

THE INANDA SCHEME: a briefing

THIS CONTRIBUTION is written in the style of the 'Briefings' in earlier issues of Work In Progress, its intention being to get down on paper some of the events and issues that have unfolded in Released Area 33. A more theoretical background to resettlement, the housing question in general, and the self-help approach in particular can be found in the DSG/SARS information publications. (1)

There are many information gaps in this contribution - possibly the most important concerns the actual residents of the site-and-service scheme discussed below. On this aspect, the Durban Surplus Peoples' Project will be publishing a report, based on a survey of residents, in the near future. This should help to fill the gap. Given the nature of the issue and the difficulty of checking and verifying information, the writer is well aware of the tentative and speculative nature of this article. As with all contributions to WIP, any corrected or additional information and insights would be welcome.

PRIOR TO the 1950s, the area north of Natal's Umgeni River and inland from the coastal strip, was mainly agricultural land. Large tracts were under sugar cane, mainly owned by the sugar estates. Further inland and north of the river there were smaller plots, owned under freehold title by africans, indians and whites. Beyond that was the african reserve of Zululand.

Indian and african labour, servicing the

Durban area, was housed in Cato Manor, behind Durban University. With the massive influx of black labour in the 1940s and 1950s, the Cato Manor area developed into a vast slum with a population of up to 160 000. Local and state officials feared the outbreak of epidemics, uncontrollable vice, crime and political agitation, and in 1958 Cato Manor was proclaimed a white group area.

The removal and resettlement of people from Cato Manor was quickly undertaken. Land was expropriated from the sugar estates north of the Umgeni, and the african township of Kwa Mashu was built. As Kwa Mashu 'filled up', Ntuzuma township was started, next to Kwa Mashu, and in the 1970s Phoenix and Newlands indian and coloured townships were built. When Phoenix and Ntuzuma are completed, the townships north of the Umgeni will house a population of approximately 500 000. The majority of the working population in these townships has to travel the 20km, daily, to work in Durban.

However, not all those removed from Cato Manor were resettled in the townships. Thousands did not 'qualify' for, or resisted, removal to the ordered, controlled bleakness of the townships. Many settled in the informal settlements on the outer area of Durban.

One of these settlements was in the Inanda area, north of Kwa Mashu and Ntuzuma. Inanda is comprised of two parts: an area within the KwaZulu boundry, where the land is under tribal tenure and authority- this area is relatively sparsely settled; and an area immediately adjacent to the KwaZulu boundary, which is Released Area 33 (RA 33).

The Native Trust and Land Act (Act 180 of 1936) declared certain land as released areas. These areas were to be acquired by the South African Native (now Development) Trust (SADT),

to make up the 13% quota of land for the reserves or bantustans. RA 33 is one of these released areas. It consists of freehold land owned by african and indian landlords, and various churches. The SADT owns three sites in RA 33, and it is on these that the Inanda site-and-service scheme was located.

RA 33 had for years been in a sort of administrative 'limbo'. It was not part of the KwaZulu bantustan, it was not an urban area, it was not part of 'white' South Africa. It had no local authority. Officially it was administered by the Verulam magistrate. In reality it was controlled by the landowners. Its uncertain status, however, meant that it was an appropriate place to live in for those who could not get a house in the overcrowded townships; for those not eligible for a township house; for those who did not want to live in a township; and for those moving from the impoverished rural areas. In RA 33 a person could rent a shack, or rent a small plot and build a shack.

The landlords; however, provided no services. There was no piped water supply, and rivers and streams were the major source of water. There were a few boreholes, but these were owned and controlled by landlords and shopowners who sold the water at exorbitant prices.

In the 1970s there was a considerable increase in settlement in the area, and the population in the 30km square area is presently approximately 80 000. During 1978-79 Natal experienced a long drought, and early in 1979 members of the communities in RA 33 approached the Urban Foundation's Natal Region office in Durban with a request to solve the water problem. The Urban Foundation (UF) undertook a study and by June 1979 came up with a proposal for a permanent water supply system that would cost

approximately R2,5-m. The UF study found that there was excess capacity in reservoirs serving the Ntuzuma and Phoenix townships, and that this could be easily extended to serve RA 33.

The Urban Foundation also set about trying to find out which government department was responsible for the area, and to convince it of the viability and need for such a water scheme.

The drought continued into the summer of 1978-79. The water sources in RA 33 dried up or were reduced to a sewage-fouled trickle. Negotiations with government departments continued. It appears that these departments, particularly the Department of Co-operation and Development, were stalling on the issue, using the excuse that there was no local authority for the area. However, the South African Development Trust (SADT) is responsible in terms of the 1936 Act; the Department of Co-operation and Development acts for the Trust and is therefore the legal authority in RA 33.

Then, in January and February, the Durban municipal and state health authorities began receiving reports of dramatic increases in typhoid cases from hospitals and clinics. The media suddenly focussed attention on this 'new' issue, and the Regional Director of State Health, Dr Johan van Rensburg, was quoted as describing the situation as an 'epidemic'. (2) The article quoting van Rensburg was headlined 'Fears typhoid may spread to Durban' and contained the following opening paragraphs:

Durban is sitting on a typhoid bomb. Thousands of workers could be unwitting carriers of the killer disease - and there are fears that the epidemic could spread to the city.

The bomb is Inanda and the solution is water piped within easy reach of every home.

But Inanda - one of Durban's major labour sources - is a squatter's haven. (3)

Typhoid is prevalent in South Africa, with Natal having the highest number of reported cases. (4) When the media got over its initial hysteria at having discovered an epidemic in its back yard, it found out that

Inanda had a bad reputation for typhoid... Last year 160 typhoid cases and two deaths were reported in the 80 000 strong district. (5)

But it was not only the press which became concerned with the epidemic. Those with a greater material interest in the problem of a contaminated labour supply also expressed their 'concern'. Durban's Deputy Medical Officer of Health, Dr Muriel Richter, was quoted as saying '...that while the situation in Inanda gave cause for concern, the threat to Durban was not so great as might have been expected'. Although Inanda adjoined Durban and supplied it and other urban centres with labour, there was no reason to panic, she said.

Our Department has been inundated with calls from commerce and industry inquiring about this, but apart from those industries concerned with the sale and distribution of food there is no cause for alarm. (6)

The prospect of a typhoid epidemic certainly galvanised all parties into action. The Durban City Health Department and the State Health Department mounted inoculation campaigns in RA 33 during March 1980. (7) The UF released details to the press of its June 1979 water scheme report and its lack of success in negotiations with state departments.

The tragedy of Inanda's situation was that no one was prepared to take responsibility for being the local authority for the area, the Regional Director of the Urban Foundation, Mr Alan Mountain, said yesterday.

The Urban Foundation had investigated laying a reticulated water system in Inanda as early as March last year, and after its completion had submitted a report to various departments, including the Department of Co-operation and Development, for

consideration. However, nothing was done. (8)

It must be noted that even at this stage the Urban Foundation was looking beyond the mere provision of water to what it saw as 'long term solutions'. A statement by Mountain refers to the need for the 'upgrading of the area'. (9)

The news of the typhoid epidemic roused the New Republic Party's health spokesman, Nigel Wood, then MP for Berea, to attack the authorities for an 'unforgivable outbreak of a preventable disease'; Wood advocated supplying water to the area by road tanker. (10)

State Health moved two medical teams and a mobile clinic into the area to boost the inoculation campaigns. (11) However, these teams concentrated their efforts on RA 33 whereas the Mzinyathi river to the west of the area had been identified as one of the prime typhoid hazard areas. But the river flows through the KwaZulu district of Ndwedwe which is the responsibility of the KwaZulu Health Department. It appears that there were no contingency plans for co-ordinated action on a metropolitan scale by the three health authorities involved.

The most significant response was the forming of an emergency committee to organise relief for the typhoid-stricken area. Chairman of this committee was Brigadier Charles Lloyd, officer commanding Natal Command. (At present he is a Major-General, in command of SADF forces in Namibia). Quite how, why and when he became involved is not clear. However, Lloyd has been associated with the Urban Foundation before. At an Urban Foundation rural development conference he delivered a paper on the SADF and its involvement in bantustan development. This involvement of the SADF in bantustan rural development was part of the civic action programme - a component of 'total strategy' to resist the 'total onslaught'. (12)

This emergency committee held a meeting on March 14, 1980, and at a press conference afterwards Brigadier Lloyd said that

the prime concern had been to plan emergency measures to defuse the immediate problems of the water shortage and the typhoid epidemic, and not to attempt any solution of long-term problems.

The immediate problems in Inanda - drought and the consequent typhoid epidemic, aggravated by the fact that it lacks the basic services of an organised community - required emergency action by various departments and for that reason an inter-departmental committee was formed.

The committee had drawn up plans for short-term relief and had formed a management committee chaired by the District Magistrate and Commissioner of Verulam, to implement them.

Seventeen tankers had been loaned for free to the Department of Co-operation and Development by the Port Natal Administration Board, Department of Water Affairs, NPA Road Services, the SA Development Trust at Ntuzuma, two civil engineering contractors and the Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery. (13)

Seventeen sites were established in RA 33 and water tankers installed and supplied daily by road tankers from Monday, March 17, 1980.

Water was free, and there was no rationing. By March 30, 4 000 000 litres at a cost (in fuel, water and running costs of the tankers) of R10 000 had been distributed. (14)

This is believed to have helped bring the typhoid epidemic....within manageable proportions. 'I haven't received any notification of typhoid cases for about 10 days now', Mr Purvis (Verulam magistrate)said yesterday. (15)

The state did not seem to think the cost of tanking in water at R10 000 for two weeks (or R260 000 per year), to be too great. Mr RN Blumrick, Department of Co-operation and Development's Chief Commissioner for Natal, said at the time that 'he would be granted any additional cash needed'. (16) Yet the Department

had previously ignored the Urban Foundation's original water scheme report which had explored the feasibility of supplying water by tanker. It had estimated the cost at R144 000 a year and rejected this option as 'exorbitant'. (17)

By the beginning of April 1980, it appeared that the typhoid had been brought under control. By now the UF, the SADF, various state departments and local authorities had their attentions firmly focussed on RA 33, and were persuaded that the UF's judgement that a 'long-term solution' was needed, was correct. As Brigadier Lloyd put it, the authorities did not want 'an epidemic every time there is a drought', (18) and a solution could only be dealt with at 'ministerial level'. (19)

The recipients of this flurry of officialdom's attention viewed the matter somewhat differently:

Why did my people have to die before something was done? We always have this problem with water and a lot of people have died from the fever. I do not know how many

said Amawothi deputy chief, Cyprian Nkwanyama. (20)

AFTER THE CRISIS: A LONG-TERM SOLUTION?

IT is difficult to discover what took place in the months following the containment of the typhoid crisis. At the end of March, Co-operation and Development Minister Koornhof announced in parliament that the government was investigating on a 'medium and long term' a water supply for Inanda. (21) In June, the Urban Foundation approached the Department of Town and Regional Planning at the University of Natal, Durban, with the suggestion that the department's students focus on RA 33 in a course planning project. The UF explained that Co-operation and Development had agreed to the Foundation preparing a report on the area. This report would serve as the

basis for the drawing up of a brief for planning consultants. These consultants would then put together a plan for the formal, controlled 'development' of the area. The head of the university department approached, Professor M Kahn, agreed to make RA 33 the focus of a student project, but one which would not be structured to suit the Urban Foundation's requirements, ie it would remain essentially independent. However, the UF did recruit several students in July 1980, to gather information on RA 33. From this, the UF's Inanda Report was prepared.

However, in between Koornhof's statement and the UF's June-July actions, decisions must have been made at 'ministerial level'. In a matter of weeks, Co-operation and Development's town planners put together plans for the three SADI parcels of land in RA 33. Then the sites were surveyed and pegged, dust roads bulldozed, pit latrines with corrugated iron shelters dug on each site, and water standpipes put in every 100m.

No public announcement was made until Sunday, July 13, when Mr Purvis, the Verulam magistrate, called a meeting of residents of the Amawothi area in the north east of RA 33. This meeting was attended by Co-operation and Development, Port Natal Administration Board and Urban Foundation officials. According to press reports, and to various officials with whom the writer has discussed the matter, Purvis stressed that 'nobody would be compelled to move to the new area'. (22) Those who chose to move would be transported free of charge by GG trucks (government trucks bearing the GG - Government Garage - numberplates), and could borrow tents until they had built temporary shelters.

The Urban Foundation did not seem at all

sure of Co-operation and Development's long term plan for the area on which the site and service scheme was to be set up. The UF wrote that

The areas (ie the site and service scheme areas) are administered as 'emergency Areas' under Proclamation 188, pending proclamation as a township within a few years - no date has been set. Under present conditions a monthly rental of R2,60 is paid for each site occupied. Once the township is proclaimed, the purchase of land will be permitted and encouraged. Although the land so purchased will not be freehold, it is understood that it will offer security of tenure equivalent to 60-year leasehold. (23)

Like the Urban Foundation, the residents of the scheme have also experienced considerable uncertainty as to its future development and direction.

In an interview with the Daily News after the July 13 meeting, Urban Foundation's Alan Mountain outlined the UF's role and the advantages which it saw in the site and service scheme:

The Foundation is to set up technical advice centres from which plans and technical help will be made available, he said.

Among the advantages of the scheme are:

- * low income families have an intermediate stage between the unsanitary, fire-

prone shack in a squatter settlement and apermanence which is initially beyond their means;

* areas will develop with the incomes of the residents, ultimately offering a better quality of life for their inhabitants than the rows of boxes in the established townships could;

* landowners who rent out minute patches of ground to shack-dwellers, trapping them by absorbing the money they could otherwise have saved towards a better house, would be excluded. (24)

These so-called advantages are nonsense. The 'intermediate stage' was never spelled out to the people involved. In fact, people moved from established shack homes into green tents. Heavy rains later turned the area into a quagmire, latrines overflowed, and the tents became soggy shelters.

A shack (mjondolo) costs between R150 and R500 to build, depending on the materials used. Most people, when moved to the site and service area, put up mjondolos - the same 'unsanitary, fire-prone shacks' as in the rest of RA 33. Of the 3 000 families in the scheme, only 100 have started to build 'permanent' homes, and another 100 have their names on a list for assistance.

Thus, the vast majority are not in a position to afford to build brick/concrete block houses. Where the Urban Foundation gets the idea that the residents' income will increase to the point that they could afford a R3 500 - R4 000 house is not known.

Further, the above statement by Mountain makes the implicit assumption that 'permanent' houses will necessarily offer or lead to a 'better quality of life'. Such an assumption is highly questionable.

Finally, on the last 'advantage' listed above: most residents previously paid R3 - R4 per month, or R30 - R40 per year in rent to landlords. Thus, they will be saving between R0,40 and R1,40 a month by living on the site and service scheme. Hardly the kind of savings necessary for a 'better house'!

It appears that there was no shortage of 'volunteers' to settle on the scheme. However, not just any resident of RA 33 was eligible:

To qualify for a site in the new project, the applicant must be resident in Inanda, and must be a citizen of KwaZulu. (This does not necessarily exclude those who were born in other areas). (25)

It is not known how effectively this 'selection' process was applied to residents.

The response of the landlords and community notables to the scheme is difficult to detail. It has been said that Nkwanyama went round persuading Amawothi shack dwellers to move, whilst one major landowner, Rogers Ngcobo, was said to be initially against the move.

The press greeted the scheme positively - one Daily News headline read 'The hills are alive with the sound of building'.

The scheme's residents seem to have had a mixed reaction. Most people were confused as to what they would receive. Many thought that they would get a month's free 'rations', whereas

in fact they were given only a day's worth on arrival. Others have claimed that they were promised free building materials, and that they have had to resort to bribery in order to get 'a tent and the delivery of temporary building materials'. (26) Many believed that houses would be built for them.

When the first resettlement phase took place in mid-1980, there were no schools, shops, businesses, community centres or halls, police station, post office, sports fields, play areas, crèches or clinics. However, a free bus service for school children from the scheme to their school in AmaWothi was started. PUTCO soon started operating a service through the scheme. A year later, there is a tin shack school. A permanent school is scheduled to be built in the next month or two and it is planned that two will be in operation by next year (1982). The KwaZulu Education Department has responsibility for the schools in RA 33 - apart from the independent, church-funded Inanda Seminary school - even though the area is not yet part of KwaZulu. A mobile clinic now visits the area once or twice a week.

The first phase of resettlement was carried out swiftly, and seems to have caught the Urban Foundation unprepared for the large numbers involved - 3 000 families, 15 000 people. The UF managed to get the Department of Co-operation and Development to stop resettlement until the chaotic situation was sorted out. It also seems that the UF was influential in getting the Department to make building loans available at reasonable interest rates.

The main source of finance for the project is the funds made available by the Department....in the form of loans repayable over 30 years at interest rates depending on the income of head of household (1% for income 0 - R150, 3,5% for R151 - R250, etc). 10% deposit is required for

the loan. Maximum amount of the loan at present is R2 500. The loan is made available through the offices of the Port Natal Administration Board, and must be drawn in materials or cash for labour, either of which are to be certified by the Urban Foundation....The deposit is held in the name of the applicant until building to the stage desired is complete. From the deposit are deducted a 2,5% (of the material cost of the house) fee, and escalation costs and contingencies. The balance is returned to the applicant. (27)

On paper this looks to be fairly reasonable. Even the poorest will have access to a loan at a heavily subsidised interest rate.

However, the reality is different. Apparently, a second 'sorting out' or filtration process is in operation. The first attempted to exclude people from the scheme on ethnic/'homeland' citizenship grounds. Since then, a second has informally come into operation. It appears that households with an income of less than R100 are being refused loans, and those non-KwaZulu citizens who have somehow managed to evade the first screening process are also being refused loans.

Informed observers of the scheme believe that at least 60% and possibly 80% of the 3 000 households fall into these categories. The UF intends conducting a survey to determine the income levels of the residents, and will presumably try to use these figures to convince the Department and the PNAB to drop the second screening process. There is strong speculation that the Department will not allow those not eligible for loans to remain in their mjandolos, but will attempt to resettle them yet again. This is an added element of uncertainty and insecurity for the residents.

One form this insecurity has taken is that of rumour. Since the scheme's beginning there has been a consistent circulation of rumours

concerning houses, building materials, landlord/resident conflicts, the Urban Foundation, etc. One rumour was that people had to earn R235 per month in order to qualify for a loan. A second rumour held that people were being turned away from the motor assemblies factory where they bought plywood board. This rumour claimed that the Urban Foundation was behind the move so that they could secure a monopoly on building materials and sell them through their site office. A third rumour that circulated widely concerned the alleged building of blocks of flats on an indian-owned plot in RA 33. According to this, shacks would be demolished and people compelled to move into the flats. These flats were to be built by the UF and would cost R50 per month to rent. A fourth rumour was to the effect that large parts of RA 33 were to be expropriated as an extension to the sprawling indian township of Phoenix. A fifth rumour held that a prominent landlord had been behind an attempt on the life of a residents' committee leader.

Conditions in the scheme further deteriorated when storms hit the area in mid-December last year.

(T)he entire Tent City was flooded and residents had to dig trenches in a vain attempt to divert the water around their tents and toilets.

The toilets which were constructed on a shallow pit were flooded and when I visited the area on Sunday I found human faeces floating around.....

Mr Richard Ngubane (a resident) said: 'The area was so water-logged that we could not even go to the toilet. I regret moving from my shack further down the road. Although it was a shack at least no water came inside when it rained. I now fear an epidemic breaking out'. (28)

Residents' resentment appeared to come to a head when, in early April this year, the Urban Foundation was accused of 'robbing the people' and told that it should 'pull out of

Ematendi (the site and service scheme)¹. (29)

A meeting on this issue was attended by between 1 000 and 2 000 people:

Present at the mass meeting was the KwaZulu Minister of Works and Roads, Chief Mzonjani Ngcobo of the Anna-Qedi tribe, and the MP for Inanda Mr Rogers Ngcobo, who also heads the Inanda Liaison Committee'. (30)

A report on the conflict claimed that

there was open talk about burning down the community centre built by the Foundation and threats were made against the lives of people working for the Foundation.... (Inquiries made by the Daily News indicate that the Foundation might be forced to withdraw because of a highly organised campaign specifically aimed at bringing about withdrawal. (31)

On Tuesday, April 7, the conflict was taken up before the KwaZulu Cabinet at Ulundi where discussions were held with Rogers Ngcobo and the UF's Alap Mountain.

Mr Ngcobo said the Chief Minister, Dr Gatsha Buthelezi, and his colleagues expressed their desire not to become entangled in the Inanda controversy and advised both groups to return to Durban and sort out their differences through consultation.

Subsequently Chief Buthelezi was quoted as having urged the Foundation to remain in the settlement.... (32)

However, other reports indicate that it wasn't simply a clash between the UF and Rogers Ngcobo, but a three-way conflict with the residents' committee involved as well:

Chief Buthelezi said it was clear that a serious conflict had developed between the residents' committee and Mr Ngcobo. He said that Mr Ngcobo had conceded that although a number of residents had demanded the withdrawal of the Foundation, there was no evidence to suggest that that was the attitude of most people.

He said that Mr Ngcobo and members of the residents' committee shook hands in his office and agreed to make a fresh start to try to resolve their differences. (33)

The residents' committee was established

through elections in Ematendi held by Purvis, the Verulam magistrate. It is not known how the voting was conducted, what the percentage poll was, and how representative this committee is.

What follows is a speculative attempt to explain the conflict, and the roles played by Inkatha, the Urban Foundation, landowners, and their overlapping and conflicting interests.

An important figure in the conflict is Rogers Ngcobo. He is the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly MP for Ndwedwe district, and as a major landowner has approximately 1 400 shacks on his property. (This figure was arrived at from an aerial photograph of RA 33). The rental on each is R30 per year, giving him an annual income of R42 000 from shack farming alone. One rumour had it that while Nkwanama was urging AmaBothi residents to move into the site-and-service scheme, Ngcobo was opposing the move. On one level, the reason for his opposition is obvious - a sizeable income to protect. On the other hand he is also a KwaZulu MP and has his position of power to protect. It is this aspect which probably accounts for his attempts to adopt a 'populist' or 'pro-people' line on the issue.

After the proposed move to the site-and-service area was announced at the Sunday, July 13 meeting, Rogers Ngcobo was at the centre of a row concerning the scheme:

KwaZulu Legislative Assembly member, Mr Rogers Ngcobo has charged the Department of Co-operation and Development with failing to involve residents from the Emawothi settlement in initial consultation on the new Inanda site-and-service scheme....

Mr Ngcobo alleges that the authorities responsible for the scheme failed to consult the Emawothi community when the blueprint was formulated....and that an unofficial committee had been purporting to act in the area.

'A committee had been selected before the meeting by the Department of Co-operation and Development', Mr Ngcobo said. 'I understand this to be improper as they were giving us a committee in a straitjacket'....

Mr Ngcobo said a new committee would be formed within the next two weeks. He declined suggestions that he should serve on the new ad-hoc liaison committee. (34)

In fact he did emerge as chairman of this committee, thus putting himself in the forefront of all negotiations and entrenching his power still further. However, a residents' committee was later elected, and Ngcobo's conflict with this group appears to stem from a perceived threat to his power and control over the residents of RA 33. He seems to have tried to capitalise on the residents' insecurity and resentment, projecting himself as their champion by putting forward their needs, wishes and fears; this seems to have involved an attempt to out-maneuvre the residents' committee.

Ngcobo has adopted this 'populist' strategy not only in confrontations with the Department and Urban Foundation, but also at mass meetings held in RA 33. Here he is alleged to have attacked Inkatha and raised questions about the spending of its membership fees. He is alleged to have asked why some of the money wasn't spent on clinics and facilities for the people of RA 33. As a result of these attacks, he lost his position on Inkatha's Central Committee, which he had been a founder member of.

Ngcobo's attacks on Inkatha seem to suggest that a number of residents of RA 33 have paid Inkatha membership fees, but that there is some resentment concerning its lack of action in the area. It also suggests that the level of Inkatha organisation in the area was weak. A further indication of this is the 'desire not to become involved in the Inanda controversy', expressed by Buthelezi.

Inkatha and the Urban Foundation seem to have close links. The Reverend Enos Sikhakhane is a high-ranking advisor to the UF; as well as a member of Inkatha's Central Committee. (35) Buthelezi certainly seems to have 'confidence' in its operations - he said that if the UF was forced to pull out of the Inanda scheme he 'would be very happy to ask the UF to help in other areas'. (36)

It is difficult to work out precisely why the UF became involved in the scheme. From the way in which events have unfolded, it appears that they were largely 'sucked into' the scheme as a result of their earlier involvement. They wanted to handle the scheme on a far more carefully planned and controlled basis involving smaller numbers of people over a much longer time. They would have preferred to handle it as a squatter-upgrading/self-help incremental housing scheme, their staff and consultants having been strongly influenced by the ideas of JFC Turner and Richard Martin on an upgrading scheme in Lusaka. (37) However, they have had to follow behind the Department and PNAB. The latter do not appear to have developed any sensitivity or subtlety in the handling of a 'voluntary' resettlement programme, and have yet to develop a 'system' or expertise for such an approach to housing. There is still very much the 'GG truck and dump them in the veld' approach. The Urban Foundation seems to have devoted a large part of its time and energies to countering this approach. For example, the Department is at the moment bent on moving another 1 800 families into Ematendeni, whilst the UF is still trying to sort out the chaos and conflicts resulting from the first removals.

The Urban Foundation is highly sensitive to its involvement. In an interview UF's Alan Mountain

strongly dismissed accusations made against the UF that it was doing the South African Government's dirty work in helping accelerate mass removals and resettlements. He also rejected claims that his organisation was bent on 'creating a black middle class' by helping privileged people build posh houses. 'Before we have reached our goal in the Ematendeni project, I don't think it is fair for the world to judge us yet; what we are trying to do has the potential for creating an atmosphere of self-reliance and pride,' he concluded. (38)

It is far too glib and simplistic to see the UF's involvement in the Inanda scheme as an attempt to create a black middle class. The UF knew that it was involving itself with a poverty-stricken section of the working class in Inanda. It is wrong to see the UF as ideologically homogenous. Whilst the Natal regional office is staffed with Turnerites and the like, some of its people on the site have simplistic and even racist approaches. One UF employee on the site once proudly related how he had 'come south with the winds of change via Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia and was used to dealing with the natives'. He was in influential position on the site. Other staff members are guided by the idea that 'they are bringing the benefits of free enterprise to Inanda'. A more comprehensive analysis of the UF's role will have to be undertaken at a later stage of the project when more information is available.

The UF has had some impact on the Department. From the beginning it has argued that the whole of RA 33 and the general labour dormitories to the north of the Umgeni should be planned as a whole, and that this should be done by professional consultants. Hoins Glasson and Partners, engineers, townplanners and architects in Durban have recently been given a brief to draw up a structure plan for

the Inanda area.

The reasons for the state's intervention in Inanda are even more difficult to uncover. There are the most obvious ones: that the UF motivated for an experimental upgrading/self-help approaching to solving the housing problem. The idea that the poor pay for their own housing, with minimal government financial outlay, must have looked attractive to the state; the threat of epidemics to the labour force in the northern labour dormitories is also an obvious motivating factor for state intervention; and the potential security threat that such an uncontrolled area as RA 33 must pose, was probably forcefully brought to state attention by Brigadier Lloyd.

On the more general level, the state has been looking around for a 'solution' to the housing problem. There is a conflict between the Department of Co-operation and Development and the Department of Community Development over strategies to be adopted. The latter is opposed to the site-and-service/self-help approach, which the former seems to favour. (The Co-operation and Development's Low Commission is likely to have an influence on state housing policy, and will have to be closely analysed). Inanda could be seen then as an experiment, a testing ground in which the idea of private sector (in this case the UF) involvement is encouraged.

Before any more detailed analysis of the Inanda scheme can be undertaken, a far clearer picture of the events, the roles and interests of the various groups and organisations is needed. State strategies, the role of the Urban Foundation, interests of land-owners like Rogers Ngcobo, Inkatha and the KwaZulu administration have interacted in a complicated manner, and the overall picture is not clear.

The responses of those most affected - the residents of RA 33 - also need to be analysed in order to get a better idea of the complex processes at work in the area.

Garth Senecque

Footnotes

- (1) See: Control, DSG Information Publication 1; Population Removals, DSG/SARS Information Publication 3; and Debate on Housing, DSG/SARS Information Publication 4.
- (2) Sunday Tribune, 16.03.81.
- (3) *ibid.*
- (4) Natal Mercury, 15.03.81.
- (5) Sunday Express, 23.03.80.
- (6) Natal Mercury, 15.03.80.
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- (8) Natal Mercury, 20.03.80.
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- (10) Natal Witness, 04.03.80.
- (11) Sunday Express, 23.03.80.
- (12) Urban Foundation conference on rural development.
- (13) Natal Mercury, 15.03.80.
- (14) Natal Mercury, 31.03.80.
- (15) *ibid.*
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- (17) Natal Mercury, 20.03.80.
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- (23) Urban Foundation: Inanda self-help housing project. Undated mimeo.
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- (26) Surplus Peoples Project, Durban. Background to Inanda Site and Service Scheme. Mimeo, December, 1980.
- (27) Urban Foundation: Inanda self-help housing project, p 2.
- (28) Post, 17.12.80.
- (29) Natal Witness, 09.04.81.
- (30) *ibid.*
- (31) Daily News, 24.03.80.
- (32) Natal Witness, 09.04.81.
- (33) Sunday Times, 05.04.81.
- (34) Daily News, 17.07.81.
- (35) Natal Witness, 12.02.81.
- (36) Natal Witness, 09.04.81.
- (37) On JCF Turner, see P. Wilkinson, The Housing Question Reconsidered: Towards a Political Economy of Housing in South Africa, in Debate on Housing, DSG/SARS Information Publication 4.
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'DISSENSION IN THE RANKS' : comment

THE DIRECTION in which the struggle has been developing in these last few years makes it more urgent than ever for a clear understanding of the role of whites in the struggle for freedom. The recent NUSAS booklet Dissension in the Ranks has helped to re-open that complex question. What follows are a few comments and criticisms of that booklet, all of which are offered in a constructive spirit.

1. In looking concretely at some past examples of 'white opposition' both now and in the past, Dissension manages to land a telling blow against liberalism. By examining the assumptions of the PFP, the Liberal Party, Race Relations and even the African Resistance Movement, the booklet shows that a liberal solution to our problems is no solution at all. In practice, all these organisations have had an individualistic and moralistic approach to the South African situation. Against all evidence (although for obvious reasons) they have generally tried to wish away the connections between apartheid and capitalism. The consequences of all this is that their actions have ranged from 'change from within' (the PFP) and active collaboration with the state (SAIRR and Patrick Duncan's actions during the march on parliament in the 1960s), to charity work and individualistic political approaches (eg the Black Sash's secret 'national convention' attempts). Their persistent attempts to get our rulers to have a 'change of heart' have ignored