food by the Government”14 seem unfounded.

In mid-May 1980 the government paid an allowance of ZS100 a month, retroactive to March 1, 1980, to the approximately 34,000 ex-guerrillas in the assembly places. The guerrillas’ allowance was set to correspond with the salary of African privates in the former Rhodesian army – almost all private soldiers had been Africans. The only difference was that soldiers contributed part of their pay to pensions and therefore actually received less than the former guerrillas waiting to be attested into the army.15 The decision to pay African soldiers’ salaries to the guerrillas had been made after the election and before formal independence. In April 1980 the British governor, Lord Soames, authorized a supplementary vote of ZS35 million of which ZS10 million had been earmarked for the “associated forces” – the former guerrillas. ZANU(PF) may have promised
its guerrillas pay before they left Mozambique to return to Zimbabwe. The guerrillas not yet in the army continued to be paid until the end of August 1981, when they were physically demobilized.

In August 1981 soldiers and guerrillas waiting to join the new army were informed that if they chose to demobilize, they would receive Z$185 per month (US$259 in 1981), set to correspond with the money, food, accommodation, and clothing supplied to Africans in the army, for up to two years. In practice, demobilization from the assembly places, though not the new army, was compulsory and thus a major policy reversal. The scheme provided for other types of government assistance: guaranteed places in primary and secondary schools and encouragement and assistance for qualified candidates who wished to go to university; skills training in vocational and technical institutions; and advice and assistance to those seeking employment, with special encouragement to those who wished to pool their demobilization allowances to form cooperatives (see chapter 5). The government presented its plan to demobilize 30,000–35,000 soldiers and reduce its army to 40,000 as driven by cost concerns. However, the timing of its decision to demobilize, which it announced immediately after the February 1981 uprising in the Entumbane guerrilla camps (which spread to integrated army units), suggested its fear of guerrilla threats to law and order, and especially of ZIPRA’s threat to the regime. An internal government document noted that demobilization had been initiated “to afford the government and the nation curb a dangerous situation characterised by hostile tension due to neglect of those ex-combatants who were then in the Assembly Points and those of the National Army who could not continue as soldiers.” Ending “the group motive,” as one Demobilisation Directorate official said, was a top priority.

Both the importance of treating the guerrillas as de facto soldiers and the immediate post-election limits to Mugabe’s reconciliation policy are reflected in the different official responses to guerrilla and Rhodesian African forces’ demobilization. Altogether, some 25,000 Africans, roughly equivalent to the numbers of assembled guerrillas immediately after the independence election, were disbanded without benefits. On the same day as Mugabe appealed for reconciliation (after the election results were announced), he also condemned “irregular features” in the security forces, saying: “We don’t need mercenaries and Selous Scouts.” On April 25, 1980, the Selous Scouts’ disbandment was announced. Formed in 1973, the Selous Scouts had specialized in intelligence gathering and clandestine paramilitary operations and had operated with unusual autonomy. It had a reputation as the most ruthless unit, and was allegedly responsible for 68 percent of insurgent deaths inside Rhodesia. Of the estimated 1,800 men in the unit at war’s end, 80 percent were Africans. General Walls argued for the Selous Scouts’ retention lest they be needed for future special operations but Mugabe apparently feared this highly efficient enemy unit. On
March 6, 1980, ZANU(PF) leader Eddison Zvobgo announced the incoming government would disband Muzorewa’s auxiliaries which had been absorbed into the Rhodesian army after Muzorewa became prime minister. Soon after independence, the roughly 20,000 African auxiliaries were disbanded. In early May 1980 a two-month demobilization exercise of the 4,000 member Guard Force began. Predominantly African, the Guard Force had been responsible for defending the “protected villages,” white farms, and the rail lines. The only official public discussion of these large-scale disbandments took place when white MPs asked Mugabe to justify the disbandment of the Guard Force. Told they were “irregular” units brought into existence solely for fighting the war, a white parliamentarian noted that ZIPRA and ZANLA too were established specifically to fight the war and asked why the Guard Force could not join the new army, as the guerrillas could, and whether the disbanded Rhodesian forces were going to get the same assistance – at that time a Z$400 gratuity – as demobilized ZIPRA and ZANLA. The unequal treatment of the demobilized guerrillas (even those demobilized under the less generous 1980 program) and Rhodesian African soldiers exposes the early limits of Mugabe’s widely praised reconciliation policy and highlights the importance for the regime of treating the guerrillas as soldiers, even when demobilizing them as potential threats. The demobilization of “irregulars” in the Rhodesian army accomplished what ZANU(PF) and its negotiating partner, ZAPU, had failed to achieve at the Lancaster House settlement talks.

*De facto* equality meant not only treating the guerrillas as the equals of Rhodesian soldiers but also observing the principle of equality between ZIPRA and ZANLA. The two guerrilla armies were not only given identical terms of service in the camps but they were also treated with scrupulous equality in the implementation of other guerrilla programs. When the guerrillas moved to urban cantonments from the rural assembly camps, ZIPRA and ZANLA were moved at the same time. After violence at the Entumbane cantonments in Bulawayo, military trucks took ZIPRA men out of Entumbane to a temporary camp at Woolendale Rifle Range (south of Bulawayo) and ZANLA men to Godhlawayo Shooting Range (north of Bulawayo), leaving both in tents and outside the urban areas. When the guerrillas were sent to do agricultural work at SEED camps, each army went under the same conditions and simultaneously. Both armies were also demobilized and disarmed simultaneously and identically. But the strategy of discriminating in favor of ZANLA guerrillas, as will be shown, contaminated and ultimately undermined efforts to treat the two forces equally.

_Guerrillas as “state” law and order authorities and administrators_ ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas refused, with their leaders’ support, to acknowledge the authority of the Rhodesian law and order forces, the constitutional
forces, because it would be tantamount to accepting a Rhodesian war victory. The guerrillas were in charge of law and order in their assembly camps (and later urban cantonments and Operation SEED camps), and were allowed to keep arms there.

In early May 1980 the JHC directed that each guerrilla could retain one personal arm but had to return surplus “small arms” to the national armory. Guerrillas were to recover and place hidden arms in the assembly points, and to send heavy weapons in assembly points to Llewelin, Cranborne, or Inkomo barracks. Because of the suspicion and hostility with which the two armies regarded each other (and the Rhodesian forces) and because of their armed strength should fighting occur, the JHC’s *modus operandi* was effectively limited to persuasion and consensus. It could only try to urge the handing in of weapons and to prevent one side feeling it was being placed at a disadvantage and, therefore, refusing to comply with specific requests. This meant, according to a judge, that

at times while the Joint High Command was attempting to achieve this object of establishing central control of all weapons, it knew that one group or the other had weapons that should have been handed in, but that such a situation simply had to be accepted rather than it should push matters to a confrontation which might have resulted from any unacceptable pressure in this direction.  

For these reasons, ZANU(PF) and ZAPU and both parties’ guerrilla leaders publicly supported the former guerrillas’ right to bear personal arms and for other arms to be stored in camp armories when they were being moved from rural to urban camps.  

Accepting multiple sovereignty, the Joint High Command (JHC) and the police had an arrangement that Rhodesian police could only enter assembly places (or other camps) to apprehend guerrillas suspected of crimes with the assembly commanders’ permission and accompanied either by them or JHC members.  

In September 1980, Justice Beck acknowledged the inherent danger of guerrillas self-administering their armed camps: “nothing so gravely threatens the proper administration of the law, and hence the stability of our society, as the existence of places where the normal law enforcement agencies of the State can only peaceably go with the leave and licence of the persons still under arms in those places.”  

Announced on February 17, 1981, soon after guerrilla factional fighting at Entumbane and in a number of integrated army units, the decision to disarm the assembled guerrillas who had not yet been integrated into the new army dramatically reversed JHC policy.

The government usually relied on the guerrillas to administer programs. Guerrillas quickly became responsible for administering pay in the camps.
White army reservists were called up for the first pay parades in the assembly places in May 1980 but the JHC told them not to attend future pay parades, probably because the presence of white army members in the camps was deemed undesirable by both guerrillas and reservists. When the army called on the department administering the national registration scheme to register and issue the assembled guerrillas with metal identification cards which would include a photograph and fingerprints, it refused because of the magnitude of the exercise and because it “had a reluctance to take on the job because of the security situation.” This meant that the pay program would be implemented without the guerrillas possessing any identification, opening the exercise to serious fraud, as I discuss later. Following instructions, assembly commanders appointed their most senior and literate guerrilla officers to become paymasters and pay liaison officers. The selected guerrillas were sent to a seminar to learn how to fill in and update acquaintance rolls. Each assembly point had its paymaster, and pay liaison officers processed the claims of several paymasters. The only remaining role for former Rhodesian army personnel was to bring huge trunks of money to the assembly places. These arrangements empowered the paymasters and the pay liaison officers who came to exercise government authority in the pay program, and as will become apparent, also the assembly camp commanders and rank-and-file guerrillas.

The Demobilisation Directorate (DD) in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, with one exception (a Nigerian-trained Zimbabwean with an undergraduate degree in psychology), was composed of former high-ranking and educated ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants, each approved by the JHC and Prime Minister Mugabe. The directorate’s task was to counsel the ex-combatants on job and training prospects, to gather information on guerrillas’ educational background and employment preferences, and to administer the Demobilization Fund. It was assumed that demobilization would work better if guerrillas administered other guerrillas. Even the directorate was protected from working with white civil servants. The directorate communicated directly with the Minister of Labour and Social Services, himself an ex-guerrilla, and his permanent secretary. “[M]ixing and mingling them with the civilian personnel had been regarded not feasible” because of the need to treat ex-combatants with caution “by virtue of the fact that they were a trained personnel, which was highly and politically conscious.”

Guerrillas largely self-administered the SEED program, which sought to put male guerrillas to work on government or parastatal land – repairing war-damaged irrigation equipment, clearing land, and growing crops. The goal was to encourage the guerrillas to “swop their guns for picks and shovels,” to offer them agricultural training, and above all to give them something to do to overcome boredom in the assembly points. The men went to the projects under senior officers and with their personal weapons which were to be stored in
armories at each work site.\textsuperscript{43} ZIPRA JHC representative Dabengwa spoke of the army’s lack of expertise to provide agricultural training and the minimal effort of civilian government agencies to get the scheme off the ground.\textsuperscript{44} As was the case with the provision of food, civilians feared being involved with the guerrillas. BMATT’s first commander said: “they were not given any professional help… Civilians didn’t really want to work with the guerrillas. They feared being bumped off.”\textsuperscript{45}

The only program which the guerrillas did not self-administer (because they lacked the necessary transport) was the supply and delivery of food to the assembly camps. The experience of the private contractors who did supply the camps underscores the risks associated with entering the guerrilla-run camps. After the departure of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, the task of supplying the camps was passed from reluctant government ministries (first Social Affairs and then Defence) to private contractors.\textsuperscript{46} Private contractors did not rush to the job. J.J.M. Holdings, the sole contractor from April 15, 1980 till August 1, 1980, denied a parliamentary committee’s charge that it had made a “grossly excessive profit” (about Z$7.5 million in less than three and a half months on a rations contract that had cost the state Z$11 million).\textsuperscript{47} The company’s chairman emphasized that supplying the assembly points was a risky business and “a monumental gamble.” “It has not been made clear that had the people in these assembly points turned nasty at any time we could have lost about [Z]$1 million in any one day. We would have been bankrupt, because the army insisted that the contractor should assume the full risk, including the lives of the drivers.” He said he had to pay all his employees who went to the assembly points three times the national average because of the risk. Transporters had to be paid four times the government rate. “In the middle of the exercise one driver not employed by us was shot dead by assembly point personnel and as a result I had to raise the salaries of my drivers otherwise they would have refused to go.”\textsuperscript{48} Potential contractors were unwilling to bid for the initial army contract “because of the difficulties involved and the lack of security.”\textsuperscript{49}

\textit{Privileging the ruling party and its guerrillas}

Alongside observing\textit{ de facto} equality of the three forces, the ruling party privileged ZANLA over ZIPRA guerrillas and often the Rhodesian forces. First, the ruling party sought to make itself and its guerrillas the base of the nation and the state. Building a nation based on the party and its army was evident in the promotion of ZANLA and party war songs, symbols, and slogans for the nation, the belittling of ZIPRA through attacks on its leader and its inferior war contribution, and calls for its demobilization and disarmament and ZAPU’s elimination. Intertwined with the pursuit of a party-nation was the quest for a party-state. Party leaders threatened to impose a one-party state, called for
ZANLA to usurp the role of the police, and ultimately made disarmament a party decision rather than the joint military decision of the three armed forces it ought to have been. Second, ZANU(PF) practiced selective justice, punishing ZIPRA “dissidents” while condoning similar ZANLA behavior. Like the de facto equality of the armies, privileging ZANLA was an inherent challenge to the constitutional law and order forces and an incitement to guerrilla violence.

Building a party-nation and a party-state

ZANU(PF) used the state media to promote only its war contributions and war songs, and used its party slogans and symbols at national events. At a rally in Plumtree, Joshua Nkomo criticized the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation for broadcasting “rubbish” and some ministers for spreading propaganda that only one section fought the war. In June 1980, a letter-writer to The Herald’s editor objected to the Sunday morning program, Dzimbodze Chimurenga Dzakasungura (Chimurenga Songs Liberated Zimbabwe) because, inter alia, it “is intended to suggest that ZANU(PF) alone fought and won the liberation war and this is a disgraceful distortion of history” and seeks “to shun the visible reality that ZAPU(PF) exists and has fought as much as ZANU(PF) has done in the liberation war.” Another person worried that “[I]n our daily [radio] programmes we hear the ZANU(PF) songs of liberation while we only hear ZAPU(PF) songs on Tuesdays, and for 15 minutes only. It seems the radio is now for the party only. To be free and fair, please give time to ZAPU(PF) on equal terms.” Another faulted the broadcasting services for focusing on ZANU(PF) and its heroes, and omitting not just ZAPU heroes, but whites such as Bishop Lamont and Garfield Todd, and leaders such as Hlabangana and Burombo from an earlier era. Information Minister Shamuyarira denied partisanship charges and said his goal was to eliminate colonially inherited “regional tribal broadcasts.”

At the first Heroes’ Day in Bulawayo, a national event, ruling party speakers led the crowd in revolutionary songs and slogans praising ZANU(PF), its central committee, ZANLA (Pamberi ne ZANLA Forces – Forward with ZANLA Forces), the ZANLA High Command (Pamberi ne High Command – Forward with the High Command), the ZANLA General Staff, Prime Minister Mugabe, and Mozambique’s President Machel. In Harare, the ruling party flag rather than the national flag was reportedly displayed at Stodart Hall where the bodies of Jason Moyo (ZIPRA) and Josiah Tongogara (ZANLA), the first two national heroes, lay waiting for reburial.

In other areas, too, ZANU(PF)’s grass-roots supporters and its national leadership exhibited a one-party mentality. ZAPU’s vice-president, Josiah Chinamano, complained in April 1980 that his followers in urban townships around Harare were innocent victims of ZANU(PF) “because they contend that the Patriotic Front has no right to exist after ZANU(PF) has been elected into power, and if it does exist . . . it ought to exist in the western provinces,
Forcing people belonging to other parties to join it, ZANU(PF) behaved as if it were already a one-party state. In early November 1980 Chinamano alluded to the dangers of ZANU(PF) slogans which denigrated armed men who had no platform from which to answer back – a reference to ZIPRA in assembly camps and slogans such as *Pasi ne Machuwachuwa* (Down with ZIPRA), *Pasi ne vanematumbu* (Down with those with big stomachs – a reference to Nkomo), and *Pasi ne Vadzvinyiriri* (Down with oppressors). ZANU(PF)’s “radical” cabinet ministers belittled ZIPRA, ZAPU, and Nkomo’s role in the liberation struggle, often at party rallies in Bulawayo, Matabeleland, historically ZAPU’s turf, and frequently called for a one-party state. ZANU(PF) Minister Enos Nkala – an Ndebele who had failed to win a seat in Matabeleland in the independence election – told a party rally in Bulawayo in June 1980 that some armed “dissidents” were Ndebeles who were calling for a second war of liberation because their leader Nkomo was not in power, and that “my personal opinion is that we should have a one-party state in this country.” Soon after, Nkala told a ZANU(PF) rally in Bulawayo that the party’s task “from now is to crush Joshua Nkomo” whom he called “a self-appointed Ndebele king.” When ZAPU and Muzorewa’s UANC challenged Nkala’s call for a one-party state, saying ZAPU was in the government because of its heroic war contribution, Nkala responded: “They contributed in their own small way and we have given them a share proportional to their contributions.” In early July 1980, Minister Tekere, who was also ZANU(PF) secretary-general, told a rally he had been trying to depose Nkomo since 1961. Claiming that ZANU(PF) had been disciplined by war, and referring implicitly to ZAPU having withheld most of its forces during the war, Tekere asked rhetorically: “do you know what war is, dear Nkomo?” Tekere claimed that the behavior of the “Nkomo group” “lends easy temptation to me to begin to wonder whether a one-party state is not desirable at some stage….” After guerrilla faction fighting in Bulawayo in November 1980, Minister Tekere said Nkomo was in government as an act of “charity.” “We did not need his army in the war, so why are they making a nuisance of themselves now?” and he called for disarming ZIPRA cadres. A ZANU(PF) MP told parliament on May 20, 1980 that “the Government must work seriously and quickly for the abolition of ZIPRA and the Rhodesian armed forces.”

ZANU(PF) leaders charged Nkomo with presiding over a police force which was hostile to ZANU(PF) and ZANLA, and called for or supported ZANLA and others to usurp the police role. On trial in November 1980 for allegedly murdering a white man, ZANU(PF) Minister Tekere’s defense document noted that “he and some of his fellow Ministers honestly believed that the police still displayed loyalty to the former administration and not exclusively to the present Government, and second, (that) he was aware that the Minister in charge of the police was the person to whom the ZIPRA elements continued to owe allegiance.” Some ZANU(PF) ministers and deputy ministers agreed,
saying the police were biased against ZANU(PF), were a ZAPU force, and ought to belong to the government and not Nkomo who was just a minister.66

In November 1980, after factional fighting delayed Minister Nkala’s address to a party rally in Bulawayo, he declared: “From today the PF [ZAPU] has declared itself the enemy of ZANU(PF).” He called on ZANU(PF) supporters to form vigilante committees to defend themselves against “those who want to challenge us.” “Organise yourselves into small groups in readiness to challenge the Patriotic Front on its home ground. If it means a few blows, we shall deliver them.” He said: “If police do not want to act according to the specific instructions I have given them, then we shall proceed with those to whom the instructions have been given.” He advocated using ZANLA forces in Bulawayo if “cooperation” was not forthcoming. Minister Kangai, also present at the rally, said he would ask the prime minister to send troops to Bulawayo, and criticized the police, saying that only in Bulawayo did police commanders not meet visiting ministers.67

At a Bulawayo party rally in late September 1980, Nkomo complained that ZANLA and ZANU(PF), claiming control of areas where they had fought, refused his police force access.68 At the end of 1980, ZANU(PF) removed Nkomo as Home Affairs Minister, and later appointed him Minister without Portfolio.

After the near outbreak of civil war in February 1981 (see below), the ruling party took the decision to disarm the guerrillas by itself and in violation of its agreement that the JHC would make all military decisions. Munangagwa, JHC chair, announced falsely that the JHC had decided on this. Informed by Munangagwa that the JHC had decided on disarming the guerrillas, Dabengwa flew from Bulawayo to meet with Mugabe and Munangagwa. Mugabe indicated that the ZANU(PF) Central Committee had decided to disarm the combatants. Dabengwa expressed dismay that the party had usurped the JHC’s place in taking military decisions. Dabengwa refused to order ZIPRA to disarm but, at Joshua Nkomo’s request, explained to ZIPRA commanders at Entumbane what had transpired in his conversation with the prime minister. Nkomo said for the sake of peace he would go ahead with the prime minister’s directions, despite the objections of ZIPRA commanders. He then addressed a parade of all ZIPRA combatants at Entumbane at which he issued the order to disarm.69

In his autobiography, Nkomo complained that disarmament should not have occurred till after the disbandment of camps and claimed that arms give a soldier’s life purpose.70 ZANU(PF)’s unilateral decision to disarm the former guerrillas heightened ZAPU and ZIPRA fears of a one-party state and was an incitement to further violence.

Selective justice

The ruling party treated armed ZIPRA who committed crimes more harshly than their ZANLA counterparts. Soon after the election, Home Affairs Minister
Joshua Nkomo, invoking law and order, said guerrillas still outside the assembly points “must move away quickly to the assembly points. They either go to the Police or they join their comrades in the assembly areas.” The JHC established committees to bring guerrillas and hidden arms into the assembly points. Those found with arms outside the assembly points faced jail sentences under the 1965 Emergency Powers Regulations and the threat of being hunted down by the security forces. By June 1980, detachments from a newly integrated battalion, the security forces, and the police, especially the Police Support Unit, were used to round up ZIPRA “dissidents.” Inter alia, ZIPRA “dissidents” attacked government projects and personnel. Within the ruling party, some saw ZIPRA “dissidents” as acting under local or national leadership, the more moderate portrayed them as mere bandits. ZAPU leaders denied ZIPRA “dissidents” were linked to ZAPU or ZIPRA. They opposed the Rhodesian police and army rounding up “dissidents” while ZANLA “dissidents” were given a free hand. Fifteen ZAPU MPs called on the government to round up ZANLA troops who had left Foxtrot assembly point in the eastern districts to campaign for the party for the October 1980 local government elections rather than, as ZANU(PF) claimed, to look for water. ZAPU MP Vote Moyo said: “We wonder why ZANU(PF) is so quiet about such a serious breach of the country’s security laws by their own forces. If that had been done by ZIPRA forces, the whole country would be buzzing with ZANU(PF) complaints that the troops were dissidents trying to subvert the government.” Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of ZANU-Ndonga, also an opposition party, endorsed allegations of ruling party bias against ZIPRA.

ZANU(PF)’s tacit support for ZANLA “dissidents” was pervasive. From March 1980, ZANLA guerrillas on ZANU(PF) farms (Grazely and Oasis) in Goromonzid district (in Mashonaland East province) had killed and assaulted white farmers and mine managers, attacked police and police stations, intervened in disputes between farm workers and farmers, and politicized and intimidated farm labourers. Following incidents in September 1980, the government sent the Police Support Unit to monitor and control the former ZANLA guerrillas. The Police Support Unit and the police had been used against the guerrillas in the war, and ZANLA guerrillas demanded their withdrawal to defuse the tension that their presence had fueled. ZANLA liaison officer from Grazely Farm, Mr. One O’Clock, an appointee of the ZANLA army commander, said: “We [ZANLA] have tried to talk about means of abolishing the dispute between the comrades and the Support Unit… If there are police or Support Unit who come to this area, the comrades should be aware of their presence because the comrades become suspicious.” He advocated joint patrols of police and “comrades.” Mugabe acceded to the request, and said he did not think it was necessary for the army to be used because he had instructed that the guerrillas in Goromonzi be disarmed – something that did not occur. Also reflecting
support for ZANLA “dissidents,” the ruling party paid the legal fees of some ZANLA guerrillas accused of murder.\textsuperscript{84}

The ruling party blamed guerrilla faction fighting in the urban cantonments in Chitungwiza (near Harare) and Entumbane (in Bulawayo) in late 1980 and early 1981 on ZAPU and ZIPRA. Heavy fighting erupted in Entumbane on November 9 and 10, 1980, leaving 55 people dead, 550 injured, and 2,000 homes damaged.\textsuperscript{85} Local Government and Housing Minister, Eddison Zvobgo, blamed ZAPU for “whipping up” the tension in Bulawayo and said that there was evidence that the problems had been caused by “rabble-rousers and political malcontents who are still licking their wounds as a result of having lost in the elections this year.”\textsuperscript{86} Mugabe blamed undisciplined ZIPRA elements for starting the fighting and called the bands that went on a rampage in the western suburbs “disloyal, misguided and politically motivated armed hooligans and political malcontents whose final objective, according to the information before me, is to create chaos and lawlessness so as to pave the way for the eventual fall of my Government.”\textsuperscript{87} Nkomo and the white mayor of Bulawayo both blamed the fighting on the inflammatory speeches made by ministers Kangai, Shamuyarira, Zvobgo, and Nkala in Bulawayo the morning before,\textsuperscript{88} and ZIPRA commanders blamed ZANLA for starting the fighting.\textsuperscript{89}

Between February 7 and 10, 1981, even more serious fighting broke out in the Entumbane cantonments and spread to three integrated military units. At Entumbane alone, the understated death toll was 197 – one estimate was that over 300 ex-guerrillas had died\textsuperscript{90} – and 1,600 homes were damaged.\textsuperscript{91} ZANLA guerrillas and ZANU(PF) government ministers including Mugabe again blamed ZIPRA for starting the fighting, and claimed the events exhibited “very sinister undertones, a definite organised pattern.”\textsuperscript{92} To end the November 1980 and February 1981 fighting, the Rhodesian army and air force had intervened on the government’s side. The use of the Rhodesian army against only ZIPRA guerrillas in the second round of major fighting at Entumbane escalated ZIPRA fears and suspicions and gave momentum to a wider ZIPRA resistance to the ruling party.\textsuperscript{93} In March 1981 the government established a commission of inquiry to investigate the “mutinous disturbances” in Entumbane camps and in the three integrated battalions at Ntabazinduna, Glenville, and Connemara. Presented to Mugabe in June 1981, the report has not been made public. Allegedly, it “fell short of government expectations” for apportioning blame because it remained neutral.\textsuperscript{94} Put differently, ZANLA/ZANU(PF) did not emerge blameless.

**Guerrilla preferences, resources, and party relations**

Guerrillas often shared their leaders’ preferences, seeking power and \textit{de facto} equality with soldiers, as the preceding analysis makes clear. However, guerrillas also had their own distinct preferences. They sought access to more state
resources and wanted to retain their military status and power. Their key resources were appeals to their de facto equality with Rhodesian soldiers, appeals to their war contribution, their control of guerrilla programs which created opportunities for fraud, and their use of violence and intimidation against those who stood in their way. In their quest for more money and urban housing, and in their refusal to engage in manual labor in the Operation SEED program, the guerrillas found the party a willing collaborator. However, the guerrillas and the party came into sharp conflict over the party’s decision to demobilize and disarm the guerrillas.

**Guerrilla–party collaboration**

**Assembly money**

Appealing to their de facto equality with Rhodesian soldiers, and imitating their colleagues already in the new army, ex-combatants demanded that their assembly allowances or salaries reflect their war ranks. In early February 1981, Prime Minister and Defence Minister Mugabe asked parliament to approve a supplementary estimate of Z$28.8 million for the Defence Ministry, almost Z$19 million of which was to cover pay according to rank in the integrated army and for the guerrillas in the assembly points. Under the new system, a commander in the army and in the assembly points would receive Z$552 per month, battalion and division commanders were paid Z$249 per month, company commanders over Z$150 per month, and privates Z$100.95

Responsibility allowances, or pay according to rank, created turmoil and fighting in the camps because the lower ranks wanted the higher payments too. “When this was introduced, I’ll be honest with you,” a ZIPRA pay liaison officer told me, “there was quite a lot of uncertainty about what would happen the next day and each day. There was real hostility. People all claiming: ‘We all fought the war.’ They said: ‘There were ranks in the war but it didn’t mean people suffered differently.’ But there was quite a lot of ill-feeling to commanders.” Among ZIPRA forces, the strongest resentment apparently came from commanders who had lost their war rank and were therefore ineligible for the higher pay. Senior commanders stripped commanders of rank for disobeying orders to go into the assembly points during the ceasefire “because they feared they’d be wiped out”; for objecting to conditions in the assembly points – “people just living in tents, and the sanitary conditions weren’t good”; and for violating the peace accords by leaving the assembly points or burying arms outside the assembly points. According to another ZIPRA ex-combatant, the ZIPRA commander of Mike assembly point at St. Paul’s Mission in Lupane, who was also a ZIPRA High Command member, nearly lost his life over “the money and ranks issue” when a grenade was thrown in the assembly point. Outside the country, the guerrillas had been told that even though they had different ranks, they were equal. Pointing to the contradiction in what he called “this
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propaganda,” the ZIPRA ex-combatant continued: “People can never be equal if you have a command structure...[W]hat the guerrillas wanted was, okay, you have a command structure, be unequal in rank but equal in benefits!”胶
And he laughed.

Guerrillas exploited guerrilla control of pay administration and the lack of verifiable guerrilla identification to defraud the state. The initial pay-out alone, covering March to May 1980, cost the army twice as much as it had budgeted.胶
All guerrillas had at least two names, their birth name and their chimurenga (war) name which they acquired when they arrived at a training camp. Some had more war names – if one were sent to train in the former Soviet Union, one might acquire another name, and then still another if sent to the front. Individuals had little difficulty obtaining several pay books by using different names. They had only to request one from their own or another assembly point commander who knew them. This was a major source of fraud in the scheme.胶 Ex-combatants who had been integrated into the army had to surrender their pay books, but they often returned to an assembly point with another pay book as pay day approached.胶 Also, former guerrillas who had received a Z$400 lump sum payment under the first demobilization program often returned to the camps, obtained pay books, and received pay back-dated to March 1, 1980.胶 Further fraud arose because “a lot of the members of the forces within the assembly points could not sign names and they signed their signatures with an X...”胶

Assembly point commanders were singled out for abuses. According to the inter-party parliamentary public accounts committee, numbers could scarcely be guessed within even a 20 percent range, and guerrilla commanders deliberately exaggerated the count to receive larger pay packets.胶 Declaring the army unable to prevent fraud, its former chief of staff (Administration) Major-General Derry MacIntyre sarcastically proposed a return to the pay system in seventeenth-century Britain when a bag of money was handed to a unit commander to disburse as he thought fit. “The commanders are perhaps the only people who can positively identify the people in their camps. Up to now they do not seem to have been terribly enthusiastic about helping the Army with this identification.”胶 Strategies for inflating the numbers varied, from inserting on the pay roll the names of people who did not exist to bringing in people on pay day. At Juliet assembly point at Zezane Mission in the Lowveld, the army’s Director of Pay, a white Rhodesian officer, reported how

we were now arguing whether or not 300 men who had been paid, and who had not appeared on the pay statements, were genuine members of that assembly place. Again, I was instructed that we would see to it that these members were now paid. There were obvious inefficiencies in the camp administration, and when the whole exercise was over we had paid not an extra 300, but if I remember correctly almost 700, and the extra bill was, if I remember correctly, $800,000 over and above the amount which should have been paid in accordance with the parade state [sic] that was rendered to us by the camp commander.胶
Former guerrillas also pointed to the assembly point commanders’ fraud. The ZIPRA pay liaison officer said: “It was a deliberate move of commanders to have excess pay books . . . The paymaster comes to me and says we have 17 new names and give us 17 new pay books . . . If people put pseudo names, you – the pay liaison officer – couldn’t verify.” He maintained ZANLA abuses were much greater than ZIPRA, perhaps mere partisan sentiment. The logistics chief at a ZIPRA women’s camp, Sierra assembly point, spoke of how “(t)hey [the commanders] could say in the camp there were 700 people with . . . names . . . we’d never heard of, whereas there were only 300.” Another informant said commanders could bring in people off the street to boost the numbers in the camps. They could give small amounts of money to these people for “services rendered,” and take most of it.

Assembly commanders often used intimidation or violence, especially taking pay teams hostage, to secure their gains. The army’s Director of Pay told how at Zezane assembly point “one of my pay teams was held hostage there for approximately three days” while the guerrilla commanders demanded pay for more people. Prime Minister Mugabe himself spoke of how Pay Corps officials were harassed by people who thought they were entitled to allowances. A suspicious paymaster, the ZIPRA pay liaison officer said, might query a signature – often no more than an X – “but commanders could instruct the paymasters to do anything.” For rank-and-file guerrillas, as for paymasters, he said, it was difficult to complain. “[If] they complained, they’d just disappear. Only now [1992] people are beginning to talk freely of these things. It was bad in those days.”

Sometimes, though, rank-and-file guerrillas did protest against their commanders’ embezzlement. Guerrilla anger against not receiving pay led to at least one public protest. In December 1980 about 300 ZANLA guerrillas accompanied by women, some carrying babies, left a ZANU(PF) farm, Goromonzi Farm One, near Mrewa at seven in the morning and headed by foot for the ZANLA High Command headquarters at King George VI Barracks (KGVI) to inquire why they had not been paid, some since April 1980. Police intercepted them close to the city center, ZANLA officers from 2 Brigade addressed them, and the group returned to their base on trucks that night. According to Fay Chung in the Ministry of Education, most of the ex-guerrillas at ZANU(PF)’s Grazely Farm in Arcturus, like other ordinary ex-guerrillas in the assembly places, received little money and sometimes none at all. “Naturally this led to anger.”

Anger over not receiving assembly pay because of guerrilla commanders’ fraud could spill over into violence amongst guerrillas. When 4 Brigade heard that the military team conducting physical demobilization was going to overlap with pay day at Featherstone (Tango assembly place), a ZANLA women’s camp, the team’s head described how they “decided at that stage that I was really in
a very vulnerable position and they had to give me a defense company.” The next day she learned from the company captain how the women “were fighting the night before and trying to shoot each other, and strangle each other, and kill each other off, because of this pay thing [the commander had allegedly taken all the pay] and because they are all pissed out of their mind.” The next day the captain told her: “Ma’am, they were all drunk and I couldn’t find any beer anywhere but there is a shebeen [informal drinking place] on the side of the hill.” She went on: “So he had put them in confinement, the ones that were really causing trouble so they could calm down, sober up, and all the rest of it. And that morning there was just like a death… all over the whole place.”

Even when there was no fraud, issues relating to guerrilla payments had the potential to become explosive. Joshua Nkomo said he had gone to some trouble to personally explain to ZIPRA guerrillas at Gwaai camp how the army would stop making assembly payments at the end of September 1981. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare would start paying demobilization allowances from October 1, 1981, but only after the guerrillas had been physically demobilized.

The plan is that the ministry will pay each former guerilla a monthly salary for 24 months starting from the end of the month in which he is demobilised. Of course the men just moved from Gwaai have not been paid for October, November and December because they have not been demobilised. The Ministry of Labour and Social Services’ programme only starts at the end of the month in which they are demobilised. But no matter when it starts, it will go on each month for 24 months.”

Nkomo said he appreciated the frustration of being in Gwaai camp for three months without pay, but they had had food and shelter.

When the military team arrived at Llewellin Barracks to demobilize the ZIPRA men from Gwaai camp, they were ready to rebel because they had not been paid for three months. The team’s head recalled:

We had said, alright, when we do the demobilization of ZIPRA from Gwaai mine… we want four hundred a day, so that we could process them correctly… Anyway, the liaison officer… suddenly decided that the figures we were giving him that we could handle every day were a load of crap. And he just had a total brainstorm and he shipped in 2,000 ZIPRA in one day… I went down, looked at the thing… and bloody me these buggers just keep arriving [from Gwaai river camp]… Anyway, I just see these buses arriving one after the other, and I say: ‘What in hell is going on?’… Nobody had told me, at that stage, that these buggers had not been paid for three months and that they were very uptight… All of a sudden, you know, there was a disturbance and the liaison officer was going out and talking on the loud speaker… and the more he says, the more they get uptight. Then the next thing I look around and there is not a stuffing individual there with me… They’ve all bugged off, and I’m left there with one lance corporal… in our military police… And I thought what the stuff is going on? And they just got more unruly… Okay, now I don’t know what the problem is, I mean I don’t know what has caused these guys to be so upset, because at this stage, I hadn’t been told about the piddle on the pay. All I knew was everybody just bugged off in every direction and...
left me... And I just looked at them, and I could see their faces, and I’m... bloody angry and... too stupid to see what could happen to me. And I just stood there and I opened my mouth and I shouted one word: ‘Shut-up!’... And there’s my lance corporal. He was about five foot tall, such a little bugger, and he said: ‘Ma’am, I am here.’ I just screamed: ‘Shut-up’. And there was an absolute immediate silence... And now all of a sudden a stupid white bitch standing in front of them and just freaking out and saying shut-up and I think they were all so shattered that they did as they were told.\textsuperscript{116}

The guerrilla parties also participated in the pay fraud, seemingly with the assembly commanders’ help, and according to a pay liaison officer, used the money to buy party properties.\textsuperscript{117} The army’s Director of Pay told the inter-party parliamentary public accounts committee about the situation that had arisen at ZANU(PF)’s Grazely Farm in Arcturus where several thousand former ZANLA combatants from different assembly places were living after the elections.\textsuperscript{118}

It was apparent to us in Grazely Farm where we were given the situation [sic] that there were approximately 500 members to be paid there. When we now counted the men we discovered there were nearer 2 000 and I said my instructions were that we would pay only 500, that we had been notified of in the first instance. I remonstrated with Commander Nhongo about this, and told him that the payment of all these people was outside my authority. He then took this matter to the Prime Minister, he said I was subsequently issued with instructions that I could go ahead and pay them, but at the risk of incurring somebody’s wrath. I reckon that we paid a good 50 to 60 of what I regard as high-class prostitutes on that exercise, as members being involved in assembly cases. In many instances they were escorted there by what I took to be the high-ranking members of the party and many of them transported in official motor-cars.\textsuperscript{119}

John Landau, chair of the inter-party parliamentary public accounts committee, told parliament that at the first pay parade

the Army brought out large steel boxes of money and pay books to pay these people. What the Army... did was to empty all the money onto the table and lend the political parties the very same steel boxes. These party members stood at the bottom of the table in certain instances, or in some instances a little distance away, and as the people were being paid, their earned money, the party were collecting that very same money, together with their pay books, and putting them into the same steel trunks and taking them back to the cities for safekeeping.\textsuperscript{120}

In his closing remarks, the committee chairman reiterated that official evidence showed that political parties took cash. “I personally believe that it did take place, and I am pretty sure that your Committee feels the same way.”\textsuperscript{121} Yet the committee’s report did not indict the parties because their representatives denied party involvement.

The parties’ weak defense suggests they were merely protecting their own and the guerrillas’ image. Mugabe challenged the Pay Director’s account of what had transpired at Grazely Farm and said that if the director had paid people whom he knew were not former guerrillas, then he had to answer for
violating government policy. In light of Mugabe’s awareness of the pressure on Pay Corps officials to provide money to meet commanders’ inflated guerrilla numbers, his claim to “understand payment has only been done to the extent of the established figure” contradicts his own understanding and that of the committee’s report of what went on in the assembly places. Mugabe also avoided rebuking the guerrillas and instead focused on the inherited weaknesses of the Pay Corps, the large number of extra people it had to pay, and its loss of staff since independence. ZANU(PF) MP Mr. Bassoppo-Moyo told parliament that people in the assembly points had told “quite different stories about moneys being paid and taken by political parties, especially ZANU(PF). When we investigated these stories we discovered they were just rumours, not the truth.” In May 1980 at the time of the initial pay parades, Mugabe had referred to charges in parliament of political party representatives taking pay to party offices as “mischievous.” ZANU(PF) MP William Ndangana said it was unfair to single out recent defense expenditure for criticism when the Rhodesian army had spent an enormous amount on defense. Cephas Msipa, ZAPU MP, thought the authors of the report wanted “to create some sensation” and objected to the reference to “high-class prostitutes,” saying it “is unfair to all girls who fought for the liberation of this country to today when they go to the assembly points to collect their pay they should be described as prostitutes.” ZAPU MP Dr. Ndlovu said all wars produced their profiteers and lawlessness. The ruling party’s willingness to meet and defend (as did ZAPU leaders) the fraudulent claims of party personnel and guerrillas, to cover up the guerrilla parties’ illegitimate access to assembly pay money, and to take no criminal action against those involved in hostage taking, made them collaborators in defrauding the state and in guerrilla violence.

**Housing**

The guerrillas pressed their leaders to move them from rural areas where they were unhappy with their living conditions to urban areas. Conditions varied from camp to camp and for guerrillas of different rank. Rank-and-file guerrillas lived in the aging fifty-person tents used during the ceasefire, while their commanders lived in missions, clinics, or school and district administration houses around which assembly places had been established. The head of the Rhodesian demobilization team was horrified at the lack of hygiene at a ZANLA women’s camp at Tango assembly place.

When I arrived in that place I took one look at it and I thought “oh, stuffing hell!” I’ve never seen anything like it in my whole life . . . It was really a devil’s place. It was just barren and out in the middle of nowhere and the bridges were all gone . . . And we go across this river, okay. Now there’s not much water in the river. A lot of volcanic rock and everything. Anyway, I’ve got into this place and everywhere I look are just these flipping females and they’re dirty and scruffy . . . I open up the bloody barn door. I’ll
never forget it, it was pouring with rain and there was a big hole in the roof. Social services and I opened the door to this place and the stench that came out of it, well! . . . I mean there were feces and everything all over the place. It was just revolting! 

The guerrillas used an old building in the camp as a hospital, and they had their own medical assistants on site. There was a “hell of a lot of malaria, obvious VD, pox, advanced stages, but there weren’t so many of those . . . And our medics [the Army Medical Corps] spent their time looking after a whole lot of them.” In contrast to Tango, she found the ZIPRA women at Sierra camp “immaculately turned out” and “the toilets were immaculate.” Complaining to the editor of The Herald about conditions in assembly points, an ex-combatant described them as “dirty” and the ex-guerrillas as suffering more than they had during the war, and compared their plight with the ministers’ luxurious lives in the suburbs. Besides their often grim conditions, the camps were all located in rural areas – a product of the Lancaster House agreement. The guerrillas sought de facto equality with their Rhodesian counterparts based in the urban areas.

In mid-July 1980 the government announced that a cabinet committee (composed of three ZANU(PF) ministers and a ZAPU chair) would tour the country’s barracks “to establish that there is no place for these boys [my emphasis] as we have been told.” The reference to “these boys” underscores government concern with male ex-combatants’ grievances. The barracks were full. The government requisitioned local government housing in Seke Unit “O” and Zengeza 4, townships in Chitungwiza municipality (adjacent to Harare municipality), and in Entumbane in Bulawayo until more barracks had been built. The men would go to the urban cantonments and could keep their personal arms in their homes which they would occupy without paying rent. Despite tensions between the two guerrilla parties in the coalition government, the opposing guerrilla factions were housed adjacent to each other. According to BMATT’s first commander, it was “a question of balancing risks.” The parties and their armies would have preferred to disarm the guerrillas (despite their public support for the guerrillas keeping their arms) but recognized that their mutual insecurities about each other and the Rhodesian forces and police would not permit it. Similarly, they recognized the risks of moving hostile armies next to each other, but the government was also “anxious not to have all ZIPRA in Matabeleland and ZANLA in Mashonaland – it could have been a risky affair, with potential for civil war. Government felt the risks of leaving them in the assembly places were higher than moving them into the towns.”

Mugabe’s defense in parliament of the government’s decision to move the guerrillas to the urban areas highlights the importance of treating the guerrillas as equals of the Rhodesian soldiers, the desire to appease the guerrillas, and fear should the guerrillas rebel against their conditions.
I do not see how a movement of people to Chitungwiza can be regarded as an unfortunate plan. Where do we want these sons of the soil to live? – [Hon. Members: Hear, hear.] – Permanently in the bush like animals? Who would then be entitled to live in urban areas, at Inkomo, at Heany, at Cranborne [barracks] – their counterpart, those they fought on the other side who should now join hands with them and share the barracks with them; is it being suggested that we exclude them from urban areas perpetually and is it also being suggested that we would, in the event of a situation developing as the result of frustration, be in a position to control it in those circumstances, and which forces would we have to use to do so?

Mugabe is implying that he could not count on the constitutional forces to put down any guerrilla uprising. He continued:

Let us not fool ourselves here. Those people in assembly points deserve equal treatment with those who today enjoy the comfort of Cranborne and Inkomo Barracks – [Hon. Members: Hear, hear.] – And we are not going to discriminate against them. On what basis would we discriminate against them? They are the instrument which led to the settlement at Lancaster House. – [Hon. Members: Hear, hear.] – And the treatment we have given them thus far has been very unfair. Government is resolved therefore to bring an end to the suffering which they have endured for all these several months they have been in assembly points. – [Hon. Members: Hear, hear.]135

He concluded by reassuring the scheme’s critics that he had asked the JHC to come up with a plan “to ensure that they would be in full control, to ensure that discipline will be maintained in those new areas.”136 The JHC ordered heavy weapons to be sent to the national armories, security fencing to be erected around the guerrilla houses, and guards to be stationed at one official central exit to prevent the men from leaving with their personal arms.137 These measures proved futile, and it emerged later that ZIPRA had been surprised by ZANLA’s use of heavy weapons in the November 1980 round of fighting at Entumbane.138

In October 1980, the men began to arrive in the cantonments in military convoys. Estimates of how many men would be accommodated in Chitungwiza ranged from 4,000 to 17,000, roughly equally divided between ZANLA and ZIPRA, and from 3,000 to 12,000 for Entumbane. In January 1981 a government tender document for building new barracks estimated there were 6,894 men in Chitungwiza (3,331 in Seke and 3,563 in Zengeza) and 5,151 in Entumbane, but acknowledged that the numbers and dispositions were unstable.139 The decision to house guerrillas in the urban areas raised a public outcry from those who feared armed hostile factions living side by side in urban areas: local government authorities,140 the police,141 Reverend Sithole’s opposition party,142 and the Rhodesian Front.143 Years later, ZAPU leader, Nkomo, claimed he had publicly opposed the men going to town because he predicted greater problems of control should trouble break out.144 Retired Colonel Tshinga Dube, a ZIPRA commander, wrote that the guerrilla commanders warned the political
leaders against moving the men to town but they were intent on “appeasing good fighters” who “in just a tent feel as if they are in a five star hotel as long as they get their supplies.”

Gilbert Khumalo, ZIPRA commander of an Entumbane cantonment, told the commission investigating factional guerrilla violence at Entumbane that given the history of fighting between the two guerrilla armies in Tanzania and Mozambique, it had been a mistake to place the men in cantonments next to each other before they had been integrated. Whatever the validity of Nkomo’s and the ZIPRA commanders’ claims after the decision, other ZAPU politicians publicly supported the move to the urban areas at the time. ZAPU vice-president, Mr. Chinamano, told a party rally near Redcliff in the Midlands that ZIPRA and ZANLA should not be segregated from each other when given temporary accommodation in urban areas. “We hope the leaders of the army will see sense and take into account the national character which we all fought for.”

Even after trouble in the urban areas, Deputy Minister of Mines, Mr. Ntuta (ZAPU), supported urban cantonments for guerrillas, telling parliament, “You have got to produce an alternative to the jungle life of shooting.”

The guerrilla parties’ submission to guerrilla demands and their requisitioning of local government houses for which there was a waiting list legitimated the guerrillas’ continued war-time practices of extraction and intimidation. In March 1981 Fay Chung, then in the Ministry of Education, referred to comrades “expecting to receive a great deal, virtually overnight.” She felt “these expectations were unrealistic” but they had an attitude that “having fought, they deserved what they considered to be the just fruits of their victory.” She said, “[T]he solutions they proposed for their own problems were simplistic: if refugee children had no school, why couldn’t the Ministry of Education just take a ‘white’ school and give it to them?” She attributed these extractive solutions to them having “become used to the support they had received from the people during the war, and to military and party systems of requisitioning without rendering any account.” The guerrillas’ and parties’ mentality of “requisitioning without rendering any account” reared itself again when it fell to local government to pay for repairing houses which the guerrillas damaged in the Entumbane fighting.

Demobilization money
Both the first demobilization scheme, offering a Z$400 lump sum, and the second, which paid Z$185 per month for two years, were defrauded by guerrillas and their parties. A former political prisoner expressed disgust at how party officials sent relatives to pose as ex-combatants to collect the Z$400 lump sum and at how those in charge cheated, while political prisoners and detainees were denied payments unless they had been fighters:
The assembly phase

the mujibas were brought forward by some of the influential party officials to get this money as if they were ex-combatants when in fact they were in some cases relatives of those officials or relatives who were promised a commission. They were given their money. Then he surrenders his money to the official and he gets say $20 as a reward for helping the official defraud the state. Mujibas were living with these officials. The majority of people respected these officials very highly. Because of this reason, there were no open complaints of these wrongdoings although we all know that these things were happening and we also know the officials who were involved. But for fear of jeopardizing your future, one chose to ignore... There was no system. In some cases, the man in charge would milk the system and decide he was going to pay a certain amount... Those who fought got nothing. The relatives or even criminals rounded up by party officials were given rewards. Criminals – used by officials to pose as ex-combatants to get money due to ex-combatants. Study our system. They are there.150

There was similar fraud in the second demobilization scheme, despite Minister Kangai’s reassurance to concerned parliamentarians that records and a knowledge of who the ex-combatants were meant that “these people [the ex-combatants]... cannot cheat.”151 The head of the Rhodesian military team responsible for physical demobilization in the camps had problems with illegitimate women claimants, often connected to party leaders or the guerrillas. Her comments refer to her experiences at KGVI Barracks in Harare and at Featherstone (Tango assembly place for ZANLA women) respectively.

[T]he riff-raff who had claimed to be involved...They were ineligible ex-combatants...I used to tell them to piss off when they would arrive in their bloody ministerial cars. You know, they were dripping jewels and heavy perfume and all the rest of it, with their chauffeurs opening the doors and all the rest of it. As far as I was concerned, they did not qualify. There was a lot of trouble on the women’s side of it...

We had a cross-section from ministers, ministers’ wives, to hangers-on... Somebody who thought they were going to make a fast buck... to a little girl who carried stuff around. Yeah, and a lot of them... and I used to just say “piss off, this is not for you”... Look, a lot of those birds were their lovers and I think they thought they had to get something out of it. One of the problems was, when they knew the guys who were fighting, they learned about what areas they were in, what the commanders’ names were, etc. etc.152

Guerrillas also benefited from fraudulent claims. A ZANLA ex-combatant spoke of officers’ and DD officials’ abuses. He knew a guy, a ZANLA officer, who married twelve wives from Mt. Darwin area. He got them in line for demob money. Each got Z$185 per month. He then bought himself a farm and got them to work on the farms. Some got young brothers to register for demobilization... Officers would get lots of people off the streets, gave them demob books and then would give them a small amount for a job well done and take the rest for themselves... Demobilisation Directorate seniors got rich. Shoniwa got rich. Chihombe died in an accident but got filthy rich.153
Other directorate officials were implicated in a scheme to issue demobilization pay books to men who posed as ex-combatants, and then to share the proceeds. The prosecutor said that in early January 1983 John Munodawafa Gwitira, a directorate official, approached 24-year-old Vengai Saul Muringai to ask if he could recruit young men to withdraw money from the Post Office as demobilized ex-combatants without being detected. Muringai recruited six men, aged twenty to twenty-five, and invited them to the directorate offices, where he issued them with Post Office Savings Bank demobilization account books which Gwitira gave to him. Muringai drove the six recruits to KGVI Barracks in Harare to obtain demobilization identification cards. The plan was for the six men to withdraw money in Muringai’s presence and then return to Gwitira’s office to share the funds. The recruits were to be given a 20 percent share of an individual withdrawal, an accounts clerk in the directorate 8 percent, and John Gwitira and other directorate officials who had yet to be identified the remaining 72 percent. Between January and March 25, 1983 nearly Z$11,000 had been stolen. Muringai and his six recruits were found guilty, and Muringai was jailed for an effective two and a half years. In another court case, Muringai was reported to have issued a second demobilization pay book to a 25-year-old ex-combatant who had withdrawn his demobilization pay in a lump sum. A senior official in Social Welfare’s pension office, himself later removed for defrauding the state, took a dim view of the directorate. “It was absolutely chaotic the way that fund was run. It was run by ex-combatants alone. They had no experience in accounting or finance. People were getting twelve demob cards, money for girlfriends . . . A few in the directorate and also others took advantage of the weaknesses. Perhaps like all scandals there’s a tendency to exaggerate what happened.” In 1995 a newspaper referred to how “[S]ome former members of the military have also made it big. Some got huge pensions when they retired but others it is said had incredible access to demobilization money for former guerrillas.”

The ruling party collaborated in defrauding the Demobilization Fund. The fund distributed Z$202 million to some 36,000 demobilized guerrillas (including mujibas) from 1981 to 1986—Z$116 million for 1981–3 (the initial estimated total cost), Z$66 million in 1983–4, Z$19 million in 1984–5, and Z$1 million in 1985–6. Yet it was never audited. Moreover, the only court convictions for fraud appear to be those of Muringai and his fellow civilian recruits. John Shoniwa, directorate head, was dismissed by the Public Service Commission for embezzling funds—he allegedly also stole four of the five copies of the army records created during the demobilization exercise which provided information on war wounds, dependants, and other data for each guerrilla demobilized from the camps— but was given another job in the Defence Ministry. When he died, he was granted provincial hero status, and ex-combatants protested that he should have been granted national hero status. Neither Gwitira nor the accounts
clerk in the directorate nor the other nameless guerrilla beneficiaries appear to have been penalized.

Because the fund was never audited, it is difficult to assess the extent of fraud. Using the official figure of 36,000 demobilized guerrillas plus mujibas, the directorate’s figure of 24,000 guerrillas demobilized from the army, and the official estimate of 33,000 ex-combatants in the defense forces in 1988 makes for 93,000 ex-combatants (including mujibas who got demobilization money). Mujibas were treated initially like cheats if found applying for demobilization benefits but later were regarded as legitimate claimants. A directorate official said: “We come across a mujiba – he has a demob book. An experienced person interviews the person. We allowed him to get into the system. His education was disturbed, his participation [in the war] was important, he needed assistance to rejoin civilian life.” Moreover, at least for ZANLA, some youth received quasi-guerrilla training in the border areas near the end of the war, and came to see themselves as liberation fighters.

If one accepts the official figure of some 50,000 war veterans today and takes into account the ineligible guerrillas and those who claim they never got paid, the puzzle about who did get money grows. Pregnant women fighters returned home under the UN-sponsored refugee repatriation program and were excluded from the program. Former fighters already employed at the start of the program, usually the better educated, were not supposed to get demobilization pay, though some did. Demobilized ex-guerrillas who found employment were informed they could not continue to receive allowances. Many ex-combatants who had not been in the assembly places when demobilization cards were issued – some had been doing administrative work at their party headquarters in Mozambique, Zambia, or Zimbabwe – found it too difficult to get the required party verification before they could receive demobilization pay. Another group, an estimated 6,000, returned home either before entering the assembly places or prior to demobilization because they wanted to end their war experience. “They feared that if registered by a government unit, they’d be called to war. They never came near the demob exercise. They started to come in one by one when they realized there’d not be another war.” Former ZIPRA commander of Sierra assembly point said women, left till last to be integrated into the army, often became despondent and went home: “There were 2,000 strong ZIPRA [women] trained. About half of them demobilized [i.e. went home without being formally demobilized] – you don’t know whether to remain or go home.” Dissidents” and those convicted of crimes were also denied benefits. ZIPRA ex-combatants often did not collect their allowances because the directorate staff reported suspected ZIPRA army deserters to the security forces, the army arrested ZIPRA lining up to get their pay, and ZIPRA “dissidents” targeted them as traitors for having anything to do with the government. Still other ZIPRA combatants fled the country, thus
giving up their benefits.\textsuperscript{174} Given all these ex-combatants who did not get demobilization money, it is difficult to believe a directorate official’s claim that “[T]here could have been one or two or three who cheated but the percentage who cheated was absolutely negligible.”\textsuperscript{175}

\textit{Operation SEED}

Many guerrillas rejected Operation SEED, a Rhodesian army idea to turn guerrillas into agricultural workers.\textsuperscript{176} The guerrillas did not want to give up their military status for menial labor, and their party and military leaders had no interest in forcing them. The guerrillas’ contempt for farm labor is understandable. They had fought to turn upside down a hierarchy in which Africans did all the menial labor.

The program appealed to whites who found the guerrillas in assembly places collecting pay without doing anything a bad precedent and a threat to law and order.\textsuperscript{177} Guerrilla suspicions about the program were confirmed when the Rhodesian army officers expressed ideas on military integration and demobilization at odds with JHC policy. In June 1980 a JHC spokesman (presumably a Rhodesian army representative) said only another 9,500 former guerrillas in the assembly points would be taken into the national integrated army; the remaining 23,000 would be made “active reservists.”\textsuperscript{178} In August 1980 Rhodesian Wing Commander John F. Barnes, Operation SEED’s acting commander, publicly stated that the program was devised to provide employment for guerrillas who would not be absorbed into the new national army.\textsuperscript{179} Mugabe responded with assurances that every guerrilla would have an opportunity to join the new integrated army, regardless of the cost.\textsuperscript{180}

By July 1981 Operation SEED was in the process of closing down.\textsuperscript{181} Only 20 percent of the intended numbers of male guerrillas ever became involved in the schemes, and they accomplished little.\textsuperscript{182} BMATT’s first commander summed up the program’s problems. Besides the program lacking agricultural experts, “People selected to run it from headquarters weren’t very high quality… There was a lack of government commitment and resources. Guerrillas were apathetic – they wanted to be soldiers not farmers. Nobody breathed life into it so they [Operation SEED camps] became assembly points under another name.”\textsuperscript{183} Only Mugabe seemed committed to the program.\textsuperscript{184}

Other sources lend support to the notion that agricultural work was anathema to many guerrillas. In early 1980 during the ceasefire an assembly point survey of 5,000 male and female guerrillas who wanted to return to civilian life revealed a mere 2 percent wanted agricultural training and another 4 percent intended to take up agriculture (see Table 1). They surely did not mean as farm workers.

A Zimbabwe Project (ZP) staff member who was advocating the formation of rural cooperatives for demobilized ex-combatants recognized “that political education was needed to convince comrades that farming could be a revolutionary profession.”\textsuperscript{185} When demobilized ex-combatants attended
Table 1 *Statistical profile of assembly point personnel*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>22,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 15 years old*</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–18 years old*</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>3,504</td>
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<tr>
<td>20–25 years old</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital status</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>19,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>19.50</td>
<td>3,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed/divorced</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1,120</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Part/full primary</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>16,560</td>
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<tr>
<td>Part secondary</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4,080</td>
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<tr>
<td>“O” levels or above</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>240</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Previous employment</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled/skilled</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,160</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ambition</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial/industrial</td>
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<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>960</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific trades</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

The information is based on an assembly point survey conducted in early 1980, in which 5,145 men and women who wished to return to civilian life were interviewed. The data have been collated in percentages, and applied to a hypothetical figure of 24,000 to give an approximate idea of the aspirations and backgrounds of the demobilization group. In the table, the percentage breakdown from the initial survey is followed by the proportional figure relating to the demobilization group. Three points to note are that:

1. The original data made no specific offers of training, and the compilers of the data anticipated that more people would apply for training under the demobilization scheme.
2. There was a greater tendency for older guerrillas to wish to return to civilian life and former occupations.
3. The majority of those with incomplete education wished to continue their education.

**Source:** M.P. Davies for Director of Social Services. Reference: 26/1/7
ZP-sponsored technical training courses outside Harare, a ZP staff member observed: “A lot of ex-combatants at Adelaide Acres were interested in technical training but not in agriculture even though they were in agricultural coops. They saw themselves as a kind of elite. You couldn’t expect these people to accept rustication to become farm workers.” An ex-combatant who was an agriculture teacher at Adelaide Acres described initial problems with the first intake of ex-combatants.

Maybe their understanding of independence was that of resting after they’d done a great job. Maybe they didn’t want to do manual work. In fact, they felt they’d done their job and didn’t want to work. They wanted a reward… We had to sit down and talk… We had cases where people were too demanding… When we started the courses, they didn’t know I was an ex-combatant. There was this attitude: “I’m an ex-combatant. I shouldn’t be treated that way.” We could say: “We’re also ex-combatants. You’re just like any other Zimbabwean.”

Asked what kind of demands ex-combatants made, he laughed.

We decided to grow mealies in fields and veggies. The plot was 12 acres and had been used for ponies and horses. We said: “Let’s clear this by hand.” They said: “Ah, an ex-combatant doing this by hand. Why don’t you hire a grader or caterpillar and do it.” We removed the restriction of ex-combatants [that is, that only ex-combatants could take the course] because we found not all want what we offer.

When white MPs attacked the notion of an army engaged in production by pointing to the failure of Operation SEED, Mugabe defended ex-combatants’ commitment to agricultural work. He said: “The fact that the Operation Seed [sic] projects may not be going well in all the places where they have been established does not speak of the reluctance of the cadres to undertake these projects but speaks of the lack of the necessary infrastructure, the necessary equipment with which they could carry out those projects; the cadres are not there to blame.”

The view of agricultural work as inappropriate for ex-combatants was not confined to the ex-combatants. ZP’s historian related how ZAPU’s Secretary for Welfare, Aaron Ndambambi, told Paul Nyathi, a ZP staff member working with disabled ZIPRA ex-combatants at Vukuzenzele cooperative, that he disapproved of the idea of ex-combatants in rural cooperatives: “The idea is an insult. Men of leadership potential should not be expected to engage in physical labour. They ought to be working in an office. ZIMPRO [ZP], Ndambambi insists, is trying to dictate to the comrades at Vukuzenzele as to what they should do.”

**Guerrilla–party conflicts**

**Disarmament**

As already discussed, the ruling party blamed ZIPRA for faction fighting in February 1981 and decided unilaterally to disarm the encamped guerrillas.
The mode of decision-making violated the agreement that the JHC, on which ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the Rhodesian forces were represented, would make all military decisions. Moreover, the decision reversed JHC policy to let the guerrillas keep their personal arms until they had been integrated into the new national army. Especially ZIPRA guerrillas resisted forcible disarmament, revealing their hostility to the ruling party and their own leaders.

Despite the army inspecting ZIPRA guerrillas in Entumbane cantonments for arms before they were moved to Woolendale, many took arms with them (as did ZANLA) and created fresh arms caches, as they had done following the November 1980 flare-up at Entumbane.\textsuperscript{190} In February 1981 at Silalabuhwa, an Operation SEED camp, ZIPRA commanders reportedly refused to order their men to hand in their arms. They argued that the disarmament order should apply only to the urban areas where there was a danger of civilians being involved in any shooting incidents.\textsuperscript{191} In March 1981 there were problems disarming ZIPRA at their Mushumbi Pools camp. Three national army soldiers involved in the disarmament exercise were killed by two ZIPRA members and two others were injured. As a ZIPRA JHC representative, Dabengwa had been sent to the camp to apprehend the men. The High Court in Salisbury heard how the seven accused ZIPRA men, charged with murder and attempted murder, made anti-government, anti-army, and anti-JHC statements. They called members of the national army whom they had captured “Smith soldiers” and “Mugabe sell-outs.” When a soldier, Corporal Hassen, asked the ZIPRA men why they wanted to kill them, one replied: “Well, you have had a long time to resign from the army since Mugabe took power, but you have not.” The court heard from another national army member, Sergeant-Major Mazoe, how ZIPRA guerrillas had told their captives: “Down with the one who is ruling and down with the Joint High Command.”\textsuperscript{192} Lower-level ZIPRA commanders had begun to perceive their superiors as not sharing their concerns to protect themselves from ZANLA attacks or to retaliate against ZANLA for these attacks.\textsuperscript{193}

**Demobilization**

Both ZIPRA and ZANLA resisted demobilization. Neither group was willing to accept the authority of the Demobilisation Directorate officials from the opposing army. At Sierra assembly place for ZIPRA women, ZANLA members of the directorate were threatened.

We used to meet difficulties sometimes. There was an element of mistrust in the assembly places. They were trained to secure their bases, some of which were heavily equipped. We had a problem when we went to the one in Gweru – Sierra. The girls refused entry to us. They didn’t trust us. The first group who arrived at the camp were former ZANLA. They were going to shoot, those girls. Fortunately our ZIPRA counterparts came in good time. He was telling them: “In ten minutes you’ll have no guns.” It was true.\textsuperscript{194}
Interestingly, the demobilization team of former Rhodesians found Sierra a model of discipline and cooperation. Its head said:

Now let me tell you something. I have never been so impressed with anything in my whole life as I was with that! My team drove in ... I think it took us two days to clear that camp. When we got there, they had a guard on sentry duty who signaled that I’d arrived, and they had guards posted all the way along on the route to a parade square ... I was saluted ... Every single girl had her forms, the stuff she had to hand over, immaculately turned out ... In one day I cleared 900 and something women, which was a record ... They were brilliant! And clean! They had a building there which had been bombed ... I was invited by the camp commandant for luncheon with her which I had to decline because we were going to work through lunch ... But I had never been so impressed with anyone.

That afternoon, Joshua Nkomo arrived and asked to meet the team’s head. She described their meeting. “And he said: ‘Have you had any problems?’ And I said: ‘Nothing, it has just worked like clockwork.’ And he said: ‘If there are no problems, then I don’t need to stay...’”

There were also tensions between the Rhodesian army and the guerrillas. The first group to be demobilized were ZANLA guerrillas living around Harare – some in the townships with friends and relatives and several thousand still in municipal housing in Chitungwiza. The plan, publicized on the radio and in the newspapers, was that the ex-combatants would go to army headquarters at KGVI Barracks in Harare to be demobilized. But the presence of armed former Rhodesian military police at KGVI, charged with controlling the unarmed ex-guerrillas, was inflammatory. So the decision was taken to demobilize the guerrillas at their camps.

Guerrillas also resisted demobilization because it was a reversal of government promises to keep all guerrillas in the army and implied an end to their political mobilization. A ZANLA Demobilisation Directorate member said:

Some were really hardcore. They wanted to know what was going on in the country, why were they going out of the army, what would happen to them. Their training was different from the direction we were now going to go into. [ZANLA’s] Tongogara camp was no joke. People who remained there were proper soldiers who take commands. They were hardcores [he laughed]. That camp, you couldn’t enter that camp.

A ZIPRA representative on the directorate described Tongogara camp as “very unruly” and the guerrillas as “very hostile” and wanting a “different kind of demobilization.” At Gwaaï camp, ZIPRA men threatened to shoot the directorate team. ZIPRA combatant Andrew Nyathi, who had been at Gwaaï, wrote of the guerrillas’ resentment and cynicism when they learned about forcible demobilization and their belief that “it was something we must resist.”

Guerrillas hostile to the program wanted to know why they were being “discarded.” Was it only ex-ZANLA and ex-ZIPRA who were being
demobilized? Were the guerrilla fighters regarded as having not been satisfactorily trained in comparison with the former Rhodesian army? “It seems that somehow, somewhere there is someone trying to derail the ideology we were taught in Mozambique and Zambia. But if the comrades are not satisfied, is it not seen that guerrilla tactics can be converted into something very dangerous?” “If ZANLA/ZIPRA are disbanded, is it not realised that the former Rhodesian forces have very close links with South Africa? How can they be expected to defend Zimbabwe against South Africa?” “With constant threat from South Africa and the possibilities of a real attack where the demobilised combatants may be mobilised for defence, would it not be easy if the comrades were found in groups in productive units rather than scattered throughout the country at their respective homes?” Ex-combatants also objected to the language of demobilization because it implied mobilization for liberation was complete.

Zimbabwe Project (ZP) staff, while accepting demobilization, raised the same critical questions as the guerrillas who opposed demobilization. A member asked the directorate’s head what percentage of Rhodesian forces would be demobilized in the exercise, and was displeased when told they belonged to the Zimbabwean army. Another endorsed ex-combatants’ objection to the term “demobilization” and proposed “mobilization for development.” Echoing guerrillas’ sense of being victimized, ZP’s director found fault with the special colored post office books given to each demobee to claim their allowances because “this is not a provision which arises out of respect for the special contribution which the ex-combatants have made to their country’s liberation. It is simply a precaution against possible fraud.”

Outcomes

*De facto* equality legitimated both the regime treating guerrillas as soldiers and the guerrillas demanding to be treated as soldiers. Throughout the assembly phase the principle of *de facto* equality that the guerrillas and the ruling party invoked helped to make the guerrillas a specially privileged group among other liberation war participants and most African civilians. Guerrilla privilege was not uniformly enjoyed by all guerrillas – some benefited more than, and often at the expense of, others. For many, guerrilla privilege promised to be temporary. As veterans in the immediate aftermath of wars often do, the guerrillas frittered away their pay in wasteful consumption. Those who were disarmed and demobilized lost military power but retained their symbolic power as liberators and fighters trained in violence. The ruling party had ended the threat of multiple sovereignty: almost all the guerrillas were either in the integrated army or had been demobilized. ZANU(PF) now abandoned the principle of *de facto* equality between ZIPRA and ZANLA, constantly threatened in the assembly phase by
its privileging of ZANLA, and turned its energies toward annihilating ZAPU and ZIPRA.

**Guerrilla privilege**

Treating assembled guerrillas as Rhodesian soldiers, albeit African soldiers, in pay (Z$100 or US$140 per month and much more for those with rank), rations, demobilization allowances (Z$185 or US$259 per month for two years), and housing made them a privileged group. Public assistance recipients received only Z$45 per month (in 1984). In 1980 the minimum wage for farm and domestic workers was Z$30 per month, and Z$70 (rising to Z$85 in 1981) for industrial workers. In 1980 GNP per capita was Z$507 (US$710) per annum, and the estimated Poverty Datum Line – “the income required to satisfy the minimum necessary consumption needs of a family of given size and composition within a defined environment in a condition of basic physical health and social decency” – was Z$128 per month. An ex-minister who was in the camps during the war said the demobilization allowance, available in a lump sum of Z$4,440 (US$6,216), was more than adequate to buy a house in the townships at that time. A ZP staff member who believed that guerrillas should be treated as specially deserving worried that the Z$185 monthly demobilization allowance was higher than even the best qualified would be able to earn and that “this relatively large amount of cash in hand” would “act as a disincentive rather that [sic] as a stimulus to the undertaking of training.” Guerrillas who demobilized also found the Z$185 per month an attractive inducement.

Other liberation war participants – detainees, political prisoners, peasants, the rural elite, and the youth – did not receive any of the state largesse directed to the fighters and felt aggrieved. The party’s privileging of guerrillas over others in the nationalist movement forced an early wedge between guerrillas and those who had provided them, voluntarily or otherwise, with logistical support during the war. In 1981 in Mutoko, rural elders were peeved at guerrillas receiving government money while their children who fought without guns and their own war contributions went without monetary compensation. Political prisoners resented the distinction between “fighters” and “freedom fighters.” In 1992 a detainee said:

what some representatives in Parliament, Government and opposition have forgotten is that we still have people who lost almost everything in life due to very long periods of detention and imprisonment. They were not combatants in the military sense but were unquestionable freedom fighters, bold fighters enough to warrant the very same recognition accorded to ex-combatant fighters. We think they deserve the means of settling down to a decent living. Many of these forgotten comrades are seen in the streets of Harare asking for bus fare to enable them to get back to Chitungwiza.
Another detainee referred to the Z$300 which each former political inmate received from Christian Care upon release as “quite a lot of money at that time” but was bitter that “our own political parties did not think it was their duty to provide us with any amount to start life.”

Expressing tension and competition between the generally younger guerrillas and the older detainees and political prisoners, a political prisoner claimed government paid demobilization allowances to only the “fresh forces” (the guerrillas) because it feared their emotionalism and excitability, whereas his more mature group, viewed as “spent forces” by the guerrillas, were calm and understanding.

Another group of “freedom fighters” who resented guerrilla privilege were those who left the country intending to join the fighters but ended up in refugee camps when the guerrilla forces had enough recruits. The situation of those who became teachers in refugee camps is illustrative. Over three hundred Matabeleland teachers submitted a formal written complaint to parliamentarian Sydney Malunga in 1991. Though they identified themselves as “former refugee teachers,” Malunga introduced a motion in parliament on “ex-combatant teachers.” The teachers complained that the children they had taught had continued to receive their education because of their war services, the abducted teachers (i.e. those in the colonial service whom the guerrillas abducted and took to the camps in exile) had been paid their salaries for the years they taught in the camps, and “our comrades at Assembly Points received salaries and later on demobilisation money.” The teachers questioned government officials who “act as if they gave a decision on behalf of the colonial regime,” and felt “unfairly victimised.” Supporting the motion, an MP emphasized how the teachers had left to join the liberation fighters but the war-time leadership found it fit to push them out of the armed struggle and put them into positions which they thought were ideal and to the interest of the nation, that is to educate and bring up the students who are today perhaps the masters or perhaps the technocrats of the state today... when we came back, those that were in authority seemed to have overlooked the fact that these people did not volunteer to be teachers but they volunteered to go out of the country and liberate their country. But it was felt that educating a youngster was also a struggle which went as part and parcel like one carrying the gun... they performed a duty far-reaching like those that are in the army, or those who have been demobilised.

Privileging guerrillas over other “freedom fighters” – mujibas, peasants, refugees, political prisoners, and detainees – intensified war-time tensions in the nationalist movement and created fresh fault lines.

Guerrilla privilege was uneven. Guerrillas with rank seemed better placed to benefit from fraud, and many ordinary guerrillas seem to have gone without assembly pay while an inexplicably large number claim to have got no demobilization pay. Men were arguably more likely than women to get their
demobilization money. Many female fighters were brought back into the country as refugees who did not qualify for demobilization payments. Also, female assembly camps were integrated into the army so late that many women just left for home and may have found it difficult, as did men who were not in camps at the time of demobilization, to obtain their allowances. Men were more likely to have been moved to urban housing. ZIPRA and ZANLA differences manifested themselves more after demobilization. As the ruling party’s onslaught against ZAPU and ZIPRA dissidents escalated, all ZIPRA became liable to ruling party-orchestrated violence. As innocent ZIPRA became party targets, they often ceased to collect their allowances to reduce the risks of being victimized.

Guerrilla privilege acquired in the assembly phase was often short lived, as many guerrillas spent their assembly pay and demobilization allowances on extravagant consumption. Fay Chung noted: “[T]he money couldn’t last,” and “[G]iving money to the comrades merely bought time.” 219 From the regime’s perspective, though, time to cope with multiple sovereignty was critical. Guerrillas themselves frequently acknowledge that they spent their assembly pay on alcohol, radios, and clothes.

If you have no radio, you don’t know why you have money. As a commander, I should have led. You should have a radio and those big sun hats. You should look like an ex-combatant. 220

Most of us tried to satisfy ourselves first before we could even go to our families. There was never a thought of buying houses, we weren’t settled. There in the party [a reference to the urban cantonment in Chitungwiza to which he was moved] we never thought of such things. The guerrillas just went wild, I can say. They wanted to dress themselves well. We had no clothing. In the bush we depended on the poor peasants. 221

Here [Rukomesha assembly camp] you saw people drinking brandy without dilution. We had actually two deaths from that sort of thing. People who had chances to go out would go to the nearest town, Karoi. They’d just drink. They were even lenient – they’d just give money away to people. The fact that there were no shops in the camps meant there was nothing to buy. At some point they introduced beer into the camp – but there was no refrigeration. You found there were a lot of incidents of people being too drunk doing silly things… Businesses were making money. They could charge any prices and soldiers would pay. People would come in and buy a radio at any price and drink themselves… You know that sort of thing. First it was people in the command. Then it was an organized thing – a truck would take people to go shopping. What was popular were radios because they wanted to hear news. 222

Mostly they bought portable radios. They’d either go to town to buy them or just give the money to bus conductors to get them. And beer and spirits. Those were the fashionable things then. Initially people went to town to buy alcohol. There was some opaque beer from villages around. Once guerrillas got money, villagers came and set up businesses selling liquor. They’d just stock it at their villages. Word would go around that so and
so... people would just flock there and buy... The guerrillas didn’t budget. They’d spend the $100 on drink in one day. It didn’t bother them. 223

For most guerrillas, money – especially those amounts – was a novelty. Guerrillas’ remarks underscore their inexperience with financial management.

We were politically colonized by the whole organization, the whole system, to the extent we didn’t know the value of money... It took us quite some time to get into the monetary system... And yet some knew. Some got rich in that time. 224

We really didn’t know what we were supposed to do with that money. When we first got the $150 we thought it was so much money. We thought it was such a lot of money. Anyone we met, we thought we should give the money away. Why should we have so much?... I thought probably I have to socialize with everyone. Anyone I know... I think we’d been spoilt by the communist system we’d been taught outside the country. We were taught to share whatever we had. I think I was probably going to be rich today but I was just misusing my money – giving it to anyone. I’d see these people and I’d think: “He knows I’ve got this money. I’ll feel guilty if I don’t give him some.” 225

The truth was when people received this money, no one really knew what to do with it... You’re looking at people who’re not used to buying food. That’s why most of the people thought it was for just throwing around. Most of the people used the money without any direction. Then there was just this [attitude]: “I don’t care. What is money?” People just gave money to people on the streets... Truly speaking, that money in the assembly point, no one knew what they were doing with it. You’d just see civilians and give them money. 226

Some of these people had not worked before. Whenever you get money for the first time, you get excited. 227

While others in the nationalist movement were conscious of guerrillas’ relative privilege, the guerrillas often felt that they were victimized and not given proper recognition for their war contribution. Demobilization allowances were routinely late, inconveniencing many who depended on them for rent and other fee payments. 228 Also, post office lines on pay day meant long waits, though the authorities had hoped paying money into post office accounts in urban and rural areas would prevent large concentrations of ex-combatants. 229 The following excerpts from two letters to the editor of The Herald convey how ex-combatants interpreted bureaucratic problems as government discrimination against them as ex-fighters.

We ex-combatants should be regarded as citizens of Zimbabwe, who require the same attention as that accorded to other people of this country. If we are treated as second-hand citizens that is an insult not only to the role played by all ex-combatants, but to us as human beings as well. The demob allowance parade has no laid-down timetable. We are sometimes made to spend more than two months without getting paid. What we are supposed to be surviving on during that period, I will never know or guess. Our lives are
characterised by endless trips to post offices and the demob directorate. Meanwhile we experience a back-log in financial matters affecting our budgets and plans. One cannot even guarantee the paying of school fees or credit instalments in time because of that. Some of us are lodgers and paying our rents is worrying, to say the least. Nobody trusts us any longer as far as money is concerned. As for food, I thank the struggle for teaching me to eat anything! . . . When the money does come one has to wait for days to get it, if one is patient. The scenes at the post offices depict cattle being herded into dip-tanks . . . One thing is certain. Nobody is caring about how we fare in this increasingly material world. Is this allowance meant to be a charity handout, or is it a right accorded to all former combatants? Are we supposed to beg for it?230

We never know when we are getting paid and this disturbs our budgets . . . If we are miners or farm workers complaining like this the Government would have taken measures a long time ago. Why not in our case?231

**Guerrilla and party power**

The guerrillas were born powerful vis-à-vis the ruling party at independence by virtue of being armed and mobilized and used as a solution to the party’s problem of multiple sovereignty. Their power was diminished by disarmament and demobilization but they still had potential symbolic power because of their status as liberators and as trained fighters who might return to violence. The ruling party’s strategy of treating the three hostile armies as equals and its simultaneous privileging of ZANLA with respect to the other two forces enabled it to end the peace settlement’s legacy of multiple sovereignty. The strategy of treating ZIPRA and ZANLA as *de facto* equals, under strain from independence, gave way entirely to the one-party ambitions of the ruling party and ZANLA. Having either disarmed and demobilized the assembled guerrillas or absorbed them into the army, the ruling party felt more confident to move against ZIPRA and ZAPU.

**Conclusion**

The ruling party used the guerrillas to resolve the settlement’s legacy of multiple sovereignty and the guerrillas manipulated the party to enhance their power and privilege. Inherent in the ruling party’s strategy of *de facto* equality of the forces was an undermining of the constitutional Rhodesian security and police forces. Privileging ZANLA over the other two forces in pursuit of a party-state and party-nation led to party-sanctioned ZANLA violence against Rhodesian police and more often against ZIPRA guerrillas. Likewise, the guerrillas often used or threatened violence and appealed to *de facto* equality of the forces to enhance their access to state resources and to augment, or resist the loss of, their military power and status. The ruling party was usually a willing collaborator or accomplice, but clashed with the guerrillas over compulsory disarmament and
demobilization. In pursuit of their overlapping and independent agendas, both used violence, extracted state resources, and appealed to the guerrillas’ status as soldiers and their war contribution. At the end of the assembly period, the ruling party was poised to consolidate its power against ZIPRA and ZAPU and enhance ZANLA power. The party’s simultaneous and contradictory strategies of *de facto* equality of the three forces and privilege for ZANLA in the creation of the new army in 1980 and 1981, and the subsequent victory of ZANLA privilege in the army between 1982 and 1987, are the subject of the next chapter.
To build power in the new army, the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), the ruling party used the guerrillas. It justified their inclusion in terms of their war contribution and pursued the same strategies as it had toward the assembled guerrillas. Both guerrilla armies were treated as soldiers and military decisions continued to be made jointly by all three armies’ representatives on the Joint High Command (JHC). Simultaneously, ZANLA were privileged over ZIPRA guerrillas through protecting ZANLA from merit-based competition with ZIPRA. The strategy of privileging ZANLA over ZIPRA intensified after the end of formal integration in August 1981. Between 1982 and 1987, the ruling party sanctioned and instigated ZANLA violence and other extra-legal means against ZIPRA to secure control of the army. In the first seven years of independence, the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) was an important accomplice in the ruling party’s quest for an army loyal to the party. Whether the guerrillas colluded with or came into conflict with the ruling party and their military leaders, they appealed to their war contributions and often resorted to violence in pursuit of the power and privilege they believed they deserved.

Studies of Zimbabwe’s military between 1980 and 1987 evaluate its success in terms of the attainment of an efficient combat-ready conventional force; its cohesion, discipline, and military performance; or its balancing of ethnic domination and military professionalism. Though all these studies acknowledge politicization to some degree, they do not allow its existence to interfere with their positive evaluations of the military. Similarly, studies of military integration accept uncritically BMATT’s official depiction of itself as objective and professional. These evaluations depend on ignoring or downplaying significant aspects of the ruling party’s and the guerrillas’ agendas, resources, and strategies, and also BMATT’s often political role.

The chapter begins with the military integration scheme initiated during the peace settlement – the strategies and preferences of its designers (Rhodesian and British monitors from the CMF) who sought to retain Rhodesian military control, guerrilla rebellions, and the scheme’s abandonment. The JHC/BMATT scheme is then discussed. The focus is on the architects’ strategies and goals, the
guerrillas’ struggles and collusion with the ruling party and their leaders as they sought to enhance (or resist loss of) power and privilege, and the outcomes for the ruling party and the guerrillas. Finally, the post-integration period (1982–7) is examined to show the ruling party’s desire to intensify its military domination, its collaboration with ZANLA guerrillas by sanctioning and promoting the use of extra-legal tactics, and the end result for the ruling party, its army, and the guerrillas.

The Rhodesian/British scheme

The Rhodesian/British scheme grew out of the British initiative during the interim administration to establish momentum toward military integration (see chapter 2). In mid-March 1980 the 600 ZIPRA guerrillas at Essexvale Battle School (near Bulawayo) and the 600 ZANLA guerrillas at Rathgar (a white-owned farm in Mutoko) were divided into groups of 300 and sent to Mbalabala Barracks and Llewelin Barracks. Mbalabala (south of Bulawayo) was the training depot for the predominantly white-officered Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR). Llewelin Barracks (north of Bulawayo) was the training depot for conscripted white national servicemen and territorials (white men on call-up duty), and the headquarters of the Rhodesia Regiment in which both fought. The Rhodesians controlled training, which was provided by teams of white Rhodesians, Africans, and British instructors who had stayed on after the CMF had left the country. ZIPRA and ZANLA were placed in mixed platoons while the national servicemen were kept in a separate platoon. The scheme’s premise was that the guerrillas required rigorous training according to Rhodesian regular army standards before they could join the army. Military integration would therefore proceed slowly, preserving and prolonging white control. Based on Rhodesian retention of control over the guerrillas, this scheme was a recipe for disaster.

White Rhodesian instructors were hostile to and contemptuous of the former guerrillas. At Llewelin Barracks, a 27-year-old British instructor struggled to find words to describe the whites he encountered.

There was... incredible antagonism [to the guerrillas] within especially the white Rhodesian depot. That was my first real exposure to the majority of the Rhodesian army. They were appalling with the notable exception of white Africans [whites who led African units such as the RAR]... At this stage, there was incredible uncertainty about the fate of black Rhodesian soldiers. There was an RAR battalion next door. The attitude among the RR [white Rhodesia Regiment] was appalling. All they could talk about was taking the gap [i.e. emigrating]. [White] RAR guys said they were staying on to look after their guys. Rhodesia Regiment guys – they were very strange, some mercenaries, some on contract, many were Rhodesians but had only been in the country for about a year. It was like out of the Wild West. Some were British from former Irish Guards or Royal Marines.
Indicative of white Rhodesians’ condescension toward the guerrillas, a Rhodesian senior training officer at Llewellin, a former Royal Marine, told the press soon after independence that many guerrillas were “very slow” to react to training and that their educational level tended to be much lower than that of the national servicemen. When the British instructors bussed guerrilla officers to Bulawayo to take the Rhodesian officer selection tests, the white officers kept their distance from the guerrilla officers. According to a British instructor, “In the barracks there was definitely a frosty atmosphere. They were very correct. I believe some special arrangement had been made for guerrilla officers eating. They certainly did not come into the mess where I ate with the Rhodesian officers.”

At Llewellin, guerrilla officers and rank-and-file guerrillas resisted the training system. Of the guerrilla officers, a British instructor said:

We would try to give them something more challenging to do, but giving them something more challenging meant working harder than other troops. This was not greeted particularly happily. Basically there was a complete face-on. They were told: “This is what we’re telling you to do. Are you going to do it?” The guerrilla officers said: “We want batmen, cooks, we’re not going to do physical at six in the morning.” I kept saying: “If you’re not, I’ll inform your High Commands.”

The Rhodesians’ response to the daily mutinies was to shoot them. They would say: “We have any trouble, we’re calling the Alert Company and we’re taking them out.” Eventually I had to stop bluffing. My right hand man was an Irish Guards... I spoke to him one night and said we either back down or lock them up and take it from there with the troops who are here. I said: “You don’t show up at 6 for physical, then breakfast, then... we lock you up.” We got the Rhodesian military police that night. That morning, they refused orders. “You must get on trucks,” I told them. They got on. I don’t know why. I called Fursdon [in charge of the British instructors] on the radio. I was told: “He’s in a meeting.” “Could I speak to Leary” [his deputy]? I asked. He was also in a meeting. “Is it urgent?” I was asked. I said: “I just locked up men.” I said: “I need elements of the High Commands as quickly as possible.” I anticipated an afternoon in the cooler. All these groups – 15 Shona and 15 Ndebele – I took down to jail. There was amazing consternation at the jail. They were placed in a compound, like a barracks, not a dungeon.

The guerrilla High Commands visited and supported his actions.

The guy from the Ndebele side scared the hell out of me. A very very hard man. When he came in the reaction of the Ndebele was absolute terror. He said: “If I’d been in charge you know what would happen.” The Ndebele man was saying: “the whole lot should be executed immediately.” All I wanted to do was put them in for about 24 hours. This [locking them up] gave me a certain credibility on the Rhodesian side – not that this was my goal... Fursdon was also supportive of the fairly outrageous step I’d taken by locking the men up. He came down... [T]he only reason it [the integration experiment] did not blow up in our face was the relationship I had established with the
second in command at the Bulawayo Rhodesia Regiment depot, Butch Zeederberg, a third generation Rhodesian – the only one I ever met... He was the absolute epitome of a white African.13

Before leaving in late April 1980, the British instructor advised the newly arrived BMATT commander and his deputy, and Lt.-General Walls: “It’s got to calm down. You can’t have this mutiny-a-day... If there was going to be anything [training/integration], do it in the open bush, not in the heart of the Rhodesian Security Forces.” After the British instructor’s departure, Llewellyn continued to be the site of routine mutinies. About 400 ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas – two-thirds of the guerrillas at Llewellyn – refused to obey orders to parade. With JHC approval, they were arrested by a nearby RAR battalion and trucked with an armed police and military police escort to Khami Prison on May 7, 1980.14 According to BMATT’s first deputy commander: “It would have been a lot worse with killing had it not been for the young British instructor and his 12 NCOs.”15 The men were released later and resumed their training program.16

At Essexvale, too, guerrillas opposed the scheme. ZIPRA commanders rejected further training. According to a British instructor:

Three to four days after training, we’d started to have slight problems with the officers... The flavor I was getting from the political officer (the second-in-command) was that the officers weren’t going to do anything. There was a feeling that they’d arrived – they were officers of the first Zimbabwean battalion, as Joshua Nkomo called them, and they weren’t going to have to do anything. We encouraged them that they should be there for drill, and take part in weapons training. I think they had this fear that if you did things soldiers did, it diminished you... We decided we should look more carefully at the officers. The British instructors decided, and it was acquiesced by the Rhodesian officers, that the officers should go to Bulawayo and go through exactly the same selection process for officers as the Rhodesians – I think a three day selection process either for civilians or soldiers already serving who wanted to enter the officer corps. But we did this only for one day. The system seemed exactly the same as in the UK. During the day they took some written tests, and some individual physical tests. We also gave them “command tasks” – they involved planning, leadership to get people to do things physically or mentally demanding. We loaded the officer corps – about 40 – on the bus and drove into central Bulawayo... We ran the selection process. The Rhodesians were expecting us.

Both the ZIPRA commanding officer, forty-year-old “Colonel Smiles,” and the second-in-command, a twenty- to thirty-year-old political officer, had trained in the Soviet Union, but the others had only guerrilla training. The guerrilla command opposed testing. “Colonel Smiles and myself were on the board. The political officer did not participate in testing. He wasn’t going to do it. There was no way Colonel Smiles was going to tell him to do it given what their relationship was... The political officer was very much the one who dictated to
the Colonel.” Asked whether Colonel Smiles took the test, the British instructor replied: “It was probably my doing that Colonel Smiles didn’t do the same tests as the junior officers. I thought he was a lieutenant colonel in every way. He was... going to retire as soon as he’d seen this through. It just seemed pointless...”

In retrospect, the British instructor recognized how the Rhodesian tests designed for a regular and literate army discriminated against the guerrillas. “Maybe two or three out of the forty would have passed the normal Rhodesian officer standard. Part of the problem as I see it – standing as far away as I do now – if you took IRA for testing in the British army, you’d get the same pass rate. But actually they were doing the same thing as soldiers. They were just in different circumstances.” The requirement to pass a written test, a British monitor recorded, was “not the strongpoint of a terrorist gang leader straight out of the bush.”

After three contention-filled months, the Rhodesian scheme was terminated. Various explanations were offered for lack of progress. On May 30, 1980 Mugabe mentioned “problems of attitudes” at Mbabala and Llewellyn Barracks; in July 1980 a senior British officer spoke of “tactlessness” and “mistrust” among the men. Joshua Nkomo of a shortage of instructors, and the JHC of a lack of barracks and instructors. But the guerrillas were not going to accept any attempt to deny them their right to positions and rank in the new army which they believed they had earned through their war contributions. Rupert Smith, deputy commander of BMATT’s first team, identified the central problem: “You had a Rhodie [white Rhodesian] idea of how to do it. Britain had said to the Rhodesians: ‘What do you want?’ ‘Instructors,’ the Rhodesians had said... Rhodesian standards, time, training standards were used. We became agents of saying: ‘You’re no good’.”

Why the JHC tolerated this scheme, which violated its own policy of de facto equality of the forces, is unclear. Though the subsequent scheme accepted the de facto equality of the guerrillas and Rhodesian soldiers, it could not immediately overcome the Rhodesian scheme’s impact on guerrilla attitudes to the new army. Sydney Malunga (ZAPU[MP]) warned of the “fears and misgivings” that imprisoning the former Llewellyn guerrillas would have on those being trained for an integrated army and on those still in the assembly places. The guerrillas involved in the hapless Rhodesian scheme formed the first new battalion under Lt.-Colonel Smile Madubeko after further training in the new scheme.

The British/JHC plan, 1980–1

The discussion of the British/JHC integration scheme first outlines the ruling party’s agendas, strategies, and resources, and BMATT’s goals and modus operandi. The focus shifts to the guerrillas and their efforts either to enhance
their power and privilege or to resist losses in war-time military status, always defending their claims through appeals to their war contribution. Guerrillas are shown both as collaborators with the ruling party and their military leaders and also as often engaged in bitter conflict. Lastly, the outcomes of integration for both the ruling party and the guerrillas are addressed.

**Strategies**

The BMATT/JHC scheme, the antithesis of its predecessor, sought to merge the men in the two guerrilla armies in new infantry battalions and to promote guerrillas to officer posts as rapidly as possible. With the emphasis on rapid integration, training was de-emphasized. Consistent with the ruling party’s strategy of treating the three armies as *de facto* equals, the plan recognized the guerrillas’ war experience and service and treated them as having earned the status of soldiers. All guerrillas were guaranteed positions, at least until compulsory demobilization was announced. Middle-level officers and NCOs were chosen on the basis of their performance in aptitude tests and short courses. Alongside the professed attempt to form an apolitical army based on merit, the JHC protected senior guerrilla commanders from merit-based tests and allowed them to influence the choice of guerrilla officers, and the ruling party protected ZANLA guerrillas from ZIPRA competition for officer posts. To achieve its goal, an army that would foster regime stability, BMATT played an active political role in the scheme.

Integration focused on merging the two guerrilla armies into new battalions while the “regular” army and the air force were kept largely intact. Reportedly Mugabe recognized the army and air force might be needed, as indeed they were, when guerrilla factional violence occurred in the urban cantonments in 1980 and 1981. In the first months of independence, the auxiliaries, the Guard Force, and the Selous Scouts – some 25,000 Africans – were demobilized (see chapter 3), and national conscription was ended. This reduced the army to 6,000–10,000 “regular” soldiers. The most important fighting forces were the white-officered RAR battalions (3,000–4,000) and the specialist units – the all-white Rhodesian Light Infantry (1,000), which was reconstituted as One Commando, the all-white Special Air Services (750), which was reconstituted as the Parachute Regiment, and the racially mixed Grey Scouts (450), a cavalry unit mounted on horses. The headquarters of all these specialist units were around the capital, adding to their threat and asset value. The air force, the RAR, and the specialist units were largely unintegrated until after August 1981 when formal integration – the creation of battalions merging ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas – was complete. Even then, the RAR, whose professionalism impressed BMATT, were kept together in companies as far as possible. Integration of the small white air force (1,500) was initially viewed as a
long-term project and Mugabe was reportedly content to have the British Royal Air Force train white flying instructors to train the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{32}

Small in numbers, BMATT sought political influence.\textsuperscript{33} The first team had 35 new personnel and soon grew to 80.\textsuperscript{34} In 1981, BMATT staff peaked at 167\textsuperscript{35} – a response to the urgent need to expedite integration after the Entumbane guerrilla fighting. By October 1982 BMATT had been reduced to about 70 but was to be increased by 34.\textsuperscript{36} It declined to 60–70 in 1983–4, and about 15 in 1991.\textsuperscript{37} BMATT’s first commander and his deputy strategized to maximize influence on military decisions. Said the deputy commander:

\begin{quote}
We realized we were catalysts, not the solution. We must not be the people who were doing it. We did it by getting others to do it. We called it the “drip technique.” Palmer and I tried to meet everyday. We tried to go to joint briefings [Joint High Command daily meetings] – one of us in the first nine months was always there. We tried to see the problem before any of the other three sides and then come up with a solution… We’d try to make sure a BMATT person sat on whatever committee was set up.
\end{quote}

As JHC chair, Walls was the dominant figure. After his resignation in August 1980, JHC sessions became more of a debating forum, with more opportunity for BMATT influence, said BMATT’s deputy commander. The British Staff College teaches its students that BMATT’s role during military integration was “[A]bove all… a catalyst, a go-between the factions, a source of ideas, and an ‘oiler of wheels.’”\textsuperscript{38} Though the first team’s commander had unusually frequent interaction with Mugabe, his successors also enjoyed easy access to the prime minister. BMATT commanders invariably portrayed their access to Mugabe as superior to that of the British High Commissioner and spoke of their diplomatic influence as disproportionate to BMATT’s small size and cost.\textsuperscript{39}

The first BMATT commander and his deputy arrived on April 24, 1980, eager to emphasize a sharp break from the CMF which the deputy commander described as part of the colonial arrangements.\textsuperscript{40} The deputy commander’s “abiding memory of the first six weeks was Patrick [BMATT’s commander] and I driving out from Monomotapa Hotel every morning to find out what was going on. No one would tell us anything.” BMATT’s first commander also recalled the key actors’ suspicion. For ZIPRA, he was standing in the way of their coup; for ZANLA, he was a British colonialist delaying their acquisition of the empire they were going to build; and for the Rhodesians, he would not last long as civil war was imminent.\textsuperscript{41} But none of the sides wanted a war, according to BMATT’s deputy commander. “[For the Rhodesians] the platoon commanders and the regular army did the core fighting. They had taken a lot of casualties. The impact on a small society was very great… The whites were tired of war. ZANLA knew ZIPRA would be better at war. ZIPRA had a fear of Rhodesians beating them at war.”\textsuperscript{42} It was clear, said BMATT’s deputy commander, that
there was no way you’d stop that lot going to war unless they were in bed together. We had to do it without sowing the seeds of future problems. We had an unknown quantity of people to pull together on the skeleton of the former army to form an army which the country neither needed nor could afford and in such a way there’d be no future problem. The new army had to be affordable, it must not contain a coup, the short-term must be bendable to the long-term, and it must not be seen as a threat to South Africa which the air force was.  

Rhodesian standards and battalion organization were abandoned in favor of satisfying the guerrilla leaders’ preferences. “Who says a battalion has to be like a Rhodesian battalion?” BMATT’s deputy commander asked rhetorically. “Play to the future rather than the past.” The Rhodesian selection board courses for officers were abandoned. “You had to find a way of accommodating and incorporating their people. You had to find something that would work for them,” said the deputy commander. Each guerrilla army chose about 150 men from the assembly places whom they wanted to be potential officers (up to lieutenant-colonel) and non-commissioned officers (beneath lieutenant). Describing the choice of officers, BMATT’s deputy commander said: “We’d say to the guerrillas: ‘You tell us who your potential officers are. We’ll give them sufficient training to help, and give him advisers to help him. Go to the assembly places. Collect twenty guerrillas from each faction. We need thirty per battalion. You choose’ [my italics].” BMATT’s role in officer selection was to facilitate the preferences of the guerrilla leaders. “You tell us who you want. Often we were surprised. He was so and so’s wife [a reference to the importance of nepotism and kinship]. But at least you weren’t building in a coup.” The deputy commander described his role in officer selection as “a lowly worm” whose advice could be ignored if politically necessary and the process as one from which he “deliberately removed himself” and which was “not contentious . . . for us.” With regard to ZANLA, whose guerrilla organization made its leadership easier to conceal than it was for the more conventionally organized ZIPRA, the deputy commander described his task as an intelligence problem of finding out who was owed favors. I made sure they were brigadiers, etc. I got a lot of help from the Chinese ambassador. It was in their policy interests to keep a stable southern Africa. “That company commander in the assembly place, he should be a brigadier,” the Chinese told me. They knew. They’d trained these men. I was my own intelligence officer. That was my job.

The deputy described BMATT’s commander as the campaign strategist or commander, working “up and out” – with Mugabe, the JHC, the guerrilla commanders, London – and himself as the “tactician” working “in and down.” Reflecting the importance BMATT attached to ensuring that the guerrilla leaders were satisfied that their best men had been well placed, BMATT pressed to end integration when guerrilla recruits for officer positions were drying up. In contrast,
the guerrilla leaders wanted to absorb all the guerrillas by making the battalions larger.\textsuperscript{46}

Senior guerrilla commanders, from colonel upwards, were automatically incorporated as senior officers in the new army. In contrast, guerrillas aspiring to be junior management officers (captains, lieutenants, and second lieutenants), middle management officers (majors and lieutenant-colonels), and non-commissioned officers,\textsuperscript{47} had to pass aptitude tests in English and mathematics and short courses. Rhodesian army and BMATT personnel administered the tests at the Corps Training Depots. According to BMATT’s deputy commander, the Rhodesians introduced these tests. “The guerrilla leaders wanted it to stay. I was content with it – it gave a minimum educational base necessary for training.” Based on their test performance and on the guerrilla liaison officers’ recommendations, the guerrillas were sent for officer courses at the School of Infantry (later renamed Zimbabwe Military Academy) or for non-commissioned officer training at Guinea Fowl, both near Gwelo. Officer courses normally had thirty men – ten ZANLA, ten ZIPRA, and ten Rhodesian soldiers (mainly Africans). Three BMATT staff and Rhodesian instructors taught tactics, drill, fieldcraft, military law, battalion organization, physical training, weapons training, and leadership.\textsuperscript{48} Training was minimal: these courses were often referred to as “orientation” training, “standardization,” or, for the deputy commander, “socializing them to eat together, wear a uniform, etc. They didn’t know what a battalion was.” After only one month, the training team assessed and integrated ZANLA and ZIPRA, assigned them temporary ranks and appointments, and returned the Rhodesian soldiers to their jobs.\textsuperscript{49}

In November 1980 battalion command appointments ceased to be solely on merit and political identity became a major criterion. If a new battalion leader was ex-ZIPRA, the second-in-command would be ex-ZANLA; the next new battalion would then be led by ex-ZANLA, and the second-in-command would be ex-ZIPRA, and so on down the hierarchy. Perhaps the “drip technique” accounts for the confusion around who actually imposed this requirement. The decision has been attributed to Mugabe\textsuperscript{50} but BMATT’s deputy commander took personal responsibility. After ZIPRA dominated the command positions in the first nine new battalions, he said, “I made it a rule it must be evenhanded. It must reflect the political situation.” Neither Mugabe nor ZANLA commander Rex Nhongo would have tolerated an army where the officer corps was dominated by ZIPRA.

The ratio of officers to rank-and-file soldiers in each battalion was also a product of political engineering. Each battalion had 30 officers for 1,000–1,500 men; the British army has 30 officers for 600 people. According to BMATT’s deputy commander, “we didn’t want it to be efficient.” The intention was to “pack the mujibas [the young boys who had assisted the guerrillas during the war] underneath – they’d be got rid of later.” Also, it was important that there be
enough opportunity for upward mobility. “The coup potential was among the Mashona. There was a need to have enough place to grow – or else there’d be the long-term chance of a coup.” The commissioned officers and NCOs joined their battalions’ rank and file at the Corps Training Depots. Battalion size reflected practical considerations such as water availability at army camps, the need to economize on trucks, and trucks’ carrying capacity. Evenly divided between ZIPRA and ZANLA, the rank-and-file guerrillas (usually straight from the assembly places) went through a two-day induction process. Rhodesian army personnel attested them, issued their pay books and numbers, gave a basic medical examination, issued their uniforms, and squadded them.

BMATT provided battalion and brigade training coordinators. Each battalion had two BMATT staff, a major and a sergeant-major, both often in their late twenties. About four weeks were spent at the Corps Training Depots, at Inkomo (near Harare) or in Bulawayo, in basic infantry training and in “on-the-job” training, during which the guerrillas, from the battalion commander down, would sit alongside their opposite Rhodesian number.51 There followed leave of three to six weeks while temporary barracks were constructed. The battalion training coordinators then spent four months advising and assisting their battalion’s commanding officer, whose average age was spacing 23.52 The new battalions were attached to one of the four infantry brigades: 1 Brigade (headquartered in Matabeleland Province), 2 Brigade (Mashonaland), 3 Brigade (Manicaland), and 4 Brigade (Masvingo). In February 1981 BMATT introduced brigade training coordinators, one of whom described how much basic assistance the battalions still required and how military training remained a low priority.

Although we were officially described as a Training Team, training was not always high on the list of pleas for help. It must be remembered that no-one in the new Battalions had any experience at all of handling or administering over a thousand men in barracks in peacetime. The Battalions were composed of men who had operated as guerrillas and whose experience consisted of living in small groups with little or no logistic support and no permanent home. Often, therefore, it was the instruction of key personnel in the minutiae of maintaining the unit in discipline, health and good morale which occupied most of our time. Quartermasters had to be shown (and re-shown) how to indent for stores, consumables and rations. It was often only after units ran out of fuel, fridges ran out of gas and rations failed to appear that the importance of this instruction began to sink in. Paymasters had to be shown how to account for money, complete acquittance rolls and conduct pay parades... A handful of basic Medical Assistants was the normal medical cover for a unit. These had to cope with the ills of unit personnel... bilharzia, venereal disease (up to 45 percent in one unit), gumboils and a host of other minor ailments including “spirits” for which the only cure was the witchdoctor.53

The foregoing account emphasized BMATT’s political concerns in the integration scheme. BMATT gave leeway to guerrilla leaders to influence officer selection, it manipulated the ratio of officers to men in battalions to try to guard
against a coup by providing enough space for upward mobility, and it supported the notion that the officer corps must reflect the ethnic composition of the country. The inherent tensions between the ruling party’s strategy of recognizing the *de facto* equality of the three armies and its strategy of privileging ZANLA over ZIPRA was also highlighted. The former strategy translated into treating all guerrillas’ war experience as qualifying them as soldiers who had earned their place in the new army. The latter strategy led to the early termination of merit-based competition for command posts because ZIPRA was monopolizing them and the adoption of parity appointments.

*Guerrilla struggles*

The guerrillas wanted to augment or protect their power and privilege, always justifying their claims in terms of their war contribution and often threatening or using violence. They sought white Rhodesian soldiers’ pay and benefits, ZIPRA and ZANLA competed for military dominance, female guerrillas desired equality with their male colleagues, and all the guerrillas aspired to preserve or improve their war-time military status as reflected in their military ranks. Their political and military leaders collaborated with them, notably in the struggles between ZIPRA and ZANLA for military dominance, in protecting the war ranks of the top guerrilla leaders, in promoting guerrillas rapidly, and in awarding higher pay to those who only had temporary officer ranks. But in many instances, the leaders and the guerrillas were at odds with each other, and the leadership prevailed. Rank-and-file guerrillas (and Rhodesian African soldiers) wanted, but did not get, equal pay and benefits with white Rhodesian soldiers. Women guerrillas sought, but did not win, equality with their male colleagues. Guerrillas wanted, but were usually unable, to preserve their war-time ranks if they failed aptitude tests.

*Guerrillas seek white pay and benefits*

Guerrillas and Africans in the former Rhodesian army objected to racially discriminatory pay scales, allowances, and benefits. MP Mawema, whose Victoria constituency in Masvingo was the home base for a large percentage of RAR men, appealed to Minister of Defence Mugabe to remove racially discriminatory salaries and allowances in the army. He offered detailed evidence of persisting racial inequalities. Two examples make the point. A black private’s monthly pay started at Z$105, rising to Z$137 in nine years and a black corporal started at Z$142, rising to Z$172 in six years. They received no allowances. A white private started at Z$285 per month and received an allowance of Z$24.36 if a single man and Z$74.36 plus a quarters allowance if married. A white corporal was paid Z$352 per month plus an Z$18 allowance if single and Z$68.33 if married, rising to Z$394 per month in four years with increases in allowances too.54
Guerrillas who received officer status but retained the substantive rank and salary of privates argued successfully that they deserved responsibility allowances, over and above their privates’ salary, because they were performing higher level duties (see chapter 2). However, other guerrillas were disappointed with the privates’ monthly pay which was even less than their assembly pay after deductions for benefits. One complained that a private’s pay was even less than assembly point pay “which was considered pocket money,” that guerrillas had been promised “that the pay would be fixed after the national army training,” and that “(W)e can’t make a living with the pay we are getting because things are so dear.”

A ZANU(PF) MP asked the government to address the inequity of only Rhodesians receiving pensions. Guerrillas, he said, also deserved pensions for their war service.

And I realize Mr. Prime Minister and Minister of Defence that certain people who live in luxury are getting pensions and have had pensions for quite a long time, and they will continue under the seat of Government to have pensions, and it would be proper if the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, would reconsider these gallant young chaps, young men and women because I am sure they deserve their pensions too for the hard work they did.

Even though they are demobilized, let alone those that are still in the service, it would not be fair for their parents to fend for them, but for the Government to fend for these people and pay them for serving the country.

My colleague wanted to know how long are these people going to be paid [assembly pay]. They can be paid as long as they can be paid, if they have no work, because they have suffered for this country in order that we should have independence of Zimbabwe. Without these young men and women we would still probably be in Zimbabwe Rhodesia suffering more than we are to-day. This is a fact. Would you please, Mr. Prime Minister, increase your Vote so that it caters for these gallant young men. They have been demobilized, they must have a pension for the foreseeable future.

The government response to guerrilla grievances about pensions and pay inequities with Rhodesian soldiers was slow. Mugabe promised that as soon as a single army and a single command structure had been completed, racial inequalities in salaries would be removed. In early 1983 the government announced it had upgraded salaries of black NCOs from Z$4.24 per day to Z$7.89 – the salary of white privates. Race-based pay scales were only removed in 1990. Government did not respond to the issue of pensions for former guerrillas till 1989 and then only for those in state employment. Consequently, pensions remained an issue till 1997 when all ex-combatants were paid war service pensions and lump sum payments in recognition of their war service.

ZIPRA/ZANLA competition for military dominance
Mugabe emphasized repeatedly the need for ZIPRA and ZANLA to abandon their party identities and develop a Zimbabwean loyalty. In late June 1980,
responding to a ZANU(PF) MP who advocated filling key positions in the army with ruling party loyalists, Mugabe said: “Members of the Defence Forces must have a single loyalty to the State. They can no longer be seen as ZIPRA or ZANLA forces. They owe allegiance to the State, and should not belong to political parties.” Yet, Mugabe’s army and party, like ZAPU and ZIPRA, would not shed their party identities. Each sought control of the new army, especially the officer corps. For ZANU(PF), army control would consolidate its power and reward its guerrillas for helping to bring it to power. For ZAPU, army control would offset its loss of political control and reward its guerrillas. At the same time, each army wanted to preserve itself as a separate guerrilla force because it was unsure if peace would prevail. In short, each guerrilla army sought to keep its best people out of the new army as an insurance policy should integration not succeed; on the other hand, each wanted its best officers to compete for posts to maximize influence in the army.

**Preserving military power.** Guerrillas left outside the country at the time of the peace settlement were a safety net should integration fail. Each army continued to refuse, as at the Lancaster House settlement, to disclose the total numbers of its forces. In the BMATT commander’s words: “Till they were brought into the disciplined force, each faction wanted to preserve some guerrillas as an insurance policy against something going wrong. Therefore there was reluctance to declare their assets till you were confident that the other side would not do you in.” Consequently, for BMATT’s commander,

one of the key problems was not quite knowing how many people were going to be declared by Nhongo and Masuku. This bedeviled me for some 18 months. That is one of the reasons we took till November 1981 rather than the end of 1980 to integrate the army. There was a moving number of guerrillas. Every time we thought we were nearly there, they’d declare another unit in Mozambique, Angola, etc.

In the latter period of amalgamation, “we were dealing with guerrillas from Mozambique and Angola rather than from assembly places.” Each side deliberately wanted to keep their best men available should war break out. Despite BMATT efforts to ensure that all the politically important guerrillas were incorporated into the officer corps, BMATT’s deputy commander recognized only partial success. “There were people coming in at the end. We couldn’t find slots for them. They’d been hidden from us. The guerrillas didn’t trust each other. Initially it [hiding their best people] was an insurance policy against the British, then the former Rhodesian army, and then each other.”

Inside the country, the guerrilla armies also tried to keep some of their best-trained men out of the new army in case of war. ZIPRA informants spoke openly about their army withholding its best forces should integration fail. An ex-ZIPRA guerrilla who became an officer in the new army described how
ZIPRA leaders earmarked certain units. They didn’t allow the integration to go on picking everyone. They would leave certain assembly places intact. Gwaii River Mine – ZAPU considered that as its strongest crack force and therefore wanted to preserve it as its crack force, and wouldn’t allow people from there to go to integration. Other units earmarked to be kept intact were those in other cities of Bulawayo and Harare. In the townships, it [withholding units from integration] was to ensure that either party had a form of presence in an undiluted [that is, not integrated] manner. It was not necessarily that they were crack units. People at Gwaii had been regrouped and reorganized in Zambia before coming into the country. It was during the negotiations. Some came from operational areas, some from training. That unit was reorganized along the lines of a regular/conventional set-up. It was reorganized to become a regular force. During the prosecution of the armed struggle, it had been observed that it had not been possible to take the countryside or towns or to defeat militarily the Rhodesian armed forces. If you understand the genesis of revolutionary warfare, you must transform from guerrilla forces into semi-conventional and eventually conventional forces to win the war. As far as ZAPU was concerned, the negotiations that took place at Lancaster House didn’t mean it should stop preparations for the war. Negotiations were just one means to end war. Other negotiations had failed to end war, so ZAPU’s preparations continued during Lancaster House negotiations, and so on.

Another ex-ZIPRA combatant said: “Senior ex-combatants from the war are not in the army. The older ones – the Nxele group [a reference to the deceased Albert Nxele, Nkomo’s former personal security officer] – it was a conscious decision at Lancaster House to see how the situation developed. When we were ready to join, when the situation looked okay, we’d been overtaken by events.” ZIPRA, then, tried to withhold its crack conventional forces assembled at Gwaii River Mine, to maintain a presence in the urban townships in Harare and Bulawayo, and to keep its older ex-combatants out of the new army as part of its insurance scheme should war erupt.

Particularly after factional fighting in urban cantonments in November 1980 when full-scale war seemed imminent, both armies recruited new men to boost their numbers. According to BMATT’s first commander, from this time, “when there was a danger of the whole thing falling apart, guerrilla commanders may actually have favored recruits – anyone – as a reserve against a rainy day.” The new recruits were often sent for integration before the armies’ trained men inside the country. Lt.-Colonel Lionel Dyck, in charge of an RAR company on a tour of duty in Bulawayo during the Entumbane disturbances in November 1980 and February 1981, told the Dumbutshena Commission of Inquiry that the factional violence was the fault of “hangers-on” who “joined the war after the war” and were “now filtering into integrated units.” “They fought over food, women and beer with which they were copiously supplied” and were in the camps to collect the $100 per month allowance. After factional fighting in the urban cantonments in February 1981, ZIPRA alleged that ZANLA was deliberately withholding trained and experienced ex-guerrillas for integration
while enrolling its mujibas into the national army. With guerrillas returning to Zimbabwe and with fresh mobilization, assembly places swelled in numbers even as guerrillas were being attested into the army, adding to BMATT’s confusion about how many guerrillas were awaiting integration. In April 1981, Munangagwa celebrated the relative peace despite there being 65,000 armed men in the assembly places during military integration – three times those assembled by the time of the election.

Who in the assembly places was an ex-guerrilla was unclear even before the guerrilla forces had remobilized. During the ceasefire, ZANLA kept its more experienced guerrillas outside the camps to mobilize for the election but pushed mujibas into the camps to maintain the numbers it had told the British would assemble. After the elections, BMATT’s first commander thought that numbers in the assembly places had possibly increased too. “Once it became known that every guerrilla had a right to be part of the army, and paid, fed and clothed in the integrated army, every man aspired to join the army in a time of high unemployment.”

Months before the factional violence, Mr. Goddard, a Rhodesian Front MP, asked Mugabe if he were aware “that perhaps well over 50 percent of that number [34,000–35,000] currently in the assembly points are, in fact, mujibhas [sic] with no military training of any type, and will the same offer be extended to them, that is to join the National Army?”

Just as the leaders balanced the need to retain a guerrilla army and to compete in the new army, ZIPRA and ZANLA individuals also often sought to balance the dangers of integrating against their usually poor prospects of civilian employment. According to a ZIPRA ex-combatant, ZIPRA fears of working alongside ZANLA were pervasive, forcing the ZIPRA High Command to switch from its initial strategy of nominating soldiers to go for training to a volunteer system:

there was disillusionment and dissatisfaction on the part of ZAPU as far as the election was concerned. There was some resistance from those who’d grown up in the ZAPU side to join the government army. It would be like joining competitors, therefore presupposing the need for those who want to join to do so on a voluntary basis…The future was uncertain/inscrutable. They’d rather adopt a wait and see attitude.

He himself waited until after the demobilization scheme was announced. Balancing his concerns about safety and being a political tool of ZAPU leaders’ insurance policy of keeping some of their best men out of the new army with the chance to be integrated as an officer, in June 1981 he asked to be sent for integration. A former ZIPRA medical officer recalled how “[T]he first group of officers had left from Chitungwiza for integration – about 250. I felt like many others: ‘Let me remain with my gun, where I am; it’s too early for integration.’ But at Gwaai [he was moved there after the November 1980 fighting in Chitungwiza] I started to feel differently.” Faction fights in the integrated
units which left ZIPRA guerrillas dead also made their colleagues fear joining the army. For example, in January 1981 a number of ZIPRA soldiers in 2:2 battalion in Mudzi were killed.\textsuperscript{74} Sentencing a 23-year-old ZANLA member for his involvement in the murder of one of these ZIPRA men, the judge remarked that the accused’s decision to drag his victim into the bush and kill him revealed “quite a strong participation in the anti-ZIPRA activities of the NCOs.”\textsuperscript{75} Gilbert Khumalo (the war name of Nicholas Nkomo), ex-commander of a ZIPRA camp at Entumbane in February 1981, told the Dumbutshena Commission of Inquiry that military leaders who failed to follow up complaints of factional fights in the army were to blame for the Entumbane fighting. After fighting in a battalion near Rusape, men fled to Entumbane. “But those who we looked to for solving such problems did not do anything. They seemed to ignore such developments.”\textsuperscript{76}

ZANLA individuals also feared joining an integrated army. An ex-ZANLA detachment political commissar described himself as

one of the apprehensive types . . . [who] wanted to find out what was going on before throwing myself into it. I spent a whole year in an AP [Zezani], then went to Tongogara to start this farming project. When some of us felt we’d had enough of farming we slipped into Entumbane. After factional fights there we moved out of Entumbane and went to Godhlawayo. Then I did standardization.”\textsuperscript{77}

A former ZANLA guerrilla who had been in charge of his platoon’s security and who was attested as a private soldier on New Year’s Day in 1981 contrasted his bravery and spirit of adventure with many of his comrades’ fears of integration.

We were many thousands in Chitungwiza. When people heard we were going to mix with ZIPRA and our former enemy the Rhodesian army to form units of the army, that was not normal, that was fearsome. To tell the truth, we did not like it. We thought we were going to form a party of only ZANU(PF), but that was not to be. So most of the guerrillas never trusted some candidates from other parties. They feared maybe fighting could break in camps. Because of that fear and mistrust of other parties’ candidates, there was resistance from a lot of guerrillas of not wanting to be early soldiers of that kind of mix. Myself, I took up the challenge. It was like an adventure. I wanted to be among the pioneers of the ZNA and indeed, even today, I can proudly say I’m one of the pioneers of the ZNA because I went first. It needed men of men to take up the challenge to mix with ZIPRA and the Rhodesians. In fact it did occur that fighting broke within the camps.\textsuperscript{78}

He also recognized that with only grade 7 (primary schooling), the army offered “an immediate job so I could survive. It was the only job I felt I could take as an uneducated person.” Asked what those who didn’t join thought at the time, he replied: “People had no future in mind and they thought their party would take care of them. They thought maybe later units of each party could be formed, because that’s what they wanted.” Like ZIPRA, ex-ZANLA guerrillas in
integrated units also died in faction fights. An ex-ZIPRA man’s attack on a ZANLA soldier who died in hospital after a quarrel over food between ex-ZANLA and ex-ZIPRA in 2:1 battalion was raised repeatedly in ZANLA evidence to the Dumbutshena Commission of Inquiry as a prelude to the factional flare-up in the battalion in February 1981.79

Securing power in the army. Coexisting with each army’s strategy of preserving military assets as an insurance policy, the armies also engaged in vigorous competition for top military posts in the new army. Describing the officer and NCO courses near Gwelo, a colonel (ex-ZIPRA), spoke of “a spirit of competition between ZIPRA and ZANLA. Both groups wanted to win as many of these high posts as possible.”80 Another ex-ZIPRA combatant in the army also acknowledged competition for top positions. “So the competition . . . was competition to send your cream into the army. There are obvious reasons for that. Either faction hoped to win an influential or dominating position in various agencies of government, in particular the armed forces.”81 Amongst privates, too, there was a sense of pride in their training, especially among ZIPRA. According to Margaret Ndebele,

the time we were attested, we had that pride being an ex-ZIPRA. And ZANLA too. We thought we were better trained than ex-ZANLA . . . Our performance really differed. It showed they didn’t have enough training. They had four months training there. We had six months. It showed in physical fitness. Even the Rhodesian forces who were first training us were saying: “With ZIPRA we don’t have trouble, but with the ZANLA, ah!” Such things would make us proud to be ZIPRA.82

Indeed, General Walls, the JHC chair, had great respect for ZIPRA forces, which did not endear him to Mugabe. “If I had all ZIPRA we could colonize all Africa,” he is reported to have said on more than one occasion.83

Each guerrilla army’s members acknowledge their army drew on educated civilians to enhance their competitiveness. The former ZIPRA commander of Sierra assembly places said that ZIPRA commanders recruited educated civilian women to take the tests to enter the various army corps which mostly ill-educated ZIPRA women had trouble passing. “That also made some of the girls who’d not been in the liberation struggle be attested into the ZNA. I think our commanders were embarrassed because we had such low levels of education so they got some women who were civilians to be integrated.”84 A former ZANLA combatant in the new army said: “After ZIPRA was taking in civilians with academic qualifications where they couldn’t find ZIPRA with qualifications, that’s when ZANLA started to look for educated people.”85 Denying ex-ZIPRA pulled educated civilians into the assembly places to make it more competitive in the military integration exercise, a former ZIPRA guerrilla in the new army believed
ZANLA accepted schoolleavers into assembly places. Many just joined. Some are not very far from here [his army office]. They managed to look cleverer in the integration exercise because of their education. Some have risen. From the ZAPU point of view, it’s actually the opposite. I’ll count one or two ex-ZIPRA who weren’t trained but were just recruited into the assembly places. ZANLA had been claiming in the war that they were the ones fighting the war and that they had the largest forces. So they had to let anyone into the APs in order to get that number.86

Left to merit-based competition, ZIPRA would have dominated the officer corps in the infantry battalions and the specialist forces. Seeking to deflect Mugabe’s allegations of ZIPRA disloyalty after the November 1980 violence in the urban cantonments, Nkomo drew attention to ZIPRA’s success in capturing leadership positions in the new battalions. “We have nine brigades in the country, six of which are under ZIPRA leadership.”87 In the integrated Parachute Regiment being formed, ZANLA was again losing to ZIPRA. Only 72 of the 159 men had survived the three-week pre-selection phase to test fitness, courage, and capability, and of these, most were from ZIPRA or the former Rhodesian army.88 ZANLA was not prepared to accept ZIPRA dominance. Referring to the violence in two of three integrated units in February 1981, Boniface Mao Hurungundo, a former ZANLA liaison officer for Entumbane at 1 Brigade, told the Dumbutshena Commission of Inquiry that the fact that the command structure at 1:2 and 1:3 battalions had been almost all ZIPRA was “one of the issues which may have caused these disturbances.”89 ZIPRA’s superior performance in officer competition reflected its better training, including in conventional warfare. A ZNA colonel, a former ZANLA guerrilla, claimed that “[o]n average ZANLA had commanders with no education. ZIPRA had sent commanders with no education. ZIPRA had sent commanders for courses overseas and they’d been trained in conventional warfare – an advantage.”90

Following Nkomo’s comments about ZIPRA winning command posts in the new battalions, the decision was reached to balance the leadership in the regiments or new battalions. Ensuring rough equality between ZIPRA and ZANLA in officer and NCO posts was deeply resented by ZIPRA which had a competitive edge. In Lookout Masuku’s evidence during the treason trial of ZIPRA commanders and ZAPU leaders in 1983, he alluded to the resentment of ZIPRA commanders toward the ZANU (PF) government’s special directive to award field officer commissions on the basis of parity rather than merit.91 A ZIPRA guerrilla who became a dissident commander of about 200 former comrades in Dukwe camp, Botswana, said he had left Zimbabwe because ZIPRA was being persecuted by the “neocolonial government of Robert Mugabe” and he was especially bitter because he had not been made a brigade commander at integration.92 ZANLA could justify parity because each battalion was composed of equal numbers of privates – 50 percent ZANLA and 50 percent ZIPRA – even though ZANLA had a far larger army.
Merit-based competition appears to have died even earlier for at least some guerrillas who had joined ZIPA, the joint ZIPRA and ZANLA force which had a brief existence during the war. A ZIPA leader said ZIPRA leaders Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku helped to make it possible for ZIPA guerrillas to join the new army. In 1980 three ZIPA High Command members chose to go for integration. “They said we were all free to rejoin. But in three weeks we were expelled. Yet we’d passed exams/tests and the British were impressed with us. They didn’t know our background.”

Gender inequality

During the war, women in the guerrilla armies had not experienced equality with their male counterparts. The numbers of women fighters, like for all fighters, will always be subject to debate. Zimbabwe Project estimated there were 4,000 out of 66,000 ex-combatants. ZIPRA women combatants had been confined to support roles outside the country. ZIPRA’s commander of women said they had been trained for “a supporting role in areas where it was safe enough to bring them – mainly medical side and transport side . . . camp security, signals (we women were very good with our radios), we maintained a very big hospital – the men who are in for treatment are different, he won’t be bullying you, it’s your duty to treat him.” ZANLA women in base camps had started off as carriers of food and weapons for guerrillas in 1972. In 1973 they demanded the right to military training, and a policy of equal training for men and women was subsequently introduced. However, discrimination persisted. Men were more likely than women to be chosen for training. Women were also kept out of operational areas till 1978, and when they were deployed, their numbers were small and they were sent to liberated areas only to do gender-specific labor. They worked as nurses, political commissars, health workers, and brought arms and ammunition into operational areas for forward transfer. Keeping women fighters away from the front also meant they were discriminated against in promotions which depended heavily on combat roles. Trained women fighters who became pregnant were isolated in camps and lost their status as fighters. They returned at the ceasefire as refugees. Given these experiences, it is hardly surprising that women fighters found themselves discriminated against in the new army.

The JHC discussed at length whether women should serve in the new infantry battalions but decided against it. According to BMATT’s first commander: “The attitudes of the guerrillas were surprisingly conservative especially given changes in countries like the UK and US and having had women in the guerrilla army.” The exclusion of women from the infantry battalions entailed a double discrimination: women were not allowed to join fighting units and they did not have the opportunity to go through the standardization exercise with its opportunities to join the officer corps. Female guerrillas were directly absorbed as privates into the Army Corps or specialist units in administrative and
Military integration

clerical posts. The former commander of ZIPRA women lamented women’s restricted roles in the new army, which she said resembled ZIPRA war-time practices. Hopes of a change in their role in peace time were dashed after independence.

We just went straight into the Corps... Signals and Medical Corps took ladies first... I came into the Corps in September 1980. You live in the camp, shuffling from Gweru [where Sierra assembly place was] to here and back – just administrative. After I left Sierra AP, the army had to place those who were left. Many went into One Commando – the most rigorous training of all units. They do administrative duties: keeping records, etc. But they exercise with One Commando. Others went to Parachute Unit. Only one lady, a ZANLA one, did it, the others do administrative duties. Many also went into military police. The main reason was that men felt ladies couldn’t be trained with men in battalions. So the Corps had to take them, after the big exercise of integrating the men... The integration – I thought it was very unfair that we women weren’t given a chance. The highest woman is a lieutenant colonel.98

Having started as privates, regardless of their war rank, women continued to face discrimination in promotions. Women had restricted access to the standard routes to promotion. They were rarely chosen to go for training abroad or to go for interviews before officer selection boards, and were first accepted into potential officers’ courses at the Zimbabwe Military Academy in Gweru in 1997.99

The slow pace of integrating women resulted in many missing a chance to gain a position in the army. The ZIPRA women’s ex-commander spoke of female guerrillas, frustrated and uncertain about their future, choosing to return home.

In the assembly places, the army was really busy trying to integrate the men and we were told to be patient... The integration of women was very, very slow. There were 2,000 strong ZIPRA-trained women. About half of them demobilized. You don’t know whether to remain or go home. They became despondent; they didn’t know what would happen to them. About one-third to a half went home.100

Another ZIPRA woman said the slow pace of integrating women meant that many female commanders never had the chance to take the exam (presumably the aptitude tests) before demobilization began.101 Asked about the slow pace of women’s integration, BMATT’s first commander said: “I do seem to recall, the problem was set aside for quite a long time. Women were a little down the queue of priorities.”102 Interviewed in April 1981, then JHC chair Emmerson Munangagwa said the integration of women had not yet begun.103 The military integration exercise ended in August 1981.

Military status

The introduction of standardization courses and aptitude tests threatened un-educated guerrillas who had high war ranks but also created an opportunity for
better-educated guerrillas to win promotions. The top guerrilla leaders were able to exempt themselves from having to take tests and courses and thus to protect their war-time status. However, beneath the very top leadership, other uneducated high-ranking guerrillas had to take the tests which would influence the level at which they would be integrated. For most, failure meant being integrated as a private, and thus loss of their war status and power. Some male ZANLA guerrillas who failed the tests were absorbed in the Fifth Brigade – which was outside the BMATT/JHC integration exercise – and were able to retain their war status. Those who passed the tests, and the top guerrilla leaders, enjoyed political support for rapid promotions and they soon took power from white Rhodesians who left the army in droves.

During the war, uneducated guerrillas predominated among the early recruits and rose to occupy positions of rank in the army. An ex-ZIPRA deputy detachment commander, later withdrawn from the front to join the crack force ZIPRA was forming, had “O” levels when guerrillas “force marched” him and others to Botswana from Manama Mission in 1976. When he got to Zambia, he found the uneducated entrenched in power in the army. “There was seniority based on first come first served. People went to join the external forces at different times. Even if you weren’t educated or intelligent, just because you got there first, you’d be senior. It becomes difficult for more educated to displace him. He’s already there and has experience.”

ZANLA’s army, too, had promoted the uneducated earlier recruits to positions of command. The more educated who joined the guerrillas later were regarded as potential colonial spies or “sell-outs.” Guerrilla recruits often discovered that even a little education was a liability which could result in brutal beatings and other punishments. A former ZANLA ex-combatant who left in 1975 before he had taken the “O” level exams found it “dangerous to boast of education in the first years of struggle. You were seen as an oppressor. How else could you have got an education under colonials? Then schools were established and it was better.” A fourteen-year-old girl crossed the Mozambican border in 1976 to discover that even a Form 1 education (one year of post-primary schooling) turned her into a potential security threat. Each time she moved camps, she would be interviewed by security personnel. “If on these interviews … you could tell them I was doing Form 1, they got angry. Most were from very poor families who couldn’t afford to send their children to school. They could take it as if you were part of the system that was in this country that they didn’t want to comply with. So I would say I had Grade 1 or Grade 2. You had to [to escape their wrath].” Inspired by Mugabe’s encouragement to university students in 1975 to join ZANLA, a science student went to Mozambique. At Tembwe training camp in northern Tete, he found the commanders were from the northeast where there weren’t many educational opportunities and they were illiterate. “They feared the university students had come to take
their positions. They were saying funny things about us. Smith maybe sent us, etc. They put us in underground pits. We were lucky. Mugabe had met us. When he got to Mozambique he asked at some point about us, knowing we were coming. The commanders had to let us out, clean us up, etc.” His seniors wanted him to become an instructor or go for specialist courses but he refused, saying he wanted to go to the front to experience the war before he trained others. The truth was he did not want to stay in Mozambique. “I thought I’d rather be killed fighting the enemy.”

Late in the war, when each guerrilla army introduced education into the camps, the uneducated guerrillas resisted the idea, often with violence. The war was almost at an end before guerrilla opposition to education diminished.

The JHC, with BMATT approval, exempted the most senior guerrilla leaders from the aptitude and standardization tests. The JHC’s protection of the top guerrilla leaders (including its members) was intended to ensure continuity of leadership between the guerrilla armies and the new army, and thus to reward their war service and to legitimate the war. Ex-guerrillas who performed well in the tests defended the JHC’s decision in somewhat different ways but always underscored the importance of rewarding the guerrilla leadership for its war contributions. A ZNA colonel, formerly ZANLA, compared the continuity of the guerrilla leaders with that of the Rhodesian army leadership.

It was integration they were after and control of the army, and we had the masses in the grip. The Rhodesian army leadership remained intact. If all the leadership went through standardization, the people leading the two armies would have been obliterated, except for one or two. So they said: “From this level upward, we’ll take them and commission them accordingly; from this level down, we’ll standardize.”

A lieutenant-colonel in the ZNA (ex-ZIPRA) drew an analogy between the continuity of the military leaders and that of the political leaders of the guerrilla movements.

From the level of colonel equivalent, there was no testing. In ZANLA they were General Staff to High Command; in ZIPRA they were called regional or zone commanders to heads of departments and the headquarters. Most of them constituted the Joint High Command. They were already in positions of authority. They didn’t see any need to go through testing. So they recommended to the political leadership that they just be confirmed. After all, the political leadership wasn’t being subjected to standardization. Secondly, I believe hindsight told the political leadership that there were obvious weaknesses with those at the top so if you put them through a selection process it would be difficult for them to achieve the criteria. The BMATT indicated also there was no way you’d design a formal course for people at that level of command. You’d just design a course for them to do what you’d expect them to do at that level of command if they weren’t already well trained. It would have been a negation of the very fact that they’d already been given the top command in the war. How would one turn around and say: “Although you’ve been leading our forces during the war, you’re not good enough to
The introduction of educational requirements for junior and middle management positions in the new army threatened the status of guerrilla commanders. The guerrillas who could not pass the aptitude tests resented the fact that only they, and not the Rhodesian forces, were subjected to tests which carried the threat of reversing ranks earned in the war. They felt as if they were being discarded. In September 1981 Zimbabwe Project recorded sympathetically the uneducated commanders’ objections to the way in which formal education rather than proven military ability was invoked as a criterion for admission to the army, and to how those with Grade 7 or less were “to be thrown out” along with ex-combatants handicapped as a result of their war injuries. Similarly, in April 1981 a journalist expressed uneducated guerrilla commanders’ grievances to Minister of State Munangagwa, the JHC chair. “It appears that some of the comrades who left the country to join the struggle and gave up their education are now being left out because they don’t have the necessary educational qualifications. What is being done to remedy this?” Munangagwa sidestepped the issue of rank reversals, answering:

That question I think is exaggerated. We didn’t get this independence through Ph.D.’s and M.A.’s or speaking English like a Londoner. We are now independent because comrades, whatever level, some without even having gone to school and some having gone up to university level, came to join the struggle. In the army today we don’t ask somebody whether he has education. Anybody who wants to be in the army who has been in the liberation movement is allowed to come into the army.

Anyone could join the army but uneducated guerrillas were unlikely to secure the ranks they had enjoyed during the war. Both guerrilla armies recruited their war commanders for the standardization courses but they had to first pass the aptitude tests. Many did not pass. A former detachment political commissar, who joined ZANLA prior to writing his “O” level examinations, referred to the educational requirements as “very tricky” because ‘guerrilla armies’ best commanders are not necessarily the ones with the best academic qualifications.”
Another former ZANLA detachment commander presented the problem of rank reversals as of only fleeting significance.

[It] did create an impression of one who’d been in a leadership position in war but who could now no longer qualify. Naturally, they would have felt: “We are now being displaced in favor of those who are better educated.” Because you could find that you could have a situation whereby having been sent on the course, after assessment of the course, the seniority that existed in the war was reversed. So you’d find one who was junior before having to lead one who was superior before. In such cases, you’d get situations of refusal to accept the new boss who was your junior one time. Such situations were not long-lived because it was made clear that after being attested to the integrated army that you became subject to military discipline, with the disciplinary code in the Defence Act being the guiding principle. That’s where the ratification of appointments by the JHC became very important. It meant they were ratifying the new order rather than the previous one.119

Former guerrillas who suffered a rank demotion when they were integrated into the army sometimes deserted. A ZIPRA ex-combatant said: “I know a number of guys who went for integration. He’d be told he’d be a sergeant. He’d say ‘no’ and leave. What it means is they’d be classified as a deserter. You look at someone who thought he’d be integrated at the rank of the people he’d been operating with in the war.”120 Some guerrilla commanders found ways to resist losing their war status. According to a former ZIPRA detachment political commissar,

[t]hose who’d occupied very senior positions and dropped very low would go back sometimes to assembly places; they’d desert and redo the selection. That would be done without the knowledge of the integrating team or instructor. The identification process in the assembly place was difficult. A person would come back using another pseudo name . . . I know some. He may be in your standardization class, and you know he failed. Later you saw him resurface as an officer in another unit. You’d say: “How did you do it?” He’d say: “I went back to the assembly place for another selection process.”

His own experience was different. Recruited to train for a middle-management position, his aptitude test results were so good that he was sent to the senior management training course.121 He believed the problems caused by rank reversals during integration had persisted in the army. “Many people who’d occupied very junior positions during the war rose during the selection process . . . Even today if you know people’s background in the war, it is a problem. Senior people in the war didn’t want to take instructions from people junior in the war.”122

Rank reversals affected women too. A former ZIPRA female commander complained of this inequity: “If I can say, with us ladies, we were so unfortunate. Most of us were integrated as privates whereby we were getting $75 per month. I don’t think we were treated like our male counterparts. Even though we held the same ranks, we were integrated as privates. Then we were sent for those courses.
Those of us who rose, rose from private.”123 Asked how she felt about the men whose high war ranks protected them from having to go through aptitude tests and standardization to become officers, she replied:

We were against that. Some of us were holding ranks of battalion commanders (equivalent to lieutenant-colonel) but we were attested as privates. We were definitely hurt about that. And another thing was we did not have someone to represent us. That made everything worse. The person we thought was going to represent us was attested later than us because she had a baby. She refused to be integrated as a private. Then Joshua Nkomo said she should be attested as an officer and commissioned as a lieutenant. In the camps, she was supposed to be a brigade commander – women had a brigade. She didn’t go into the assembly place with us. She had a baby when she came from the liberation struggle. Now she’s a major. We were also saying she couldn’t be attested as a private . . . We were complaining at Joint High Command about being attested as privates. Both of them – ZANLA and ZIPRA – I think, failed to represent us.

She also objected to the exams and interviews which female commanders had to pass.

And the way we were integrating made some of the girls fail. We were given an exam whereby we were questioned on commerce and accounting. If you failed, you went back to the assembly place. You could take the exam again. If you pass, you’re lucky; if you fail, tough luck . . . We were taking the exams and interview here at the Army Headquarters. I think it was administered by ZIPRA, ZANLA, and the Rhodesian forces. At first they had to take the commanders: company, battalion, and section commanders . . . After commanders had gone for exams, they’d just choose anyone. There’d be a parade, and a liaison officer would just choose: you, you, etc. whether you knew the person or not . . . All the women wanted to be integrated into the army. Some of the commanders failed the exam. Even today they have failed to be integrated into the ZNA.

Stressing how female ex-combatants are largely outside the officer corps, she continued: “There are very few ex-combatant women who are officers. Most are coming from the civilians and most are coming from the medical section because of their qualifications.”

For frustrated and humiliated ZANLA male guerrilla commanders who could not make the officer or NCO ranks, the Fifth Brigade was a convenient outlet. Mugabe publicly announced its formation in August 1981, at the end of the BMATT/JHC program, and justified it as necessary to defend against South African aggression.124 According to a former ZANLA detachment political commissar, “the bulk of 5 Brigade was made up of ZANLA commanders whose educational qualifications were such as to prejudice them in going through standardization. There were also some ZIPRA commanders in 5 Brigade and some new ones [i.e. civilians].”125 A former ZIPRA detachment political commissar said of the Fifth Brigade: “5 Brigade was taken from ex-ZANLA assembly places and grouped for training by the Koreans. You will appreciate the nature of selection that would take place. It would be taking those people who weren’t
in positions of command and giving them command positions.” Asked if most had failed to qualify as officers in the integrated army, he replied: “To a large extent it is true that ex-ZANLA who’d failed standardization constituted much of the command element of 5 Brigade.”126 However, some whole battalions formed under the BMATT/JHC scheme joined Fifth Brigade.127

Guerrillas and their political supporters wanted more rapid guerrilla promotions in the new army in order to reflect the guerrillas’ war contributions and to preserve their status as “victors.” In September 1980 Mr. Mawema, a ZANU(PF) MP, expressed concern that the guerrilla leaders on the JHC had no rank while their Rhodesian counterparts did. He told parliament:

On the same platform with him [Lt.-General Maclean] we have Comrade Rex Nhongo and Comrade Masiku [sic]. These men seem to have no status for the job they have done of leading the forces to win a battle in this country. They have had good training and they deserve some status. Could they be immediately appointed to the same rank as Mr. MacLean. [sic] – [Mr. Stuttaford: Why not Admiral?] – This is in recognition of a job well done.128

Mugabe gave his assurance that the four men on the JHC were “equal in status.”129 Another ZANU(PF) MP called on Mugabe in his capacity as Defence Minister to make “as many promotions as possible in both the Army and the Air Force.”130

Male guerrilla promotions were occurring rapidly but because the standardization courses for officers and NCOs provided only one month’s training, the JHC initially withheld granting officer ranks until they had further training. Mr. Mawema questioned why the guerrillas, the victors of the war, were losing status to the Rhodesians, the militarily defeated.

The integration means that we have won the war, but we want to integrate those who fought us to accept the change. In so doing we have had many field commanders. The information I have is that our men, both ZANLA and ZIPRA, who have been commanders, will not receive the rank of commander when they are integrated, they will get the simple title of captain. Does this mean we have had a poor training? Does this mean we have not accomplished a good job? – [Wing-Commander Gaunt: Yes, on both counts.] . . . I would therefore like to appeal to the Prime Minister, our comrades who have done such a good job of integration, that they also be given the title of colonels and everything above, and not that of captains . . . Integration is no indication of surrender . . . To continue to give total power to the Whites who held power during the previous regime will mean surrender by our own forces who have done a good job. I would like to appeal to the Prime Minister to raise the status of our commanders.131

White MPs made fun of rapid guerrilla promotions. A white parliamentarian criticized turning out “in a mere five to seven weeks a full battalion’s worth of officers from brigadier down to the lowest platoon commander, including all the necessary administrative staff.”132 Another said: “It would appear that he [MP Mawema] would like promotion to be instant and all round, and not
accepting mere captains but to go right up to colonels. This does rather bring to one’s mind the story brought up by W.S. Gilbert in the Gondoliers where the kind-hearted King promoted everybody instantly to the top of the tree, only to find that when ‘everybody is somebody, no one is anybody.’ At the same time, white MPs were silent about rapid white promotions which occurred as the white officer corps left en masse. In August 1980 after retiring as army commander, General Walls told the BBC that an estimated 60 percent of the white officers and NCOs had resigned because “they don’t want to stay under present political conditions.”

Mugabe temporarily froze white promotions in September 1980, acceded to guerrilla demands for pay corresponding to their temporary ranks (see chapter 3), and in April 1981, commissioned the first twenty-seven ex-guerrillas as senior officers – from colonels to lieutenant-generals. This first batch of newly commissioned senior officers could afford a sense of humor about the pace of promotions. At the end of a six-week orientation course at Zimbabwe Staff College, their only post-independence training, one officer said to Mugabe that he was worried about promotion when officers who were “lieutenant-colonels before breakfast, full colonels after breakfast, appeared as brigadiers at lunch and then at supper-time as higher officers.” To laughter, Mugabe replied that he was not aware of any “breakfast-and-lunch appointments” but if there were, “they will end right there – at breakfast.”

The continuous departure of whites from the army and the lifting of the freeze on white promotions again created opportunities for rapid promotion for those who stayed behind. In February 1981, the brigade headquarters were still being run by white officers but they too were leaving, often at short notice. In 1981 the Service Corps was estimated to be 70 percent under strength in officers and NCOs. For example, in January 1981 the Pay Corps had 164 staff instead of 648 and had to cater to a much larger army. Similarly, white officers still were in charge at the Zimbabwe Military Academy, but their numbers were few. The steady and rapid departure of whites was described as “flesh falling off the bones.” For most whites who stayed in the army during and after integration, the goal was “to stay as long as they could take the frustration, get promoted by four ranks, and then leave with higher pensions. We were left with the worst except for one or two by the time I came,” said a BMATT commander who arrived in January 1982. His chief of staff described white staff officers in army headquarters as “messing up” and “doing nothing” but staying till they could qualify for their pensions. A former guerrilla, in a letter to the editor of *The Chronicle* in October 1983, expressed deep resentment against ex-Rhodesian soldiers who got promoted through his sacrifice in the liberation struggle and then resigned with big pensions. The ex-guerrilla called for their pensions, which he considered payment for killing and burning homes during the war, to be abolished.
As already noted, guerrillas and their supporters were more apt to accept begrudgingly the Lancaster House constitutional protection of existing government pensions and to seek equal pension benefits with their Rhodesian colleagues in the army.¹⁴⁵

**Outcomes: party power and guerrilla privilege and power**

The absorption of thousands of guerrillas into forty-six new battalions by August 1981 – thirty-six were formed after the Entumbane fighting in February 1981 – was a milestone in the ruling party’s quest to end multiple sovereignty and build its power.¹⁴⁶ The JHC was disbanded when a formal single command was achieved. Rhodesian army commander Maclean was promoted to general and defense force head, Nhongo (ZANLA) to army commander, and Masuku (ZIPRA) to deputy army commander.¹⁴⁷ Post-integration estimates of army size – 60,000–65,000 or 80,000¹⁴⁸ – imply the absorption of 50,000–70,000 guerrillas, and this excludes those demobilized without ever having been integrated. In 1997 the number of officially registered guerrillas was about 50,000. Whatever the numbers, the ruling party had achieved a massive transformation in army composition in less than two years. *De facto* equality of the forces had brought ZANLA and ZIPRA into the army as soldiers on an equal footing and guerrillas were in command of most infantry battalions. Notwithstanding its protestations, however, the ruling party sought an army loyal to it. Hence its protection of ZANLA from ZIPRA competition for officers’ positions (with BMATT collusion), Mugabe’s approval of all posts above lieutenant-colonel, and the exclusion of certain ex-ZIPA guerrillas from the officer corps on political grounds. When integration ended, ZANLA constituted 60 percent of the army and the officer corps, ZIPRA 30–35 percent, and the former Rhodesian soldiers, chiefly Africans in the RAR, the remaining 5 percent.¹⁴⁹ Whites still in the army were chiefly in logistics, where despite rapid promotions, they were still in junior ranks. The specialist units were still white-officered.¹⁵⁰

Neither the ruling party nor the senior officer corps, all political appointees, showed an interest in military training. Following integration, BMATT was appalled at battalion officers’ lethargy, the lack of training taking place in most new battalions, officers’ low interest in training courses which BMATT brigade teams tried to run,¹⁵¹ and the battalions’ abysmal operational capacity in 1982.¹⁵² In 1982 BMATT recommended nine of the new battalions disband as soon as possible.¹⁵³ Talking chiefly about ZANLA officers, a BMATT official said: “Some units were so badly trained they were downright dangerous.”¹⁵⁴ By October 1983 it appears as if six of the battalions had been disbanded as part of the demobilization program within the army.¹⁵⁵ BMATT’s effort to force all infantry commanders to attend its training courses in 1982–3 or lose their positions failed because army commander Nhongo would not support a scheme
which interfered with his authority to decide who got sacked. The subsequent BMATT leader cultivated Nhongo’s support for officer training. In 1983 when Nhongo told the brigadiers to go to the Zimbabwe Staff College for courses, they did, though it “came as a nasty shock to them.”

Lack of accountability flourished. With the Pay Corps in disarray because of the departure of white soldiers, the absence of suitably skilled replacements, and the rapid increase in army size, soldiers could get multiple pay books. Soldiers were paid in cash, creating opportunities for theft. Eager to protect opportunities for graft, the army resisted BMATT offers of logistics advisers. In 1982, BMATT started to set up a pay and records office to account for every soldier in the army. But graft continued. Funds for building new barracks were diverted, army vehicles (cars and trucks) and the workshop which BMATT set up near Harare for the maintenance of army vehicles were routinely used for personal purposes, and the food ration system was a source of profiteering for those in charge. Guerrilla crimes in the integrated battalions, as in the assembly places, often went unpunished.

Absorbed in the new army, the guerrillas were privileged over usually better-educated civilians eager for employment. In 1987 the Sixth Brigade, the first to recruit civilians, required applicants to have a Zimbabwe Junior Certificate and be between eighteen and twenty-two years old. Of 83,000 applicants, only 5,000 were selected to undergo one year’s training. Later military recruits were required to have at least 5 “O” levels. Observers of recruitment exercises described the thousands who sought limited places and the need for riot police to control the disappointed rejects. The guerrillas were also privileged in promotions over often well-trained African RAR soldiers.

Not all guerrillas benefited equally. The more-educated men got rapid promotions, squeezing out illiterate guerrilla commanders. ZANLA were protected from ZIPRA competition by the introduction of the rule requiring ZIPRA and ZANLA to have parity in battalion command posts. The most senior war commanders of both armies were sheltered from competition and were political appointees. Women were excluded from infantry battalions and thus rapid promotions to officer posts. They entered the Army Corps or specialist units as privates if they could pass tests. Guerrillas who were kept outside the new army as part of their army’s insurance strategy should war break out sometimes lost an opportunity to join the new army.

**Post-integration, 1982–7**

Even as Mugabe continued to call for an apolitical army, the ruling party and ZANLA colluded to consolidate their power against ZIPRA/ZAPU. In February 1982, conveniently after ZIPRA had been disarmed and demobilized, the ruling party announced it had “discovered” ZIPRA arms caches,
most on property bought with ZIPRA ex-combatants’ allowances or close to former ZIPRA assembly places (Gwaii and Mushumbi Pools), Operation SEED camps (Silalabuhwa), and urban cantonments (Entumbane). The government had prior knowledge of arms caches.\textsuperscript{167} Indeed, ZIPRA’s Dumiso Dabengwa, along with Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, and Munangagwa were members of an ad hoc committee who met early in 1982 to discuss how to handle these arms caches.\textsuperscript{168} After the announcement of the arms discovery, the ruling party dismissed Joshua Nkomo from government. On March 10, 1982, the ruling party arrested ZIPRA’s two JHC representatives – Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku – accusing them and five other ZIPRA and ZAPU members of treason and other state crimes. Most ZAPU cabinet ministers withdrew from the coalition government, removing the veneer of a government of unity. I turn now to ZANLA/ZANU(PF) collusion against ZIPRA and its outcomes.

\textbf{ZANLA/ZANU(PF) collusion against ZIPRA}

According to a BMATT commander in these turbulent times, ZANLA/ZANU presented all ZIPRA/ZAPU as plotters and called for the public execution of “dissidents.” As the BMATT commander observed, if all ZIPRA had been plotters, there would have been uprisings within the army concurrent with dissident activities outside the army. Yet ZIPRA mutinied in only two battalions after Dabengwa’s and Masuku’s arrest in March 1982. The plotters were arrested, the battalions disbanded, and most ZIPRA did not desert.\textsuperscript{169} But rumors abounded that ZIPRA would be slaughtered. The co-authors of Violence & Memory write: “So-called ‘dissident sympathizers’ and ‘disloyal elements’ were in fact purged, arrested or worse with such ferocity in 1982 that senior army officers subsequently had to make a tour of ZNA units to assure soldiers that ‘they wouldn’t be victimized for past affiliations.’”\textsuperscript{170} Still, party-instigated or -sanctioned violence continued against ZIPRA in the army, and especially officers, along with disappearances, illegal detention, purges, and disregard for their military authority. Court trials and convictions of ZAPU/ZIPRA members who were accused of state crimes were rare. BMATT claimed that its diplomatic intervention did prevent ZANLA/ZANU(PF) leaders from implementing even more drastic programs against their opponents.

ZANU(PF) cabinet ministers’ speeches instigated and approved crimes against “dissidents,” whom they took to be all ex-ZIPRA, ZAPU leaders, and ZAPU civilian supporters. In October 1982, Minister of Defence Sydney Sekeramayi said, “the National Army’s purge of dissident sympathisers and disloyal elements within its ranks [my italics] has dissidents on the run.”\textsuperscript{171} In March 1983, he told a press conference: “The foreign Press has been spreading malicious stories about the so-called atrocities committed by the
security forces.” At a rally in Matabeleland North in April 1983, Emmerson Munangagwa, Minister of State Security and in charge of the CIO, told a “huge, forcibly assembled crowd” that the army had come to Matabeleland like fire, “and in the process of cleansing the area of the dissident menace had also wiped out their supporters.” At that same rally, Munangagwa said: “Blessed are they who will follow the path of the Government laws, for their days on earth shall be increased. But woe unto those who will choose the path of collaboration with dissidents for we will certainly shorten their stay.”

ZIPRA officers were victims of disappearances and mostly extra-legal arrests and detentions. An ex-ZIPRA officer said:

Intelligence officers would arrest ZIPRA officers for being against the government (1981–83), some having been involved in anti-government feelings outside the army or fueling anti-government feeling among officers in the army. Some were arrested and never came back. A few disappeared after arrest and to date no one knows where they are. A few who returned opted to demobilize.

After the arrests of ZIPRA’s military leaders in early 1982, a ZIPRA medical administrator at Tsanga Rehabilitation Centre recalled how ZANLA soldiers from nearby 5 Brigade headquarters created a tense environment for him.

Most of the patients were ex-ZANLA. You’d meet from 5 Brigade these funny officers coming into camp, as if visiting. But they’d talk to patients and tell them funny things. I remember one of the patients shouting at me that I’d paralyzed him... These officers would drive to the center as if coming to visit on weekends to see injured people. They’d start instigating this tension. There was nothing I could do, just keep quiet.

When he moved to 3 Brigade headquarters in Mutare in 1983, he became a victim of ZANLA violence. When asked: “Were there any difficulties for you in 3 Brigade, Mutare?” he answered: “No, not really. It was a well integrated unit.” Then he began:

They took people from Bulawayo and imprisoned them in Mutare. That was nasty. There’d been some split after fighting at 3 Brigade. I was taken by my superior [ex-ZANLA] and others as I came from the hospital and put in a dark room with dissidents who’d been moved from Bulawayo. It was terrible. You don’t want to write it. You don’t need it.

He continued his story about how ZANLA “unofficially” locked him up for two weeks and taunted him by laughing, singing, and making him sing. He was told he could call his wife – a white Briton – but he had to tell her that he was at a board of enquiry meeting. “I had to lie. She couldn’t understand. She knew something was wrong and called my commander. Other officers had also reported me missing.”

ZANLA commanders in the Fifth Brigade and the ZNA authorized purges of ZIPRA in their units. At the passing-out parade for Fifth Brigade in December 1982, commander Perence Shiri reportedly told the members: ““From today
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onwards I want you to start dealing with dissidents. We have them here at
this parade... Wherever you meet them, deal with them and I do not want a
report.””176 In July 1982 the commander of 2:1 battalion told his soldiers who
had been sent to Lupane to deal with dissidents: ““We came to hunt dissidents . . .
if we want to finish some dissidents, we must first finish those in the section.
After that we go to the bush.””177

ZANLA soldiers violated the military command system in at least three ways.
First, they refused to recognize ZIPRA promotions. An ex-ZIPRA war comman-
der, emerging as a major after standardization, became the second-in-command
of 3:2 battalion in Rusape. While he was in Harare on a staff course, the gov-
ernment announced it had found arms caches. After his course, he returned to
his Rusape unit. Later in 1982 he went to a foundation course at Zimbabwe
Military Academy, Gweru, and from there, to a staff course at the Zimbabwe
Staff College, from which he emerged top of his class. He was posted to be-
come a major at 3 Brigade in Mutare. However, the brigade commander, Shava
Gava (the nom de guerre of ZNA’s current defense force commander, Vitales
Zvinavashe), “refused to take me. I was sent back to 3:2 and just continued do-
ing my job. I lost a very good job. That’s how dissident fighting affected me.”
In June 1985 he was sent for a year to the USA to do a Commander General’s
Staff Course. In 1992, at the time of the interview, he was a colonel.178

Second, ZANLA subordinates also violated the command structure by refus-
ing to acknowledge ZIPRA authority. A ZIPRA officer who resigned in 1990
spoke of ZANLA disregard for ZIPRA authority.

Say you’re a platoon commander. You find you can’t take decisions. Someone beneath
you becomes the kind of proxy commander. I was a colonel, mostly in charge of training
at Llewelin. Two officers committed a crime. They got into a hospital ward and wanted
to rape female patients. These guys were reported to me as the senior commander. I
remanded them for a court martial. But because I was the senior person ordering a court
martial – I a ZIPRA – those men were immediately promoted to majors and the whole
case ended there. We were there as senior officers but we had no power. All the powers
were given to ZANLAs. A ZANLA is more powerful than a colonel.179

Third, ZANLA officers also discharged ZIPRA army members. A confiden-
tial BMATT document refers to the removal in August 1982 of ZIPRA from
the Mechanized Battalion, a battalion in 2 Brigade led by ZANLA’s Agnew
Kambeu.

The battalion was well integrated with 33 percent each of Former Army/ZANLA/ZIPRA
and had a high standard of operational capability coupled with sensible and constructive
training. However last month all ZIPRA elements (some 250) were removed and sent
elsewhere which has reduced the battalion to a fairly poor state although the Former
Army company is apparently still [in] being and tends to be used for demonstrations.180

An ex-ZIPRA officer in the Mechanized Battalion spoke of his illegal discharge
(rather than being “removed and sent elsewhere” as BMATT reported) and of
ZIPRA predominating over ZANLA (rather than the battalion being evenly divided among the three forces).

I was illegally discharged from the army without any signal. I was never found guilty. I violated no regulations but I was discharged. I was only discharged verbally...I’m one of the founder members of 1 Mechanized Battalion. ZNA only had infantry battalions. 1:2 and 1:3 battalions disbanded after the Entumbane conflict. I recruited from them and from 2 Brigade. The Mechanized Battalion moved to Alphida Barracks and started training soldiers in artillery, communications, reconnaissance, etc. This was from October 1981. Ex-ZIPRA were more than ex-ZANLA in that battalion because they had more experience in artillery and communication. In May 1982 I was illegally discharged. I was just told to pack my bags and go home. It was not just me. It happened to many ZIPRAs. ZANLA could tell you to do something unreasonable and just kill you if you disobey. I said: “Tell me the reason I’m being discharged.” The reply I got was: “If you want to save your life, go home to Bulawayo.” I couldn’t resist this order. I have children. They are not mature and couldn’t look after themselves. That man who gave me the order was the acting commander in place of Acting Battalion Commander Hickman. Hickman liked me for my performance but he could do nothing. If you’re not a ZANLA, then you’re not a commander. Even a private could tell you shit. So I left without any pension benefits... Many ZIPRAs were discharged from different battalions. We couldn’t pursue these cases.181

In Bulawayo, he was not safe. In June 1982 he was arrested by the CIO and taken to Stopps camp. For three weeks he was tortured and asked about ZIPRA’s liberation struggle. He was arrested again after the 1985 elections, and spent six weeks at Stopps camp where he was again tortured and asked “the same silly questions as in 1982.” He was then detained in Khami prison for eighteen months “just because ZANU was the god – in those days they called themselves Jesus.”182

Those removed from the army illegally or detained and subsequently found to be innocent were not reinstated. When ZIPRA defendants in the Dabengwa case were released from detention in July 1986 – they had never been convicted of any crime – they returned to the army. According to one defendant, they said: “‘OK, gentlemen, we are now back,’ only to be told we are now discharged.”183 Many illegally dismissed ZIPRA soldiers sought readmission to the army after party unity. In 1992 the Army Legal Services Director, a former ZANLA combatant, confirmed this phenomenon but absolved the army of responsibility for illegal discharges. “Those who deserted are now reapplying. They say they didn’t desert. They say they were dismissed. It’s a political problem. The politicians started it. They should solve it.”184 Suspected ZAPU/ZIPRA “dissidents” or “dissident” supporters who were detained or tortured were only rarely brought to court, suggesting that the government knew it did not have a case.185 In court, the government was seldom able to win convictions. When Dabengwa, Masuku, and five others were charged with treason and other crimes, the courts dismissed the treason charges
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for lack of evidence against all but Dabengwa, and on April 1, 1983, six of the defendants, including Dabengwa and Masuku, were acquitted. Four of the men, including Dabengwa and Masuku, were immediately redetained under the Emergency Powers Regulations. In September and October 1985, after the July 1985 parliamentary elections in which ZAPU had performed well despite stringent extra-legal efforts to crush it, eight high-ranking army officers (all ex-ZIPRA) – interestingly, none in operational units – were arrested. Four of the officers were charged in their detention orders with conspiracy to overthrow the government, and were held in custody for several months while the government considered formalizing the charges. The other four officers were released without charges after being detained. ZAPU MP Sydney Malunga was detained, for the third time since independence, soon after the elections in July 1985 and tortured during his detention. Malunga’s ZAPU colleagues were detained during late September 1985, but they were also not immediately charged. Malunga was finally formally charged with aiding and abetting dissidents. He was acquitted in July 1986 but was kept in detention while the state decided whether it had enough evidence to proceed with a charge of treason against the other ZAPU officials still in detention. The state finally had to concede it had no further grounds for detaining the men, and in September 1986, after a year in detention, they were all released.

BMATT sometimes intervened successfully in support of ZIPRA. In mid-1982, Army Commander Rex Nhongo wanted to remove the entire ZIPRA officer corps. “We’d been pushing demobilization for a while,” said BMATT’s commander at the time. Nhongo finally responded positively. “Parade all officers and demob all the ZIPRA officers. We can reduce the army AND solve the ZIPRA problem,” he proposed. BMATT’s commander intervened.

Nhongo’s predilection for “purge” tactics to eliminate the “ZIPRA problem” was again apparent in his 1982–3 scheme to send the ZNA, South African style, to invade Botswana and attack refugee camps which held ex-ZIPRA members who had fled Zimbabwe. “They were within hours of implementing that policy,” says the BMATT commander, when BMATT intervened. “Time and again we were like lemmings. We rushed to the precipice but came back again. Credit must be given to the Zimbabweans themselves. They never really went over the precipice. They always drew back, just in time.” ZIPRA victims would disagree with this upbeat BMATT assessment. To my knowledge, BMATT
never publicly protested systematic attacks on ZIPRA. In March 2001 sources reported Britain’s intention to withdraw the small BMATT team in protest against the government’s expulsion of a BBC journalist, attacks on the judiciary, and failure to restore law and order.\textsuperscript{191}

\textit{Outcomes}

By December 1987 when the ruling party and ZAPU agreed to merge, ZANU(PF) had consolidated its power over ZAPU. ZANU/ZANLA had consolidated its control of the army too. By the end of the decade, the ZIPRA officer component in the army had fallen to less than 20 percent – a decline from 30–35 percent at the end of integration in August 1981.\textsuperscript{192} Though ZIPRA promotions became more common after party unity, lieutenant-colonel was usually the upper limit.\textsuperscript{193} The number of whites and Africans who had fought for the Rhodesians also declined. By mid-1983, there were no more than twelve white officers in the fighting units. Most had been in the RAR or special fighting forces, the units which did most of the fighting in the war. According to BMATT members, the guerrillas despised these units for their war participation on the Rhodesian side, and feared and admired them for their training.\textsuperscript{194} By the end of the decade, there was one white officer in the fighting units – commander of the Parachute Battalion, Colonel Lionel Dyck, who has since retired – and one in logistics.\textsuperscript{195} Despite the Parachute Battalion being like a praetorian guard, despite the hot-line that Colonel Dyck had to Army Commander Rex Nhongo, and despite his loyalty, his prospects of promotion, because he was white, were nil.\textsuperscript{196} Ex-RAR Africans became commanders of the Parachute Battalion and of One Commando, but promotion to colonel was also the limit for Africans who had served in the Rhodesian army.\textsuperscript{197} The absence of improvement in privates’ salaries and low prospects for promotion, despite their superior training and their demonstrated loyalty,\textsuperscript{198} soon drove most ex-RAR Africans out of the army, though they stayed longer than the whites.\textsuperscript{199} Through violence and partisanship, the ruling party and its guerrillas had enhanced their control of the “national” army.

The low interest of senior officers in training and the lack of financial accountability in the army during and immediately after the integration program continued. A former BMATT commander (1989–91), conceding the generalization, said: “Zimbabwean officers would be off visiting their families. British officers would end up training the battalion. Zimbabwean officers want the privilege; they don’t want the effort. They don’t understand the word service; the young ones do better than the older ones.” Other BMATT personnel distinguished between corrupt and inept senior officers and the talent of some middle-level officers (captains, majors, lieutenant-colonels).\textsuperscript{200} Specific army practices further compromised the officer corps’ quality: except for specialist units, officers were recruited from within the army and without an age limit,
and the absence of a mandatory retirement age made for little movement out of the officer corps and rank inflation.\textsuperscript{201} The logistics branch of the army remained rife with corruption and mismanagement. One BMATT leader, employing stereotypes, said: “Accounting for Africans was a mystique. We didn’t achieve it with any satisfaction. They had a potential to be on the make.”\textsuperscript{202}

The culture of impunity related not just to extractive practices but also to human rights abuses. ZANLA commanders and their underlings committed systematic abuses against ZIPRA colleagues in (and outside) the army with party approval, incitement, and protection. In July 1982 the government enacted the Emergency Powers (Security Forces Indemnity) Regulations, similar to the Indemnity and Compensation Act passed by the Smith government in 1975, granting immunity from prosecution to government officials and the security forces, as long as the action they had taken was “for the purposes of or in connexion with the preservation of the security of Zimbabwe.”\textsuperscript{203} Though this was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1984, most police and security officers believed themselves to be protected by the law while most victims of torture remained unaware of their right to bring action for damages.\textsuperscript{204}

For ZANLA guerrillas, the removal of ZIPRA, especially higher-ranking ZIPRA, opened opportunities for promotions. The ZIPRA/ZAPU leadership wanted its supporters to stay in the army so that it could maintain influence.\textsuperscript{205} Individual ZIPRA survival strategies differed, with officers tending to remain in the army while privates and NCOs often deserted or demobilized (1981–4). Poor and erratic pay and low promotion prospects reduced tolerance for abuse.\textsuperscript{206} A ZIPRA ex-combatant said of deserters: “Three-quarters of people from my area (Bango chiefdom) went to South Africa to work as immigrants and left all their pensions, etc. You’re looking at people who got [Z]$69 per month and there was the computer pay problem. I went without pay for three months in ZNA [Zimbabwe National Army]. I got $3.16.”\textsuperscript{207} ZIPRA officers, content with their salaries, aware of their grim prospects of alternative employment, and fearful of being labeled dissidents if they left the army, were more apt to endure abuses and hope for improvements in the political climate. An ex-ZIPRA officer captured the officers’ dilemma.

I continuously had a feeling of insecurity. To volunteer to leave, I was still young and was not sure I would find it easy to start a civilian type of life. And if I left, I was not sure that government wouldn’t follow me up and say, “Why are you leaving to join dissidents or some other anti-government agency?” So I stayed in the hope that the political position would improve. I had to choose the better of two evils.\textsuperscript{208}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Integration and the rhetoric of reconciliation were no more than a cover for the ruling party as it sought to end multiple sovereignty. \textit{De facto} equality of the forces enabled the party to incorporate the guerrillas into the army and reduce
the threat of organized ZIPRA violence. The strategy that prevailed throughout the first seven years, though, was the privileging of ZANLA. Both strategies were justified as recognizing the guerrillas’ war contribution. The party relied too on ZANLA violence which it often incited. What the party and its military leaders cared most about was securing power. Rewarding the guerrillas for their war contribution was a party goal but it was not as important as developing party power on the backs of the guerrillas. Even ZANLA guerrillas were expendable. The illiterate war-time commanders and women fighters of both parties found themselves marginalized. Still, guerrilla privilege and power over civilians and trained Rhodesian soldiers was the norm.

Guerrillas struggled to boost or retain their privilege and power. Their war contributions were a powerful symbolic appeal, and their use of violence was widespread. Discontented ZIPRA members used violence and justified it in terms of their war contributions not being accorded appropriate recognition or war goals not being implemented. ZANLA violence was justified because ZIPRA were destroying what the war had been fought for or because ZANLA deserved the fruits of victory because they had contributed more to the war effort. Officers often did not even feign interest in training, and they used the army to extract resources. Guerrillas’ sense of entitlement was strong.
What became of the ex-combatants who demobilized? This chapter turns to this group’s desires and efforts to fulfill them and how they fit (or did not) into the ruling party’s agendas. The party sought to retain ex-combatant support and to build power and legitimacy by using ex-combatants in at least two ways. It deployed ex-combatants into cooperatives that symbolized economic transformation toward socialism, and it gave ex-combatants (chiefly ZANLA) privileged access to employment and training in the bureaucracy and private sector, both the preserve of its former Smith and Muzorewa enemies. It justified guerrilla privilege in terms of their war contribution. ZIPRA ex-combatants suffered the party’s often violent wrath, experiencing difficulties in forming and sustaining cooperatives and obtaining employment or training where ZANU(PF) had control. Employed ZANLA ex-guerrillas used their positions of privilege to assert their authority and power over management and other workers. In the cooperatives, the ex-combatants were more adept at extracting and consuming resources than at using them productively. Ex-combatants justified their agendas with reference to their war contributions, often using violence and intimidation. The ruling party was both collaborator and antagonist as ZANLA ex-combatants sought privilege and power. Both ex-combatants and the party were skillful manipulators of NGOs.

Studies of demobilized ex-combatants in Zimbabwe tend to evaluate success in terms of subjective criteria. Some evaluate demobilization as a failure because it left a sizeable percentage of ex-combatants unemployed. The World Bank, however, presents demobilization and military integration as a success in the medium term according to several criteria: security and political improvements, resumption of “normal” economic activity, and a “peace dividend” from reduced military expenditures. However, it found reintegration “less successful,” given the high number of ex-combatants subsequently rehired by the government (hence adversely affecting fiscal constraint objectives) and a relatively high level of unemployed ex-combatants. These studies impose their authors’ preferences on ex-combatant programs or take at face value the government’s professed objectives. In doing so, they miss how ex-combatants and the party pursued their own agendas of power and privilege and their respective strategies and practices.
The chapter investigates these dynamics first with respect to the formation and functioning of ex-combatant cooperatives and then in the context of employment and training programs.

**Cooperatives**

The cooperative movement was at the center of much excitement about the potential for social and economic transformation. The ruling party, demobilized guerrillas, and NGOs had their own interests in the movement. The ruling party saw cooperatives as a means of addressing the immediate employment needs of especially demobilized ZANLA ex-combatants, an important political constituency which needed to be appeased. Depicting ex-combatants as the socialist vanguard, the ruling party appealed to them to lead the cooperative movement to fulfill war-time goals of transformation. But its more urgent task was building power over ZAPU/ZIPRA. For their part, the demobilized guerrillas wanted resources to support a “decent” lifestyle. They had little interest in cooperatives or socialism, though the discourse about them (the ex-combatants) as a socialist vanguard was empowering. To get access to their demobilization money and to invest it as they pleased, they appealed to their war contributions and threatened violence. NGOs wanted to promote socialist or “grass-roots” development. They supported official and ex-combatant discourse about the ex-combatants as a vanguard and a specially deserving group and provided the funds to promote cooperatives. The NGOs were a critical resource in the cooperative projects. For the guerrillas, the NGOs helped to satisfy their desire for material resources. For the party, the NGOs supported its symbolic commitment to economic transformation and its clients. By 1987, many cooperatives had collapsed and those that continued to function had not lifted ex-combatants from the very low standards of living they had hoped to escape. But the party had kept alive to a degree the myth of its socialist ambitions and at the same time had secured power over its chief party opponents. The discussion begins with the relationship between the ruling party and the guerrillas, and then moves to the role of NGOs, and finally to an assessment of the outcomes in terms of the actors’ agendas.

**The ruling party and the guerrillas**

The ruling party saw ex-combatant cooperatives as a means of retaining its ZANLA power base by providing employment. Cooperatives were also important symbols of the party’s professed commitment to gradual long-term socialist transformation. To legitimate cooperatives, the ruling party drew, *inter alia*, on the communalism and kinship-driven ideology of traditional society and the experience in mass organizations during the liberation war. Using the guerrillas
to build cooperatives helped to reinforce their legitimacy as the revolutionary vanguard, and thus to legitimate cooperatives and the party. The party’s minimal financial contribution to setting up cooperatives reflected its low interest in their viability. Ex-combatant cooperatives, which included agricultural, manufacturing, and service cooperatives, had to raise their own funds to purchase their means of production. If ex-combatants could formulate projects which government officials deemed viable, they could receive their demobilization money in lump sums. If ex-combatant cooperatives wanted additional resources, they had to look to the non-government sector. Government allocated only Z$4 million in 1984/5 for ex-combatants whose demobilization allowances had run out, and spent only 25 percent of it – all on three agricultural cooperatives. A single NGO’s funding for ex-combatant training (Z$50,000 in 1983) exceeded what the government spent on training its cooperative staff in 1983 and was the equivalent of its 1985 staff training expenses.

Government ideas about ex-combatants as the socialist vanguard also underpinned state agricultural collectives, and critics argue that government support was inadequate especially given that these collectives were supposed to be the linchpin of the land resettlement policy. Known as Model B resettlement schemes or producer cooperatives, state agricultural collectives were supposed to facilitate land redistribution from whites to Africans, and to promote collectivization by resettling groups (50 to 200 people) on a formal cooperative basis. All the members had to be landless, unemployed, or have insufficient land. The government leased (on an annual basis) high-quality commercial farm land to the cooperative, and provided an initial “Establishment Grant,” short-term credit through the Agricultural Finance Corporation, and education and training.

Ex-combatants who formed their own cooperatives or joined state agricultural collectives wanted access to resources to sustain the standard of living to which they aspired. Cooperatives provided an employment opportunity for the guerrillas, most of whom were property-less, lacked education, and understandably did not want to become rural subsistence cultivators in the communal lands. Close to 60 percent of ex-combatants who formed their own cooperatives were functionally illiterate. The cooperators on Model Bs had similar educational and economic profiles and economic motivations. According to Langford Chitsike, who served as permanent secretary when a new Ministry of Cooperative Development was created in the Prime Minister’s Office in 1985, “the ex-combatant comes with primary and probably lower secondary education. He has no property but may have a bit of demobilisation cash with him. He may wish to invest his money before finding himself totally bankrupt and out of employment.” For the farm workers, peasants, and urban dwellers who joined ex-combatants in state collectives, economic motives also predominated. The illiteracy rate among Model B members was 36 percent, 31 percent had five years of
schooling, and 33 percent had more than five years of school.\textsuperscript{14} A survey of five Model Bs found that 65 percent of the members were ex-communal farmers, 16 percent former farm workers, 10 percent former urban unemployed, and only 8 percent ex-combatants.\textsuperscript{15}

Contrary to party and NGO images of guerrillas’ war background making them ideal cooperators and vanguard socialists, NGOs which advocated education with production – education directed toward productive employment usually in rural collectives – came to acknowledge that ex-combatants desired formal education and urban salaried jobs. Zimbabwe Foundation for Education and Production (ZIMFEP), for example, found this negative attitude to its “education with production” philosophy to be “shared by all the participants in the drama: parents, teachers, students, bureaucrats.”\textsuperscript{16} Perhaps one of the most successful programs, from the vantage point of meeting ex-combatants’ expectations, was ZP’s technical training at Adelaide Acres center. Cooperators who attended this course tended to obtain private sector employment rather than return to their cooperatives, as they were supposed to. After six years, ZP closed the center because it was benefiting individuals rather than the cooperative movement.\textsuperscript{17} What these NGOs came to learn about ex-combatants’ preferences was foreshadowed in a 1980 survey of ex-combatants in assembly camps who wanted to demobilize. Nearly 80 percent wanted jobs, and only 4 percent were interested in agricultural employment (see Table 1).

In 1992, when structural adjustment and the promotion of entrepreneurship had come into vogue, an ex-Demobilisation Directorate (DD) official and deputy chairman of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) asserted ex-combatants had joined cooperatives as a means of getting access to the financial resources they needed to start businesses. “What business can you do with $4,400? So you’d have to group together just for the purpose of getting money. But you may not want to group. Those people had no choice but to come together in order to buy a farm or business. In business, I believe you go into partnership because you have the same aims and goals.” Asked whether the army had not given ex-combatants special skills in working together, he strongly disagreed. “That was in the army; you have no choice but to live together. In the army, you have commanders and rules and regulations. In civilian business, you all put in equal shares and then someone tries to tell you what to do. You say: ‘Who are you to tell me what to do? We put in equal amounts of money.’”\textsuperscript{18} ZP’s unpublished official history spoke of a different kind of pressure on ex-combatants to join cooperatives. Shortly after the start of demobilization payments, rumors abounded that ex-combatants would “forfeit their right to any further pay” unless “they set up a business, entered a training scheme or joined a co-op within two months.” Anxious ex-combatants evidently flocked to ZP’s Bulawayo office.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, at the start of the demobilization
program, Mugabe had promised a white parliamentarian that each cadre would receive demobilization money “provided he also agrees to undergo training or to be sought a job in the private sector, or to go into the youth scheme . . . and other schemes.”

Ex-combatants were artful players of patronage politics. To obtain access to their demobilization money in a lump sum, ex-combatants threatened directorate staff who might question the viability of their projects and deny them advance demobilization payments which they claimed they had earned through their war contribution. All those who worked closely with ex-combatants encountered their threatening behavior. A directorate staff member said: “They can be very bullying if you don’t know them.” The only non-combatant on the directorate remarked: “They had this mentality: ‘You don’t just tell me what to do. Nobody just tells me what to do.’” A directorate official described how ex-combatants would go to ministers and complain they’re being denied their money. They [the ministers] would come and say give them the money, regardless of viability . . . The argument used by ex-combatants was: “If we were in the war able to fight for independence, why can’t you entrust to us a little money which is owed us?” Their argument was highly inflamed by politicians. Pressure to give demob money was from ex-combatants below and politicians. If someone comes and squeals and wants that money, who is going to evaluate the project?

Another directorate official said: “We’d try to counsel people not to buy businesses or hotels, etc. They didn’t want to hear it. They would just insist. They’d come with a letter from a minister’s office. They’d go sit in the minister’s office [and complain]: ‘The Demobilisation Directorate won’t let us use our own money.’” He went on to describe how “some relatives of Nyagumbo [Minister of Mines in 1980 and Minister of Cooperative Development in 1985 and a national hero] wanted to buy a shop in Headlands. We said no; Nyagumbo said yes. Six months later they were out of business.” Though the directorate had European Economic Community (EEC) money to pay consultants to evaluate each project, “no one would listen to that professional language. Once they wanted something, they wanted it.”

In the first six months of 1983, five Zimbabwean “technical experts,” paid by the EEC, assessed ninety-three projects proposed by ex-combatants to recommend how much demobilization money should be advanced to those deemed economically viable. Their recommendations were disregarded. Of ten projects turned down as unviable, three were still advanced demobilization funds. For example, Tendai, an agricultural cooperative in Rusape, received Z$31,000. More importantly, the EEC consultants corroborated the directorate’s complaints that once ex-combatants received their demobilization advances to invest in approved projects, they often did as they pleased. The consultants referred to “the sad situation where the Co-operatives simply do as they wish without
fear of being apprehended or taken to task over the issue.” The ex-combatants’ and the government’s disregard for the consultants’ advice is taken up again below in the discussion of the ex-combatants’ misuse of funds and the party’s low interest in the cooperatives’ economic success.25

The fate of ZIPRA cooperatives became entangled in the ruling party’s political vendetta against ZAPU/ZIPRA. Unlike ZANLA combatants, ZIPRA combatants had access to very few offices in government and felt they had to work very hard because patronage opportunities were limited.26 A directorate representative (ex-ZANLA) believed too that ZIPRA combatants had acquired more skills during the war. While ZANLA was more involved in fighting, ZIPRA combatants in camps outside the country were being trained in spheres such as customs.27 When Minister of Labour and Social Welfare Kumbirai Kangai first invited the individuals who formed the core of Zimbabwe Project (ZP) to establish an organization to help fund ex-combatant cooperatives, most of its members were aware of ruling party pressures to support only ZANU(PF) supporters. Minister Sekeramayi had made it clear already in 1980 that agencies should not fund party projects – that is, the projects of parties other than ZANU(PF).28 ZIPRA cooperative Simukai experienced ministers actively thwarting its efforts to obtain land. For example, Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Welfare Robson Manyika (a national hero) told his Mashonaland West constituency that they should not allow Ndebeles to have land in Mashonaland.29

The conflict in Matabeleland and the Midlands affected adversely ZIPRA cooperatives at their crucial founding moment. They suffered threats from dissidents and from government security agencies and were victims of the virtual halt to development in the conflict areas. Even cooperatives composed chiefly of ZIPRA outside the region of conflict, such as Simukai and Memorial Cooperative, were harassed by security organizations. New Tone Sound Band, a music group formed by former ZAPU political detainees, were given instruments purchased by NITRAM, and performed at NITRAM’s Castle Arms Hotel. NITRAM was a private company formed by ex-combatants for ex-combatants and was involved in a wide range of activities from poultry farming to training mechanics. It had some 10,000 shareholders, all ex-combatants, who had contributed some of their initial Z$100 assembly pay to form the company. When NITRAM was banned in 1982 following the “discovery” of arms caches, the group’s instruments were seized, threatening the members’ livelihood. In 1984 soldiers beat up two members of Vukuzenzele, a cooperative for ZIPRA’s war disabled, and threatened former prime minister Garfield Todd who had donated his land to the group; unusually, the culprits were apprehended. The chair of the newly formed federation of cooperatives was arrested and detained in Matabeleland. Zenzele Cooperative in Bulawayo folded when all its members found themselves
locked up and its best bus destroyed by security force members posing as ZIPRA “dissidents.”

The upbeat prognosis which ex-combatants involved in a hotel enterprise gave to the official press says much about their belief in political promises, their manipulation of their widely promoted image as ideal cooperators, and their sense of power and status as the socialist vanguard. In July 1983 thirty-seven former ZANLA combatants paid Z$70,000 to buy a hotel from the owner, Mr. Petrus, who was emigrating to South Africa. Cde. Felix Hamadziripi, a management committee member, said he expected the limited flow of patrons to pick up. “The Minister of Transport, Cde. Masango, promised us that he would request long distance buses to re-route their buses through Macheke Hotel to afford us more clientele.” He spoke of the comrades’ unity. “Togetherness has become a household word in our vocabulary. You know we stuck together under gruesome war conditions and we won the war. Our source of inspiration here is the pride reflected in that togetherness and on that platform we will triumph together.” He claimed three of the ex-combatants had basic training in catering and more would be sent for further training that year. On the loss of the white customers who used to frequent the hotel, he said: “They think standards have died and they have never really adapted to the new order any way. You see some farmers are sometimes the worst racists you can get. But some are accommodating and we get along with them well.” Another ex-combatant said: “We are quite grateful to the Government for the advice it gave us on this venture.”

Directorate officials’ story of this hotel cooperative highlights the ex-combatants’ disregard of instructions, their naive get-rich-quick ambitions, and their fragile unity. A directorate official described how eighty-nine ex-ZANLA combatants came to the office saying: “We want to farm. We were together in a socialist way in the war.” The Ministry of Lands allocated them a farm in the Cashel Valley in Chimanimani district, presumably as a Model B cooperative. The official continued:

We gave them their demob cheque. All went on the same bus to the farm. While on the bus they were reading newspapers. They saw a hotel for sale in Macheke. They held a meeting on the bus. They dropped there [at Macheke]. We phoned the farm. They weren’t there. Christian Care [an NGO] had given us food for them. They had the demob cheque and bought the hotel. News arrived to us after a week that they’d bought the hotel. Me and Mpoko drove to counsel them. They were sleeping in rooms. We said: “Where will your customers stay?” Some were persuaded to go to farm at Svinurayi [Open Your Eyes]; some stayed at the hotel. This caused fights. Those who stayed at the hotel were accused of taking profits. We had several meetings with them. They were of different age groups. Some would start taking dagga [marijuana]. They eventually sold the hotel.

Internal feuding among cooperators was not unusual. A study of Shandisai Pfungwa (“Use Your Brains”) at Marondera, a beacon of promise among the
Model B schemes, found “its prospects were undermined by frequent thefts, disunity and excessive bickering.”

The frequent misuse of cooperative funds by cooperators reflected not only their ignorance of cooperative principles and of finance but also their overriding desire for immediate cash. The EEC-paid consultants portrayed the misuse of funds by even viable cooperatives as fast increasing. The members are either sharing funds in proportion to each member’s contribution and not investing at all in the recommended project or are investing the funds in entirely different projects from those recommended by the consultants and approved by the Directorate… For those Co-operatives operating projects recommended by the consultants, they are not following the recommendations which were made for the projects… when funds are drawn at will and for no beneficial purpose, nothing short of insolvency can be expected from the projects.

The consultants concluded that “it should be admitted that members of the Co-operatives and other enterprises so far advanced their allowances, have proved to be extremely irresponsible especially in financial matters.”

The consultants advised that the directorate increase its staff to monitor the cooperatives; that the planned Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) help ex-combatant cooperatives with financial, training, and advisory services; and that ex-combatant cooperatives contribute to a revolving fund. The consultants noted that most ex-combatants had been drawing their demobilization pay for over twelve months so that even cooperatives with many members would have only a third of the project’s required finances. Moreover, if the number involved in the cooperative became too large, “the whole venture ends up in creating disguised unemployment…” These recommendations were ignored, reinforcing the argument that the economic success of cooperatives was never as important as their function of providing patronage to an important constituency which was also politically ideal for keeping alive a socialist agenda.

The findings of a study of producer cooperatives in the first five years of independence resonate with the foregoing characterization of ex-combatants and the cooperatives that they formed with their demobilization money. This research singled out ex-combatants for their role in corruption, misuse of funds, and their manipulation of socialist rhetoric, their party links, and their war credentials for personal power and material gain. Further illustrating lack of any guerrilla solidarity, some ex-combatants exploited their former comrades as well as others in the same cooperatives. According to Akwabi-Ameyaw:

the producer cooperatives were notoriously prone to fiscal and related abuses. Most of the elite in control of development resources such as project vehicles, inputs, and material aid at the grass-roots level used their political knowledge and party influence as “comrades” to dominate and patronize the rank and file. This new elite, mostly
Employment programs for the demobilized 149
demobilized guerrillas from the liberation war, many of whom provided the nuclei for the new cooperatives, asserted claims to playing “heroic” roles in the chimurenga and articulated their ideological consciousness of and commitment to the ZANU-PF socialist developing [sic] ideology. Exploiting this qualification to their personal advantage many of them suddenly assumed control over project resources in the cooperatives. The existing socially volatile situation, where enforceable sanctions to ensure fiscal accountability was [sic] absent, made corruption easy to perpetrate. That was the prevailing culture in the day-to-day operations of the Model Bs as self-imposed chairmen and committee members diverted public booty from government for family or personal use. The general members consisted of... the aged, illiterate, former guerrillas, and laborers from mostly abandoned European farms... They chose to be either apathetic or acquiescent to what was happening.37

Non-government organizations

The political ideas and practices of NGOs meshed well with government and ex-combatants’ interests in cooperatives. Zimbabwe Project (ZP) was the pivotal organization working with ex-combatant cooperatives. In its first four years, ZP disbursed Z$4 million, organized training and education for cooperative members, sponsored inter-cooperative communication including the collective cooperatives’ newspaper Vanguard and their federal organization Zimbabwe Marketing Producers Cooperative Organization (ZPMCO), later renamed Organization of Collective Cooperatives in Zimbabwe (OCCZIM), and handled grants for ex-combatant cooperatives for some externally based agencies.38 Canadian University Services Organization (CUSO)/Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) gave ZP Z$2.7 million for a three-year education program for the collective cooperatives, beginning in 1983. This helped to finance 1,200 ex-combatants doing primary and secondary school correspondence courses, on-site book-keeping and adult literacy, and administrative and finance courses for collective cooperatives.39 ZP also raised funds to pay for cooperators to take agricultural courses at Kushinga-Phikelela Agricultural Institute (which opened near Marondera in early 1981 to provide tuition chiefly for ex-combatant collective cooperators who had finished primary school) and Hlekweni Rural Training Centre. At Adelaide Acres, outside Harare, ZP established a center to train ex-combatant and later other cooperators in metalwork, building, woodwork, growing their own food, cooperative theory, and basic accounting. The requirement that cooperators have primary schooling was seldom enforced. When this center closed after six years, ZP provided on-site technical training at appropriate cooperatives.40

ZP provides an excellent example of the ideas and practices of NGOs which made them a critical resource for government and ex-combatants. ZP had worked with refugees in the liberation movements’ camps chiefly in Mozambique and Zambia, and was contemplating its future when cabinet
ministers invited it to establish itself in Zimbabwe and work with ex-combatants whom the government had already decided to demobilize. Its first director was Judith Todd, daughter of former Rhodesian prime minister Garfield Todd and herself a former political detainee who had gone into exile. Its small, dedicated staff included ex-combatants, African and white ex-political detainees, and other political activists. Its interest in cooperatives arose from a combination of a director who wanted to help ex-combatants, government promotion of cooperatives, and a ZP staff member’s self-described “bee in my bonnet about coops.” According to this staff member, “When Judith and I came out here from London, we had no idea what we’d do with the money.” He favored drawing on the small percentage of ex-combatants, whom he believed were committed to agricultural cooperatives, to create five large collectives which could be given training, management, and other resources to enable them to serve as models which would attract others. “I had a hunch that the $185 per month program was not in the end likely to lead to a satisfactory life experience for people and more would come round to coops.” His hope was that the cooperative movement would grow to be a transformative force. As things turned out, ZP did not have a chance to create model cooperatives and instead found itself responding to the deluge of ex-combatants being sent by the directorate for assistance in forming cooperatives.

ZP had an image of the ex-combatants as “special” and therefore deserving special treatment. ZP remarked that “it would be tragic, if the most dynamic men and women during the struggle became the most frustrated group in Zimbabwe, having to watch those who stayed in the country or went overseas to study reap the fruits of the liberation war by getting easily well-paid jobs, including top posts in Government.” ZP continued to promote the notion that, as its first director said, ex-combatants “were responsible for the birth of Zimbabwe and we, as a nation, owe a very particular debt to them.” ZP disliked the term ex-combatant which the Demobilisation Directorate used to include former Rhodesian soldiers and preferred “comrades” which it described as a formal term of respect in Zimbabwe. A former ZP staff member believed that ex-combatants’ high expectations of “deserving well of the republic” ought to be honored, and that it would not be equitable or just compensation “to send these chaps to the bottom rungs of the ladder in Zimbabwean society to start as farm workers.” His proposal drew on the notion of ex-combatants being ideally suited to collectives because of their war experience living together. Referring to this idea, he said: “I did believe that ex-combatants were collectively oriented. I was selling an idea and you had to be enthusiastic and suppress doubts and knowledge that many people will not stay the course.” In 1987, ZP’s director was still committed to the idea of ex-combatants as a special group. She spoke of the urgent need “to ease the plight of ex-combatants throughout the country” as “all of us who now have the good fortune to live in a free Zimbabwe owe so much to the liberators, too many of whom are not enjoying the fruits of freedom.”
In 1997, no longer ZP’s director, she publicly berated ex-combatants who had just won war service pensions for behaving as a specially deserving group, indicating a major change of heart.47

ZP saw itself as unusually, perhaps uniquely, well placed to work with ex-combatants. Its founding members arrived in Zimbabwe with preconceptions about their superior ability to relate to ex-combatants, despite their previous work having been with refugees. “(N)ot all churches and voluntary agencies,” ZP reported, “find it easy to relate positively to the men and women who fought during the war on the side of the people.”48 Writing to commemorate ZP’s tenth anniversary, in a chapter entitled “Resurrecting the Crucified: The Men at Lido Wake Up and Do It Themselves,” ZP’s historian depicted disabled ex-combatants as victims of official neglect.49 More generally, the government’s approach to cooperatives was portrayed as at odds with ZP’s progressive outlook:

the co-operative movement is under serious if silent attack from within the Ministry itself…Government is not only limited in the resources it can provide, but its mode of operation, its philosophy of training and its authoritarian attitudes are not really conducive to the formation of self-reliant and autonomous co-operatives. This is why organizations like ZIMPRO [ZP] have a special and distinctive role to play in helping the ex-combatants.50

ZP, the history continues, has always been committed to a vision of grass-roots cooperatives. If cooperatives are to be autonomous, they must be helped to help themselves rather than told what to do. Hence ZP’s training programs emphasized the need for cooperators to develop democratic rather than technocratic attitudes. That is, cooperators would not return to their cooperatives as “experts” in a particular skill but as teachers whose goal was to share their knowledge.51

ZP’s ideas about ex-combatants as a “special” group and its philosophical opposition to controlling cooperatives influenced it to adopt generous lending practices. In 1981, it started a revolving loan fund with a Z$200,000 grant from the German organization, Bread for the World. Unconditional interest-free loans were made to the cooperatives. In 1985 the director described how this fund worked.

The only pressure we bring to bear is when making the loan, we emphasise that as soon as it is paid back [sic], so other comrades can be assisted. This scheme has worked very well, in comparison to what we know of the operations of other loan funds (for example the late Development Finance Corporation) but I think this is because of the special constituency involved [my italics] – the ex-combatants. We hope soon to undertake an evaluation of all our loan funds, and then we will be able to make available to you data on exactly how they have fared. In the meanwhile I would say that we have had approximately a 60 percent pay-back rate on this scheme, with no major pressure as yet being brought on those who have not paid back. The drought, and other unforeseen hazards of course had their negative effect on this.52
ZP’s three-year plan (1986–9) noted that “recovery of loans is at acceptable and improving levels.”

Consultants who evaluated the revolving loan fund in 1985 found only 20 percent (rather than the director’s estimated 60 percent) of loans were being repaid and recommended that ZP charge interest. That year ZP’s Bulawayo office manager, a Catholic priest turned political commissar during the war, also advised on the need for a different financial policy. “[C]o-operatives which have been given big sums of money have either collapsed or are going through thick and thin to survive, while progress on co-operatives which have been given minimal assistance can be noticed and realised and most co-operatives are stable most of the time.” He went on to list some of the reasons why cooperatives collapsed:

1. The assisted members tend to relax and take no pains in making themselves self-reliant.
2. The members tend not to differentiate between the initial working capital and the profits; and so their usage of money becomes lavish.
3. The pools of money which have been put into these cooperatives blindfold the perception of the co-operants and they then take less precautions in protecting their properties.
4. The giving out of a lot of money to groups make [sic] them think that we the sponsors have a lot of money and so they can always come back to us if their businesses are not doing very well . . .
5. This type of funding encourages dependency.

He referred too to members stealing money from cooperatives and trying to open private businesses which did not succeed and which hastened the collapse of cooperatives. ZP responded to such advice by deciding to devote more assistance to more successful cooperatives and to introduce interest rates. But it defended the need to take into account what it believed were the important social characteristics of collectives; to recognize that even when ZP helped cooperatives which were unlikely to succeed, it was training people who might later be in a position to set up viable ventures; and to encourage cooperatives to use their surplus for growth before demanding loan repayments.

ZP’s financial relationships with ex-combatant collective cooperatives, its political commitment to cooperatives, and its conception of ex-combatants as a “special constituency” endowed with revolutionary dynamism and collectively oriented, were all typical of NGOs working with state agricultural collectives and small-scale cooperative enterprises. For the former, government support had been weak and NGOs had moved into the vacuum, giving funds largely on a grant basis, over-financing and duplicating finance on projects, financing projects without sound feasibility studies, and failing to monitor, evaluate, and audit projects. Many small-scale cooperatives’ members lacked a spirit of self-reliance and believed cooperatives were introduced to get a lot of help.
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from government agencies and NGOs. Slightly more than one-third of the NGOs surveyed knew how much money they were distributing to small-scale cooperatives. Though many NGOs had moved away from grants to loans, the fact that most did not charge interest implied they were not treating the cooperatives as enterprises which they expected would make a profit and therefore repay the loans.57

According to a former ZP staff member, other NGOs embraced cooperatives because they represented ideals that appealed to the twentieth and even the nineteenth century: grass-roots, self-managed, voluntary, democratic, profit-sharing, ownership of the means of production by producers and not the state, small is beautiful, education. Also, ex-combatants “were generally considered quite a good thing among overseas donors. They were young, heroic, romantic.” For donors, cooperatives and ex-combatants were “sexy.”58 Two CUSO officials spoke of how donors in the 1980s saw cooperatives as a way of supporting “progressive” development in southern Africa. CUSO, the most prominent sponsor for producer cooperatives, and other organizations gave money to cooperatives indirectly through ZMPCO, the cooperatives’ apex marketing organization, and naively assumed government would see the funds were used in productive ways. The NGOs themselves were staffed by personnel who were often political, idealistic, and not business-minded. A number of collectives were able to obtain support from several different organizations, without any of them knowing about other donor support. This “laissez-faire NGO regime” suited the government because it meant less financial pressure from the Department of Cooperatives, most of whose budget was for staff salaries.59 NGOs’ easy money also prolonged the lives of cooperatives and largely kept ZANLA cooperators off the ruling party’s back while it pursued its power-building objectives in Matabeleland and Midlands.

Insofar as NGOs did not speak out against the ruling party’s brutal activities in Matabeleland and the Midlands for fear of risking their right to operate in Zimbabwe, they remained valuable resources for government and the cooperatives. The ZP’s unofficial history shows how vulnerable the organization was to the ongoing party feuding between ZAPU and ZANU(PF), and the trustees’ desperate efforts to appease the rulers. In 1983 when Fifth Brigade atrocities were underway, ZP’s director came under attack for her alleged pro-ZIPRA bias. These charges came from, among others, a London-based ZP trustee, the Oxfam representative in Zimbabwe, and a woman who worked in ZANU’s refugee camps during the war and was active in ZIMFEP and ZP after independence – all three of them white foreigners. The trustee charged that ZP was spending a disproportionate amount of its funds on ZIPRA cooperatives and insisted that the director and staff go through the list of ZP-supported cooperatives to indicate which were ZANLA and which were ZIPRA. She refused. “I said we didn’t work like that and that if we started, the poison that was afflicting the country,
would afflict us.” The director’s father, Senator Todd, who was a trustee, examined the projects which ZP supported. He found its funding was distributed in the same proportion as the projects – two-thirds in Mashonaland and one-third in Matabeleland – except for Vukuzenzele, the ZIPRA war-disabled cooperative on land he had donated, which received a lot of international funding. Eight months later, near the end of 1983, Prime Minister Mugabe told Senator Todd that the woman party loyalist had come to him “with various criticisms,” including that ZP funds were not being “even-handedly” distributed. The director’s alleged pro-ZAPU bias also threatened an important ZP funding source, Oxfam, whose representative wrote to his headquarters in August 1983 to recommend that Oxfam should largely discontinue further funding to ZP. Meanwhile, in March 1983, Minister of Education Mutumbuka had told the London-based trustee, who had sought an audience with him, that the director had to leave or ZP would be closed. The trustee agreed that the director had to go and that someone “acceptable to government” should take over. Senator Todd wrote to Prime Minister Mugabe on behalf of the trustees, saying that they would accept a ZANU(PF) director, albeit reluctantly, but would not force the director out of ZP. The director stayed on. In October 1983, Minister Kangai said the director had to be removed for “security” reasons which could not be disclosed. Through the atrocities in Matabeleland, ZP was fighting for its survival and its legitimacy with the ruling party rather than confronting the government as an organization. To her credit, ZP’s director, in her personal capacity, did pass on reports of atrocities in Matabeleland to ZNA commander, Solomon Mujuru (whose war name was Rex Nhongo). For this, too, her detractors criticized her.

Outcomes

Though intended to be profit-making enterprises, collective cooperatives rarely had much money to distribute to their members. Government officials estimate over 10,000 ex-combatants used some or all of their demobilization allowances to form over 100 collective cooperatives, mostly in agriculture but also in industry, commerce, and mining. By 1988 only 5,886 ex-combatants remained in cooperatives. Of 310 collective farming cooperatives (combatant and non-combatant) in 1992, a parliamentary committee found fewer than 30 “actually operating well.”

Cooperatives never provided a stepping stone to economic modernization or socialism – the objectives which commentators most commonly attributed to government or competing factions in the party. But the ruling party had bought time, just as it did with the payment of demobilization money. The NGO-supported cooperative movement engaged ZANLA cooperators, thus preventing them from becoming a threat to the regime and leaving the ruling
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To retain patronage and build power, the ruling party privileged guerrillas (chiefly ZANLA) over civilians in employment, training, and promotions. The privileging of ex-combatants was justified in terms of their war contribution. In the workplace, ex-combatants often used violence and intimidation and colluded with the party to transform racist and other managerial practices and to empower themselves. But collusion turned to conflict when the party retreated from its support of ex-combatants in the workplace and began to publicly indicate that it did not want to continue to treat ex-combatants as a special group. The ruling party’s attempt to distance itself from the ex-combatants reflected its sense that its power was secure in the bureaucracy, the workplace, and increasingly even in Matabeleland. Ex-combatants’ privilege in terms of jobs was impressive, given their generally low skills and education, but given their frames of reference – workers who did not fight in the war, their leaders, white Rhodesian soldiers – they continued to feel victimized. The argument is developed first with reference to the ruling party’s goals and strategies, then the
ex-combatant–party relationship of collusion followed by conflict, and finally the outcomes for the party and the ex-combatants in terms of their agendas.

**Ruling party goals and strategies**

At independence, the ruling party had still to establish an urban power base. The liberation war had been waged mainly in the rural areas and the nationalist parties had not had a strategy of mobilizing the workers. Organized labor, which represented only about 12 percent of 1.2 million formal sector workers in 1980, was politically divided and had paid little attention to representing workers’ interests because of government repression and internal organizational weaknesses. The bureaucracy and the white-controlled private sector were dominated by Smith and Muzorewa stalwarts. The spate of private and public sector strikes, beginning even before ZANU(PF) officially took office and continuing into 1981, only heightened the party’s anxieties about workers’ loyalties and its ability to control workers. Many strikes were organized by shopfloor workers rather than unions, reflecting union weakness. Most of the strikes (44 percent) were said to be over wages, another 19 percent over racism, and 15 percent over dismissals.

The ruling party lashed out against labor militancy as a threat to nationalism and to the gains of the nationalist struggle, and maligned the labor movement for its marginal role in the war. The government also used police and the army to repress strikes and authorized hundreds of dismissals of “illegal” strikers. At the same time, the government introduced various reforms “to address, placate, suppress and otherwise marginalise workers’ demands.” It introduced national minimum wages in previously excluded sectors and required employers to obtain ministerial approval for employee dismissals. In July 1980, it set in motion plans to create a single national labor center. With the Muzorewa–Sithole union federation in mind, Minister of Labour Kumbirai Kangai threatened: “Any trade unions who act against the government policy of having one national centre will be crushed.” Through packing an interim steering committee with party loyalists, creating splinter unions (often built on the workers’ strike committees which party activists saw as ideal recruiting grounds for party members), and deliberately failing to check the validity of unions’ credentials, the ruling party engineered the creation of a politically subservient Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in February 1981.

An important government response to the strikes was the creation of workers’ committees. Identifying lack of communication between management and workers and between unions and workers as the key reason for the strikes, the Ministry of Labour published the *Workers’ Committee Guidelines* in February 1981. Workers’ committees were to be created and elected by the workers to represent themselves in discussion/negotiations with members of management.
The Guidelines seriously circumscribed workers’ committees’ powers, denying them bargaining rights over pay and job grading, *inter alia*. Yet the publication of the Guidelines, according to Freek Schiphorst, “was accompanied and followed by a series of official public policy pronouncements which indicated the ultimate aim of the new government was to introduce a form of workers’ participation which would go far beyond the objectives of humanising work and workplace relations, and increasing productivity…” Despite references to sometimes grand schemes to transform the nature of society and the workplace, Schiphorst concludes: “What ZANU(PF) had in mind was the control of labour, not its empowerment.”

In this insecure environment, the party used ZANLA guerrillas to help build a loyal bureaucracy and to gain a foothold in the private sector. Employing guerrillas was also a source of patronage and a means of containing their potential to cause trouble. To achieve its goals, the ruling party treated the ex-combatants as a special group: it created civil service and local authority posts for ex-combatants who could not meet the formal educational requirements for government employment; it gave priority employment in the bureaucracy to qualified ex-combatants, and provided for rapid promotions in the public sector. The party also supported training and educational opportunities for ex-combatants. The party, through cabinet ministers’ personal intervention and through the Demobilisation Directorate, tried to encourage the recruitment of guerrillas. In both private and public sectors, the party often used threats and intimidation to obtain positions for its guerrillas.

**Priority employment, employment creation and accelerated promotions**

In 1980 Finance Minister Senator Enos Nkala promised that ZANU(PF) would give priority in government posts to qualified ex-combatants in the assembly places and indicated that plans would be made for ex-combatants who could not meet educational criteria for public sector appointments:

> we have asked them [Customs] before they employ anybody else, first to go to the assembly camps and see if they can get people from there who have the necessary educational qualifications. I myself have asked the Deputy Minister of Finance to supervise that operation. Before anyone is employed in the Customs Department, preference should be given to the people who fought for the liberation of this country. So we are still working on that. – [Hon. Members: Hear, hear.] – . . . In areas where we cannot place people from the assembly camps, we have said those who are sufficiently qualified should be employed, because we are aware that some of our colleagues in the assembly camps have not had the necessary experience and qualifications to be placed at a higher notch at this moment. We want them to be taken at a lower level. I will see that they are taken.

Party recruiters, according to interviewees, visited the assembly places and sought out the educated ex-combatants, many of whom did not wish to be
soldiers. A ZANLA ex-combatant who worked as a Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) producer related how he had got his job. “We were sent as a team headed by Charles Ndlovu [a ZANU(PF) official]. We were deployed. No panel interviewing you saying you’re the best man for the job,” he complained in 1992, seemingly oblivious that with only “O” levels he had a rather good job. The team to which he refers included other ZIPA commanders, some of whom, like himself, had been put in pits in Mozambique during the struggle by ZANU. These men were recruited into the ZBC as producers, he said, because their socialist political education made them best equipped to articulate the socialist message the party wanted to project. Why they were trusted to be party propagandists remains a mystery though the party’s faith in them proved well founded.

Most ex-combatants could not take advantage of priority employment in the civil service because they lacked the qualifications. Even menial labor in the public sector required Grade 7 or Form 2 and clerical work four years of secondary schooling (“O” levels) in particular courses. Fewer than 20 percent of the guerrillas had any secondary schooling, and the vast majority of the rest had less than primary education, with nearly 50 percent illiterate. Amongst 800 ZIPRA women at Sierra assembly point, the highest educational level was Form 2.

Ministries created posts with lower or no requirements for ex-combatants who failed to meet the educational criteria for established civil service posts. The Health Ministry employed health cadres, recognized their medical experience during the war, and created posts for them even when they failed evaluation tests to work as medical assistants. Ministers employed and used police staff to train ex-combatants as guards for their residences without first attesting them into the police force, as they should have. The Local Government and Housing Ministry employed as local government promotion officers (LGPOs) those ex-combatants with at least two years’ experience as political commissars in the liberation army and “O” levels in three subjects. The PSC approved the grading structure for this new category but the party made the appointments. The newly created Ministry of Youth, Sport and Recreation, headed by female ex-combatant Teurai Ropa Nhongo, experienced what a PSC member described as a “mass influx” of ex-combatants and as

more a case of acceptance by the PSC later of what was on the ground… We were asked to pay for them. They had been working on a temporary payment voucher for two years. The temporary voucher system is there for emergencies. For instance, you have the right qualified person for a vacant post and you can’t wait for the bureaucracy to process the new person. You pay that person with a temporary payment voucher. Posts had already been created when this was brought to our attention. We tried to formalize things. We did design a salary scale… That ministry regarded itself as the political wing of ZANU(PF). They set up district and provincial offices… They’d more or less regarded themselves
as not being subject to Treasury, PSC, etc. They regarded themselves as guardians in this hostile situation [my italics]. This came to light in 1981. People realized it was there. No one wanted to tackle it. It was politically sensitive.98

These ex-combatants became the nucleus of the Ministry of Political Affairs (to which LGPOs were later transferred) when the Ministry of Youth was eliminated. When Political Affairs was abolished they were moved to the Ministry of National Employment and Cooperatives. A young woman recalled how in June 1980 someone from ZANU(PF) headquarters came to a party farm in Goromonzi where she was staying and selected about ten people with at least Form 2 – well below the formal government job requirements – to attend a month-long youth leadership course at Domboshawa to prepare them for jobs in the Youth Ministry.99

By the time of compulsory demobilization in late 1981, priority employment for ex-combatants was formalized. The new ministers worked through the PSC, as required in the constitution. The Labour Ministry requested ministries to give priority to demobilized ex-combatants who were qualified. In 1982 President Banana mentioned that the restructuring of the police would continue and that there would be an increase in the size of the Police Support, “with as many ex-combatants as possible being recruited into the Police and the Support Unit.”100

New employment categories continued to be created to facilitate hiring ex-combatants. For example, in 1983 Home Affairs Minister Herbert Ushewokunze created special constables to employ ex-combatants who could not meet the entry-level requirements for the regular police which had been raised from a primary school certificate to five “O” levels.101 Starting in 1981, the Local Government and Housing Ministry paid local authorities nearly Z$1 million to cover the wages and salaries of ex-combatants whom they hired as municipal police. By 1988 the program covered 1,700 ex-combatants whose main task, as before independence, was to guard municipal installations.102 Selected by former ZANLA commanders in Harare, recruits were supposed to be 18 to 30 years old, to have at least two years’ secondary education, and to train for about two months.103 Those without education were employed as municipal diggers. Before the directive to employ ex-combatants, the social welfare pensions section in the Department of Social Welfare which processed applications for war disability pensions gave preference to ex-combatants to fill thirteen positions as pension clerks. They were hired partly out of recognition of their war service and partly because it was believed they would give the department legitimacy with its new ex-combatant clients and help identify other ex-combatants.104

Efforts were also made to employ ex-combatants in the small white-controlled private sector and parastatals (state-owned corporations). The Demobilisation Directorate worked directly with the private sector. According to a DD official, the private sector was often forthcoming in hiring ex-combatants as
unskilled workers. He said: “I had so many companies I dealt with at that point that needed general laborers. NATBREW, Chibuku, CAPS Holdings in Harare, Continental Fashions, Tregers in Bulawayo, Lange Menswear to train them as tailors, Sugar Refineries, PG Industries, Nedlaw, Securitas. We wrote letters to them. We had demob pamphlets which we used to distribute.” ZANU(PF) ministers and officials also pressed the private sector and parastatals to employ ex-combatants. Rather than formal letter-writing, they were more likely to telephone personnel managers and either politely request or intimidate them to hire ex-combatants. In 1983 Minister Kangai railed against a “fairly sizeable number” of private sector employers “who did not want vacant posts in their companies filled in by former guerrillas.” Warning that their actions were contrary to reconciliation and would not be tolerated, he referred to “cases where these former liberation fighters have actually been offered jobs but when their employers discovered that they were ex-combatants, the offers have been withdrawn.”

Some government departments had directives to accelerate promotions for ex-combatants. According to a former management trainer at the Zimbabwe Republic Police Staff Training College in Harare, the Home Affairs Ministry directed that ex-combatants be promoted rapidly to top ranks in the police force. “I know there was a time that if you weren’t an ex-combatant, you wouldn’t get into the police, and definitely while I was there [1982–5], there was a push for promoting them.” In about 1984, ex-combatants from the army were moved to assistant commissioner posts, despite no police experience. The Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, which first recruited a sizeable number of ex-combatants into the Prison Service in 1985, introduced a program to accelerate their advancement to senior ranks in February 1986.

Under normal circumstances, a prison officer can only be considered for promotion from the basic grade (2) rank to grade (1) after a period of at least four years of Service and thereafter it will take two year intervals to qualify for promotion to the next grade or rank. At this rate of progression, someone who might have joined the service in 1985 would be only a Senior Prison Officer by now [1993] assuming that he didn’t miss out on any promotion and that vacancies were readily available whenever he was due for promotion. With the accelerated promotion for ex-combatant prison officers the minimum period to qualify for consideration for promotion was reduced from two years to one year and this was to try and give the newly promoted officers enough time to assimilate all there is to know about the job at the respective rank strata.

By 1993, the Prison Service had promoted 143 of 419 ex-combatants under the program.

Education and training
Government and parastatals offered ex-combatants educational and training opportunities. The government offered ex-combatants in newly created job
Employment programs for the demobilized

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categories opportunities to upgrade their education. The Local Government Ministry provided LGPOs with training programs at its Dombashawa facility, and established a fund in 1984 to encourage them to study for higher qualifications. The same ministry trained 220 women ex-combatants, hired as district council secretaries, in typing, business, English, and office practice at Speciss Colleges in Bulawayo and Harare, and later gave them another three months’ training at Kushinga-Phikelela’s Department of Secretarial Studies. Medical training institutions in Mutare, Gweru, and Gwanda admitted ex-combatant nurses to enable them to qualify for the newly created post of State Certified Nurses, and with further training, to become State Registered Nurses. The Social Welfare Department paid for ex-combatants on its staff to study further. The parastatal Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) put ex-combatants it hired as security guards through its security unit’s training. Prime Minister Mugabe himself ran classes for ex-combatants whose formal education was inadequate for their jobs. Ex-combatants were also given priority admission in government institutions. New technical colleges which opened in the 1980s to provide the equivalent of four-year apprenticeship training offered priority to ex-combatants who could meet the entry qualifications which included “O” levels in mathematics and science. Ex-combatants who had been training to be teachers under ZANU’s ZINTEC program in the Mozambican refugee camps were given priority in ZINTEC teacher training colleges even if they lacked formal qualifications.

NGOs helped to defray patronage costs for the party-government. In 1981, an American woman established Danhiko School – the Shona word for “ladder” and implying step by step progress. As an officially registered independent secondary school, Danhiko received government funding for five teachers and for students’ books, and official recognition of its academic program. In 1983 when Danhiko moved from a Harare township to a site on the Old Mutare Road, it established vocational programs too, eventually offering two-year courses in carpentry and garment-making. Ex-combatants constituted the majority of the student body for several years, peaking at 200–250 students. For vocational training, in particular, basic English skills and aptitude tests were given more weight than the primary school certificate which ex-combatants often could not produce. The carpentry program gave students an internationally registered certificate through the City and Guilds of London, while the garment-making program was the only government certified one, thus advantaging its graduates. An array of NGOs, including Norwegian People’s Aid, Danish Volunteer Service, Volunteer Service Overseas (British), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and German Volunteer Service sponsored the production units, a sports center with facilities for the disabled, and a physiotherapist. The air force erected temporary boarding facilities until permanent facilities were built in 1985. Ex-combatants who attended Danhiko were funded by the
government, through the Demobilisation Directorate, the War Victims Compensation Fund (which paid for education and training for the war disabled), or the Swedish-sponsored Scholarship Fund.\textsuperscript{118}

In 1986, Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production (ZIMFEP) established Mupfure College on a former farm near Chegutu to provide skills training for ex-combatants. World University Services had purchased the farm with Canadian funds to establish a training center for ex-combatants but the project had not got off the ground. ZIMFEP had been running seven schools since independence to enable those from refugee schools in exile to complete their secondary education. Though ZIMFEP schools welcomed ex-combatants, few enrolled partly because as adults, often with families, they did not want to learn with children. Also, ex-combatants frequently did not have primary school certificates. Mupfure College had no formal entry qualifications for its two-year programs in agriculture, building, textile design, or carpentry. Because Mupfure was officially registered as a secondary school, the government paid for one teacher for every thirty-three students. Volunteer teachers were paid by their organizations, and ZIMFEP paid others. Tuition was free, and allowances – initially from production but later from donors – enabled students to visit their families. Most funding was from HIVOS, a Dutch agency. In its first year, Mupfure enrolled about 60 ex-combatants, and thereafter, on average 140 students, increasingly non-combatants.\textsuperscript{119}

NGOs also sponsored a variety of courses for ex-combatants. Through ZP the German agency, Bread for the World, paid for training a hundred ex-combatants for the government prison service. The Catholic Development Commission (CADEC), the development and social services arm of the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe, paid 75 percent of the tuition for two years for ex-combatants who wished to further their education in technical or vocational colleges. Between 1982 and 1987 CADEC funded seventy-seven ex-combatants, most of whom were referred by the Demobilisation Directorate.\textsuperscript{120} NGOs, such as Danish Development Aid from People to People, funded ex-combatants to train abroad. A SIDA-sponsored Scholarship Fund for ex-combatants was run by the Ministry of Education and Culture. By 1988 it had supported 4,200 ex-combatants in academic training, and 2,400 in vocational training.\textsuperscript{121}

\textit{Guerrilla–party relations}

At first, the ruling party and ZANLA ex-combatants colluded in workplace conflicts. Unskilled ex-combatants came into conflict with management when they seized opportunities to exercise power on the new workers’ committees and pushed for workplace change. Skilled ex-combatants became the focus of emotional debate, with employers charging their training was inadequate and the party and the ex-guerrillas labeling employers as racist. At some
point – precisely when is disputed – the party abandoned its support for ex-guerrillas in workplace conflicts and their relationship became confrontational and conflict-ridden. Whether as collaborators or antagonists, the party and the former guerrillas (and their supporters or detractors) appealed to their participation in the liberation struggle, and used intimidation, and on occasion even coercion, to achieve their respective objectives in the workplace. These dynamics are examined separately for unskilled and skilled ex-combatants. The different relationship between the ruling party and ZIPRA combatants is discussed on pages 179–83.

Guerrilla–party collaboration
Ex-combatants encountered fear and hostility in the workplace. African workers had worked for the Smith and Muzorewa regimes or for whites and, at least initially, feared the ex-combatants might displace them. White managers, who all fought in the regular or conscript army or in the police reserves against the “terrorists,” and recently promoted black managers also saw ex-combatants and their party allies as potential threats to their job security and promotion prospects. They too feared ex-combatants, widely perceived as ill-educated, would “take over” the workplace as they implemented the party’s proclaimed Marxist-Leninist vision. Management’s contempt for and fear of the well-educated ex-combatant minority was perhaps even greater. In their workplace struggles, ex-combatants turned to their primary ally, the ruling party, which was also usually responsible for their jobs. Ex-combatants and the party, both wittingly and unwittingly, inspired fear among those outside the liberation movement, especially in management.

Unskilled workers and workers’ committees. Ex-combatants who had been hired as unskilled workers through party patronage were particularly interested in using the workers’ committees to exercise power. They wanted to remove racism, win higher salaries, and improve workers’ conditions. They arrived in the workplace proudly still using their often martial and revolutionary war names – such as Comrade Chiwundura Mabhunu (Thrash the Boers), Advance Chimurenga (Forward with the Revolution), Urayai Mabhunu (Kill the Boers), Paradzai Mabhunu (Destroy the Boers), and Mabhunu Muchapera (Boers, You Will be Wiped Out) – which were “deliberately derogatory, a statement of defiance or a challenge to the enemy.” The ruling party encouraged these unskilled ex-combatants’ aspirations and militancy insofar as it repeatedly called for workers’ participation to promote socialism, when in fact the Workers’ Committee Guidelines of 1981 provided very limited powers to workers. These promises of socialism also instilled anxiety in whites who feared the ruling party’s ostensible socialist commitment and who “had to learn to
communicate with a largely-unknown new power structure in the early months and years of Independence.”126

An industrial relations officer who, after a six-month stint in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, had joined the parastatal ZESA in 1983, spoke of ex-combatants’ interest in workers’ committee positions, their links to those in power, their fearlessness, and other workers’ passivity.

To be a member of a workers’ committee, you had to stand your foot down and not be scared. You’d find most of those positions would be taken up by ex-combatants. At that time, you needed someone who would argue with managers, and at that time they had access to government and they could complain about their employers... Workers there before [independence] were afraid of being involved in the workers’ committees. They wanted to secure their jobs and get on with their work. Ex-combatants didn’t have any fear. Other workers were suspicious that ex-combatants had come with ministerial directives to take over.127

That workers were generally reluctant to involve themselves in workers’ committees receives support from other sources. In 1984 the Chief Industrial Relations Officer explained the submission of the first leadership of the ZCTU to the party and government as follows: “Psychologically, the workers look upon the [liberation] struggle as a time when they could have contributed a lot, but which they did not. Having failed to stand up to the challenge then, the workers at present suffered from inhibitions and tended to leave the initiative in labour matters to those who had distinguished themselves during the liberation struggle.”128

Ex-combatants’ desire for power and their militant leadership vis-à-vis other workers are also evident in the remarks of a personnel manager, who unlike most managers had been a party activist in the country during the war. He recruited ex-combatants “with the right kind of attitude” from the Ministry of Labour and the party headquarters, first for the Dairy Marketing Board parastatal, where he worked from 1980 to 1983, and then for Lonrho, and especially for its subsidiary, ZIMOCO. In the early 1980s, he said, “the problem most industrialists faced was ex-combatants expected to be treated more favorably than others because of their contribution to the war.” He continued:

Ex-combatants were very aware of their rights. Where they see racism, they’d voice it, to the point of organizing a sit-in, or demand removal of the personnel director. Others respected them whether right or wrong – out of fear of ex-combatants or out of respect for ex-combatants. They were very militant. They felt if they got into an organization, they could challenge management. The philosophy they’d been taught was to control the means of production. A Marxist-Leninist approach. These youngsters were indoctrinated and felt they would exercise power... Ex-combatants thought the only way to change was through confrontation. They wanted to initiate change... Ex-combatants did not know how far their authority went. As a result they started to challenge management decisions: why is he being hired, what is his background?129
A manager at National Breweries, who had taught at Fletcher High School during the war, corroborated the images of ex-combatants as beneficiaries of party patronage, eager for power on the workers’ committees, and militant revolutionaries.

There were requests from ministers to take on these people... Most were polite, just we were scared. The bad guys were Banana [President] and the late Dr. Ushewkunze [a national hero] who called regularly for favors, including beer supplies. They [ex-combatants] were hired as general labor. They see me. I never fired a single bullet. I’m a manager. I have a company car. They feel resentment. Whites are still here and the economy is 90 percent in their hands. Out of this feeling, they lost loyalty to the company. They were elected to workers’ committees. People thought they’d fought the war, they’d know how to fight and they’d fight management. But they took it too far. Most workers’ committees were run by ex-combatants. They enjoyed this sort of thing... They were very militant, uncompromising.

Self-described as “one of those cowards” who had received a university education in the United Kingdom during the war, a personnel manager who worked first in the Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development, then at a pharmaceutical company, and from 1987 at United Bottlers, underscored ex-combatants’ desire to exercise leadership on workers’ committees, the fear they initially inspired, and their reluctance to take orders.

The fear of ex-combatants as unruly came from the society. During the war they’d call villagers and say: “let’s sing.” They’d impregnate some girls. They changed a lot of practices and customs and no one would question them because they had the gun. Because of that, people feared they’d be unruly. I would say whites would be more scared than blacks, but there was this fear even among blacks. You’d find it much more difficult to discipline an ex-combatant... If somebody was a commander in the war, they’d want to take a leadership role at work. This particular one soon became a representative for his department on the workers’ committee. It could become kind of awkward. I can say the company can only afford a 14 percent wage increase. He’ll say: “You have a Mercedes Benz. You don’t care about the welfare of workers.” I’d say: “No, it’s a perk.” He’d say: “No. You’re an oppressor.” If it’s something that will gain them something, you will find the others on the committee may actually support them.

Ex-combatants were reluctant to take orders partly because their supervisors were Africans who had been soldiers or police in the previous regime. These men had been promoted either toward the end of the war when there was a rapid exodus of whites or soon after independence to placate government demands for Africanization. In May 1980 Mr. Mudzingwa (ZANU(PF) MP, Mashonaland West) expressed anxiety over whites hiring former soldiers in industry.

We have in our notes that there are certain whites who are now employing people of the past regime of Bishop Muzorewa in high posts so that these people will be responsible for firing those people who support ourselves. Now... ZANU is on record as having
suffered for the people… and these are the people who put us into power and ZANU shall on record [sic] continuing to protect these people to the bitter end.133

The Lonrho manager who had been a war-time party activist described the tensions between ex-combatants and their work supervisors who had served the former regime, and ex-combatants’ desire for other ex-fighters to be managers. They wanted to see some black faces in management and had their own people [ex-combatants] they wanted in those places. You know the expression “you’re happier with the devil you know than with the devil you don’t know.” Industry at that time had promoted blacks into personnel management. People realized they had to have black faces dealing with blacks who’d become politicized. The only person was an ex-policeman who was a disciplinarian. Ex-combatants clashed with these men from the wrong party and lacking professional qualifications.134

Ex-combatants rejected not only Africans who had supported the old regime but also Africans who had been educated overseas during the war. Ex-combatants would accept only ex-fighters as having legitimate authority. In 1992 ZANU(PF) MP Lazarus Nzayebani, himself a former fighter, depicted ex-combatants in government after independence in ways that were valid too for ex-combatants in parastatals and the private sector.

Ex-fighters could hardly listen, could hardly accept being given orders by someone who hadn’t been a soldier. Many times if they were given orders by someone who hadn’t been a soldier they could hardly take them. It was prevalent in all government departments. The majority of blacks who are now permanent secretaries, etc. had been to universities outside of Zimbabwe . . . ; some had been here working for the Ian Smith government.135

In another important form of collusion with ex-combatants on workers’ committees, the ruling party involved itself in settling workplace grievances. It called in those employers about whom ex-combatants voiced complaints or directly contacted them. This form of complicity between the party and ex-combatants, with its intent to intimidate, is evident in the following comments of African personnel managers in 1992.

An employee you recruited through the party or party headquarters fails to integrate. He’s swimming in the wrong direction. In those days you had to satisfy the Ministry of Labour why you were dismissing them. These youngsters would be first to report the incident to the party. There’s no accountability in politics. I had problems with the party but it was not so bad because I was in the party. [He had been active in ZANU’s internal wing during the war.] Sometimes a party person complained he was being victimized because he was an ex-combatant.136

They have contacts with government – Kangai, or they report you to CIO, ZANU(PF). They are virtually a wing of CIO. People have been called in and questioned about things at work. Ah! How do you know? From ex-combatants, they’d tell them . . . They
thought they could influence events in the government but they find they are powerless like everyone else... Like government, they wanted to dictate to us about socialism... Way back they’d be proud and say I was an ex-combatant... They identified closely with ZANU(PF) and the government, but now very few people are proud to be associated with ZANU(PF) and the government... There’s no more fear of them or hating them...

An ex-combatant in the accounts department – he had “O” levels and was very bright – refused to do overtime. I fired him for refusing to take instruction from his superior. He went to complain to Manyika (now the late) [Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Welfare]. Manyika called me to his office. I was searched by his bodyguards. Then the ex-combatant greeted Manyika with party slogans. He was trying to intimidate me and show his closeness to Manyika and reveal me as an oppressor. Manyika spoke to me in Shona. I said I preferred English. I was from Matabeleland and my Shona wasn’t very good. I refused the tea he offered me. I told Manyika: “I don’t take government tea.” It was just to break the ice. Manyika listened to the story and found me to be right.137

Some ex-combatants when they started would rely on government contacts. They’d say: “Chef, you’re the one who got us this job. The company is not treating us well.” Then the chef would call up the company. They’d phone the white guy, the MD here, and he’d invariably come to me for advice. You must handle it very delicately. If not, you can have problems with government that can be a problem for the company.138

War veterans’ and party involvement in company politics in the 1980s at times led to violence against management. At a meeting of personnel managers to discuss the wave of war veterans’ invasions of firms in 2001 an African manager recalled his experiences in the 1980s.

My recollection of warlords in labour issues dates back as far as 1980s. We are seeing a return of many of these events today. The underlying causes are the same i.e. – power game involving Politics, publicity, etc, with obvious negative knock on effects on production, the customer and morale...

During that period (1980’s) I was working for a company called Zim Alloys (Rhodesia Alloys). The warlords involved at that time were a group of war vets, who had just been elected as city councillors in Gweru. The Mayor in particular was the key figure. He wanted the white management to conform to perceived african style of management. Their involvement in that company led to a production manager being assaulted in the Personnel Manager’s office by a Workers Committee Chairperson (whose name incidentally was Muchandiguta [You (plural) will get enough of me – by which was meant “I will punish you till you can no longer take any more”139]) and this led to the immediate closure of the factory by management. The results were an immediate lock out. The first lock out I ever saw. The Workers Committee Chairperson was fired.140

Studies of workers’ committees are silent about the high-profile involvement of ex-combatants which managers recalled in interviews in 1992. Conducted in different kinds of work organizations and at different times, these studies none the less often do lend support to the preceding arguments: a tight connection
between the workers’ committees and the party, workers’ intimidation of management and occasional violence, the use of the committees by the politically ambitious, and a preponderance of unskilled and often illiterate or semi-literate committee members in industry.

**Skilled workers and qualifications.** After the war, ex-combatants who had been trained or schooled in Mozambique were issued with party letters, signed by Education Minister Dzingai Mutumbuka (in his capacity as party Secretary for Education) or Labour Minister Kumbirai Kangai. These party certificates verified their level of training or the local equivalency of their schooling and had to be recognized. Others were certified by foreign countries which had provided free training and education to the liberation movements as a gesture of support. The foreign certificates especially became the source of contention between the party and ex-combatants on the one hand and employers and often government officials on the other. Because those who had been involved in the war – party activists and ex-combatants – were aligned against whites and Africans, who had often been outside the country educating themselves during the war, the issue was especially inflamed. As was the case with unskilled workers, there were tensions between the skilled ex-combatants and their fellow workers, and employers and workers often felt the party was forcing the hiring of skilled ex-combatants.

Employers, especially in the private sector but also in parastatals, bristled at party pressures to employ ex-combatants whom they considered unqualified and denied allegations of racism. A white immigrant who came from Zambia in 1972 and headed the only private sector training center for apprentices, at Delta Corporation, said government officials accused his organization of racism in the selection of apprentices. He claimed that in 1980 the company admitted twenty-two apprentices, all black, and that in 1992 it accepted over eighty, only three of whom were white. His complaint was
government was dictating to us who we should employ... The president [Banana] has called me up and said: “You must take so and so.” I say: “I can’t.” I won’t succumb to that pressure. It must be on merit. He says: “I’ll fire you.” I said: “You can’t fire me. You don’t employ me.” Top people would phone me up in the first few years and say: “You must take so-and-so. He was in the liberation struggle and he’s now risen to a certain level.” Sometimes I’ll bend the rules a little and agree to test someone if they’ve done well, but I won’t just take them on.

Delta’s head of apprenticeship training was criticized by African government officials. One said he refused initially to admit trained ex-combatants and that Delta’s policy was that training should be reserved for employers’ sons and daughters; others complained he flouted efforts to centralize recruitment of apprentices in government when this practice was introduced in 1985.
white government official said that in the early 1980s when whites employed their own children it was seen as racist but that by 1992 there was a recognition that whites, like blacks, would want to see their families employed, given equal qualifications.\textsuperscript{149}

An African who obtained his “O” level certificate in 1979 described how the party forced inadequately trained ex-combatants on the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) parastatal where he worked, and how ex-combatants themselves threatened their employers directly and indirectly with their party leverage and would listen only to other ex-combatants. He also alluded to how urban people looked down on ex-combatants and perceived them as wanting to “take over,” while ex-combatants viewed those who did not fight in the war as “whites” or “sell-outs.”

The recruitment of ex-combatants was never smooth. It was something people always shouted at one another about. A number of them really thought those who didn’t fight were whites and that they’d take over their jobs. But parastatals, we have our own recruitment policy. We can’t just be forced to take anybody. There’s an individual or group of individuals from a certain section – the government or the party (somewhere there’s a certain link there) – who’d say “you must take these people”\ldots We were forced to take these people. Some can be intelligent and can do the job if it’s general. Others couldn’t and would be frustrated. They’d say: “He did technical training outside the country” but he’d come to the PTC training college and could do only radio communications\ldots People who’d been to war and those who were in town, it was difficult to integrate the two. Those in town thought those who went to the war were ignorant – many of them were. They thought they could just take over\ldots There was a lot of apprehension and suspicion on both sides\ldots Someone can be sent for a job. You tell him he didn’t meet entry requirements. Then he goes back and tells them we ill-treated him. That guy who sent the people is not keen to speak to the general manager. He phones us. We’re just operations people. A high-ranking person calls me up and complains. You try and speak nicely to the person and explain what the entry qualifications are. He could understand or say we’re useless people. The man who was in charge of human resources was an ex-combatant himself. He could just bulldoze. He probably helped the situation here because he could shout at an ex-combatant – he had the confidence. Even if these people came to his office, they couldn’t threaten him. But the person could threaten you and you could be afraid that he’d shoot you\ldots Some left under pressure because they couldn’t do their work mainly. Those who stayed, some have risen. We actually have some in high positions here.\textsuperscript{150}

The first African chief apprenticeship officer, who trained as a transport engineer and then studied technical education at US and Canadian universities during the war, spoke of how difficult it was to rebuke an ex-combatant who was violating work norms, how quick ex-combatants were to report to senior party officials, how resistant ex-combatants were to obeying those they did not consider their leaders, how party leaders bolstered ex-combatants, and how virulent racism was.
Because of orientation or brainwashing that goes on in the army, we had one trainee at Duly’s Company [automotives] who was coming late. We had a counseling session: “You must subscribe to norms and values of the company.” When the white foreman spoke to him [about being late], he said: “You can’t talk to me like that.” He reported to Minister Kangai, Minister of Labour, that he was being harassed by a white man. I had to investigate and say no, the ex-combatant was not adhering to the norms and values of the company. Government was giving a lot of prestige to the fighters so they thought they were the cream of the nation… Some didn’t care about personal hygiene. A comment from a white and this guy would totally erupt. I was called to intervene. My minister was Frederick Shava [Manpower Planning and Development], but they would say they have their own bosses, their own ministers. Kangai would talk to Shava and ask him to investigate. And then they’d come to me. The politicians would blast me. You don’t understand the war. You’re a reactionary. You’re not an ex-combatant. The employers would call me an ex-combatant. Little did they know I was a technocrat and was coming from a Western model. I managed to survive. I always say this is one of my achievements coming from this history… One occasion, one guy grabbed a guy and gave him a blow on the face. The employer had to go to hospital. The employer had called the trainee a kaffir. I would recommend we transfer the trainee to a different company, to a government-owned institution or nearly all black company.151

The chief apprenticeship training officer claimed that ex-combatants training abroad were misled by politicians about the local value of their training, and resisted hearing his criticisms of foreign training programs. Sent to examine the course content at foreign institutions after independence, he recalled telling students at a West German college that what they did in one year was equivalent to what a polytechnic student at Harare did in two weeks.

They jeered at me. They termed me a reactionary. I also didn’t make slogans. One student at a college I visited said: “You must say slogans.” . . . When they came [home] they thought they were top engineers. Ministers who addressed us in West Germany told us that. Politicians were appeasing them. About two months after independence, they told ex-combatant students in West Germany: “You’re coming home. There’s a shortage of engineers. When you come home, you’ll all get jobs.”152

Before inquiring into why employers and government were so exercised about ex-combatants’ certificates, an alternative view on ex-combatants is offered. It accepts the preceding critical perspectives but applies them to only a minority of ex-combatants. The two registrars for skills upgrading and apprentices felt most ex-combatants were highly motivated, determined, resourceful, and quickly recognized the inadequacies of their training abroad.

The bulk of them were quite reasonable and didn’t behave the way we’d expected. We’d thought they’d been in the bush for a long time and were politicians. We thought they were coming to grab jobs, but they knew they could only get what they deserved. They even admitted they knew nothing and wanted to learn . . . They were very resourceful, they had a lot of initiative . . . They were not quitters. They’d persist. They’d used all
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sorts of persuasive means… Ex-combatants were not afraid of seeing anyone. It doesn’t matter what the position is. If they saw a clerk and weren’t satisfied, they’d want to see the next person and so on, eventually getting to the president himself.153

Accepting the validity of charges of racism and that many employers and government officials were overtly hostile to the communist bloc, there were other reasons for the low regard for ex-combatants’ certificates. The chief apprenticeship officer spoke contemptuously of the party certificates. “Even if you’d asked these guys some mathematics, you’d find it was a lot of BS.” He had no more respect for foreign certificates. “The majority of cadres were not selected on the basis of good academic standards. You’d find a guy who had no maths being sent for engineering training.”154 The training itself had shortcomings. At Lumumba University in Moscow, the certificates specified they were valid in Africa only, underestimating skills proficiency in Zimbabwe. Some would call themselves engineers and had completed five-year programs at Lumumba University, but they had spent two-thirds of the hours on philosophy, language, and communism rather than on technical training.155 Soviet training was suitable for industrialized rather than industrializing countries. In both Eastern and Western Europe, the training was for replacement; the needs in Zimbabwe were for maintenance. In Zimbabwe, the machinery involved more manual work compared with the more automated machines in Europe. Training was either too specialized or too broad for Zimbabwe’s purposes. For instance, the construction industry in Zimbabwe wanted more than a building certificate; it wanted a particular trade certificate such as brick making. European training was broader, including administrative skills, and graduates would not be able to lay bricks at the speed and proficiency required in Zimbabwe. Foreign trainees had to learn local measurement systems and technical terms in English. Eastern European countries would certify as engineers those whom Zimbabwe would only consider technologists; what East Europeans would consider a degree, the Zimbabweans would call a national diploma.156

Particular scorn tended to be reserved for the West German system – perhaps because it was Western European – whose graduates reportedly had the highest expectations (perhaps for the same reason) and the lowest performance levels. Between 1978 and 1983, Otto Benecke Foundation sponsored some 600 Zimbabweans sent by the liberation movements to train in West Germany.157 During the war, the West German trade unions resisted incorporating African trainees, so they were trained separately. After independence, trade unions allowed scholarship students to train alongside Germans. But they used sophisticated equipment when the equipment in Zimbabwe was from the 1950s and 1960s because of economic sanctions. One group was trained in “high tech” printing when what Zimbabwe used was manual printing. It was also alleged that Zimbabwean trainees in engineering fields were not allowed to touch the
machines; they could only observe. Delta Corporation’s apprenticeship training program was asked to test three ex-combatants who had spent three and a half years training as fitters and turners in West Germany and who had been rejected by industry on their return. It reported in December 1982: “We found they weren’t even up to first year standards.” Praise was reserved for the Malawian training system, Hungarian refrigeration training, and Ethiopian aviation training.

In 1983 two government reports endorsed industry’s criticisms of ex-combatants’ technical training abroad. In the majority of cases, these trainees required more practical and workshop experience for periods ranging from six months to three years. The Manpower Planning and Development Ministry offered these ex-combatants priority in its trades testing scheme, introduced in mid-1982, to enable workers without high school education to obtain formal recognition for the skills they had obtained on the job. Initially, those who passed a trades test at the standard required at the end of an apprenticeship would receive a journeyman’s certificate. Subsequently, the scheme offered a graded rather than a pass/fail system. Individuals could choose one of four levels at which to be tested. Class 1 was equivalent to a four-year apprenticeship; class 4 to a one-year apprenticeship. If an ex-combatant failed a class 1 trades test, s/he could be offered a second or third year apprenticeship. Many ex-combatants whose foreign certificates were not recognized as well as those who had no such certificates but sought to upgrade their positions took these tests. The ministry also introduced a national training levy from January 1983 and offered rebates to employers in the private sector, parastatal organizations, and local authorities who hired ex-combatants and ex-refugees for upgrading or training as apprentices, trainee technicians, or student-pupil engineers. In 1984 the ministry introduced a supplementary training scheme specifically for foreign-trained ex-combatants which offered a maximum four months’ training. From 1985 to 1988 the ministry took over the recruitment of apprentices from industry to circumvent alleged racist selection practices.

These schemes represented a shift in the relationship between ex-combatants in the workplace and the party. The party had accepted industry and government criticisms of ex-combatants’ certificates. Even though ex-combatants were given preferential treatment in the training schemes, the rejection of their foreign certificates was a blow to their status and marked the end of unwavering party support for ex-combatants in the work environment. Ex-combatants could legitimately complain that the liberation movements had sent them for training, usually to socialist countries, and should see to it that their skills were recognized. The next section focuses on how the party drifted away from ex-combatants in the workplace, and on what lay behind these changing dynamics.
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The relationship between guerrillas and the ruling party soured as the party ceased to intervene directly in support of ex-combatant grievances in the workplace. The timing of the party’s withdrawal of support for ex-combatants in the workplace, it will be seen, are disputed. However, a common thread underlines various accounts of why this relationship changed. In particular, as the party became more reliant on educated government bureaucrats, it had less use for revolutionary ideology and for the ex-combatants.

One view is that the Manpower and Development Act of 1984 heralded a change in the party’s relationship to bureaucrats, ex-combatants, and employers over workplace issues. The legislation replaced the Apprenticeship Training Act of 1968 under which very few blacks were trained as apprentices. Inter alia, the new law required apprentices to have five “O” levels and sought to encourage employers to take on apprentices by requiring them to pay a training levy whether or not they trained apprentices. From the perspective of the ex-chief apprenticeship officer, this new legislation represented a victory of bureaucracy and law over rule by party fiat.

In terms of the ideology of the party, they were all living as equals in Maputo. They felt free to approach Kangai. But we were saying Kangai is now a minister. They must follow protocol. The minister felt an obligation to help these friends. He was minister because of these fighters. Because these guys had a lot of sympathetic hearing, it set a precedent. They’d just walk into these offices. We, the senior government officials, were considered very unimportant people. Till about mid-1985. By 1984 we had a Manpower Act. People started to feel its effects in 1985. Before that there was a lot of policy that superseded legislation. Policy was announced at a rally by a minister or promises were deemed more important than legislation which was deemed irrelevant.

A black personnel director in the private sector seemed to be describing the same decline in party influence at the workplace, though without dating or explaining it. “Some of them [ex-combatants] were kind of difficult to manage but once the political situation started to change – knowing a minister and shouting Pamberi ne ZANU(PF) [Forward with ZANU(PF)] – they changed.”

Though not concerned specifically with ex-combatants, Freek Schiphorst also points to the importance of government legislation in altering the balance of power between management and workers. The long-awaited Labour Relations Act of 1985 institutionalized registered trade unions’ collective bargaining rights and the power of unions over workers’ committees, though the registration of collective bargaining agreements rested on ministerial discretion. Schiphorst remarks: “There now was a legal backing to the managerial view to institutionalisation of labour–management relations.”

Interestingly Blair Rutherford’s study refers to commercial farm workers in the early 1990s dating the decline of party activities on the farms – party rallies,
ZANU(PF) youth gangs demanding to see party cards, and party support for workers’ committees – to around 1986, after the second national election in 1985. He is unclear about why party activities subsided in this period, but invokes another analyst’s account of “the increasing emphasis on self-enrichment over redistributive justice issues amongst the leaders of the government during this time.” However, the party’s need to introduce a leadership code in 1984 to contain its leaders’ rapid accumulation of wealth suggests that self-enrichment had an earlier history.

Some ZANLA ex-combatants and their supporters present the withdrawal of party support for ex-combatants as signaling the victory of the educated who advanced their own interests over those who fought for the country’s liberation and the party’s socialist ideology. A white ex-ZP staff member saw radical ex-combatants as having lost power between late 1982 and mid-1983 to those educated overseas during the war.

I was out of the country and returned to a different atmosphere. This was a critical period in Zimbabwean history. People who’d come from universities and who had little commitment to ideology as opposed to basic nationalism and a desire for political power of either parties were somewhat in awe of ex-combatants and unsure of government intentions and unsure because of their lack of commitment to the ruling party and apprehensive government would be committed to a more radical policy than turned out to be the case. There occurred in this time period a shift in influence from politicians who believed in ideology – by politicians I mean ex-combatants – to those who had no real links to the party that weren’t self-asserted e.g. chair of the party in Nottingham, etc.

The Matabeleland conflict, he believed, gave these bureaucrats a chance “to show their loyalty by condemning dissidents, ZAPU, regionalism (although they may have been regionalists in their own way) . . . This was not verbalized but it was an atmosphere.”

A ZANLA ex-combatant, working toward his “A” levels when he joined the struggle and a member of a select group sent during the war to study Marxist-Leninism at Mondlane University in Mozambique, saw a decline in party ideology vis-à-vis government power and in ex-combatants’ status vis-à-vis the status of the overseas educated immediately after the return home.

That [1980] is when we started to let loose the imagination that previously ran away with us. We thought as ex-combatants the party should dictate to government. We thought party and government were one. We were left wondering why the party didn’t challenge government on some things. We were left on our own in the new Zimbabwe. When we came in we were talking about transformation rather than reform. We thought those with correct ideology would be put in positions to execute the transformation. Mostly it was us former combatants and those working underground who were supposed to spearhead the transformation. It was actually enshrined in the Action Plan for a new Zimbabwe . . . We expected preferential treatment . . . A lot of new leaders were brought
Employment programs for the demobilized

In 1985 in the midst of the insurgency when public complaints by ex-guerrillas were rare, unemployed ZANLA ex-combatants from Mashonaland Central met to express their sense of rejection. They reminded government officials that independence had come about through their dedication and sacrifices. While they suffered unemployment, their former enemies still had senior jobs in the police, education, and local government. “These people often say they received salaries from Ian Smith, then from Muzorewa and now are receiving more money from the Mugabe Government,” said one former ZANLA combatant.

Disabled ZANLA ex-combatants at Ruwa Rehabilitation Centre, just outside the capital, expressed similar grievances in a private letter to the prime minister in September 1986. They complained, as they had since 1980, that the government had accorded to the disabled ex-Rhodesian forces a superior status to that of the disabled ex-combatants. The former had “a well-paying job...a handsome pension...a happy life,” which they too demanded. As “the true liberators of our motherland,” they demanded that when their comrades died, their families should receive the same material benefits that the government paid to the dependents of officially declared heroes. Ruwa ex-combatants lashed out at some of their war-time commanders, at “opportunists and bandwagoners” who had entrenched themselves in the party and the government, and at their leaders who had abandoned socialism: “many senior Government and Party officials have embarked on the dangerous road of self-enrichment by hook or by crook at our expense. They preach socialism by day and practise capitalism by night.” Only a minority of officials were concerned with their plight. The document concluded: “we are not anti-government nor are we reactionaries but we are only trying to help the government to help us.” In October 1986, Ruwa ex-combatants followed up their letter by sending a delegation on two visits to the home of Minister of State (Defence) Kadungure, a former war commander and also the Acting Minister of Labour and Social Welfare. They also took hostage a number of civil servants at a meeting held at Ruwa. In a major display of force led by the army commander, General Mujuru (Rex Nhongo), the ex-combatants were forcibly removed from Ruwa on October 21, 1986 and the center was closed.

The decline in party support for ex-combatants was evident in changing party responses to precisely such grievances among ex-combatants, and not just their violent expression. Most party leaders appeared to have little further use for revolutionary ideology and appealed to “expertise.” In July 1986 a ZANU(PF)
MP asked: “Is the Prime Minister aware of most of the employers in this coun-
try, even parastatals, who dislike to employ our ex-ZANLA combatants, but are
prepared to employ ex-Muzorewa/Smith groups; and wherever they are em-
ployed, that these employers never accord them any promotion?”\textsuperscript{181} Mugabe
invoked the importance of formal education.

In fact, if that is the situation, let us get to know who is discriminating in that way and
what are the facts. Let us not just conclude. However, employing former combatants,
important though it is, does not just occur as a matter of routine. Where skills of a given
level are required, they must also compete by way of skills, unless what we are talking
about is general work. If it is general work, well fine – I get the point. However, if it
is for example, a bookkeeper that we require or an accountant or some such person,
well at least that person, the former combatant in question, must have bookkeeping or
accountancy to qualify him for that job.\textsuperscript{182}

Even when it came to “general work,” though, the ruling party did not
stand behind Transport Minister Ushewokunze, a ZANU(PF) “radical” and
ex-combatant medical doctor, when a parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into
Parastatals alleged that he had intervened in government appointments and
had directed Air Zimbabwe’s general manager to hire eleven unqualified ex-
combatants as security guards. The minister defended his hiring of “reds.”

Yes, they are “thin on literacy” because they had to forego their education in order to
execute the armed struggle. That is a value judgement by people who perhaps were not
with us or for us during our struggle for Independence.

Most of the people would not have achieved the level at which they are if it were not
for those ex-combatants. They would still be junior or mid-management civil servants.
Now the people who gave them their positions, the positions they are basking under now,
are described as “thin on literacy” – today they are said to be “thin on literacy” by the
same Committee members some of whom were anti-ZANU(PF) during the war. They
were fighting against these ex-combatants obviously and, I was being stupid because I
should not expect good judgement about ex-combatants from this Committee. But “thin
on literacy”; why, as they got thick on literacy what were these Committee members
doing? The ex-combatants are not even competing for jobs belonging to the learned,
only paltry and security jobs . . . I find it emotionally upsetting that this kind of value
judgement can be made by a Committee which we obviously set-up.\textsuperscript{183}

In appointing ex-combatants, he said he was “carrying out the recognised
party/government policy of wherever possible to offer employment to as many
ex-combatants as possible.”\textsuperscript{184} He dismissed the committee critics as people
who did not support the guerrilla war effort.

I have absolutely nothing against the person in the Committee in their persons, but
their part, they can never be the people who can sit in judgement over our policies they
sought to fight yesterday . . . We have the hon. Justice Smith as Chairman. I believe he
owns a Bachelor’s Degree and was a legal draftsman at the point of promotion. This
man has had a distinguished colonialist career. This is very good if you look at it as a
Outcomes

The ruling party largely attained its objectives of securing a loyal bureaucracy and workforce. The civil service had changed in racial composition and size. By 1984 88.2 percent of established civil service posts were held by Africans compared with only 11.8 percent in 1980, and 77.7 percent of senior management posts (undersecretary and above) were held by blacks compared with 22.3 percent in 1980.188 The civil service expanded from 62,000 to 181,402 officials between 1980 and 1989.189 The ruling party felt more confident of the loyalty of educated African bureaucrats who did not have war backgrounds. Angela Cheater refers to the “expanded and fully politicized state system” that ZANU(PF) had achieved by the end of the first decade of independence, and its operation on particularistic principles of tribalism, nepotism, and ministerial appointments.190 The party also could feel that it had control over workers and management through legislation such as the Labour Relations Act and the Manpower Development Act. Though the ZCTU, the single labor federation created by the ruling party, began to be critical of government after 1985, it did not challenge the party/government’s legitimacy. Schiphorst aptly remarks that “for a predominantly rural-based political party that never had showed much attention to urban labour, it had done remarkable [sic] well in the urban areas. The initial waves of strikes surrounding Independence had not turned into a dangerous tide-wave threatening ZANU(PF). And over the years, it became clear for [sic] the ruling party that it had organised labour firmly in its pocket.”191 It
is also the case, though, that there was no popular support in the unions for the coopted leadership, and “after nine years of existence the workers considered the ZCTU as a stranger in their midst.”

A significant number of ex-combatants were beneficiaries of privileged access to jobs. In 1988 Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare Minister, John Nkomo, told parliament that the government had employed an estimated 13,512 ex-combatants, mostly as police, prison officers, and security guards but also as ministers, deputy ministers, permanent secretaries, magistrates, clerks, and so forth. Outside the army, the leading employers of ex-combatants were the Ministry of Home Affairs, with jurisdiction over police, immigration, and customs (3,550), local authorities under the Ministry of Local Government (2,609), the Ministry of Health (2,000), and the Central Intelligence Organization (1,007). Other government ministries and parastatals employed smaller numbers: Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (350), Youth, Sport and Culture (300), Natural Resources and Tourism (231), National Supplies (122), Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare (111), parastatals (105), Co-operatives and Women’s Affairs (62), Information, Posts and Telecommunications (41), and Energy and Water Resources (24). To these numbers, one must add the ex-combatants hired by city councils, including as municipal police and diggers. Despite government and party efforts, officials estimated that one-third (13,560) of ex-combatants who had been demobilized from the assembly points (as opposed to the simultaneous demobilization from the army) were unemployed in 1988. According to unofficial figures, though, there were 25,000–35,000 unemployed ex-combatants in 1988.

To appreciate the extent of guerrilla privilege, it is important to stress the grim employment environment and to recall the low educational levels of the overwhelming majority of guerrillas. In 1988 an estimated 25 percent of the workforce was unemployed. Even the educated struggled to find work. At least 2,000 professionals, unable to find jobs, had gone abroad. Secondary school leavers had increased from under 30,000 per annum in 1984 to 100,000 per annum in 1988, yet only 167,000 new non-agricultural jobs had been created between 1980 and 1988.

The guerrillas’ frames of reference – workers, who did not go to war and who were usually better educated than ex-combatants, white Rhodesian soldiers, and their own leaders – guaranteed that they would continue to feel victimized. It is also important to emphasize what employment meant in terms of standards of living.

The direct effects on living standards of the government’s social reforms began to taper off for the bulk of wage-earners towards the middle of 1983. As a result real minimum wages in manufacturing were virtually unchanged five years after independence. Although domestic and agricultural workers were slightly better off after the introduction of the national minimum wage act, industrial workers’ real incomes declined by 18 per cent, whilst profits remained fairly stable, except in 1983.
By 1990 when structural adjustment had been introduced, real minimum wages were well below their peak levels in 1982.198 Patronage often makes for inefficient and undynamic workers. Party loyalty rather than merit has consistently guided appointments and promotions in the bureaucracy, guaranteeing inefficiency and corruption. There remained an image of ex-combatants, as with other civil servants, as poor workers. In 1992 a frustrated “Coloured” bureaucrat in the social welfare pensions office spoke derogatorily of ex-combatants’ work performance.

Ex-combatants. You can’t work with them. The lady in the registry is an ex-combatant. She just came back from lunch at 3 o’clock. The man you saw in my office this afternoon—he’s an ex-combatant. I told him to go home. He came in this morning, had a cup of tea, then has just been sitting. He got a cheque for insurance yesterday. So he came in drunk this morning. I could smell it on his breath…I spoke to him very nicely. You heard. He can get violent. He can throw you out the window…

Later, she said of ex-combatants: “They don’t sit [and work]. Only their jackets sit.”199 In the private sector and parastatals, however, some informants spoke of most ex-combatants as hard workers who had integrated with other workers.200 Importantly, even some managers credit ex-combatants as having played an important role in using workers’ committees and their party links not only to enhance their power but also to improve workers’ conditions.201 Studies of workers’ committees also attribute improvements in the work place to these organizations.202

In a now familiar pattern, guerrilla privilege was not shared evenly. The ruling party’s role in job recruitment and promotions ensured that even well-qualified ZIPRA ex-combatants would be excluded or on a slower promotion track than their ZANLA colleagues. In 1990 a prominent journalist described how she had left Highfield township in 1976 to join the liberation war in Zambia, from where she left to train as a journalist at City University, London. At independence, she left her job as the first African sub-editor of Africa Economic Digest to return to Zimbabwe, expecting to find comparable work. “That was not to be. Recruitment of media personnel was being carried out through Zanu PF party. The late Justin Nyoka [a national hero] was in charge. On hearing of my job needs, the man burst out laughing. ‘Why do you want a job as a journalist? Why don’t you ask Nkomo to buy you a farm? He is buying all Zipras farms.’ ” Just because ZIPRA ex-combatants “bet on the wrong horse,” she lamented, they have been treated as second-class citizens in a free Zimbabwe.203 In Matabeleland, where most ZIPRA lived, even low-level central government positions specially created for ex-combatants, like LGPOs, went to Shona-speaking ZANLA rather than ZIPRA ex-combatants, engendering local civilian resentment.204

Prior to the 1985 general election, ZAPU MPs expressed concerns about unemployed ex-fighters generally, though they clearly had ZIPRA in mind.
Sydney Malunga charged that the majority of ex-combatants had never been assisted, and implicitly linked unemployed ZIPRA to the threat of widening the dissident problem. “Right now the State is trying to contain the nagging abominable trend brought about by dissidents, and yet we, the Government, are helping in adding to the percentage of the unemployed by not catering for people who should be rehabilitated.”205 The Deputy Manpower Minister ignored the innuendo about partisanship but denied that most fighters had not been catered for, a position Mugabe reiterated.206 ZAPU MP Stephen Nkomo worried aloud about the unemployed demobilized fighters, especially in his constituency around Bulawayo, and reminded parliament that “it is a national duty that the State looks after the interests of the ex-combatants, because these are the people who contributed a great deal to the liberation of this country. Now that we are reaping that fruits so [sic] liberation as an independent State of Zimbabwe, we should be seen to be assisting these young people.”207

After the party unity agreement, ZAPU MPs and civilians in Matabeleland complained more often, and more explicitly, about government discrimination against ZIPRA ex-combatants. MP Malunga said ex-ZIPRA in Home Affairs reported “they are being discriminated against for a very long time and they even went to the extent of giving some numbers…of ex-ZANLA combatants who hold senior positions in the Ministry.”208 Mr. Ndhlovu (Bulalima-Mangwe MP) asked why not a single local government promotion officer, a job which required even lower qualifications than a clerk, was from his district. He spoke of having met with more than 700 unemployed ex-combatants in Plumtree.

They contributed towards the liberation of this country, but today they are suffering. How do these young men and women support our unity if they cannot be participants in their home areas. I hope the Ministry of Political Affairs will not make the same mistake bringing people from other districts to man offices at the expense of local party members. Everybody must enjoy the fruits of independence.209

The ruling party hid behind claims that such questions and statements about discrimination against ZIPRA were against reconciliation and would damage national unity.210 However, civilians in Matabeleland shared their parliamentarians’ perceptions of discrimination in favor of Shona-speakers.211

Besides discrimination in employing and promoting ZIPRA ex-combatants, the ruling party’s power-building activities resulted in many ZIPRA ex-combatants who had found government or ZAPU employment losing their livelihoods, and all too often, their lives. After the 1980 election, but allegedly conceived earlier, ZIPRA founded a company, NITRAM, which Isaac Nyathi, a ZAPU man and a trained economist, headed. With a percentage contribution...
Employment programs for the demobilized

from ZIPRA soldiers’ first three months’ assembly pay, NITRAM bought farms in Bulawayo, Harare, and Gweru, and hotels as an insurance against their destitution. In February 1982 the ruling party confiscated the NITRAM properties on which it alleged ZAPU was hiding arms to subvert the government. Those ZIPRA employed on these properties were driven out of work. ZIPRA veterans remained aggrieved that they had never been compensated for the loss of their properties. ZIPRA veterans made the return of their properties and compensation an issue during the election campaign and land invasions in 2000 and succeeded in obtaining the return of some property and promises of compensation with other farms where former ZIPRA farms had been leased or sold. How productive these projects would have been must remain speculative. ZANU(PF), however, found its guerrillas wanted salaried jobs and had no interest in working on party farms.

From 1983 until the imposition of party unity, ZIPRA along with ZAPU leaders, councillors, and civil servants were often official targets of detentions, beatings, torture, disappearances, and killings. The lucky ones were able to flee. Between 1983 and 1984, the Fifth Brigade engaged in indiscriminate as well as more targeted violence against, inter alia, ex-ZIPRA civil servants. The authors of Violence & Memory, which is set in Matabeleland North, write: “Health staff, particularly the nurses who were former Zipra guerrillas, were also attacked. One such who served at Nkayi hospital recalled how the Fifth Brigade ‘came to look for the Zipras, and a number who worked at the hospital were killed.’” During and after the Fifth Brigade’s reign of terror, and especially before and after the local and national government elections of January and July 1985 respectively, the CIO and ZANU(PF) Youth conducted a more focused program of political violence. According to Violence & Memory, the CIO “was central in orchestrating the detentions and disappearances of Zapu leaders, councillors and others such as Zipra guerrillas.” Government repression did not make a dent in ZAPU electoral support. After ZAPU’s successful performance in the July 1985 general elections, despite virtually every rural and urban ZAPU office outside Bulawayo having been closed or burned out, the government detained, among others, nearly 200 employees of the Bulawayo City Council: municipal police, ambulance drivers, garbage collectors, and some middle-level bureaucrats. Many of these were ex-ZIPRA combatants or ZAPU organizers during the war, and so were beneficiaries of ZAPU patronage after the war.

Women fighters were disadvantaged in the competition for jobs at least in part because of their generally lower levels of education. Domestic service became a common occupation for female ex-combatants. A former ZANLA commissar, whose family encouraged her to return to school to finish her “O” levels and to pursue further education, said:
We went to a party of a friend who was an ex-combatant. Before the war she was working with her parents for Mr. Brown, then she went to Mozambique and was lucky to survive, and now, she said: ‘I’m still working for Mr. Brown.’ We have some – I think a lot – are working as domestic workers. I’m not saying they shouldn’t be housegirls. Probably they’d be housegirls if they hadn’t gone to the war. Perhaps they would have failed grade 7.220

The ex-combatant with whom she had a daughter after the war spoke emotionally of the difficult time women had during and after the war.

Women ex-combatants never got sent anywhere. The camps were a dead end for them. Many married – not formal marriages – comrades in the camps and had children. They were forced relationships. You don’t really have any choice when you live in a closed society. Then they came home and the men didn’t recognize the marriages and they had to take care of the children and maybe their parents had died during the war. They found the public sector and private sector closed to them. They could do nothing but dirty themselves and become prostitutes.221

Others have elaborated on senior ZANLA commanders during the war demanding sex with women and especially young girls in the camps and on similar behavior by guerrillas and mujibas in operational zones.222

The demand for training and education, if enrollment at institutions for ex-combatants is an indicator, has all but dried up. Though ZIMFEP’s ex-director boasted in 1992 that Mupfure College could recruit 8,000,223 ten years after its founding the college was serving predominantly ordinary school leavers and drop-outs who did not hold a full “O” level certificate.224 In 1990 ex-combatants represented just over 20 percent of the 332 students at Danhiko; years earlier its principal had been recruiting Namibian and South African ex-combatants partly to make the school a regional one but also to fill places. (See Table 2.) While these institutions have made a valuable contribution, the success of their graduates may fall short of ex-combatant expectations. Mupfure graduates tended to form cooperatives under continued ZIMFEP guidance, making them “much better off than general laborers.”225

The same patterns of the marginalization of ZIPRA and women ex-combatants are evident in training programs. For women ex-combatants, NGO money was often channeled through Sally Mugabe and was thus like ZANU(PF) money. Mupfure College wanted to have a student body made up of equal proportions of male and female ex-combatants. However, its first intake had only fifteen women, mostly ex-refugees who had gone to ZIMFEP schools after the war and were still single. According to a ZIMFEP official, women ex-combatants had usually not gone to school but had married and their husbands would not allow them to leave their families to go to Chigutu.226 Only about one-third of the small contingent of ex-combatants funded by CADEC were women.227 Ex-ZIPRA combatants were much less likely to benefit from
Table 2 *Categorization of Danhiko students, 1990*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex-combatants</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>23.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>32.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered war victims</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered refugees</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwean</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>83.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibian</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambican</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other citizenship</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married with children</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>31.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married without children</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced with children</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced without children</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single with children</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>14.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single without children</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>43.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With dependents</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>20.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1990 Danhiko Report by Stelios Comninos, obtained from Dr. Sharon Ladin.

Demobilized ex-combatants were used by the ruling party to legitimate its socialist image and to help create a power base in the bureaucracy and among workers. At the same time, the party could continue to build power by educational and training opportunities. Danhiko’s principal visited the Demobilisation Directorate’s Bulawayo office to recruit ex-ZIPRA combatants. Still, even when ex-combatants were an overwhelming majority in the school, there were never more than about twenty-five ZIPRA because they were reluctant to be in ZANU(PF)-dominated Harare after independence and through the years of the insurgency. Reflecting their exclusion from most government posts and NGO programs, 160 ZIPRA combatants applied to go to Mupfure College when it first opened compared with only 30 ZANLA. Of the 63 students admitted, 66 percent were ZIPRA. The first intake had a high proportion of students who had some “O” level courses, perhaps also reflecting the exclusion of ZIPRA ex-combatants from government patronage. According to an individual closely connected to ZIMFEP, Mupfure had places for 300 ex-combatants but officials were reluctant to have predominantly ZIPRA students. Taking only 63 students was a solution which incorporated all the ZANLA applicants though only a small percentage of the ZIPRA ones.

Conclusion

Demobilized ex-combatants were used by the ruling party to legitimate its socialist image and to help create a power base in the bureaucracy and among workers. At the same time, the party could continue to build power by
eliminating the chief party opposition and its guerrilla support. Feeling more secure on all these fronts – ZAPU opponents, workers, bureaucrats, and preparation for a socialist-style one-party state – the ruling party tried to retreat from its ex-combatant base. Ex-combatants did their party’s bidding in large part because it brought them power and privilege. But the privilege and power the guerrillas won were often ephemeral. The cooperatives became financially insolvent, NGO resources dried up, and the standard of living for even those who had jobs ceased to improve in the early 1980s, thus ending most ex-combatants’ prospects of material well-being. And when the party withdrew its backing for ex-combatants in the workplace, they had to fend for themselves. For employed and unemployed ex-combatants, their frames of references were such that they saw victimization and discrimination rather than protection and advantage. Looking to white Rhodesian soldiers (who had amassed great privilege under white minority rule), to African workers (who had secured jobs in a limited, competitive, and racially discriminatory job market), and to their political and military leaders (who had accumulated wealth rapidly by giving themselves privileged access to state resources), ex-combatants felt that their years of war service had not been recognized.

After the party unity agreement of 1987, the party threatened to stop treating ex-combatants as a “special” group. Ex-combatants felt abandoned by the very people they had fought to empower. The party and NGOs had participated for seven years in a discourse about recognition for war service and had reinforced and legitimated ex-combatants’ ideas about being a specially deserving group. Would the party be able to make good on its desire to abandon its ex-combatant base? Or were its own legitimacy and power too enmeshed with ex-combatants and the war of liberation? Continuing the focus of this chapter, an appendix offers a snapshot of the increasingly conflict-ridden relationship between ex-combatants and the ruling party over employment issues from 1988 to 1997. At the same time, the appendix identifies important instances of collusion between the party and ex-combatants. (See Appendix: The ruling party’s attempts to withdraw ex-combatants’ special status and ex-combatants’ responses, 1988–1997.) The epilogue picks up on the relationship between ex-combatants and the ruling party in 2000–1.
Despite guerrilla wars being the major form of contemporary warfare, we know remarkably little about the politics of guerrilla incorporation and its consequences for political and economic development. Though social science offers competing models for understanding the relationship between states and different social groups, it has had a tradition of paying relatively less attention to military groups, despite their importance.\(^1\) Social science has also often assumed that revolutionary wars end in military victory. In contrast, the post-Cold War literature on peace settlements and demobilization and reintegration programs (DRPs), collectively referred to as peace-building studies, places military formations on the international policy agenda and assumes the significance of peace settlements in shaping outcomes.\(^2\) This study builds on the latter literature insofar as it seeks to understand the politics of Zimbabwe’s first seven years by examining the Lancaster House peace settlement and guerrilla programs: assembly, disarmament, demobilization, military integration, and civilian employment. The book asks different questions, though, from the war-to-peace transitions literature and from DRP studies.

Rather than asking about the conditions, determinants, or lessons of success and failure for peace-building, the central motivating question of this study concerns the strategies, agendas, resources, and interactions of the ruling party and the ex-combatants. Insofar as outcomes are a core concern, this book is engaged in an evaluative exercise. But its purpose is to understand to what extent actors achieved their own agendas rather than peace-building objectives which the international agencies (with scholars close behind) have embraced. To get beyond domestic actors’ avowed goals, it is important to examine their everyday discourse and practices in the context of political struggles. The same analysis ought to be applied to international actors involved in peace-building, as this study seeks to do for Governor Soames, the Commonwealth Observers’ Group, the Commonwealth Monitoring Team, and the British team at Lancaster House during the transition, and for the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) and NGOs in the DRPs. By asking different questions, the study offers a new perspective on Zimbabwe’s transition and DRPs, and more generally on peace-building studies.
The study of Zimbabwe’s transition and DRPs illuminates how the settlement shaped the relationship between the guerrillas and the ruling party as each pursued their respective agendas. Mugabe’s party won electoral power in the independence elections, but the settlement left intact the Rhodesian army, bureaucracy, and private sector as well as the two mutually hostile guerrilla armies, ZIPRA and ZANLA. To build state power and legitimacy and to gain a foothold in the white-controlled private sector, the ruling party turned to the guerrillas and to appeals to the liberation struggle.

In the first critical eighteen months of independence, the ruling party pursued two contradictory strategies. It tried to treat all three armies as equals, which had the desirable effect of limiting the party’s dependence on its former Rhodesian enemy forces, preserving the legitimacy of the guerrilla struggle, and of containing the strong tensions between the guerrilla armies. On the other hand, treating all the armies as equals created its own monsters: it undermined constitutionalism, retained the guerrillas’ coercive power as fighters and their symbolic power as liberators trained in violence, and established guerrilla privilege as they were treated like regular soldiers, a relatively privileged group in Rhodesian society. Simultaneously, the ruling party consistently privileged ZANLA over ZIPRA in the assembly places, in the army, and in civilian employment, and nurtured and incited their violent conflict. By late 1981 the ruling party had established a single army command, with ZANLA in control of most key posts, and a single workers’ organization whose leaders were under party control. But it remained insecure vis-à-vis ZIPRA/ZAPU, rank-and-file workers, employers, and the bureaucracy. To add to these challenges, it had acquired the task of incorporating tens of thousands of largely unskilled and uneducated demobilized ex-combatants into the economy.

The ruling party gave demobilized ZANLA ex-combatants access to jobs and used them as the socialist vanguard in the workplace. Both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants were deployed as revolutionaries in the formation of cooperatives. At the same time, the party used ZANLA ex-combatants in the state security forces to violently punish ZIPRA ex-combatants in and out of the army. The vendetta against ZIPRA continued until the unity agreement in 1987, when the party felt it had crushed ZAPU/ZIPRA. Party support for ZANLA ex-combatants in the workplace declined after the first years of independence, reflecting the party’s sense of having gained the control and support of the bureaucracy, employers, and workers. Financial support for ex-combatant and state cooperatives never matched the rhetorical support for socialist transformation, suggesting that cooperatives and the ex-combatants were merely valuable symbols for keeping alive a socialist vision. At every stage of building its power and legitimacy, the party not only colluded with ZANLA ex-combatants but also came into conflict with ZANLA members who were discontent with their place in the emerging new order. By 1987 the ruling party’s impressive power had
been built to a significant degree on violence, guerrilla privilege, and symbolic appeals to war.

The settlement empowered the guerrillas by leaving them mobilized and armed and legitimated their *de facto* equality with the Rhodesian soldiers. Guerrilla veterans sought privilege and power in the new state institutions and in the economy. In the assembly places and in the army, they appealed to the *de facto* equality of soldiers and to be treated like white (rather than African) soldiers. They also appealed to their war contributions, and used violence and intimidation against whoever blocked their aspirations. ZANLA guerrillas colluded with the ruling party to establish privilege and power in the army, in cooperatives and in the workplace. As long as the party had a use for their symbolic and coercive power, ZANLA guerrillas were mostly above criticism. ZIPRA dissidents (whether they chose their dissident status or had it thrust upon them) also sought to impose their power over civilians and state agents using violence and a war discourse to justify their actions. In the first seven years of independence, guerrilla privilege was uneven. Those who fared best were likely to be ZANLA men with some education. Women and the uneducated were likely to benefit less. ZIPRA often won benefits in the first eighteen months of independence but in the subsequent years struggled merely to survive. Some were able to retain posts in the army, the police, and local government but an untold number became victims of party-sanctioned violence between 1982 and 1987.

Is it fair to talk of guerrilla privilege when the guerrillas never saw themselves as privileged? The guerrillas, along with their supporters, who were often ex-combatants with political clout, were more apt to talk – especially after party unity when they first began to speak out publicly – of victimhood, discrimination, and the failure of society and government to recognize their war contribution. Leaving aside the special circumstances of a significant number of ZIPRA guerrillas, it is striking how other guerrillas never acknowledged their preferential treatment. To understand guerrillas’ self-depiction as “forgotten and neglected,” it is important to appreciate their frames of reference, their belief that they deserved to be rewarded for war service, and their conviction that their war contributions were superior to those of other groups who participated in the liberation struggle – all ideas that were endorsed initially by the ruling party for its own purposes. The ex-combatants compared themselves with white Rhodesian soldiers, better educated workers who did not fight in the war, and their leaders whose rapid accumulation since independence was conspicuous. These reference groups shaped (and still do shape) guerrilla understandings of justice.

Guerrilla appeals to equality and to their war contributions to legitimize their claims on the party/government were both powerful and problematic. While politically potent because they were fundamental to the goals of the liberation struggle, appeals to equality with the privileged are not economically...
sustainable in a society with a grossly skewed distribution of income and wealth. Redistribution must reduce the privilege of the “haves” – the 4 percent white minority earned almost 60 percent of income at independence and for years afterwards. Redistribution based on war contribution, for all its political valence, conflicted with other values, such as rewards for formal education. Similarly, arguments for redistribution based on superior war contribution and war suffering were politically powerful but they imposed calibrations of liberation movement activists’ contributions that were divisive.

Alone of the liberation war participants, guerrillas were targeted to receive assembly pay and demobilization pay, and preferential access to jobs in the police, army, bureaucracy, and the private sector. Rather than using their power to form an alliance with peasants, youth, political prisoners, political detainees, and other civilians who had sacrificed enormously to support them during the war, the guerrillas emphasized their superior war contribution. They, and only they, had wielded the gun, thus taking the ultimate risks and making the most significant contributions. This assertion of superiority over liberation movement activists was a major shortcoming of guerrilla veterans’ politics. It alienated that segment of society from guerrilla veterans’ struggles for war service rewards. Guerrillas’ unwillingness to consider their former war-time civilian or “paramilitary” colleagues as a legitimate reference group helps to account for their failure to acknowledge the extent to which they were the beneficiaries of privilege and for their sense of social rejection and isolation. The ex-combatants’ participation on the workers’ committees stands out as a singular instance when veterans fought to improve the circumstances of a broader social group, albeit without overcoming historically based tensions between workers and veterans.

How, it might reasonably be asked, can one reconcile an argument about guerrilla privilege with the abject poverty of many guerrillas? Leaving aside the legitimate complaints of guerrillas who never received any government benefits for one reason or another, the guerrillas’ demographic profile made them a difficult group to lift out of poverty. Overwhelmingly of low literacy and job skills in a society that valued both, and faced with stiff competition in a weak and deteriorating economy from their better educated and/or more skilled age cohorts, guerrilla veterans’ prospects for a better life were never good. The tens of thousands of guerrilla veterans who obtained jobs in the army, the police, the civil service, local government, and to a much lesser extent, the private sector, did so usually because they were beneficiaries of preferential treatment. That these jobs might not have alleviated poverty should not obscure the extent to which they were the product of guerrilla privilege.

Finally, it may be objected that it is unfair to tarnish all or most guerrillas as self-interested and prone to violence or intimidation to obtain their objectives. The study attempts to capture a political dynamic between guerrillas and the leadership. The relationship portrayed is that of politically active veterans and
the party. The study says nothing of those guerrillas who sought to lose their war identity and did not engage in guerrilla veterans’ politics. To the extent that guerrillas disapproved of their former colleagues’ behavior, however, they did not collectively and publicly articulate opposition. Quantifying the numbers of politically active guerrillas is neither possible nor pertinent. Activist minorities often wield influence disproportionately to their numbers.

The findings of this study call for a revision of the understanding of Zimbabwe’s early years that emerged from peace-building studies. Studies of the settlement almost uniformly praised it as heralding a new era of peace, stability, and democracy. This evaluation was based on a variety of measures, most importantly compliance with the most significant settlement provisions and/or the end of the war. How much compliance was necessary, what war had ended, and how one knew it had ended, were all tough questions which analysts resolved based on subjective and arbitrary assessments. To make positive judgments, analysts had to turn a blind eye to or discount many gross violations of the settlement, the well-known hostile and often violent relations between the two guerrilla armies, the rumors that ZIPRA was withholding forces from the battlefield to annihilate ZANLA after independence, and the refusal of the three major armed forces to agree to demobilize or integrate during negotiations. Despite their use of often different criteria, analysts consistently ignored these signs of trouble ahead.

Studies of DRPs evaluated military integration a success at creating a conventional efficient force (a professional army), had mixed assessments of employment creation programs depending on their criteria (e.g. extent of ex-combatant unemployment, fiscal costs of job creation, the resumption of “normal” economic activity), and equivocated on whether demobilization benefits were too high, too low, or just right. These measures relied on taking seriously official goals and treating benefits as if they were set in a political vacuum. Leaving aside the fact that the indicators of a conventional efficient force, adequate demobilization pay, and acceptable unemployment are inevitably subjective and arbitrary, these studies missed political patterns because they did not pay enough attention to actors’ agendas as they expressed themselves in political struggles. The ruling party sought to build power and legitimacy on its inclusive ZANLA guerrilla base and the guerrillas tried to extract government resources and secure or develop their power. Both the ruling party and the guerrillas participated in a legitimating discourse of the guerrillas as “soldiers,” relied on symbolic appeals to the liberation war and, to a significant degree, used violence and intimidation to attain their goals.

More generally, studies of peace-building are inherently limited in their ability to understand transitions and DRPs because of their evaluative orientation. For transitions, lenient measures of success, such as full or select compliance with settlement provisions or ending the war, are more common than stricter
measures which require movement toward democracy beyond “free and fair” elections. For reintegration, measures range from meeting program goals to eliminating material and/or non-material differences between ex-combatants and non-combatants and to emerging wealth and status differences in the population. Demobilization measures may include or exclude disarmament. These measures are subjective and arbitrary and have more to do with analysts’ preferences than political processes. Moreover, the mere exercise of judging transitions or DRPs in terms of externally imposed criteria requires analysts to sideline and ignore important dimensions of politics, power, and history. The Zimbabwe study highlights how the evaluative bent of the peace-building framework privileged peace-building agendas over domestic actors’ agendas, and was insensitive to the influence of the war past and the settlement on post-settlement politics.

Veterans’ politics has been the subject of inquiry in diverse geographical contexts. But there remains little interest in guerrilla veterans’ politics outside the restrictive frameworks of the peace-building literature. The study of guerrilla veterans would seem to offer fresh terrain to explore not just veterans’ politics but also the politics of war symbolism, the politics of memory, the politics of post-war justice, welfare politics, military politics, and new understandings of who is a veteran. Given how many African and other societies on the periphery of the international system have been embroiled in violent guerrilla conflicts since World War II, it seems all the more urgent to pay attention to the ways in which these wars and their veterans may contribute to shaping societies and polities.
Epilogue: the past in the present

For most observers, veterans’ power was first demonstrated in their violent protests and subsequent extraction of lump-sum payments and monthly war service pensions in 1997. Asked to pay additional taxes to fund the veterans’ new benefits, workers protested, with the tacit support of white private sector employers. Both workers and white employers became targets of an allegedly new alliance between veterans and the party.¹ This emerging conventional wisdom is wrong. First, this study demonstrates that veterans’ power and their collaboration with the ruling party dates back to 1980. Second, my ongoing study of the politics of veterans’ pensions shows that veterans exercised considerable power to win further benefits from an existing pensions program (war disability pensions), to be included in another (official heroes’ pensions), and to introduce new pensions from 1980 to the present. Significantly, war service pensions were a major concern for guerrilla veterans from independence and their power was demonstrated when the government recognized war service years when calculating the retirement pensions of guerrilla veterans in the army in 1989 and, soon after, in the civil service. The politics of veterans’ pensions displays the same dynamic that I have shown characterized the relationship between veterans and the ruling party in the context of working out the legacies of the peace settlement: often simultaneous conflict and collaboration as party and veterans manipulate each other, using violence and intimidation and a war discourse, to advance their respective agendas.² It is not possible in a single volume to show these parallels across different arenas. However, it is instructive to show how contemporary politics in Zimbabwe recalls the early post-independence years. The focus is on the collaborative rather than antagonistic component of the relationship between veterans and the ruling party. First, though, something must be said about the term war veteran. Indeed, the wrangling about who is a war veteran is itself an issue on which veterans and the party may participate on the same or opposite sides.
Who is a war veteran?

Who is an authentic war veteran has been a feature of veterans’ politics since 1980. As previously noted, during the war, educated ex-combatants who were more likely to be critical of the party were often labeled “sell-outs” and severely punished. Since independence, veterans, other liberation war activists, the media, and the party have used a discourse about who is an authentic veteran as a political weapon. Ex-combatants, as this study shows, often claim they never benefited from pay-outs intended for them because non-combatants masqueraded as veterans. These non-combatants included youth who were either trained inside the country during the war or who took great risks working for the guerrillas. When veterans criticized government, the party might label them “inauthentic” combatants or question their credentials, on the grounds that fighters were disciplined and did not challenge the party. Many refugees, especially youths who left the country expecting to become fighters but who were denied training, and others whom the party preferred to use as teachers in the camps, see themselves as authentic freedom fighters, as do former political prisoners and political detainees and mujibas and chimbwidos (male and female youths who provided logistical support to the guerrillas during the war). These groups, too, want war veterans’ status and its associated state benefits and protest the official definition of war veterans which includes only those who received military training. In the looting of the War Victims Compensation Fund between 1993 and 1997, veterans and the media (official and private) blamed “inauthentic” combatants for stealing benefits which belonged to those who had fought the war, though many of the “thieves” were themselves combatants. In 1992 when I interviewed the recently elected ZNLWVA executive, individuals often questioned the liberation credentials of their colleagues because they had not gone to the front, had joined the war late, or had never acquired high war ranks.

Today, party supporters, including the official media, often support party youth who call themselves war veterans, though they are obviously too young to have fought in the war. The purpose is twofold: first, to legitimate their activities, such as land occupations, as part of a new war for economic liberation, and second, to capitalize on the prevailing fear ex-combatants still invoke among civilians. The private opposition media are apt to refer to self-styled war veterans or “war veterans” or militias to emphasize the role of thug elements and deny the liberation pretensions of the party. At the same time, opposition press reports often contain evidence of war veterans’ participation. Curiously, the Zimbabwe Human Rights (ZHR) NGO Forum, which itself documented the crucial role of war veterans, often by name, in one report (see below), seeks to diminish their role and emphasize the importance of party youth in a subsequent report. Others have their own axe to grind. Hence in May 2000 a group of war
veterans, themselves marginalized in post-war politics – some because of their leadership role in ZIPA – formed the Zimbabwe Liberators’ Platform for Peace and Development, and dissociated themselves from “inauthentic” veterans’ relationship with the party in land occupations. Their spokesman said: “True war veterans are not involved in these invasions. It is only a vocal few that are being manipulated by politicians and mainly political hooligans who are involved.”

There are many other instances of internal political struggles where a discourse about who is an “authentic” veteran has been used as a political weapon. The now deceased ZNLWVA chair, Dr. Chenjerai Hunzvi, who also used the name Hitler Hunzvi, had his credentials questioned by the highest echelons in ZIPRA/ZAPU at the height of veterans’ confrontation with the government in 1997. ZNLWVA members, engaged in endless power struggles, often accuse each other of being “inauthentic” veterans, and party factions hostile to an individual may chime in too. In August 2001, the credentials of Joseph Chinotimba, a Harare municipal worker who has emerged as a powerful commander in the current “war” against the MDC, were maligned by, among others, a leader of the Zimbabwe Liberators’ Platform and the former army commander, Solomon Mujuru. Chinotimba, who lives in a party house in a Harare suburb and drives a Cherokee, apparently enjoys Mugabe’s support. Both Mujuru and Mugabe, who support different candidates in the dispute over who will become the next president, were using Chinotimba’s war credentials as a political resource. Observers unfamiliar with how distinctions between “authentic” and “inauthentic” combatants have been used in political struggles are likely to make serious errors. Hence Robert Rotberg seeks to deny any significant involvement of war veterans when he refers to the “supposed war veterans.”

The evidence for war veterans’ involvement in contemporary politics, however, is irrefutable. And it is not just the ZNLWVA national executive. Indeed, a study of the 2000 parliamentary election in Matabeleland North notes that war veterans were important in part because they offered an effective national organization, reaching down to district levels. The ZHR NGO Forum’s report, “Who Was Responsible?,” provides evidence of grass-roots participation by veterans in the violence against and intimidation of MDC supporters in the parliamentary election campaign of 2000. The report lists 644 perpetrators by name and affiliation, including if they were a war veterans. These names are a fraction of those who participated in campaign violence, coming as they do from only about 1,000 statements from victims of political violence to the human rights groups and information from victims who testified in the MDC election challenges at the High Court. Most victims are unable or fear to report their experiences. The list of names gives an unusual opportunity to assess the extent of war veterans’ participation. Obviously, there is a bias toward provinces which had the highest number of election challenges. Overall,
Table 3 *Perpetrators by province*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Perpetrators Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Veterans Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


War veterans represent 21 percent of the perpetrators. There is interesting variation in the numbers of named perpetrators and veterans by province. The three provinces in Matabeleland were not included for lack of data. Veterans constituted 60 percent of total perpetrators in Manicaland, over 48 percent in Mashonaland West, 20 percent and 21 percent in Masvingo and the Midlands respectively, 2.6 percent in Harare (though if one included two known veterans, the figure rises to over 7 percent) and 1.3 percent in Mashonaland Central (see Table 3). It is difficult to interpret this provincial variation. However, the relatively low level of election violence in Harare province probably reflects the ruling party’s acceptance of MDC dominance in the province’s urban constituencies. These data underscore the depth of veterans’ involvement in election campaign violence. Other evidence below will reinforce the claim that war veterans’ collusion with the party is much deeper than the ZNWLVA’s national executive.

**Collusion between veterans and the ruling party, 2000–1**

Just as the ruling party used ZANLA veterans to win electoral power among the rural majority in 1980 and then to build power in the army, the bureaucracy, and among urban workers in the first seven years of independence, so today it is using veterans (ex-ZANLA and ex-ZIPRA) alongside others to try to preserve its power among these constituencies. Land resettlement, like the cooperative movement, is merely a symbol of the party’s revolutionary credentials. There is no genuine commitment to, or program of, economic transformation. Even collaborative attacks on the judiciary by party and veterans are not entirely new. Veterans clearly have their own agendas as they persist in seeking privilege and power, both of which are threatened by a change in regime. The party and veterans collude against the new political opposition, the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC), formed in September 1999, and continue to rely on liberation war appeals and on violence and intimidation.

**Winning rural support**

In the 1980 election campaign, ZANU(PF) and ZAPU concentrated on winning the crucial rural vote. Both used guerrillas to campaign but ZANU(PF) deployed ZANLA political commissars in the rural areas on an incomparably greater scale. Thousands of ZANLA guerrillas were deliberately kept out of assembly camps and infiltrated into the country in violation of the settlement provisions to ensure that their party won the election. The party and its commissars threatened to return to war if people did not vote for it and used the provocative and intimidatory image of guns in its campaign slogans, implying the war would continue if Mugabe lost the election. It goes without saying that there was no punitive action against those who performed revolutionary duties. Indeed, as already noted, the party paid its commissars. The British election monitors’ report claimed that in one-third of the rural areas the voters were not free to vote, chiefly because of ZANU(PF)/ZANLA violence and intimidation. The Commonwealth Observer Group’s report failed to grasp the extent to which ZANLA violations of the settlement were orchestrated and was chiefly concerned with the Rhodesian forces’ violence. ZANU(PF)’s overwhelming election majority persuaded these and other observers that electoral violence and intimidation had not altered the election result which they accepted as a legitimate expression of people’s preferences (see chapter 2).

In the June 2000 parliamentary election campaign, ZANU(PF) again targeted its violence and intimidation on the rural majority. White farmers, African farm workers, and the African rural elite all became prime targets because they were suspected to be MDC supporters. The party and veterans colluded in intimidating and attacking these groups. Invasions of white-owned commercial farms began soon after a referendum in early February 2000, in which 55 percent of those who voted – turn-out was only 26 percent – rejected the government’s proposed constitution. Led by war veterans, land invasions were a deliberate attempt to place intimidating party campaigners close to their rural targets. War veterans and their colleagues were paid for their campaign work. The recently formed MDC, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, a worker who rose through the ranks in the trade union movement and who has no war credentials, made stunning inroads into party power. The MDC won 57 out of 120 seats, though the ruling party retains a significant parliamentary majority because another 30 seats are for appointees, all ZANU(PF) supporters. Violence and intimidation clearly did affect the election result. MDC candidates are challenging the validity of election results in thirty-eight constituencies on the grounds that ZANU(PF) violence and intimidation was a criminal offense in terms of the
Electoral Act and had affected the result.\textsuperscript{20} Several High Court victories, and Mugabe’s (unsuccessful) attempt to stop the challenges, lend support to the MDC claims.\textsuperscript{21}

The ZHR NGO Forum’s July 2001 report on the alleged perpetrators of violence in the election found the ruling party “engaged in a systematic campaign of intimidation aimed at crushing support for opposition parties . . . In campaign speeches, Zanu(PF) leaders and candidates seemed to sanction the use of violence and intimidation against political opponents and contributed substantially to the climate of fear that overshadowed the election campaign.”\textsuperscript{22} At a ceremony for the opening of a water pipeline between the Pungwe River and Mutare in March 2000, President Mugabe himself warned: “Those who try to cause disunity among our people must watch out because death will befall them.”\textsuperscript{23} In May 2000, then Minister of State Security Sydney Sekeramayi warned white farmers and their farm workers who had attended a ruling party rally, and given up their MDC t-shirts, of dire consequences if their demonstrated ZANU(PF) support was not genuine. “After the votes we will see who has been cheating us and we will deal with each other.”\textsuperscript{24} The Defence Minister, Moven Mahachi, allegedly told a crowd on June 2, 2000: “we will move door to door, killing like we did to Chiminya [Tsangirai’s electoral agent who was murdered]. I am the minister responsible for defence therefore I am capable of killing.”\textsuperscript{25} The report also provides evidence from witnesses’ statements to the ZHR NGO Forum, High Court testimony in MDC election challenges, and various newspaper reports, of Zanu(PF) parliamentary candidates threatening MDC supporters with assault or death.\textsuperscript{26}

The report draws attention to the collusion between war veterans and the ruling party. War veterans seemed to be the primary tool used by ZANU(PF) to implement the “campaign by violence” strategy. There was a general fear of the war veterans and their capacity to instigate violence. They seemed to move from constituency to constituency in an organized and calculated manner. The president and ZANU(PF) leadership clearly supported the activities of these war veterans. In a speech in Bindura shown on ZTV on April 8, 2000, President Mugabe said: “We were told to arrest them (war veterans) and remove them from farms. We refused because the occupations are justified. We said there would be no policemen who will go there. If the British want police to evict the war veterans then they must send their police” (italics in original).\textsuperscript{27} The report elaborates on the role of veterans: “The war veterans placed themselves on 1,500 commercial farms around the country, which were utilized as springboards to implement an effective campaign of organized violence. It also allowed the war veterans to control the thousands of farm workers that were part of the rural electorate, which Zanu(PF) saw as its lifeline to staying in power.”\textsuperscript{28} Despite the relatively small number of deaths (36–40 people) between February and June 2000, the party’s “campaign of terror was highly sophisticated and extremely effective.”\textsuperscript{29}
The party and veterans saw themselves as fighting a third *Chimurenga* (liberation war) to consolidate and defend the war of liberation, the second *Chimurenga*. Threats of war were made to the electorate if it voted the ruling party out of power. For example, Josiah Hungwe, governor of Masvingo, threatened white commercial farmers whom he suspected of MDC sympathies with war if they did not vote for the ruling party. “We do not want another war. If you want peace you should support me and the ruling party . . . If you want trouble vote for another party.” ZNLWVA leader and former ZIPRA dissident Andrew Ndlovu threatened the violent overthrow of the MDC if it won the June 2000 election and the installation of a military government. He said the war veterans would never allow the country to go back to Smith, a reference to the MDC being a party to promote whites’ interests. War veteran Edmore Hwarare, commander of the war veterans occupying farms in Masvingo West and parts of the Midlands, said ex-combatants would not accept the results if any opposition party won the elections. The MDC president should train its own soldiers to fight ZANU(PF) if he wants to rule. “This country was won through the loss of blood and not elections. Therefore, if anyone wants to take it he should go to war with the ruling party. Even if other people accept the results, we will not . . . We are married to this country and Mugabe. We are going to support Mugabe until we bury him.”

In early 2000, the party allocated the ZNLWVA Z$20 million for their campaign effort. They formed militias composed of party supporters, mostly unemployed youths, and paid the recruits. Some veterans complained they never received their promised payments. The party also provided transport and other logistical support, and the veterans enjoyed the support of CIO, army, and police personnel. At least one party candidate, who was standing in the urban constituency of Mufakose, hired youths to torture local residents and paid them Z$500–700 a week for bringing in MDC t-shirts with the blood of supporters on them. A ZANLA veteran who had joined the MDC referred to a letter from Joyce Mujuru, Acting Defence Minister, Mt. Darwin North MP, and wife of former ZNA commander, Solomon Mujuru, promising Z$25,000 to party supporters who killed him, and of youth being paid Z$500 per day. An MDC candidate in Bindura also spoke of party promises to pay his killer Z$300,000. ZNLWVA secretary-general Andy Mhlanga said his association would ask ZANU(PF) for at least Z$15 million to campaign for the presidential election.

In October 2000 the government offered amnesty to those who had committed politically motivated crimes between January 1 and July 31, 2000 but excluded those accused of murder, robbery, rape, indecent assault, statutory rape, theft, possession of arms, or any offense involving fraud or dishonesty. However, very few people accused of crimes which the amnesty did not cover were prosecuted. Even where arrests were made, no one had yet stood trial. Moreover, subsequent political crimes rarely led to arrests, and trials for such cases were
virtually unheard of. According to the ZHR NGO Forum’s July 2001 report, “Zanu(PF) supporters, war veterans and CIO members seem to operate with official impunity.”

Retaining the army’s loyalty

Between 1980 and 1987, the ruling party used veterans to help build power over the Rhodesian forces. Senior guerrilla leaders were retained in their leadership posts while all other guerrillas were entitled to army careers, at least until the policy reversal which made demobilization of those still in assembly camps compulsory. At the same time, the ruling party and ZANLA veterans colluded to help build power in the army chiefly over ZIPRA. BMATT helped the party to bend rules so that merit gave way to appointments based on the need for parity between ZIPRA and ZANLA, thus limiting the number of posts ZIPRA seemed headed to acquire. From early 1982, the party and ZANLA veterans colluded in a vicious attack on ZIPRA members in the army, especially those in command positions. Disappearances, detentions, arrests, torture, and refusal to obey ZIPRA commanders or accept ZIPRA appointments became widespread. Impunity was provided for when in July 1982 the government introduced Emergency Regulations effectively reinstating the Smith regime’s Indemnity and Compensation Act which protected government agencies from prosecutions as long as they were intending to preserve the security of Zimbabwe. The Supreme Court struck down these regulations as unconstitutional in 1984 but with no practical effect for perpetrators or victims. While rank-and-file army members had complaints about low salaries and other conditions, the army also provided secure employment and opportunities for graft (see chapter 4).

Both the army’s top leadership, themselves liberation war veterans, and many other veterans in the army are vested in the party remaining in power. Especially the senior men receive excellent pay and benefits, augmented by patronage, including farms and lucrative opportunities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where the army had been fighting to defend that country’s government since late 1998. These leaders authorized the use of their personnel, vehicles, planes, and allegedly arms to assist in the land invasions during the June 2000 election campaign and the presidential campaign. After the MDC won all seats in the capital, the police and the army attacked people in the surrounding high-density suburbs to punish them for voting for the MDC. There is strong regime support in the army.

The ruling party and army leaders took steps to respond to their anxieties about potential MDC loyalties in the army. In September 2000 Moven Mahachi, the Defence Minister, who has since died, amended the Defence Act to create a reserve force composed of war veterans, and war veterans’ issues and their association, the ZNLWVA, were brought under the Defence Ministry. In May
2001, the ZNA commander, Lt.-General Constantine Chiwenga, a war veteran, reportedly toured army barracks to mobilize support for President Mugabe in the presidential election. He is said to have told soldiers that the army should never allow Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC leader and presidential contender, to govern Zimbabwe. He called the former trade union leader a “deserter” of the 1970s liberation war – in fact, Tsvangirai stayed in Zimbabwe during the war – and said no “self-respecting” soldier should ever consider saluting him. To secure party loyalty, Chiwenga introduced a policy of promotions for all war veterans in the army, and banned war veterans from retirement before the presidential election. Mugabe promised every member of the uniformed services (including the army) a plot under the fast-track resettlement scheme. The defense forces were to implement the movement of people on to the plots. All war veterans, including those in the army, were paid 25 percent increases in their monthly pensions from August 2001, backdated to January 2001.

There were rumors that if there were food riots – there was a predicted shortage of maize, a staple, in October 2001 – the army would intervene to place in power a new ZANU(PF) leader. These reports apparently had their origin in army discussions on staging a coup, to reinstate Mugabe as the elected leader and allow him to rule by decree and install his preferred successor. But intense rivalries between war veteran Emmerson Munangagwa, Speaker of the House of Assembly and former Defence and Security Minister, and Sydney Sekeramayi, also a party stalwart and currently Minister of Defence, for the succession and for control of the army led the army hierarchy to abort coup plans. Munangagwa reportedly has Mugabe’s support and the support of a few officers in the army hierarchy whereas Sekeramayi has the support of Solomon Mujuru, the CIO, and most of the army’s top brass. The important point is that a military coup would almost certainly have been in support of the ruling party. In August 2001, Didymus Mutasa, one of the ruling party’s most senior and loyal members, warned for the second time in two months of a coup should Morgan Tsvangirai win the presidential election.

Securing control over the judiciary

Attacks on court officials for their Smith or Muzorewa affiliations were not uncommon in the early months after independence. War veterans, including Edgar Tekere, ZANU(PF) secretary-general and Manpower Development and Planning Minister, used revolutionary rhetoric to defend the crimes they stood accused of committing and to undermine the legitimacy of the courts. ZANU(PF)’s complicity included funding and/or orchestrating public support for these defendants. These cases, which were not part of this study, are included here because they resonate with veterans’ and the party’s attacks on
members of the judiciary and with their appeals to revolutionary agendas in 2000–1.

Tekere was accused of murdering a white man on August 4, 1980, a charge he did not deny, though he did not plead guilty. Tekere’s British-led defense team sought to protect the new constitution and the judges’ impartiality, and at the same time, to use the fact that the judges were appointees of the previous regime to advance their client’s cause. The defense submitted an unsuccessful application requesting that the presiding judge recuse himself and that the other judges who had been appointed under the former regime be disqualified. The defense argued that Tekere, and anyone in his position as a prominent “terrorist,” would reasonably feel that the judges, upholders of a “rebel government,” could not be impartial. Moreover, the defense said, Tekere’s public statements since independence that judges in office before the end of the war should no longer sit as judges would make him feel that the judges could not be impartial toward him. In contrast to the delicacy with which the British defense team danced around the constitutional issues of Tekere’s case, other guerrillas directly attacked the court’s constitutionality and impartiality.

Three ZANLA guerrillas who were living on ZANU(PF)’s Oasis Farm were accused of murdering three whites and of attempting to murder the two-year-old child of one of their victims on July 19, 1980. The accused were represented by a firm of attorneys acting on ZANU(PF)’s behalf, but they refused to speak to two white advocates whom their attorneys had briefed. They asked to speak to Rex Nhongo, ZANLA’s leader, or Emmerson Munangagwa, a ZANU(PF) cabinet minister who had been ZANLA’s intelligence chief. The attorneys hired African advocates. When the trial was scheduled to begin in January 1981, the accused requested that Justice Dumbutshena, the first black judge, his two assessors, and the public prosecutor step down from presiding at the trial. In a statement read by his counsel, one of the accused, Chinowa, said that he “rejected outright the public prosecutor, the trial judge and the appointed assessors to sit in judgment over me. I absolutely refuse to address these gentlemen in any respectful manner and hold myself blameless for whatever events may have happened.” These court officers, he said, had served in the former Smith and Muzorewa regimes, had promoted racial discrimination, and “were unashamedly drunk with blood on their hands.” He would “obediently and respectfully” stand trial under a judge, assessor, and prosecutor appointed by ZANU(PF). Should he be forced to stand trial, he would ask for the entire ZANU(PF) government and the ZANLA High Command to stand trial with him, as he was under their influence and owed allegiance to them. Had the people at the farm where the murders allegedly were committed behaved in a “reasonable and respectful manner” toward him and his comrades, the “unfortunate incidents” would not have taken place. Judge Dumbutshena rejected the application, saying he had been appointed after independence with the approval of the ZANU(PF)
government, and that the assessors and public prosecutor had sworn allegiance to the new government which had also approved their appointments. When the trial began, the men pleaded not guilty. Chinowa refused to take the Christian oath, but said he was bound to tell the truth in the name of all the heroes who had died during the war. Before the men were sentenced to death, Chinowa told the judge that for him (the judge), the blood of the dead whites was thicker than that of his own people. The only reason he was being sentenced to death, he claimed, was because he had killed “royal blood” (i.e. whites). Had he been a man of means like “Comrade Tekere” rather than a poor African, he would be free.

In September 1980, a court in Enkeldoorn found two ZANLA guerrillas guilty of assault in a kangaroo court. The white magistrate reportedly wanted to sentence the men in Umvuma, where they lived, so that the community could see justice done. The men’s ZANU(PF) supporters, mostly women, had their own ideas. As the magistrate was announcing the two men’s prison sentences, the crowd, which was encouraged by one of the guerrillas, started shouting “no jail” and hurling abuse at the magistrate and police. When the magistrate and the court interpreter left the court room, the two guerrillas refused to be moved from the dock. Police reserves were called in to try to restore order without bloodshed. They negotiated with the local ZANU(PF) chair and a ZANLA liaison officer. The police agreed to their request that the two men be allowed to walk with police and prison escorts to the police station rather than be transported in a prison truck. The pact was violated and the men escaped but were recaptured.

Following adverse court rulings on farm invasions and on the validity of ZANU(PF) victories in certain constituencies in the June 2000 election, judges became targets of the ruling party and its supporters. The land occupations began in mid-February immediately after the electorate rejected the government’s draft constitution, which included a provision allowing for the expropriation of land without compensation, should the British government refuse to fund it. The Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), representing 4,500 mainly white commercial farmers, applied to the High Court in March 2000 and again in November 2000 to try to end the land occupations and remove the war veterans, party youth, and others from their land. The results in both cases were consent orders involving the Commissioner of Police, the ZNLWVA and its chairman Chenjerai Hunzvi, the governor of Mashonaland West, Border Gezi, the ministers responsible for land resettlement, and the provincial governors. The thrust of the consent orders was that the land occupations were illegal, they should stop immediately, and the police should act to remove illegal occupants on farms. Despite the government and other respondents agreeing to their illegality, land occupations continued and the police largely stood by. Meanwhile the CFU had initiated proceedings on the constitutionality of the government’s fast-track resettlement program.
in September 1999. On December 27, 2000, all five judges of the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the government’s fast-track resettlement program was unconstitutional and ordered immediate compliance with the existing consent orders and a halt to further land acquisition. Again, there was no compliance.53

The CFU and MDC victories in the High Court and Supreme Court drew the ire of party supporters against the judges, all President Mugabe’s appointees, except for Chief Justice Gubbay who was a judge prior to independence but was appointed Chief Justice in 1990.54 These court rulings, deemed as embarrassing and undermining government’s ability to rule, provoked a campaign to get rid of judges “under the guise that these judges are remnants of the racist governmental institutions of the former colonial regime.”55 Prominent in the campaign were government officials, ruling party parliamentarians, party youth, and ZNLWVA leaders. War veterans’ leaders threatened violence against certain judges to pressure them to resign, with some success. Chief Justice Gubbay (a white) was forced to retire prematurely in March 2001, and since then, at least one High Court judge, Judge Devittie (involved in three successful MDC election petitions), has retired because of war veterans’ threats of violence.56

A few examples illustrate the type of objections made about the Supreme Court judges and some High Court judges and the manipulation of revolutionary appeals when the real issue was party power. President Mugabe told newspaper editors in February 2001: “‘[T]hey [judges] drank tea with whites. They sympathize with the whites and cannot be seen to pass judgments against the [white] farmers.’”57 Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa, speaking at a Joint Command and Staff Course at the Zimbabwe Staff College in January 2001, criticized the workings and racial composition of the Supreme Court.

The present composition of the judiciary reflects that the country is in a semi-colonial state, half free, half enslaved. Visitors to our country would be excused from observing, as they often do, that if one came to the country, chaperoned to a sitting of the Supreme Court and made to leave immediately, one would by that fact alone conclude that he has been to a European and not African country. It is like we have an English court on Zimbabwean soil.

He called the Supreme Court “the main opposition to the ruling party,” and said:

We must begin to exorcise from all our institutions the racist ghost of Ian Smith and we do so by phasing out his disciples and sympathisers and fellow travellers. The elements on the present bench and associated with the Smith regime must know and must be told their continued stay on the bench is no longer at our invitation. Their continued stay is now an albatross around the necks of our population.

Admitting that all the judges, bar Chief Justice Gubbay, had been appointed by President Mugabe, he said those were the days when “the black population was
like sedated, drugged and intoxicated by the spirit of national reconciliation, which we understood to mean that the white population would co-operatively agree to relinquish their privileged position and access to our resources but alas which they understood to mean the preservation of the pre-1980 status quo and for all time.” After the forced resignation of the Chief Justice, Minister Chinamasa said the remaining Supreme Court judges needed to go, as well as nearly one-third of High Court judges. Vice-President Muzenda, meeting with the Chief Justice and another member of the Supreme Court in mid-January 2001 to discuss threats on the justices’ lives if they did not resign, accused the Chief Justice of aiding and abetting racism and said their court judgments on land threatened the landless.

Veterans also used revolutionary war appeals to justify the removal of justices who opposed their quest for land. In February 2001 Mike Moyo, ZNLWVA’s Harare Province deputy chair, promised the war veterans would raid and occupy the homes of all white judges until “they have boarded the plane back to Britain.” He also warned “those black judges who sympathise with whites also need to watch out.” Chenjerai Hunzvi, ZNLWVA chair, justified attacks on judges. “We’re fighting for the liberation of the land, and if they want to stop us, we are going to remove them.” He defiantly said: “We will not be told by anyone to stop. It will only be death that will stop us.” In May 2001, Hunzvi died. Despite government bullying to encourage the resignation of two other Supreme Court judges, one white and one Asian, both served out their terms until their statutory retirement in 2001.

Retaining urban workers’ support

In the 1980s the ruling party used ZANLA guerrillas to try to build a power base among urban workers in the bureaucracy and in the private sector. The party spurred on workers’ committees with promises of support for workers’ participation in management decision-making and intervened on behalf of ZANLA veterans on workers’ committees who reported management abuses and racism. Managers were called to party headquarters where the party intervened to solve workplace disputes. The entire exercise was infused with intimidation and occasional violence. To a considerable degree, the intimidation arose from the fact that the managers were dealing with a new power structure which was also perceived initially as committed to a socialist revolution. To an extent, the non-combatant workforce deferred to the veterans whom they both feared and held in awe. Ultimately, the party withdrew support for veterans’ activities when it no longer deemed them expedient, leaving veterans with a sense of having been betrayed (see chapter 5).

In April 2001, ZANU(PF)’s newly elected Harare provincial party executive (composed of a number of war veterans) formed a committee to deal with
labor disputes in its province. The labor committee was chaired by Chris Pasipamire, a war veteran and the Harare provincial party vice-chair, and included Joseph Chinotimba, ZNLWVA’s Harare Province chair. The late Border Gezi, a politburo member and also Minister of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation, was said to be involved in creating the committee. The goal was to win back the urban vote from the MDC (it won all the Harare and Bulawayo constituencies in the 2000 general election) by resolving workers’ grievances against employers and to intimidate those companies believed to be MDC supporters and financiers. To mobilize workers, politicians also made frequent references to workers running the companies.

In less than two months war veterans and their supporters had invaded about 200 mainly white-owned private companies (as well as foreign embassies, NGOs, and other organizations), chiefly in Harare and Bulawayo. Lacking any legal authority, these groups put forward some legitimate workers’ grievances, including the size of retrenchment packages and the long delays in appeals being heard by the Labour Tribunal. The groups kidnapped company executives and held them hostage, initially on their own premises. Executives and managers who resisted even legitimate demands to pay exorbitant amounts of compensation to sacked workers or to reinstate them were forcibly marched to the provincial party headquarters where they were threatened and often tortured and beaten. Money extorted from executives was often taken by these groups for their personal use. Seldom did the police intervene to stop the extortion and assaults, or to institute criminal prosecution after the event. Workers themselves were vulnerable to veterans’ retaliation in the high-density suburbs where they lived alongside each other should they indicate any resistance to the veterans or support for management. Central government and the ruling party also did not intervene, though Nkosana Moyo, Minister of Industry and International Trade, publicly condemned the company invasions (two weeks later he resigned) and others, notably Minister of Home Affairs John Nkomo (also national party chair) and ZANU(PF) vice-president, Joseph Msika, voiced “lukewarm” objections.

However, after international pressures and threatened sanctions government and party officials and ZNLWVA leaders (including Hunzvi and Chinotimba) ordered the company invasions to stop, disbanded the labor committee, and called on the police to arrest “rogue” elements for intimidation and extortion of money from company officials. These “rogue” elements, party leaders said, had distorted party policy which was to use the labor committee to intercede in labor disputes through negotiations between employers and the Labour Ministry. Said Hunzvi of the “rogues”: “These people want to tarnish the image of the Government and the war veterans and we do not tolerate that.” Police arrested and charged thirty-six people, including war veterans. When Mike Moyo, a former vice-chair of the ZNLWVA Harare Province and the secretary for security
in ZANU(PF)’s Harare Province, was arrested on charges of extortion (he was later set free), he said John Nkomo, national party chair, and July Moyo, Labour Minister, had ordered or sanctioned the company occupations. He accused John Nkomo of protecting big people who were office bearers in the ruling party, and charged that Chinotimba and Hunzvi had benefited hugely from extortion and should be arrested.77

After a lull, company invasions resumed.78 The party’s withdrawal of support for veterans in 2001 was more ambivalent than its distancing of itself from workers’ committees and their veteran leadership in the mid-1980s. Even after the March 2002 presidential election, the party continued to intervene in labor matters. Joseph Chinotimba is the vice-president of the ruling party’s new trade union federation, the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions, which seeks to eliminate the MDC-linked Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.79 A labor relations specialist drew an analogy between management’s need to learn to deal with the new power structure parallel to central government—the war veterans—and its need in the early 1980s to acquaint itself with the new party–government power structure.80 While the presence of veterans in the workplace may appear to management to be a new power structure parallel to the central government, the foregoing suggests that veterans and the party/government have been interdependent in pursuit of their common and particular interests. In veterans’ and the party’s use of revolutionary appeals, their mutual manipulation, their collusion, and also their disagreements, the labor invasions of 2000–1 and the upheavals in the workplace in the early 1980s have similarities.

**Preserving the loyalty of the civil service**

At independence, the civil service was dominated by supporters of the previous regime. The ruling party’s recruitment of chiefly its own veterans was intended to provide patronage, ensure loyal cadres, and introduce a group who could protect party interests. Some veterans met civil service standards but were incorporated over other equally or better qualified civilians. Others were unable to meet the requirements and were incorporated into specially created posts. The government/party responded to pressures for rapid promotions of veterans in the civil service. The central government also instructed local authorities to hire veterans on their staff. During the conflict in Matabeleland and the Midlands council staff and civil servants who belonged to ZAPU/ZIPRA became official targets of detentions, beatings, torture, disappearances, and killings (see chapter 5).

Control of the civil service was again a ruling party concern, as ruling party and government officials made clear, especially in the wake of the parliamentary election and in anticipation of the presidential election. In September 2000, Border Gezi, a cabinet minister and politburo member, said he intended
retrenching all civil servants and replacing them with ZANU(PF) supporters. “If you want to work for the Government, you should be prepared to support ZANU(PF).” In April 2001 Border Gezi told all civil servants who were not prepared to implement government programs, which were ZANU(PF) programs, that they were free to resign. Education Minister Stan Mudenge told staff and students at teachers’ colleges in Masvingo in July 2001 that the only way they could guarantee their safety was to vote for ZANU(PF). He warned: “You are going to lose your jobs if you support opposition political parties in the presidential election. As civil servants, you have to be loyal to the government of the day. You can even be killed for supporting the opposition and no one would guarantee your safety.”

Aneas Chigwedere, Deputy Minister of Education, Sports and Culture told head teachers at a conference in June 2001 that his ministry would not protect teachers affected by war veterans’ and ZANU(PF) supporters’ violence. “I blame you for championing your political agendas, that will result in you falling victim.” Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri, himself a war veteran, declared his allegiance to the ruling party in January 2001, in case his behavior in the campaign and land invasions had not already made it clear. “I support ZANU(PF) because it is the ruling party,” he said. Provincial governors, ZANU(PF) appointees, also encouraged war veterans’ violence and made public threats against the MDC.

Veterans (outside the security organs) colluded with the party in purging the civil service and local authorities of suspected MDC supporters, using intimidation and physical assaults. These purges included rural teachers and head teachers, rural and district council staff, district and provincial administrators, and senior police officers. As with labor invasions, war veterans tried to justify their interventions in terms of legitimate local grievances, including corruption and lack of accountability. Yet some of their interventions were patently self-serving. McGregor describes for Matabeleland North how war veterans and other ruling party supporters benefited directly from their dismissals of public servants from the Ministry of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation.

In each district, veterans expelled the Ministry’s four or five community workers on a range of charges, replacing them with war veterans or party loyalists and their relatives. Not only were the suspensions of existing personnel illegal, but the new incumbents often lacked the requisite five O level school examination grades, and their appointment was thus in violation of Public Service Commission requirements.

Veterans certainly expected to benefit from the dismissal of elected and appointed local authority staff and central state civil servants.

War veterans in the police force received promotions in a bid to guarantee party loyalty in the presidential election. The privately owned Daily News reported in March 2001 that police officers were asked to identify ex-combatants among their ranks just before the previous Christmas. Reportedly, 419 officers
were promoted, more than 300 of whom were war veterans who were promoted to ranks of sergeant and assistant inspector. Disgruntled police officers allege that many veterans who were promoted are illiterate and that professional officers were overlooked. The alleged aim was for all police posts to be led by war veterans by the time of the presidential election.90

The rhetoric of economic transformation

Government and party officials, demobilized veterans, and NGOs had a vested interest in portraying the ex-combatants who joined the cooperative movement as its revolutionary vanguard. According to official rhetoric, cooperatives were going to be a crucial instrument for slowly transforming the capitalist economy toward socialism, one of the goals of the liberation struggle. But the ex-combatants had little interest in cooperatives other than as a source of income and many aspired to join the more lucrative private sector. NGO funds poured into cooperatives produced little development but exacerbated a sense of entitlement to further support. The party seemed equally uninterested in cooperatives, if the provision of government resources is an indicator of interest. Moreover, the party’s partisan interests prevailed over any commitment to cooperatives. The ruling party was hostile to ZIPRA cooperatives from the outset and relied on the security organs to ensure they would be developmental failures. Inter alia, the party focused adverse attention on NGOs which provided support to ZIPRA cooperatives. The cooperative movement was a high-profile publicity campaign whose main significance was symbolic. At the same time, it was an opportunity to incorporate ex-combatants as party patrons and build party power (see chapter 5).

The role of land occupations since February 2000 as a means of legitimating the declining popularity of the party shares much in common with the political function of cooperatives in the early years of the 1980s. The ruling party and its veteran supporters promoted land occupations as necessary to eliminate gross racial land inequalities. The struggle for land was presented as the major rationale behind the liberation struggle and the new third Chimurenga, the rebellion against economic injustice. “The economy is land, and land is the economy” was the party’s rallying cry in the 2000 parliamentary election campaign. The party praised war veterans for instigating spontaneous land invasions in February 2000 and for being the party’s revolutionary conscience, though the party itself may have ordered the invasions.91 But the land invasions had nothing to do with development and equity. Rather, they were a source of patronage and legitimacy for a party seeking to buttress its waning power and popular support at a time when its purse was depleted. The Supreme Court, ruling unanimously on the unconstitutionality of fast-track resettlement in December 2000, found no coherent program of land reform, and argued that it was primarily ZANU(PF)
supporters who were beneficiaries and suspected or MDC farmers whose land was acquired.92

The goals of fast-track resettlement were clearly unattainable – the government, with army assistance, intended to move people on to the 4,700 white-owned farms it had listed for compulsory acquisition.93 The country had no resources to implement viable land reform. Inputs, infrastructure, and agricultural staff did not exist for such an ambitious undertaking. Foreign aid was unavailable. Under the cover of land reform, thousands of farm workers had already lost their jobs and white farmers their land for the benefit of ZANU(PF) supporters, regardless of whether they were even interested in farming. Stories of war veterans selling land plots suggest that some veterans themselves were not interested in resettlement and were using their central role in land occupations and land allocation committees to enhance their power and make money.

Conclusion

Significant differences distinguish the years between 1980 and 1987 and those between 2000 and 2001. These include the domestic, regional, and international political and economic environment, the degree of centralization of veterans’ and party power, the extent of veterans’ organization, the nature of schisms among veterans, and the character and identity of the political opposition. Yet a comparison of the two different time periods underscores how ZANU(PF) and the war veterans have shown remarkable consistency in their power-seeking agendas, their appeals to the revolutionary liberation war, their use of violence and intimidation, and their abuse of state resources. The ruling party and veterans have manipulated and shaped each other as they have pursued their distinct and overlapping agendas. For the party, using the veterans to build power has always entailed a dangerous tension precisely because they have had their own agendas. The desire for a generational shift in power may be among them. These findings beg not only for new frameworks beyond peace-building with its dichotomous notions of war and peace and its externally imposed evaluative criteria of democracy, reconciliation, peace, and stability, but also for more attention to understanding guerrilla armies and their post-war fates.
Appendix: The ruling party’s attempts to withdraw ex-combatants’ special status and ex-combatants’ responses, 1988–1997

When the government disbanded the Demobilisation Directorate in 1986/7, in the words of one of its officials, it wanted “ex-combatants to feel part of society, not to feel better served than any other citizen.”¹ Shortly after the party unity agreement in 1987, the official press struck a new tone. “Eight years ago, Zimbabwe’s mighty young freedom fighters brought down the fall of the colonial regime. But today some of them are still basking in that glory and refusing to come to terms with the present realities of Zimbabwe.”² In March 1988 several government/party leaders sought unsuccessfully to stifle efforts in parliament to seek special treatment for ex-combatants.³ At the time of the parliamentary debate, newly appointed Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, John Nkomob bluntly told the press that ex-combatants’ problems were no longer special.

One does not have to single out a particular group for preferential treatment eight years after independence. I think in the eight years we have gone through too many things have been evened out between the ex-combatant and the non ex-combatant. We should now be addressing unemployment as a national problem that faces both the veterans of the war and those who were young during the war, but who have now attained the age of majority.

“[P]eople must not be too selective about jobs they are called upon to perform,” he said.⁴ Responding months later to the first parliamentary debate on the plight of ex-combatants, he defended government’s ex-combatant programs, though he agreed that more could be done. For the short term, he acknowledged the special status of ex-combatants. He assured the House of Assembly that his government, “born out of revolutionary struggle,” had a “special responsibility” toward the ex-combatants that it “cannot possibly and should not ignore.” As a “short term solution,” government still hoped to renew its call for organizations to give priority to the employment of ex-combatants. In the long term, policies had to be formulated to cater for unemployed ex-combatants and unemployed youth.⁵

Joshua Nkomo, appointed Senior Minister of Political Affairs in President Mugabe’s office after the 1987 unity accord, also called for an end to
ex-combatants’ “special” status. At a May Day rally in Bulawayo in 1988, he appealed to ex-combatants to appreciate the country’s unemployment problems and not consider themselves as special cases because they fought the war for liberation. “You went to fight for the liberation of the country, you were not mercenaries,” he said. In July 1988 when ex-combatant Obed Mpofu (ZAPU MP) asked whether there would be a “high powered delegation” to discuss the plight of ex-combatants as well as the recently amnestied dissidents, Minister Nkombo replied that the ex-dissidents presented a security threat and therefore required special attention whereas the ex-combatants had a problem of unemployment which was shared by youth generally. “It is not just the ex-combatant—it is the young people who have no jobs… The problem is not for those who carried the gun during the war, it is the problem facing all the young people in this country and therefore, we would like to have only an all embracing answer to this problem…” At the same time, the official press underscored the severity of unemployment, commenting that the vast majority of the 100,000 “O” level school leavers each year stood no chance of gaining jobs.

The exchange in parliament between Mr. Bhebe (ZAPU MP) and the Minister of Defence, Mr. Nkala, in August 1988 was also revealing of the party’s desire to free itself of ex-combatants. Mr. Bhebe asked why the government did not first recruit demobilized ex-combatants when forming the Sixth Brigade:

we have had a sixth brigade and we had hoped that this one would have taken cognisance of the fact that we have got former freedom fighters who had been demobbed and that first of all, before taking on any new incumbents, these would have been the first people to be taken in for training in a formal manner. Some of them had been guerrillas. Why is [it] that the Minister saw fit to take new people, instead of first of all taking these old fighters and then adding on new ones in order that we should have not now been having some demobilised ex-combatants – they should now all have been contained in the Zimbabwe National Army.

Minister Nkala answered that the army deliberately recruited people with five “O” levels, including at least a passing grade of C in English, mathematics, and science, because the goal was to create a professional army which needed educated people. Aware of the sensitivity of his answer, Nkala said: “The army, I want to apologise first for what I want to say, has nothing to do with anybody either the demobilised people or those who would have wanted to have come into the army and were not taken. The army is not a dumping ground.”

Ex-combatants fought back. They denied they had enjoyed privilege. They continued to see themselves as disadvantaged compared with unemployed youth, those who got employment during the war years, Rhodesian soldiers, whites after World War II, and their own leaders. They blamed their leaders for failing to recognize their war sacrifices. Especially backbenchers in parliament,
among them some ex-combatants, sympathized with and sought to win the aggrieved ex-combatants’ political support to advance their own careers.

In 1988 ex-combatants and their supporters rebutted official attempts to deny their special status and to lump them together with other unemployed youth. What distinguished ex-combatants from other youth, they emphasized, was that they had sacrificed their education to fight for their country. Joshua Nkomo’s statement that the ex-combatants had not fought for money was galling to ex-combatants. “We never fought for money,” said an ex-combatant.

What Dr. Nkomo must bear in mind is that both ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants really suffered in the bush. So please, I ask Dr. Nkomo not to provoke the hungry ones. Somebody like Dr. Nkomo is not supposed to talk like this. He must talk to those who started talking about ex-combatants. Leave us Dr. Nkomo we are just patient as you left us. We will simply carry on with our push-carts [a reference to the form of employment of many ex-combatants].

Another appropriated Joshua Nkomo’s language of mercenaries to criticize government and party leaders for accumulating wealth without doing anything for ex-combatants. “What the mercenaries are asking for is only food, shelter and clothing for themselves and their families. Not posh cars and three or more houses. These things need employment and money.”

Increasingly after party unity, the ex-guerrillas’ leaders became a frame of reference and a target of public criticism. An unemployed ex-combatant blamed the leaders for his situation. “I agreed to be demobilised thinking it would be easy to get a job. It seems our leaders are to blame as their promises were not fulfilled. They are living in luxury while we are suffering. It seems the exercise to demobilise us was not done properly.” In 1989 a letter to the press complained that government had recruited “raw and untested” civilians for 5 and 6 Brigades – actually the latter selection process was tough and only 1,000 of 27,000 applicants were accepted – and demobilized “the brave, tested and experienced ex-combatants.” The letter warns: “The ex-combatants are aware of what is happening in their country. Remember they are ex-combatants/fighters not beggars!” Another observed: “Ex-combatants were taken for a ride during their demob [sic] exercise. They were told that the army was too big and the State’s economy could not carry it. But three brigades have been formed since…” In 1992 an ex-combatant in the army commented: “I want to say ex-combatants are expecting too much from the government. Their current problems are not exclusive to them. But politically it is difficult to pronounce these views. The politicians have a reasonable standard of living. It would be an irresponsible statement. There’s a saying ‘you tend to forget those who made you what you are today.’”

Ex-combatants used other frames of reference, too, to criticize the governments demobilization scheme. In 1992 the chair of the newly formed Zimbabwe
National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), Charles Hungwe (appointed a High Court judge in 2001), traced war veterans’ frustrations to the demobilization exercise and contrasted the haphazard program with the experience of the Rhodesian (white) soldiers who “got fat cheques, life pensions and other retirement incentives.” Another ZNLWVA official, a former directorate member, scoffed at the Z$4,400 lump sum because after World War II whites had been given farms.19

References to how ex-combatants had wasted their money in the early 1980s drew emotional outbursts. In 1991, Mr. M. T. Chinamasa, a ZANU(PF) parliamentarian, reminded his colleagues how irresponsibly ex-combatants had used their demobilization money: “the youngsters went mad with that money. Some hired taxis went from Mutare to Harare in order to find the Bulawayo train still there. They went out drinking with brief-cases full of money. What has happened today is what [sic] they are coming back to say that you did not give us anything. – [Mrs Dongo (ex-combatant): Inaudible interjection].”

The following two responses illustrate how ex-combatants and their supporters rejected such criticism and appealed to their poverty and suffering.

It is a sad thing to hear some people say some of these fighters misused their demobilisation funds. What have they themselves done with the money they have earned in all the years they have worked?

When these brave young men and women crossed our borders their parents were butchered by the regime’s forces. Some parents managed to go across as well. After independence the entire surviving members of such families had nothing to feed on except the meagre $185 which was the demobilisation pay for an ex-combatant who automatically had become the bread-winner of the family.

It is only those ex-combatants who were born in well-to-do families who managed to save for the future. When talking about the suffering of ex-combatants we don’t refer to the sons and daughters of big-tummy daddies with wardrobes and kitchen units loaded with money, but of those poor peasant farmers who were the backbone of the struggle for independence.

Let’s not create a class struggle.21

You’re talking of people who’d come from poor families where maybe frustration that made you go and fight was because your poor dad was getting that little money. I come back. No clothes, I need a place to live, need to eat. Some people did not even get this. And some who’d gone much earlier had left families [who now needed to be cared for]. Z$185 was simply not enough. To say ex-combatants used this money roughly is insulting.22

Ex-combatants saw themselves as disadvantaged compared with workers who educated themselves or got jobs during the war and blamed their leaders for their plight. In 1990 a state certified nurse, a category created to bring ex-combatants with some war-time medical experience but inadequate education into the civil service, complained when the government granted salary increases
to only the state registered nurses, who already earned much more than the state certified nurses. “[We are being] left in the cold by the Government we shed blood to bring into power. We are now being laughed at by the State Registered Nurses who continued with their studies while we were liberating this country.”23 Presenting the grievances of local government promotion officers, another job category introduced to bring inadequately qualified ex-combatants into the public service, a parliamentarian contrasted their loyalty, despite salary grievances, with the unpatriotic workers then on strike for more pay who ought to have been asking the government to set aside “funds earmarked for their increments” to help ex-combatants. He referred to some ex-combatants in the public and private sectors as being under “intensive mental torture” from their seniors or employers, and appealed to government and society to accept ex-combatants. “Even some leaders within both the Party and Government do not feel at ease near ex-combatants.”24 In 1994 MP Margaret Dongo, herself an ex-combatant, made representations on behalf of special constabularies, a category created for ex-combatants who could not meet entry-level educational requirements to join the police force. Could not their experience outweigh their lack of formal academic qualifications so that they could be integrated into the regular forces?25

Better-educated ex-combatants in regular civil service posts often felt aggrieved too. A ZANLA ex-combatant, employed at Lonrho as a manager, railed against the party for failing to give preferential treatment to the fighters, evidently not counting how ZANU(PF) had recruited him to spend two years at Punjab University in India.26 In the 1990s, ex-combatant MPs and ex-combatants’ supporters asked questions about how many ex-combatants were ambassadors, had got scholarships to study abroad, and sat on government boards.27

Ex-combatants complained that their Scholarship Fund, run by ZANLA or ZANU(PF) stalwarts from a Harare office, went to non-combatants. Even ZANLA ex-combatants complained that the most important attribute of successful applicants was being a friend or relative of high-ranking party officials rather than an ex-fighter. In 1992 a former ZANLA/ZIPA fighter said: “Very few ex-combatants benefited. I don’t know of any ex-combatant who got a scholarship. They never advertised it. You had to be in Harare to even hear of it. Scholarships went to girlfriends, family, etc.”28 A former ZIMFEP director, himself a ZANLA combatant, who helped to screen ex-combatants’ applications disagreed. “Maybe there was 10 percent diversion. The program was never publicized enough, and was being processed in Harare. You had to apply from the Harare office. Allegations of ex-combatants are based on ignorance. One might not know anyone in one’s whole district who’d got a scholarship.”29 In 1990 the ZNLWVA asked that it be involved in vetting and verifying applicants to ensure only “authentic” ex-combatants benefited.30 A ZANLA woman in the
CIO complained to President Mugabe at the ZNLWVA’s inaugural meeting in 1992 that women had no access to the Scholarship Fund. “Women never got any of these scholarships. The people who man these offices look at us like prostitutes and say: ‘You are the ones who used to service chefs. Your day is over.’ Most of the scholarships, I know for certain, I can give you my proof, were given to friends, lovers and relatives.” A parliamentarian who asked how many women had been chosen to study abroad was told that 12 of the 183 students who had won scholarships in 1996 were women.

After 1988 there were still appeals for government assistance to train ex-combatants. For example, in 1990 Mrs. Dongo, an advocate for ex-combatants’ special status, urged government to build a multidisciplinary training center to provide ex-combatants with academic, managerial, technical, and marketing skills to form viable income-generating projects and find jobs in the rural informal sector. The same year MP M.T. Chinamasa advocated giving “unemployed patriots” (ex-combatants) priority in access to farm land, with government providing vocational and technical training in their respective farming specializations.

Even as the party tried to terminate ex-combatants’ special status, ex-combatants won significant victories. With the chief exception of ex-combatants in state employment winning recognition in 1989 for their war service years when calculating their retirement pensions, these victories were outside the workplace. The party approved the formation of a veterans’ association, the ZNLWVA, which finally held an inaugural meeting in 1992. The War Veterans Act of 1992 was passed to provide for government assistance to ex-combatants’ schemes, though the Treasury’s refusal to provide financial support made this legislation ineffective. Between 1993 and 1997, top party and government officials (many themselves ex-combatants) colluded with the ZNLWVA in looting the War Victims Compensation Fund, which was supposed to pay war disability pensions to ex-guerrillas and civilians. In August 1997, in the midst of an enquiry into the defrauding of the fund, veterans succeeded in winning lump-sum payments and monthly life pensions for their war service.
1 INTRODUCTION

4. David, 1997; Holsti, 1996. The terms “civil wars,” “intrastate wars,” and “internal wars” are inadequate because they do not capture the often widespread international and regional dimensions of these violent conflicts. This is as true for the Cold War period as for the post-Cold War. However, I use the terminology without problematizing it again because it is convenient.
8. Doornbos and Tesfai, 1999, is part of the War Torn Societies Project.
19. Ibid., p. 43.
20. Ibid., pp. 28–9, 40–1; Berdal, 1996, p. 8; Colletta et al., 1996; Kumar, 1997a.
22. For examples other than the references in the critique of peace-building studies, see Pugh, 1995; Weiss, 1994; Shaw, 1996; Stedman and Rothchild, 1996.
23. Duffield, 2001; Berdal and Keen, 1997; Keen, 2000; Richards, 1996.
28. Berdal and Keen, 1997 critique DRPs for “new” wars but retain important peace-
building discourse, such as the importance of external assistance to meet the “needs”
of those carrying out acts of violence (pp. 816–7). See discussion on p. 22.
29. For similar critiques of development discourse that are unrelated to the peace-
building literatures, see Malkki, 1995; Escobar, 1991; Williams, 1993.
30. Atlas and Licklider, 1999, p. 37, footnote 1; Licklider, 1995, p. 682 also stipulates
that a civil war ends when the concern among warring parties about living together
ends.
32. Ibid, p. 689, Table A-1.
33. Doyle and Sambanis, 2000a, p. 783.
34. Doyle and Sambanis, 2000b, p. 3 do not require a conflict to have 1,000 battle deaths
per annum to count as a civil war, as Licklider does. They object, inter alia, that this
number is “rather arbitrary.” Instead, their coding of wars “uses the 1,000 deaths
threshold for the entire war as long as the war caused 1,000 deaths in any single
year.” There is obvious redundance in this criterion. Wallenstein and Sollenberg,
1999, p. 595 offer a still different battle death count criterion for wars: more than
1,000 battle-related deaths in any given year.
35. Doyle and Sambanis, 2000b, p. 4.
1997, p. 345, footnote 26 chose the five-year period, “the most widely used indicator
in the literature” on successful settlements to see if a settlement would survive the
first general election.
40. Hampson, 1996, p. 10; see also p. 207.
41. Ibid., p. 217.
43. Doyle et al., 1997, p. 20.
44. Hampson, 1996, p. 224.
use somewhat different measures, their judgements as to which political systems
are democratic and which are not correlate to an extremely high degree.” McHenry,
1997, remarks on the irony that authors are eager to claim both that their measures of
democracy are superior to other indices of democracy and that they are also highly
 correlated with them.
51. Doyle and Sambanis, 2000a, p. 783. Ibid., p. 787, footnote 29 justify the two-year
time period as follows: “Most countries and organizations have tight deadlines and
limited horizons when extending military and economic aid to war-torn states. After two to five years, moreover, accidents (hurricanes, droughts) and other factors that have little to do with either the success or failure of peacebuilding strategies enter into the determinants of the stability of a country.”

53. Ibid., p. 564; see also p. 567.
54. Hampson, 1996, p. 10
57. Doyle et al., 1997, p. 20. Their claim that “achieving success along one measure may require bending another” contradicts their subsequent claim: “Dimensions succeed or fail separately…”
60. Walter, 1997, pp. 340, 352–3. Britain made it clear at Lancaster House that it would only monitor the implementation of the settlement and the monitors carried only light arms. (See chapter 2.)
62. Ibid., pp. 83, 85.
63. Ibid., p. 218.
64. Doyle and Sambanis, 2000b, p. 23.
65. Ibid., p. 46. In evaluating peace-building after what they identify as a violent conflict in 1984, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000b, p. 46 again depart from their own criteria for successful lenient peace-building when they state that “the violence ended substantially after the government’s purges of civilians in 1984, so this could be interpreted as a PB success. However, the success came at the cost of eliminating opposition, so we code it as a PB failure.” Moreover, they implement their fresh ad hoc criterion – the elimination of opposition – in ways that do not accord with the facts. The opposition continued to exist after 1984, and won fifteen seats in parliament in the 1985 general election.
66. See Doyle and Sambanis, 2000a; Barbara Walter, 1997, 1999; Zimbabwe war termination literature in chapter 2.
68. Ibid., p. 51.
70. Atlas and Licklider’s assertion that the “black-on-black” armed conflict was “a (necessary) prelude” to a more secure settlement and “may have helped to solidify rather than undercut” the civil war settlement and that “the later struggles . . . determined whether the settlements would hold” must be repudiated (ibid., pp. 50–1). Hence Atlas and Licklider’s claim (p. 42) that the regime’s policy of protecting white farmers signaled to them that the regime “was adhering to the terms of the settlement, in spirit as well as in letter” is without foundation. More importantly, presenting state-sponsored violence against white farmers’ “tormentors” as adhering to the terms of the settlement privileges the constitutional protection of white farmers’ privately owned land at the expense of the constitutional rights of all citizens. The state of emergency which remained in effect till 1990 vitiated some of the most vital constitutional protections and others, such as torture, which the constitution did not permit even during a state of emergency. See Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, 1986, pp. 89, 146–7. Finally, Atlas and Licklider’s claim (p. 42) that “in order
to placate and protect his former white enemy, Mugabe assaulted constituent ele-
ments of his former black civil war ally: Nkomo’s ZAPU/ZIPRA and the people of
Matabeleland” misses the central dynamic of the conflict in the 1980s which had
nothing to do with protecting whites.
71. Hampson, 1996 does not differentiate between the wars in El Salvador, Namibia,
Cyprus, and Cambodia but merely distinguishes them all from interstate wars. See
also Walter, 1997, 1999 who focuses on the differences between civil wars and
interstate wars rather than distinctions among her civil war cases.
73. Besides those which follow, see Kaufman, 1996, who distinguishes between ethnic
and ideological wars; Licklider, 1995, p. 682 who distinguishes not only between
ethnic-religious-identity wars but also between civil wars and colonial wars;
Doyle and Sambanis, 2000b, pp. 12–13 who differentiate between
ethnic-religious identity wars and revolutionary-ideological-other wars; and Mason
and Fett, 1996, pp. 554, 558, footnote 10, who distinguish between revolutions or
separatist wars, ethnic conflicts, and religious ones. Like Licklider, 1995, Mason
and Fett, 1996, p. 556, footnote 6, do not count anti-colonial revolts as civil
wars.
76. Ibid., p. 689.
77. Atlas and Licklider, 1999, e.g. pp. 41, 43.
78. Ball with Halevy, 1996, p. 32.
80. See chapter 2.
82. Stedman, 1997, p. 35.
85. For refugee studies, these criticisms are well laid out in Malkki, 1995.
86. Murray et al., 1994, p. 45.
88. Ibid.
89. Kumar, 1997b, pp. 2–3; Ball with Halevy, 1996, pp. 40–1.
90. Kumar, 1997b, pp. 2–3; Ball with Halevy, 1996, pp. 40–1.
92. Preston, 1997, p. 470. “If the overall goal of the integration of fighters in the transition
from war to peace is to maintain stability, this was achieved in Namibia . . .”
93. Preston, 1997, p. 454 now makes stability the product of government fighter strat-
egies of containment and nation-building.
95. Colletta et al., 1996, p. 18.
96. Ibid., p. 22.
100. Borges Coelho and Vines, 1994; Colletta et al., 1996, pp. 8, 15; Mehreteab, 1999, p. 60.
103. Ibid., p. 182.
106. Clark, 1996, p. 1, See also Clark, 1995, p. 50; Borges Coelho and Vines, 1994. Vines, 1998, p. 192 notes that the UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique defined demobilization to include disarmament. Studying negotiated settlements of interstate wars, Towle, 1997, pp. 13–14 uses disarmament as the comprehensive term to include both partial disarmament or “arms control” (e.g. limits on forces, destroying fortifications) and demilitarization (as originally intended in post-war Germany and Japan).
113. Ibid., p. 456. “If the success of demobilisation and rehabilitation depends on meeting the needs of different military and paramilitary groups, account should be taken of the social, ethnic and gender influences on combatant expectations of civilian life.”
114. Ibid., p. 463.
115. Ibid., pp. 460–2.
116. Ibid., p. 470.
118. Ibid., p. 104.
119. Ibid., p. 74.
120. Ibid., p. 80.
122. Ibid., p. 469.
123. Ibid., p. 465.
129. Revolutionary regimes have sometimes chosen to demobilize the armies which brought them to power, suggesting that revolutionary regimes may not always see military mobilization during revolutions to be an asset in their consolidation. Settlements that terminated wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Algeria did not prescribe
what the guerrilla parties had to do with their armies. Interestingly, in none of these countries did the new ruling party retain intact the guerrilla army which had helped to place it in power. After a mutiny of the liberation army in the year of Mozambique’s independence, the southern-led political party replaced most of the northern Makonde who had formed the core of the revolutionary army with conscripts. In Angola, the politically victorious party at independence disbanded its rather hastily mobilized guerrilla troops and built up a conventional army using the draft, and according to William Minter, “stressed recruitment of both troops and officers on a national basis, and advancement on merit within the ranks.” The struggle for Algerian independence gave rise to two armies – one an internally based guerrilla army which was increasingly impotent because of the effectiveness of French counterinsurgency operations, the other an externally based conventional army which did not participate militarily in the war and which included some of the best guerrillas who had left Algeria for military training camps in Tunisia and Morocco. Nominally, both supported the same political party. Political consolidation in Algeria revolved crucially around the competing visions of the guerrillas and the conventionally trained army about who would rule. Ultimately, the views of the conventional soldiers prevailed, in part through armed struggles. See Clarence-Smith, 1989; Minter, 1989, 1994; Grest, 1990; Zartman, 1973, 1975; Entelis, 1986.

130. Skocpol, 1994; Adelman, 1985; Tilly, 1990; Porter, 1994; Downing, 1988; Posen, 1993; Bensel, 1991. For Africans who participated in imperial armies in World War II, some have argued that military experience promoted nationalist or anti-colonial politics. Proponents of this thesis include Shiroya, 1968; Matthews, 1982; Rothchild, 1959.

131. See subsequent chapters.

132. In addition to earlier references to those who support the measure of successful reintegration as the elimination of differences among combatants and ex-combatants, see also Kingma, 1997, pp. 155, 162; Lodgaard, 1997, p. 148; Alden, 1996, pp. 66–7.

133. E.g. Ball with Halevy, 1996.


135. Snow, 1996; Kaldor, 1999; Clapham, 1998; Duffield, 2001; Berdal and Keen, 1997; Richards, 1996.


137. Lt.-Colonel Ron Reid Daly, as told to Peter Stiff, 1983, p. 714; Cilliers, 1985, p. 239.

138. Cilliers, 1985, p. 239.

139. Ibid.


142. Cilliers, 1985, p. 239.


144. Ibid., citing interviews with Brigadier Gurdon (British) and Emmerson Munangagwa (ZANU(PF)).


146. Alexander et al., 2000; see also Kriger, 1992, p. 45.
147. For those who view the movements as non-tribalist and non-regionalist, see Alexander et al., 2000; Werbner, 1991. Alternative views may be found in Kempton, 1988; Sithole, 1979. Alexander, et al. and Werbner focus on rural nationalism; Kempton and Sithole on exile nationalist politics. There seems to be a need to examine the interrelationship between the external and internal dynamics of the nationalist movements.


151. Martin and Johnson, 1981, p. 166. For the Nhari rebellion, see ibid., pp. 159–68. Gukurahundi was also the name ZANU gave to the objective of its struggle in 1979, the Year of the People’s Storm, and to its counterinsurgency against ZIPRA and ZAPU in the 1980s.

152. Ibid., pp. 191–214.


154. The account of ZIPA in this and the following paragraph draws on Moore, 1995.

155. Gumbo was elected a ZANU(PF) member of parliament in 2000 after years of marginalization.


163. Ibid., pp. 158–64.

164. Ibid., pp. 164–5.


166. Ibid., p. 142, footnote 14. The first explanation is from Nicholas Nkomo, commander of the Northern Front 2, the second from Jeremy Brickhill who worked with Dabengwa in ZIPRA intelligence, and the third is from a ZIPRA guerrilla I interviewed in 1992.


168. Daly, as told to Peter Stiff, 1983, pp. 710–13.

169. Alexander et al., 2000, p. 161, footnote 9, pp. 162–4. These authors claimed guerrilla excesses to be greatest in areas where the guerrillas and the Rhodesian forces contested for control and least where guerrillas had established semi-liberated zones. They also found, in seeming contradiction, that guerrilla violence increased toward the end of the war, even as there was an expansion of semi-liberated zones (p. 142). Their argument about the relationship between violence and contested areas seems to dovetail, rather than differ as they claim, with what I argued in Kriger, 1992. All the parts of Mutoko district in which I worked were contested areas.

170. CCJPZ and LRF, 1997, especially part 1, pp. 1–73, for an overview of the period from 1980 to 1987.

172. Ibid., pp. 31, 37.
173. Ibid., pp. 34–5.
174. Ibid., pp. 45–6.
175. Ibid., p. 48.
176. Ibid., pp. 62–3.
177. Ibid., p. 70.
178. Ibid., pp. 69–70.
179. Ibid., p. 72.
181. American Political Science Association Personnel Service Newsletter, 1998, p. 19 contained a not atypical job announcement for a position in comparative politics at University of Maryland, College Park. It read: “Preference will be given to applicants whose approach is global or broadly regional. Applicants who do descriptive case and country studies will not be considered.”

2 THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

4. The discussion of the Lancaster House conference relies on Davidow, 1984; Verrier, 1986; Rice, 1990; Stedman, 1991; Tamarkin, 1990; and the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference (CC) minutes, 1979. These last appear as CC (79) in subsequent notes. These documents were generously lent by Stephen Stedman. They should be available in the Zimbabwe National Archives.
5. Kriger, 1998 argues that labeling the conflict an anti-colonial struggle for majority rule suppressed the equally important armed struggle between the two guerrilla parties.
11. E.g. Charlton, 1990 reports Nkomo wanted to continue with the war. Renwick, 1997, p. 12 notes that ZAPU moderates were persuading Nkomo to negotiate whereas his military wing favored eventual armed victory over ZANU.
13. Ibid., p. 70; Rice, 1990, pp. 200–1 cites about 1,500 monitors.
15. The new constitution provided that a majority of the members of the service commissions did not need to have held senior rank in the government service, as the 1979 constitution stipulated. However, the chair and one other member of the public service commission had to have held senior ranks in the public service, thereby ensuring, as the PF objected, that at least two of the members of the public service commission would be white for many years to come, because there were so few African senior civil servants. Moreover, as the PF pointed out, the chair of the public service commission was also to be the chair of the defense force and police commissions and a member of the judiciary commission.


17. CC(79)16: This document contains the PF counterproposals to the British constitutional proposals, September 18, 1979.


25. CC(79)53: Summary of 23rd plenary session under Chairman Carrington, November 1, 1979. The British also argued that the longer the interim period and its uncertainty, the greater the risk of a ceasefire breakdown; see CC(79)49: October 31, 1979. The PF wanted a transition of six months to make the ceasefire effective and to introduce power-sharing institutions that would enable free and fair elections to be held.


29. For example, CC(79)26: Chairman’s statement during 11th plenary session, October 9, 1979.


32. Ibid.; Renwick, 1997, p. 41. After independence, in exchange for adhering to these constitutional constraints, Britain agreed to fund half the costs of resettlement provided the Zimbabwean government contributed matching funds. See Palmer, 1990. Hazlewood, 1985, p. 460 notes that less than 5 percent of total Kenyan government
expenditure on the transfer of European farms to Africans in the 1960s was not covered by overseas grants and loans.


36. Ibid., p. 75.


38. Davidow, 1984, p. 76


40. Interview, General Sir Martin Farndale, September 13, 1994, at East India Club.


44. CC(79)90: PF proposals for a ceasefire agreement, November 27, 1979; CC(79)98: Summary of 41st plenary session, December 6, 1979.


46. CC(79)92: Conference Paper, statement delivered by Lord Carrington on November 28, 1979 at a bilateral meeting with the PF delegation.


55. Rice, 1990, pp. 83, 200–1. In contrast, Wiseman and Taylor, 1981, p. 98 report: “other than the alleged attempts to introduce military elements as refugees, there was to our knowledge no substantial infiltration of men or arms across the borders.”


57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.


60. Rice, 1990, p. 161. She discusses in p. 161, footnote 52 how she arrives at this percentage based on ratios and estimates provided by Munangagwa, Tungamirai,
and Dabengwa. The specific references to Munangagwa are to her interview with him in 1989 and the transcript of his interview with Granada Television for the “End of Empire” series in 1985.

61. Robin Renwick, British ambassador to the USA, interview, June 17, 1994, at British Embassy, Washington, DC. Verrier, 1986, p. 295 claims Mugabe accepted this figure but Commonwealth Observer Group, Southern Rhodesia Elections, 1980, p. 31 (henceforth referred to as COGR, 1980) cites Mugabe claiming this figure to be an exaggeration.


63. COGR, 1980, p. 31. The COG seemed to accept ZANU(PF) claims that “those [ZANLA] who had remained outside the assembly camps had been deterred from responding to repeated calls to assemble by their commanders by needlessly aggressive acts by the Security Forces after the cease-fire had come into effect” (p. 32). More generally, it felt security force behavior “would not have encouraged members of ZANLA or ZIPRA to come forward in response to their commanders’ orders, after they had once failed to meet the deadline set by the Lancaster House Agreement” (p. 32).

68. COGR, 1980, p. 31.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. BOGR, 1980, p. 11; see also p. 13.
72. Ibid., p. 11.
74. Renwick, 1997, p. 54.
76. Ibid., p. 278.
79. UK Ministry of Defence, n.d., pp. 152–3. In contrast, Ginifer, 1995, p. 52 applauds the “strong sense of political leadership and discipline that ZANU, in particular, had established over its guerrillas.” Also in contrast to the British report on the CMF, the commander of the CMF’s New Zealand contingent noted that ZIPRA guerrillas, as distinct from ZIPRA regulars, “were not particularly well-disciplined nor was the level of their soldier skills high.” See Moloney, 1980, p. 24.
80. Daly, 1983, p. 710.
82. Ibid., p. 13.
84. UK Ministry of Defence, n.d., p. 112.
89. UK Ministry of Defence, n.d., p. 112.
90. Ibid., p. 70.
91. Ibid., pp. 107–8, 112–13, 126.
92. Ibid., pp. 72–6.
94. Ibid., p. 35.
95. Ibid., p. 35.
96. Ibid., pp. 35–7.
97. Rice, 1990, pp. 323. Ibid., p. 329 seems to prefer not to talk of COG bias: “The Observers should not be faulted for bias as much as for failing to counter the impression or supposition of bias.”
98. Ibid., p. 324. On the origins of the bad blood between Muzorewa and the COG, see ibid., pp. 242–5.
100. Both reports took into account the recent brutal war in assessing whether the election conformed with the conditions set out at Lancaster House by the British government. BOGR, 1980, p. 16 concluded that, despite campaign intimidation in areas, “[T]here were large and important parts of Rhodesia where normal political campaigning took place without any serious let or hindrance and where there was without question freedom of movement, assembly and expression.” Moreover, the polling days were free and fair and the ballot secret. “We believe that the remarkably high poll demonstrated that the people of Rhodesia as a whole want an end to the war and a new start in independence… We conclude that the election… despite all the imperfections of the campaign, will constitute a valid democratic expression of their wishes.” COGR, 1980, p. 74 acknowledged imperfections ranging from limitations on the parties’ freedom to campaign to intimidation but felt these were countered by the parties’ abundant access to resources to take their message to the voters, the widespread belief in the secrecy of the ballot, and other factors. “Taken as a whole… the election offered an adequate opportunity to the parties to seek the favour of the electorate and sufficient freedom to the voters to exercise their franchise according to their convictions. We therefore reaffirm the conclusion of our interim report that the election was a valid and democratic expression of the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe.”
103. George Chiweshe, ZNA Legal Services Director, interview, July 1–2, 1992, King George VI (KGVI) Barracks, Harare.
105. Ibid., citing interview with Cephas Msipa on November 16, 1989.
109. Ibid., p. 102, citing interviews with Josiah Tungamirai and Dominic Chinenge on December 5, 1989 and November 20, 1989.
112. UK Ministry of Defence, n.d., p. 133.
115. Ibid., pp. 12–13, 106–8, 113, 123.
117. Ibid.
120. Rhoderick-Jones, 1980, p. 73.
134. Robin Renwick, British ambassador to the USA, interview, June 17, 1994, at British Embassy, Washington DC.
136. Ibid., p. 134.
137. Letter from David Moloney, head of New Zealand contingent to CMF to Denis McLean, former ambassador to New Zealand, 1995 (exact date not available).
138. Robin Renwick, British ambassador to the USA, interview, June 17, 1994, at the British Embassy, Washington, DC.
One version is that CMF chief of staff Brigadier Gurdon’s advance team to Rhodesia in November 1979 failed to confirm General Walls’ verbal commitment at Lancaster House that the Rhodesian forces would supply the assembly points (Rice, 1990). Another is that the Rhodesian forces agreed to provide the logistics but never made arrangements because they assumed that the guerrillas would kill the CMF monitors as soon as they deployed to the rural areas (Major-General Ken Perkins, interview, September 8, 1994, London). A still different account suggests the Rhodesians deliberately neglected the guerrillas’ needs, hoping the ceasefire would collapse (Verrier, 1986).

The United Kingdom Land Forces, the headquarters mounting the CMF operation, sent mugs, plates, forks, spoons, pots, pans, toiletries, tents, blankets, foam mattresses, towels, tubs, toilet rolls and other sanitary items, buckets, brooms, tables, cooking facilities, uniforms, tennis shoes, medical kits, cigarettes, footballs, underclothes, and a wide range of food stuffs sufficient for 20,000 people.

The allegation of whites withholding meat because they did not want to feed the guerrillas is not supported by evidence in the British report on the CMF. Rice, 1990, p. 112 records how the CMF logistics chief told her how he met with the Rhodesian cattle producers’ association to see if they could meet the guerrillas’ demand for beef, only to be told the national herd had been reduced. Beyts, 1980, p. 75, a British monitor in charge of ZIPRA assembly camps in Matabeleland North, describes how his team had to haggle with cattle owners to acquire meat for the guerrillas.


Ibid., p. 88. The report’s assertion, already cited, that the “correct scale” included meat.


Ibid., pp. 112–13.

UK Ministry of Defence, n.d., p. 67. Ibid., p. 67 also refers to the guerrillas believing that they had been promised meat rations. This claim is difficult to reconcile with the “correct scale” included meat.


Ibid., p. 102.

Ibid., pp. 102–3, citing her interview with Dumiso Dabengwa on November 30, 1989.

UK Ministry of Defence, n.d., p. 89.


Kriger, 1992.


The Zimbabwean press suggests Mugabe invited Walls to stay on as army head after the election results; others claim he did so on the eve of the poll. See Verrier, 1986, pp. 302–3; Smith and Simpson with Davies, 1981.

174. Acland, 1980, p. 50
178. Herbst, 1989, p. 76 refers to the ruling party’s concern in the early years of independence that the civil service hierarchy might “hijack” policy and perhaps even become an “invisible Cabinet.”
181. Ibid., pp. 3–4, 7.
182. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

3 THE ASSEMBLY PHASE

2. See chapter 1. The claim of the World Bank, 1993, pp. 20, 23–6 that in Zimbabwe demobilization was a higher government priority than military integration, and that the assembly phase was a prelude to demobilization, illustrates the tendency in peace-building studies to assume guerrillas are solely a regime threat and to miss how a regime may seek to use guerrillas to build power.
3. For example, Weitzer, 1990, pp. 148, 164–6, casts independence as a unique opportunity to liberalize security arrangements, seemingly oblivious of threats to the regime arising from the existence of three separate armies. Hodder-Williams, 1983, attempts to explain or classify problems of order after 1982 without making crucial connections between the ruling party’s power-building strategies and the responses of assembled guerrillas. For instance, he blames problems of order on unassembled guerrillas, Muzorewa auxiliaries, and a heavily armed white population. Even the factional violence in February 1981 is blamed on unassembled ZIPRA guerrillas (pp. 1, 14). Similarly, Ranger, 1986, p. 390 attempts to classify challenges to law and order after 1982 but skips quickly over armed activities during the assembly phase, noting only that “the conditions of the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe favoured outbreaks of banditry” and that the prolonged assembly phase caused disaffection among the guerrillas. Finally, studies of military integration (e.g. Evans, 1988; Seegers, 1986) largely ignore its relationship to the assembly phase and how the regime pursued power-building strategies with regard to the assembled guerrillas and the integration of the three armies.
7. House of Assembly, 1981, p. 28. The committee members, appointed on May 23, 1980, were Rhodesian Front chief whip Mr. John Landau (chair), Finance Minister Enos Nkala, Mr. Chambati, Mr. Holland, Mr. Mawema, Mr. Mukarati, Dr. C.D. Ndlovu, Mr. Sanyangare, and Mr. Shirihuru.
9. House of Assembly, 1981, p. 28; “Massive New Scheme for Ex-Guerillas,” _TH_, January 24, 1981, p. 1. The tender, for which ten companies had submitted bids, stipulated that each “man” would receive each day: 300 g of beef/offal or up to 170 g of either chicken, pork, or mutton; 40 g of bacon; 200 g of potatoes; 150 g of fresh vegetables (excluding potatoes); 50 g of onions; one piece of fresh fruit; 300 ml of fresh or powdered milk; one-third of a loaf of bread; 50 g of margarine or butter; one and a half eggs; 35 ml of cooking oil, lard, or dripping; 5 ml of tomato sauce; 10 g of salt; 100 g of sugar; 15 g of jam or marmalade; 15 g of tea; 2 g of curry powder; 5 g of custard powder; 2 g of mustard powder; 80 g of shelled groundnuts; 400 g of maize meal; 120 g of rice; 5 g of chloride of lime; and four sheets of toilet paper.
10. Margaret Ndebele, ZNA, interview, August 7, 1992, at KGVI Barracks, Harare.
12. Andy Ncube, ex-ZIPRA member, interview, July 12, 1992, at his home.
16. “Pay Protest March by ZANLA Men,” _TH_, December 10, 1980, p. 1. Among the 300 former ZANLA guerrillas protesting in December 1980 because they had not received pay, one told the press that “when we left Mozambique, we were told that we would be paid monthly.”
20. Correspondence from the Demobilisation Directorate to The Secretary, Minister of Labour and Manpower Planning, February 17, 1984. Zimbabwe Project (ZP) files.
21. Mr. Makande, interview, August 25, 1992, Harare. In 1992, Mr. Makande was Chief Executive Officer, Finance, Ministry of Education.
24. Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979, pp. 17–20; Lohman and MacPherson, 1983 give the percentage of insurgent deaths inside Rhodesia for which the Selous Scouts were responsible.
38. Interview, Major Khumalo, August 14, 1992, at Zimbabwe Reserve Bank.
39. Correspondence from the Demobilisation Directorate to The Secretary, Minister of Labour and Manpower Planning, February 17, 1984. ZP files.
41. Musemwa, 1996.
45. Brigadier Patrick Palmer, BMATT’s first commander, interview, September 1, 1994, at his Windsor Castle home.
46. House of Assembly, 1981, pp. 13–14, 19–20, 23. Under CMF pressure, the Social Affairs Ministry had taken over provisioning assembly places on March 1, 1980, days before the announcement of the election results. Unwilling to directly deal with the guerrillas, the ministry subcontracted to private companies. The Rhodesian army was supposed to take over the provisioning, delivery, and cost of food to the assembly places on March 21, 1980. It only assumed authority on April 14, 1980 and then it too subcontracted to the private sector, claiming staff shortages.
72. On the JHC committees to return arms and personnel to the assembly places, see “Former Guerrilla Is Cleared of Grenade Threat,” TH, June 18, 1981, p. 11; Judgment by Honourable Mr. Justice Squires in State versus Dumiso Dabengwa and 6 others, April 27, 1983.
73. “Zvobgo’s Warning to Rural Gunmen,” TH, May 17, 1980, p. 1. ZANU(PF) Minister Zvobgo told Gwanda Rural Council in Matabeleland: “Men who leave the camps and cause trouble will not be returned to them. They will be taken to jail and if this doesn’t work, the security forces will be called in to put an end to the problem.”
75. HAD, May 27, 1980, v. 1, n. 6, p. 236; MP Mr. Shava implied ZIPRA “dissidents” would soon be found to be “an organized force following midnight orders and instructions…That will be the time for us to wipe your crocodile tears from your cheeks and denounce you.” HAD, June 26, 1980, v. 1, n. 21, pp. 1089–90; Mugabe spoke of “[O]rganized bands of some ZIPRA followers,” under local

Minister Mubako said it was wrong to label “dissidents” as ZIPRA because they were no longer under ZIPRA command. See “One-Party State Idea is Slated,” *TH*, July 1, 1980, p. 1.


84. E.g. the party paid for Edgar Tekere’s defence and for the lawyers for three ZANLA guerrillas accused of murdering three whites. (“Men on Murder Charges Forced into Dock,” *TH*, November 19, 1980, p. 3; “Murder Trial Postponed,” *TH*, November 20, 1980, p. 4.)


89. Defence Outline in State versus Dumiso Dabengwa et al., p. 25.


89. Defence Outline in State versus Dumiso Dabengwa et al., p. 25.


94. Rupiah, 1996, p. 37 repeats uncritically the official line.

95. “Extra Defence Cash Approved,” TH, February 6, 1981 p. 1, p. 3; Major Khumalo, interview, August 14, 1992, at Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; Margaret Ndebele, interview, August 7, 1992, at KGVI Barracks, ZNA. As a pay liaison officer for four assembly places, Major Khumalo received Z$249 per month. As chief of logistics at Sierra assembly place, Margaret Ndebele was paid Z$150 per month.

96. Major Khumalo, interview, August 29, 1992, at Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.

97. Colonel Maseko, interview, July 27, 1992, at KGVI Barracks, ZNA.

98. “Auditor Slates Wartime Army Accounts,” TH, April 30, 1981, p. 1. The army paid out twice as much – Z$20 million instead of Z$10 million – as had been allocated for the exercise, and made up the difference by drawing on the savings from disbanding the Security Force Auxiliaries, Bishop Muzorewa’s private army which had become part of the Rhodesian army when Muzorewa became prime minister.


100. “‘Nothing Sinister About 5th Brigade,’” TH, October 29, 1981, p. 5. When Senator Wilson raised the problem of military personnel holding double pay books even in October 1981 after the pay exercise had ended, Minister of State Munangagwa told him that the government was “extremely concerned” about this issue and “everything possible is being done to hunt down and trace” those guilty of drawing two salaries a month.


104. “Army Pay: New Scandals,” TH, January 31, 1981, p. 1; HAD, January 30, 1981, v. 2, n. 31, p. 1450. The analogy with seventeenth-century Britain is imperfect but suggestive. Howard, 1974 discusses how, before European standing armies, rulers relied on military contractors who signed contracts which specified how many men they would raise, for how long, and at what pay scales. The contractors were responsible for paying their men, and there were untold opportunities for corruption.


106. Major Khumalo, interview, August 14, 1992, at Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.

107. Margaret Ndebele, interview, August 7, 1992, at KGVI Barracks, ZNA.

111. Major Khumalo, interview, August 14, 1992, at Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.
114. Mary Miller, interview, August 29, 1992, at her Harare home.
115. “Ex-Guerrillas Unpaid for 3 Months,” TH, January 15, 1982, p. 4; “Ex-Cadres ‘Knew Pay Procedure,’” TH, January 16, 1982, p. 7. An ex-guerrilla at Llewelin Barracks had complained to TH that they had not been paid for three months – October, November and December 1981 – and that they were so concerned that they would never get this money if they demobilized, that they had sent some of their commanders to army HQ in Salisbury.
116. Mary Miller, interview, August 29, 1992, at her Harare home.
117. Major Khumalo, interview, August 14, 1992, at the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.
118. HAD, February 3, 1981, v. 2, n. 32, p. 1549. According to Prime Minister Mugabe, several thousand former ZANLA combatants had been removed to the farm from different assembly points after the elections to train for a military display which would take place throughout the country during the independence celebrations. That exercise did not take off because it was then decided by the Joint High Command that rather than have just ZANLA and ZIPRA, let us have a tripartite arrangement and restrict it merely to a unit to form a guard of honour on the night of the Independence ceremony. And so only that unit which we saw on the night we had our independence was prepared. The rest of the people who had been drawn from assembly points remained at Grazeley. But of course, in due course, some also gravitated there from assembly points, including certain other civilians who went there merely out of curiosity. But these did not constitute the bulk of them.
120. Ibid., p. 1445.
122. Ibid., pp. 1548–50.
123. Ibid., pp. 1546, 1550–1.
124. Ibid., p. 1521.
126. Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 1997, pp. 164–6, 185–6 discusses how ZANLA female fighters, often young girls, were coerced and even beaten to have sex with male commanders in the camps. The leaders also punished them and labeled them prostitutes for sleeping with the men. It is possible that among these so-called “high-class prostitutes” were legitimate female fighter claimants.
128. Interview, Mary Miller, 1992.
129. Ibid. See Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 1997, p. 163 on sexually transmitted diseases in ZANLA camps.
132. “Army to be Probed. Investigation Starts Today,” TH, July 17, 1980, p. 1; “Cabinet Nine to Visit All Barracks,” TC, July 17, 1980, p. 1; “Ex-Guerillas Move in Today,” TC, October 1980. The cabinet committee was composed of Minister of Public Works, Clement Muchachi (ZAPU), Minister of Local Government and Housing, Minister Zvobgo (ZANU(PF)), Minister of Finance, Mr. Nkala (ZANU(PF)), and Minister of Transport and Power, Mr. Kadungure (ZANU(PF)).


134. Brigadier Patrick Palmer, BMATT’s first commander, interview, September 1, 1994, at his Windsor Castle home.


136. Ibid., p. 1071.


141. “ZANLA, ZIPRA Men to Move in Tomorrow,” TH, September 30, 1980, p. 1; “Ex-Guerilla Camps ‘Were Too Close,’” TH, May 13, 1981, p. 1. Superintendent Robert Giles, deputy officer commanding Bulawayo West, in evidence to the commission of enquiry established to investigate guerrilla violence in Entumbane in November 1980 and again in February 1981, said police had earlier recommended against the camps being established because of the possibility of disturbances. “However, the government went ahead and the camps were formed in close proximity to one another. I feel the disturbances on both occasions resulted from the mistrust of one party against the other.” After the November 1980 fighting, police again recommended the camps be separated but they were again ignored.


147. Mr. Chinamano made this statement prior to the decision having been taken or made public. The decision was made by the government and not the Joint High Command, as the latter later asserted; see “New Homes Pledge to AP Men,” TH, September 12, 1980, p. 1.
152. Mary Miller, interview, August 29, 1992, at her Harare home.
159. Mary and Tim Miller, interview, August 29, 1992, Harare home.
161. Mr. Makande, interview, August 25, 1992, Harare office. For demobilization of 20,000–25,000 from the army, see Zimbabwe National Army Statistics. Posted strength at October 1, 1983. Obtained from BMATT staff member. These figures are supported by Mugabe’s reference in September 1981 to 65,000 soldiers in the new army and the official intention to reduce it to 40,000. See “Zimbabwe to Have Army of 40,000 Men,” *TH*, September 16, 1981, p. 1.
163. “Gun Test Exposes Demob Pay Fraud,” *TH*, March 27, 1982, p. 1 describes how director John Shoniwa expected to “net” over 1,000 *mujibas* who had fraudulently received pay when ZIPRA ex-combatants from Gwai River Mine assembly place were demobilized at Llewellyn Barracks near Bulawayo. At some stage, however, their claims were recognized.
166. Margaret Ndebele, interview, August 7, 1992, KGV1 Barracks, Harare. See also Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 1997, pp. 183–4 on pregnant women fighters returning as refugees.
168. Minister Nkala tried to convince a Beitbridge rally what a good deal ex-guerrillas were enjoying. “In fact, some of the demobilised combatants earn two salaries. One
is at their place of work and the other is the guaranteed demob pay. This is why we are asking the dissidents: ‘What more do you want?’” See “Bandits Told: This is Your Last Chance,” _TH_, June 14, 1982, p. 1. But in November and December 1982, Minister Kangai appealed to the public to report anyone employed whom they knew to be getting demobilization pay because it was against the rules. See “77 Held in Hunt for Dissidents,” _TH_, November 3, 1982, p. 1; “$2 Million Aid for Demobbed Fighters,” _TH_, December 15, 1982, p. 6.

169. Mr. Hungwe, interview, August 19, 1992, Harare office; Colonel Maseko, interview, July 27, 1992, KGVI Barracks, Harare; Tapiwa Gomo, interview, July 25, 1992, Harare. A ZANLA guerrilla who had risen to the rank of brigadier in the new army claimed party verification was easy to obtain.

The parties wanted to impress their people to gain more votes ... they had to lie and say he was an ex-combatant. As long as one got a document from the party, one was bound to get a demobilization allowance. It was all a political blunder ... You had to keep a good name. There was a panel chosen from all parties which was sitting as the demob committee and it had to approve whether or not one was an ex-combatant. Now with a letter from ZANU(PF) or ZAPU(PF) it was now very difficult for the committee to work professionally. The committee was made up of veterans – senior party cadres of all factions. That panel should have interviewed you and checked without individual party influence, if not directives. 

Brigadier Machingaidze, interview, August 9, 1992, at his home.


171. Margaret Ndebele, interview, August 7, 1992, KGVI Barracks, Harare.


174. In November 1982, when the Matabeleland conflict was in its infancy, 334 ZIPRA ex-combatants were in Dukwe refugee camp in Botswana. See “‘Dissidents Waiting for Leaders’ Orders,’” _TH_, November 4, 1982, p. 1.


177. For white objections to the guerrillas getting paid for doing nothing, see HAD, September 18, 1980, v. 2, pp. 1023, 1025.


182. World Bank, 1993, p. xii, footnote 20. These and other irrigated schemes under parastatals became state farms which were supposed to be models of socialist property relations and raise incomes dramatically. Though they never operated as
socialist farms, they did raise incomes for permanent workers and for peasants who grew crops under management’s direction but these incomes remained low. For a discussion of state farms, see Sato, 1987, pp. 125–31.

183. Brigadier Patrick Palmer, BMATT’s first commander, interview, September 1, 1994, at his home.


186. ZP staff member, interview, July 8, 1992, Marondera.


194. Mr. Makande, interview, August 25, 1992, Harare. Mr. Makande had been recruited to join ZANLA for training while he was living in Zambia in 1972/3. He trained at Chimbichimbi camp in 1973, and was later sent back to Lusaka to train as an auditor.


197. Ibid.


199. William Manyika, interview, August 31, 1992, Harare. Manyika had an undergraduate degree in psychology from a Nigerian university. When he returned home, he was the only non-combatant employed by the directorate to help counsel the former guerrillas.


201. Questions posed by ex-combatants, August 1981. ZP files.


204. Letter from Judith Todd to Brother Arthur, September 13, 1981. ZP files.

205. HAD, September 11, 1984, v. 11, n. 1, p. 41.


208. Musemwa, 1994, p. 4 argues that demobilization payments fell short of the PDL income because ex-combatants did not have “decent” housing and other basics which the PDL assumes. This does not challenge the argument of guerrilla privilege.

209. Conversation, June 1, 1992, Harare.


211. Interviews with former guerrillas at KGVI Barracks in August 1992.

218. Ibid., pp. 4665–6.
220. Margaret Ndebele, former logistics chief, Sierra camp, interview, August 7, 1992, at KGVI Barracks, Harare, ZNA.
221. Colour Sergeant Stanley Made, interview, August 5, 1992, KGVI Barracks, Harare, ZNA.
222. Andy Ncube, interview, former medical officer at Rukomeshu camp, July 12, 1992, at his Harare home.
224. Brigadier Machingaidze, former ZANLA liaison officer, interview, August 9, 1992, at his Hatfield home.
225. Margaret Ndebele, former logistics chief, Sierra camp, interview, August 7, 1992, at KGVI Barracks, Harare, ZNA.
226. Andy Ncube, former medical officer at Rukomeshu camp, interview, August 1992, at his Harare home.
227. Colonel Maseko, former ZIPRA combatant, interview, July 27, 1992, at KGVI Barracks, Harare, ZNA.

4 MILITARY INTEGRATION

1. Alao, 1995, p. 113. In contrast, Seegers, 1986, pp. 154–5 emphasizes how the army, envisaged to be a conventional force in 1980, used major portions as a counterinsurgent force in Matabeleland. Evans, 1992, p. 239 also evaluates positively the army’s conversion into a conventional force.
2. Seegers, 1986, p. 157. Evans, 1992, p. 248 also acknowledges the ZNA’s cohesion (unity) and ability to function as a viable organization. Alao, 1995, p. 14 attributes growing cohesion in the army to the pressures of operations in Mozambique.
3. Evans, 1992, pp. 247–8. Evans, 1992, p. 239 seems to imply that professionalism is a well-trained conventional force which he contrasts with politicized irregular soldiers.
4. Evans, 1992, and Seegers, 1986, acknowledge the army’s politicization from 1980, but do not see it as affecting military performance and cohesion. Evans, 1988 sees politicization as a post-integration phenomenon. Alao, 1995, pp. 110, 116 concedes politicization as inevitable, given the guerrilla roots of the armies, but denies even the politicization of promotions and sees the government as seeking to resolve (rather than inflame) political party tensions. The atrocities of the Fifth Brigade are attributed to boredom, indiscipline, and poor training (p. 114) rather than a politically orchestrated campaign. Rupiah, 1996 attributes the success of integration, *inter alia*, to the government’s political supervision to ensure its survival and to the enlightened guerrilla leadership which remained subordinate to the political leaders. Rupiah ignores the government’s quest for party control of the army and the guerrilla leaders’ role as accomplices.

5. Alexander et al., 2000, p. 189 draw attention to ZANLA’s extra-legal activities against ZIPRA inside ZNA brigades in 1982, and not only in the Fifth Brigade which fell outside the integration exercise. The purpose of their study, however, is not to evaluate military integration.


7. Prior to 1975 there was a single RAR battalion (1,000 men). By 1979 the predominantly African RAR was the largest single unit in the army.

8. In 1979 there were 5,000 conscripted national servicemen, including Africans, Coloreds, and Asians. Only whites received combat training. Territorials served either in the Rhodesia Regiment, alongside white national servicemen and Africans in the RAR, or with regular units, or even occasionally in the specialist units. See Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979, pp. 5, 7, 14–15, 17; ‘‘Standing Down’’ – editorial, *TH*, March 26, 1980, p. 8.

9. At Llewellin Barracks, for example, a white Rhodesian major was in charge of three training companies, each headed by a white Rhodesia Regiment major and composed of two or three other white Rhodesian officers, five British senior non-commissioned officers, and one-third Rhodesian recruits (probably drawn from the last intake of African conscripts), one-third ZIPRA, and one-third ZANLA. (Colin Gordon, interview, September 3, 1994, Leicester.)


14. ‘‘ZIPRA Men on Patrol,’’ *TH*, May 23, 1980. A week later the JHC announced it was establishing a board of inquiry to investigate the decline of army discipline since the start of integration and referred to joint disciplinary action having been taken against ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas.


25. Annex C to BMATT/1406, September 3, 1982, Restricted, noted that Smile Madubeko was in command of the battalion at Mt. Darwin in 1982 and had been in command since June 1980.
27. “Standing Down” – editorial, *TH*, March 26, 1980, p. 8. Africans, Coloreds, and Asians were conscripted but did not receive combat training. In 1979 there were 5,000 national servicemen (of whom 1,750 were Africans) and 58,000 territorials. See Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979, pp. 5, 7, 9–11, 14–15, 17.
29. Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979, p. 13 refers to four RAR battalions; Evans, 1992 to three RAR battalions; Moorcraft, 1990, p. 135 to a fourth being set up.
30. Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979, pp. 12–17, 31–3. All these units allegedly had foreigners, often former British soldiers.
32. General Sir Patrick Palmer, interview, September 1, 1994. After senior white air force officers were charged with sabotaging new planes at Thornhill Air Base in Gweru in July 1982, the Pakistanis were invited to integrate the air force and initially provided its command elements too.
33. Under the Director of Military Assistance Overseas, BMATT was funded by the Foreign Office. Except for its commander and his deputy, the first BMATT team were volunteers, chiefly non-commissioned infantry officers who came unaccompanied for six months. After the formation of the new battalions, when BMATT’s emphasis shifted to staff training, it recruited more experienced personnel who came for longer and could bring their families. Unaccompanied volunteer staff reduced costs, a major consideration for the Foreign Office, but made for problems in building trust and continuity. Longer-serving BMATT staff officers provided continuity but were often not the highest quality – serving in Zimbabwe was not a fast track for promotions. BMATT personnel were well compensated. They received their regular military salary as well as Foreign Office pay, were given higher ranks in Zimbabwe, and, in theory, the Zimbabwean government (but in practice often the Foreign Office) paid their housing and medical costs. Major-General Colin Shortis, BMATT commander, January 1982–June 1983, interview, September 7–8, 1994, Tiverton, UK; Jeremy Archer, BMATT staff, interview, September 2, 1994, London; Colonel Ball, BMATT staff, 1988–91, interview, September 15, 1994, Royston.
38. (British) Staff College 22 Army Staff Course 1988. Presentation: “Campaign Study: Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Emergence of a Nation,” p. 25.
43. Ibid. Referring to the South African involvement in the later destruction of new Zimbabwean aircraft in June 1982, Smith said BMATT was aware of the potential for trouble because the air force was seen as a threat to South Africa but could do nothing about it because the guerrillas were not technically competent to be integrated and the air force was needed in case of trouble.
45. Archer, 1982, p. 62; Gethin, 1981, p. 104; Toyne-Sewell, 1991, p. 54. The actual numbers being trained, according to one British adviser, were only 120. See Wright, 1981/2.
52. Archer, 1982; Gethin, 1981; Wright, 1981/2; Boys, 1982; BMATT, Zimbabwe, 1981.
55. Letter from C.R.L. Nkomo to the editor, “Army Pay.” TC, December 25, 1980, p. 8. The Ministry of Defence replied that the privates’ pay of Z$98 per month was after pension deductions so that the gross pay was actually higher than assembly place pay. See also Letter to the editor from “One Soldier,” Bulawayo, TC, March 3,
1981, “Army Pay,” p. 6 asking why members of ZNA should not be offered “a realistic salary.”


58. In 1989, there were still race-based pay scales. One soldier complained: “They [our leaders] preach about the badness of racial discrimination, but in the ZNA there is what is known as the E.S. [European Scale] pay scale and A.S. [African Scale] pay scale… This is effective today, nine years after independence.” (See letter from Peter S. – Detachment-Level (Zanla, Bulawayo), “Problems Plague the Army,” Parade, June 1989, p. 5.) Another exclaimed: “Oh! God, who would think an animal like (E.S) European Scale would be having room in a socialist Zimbabwe today? The bad part of it is that the animal still survives in the army today where there are many ex-combatants. We want the head of this animal chopped off as soon as possible.” (See letter from Border Control, Chiqualaquala, “Why Are We Soldiers Suffering Like This?” Parade, June 1989, p. 5.) In 1989 Secretary of Defence Willard Chiwewe referred to the black NCOs and privates still being paid on the African pay scale whereas whites of equivalent rank were paid on the white pay scale as “an administrative oversight” which could have been a result of attention to military integration and demobilization. See “Black Soldiers Earn Less Than Whites,” The Sunday News (SN), July 30, 1989, p. 4. The removal of inequities, starting in January 1990, was announced in November 1989. See “New Army Pay Scales,” SN, November 26, 1989, p. 2.


60. Newspaper reports confirm that guerrillas from outside trickled in, e.g. “ZIPRA Group Arrives from Angola,” TC, April 9, 1981, p. 1 reported 180 ZIPRA had gone to Gwaai. “ZIPRA on Way from Libya,” TC, June 5, 1981, p. 1 reported the arrival of 300 ZIPRA from Libya, and the pending arrival of another Libyan contingent.


63. Lt.-Colonel Zulu, interview, August 5, 1992, Q Branch, KGVI, Barracks, ZNA.

64. Lucky Dube, interview, August 28, 1992.


71. Lt.-Colonel Zulu, interview, August 5, 1992, Q Branch, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.

72. Lt.-Colonel Zulu, interview, July 29–30, 1992, Q Branch, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.

73. Andy Ncube, interview, July 5, 1992, at his Harare home.
77. Colonel Ndlovu, interview, July 29, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
78. Colour Sergeant Stanley Made, interview, August 5, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
80. Colonel Maseko, interview, July 27, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
81. Lt.-Colonel Zulu, interview, July 29–30, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
82. Margaret Ndebele, interview, August 17, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
84. Margaret Ndebele, interview, August 7, 1992, Zimbabwe Staff College, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
85. Colonel Ndlovu, interview, July 29, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
86. Lt.-Colonel Zulu, interview, August 5, 1992, Q Branch, KGVI Barracks ZNA.
90. Colonel Ndlovu, interview, July 29, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
93. Ex-ZIPA High Command member, interview, June 20, 1992, Harare.
94. The Zimbabwe Project’s Experience in Resettling Ex-Combatants, August 1989, ZP files. This number must refer to women fighters in assembly camps. But many left assembly camps or never entered them, making them impossible to include. In an interview, the commander of ZIPRA women referred to 2,000 women fighters under her command. In 1978, 25 percent of ZANLA’s 40,000 fighters were said to be women and in 1979 ZANLA claimed one-third of its forces were women. For ZANLA figures, see Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 1997, pp. 113–14.
95. Major Mpofu, interview, July 28, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
97. General Sir Patrick Palmer, interview, September 1, 1994, Windsor Castle. The report of an educated ex-guerrilla in ZNA on military leaders’ thinking about women provides insight into the men’s conservatism:

One day the army commander was addressing the ladies (we were mixed): “I appreciate you might say I’m not promoting you. But the limitations of the organization tend to restrict that opportunity. Say I appoint you as lieutenant colonel or major, and that post was to command a battalion in the field or which is very far from your residential place.” Traditionally, when a lady gets married she goes to stay with her husband. If the army commander found you most suitable to command a regiment or go some other area, you’ll be wrecking your marriage. If you went to the field and you’re deployed with your troops in Mozambique – it’s an operational area and civilians can’t visit you. How do children feel? They can be more comfortable with the father away. But the other way around is more difficult, particularly in our African tradition. (Lt.-Colonel Zulu, interview, August 5, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.)
246 Notes to pages 123–128

98. Major Mpofu, interview, July 28, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
100. Major Mpofu, interview, July 28, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
101. Margaret Ndebele, interview, August 7, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
104. For ZANLA, see Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 1997, p. 104. Initial recruits were uneducated; the mid-1970s saw relatively educated people joining up, and toward the end of the war educational levels were falling again as recruits became younger and younger.
105. Lt.-Colonel Zulu, interview, July 29–30, 1992, August 5, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
106. Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 1997, pp. 140–1, 192 discusses tensions between the educated and illiterate in the camps, and the severe punishments the latter dispensed for minor or alleged offenses.
107. Colonel Ndlovu, interview, July 29, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
108. Warrant Officer I Margaret Matanda, interview, August 4, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
110. Chung, 1996; Nare, 1996.
111. Evans, 1992; Dabengwa, 1990.
112. Colonel Ndlovu, interview, July 29, 1992, KGVI Barracks ZNA.
113. Lt.-Colonel Zulu, Q Branch, interview, July 29–30, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
118. Colonel Ndlovu, interview, July 29, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
119. Colonel Chanakira, interview, July 28, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
120. Andy Ncube, interview, July 12, 1992, at his Harare home.
121. Lt.-Colonel Zulu, interview, July 29–30, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
122. Ibid.
123. Margaret Ndebele, interview, August 7, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
125. Colonel Ndlovu, interview, July 29, 1992. An ex-ZIPRA guerrilla working at Tsanga Lodge with disabled soldiers remembered how ex-ZIPRA soldiers, mostly
from 4 Brigade, came into 5 Brigade as commanders. 5 Brigade’s headquarters were in the town of Inyanga about 20 kilometers away: A. Ncube, interview, July 5, 1992, at his Harare home.

126. Lt.-Colonel Zulu, interview, August 5, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
127. For instance, the new battalion commander of 2:4 – a man with “O” levels – took his entire battalion to Inyanga for training and remained its commander when it became the first battalion of 5 Brigade. He served as Fifth Brigade’s deputy commander from early 1982 to 1983. Lt-Colonel Munemo, interview, July 29–30, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA. “A man who was integrated as a private tells of how his battalion (4:4) was moved from Masvingo to Inyanga in 1983 where it met other 4 battalions (e.g. 1:4, 2:4) with some Korean instructors to form the Fifth Brigade (Colour Sergeant S. Made, interview, August 5, 1992). The fact that a military document lists 1:4 battalion as disbanding, and does not list 2:4 and 4:4 as existing, lends support to these claims: see BMATT document,” Command Elements: Formations, Corps, Units,” HQ 1 Brigade, Brady Barracks, Bulawayo, March 1982. According to BMATT documents of September 1982, 4:0 battalion and 401 battalion – both deployed on operations but of low operational capability – were due to be moved to the Fifth Brigade. (Annex E To BMATT/1406 September 3, 1982. Restricted.) CCJPZ and LR, 1997, p. 46, citing Jocelyn Alexander, refers to ZIPRA dissidents’ claim that 5 Brigade attacked ZIPRA in 4 Brigade, leading to mass desertions and the disbanding of several 4 battalions. This is consistent with the BMATT data.

145. For the constitution of pensions, see p. 42; for the quest for equal pensions, see p. 115.
146. Gutteridge, 1984, p. 117 refers to a total of forty-six battalions. Toyne-Sewell, 1991, p. 54 notes that twelve battalions were formed in the first year, implying more than one per month given that integration started well after the beginning of the year.
148. For the smaller figure, see Gutteridge, 1984, p. 116. For demobilization of 20,000–25,000 from the army, see Zimbabwe National Army Statistics, posted strength at October 1, 1983. Obtained from BMATT staff member. These figures are supported by Mugabe’s reference in September 1981 to 65,000 soldiers in the new army and the official intention to reduce it to 40,000. See “Zimbabwe to Have Army of 40,000 Men,” TH, September 16, 1981, p. 1; for the larger figure, see (British) Staff College, 22 Army Staff Course 1988, Presentation: “Campaign Study: Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Emergence of a Nation.”
150. BMATT papers, obtained from BMATT staff member.
153. A confidential BMATT memo of September 1982 listed battalions 18, 28, 29, 36, 37, 46, 47, 402, and 403 as due for disbandment. Most of these battalions were placed in Class E, defined as “recommended for disbandment as soon as possible” or Class D, defined as “suitable as a holding unit” (“Current State of Battalions,” HQBMATT, September 7, 1982).
154. Colonel Peter Walton, BMATT staff, interview, September 13, 1994, Winchester, UK.
155. In October 1983, battalions 29, 36, and 403 apparently still existed; Zimbabwe Army Statistics, obtained from BMATT.
156. Colonel Roderick Arnold, BMATT staff, interview, September 16, 1994, Upavon, UK.
158. Ibid.
160. Colonel Roderick Arnold, BMATT staff, interview, September 16, 1994, Upavon, UK. A BMATT coordinator related a similar story of theft of soldiers’ pay in 1981. “The Admin Officer, Capt Ronnie Mnaphi, went down to Bulawayo on a pay run with about $5000 (3500 pounds) and a large bundle of acquittance rolls. There was no mechanism within the ZNA at this stage for paying soldiers away on a course and so the Admin Officer had to do it personally. Having arrived in Bulawayo he
went home and got his own car and set off to find the soldiers at the Driving School. On the way he had a bad smash and when he came to in hospital he discovered that all the money and the acquaintance rolls had been stolen. So had the only keys for the safe in Battalion Headquarters.” Archer, 1982, p. 65.


167. In March 1981 Minister Zvobgo postponed indefinitely the municipal elections in Bulawayo scheduled for March 28–29 1981, citing as the reason “lots of weapons” that had disappeared from ZIPRA camps (“No Bulawayo Poll until Security Settles – Zvobgo,” TH, March 17, 1981, p. 1). A day before the end of the disarmament exercise, an editorial in TC referred to the belief that many guerrillas had hidden weapons as an insurance policy against further factional fighting (“The Way to Peace and Prosperity” – editorial, TC, May 18, 1981, p. 4). At the end of December 1981, immediately after ZIPRA combatants were moved to barracks from Gwaai River mine camp – the last camp to be demobilized – the army entered to search for arms claiming that they had known that a large quantity of arms brought into Gwaai after the war had not been accounted for (“Caches Could Arm a Brigade,” TH, February 8, 1982, p. 1).

168. CCJPZ and LRF, 1997, p. 41.

169. Major-General Colin Shortis, BMATT commander, January 1982–June 1983, interview, September 7–8, 1994, Tiverton, UK. See also the statement by Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office (Defence) that there were few deserters, most of whom had not been in the liberation war. “Zimbabwe to Set Up Army Training Team,” TH, July 21, 1982, p. 1. Less than two months later, he put the number of deserters at 300, adding that they were mostly ex-ZIPRA combatants. See “Ex-ZIPRA Men Have Nothing to Fear,” TC, September 9, 1982, p. 1.

170. Alexander et al., 2000, p. 189. “Ex-ZIPRA Men Have Nothing to Fear,” TC, September 9, 1982, p. 1 reports on Minister of State (Defence) in the Prime Minister’s Office, Sydney Sekeramayi, giving assurances to former Rhodesian and ex-ZIPRA men in the ZNA that if they had committed no crime, they had nothing to fear. “There will be no witch-hunting,” he said in an interview.
He disclosed that the ZNA’s most senior army officers – Army Commander Rex Nhongo (ex-ZANLA), Major-General Josiah Tungamirai (ex-ZANLA), and Major Jevan Maseko (ex-ZIPRA) – had launched an exercise to assure all the soldiers that they were equal members of the ZNA. “A Pledge to Heed” – Comment, TC, September 10, 1982, p. 6 editorialized that the pledge of equal treatment for all regardless of past political affiliation had been made many times, “even though there was no need. Yet some elements have deserted in the belief, perhaps spawned by political discontents, that they would be victimised.” Observing that the vast majority of ex-ZIPRA combatants had opted to stay in the army, “loyal to the Government of the day,” the editorial stated: “Important, therefore, that not all are tarred with the same brush.”

171. CCJPZ and LRF, 1997, p. 41.
172. Ibid., p. 53.
173. Ibid., p. 54. The report notes: “Forced attendance at weekend-long ‘pungwes’ [political education meetings, a ZANLA war-time practice] was a notable feature in Matabeleland North in March, April and May of 1983...” (Ibid., p. 54, footnote 203).
174. Lt.-Colonel Zulu, interview, July 29–30, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA; BMATT confidential records of March 1982 show that Major S. Nleya, second-in-command of 2:7 battalion was under arrest, and BMATT records of September 1982 show that Lt.-Colonel B. Hlongwane, commander of 2:9 battalion, was under arrest in 2 Brigade.
177. Ibid., p. 195, citing a ZIPRA informant.
178. Colonel Maseko, interview, July 27, 1992, KGVI Barracks, ZNA.
182. Ibid.
184. George Chiweshe, Legal Services Directorate, ZNA, interview, July 1–2 1992, KGVI Barracks, Harare. In 2001 Chiweshe was appointed a High Court judge.
185. CCJPZ and LRF, 1997, p. 44.
186. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986, pp. 87–8. Nicholas Nkomo and Tshaka Moyo were the two other men who were redetained.
188. CCJPZ and LRF, 1997, p. 71.
190. Ibid.
5 EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS FOR THE DEMOBILIZED

3. Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 1997, pp. 275–6 makes a similar claim with regard to government projects to empower women economically. She writes: “it is clear that ZANU PF partisan concerns often took precedence over women’s economic
empowerment, thereby frustrating any objectives to improve their position in relation to men.”

4. For examples of government policy statements about cooperatives and socialism, see Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1997, pp. 441–2; Mumbengegwi, 1984, p. 49; 1988, p. 156.


6. The three cooperatives, all for ex-ZANLA combatants, were Sashi Cooperative in Bindura (sixty-eight families), Dzikamidzi Cooperative near Shurugwi (thirty families), and Svinurai Cooperative in Cashel Valley, Chimanimani (forty families).


13. Ibid., refers to the various economic motives of non-combatants who joined Model B resettlement schemes.


16. Former ZP staff member, interview, July 8, 1992; see also Ladin, 1993.

17. Former ZP staff member, interview, July 8, 1992, Marondera.


30. Hoffman, c. 1990, chs. 6 and 12. On Zenzele Cooperative, Brian McDonald and Isaac Dube, interview, CUSO, June 29, 1992, CUSO office, Harare. See also Musemwa,
1994. On NITRAM, see Letter from Judith Todd, ZP director to “Friends,” December 15, 1981. On Vukuzenzele, Stephen Nkomo (ZAPU MP) claimed: “a mob of people went to this cooperative, a well laid out centre. They got there and beat up the disabled ex-combatants. People who got disabled because they were fighting for the liberation of this country. But they were beaten up by the ZANU (PF) mob, and the Minister [of Home Affairs] did not mention that when he sought the extension [sic] of the State of Emergency.” “Renewal of Declaration of State of Emergency – Motion,” HAD, July 24, 1984, v. 10, n. 14, p. 613. It is unclear whether this incident, which refers to party mob violence, is the same as that which refers to soldiers’ violence.


32. Model B schemes received land from the government whereas other agricultural cooperators had to purchase their land.


34. Chitsike, 1988, p. 115


43. “Proposal for Funding Rural Co-operative Education,” Zimbabwe Project, June 23, 1982; Appeal to all agencies and individuals supporting the work of Zimbabwe Project from Judith Todd, July 1, 1982; “Zimbabwe Project Involvements in Resettling ex-Freedom Fighters,” M.Z. Mtsambiwa, Projects Officer, Zimbabwe Project. ZP archives.

44. Former ZP staff member, interview, July 8, 1992.

45. In contrast, ZP’s historian, Hoffman, c. 1990, chs. 4 and 7, depicts the organization’s focus on producer cooperatives as the product of its longstanding interest in and commitment to producer cooperatives, demonstrated by its 1978 decision to enlist Guy Clutton-Brock, supporter of pre-independence cooperatives, as one of its trustees.
46. ZP Director to K.D. Mavuti, Deputy Secretary for Finance, ZANU(PF), Harare, August 5, 1987. ZP archives.
49. Hoffman, c. 1990, ch. 5.
50. Ibid., ch. 4, pp. 20–1.
51. Ibid., p. 22.
58. Ex-ZP staff member, interview, July 8, 1992.
60. Hoffman, c. 1990, ch. 6, p. 12.
61. Ibid., pp. 15–16.
63. Ibid., ch. 8, pp. 10–11, 20.
64. Ibid., ch. 6, pp. 18–19.
65. Ibid., ch. 6, p. 20.
66. Ibid., ch. 7, p. 13.
67. Ibid., ch. 11, p. 18.
70. Sylvester, 1991, p. 119 dates the decline in socialist idealism as follows: “It was more common, however, for the socialist idealism of the first five years to drop away or simply lose its bite . . .”
73. Paul Hlongwane, interview, May 1, 1992, Simukai.
74. Schiphorst, 2001, pp. 38, 64, footnote 5; see also Raftopoulos, 2001, p. 3.
79. Saunders, 2001, pp. 136–7; Schiphorst, 2001, p. 64, footnote 5. Citing “Unity of parties the key,” Sunday Mail (SM), October 25, 1981, Moyo, 1992, p. 23 writes: “In one instance Mugabe attacked striking teachers and nurses calling them ‘Madzakutsaku’ (Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s supporters) saying, ‘when we were fighting the war
these people were supporting Smith’s government and today when they have true freedom they want to start their own little war.’” Referring to Mugabe’s tirade in December 1997 against the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions’ leadership for its lack of liberation credentials, Raftopoulos, 2001, p. 13 noted that this was “a theme that has been a constant refrain throughout the post-colonial period.”

84. Ibid., p. 53 citing Shadur, 1994, p. 102.
85. Ibid., pp. 50–4, 64, 87. Ibid., pp. 223–4 claims that trade union officials – especially those belonging to the ZANU(PF)-affiliated federation and ZANU(PF) militants – used the workers’ strike committees to build up new splinter unions to boost the number of pro-party unions and hence union delegates’ votes at a unity congress. The Muzorewa labor federation leader complained in late 1980 about the government’s use of workers’ strike committees to divide and control trade unions for the ruling party’s political ends.
89. Ibid., pp. 196–9.
90. Ibid., p. 200.
92. Interview, August 22, 1992, ZBC.
93. This point was corroborated by another ZIPA commander. Interview with ex-ZIPA commander, June 20, 1992, Harare.
100. Presidential speech, HAD, June 15, 1982, v. 5, n. 1, p. 4. Home Affairs Minister Ushewokunze told senior police officers in 1983: “We shall also recruit more ex-combatants because they can graduate from our institutions much more quickly as they already have some training in some police-related activities.” See “Enlist and Enlighten the Povo, Police Told,” TH, March 24, 1983, p. 3.


106. For example, an industrial relations officer at ZESA recalled: “You’d get a phone call to say: ‘Hello. This is ZANU Headquarters. Do you have vacancies?’ We’re talking in hundreds especially in security guards.” (Mr. Mpofu, ZESA Industrial Relations Officer, interview, July 2, 1992, Harare.) For further examples of intimidation and polite requests, see pages 165, 168–9.


113. Gibson Langa, interview, Social Welfare Pensions Section, Harare, August 20, 1992, already had his “O” levels when he was hired in 1981. He obtained a certificate in business studies for which the department paid.

114. Mr. Gumbo, Industrial Relations Officer, ZESA, interview, July 2, 1992.


117. Lt.-Colonel Munemo, interview, July 29–30, 1992, ZNA. Lt.-Colonel Munemo worked in ZANU’s Education Department during the war. He had completed “O” levels and had taught prior to joining ZANLA.

118. Sharon Ladin, ex-Danhiko director, interview, August 29, 1992, Baltimore. Dr. Ladin was the director till 1987.


120. John Nyamutowera, coordinator, CADEC, interview, July 1, 1992.
122. For examples, see Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1992, p. 38; Maphosa, 1992, p. 21; Shadur, 1992, p. 30.
123. For these and other *noms de guerre*, see the article by ex-combatant Charles Pfukwa, 1998. On ex-combatants’ deliberate retention of their war names, Mr. Eddison Munyuru, principal of Chinhoyi Teachers’ College, interview, July 7, 1992, Chinhoyi.
127. Mr. Gumbo, ZESA Industrial Relations Officer, interview, July 2, 1992, Harare.
131. Saul Kangai, interview, June 12, 1992, United Bottlers, Harare.
133. Mr. Mudzingwa, Motion on presidential speech, HAD, May 21, 1980, v. 1, p. 119.
139. I thank Vupenyu Dzingirai for this translation.
141. Rutherford, 2001 notes that the committees set up in the early 1980s on commercial farms acted as the local structures of the party and championed workers’ rights (p. 208) and that workers’ committees on farms in Hurungwe district were commonly created by party and/or Ministry of Labour officials (p. 210).
144. Ibid., p. 18; Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1992, p. 41.
146. Mr. Jake Richards, head of apprenticeship training, Delta Corporation, interview, June 9, 1992, Harare.
147. Mr. Eddison Munyuru, Principal of Chinhoyi Teachers’ College, interview, July 7, 1992, Chinhoyi.
148. Mr. Hamadziripi, Registrar for Skills Upgrading, Ministry of Higher Education and
Mr. Muziwa, Registrar for Apprentices, Ministry of Higher Education, interview, July 6, 1992, Harare.
149. Mr. George Douglas, Secretary of National Manpower Advisory Council, interview, July 1, 1992, Harare.
151. Mr. Eddison Munyuru, Principal of Chinhoyi Teachers’ College, interview, July 7, 1992, Chinhoyi.
152. Ibid.
153. Mr. Hamadziripi, Registrar for Skills Upgrading, Ministry of Higher Education and
Mr. Muziwa, Registrar for Apprentices, Ministry of Higher Education, interview, July 6, 1992, Harare.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid.
156. Mr. Hamadziripi, Registrar for Skills Upgrading, Ministry of Higher Education, and
Mr. Muziwa, Registrar for Apprentices, Ministry of Higher Education, interview, July 6, 1992, Harare. Many of these issues were also raised by others. Mr. Eddison Munyuru, Principal of Chinhoyi Teachers’ College, interview, July 7, 1992, Chinhoyi. Mr. George Douglas, Secretary of National Manpower Advisory Council, interview, July 1, 1992, Harare.
158. Mr. Eddison Munyuru, Principal of Chinhoyi Teachers’ College, interview, July 7, 1992, Chinhoyi.
159. Mr. Jake Richards, head of apprenticeship training, Delta Corporation, interview, June 9, 1992, Harare.
160. Mr. Hamadziripi, Registrar for Skills Upgrading, Ministry of Higher Education and
Mr. Muziwa, Registrar for Apprentices, Ministry of Higher Education, interview, July 6, 1992, Harare.
161. Mr. Eddison Munyuru, Principal of Chinhoyi Teachers’ College, interview, July 7, 1992, Chinhoyi.
164. Mr. Hamadziripi, Registrar for Skills Upgrading, Ministry of Higher Education and
166. Mr. Hamadziripi, Registrar for Skills Upgrading, Ministry of Higher Education and


169. The new legislation and its predecessor were explained in an interview with George Douglas, Secretary of National Manpower Advisory Council, July 1, 1992, Harare.

170. Eddison Munyuru, Principal of Chinhoyi Teachers’ College, interview, July 7, 1992, Chinhoyi.

171. Saul Kangai, interview, June 12, 1992, United Bottlers, Harare.

172. Schiphorst, 2001, pp. 219–20; see also pp. 165, 177; Madhuku, 2001, pp. 125–6. The Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1992 shifted power away from trade unions to works’ councils which were composed of workers’ committee representatives and management.


174. Ex-ZP staff member, interview, July 9, 1992, Marondera.


177. The September 14, 1986 letter to the prime minister from the Ruwa ex-combatants – the so-called Ruwa Document – was obtained from the offices of the CCJPZ, Harare.


180. Ruwa Rehabilitation Centre for ex-combatants. Notes based on Ruwa ex-combatants’ reports to the CCJPZ. October 22, 1986. CCJPZ files.


182. HAD, July 16, 1986, v. 13, n. 11, p. 388. Both Cheater, 1992c, pp. 72, 74 and Gaidzanwa, 1992, p. 67 discuss how the post-independence government, reversing the pre-independence government’s practices, valued formal education more than work experience in promotions and hiring.


186. Ibid., November 18, 1986, v. 13, n. 34, p. 1643, see also p. 1649.


188. Ministry of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, 1985, p. 16.

In 1994 the Home Affairs Minister claimed to have 28,000 special constabularies (a category created to cater for ex-combatants who lacked the entry qualifications for the regular police) and 20,000 regular police, who included many ex-combatants. (HAD, September 14, 1994, v. 21, n. 28, pp. 1921–2.)

This was the estimate in the March 1988 parliamentary motion to address the plight of ex-combatants. All figures for unemployed ex-combatants should be treated with caution. In 1991, 15,000 ex-combatants were reported to be unemployed. See “Success Story for Local Co-operative,” TH, February 27, 1991. In 1984, ZAPU MP Sydney Malunga had referred to 17,000 unemployed ex-combatants, a figure which Mugabe denied. See HAD, August 28, 1984, v. 10, n. 25, p. 1272 and “General Election Set for Next May,” TC, August 16, 1984, p. 1.


Wood, 1988, p. 293.


Mrs. Daniels, internal audit supervisor, social welfare pensions office, conversation, July 24, 1992.


Mr. Gumbo, Industrial Relations Officer, ZESA, July 2, 1992, Harare.


Alexander et al., 2000, pp. 207, 228.


HAD, August 28, 1984, v. 10, n. 25, p. 1272. Mugabe claimed only a small minority had refused to do anything to better themselves and denied there were 17,000 former combatants who had no means of making a living after their demobilization allowances had ended. See “General Election Set for Next May,” TC, August 16, 1984, p. 1.

HAD, September 11, 1984, v. 11, n. 1, pp. 33–4; see also ZAPU MP Mr. Jekanyika’s concerns about unemployed ex-combatants in HAD, November 9, 1984, v. 11, n. 8, p. 618.


212. Senior ZIPRA commander, interview, May 18, 1992, Bulawayo; Judgment by Honourable Mr. Justice Squires in State versus Dumiso Dabengwa and 6 others, p. 12; Defence outline in the state versus Dumiso Dabengwa..., p. 14.
216. Ibid., p. 218.
217. Ibid., p. 224.
220. Female ex-combatant, interview, June 23, 1992, PTC. Since 1989 she had been employed as an executive officer (a level above a clerk).
228. Sharon Ladin, ex-Danhiko director, interview, August 29, 1992, Baltimore. Dr. Ladin was the director till 1987.

6 CONCLUSION

1. Social scientists’ (including historians’) distaste for military groups has often been lamented. Referring to the American Revolution, historian John Shy (1990, p. 3) remarked in 1976 that “with some exceptions, more than seven years of armed struggle have been left to the military historians, who have generally been preoccupied with recounting military operations and assessing generalship.” Isser Woloch (1979) observed that his was the first historical study of French revolutionary veterans, and even in the late 1980s, social histories of the French revolutionary armies were considered rare (Forrest, 1990). Analysts of warfare and military organization have commented on how poorly these subjects have been served by social science paradigms (Porter, 1994; Ashworth and Dandekar, 1987). Theda Skocpol (1992) drew attention to the significance of Civil War veterans’ pensions in her study of the origins and development of US social policy, and to how social science approaches, rooted in the study of socioeconomic processes, had divorced themselves from the study of wars and the military. Alfred Stepan (1988) found the neglect of the military in studies of democratic transitions “stunning” and attributed it to theories of the state which do not accord the military an independent status, to scholars’ understandable fear of repression and censorship, to the relative difficulty of researching the military, and to the “normative disdain” for the military as a topic, a longstanding problem often referred to as “liberal bias.”
2. See chapter 1.
5. For example, Parsons, 1999; Lunn, 1999; Echenberg, 1991; Grundlingh, 1987. For the USA, see Skocpol, 1992; Resch, 1999; Ross, 1969; Amenta, 1998. For France, see Woloch, 1979.

EPILOGUE: THE PAST IN THE PRESENT

4. For ZIPRA, see Alexander et al., 2000, p. 142. For ZANLA, see Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 1997, p. 218. For both organizations, this became a public issue in 1997–8, when the veterans had to register for their monthly pensions and bonuses. Those trained in the country had difficulty getting registered because the training commanders in the camps outside the country could not authenticate their status.
5. Two examples must suffice. When an ex-combatant complained that the government paid demobilization money erratically, thus treating ex-combatants like “second-hand Citizens,” a government official replied: “No genuine [my italics] ex-combatant could be so ungrateful and ignorant of demobilisation pay dates.” (See Letter from B.H. Manzu for the Secretary for Labour and Social Services, Harare, “Ignorant of Demob Dates,” TH, December 6, 1982, p. 6.) When ZANLA ex-combatants disrupted the Heroes’ Day ceremony in August 1997 to demand pensions, Eddison Zvobgo told them that “a true Zanla” “does not disrespect his national anthem nor ignore an address by his leader” (See “War Veterans Heckle Mugabe at Heroes Day Commemorations,” PanAfrican News Agency, August 11, 1997.)
7. The War Victims Compensation Act of 1980, the first legislative provision for ex-guerrillas, defines the war but not ex-guerrillas. Assembly and demobilization payments were intended for combatants only and administrative decisions guided who received payments, as chapter 3 discusses. Subsequent payments were at least formally based on legal definitions of ex-combatants. Statutory Instrument 53A of 1989 which incorporated ex-combatants in the army and police force into the existing regulations for state retirement pensions defined an ex-combatant as “a contributor who participated actively in the liberation struggle as a combatant before the 18th April 1980, otherwise than as a member of a uniformed force of the then Government of Rhodesia…” The War Veterans Act of 1992 defined war veterans as those who
underwent military training and participated, consistently and persistently, in the liberation struggle which occurred in Zimbabwe and in neighboring countries between January 1, 1962 and February 29, 1980.


11. ZHR NGO Forum, August 2001, p. 2. Identifying the perpetrators of the violence since the June 2000 parliamentary election as “war veterans,” members of the state security services, and ZANU(PF) supporters, the report acknowledges veterans’ leadership role when it describes “war veterans” as “militias led by a small group of people who participated in the liberation war but consisting mainly of unemployed ZANU(PF) supporters too young to have fought in that war.” But the report’s use of “war veterans,” even when referring to known liberation veterans, its omission of key individuals’ veteran status, and its discrediting of ZNLWVA leaders’ war and other credentials, all have the effect of downplaying the role of veterans and make for confusion. Chenjerai Hunzvi is referred to as a “war veteran” (p. 9) whose liberation credentials are questioned by war veterans (p. 51, footnote 73, pp. 15–16); the doubt about his credentials seems removed later when he is referred to as a feared war veteran (p. 23). Mike Moyo appears as a “war veteran” (p. 10) though he was a liberation war veteran. Chris Pasipamire’s war veteran credentials are omitted (p. 10). Even when the report intends to refer only to the small core group of war veterans, it uses the more comprehensive “war veterans” (e.g. p. 15).


21. In December 2000 Mugabe issued a statutory instrument, purportedly in terms of the Electoral Act, to validate the disputed elections on the grounds that the elections had been “held under peaceful conditions,” “people who voted did so freely,” the election outcome “represents a genuine and free expression of the people’s will,”
and that challenges were “undermining political stability and the democratisation process” and had to be stopped “in the interests of peace, security and stability.” The MDC took the matter to the Supreme Court (with all five judges) which struck down the order as unconstitutional. See ZHR NGO Forum, August 2001, p. 11; Swarms, 2001, p. 3; IBA, 2001, paragraphs 8.13–8.14, 3.6, 3.7.

22. ZHR NGO Forum, July 2001, p. 2. Two other observer groups, the Commonwealth Observer Group, and the European Union Observer Group, also refer to the ruling party’s systemic campaign of violence in the general election. See IBA, 2001, paragraphs 8.5 and 8.7.


27. ZHR NGO Forum, July 2001, p. 3.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 33.


32. Ibid., p. 43, citing DN, June 5, 2000.

33. ZHR NGO Forum, July 2001, p. 16.

34. Ibid., p. 12.

35. Ibid., pp. 14, 16, 17.


40. “Party Deplores War Vets Reserve Force,” DN, October 2000. During Operation SEED in 1980–1 the idea of liberation war veterans still in the assembly camps forming a reserve army was touted by Rhodesians, who had an interest in keeping them out of the new army. Later, demobilized ZANLA veterans themselves made a case for a reserve army of liberation war veterans (see chapter 3).


42. “Mugabe Troops will Carve Up White Farms,” The Times (UK), August 16, 2001.


50. “Request for ZANU(PF) Bench Refused by Judge,” *TH*, January 13, 1981, p. 3; “Ex-Guerillas Call for Removal of Chain in Court,” *TH*, January 15, 1981, p. 5; “Court Told of ‘Standing Orders,’” *TH*, January 16, 1981, p. 3; “Death for Farm Murders,” *TH*, January 31, 1981, p. 3. The defense strategy resembled Tekere’s defense team’s. The accused did not plead guilty but the defense did not challenge the state case of what had happened on the night of July 19, 1980 at Mr. James’ farm. Instead, the defense attempted to put the events of that night in the context of what had happened earlier that day when the accused went to buy cigarettes from Mr. James’ farm store. According to the accused, Mr. James had called them “gandangas” (“terrorists”) rather than freedom fighters, told them to get out of the store and to buy their cigarettes at Mugabe’s store, and threatened to kill them with his rifle. They took this as a declaration of war, and they returned that night on a military-style expedition. The two more junior guerrillas claimed they had merely obeyed the orders of their commanders.
52. In April 2000 parliament, overwhelmingly dominated by ZANU(PF), voted to amend the constitution to provide for expropriation of land without compensation, if Britain did not fund compensation.
53. IBA, 2001, chapter 7 provides a readable summary of the land issue and the court rulings.
54. IBA, 2001, paragraphs 3.6, 3.7. The Supreme Court consisted of Justices McNally (white), Ebrahim (Asian), Sandura (African), Muchechetere (African), and until his resignation, Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay (white). White judges were in a minority both in the Supreme Court and in the High Court. Justice Muchechetere has since died, and Justices McNally and Ebrahim have retired.
56. ZHR NGO Forum, August 2001, pp. 12, 15. Judge Devittie is of “mixed race.”
60. Ibid., paragraph 10.5.
61. Ibid., paragraph 9.10.
64. E.g. Stalin Mau Mau (information and publicity), Mike Moyo (security), Chris Pasipamire (vice-chair), Chris Mutsvangwa (administration), Amos Midzi (chair). The war credentials of all except Midzi appear in numerous press reports. Midzi is


69. Ibid., p. 1.

70. ZHR NGO Forum, August 2001, p. 10.


72. Dean, 2001, p. 1. But ibid., p. 5 advocated that executives call the police because though they would not intervene to stop veterans from pursuing a grievance, they might intervene to prevent damage to property or danger to life.

73. Ibid., p. 4.


86. McGregor, 2002, p. 34.

87. Ibid., pp. 29–30.

88. Ibid., pp. 17, 33–4.

89. Ibid., p. 31. Hiring veterans who did not meet the “O” level requirement also occurred without PSC permission in 1980 and subsequently with PSC approval. See chapter 5.


APPENDIX

1. Mr. Makande, interview, August 28, 1992.
7. HAD, July 13, 1988, v. 15, n. 6, pp. 131–2. Several ex-combatants and their MPs expressed indignation that dissidents were going to receive land and government assistance while those who had been loyal went without assistance. See “Redress the Situation,” letter to the editor from Simiso Ncube, Bulawayo, TC, November 6, 1989, p. 5; Mr. Mudzingwa (ZANU(PF) MP, Chegutu East), HAD, July 6, 1988, v. 15, n. 3, pp. 81–2; “What about my Future?” letter to the editor, Worried Liberator, Luveve, Bulawayo, SN, July 3, 1988, p. 6.
10. Ibid., p. 1158.
30. HAD, June 6, 1990, v. 17, n. 4, p. 150.
31. Interview with reporter attending the ZNLWVA inaugural meeting, Harare, August 22, 1992.
33. HAD, June 6, 1990, v. 17, n. 4, p. 150.
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