

BRAZZA I

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SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE BILATERAL MEETING HELD IN BRAZZAVILLE ON FRIDAY 13 MAY 1988 BETWEEN DELEGATIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

PRESENT: SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

- Minister R F Botha (Leader of Delegation)
- Mr N P van Heerden
- Mr G R W Babb
- Mr D W Auret
- Mr A Jaquet
- Mr J Sunde
- Mr P J Botha

SADF

- Minister M de M Malan
- Maj Gen C J van Tonder
- Brig. G Opperman
- Brig. J Bosch
- Col. H D van Wyngardt

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

- Dr N Barnard
- Mr J Boshoff

ANGOLAN DELEGATION

- Minister F van Dunem (Minister of Justice)
- General Roberto Leal Monteiro Ngoma (Deputy Chief of Angolan Armed Forces)
- Ambassador Jose Agostinho Neto (Angolan Ambassador in Brazzaville)
- Col Jose Maria (Secretary to the President for Military Affairs)
- Mr Stone (Translator)

Minister Botha opened the discussions by saying that he was pleased to be able to meet so soon after the London meeting. He realised that the meeting had been arranged at short notice, but the momentum of the London talks had made it necessary. He did not foresee that the present talks would resolve all the complexities. To go the distance it was necessary to keep on walking.

Minister Van Dunem expressed his appreciation at being able to meet again in another African capital. Despite it being Friday the 13th he was not superstitious and rather thought it propitious. He then introduced his delegation.

Minister Botha in turn presented the South African delegation. He then asked if he could broach a very important matter which President Botha wished him to raise even though it was not directly related to the talks. With the agreement of Minister Van Dunem, Minister Botha raised the matter of Cuban forces thrusting southwards in the Cunene Province towards the Namibian border. South African information indicated that these forces consisted of 7 regiments together with SWAPO elements in addition to FAPLA forces. This was a major thrust and South Africa was well informed about their equipment. South Africa was extremely concerned at this development. As these forces moved south they got closer to South African personnel and if the opposing forces got too close, it only required a small spark to set off an explosion. In the light of the London talks and the spirit of those talks, Minister Botha said that this southward thrust was jeopardising the expectations of a possible agreement which had been created. The reason for this movement of forces in southern Cunene province was not clear to South Africa. Minister Botha said that possibly this movement aimed at strengthening the Angolan negotiating position.

Another possible objective was that while the Cubans intended leaving Angola, they first wanted to take revenge and hoped to achieve a victory over the South African forces. This would provide an umbrella of honour under which they could then leave Angola.

Minister Botha said that whatever the objective was, the result of this could be disastrous to all concerned. The South African Government submitted that this thrust must be halted as soon as possible and something urgently done to remove the danger of a clash. The South African delegation was not present to issue threats, but to talk about peace. However, this action seemed calculated to destroy what both parties wanted to achieve. The South African government viewed the matter so seriously that two days previously in discussions with President Botha, Ministers Botha and Malan discussed the possibility of cancelling this meeting. It was nevertheless decided that it would be better to meet and put South Africa's concerns openly and frankly to the Angolan delegation. Minister Botha reiterated that this was a serious development. South Africa was not looking for winners or losers. Peace could only be achieved if it was agreed in principle that there would be no winners or losers - there should only be winners - and clearly this was the only way to end the conflict and bloodshed. If one party wanted revenge the war would escalate and more people would die. No war lasted for ever and even if South Africa and Angola entered into another round of fighting the two parties would have to meet again, even if only later down the road. South Africa regarded this as a very important issue and would be grateful to have the Angolan government reaction to this.

Minister Van Dunem said that the movement of forces was not more than a usual exercise of sovereign rights and that the forces in question would not go beyond Angola's internationally recognised borders. However, he undertook to take the message to his government and believed that they would take the necessary measures so as not to jeopardise the spirit of the London talks. The question could be asked who started the movement, but it was more important to find a solution and he reiterated that he would raise the matter with his government. War helped nobody and both sides suffered. Human life was a preoccupation for the Angolans and it was wrong to engulf peoples in a futile war that depleted their resources. Angolans and South Africans had children and did not know what would happen to them if solutions were not found. Angola was a country that had only relatively recently gained independence and therefore did not want to waste its resources in a useless war. He agreed with Minister Botha that a lasting peace needed to be found in the region.

At this stage Minister Botha requested a short adjournment.

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Minister Botha thanked Minister Van Dunem for his response and his conciliatory tone. He said that he was not there to question Angola's integrity or its boundaries but the thrust southwards was a serious matter. South Africa was determined to decrease military activity. Minister Botha requested that the Angolans inform South Africa of its reply regarding this matter via the London channel. He was encouraged by Minister Van Dunem's statement that the Angolans would ensure that this did not lead to a flash point.

Minister Botha then raised a matter which was indirectly connected with the movement southwards. The little map that he had just handed to Minister Van Dunem indicated the Cunene River and the Ruacana Waterfall as well as the pumping station. Part of the Ruacana project was negotiated in the Portuguese days. (This led the Minister to refer to the border and the mistakes made in colonial times regarding borders). He said that a reading of the negotiations between the Germans and the Portuguese would show the intention of giving the people of Ovambo access to water. While nomadic tribes had settled in the west, the Ovambo had settled in the east. Underground water in Ovambo was very scarce. In the past the area had been a huge inland lake. This was not so now. Today the people depended on water from the rainy seasons. The past season had been very dry and the Ovambo people were now threatened with a serious water shortage. It was South Africa's duty, irrespective of politics, to provide water. There was a pipeline that ran for a short distance over Angolan territory and then fed into canals in Ovambo. If this supply were to be interrupted the people of South West Africa/Namibia would have to be told that Luanda had stopped it. Minister Botha appealed to the Angolans to ask the Cubans to stay away from this area. FAPLA forces were under Angolan control and South Africa was not trying to drive a wedge between them and the Cubans. South Africa would be grateful if an agreement could be reached quickly so that it would not be necessary to fight over water urgently needed by the people of South West Africa/ Namibia.

Minister Van Dunem said that as a specialist in border matters (his doctoral thesis had been on this subject) he knew all the treaties in question and even an unpublished one from the midforties between the Union of South Africa

and the Portuguese concerning Calueque. He was aware that the intention had been to provide water for people on the other side of the border. There were brothers on either side of the border and Angola never intended to deny anyone water. The Minister undertook to refer the matter to his government. He understood the South African concern and promised again to explain the matter juridically to his government. Minister Van Dunem then asked what other issues, apart from the bilateral ones raised, and in continuation of the four-party London talks, South Africa wanted to raise.

Minister Botha thanked Minister Van Dunem for his good spirit and said that he was ready to discuss the London talks. However he had two other serious matters that he wished to raise.

Minister Botha said that a serious situation had arisen because of surface-to-air missiles carried into South Africa via neighbouring countries by ANC terrorists. On 8 May 1988 the police had arrested 4 whites (3 men and 1 woman). In their house near Lanseria airport - a civil airport - a large number of deadly weapons including SAM 7's had been discovered. Some weeks previously another terrorist had been arrested with a SAM 7. South Africa had informed its neighbouring states that it viewed this in a very serious light. Foreign aircraft overflew South Africa and the American and British governments similarly took this development very seriously. Minister Botha asked Minister Van Dunem to convey the seriousness of this matter to his government, especially because the 4 whites had been trained in Angola. In London Mr Van Heerden had handed to Minister Mbinda a note based on information gained from the first terrorist arrested. Apparently the people now arrested had



orders to use the missiles against civilian aircraft. Minister Botha asked the Angolans to tell the ANC that if they went on with their violence the South African government would have no choice but to hit back hard. He also said he hoped an accord could be reached with the Angolan government about this matter. The whites which had been captured had been trained in Angola and Angola had to know that if anything ever happened and it came out that the terrorists responsible had been trained in Angola, South Africa and Angola would never again meet. Minister Botha said that if the ANC abandoned violence, they would be welcome to join the negotiations for a new constitution in South Africa.

Minister Botha said he wished to refer in great confidence to the positions of the United States of America and the Soviet Union in relation to the efforts to find peace in southwestern Africa. He would appreciate hearing the Angolan view because the Angolans were in a better position to know the Soviet viewpoint. Minister Botha said that Mr Gorbachev's announcement that Russian forces would leave Afghanistan could be a signal that Russia wanted to concentrate on economic development. He referred to the visit by Mr Franz Joseph Strauss and said the impression had been created that the Soviet Union wanted to withdraw from regional conflicts in a way that not only did not give an advantage to America but that also was not humiliating to itself. Noting Afghanistan as an example, he said that the Soviets appeared to be thinking more in terms of national reconciliation that would result in governments which were centrist and non-aligned, neither pro-USA or pro-Soviet. It was on this basis that Minister Malan had stated South Africa's readiness to talk to the Russians. This did not mean that Luanda and Pretoria should not talk, but all the

forces involved should be acknowledged. Minister Botha said he had the feeling that if the USA took too high a profile in these talks, the Soviets might feel excluded. That could delay these efforts and the efforts of other African countries. The Minister said he was not against the USA playing a role, particularly as Dr Crocker had been successful in getting the London talks organised. However, he was simply being realistic. The Soviet Union also had an interest in events. His question to Minister Van Dunem therefore was how the Minister thought the Soviets were reacting to discussions where the USA figured prominently and it did not? Minister Botha added that on a previous occasion he had sent a message to the Soviet Union saying that if their plans for Southern Africa were based on the idea that South Africa would be tied to the West in any future conflict, they would be wrong.

Minister Van Dunem said he was aware of the contents of the note handed to the Angolans by Mr Van Heerden. He said he would convey the concern to his government, but asked for further details of the group which had been arrested.

Minister Botha gave further details about the four white ANC terrorists and offered to make all details available if the Angolans wished to send an emissary to receive these details, especially because the group had been trained in Angola. Terrorist acts were also planned in Lusaka, but South Africa would deal with Zambia in its own way in due course. In reply to a question from Minister Van Dunem, Minister Botha said the four had reached South Africa via Zambia and Botswana. He said that at that moment the Foreign Minister of Botswana was in South Africa and that his Deputy Minister would provide her with details and brief her about these developments. Minister Botha said that



South Africa was ready to face the wrath of the world to safeguard its security. Angola should know that South Africa was ready to take the necessary actions, which could have serious consequences for the region, unless the situation improved.

Minister Van Dunem again thanked Minister Botha for his frankness. Regarding Minister Botha's reference to the super-powers he held the view that what the USA told Angola the Soviet position was, was not correct. He had been to the Soviet Union in 1987 together with other FLS Foreign Ministers and there they had gained the impression that Gorbachev wanted greater well-being for his people. He (Van Dunem) did not see the Soviet Union wanting to have a role in southern African affairs. He thought that an awareness of past Soviet experiences and sufferings in two world wars helped one to understand their position. It would be important for Angola to talk to them also in the future. Minister Van Dunem then asked if there would be another round of four-party talks as had been held in London.

Minister Botha replied that this would depend on the current talks. As he understood it South Africa had been requested to convey its proposals regarding total Cuban troop withdrawal to Angola and he asked if he was correct.

Minister Van Dunem said that prior to London Angola had made a proposal and that South Africa had made some comments on it. General Ndala had asked for South Africa's proposals which they were now ready to receive. They would study them and then reply because they were not in a position to give any answers immediately.

Minister Botha said the present meeting was not a meeting in which detail could be discussed, but it had been useful since important bilateral issues had been raised. He thought it might be useful for the Angolans to hear how South Africa saw future discussions. Firstly, he was of the firm opinion that there could be no solution for South West Africa/ Namibia unless the question of total Cuban withdrawal was settled. Secondly, he found it difficult to see a solution to Cuban troop withdrawal unless there was national reconciliation in Angola.

This should not be interpreted as interference in Angola's internal affairs but rather a statement of obstacles in the way of efforts to achieve a solution. Related to the Cuban withdrawal was the time-frame for such a withdrawal. Since Resolution 435/78 and the settlement plan had been drawn up ten years ago there had been many changes and circumstances were now different. At future meetings this could be discussed. It was important that the parties be flexible, but similarly no subject should be excluded from these discussions. Until now South Africa had not mentioned SWAPO, the Transitional Government or UNITA. If we were to establish peace in the region, the Cubans had to go, Angola had to feel secure, UNITA's position had to be cleared up and national reconciliation had to take place. Minister Botha said he did not want to interfere or give orders but he wanted to be frank. South Africa was now engaged in preparing proposals on these matters and they would be transmitted to the Angolans, once the President had approved them. Nothing could be decided now except perhaps the time and place for the next meeting. Depending on Minister Van

Dunem's reply, the participants, whether it should be bilateral or multi-party, where and when, could be decided. Minister Botha suggested that no matter who attended, consideration should be given to holding the next meeting in Brazzaville again, if the Congolese government would be prepared to act as hosts.

Minister Van Dunem then referred to the question of national Minister Van Dunem thanked Minister Botha for his remarks and said it was useful for the Angolans to know the depth of feeling of the South African government on these matters. He said that he did not have a mandate to negotiate but it was important to know what South Africa felt. Angola had told the world for some time now that they were prepared to face Cuban troop withdrawal as soon as the reasons why they had been brought there had been removed. In November 1984 they, via the Secretary-General of the United Nations, had suggested a "plataforma" to cover issues including Cuban troop withdrawal. In January 1988, via the negotiations with the USA and to show their flexibility, Angola had accepted gradual but total Cuban troop withdrawal if Resolution 435/78 was implemented and South African forces were withdrawn from Angola. But even this was negotiable.

had operated out of Angola, causing violence in Namibia. Minister Van Dunem said he had difficulty in understanding South Africa's views regarding the Cubans but said Angola's views were flexible depending on the way in which South Africa carried out its obligations. It would be useful to the Angolans if they could receive South Africa's proposals before the next meeting so that they could study them in advance. Minister Van Dunem wanted the same parties that attended the London meeting to attend the next meeting and said that he was convinced that there was no military solution to this problem. He again asked for South Africa's counter-proposals and said Angola's flexibility depended on



South Africa's flexibility and sense of reality. Angola did not want any misinterpretations. In principle Angola had no objection to Brazzaville as the venue for the next round of talks if all the other parties agreed. The usual channels would have to be used to secure agreement on this matter.

Minister Van Dunem then referred to the question of national reconciliation. He reiterated the views of President Dos Santos that the problem of UNITA was an internal one, but that it also had an external dimensions. He said that once this external dimension had been removed they could resolve the problem via their clemency programme which had existed since 1978. (Only once did the Minister refer to UNITA as bandits). He said he was glad that Minister Botha did not want to interfere in Angola's internal affairs because Angola did not want to talk to South Africa about the ANC. Minister Van Dunem said that the meeting had been useful and should not hamper future four-party negotiations in any way.

Minister Botha responded by saying that he understood why he had said what he did but he asked that Minister Van Dunem understand him clearly. He said that for a long time SWAPO had operated out of Angola, causing violence in Namibia. The ANC also had camps in Angola where they trained people to kill people in South Africa - like the four whites arrested last week. South Africa knew where these camps were and Angola had to understand that its allies SWAPO and the ANC were trying to destroy the established order in Namibia and South Africa and install their ideologies. This was something South Africans would NEVER accept.

of views related to the issues that would be discussed at the next round of talks where all the London participants would be present, had taken place.

Minister Botha said that unless the ANC stopped its violence and began to collaborate in the process of formulating a new constitution, the whole of Southern Africa would pay the price. Minister Botha then listed a number of issues where he thought there was agreement in principle -

1. Total Cuban troop withdrawal as a prerequisite for the implementation of Resolution 435/78;
2. there could be no military solutions to the problem of southern Africa;
3. the leaders of Southern Africa themselves must resolve their problems;
4. a high priority was the need for economic development, and
5. we were all African and we wanted peace and stability to be a characteristic of the continent and in particular of the sub-continent.

The list could be increased but this should be sufficient to carry us into further talks. South Africa would submit its proposals as soon as possible.

In conclusion Minister Botha listed the matters that he thought ought to be included in the press briefing that would follow the talks - thanking the host country; important bilateral issues discussed, and that an exchange of views related to the issues that would be discussed at the next round of talks where all the London participants would be present, had taken place.



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It was his impression that both governments were conscious of the need to meet again as soon as possible. This had been a useful meeting and he appreciated the opportunity to have discussions with the Angolan delegation.

Minister Van Dunem thanked Minister Botha for the frank exchange of views and agreed with the matters that had been suggested for inclusion in a press statement. He also agreed that Cuban troop withdrawal was essential for the implementation of Resolution 435/78. Angola saw Cuban troop withdrawal commencing only after implementation of Resolution 435/78 had begun but this was a matter that could be resolved. He agreed on the need to meet again as soon as possible, but said that before this could happen all four parties had to agree to the date and venue. In conclusion Minister Van Dunem said that it would be useful if the South African proposals could be received before the next meeting so that the Angolans could study them in advance.

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