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MINISTER

DISCUSSIONS WITH SILVINO DA LUZ, MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE : PRAIA :
25 MARCH 1984

1. I proceeded to the Cape Verde Islands on 24 March 1984 in accordance with your instructions after the Department had received a message on 23 March 1984 from Minister Silvino da Luz to send a representative to Praia to receive certain information. I met Minister Silvino da Luz at Praia on 25 March 1984 in the company of his Chef de Cabinet, Mr Rosindo Ferreira.
2. After conveying his greetings to you and congratulating South Africa on the Nkomati Accord, Silvino da Luz informed me that President dos Santos had visited Cape Verde, both on his way to Havana and on his return on 22 March 1984. On the latter occasion he had spent a day in discussions with President Perreira on the developments in Havana.
3. During his visit to Havana, Dos Santos had been accompanied by 'Pedale' Tonha, the Minister of Defence, Vincente da Moura, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador da Almeida and Lopo do Nascimento, Minister of Planning. Silvino pointedly mentioned that Paulo Jorge had not accompanied the group and that Do Nascimento had been "very pragmatic".

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4. Silvino said that the main purpose of his having requested a meeting with a South African representative was to assure us that, as a result of their recent discussions with Dos Santos, the Cape Verdeans were "convinced" that the Angolan leadership had decided to ask the Cubans to leave their country.

5. Secondly, he said that he thought that the points contained in the Havana communique could provide the basis for discussions between South Africa and Angola. He said that it was important that South Africa should consider a high level meeting with the Angolans as soon as possible to discuss these points and to clear up any misunderstandings which might have been created by the Havana statement. South Africa could pursue this objective either directly through our contacts with the Angolans on the Joint Monitoring Commission or by using the good offices of a number of States which have relations with Luanda. However, should we wish to convey a message direct to Dos Santos he would be happy to offer his services since he had direct entrée to the Angolan President. A suitable opportunity for the transmission of such a message would take place on 1 April 1984, at the meeting of the five Portuguese African States in Maputo. Although Silvino inferred that the proposal for a high level meeting between South Africa and Angola was a Cape Verdean idea, he left the impression that it might in fact have emanated from President Dos Santos, or at the very least, that

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President Dos Santos had concurred that Silvino should make the proposal.

6. When I asked at what level such a meeting should take place Silvino indicated that a meeting at the highest level would not be appropriate at this stage. He felt that the most appropriate person for us to meet with at this stage would be Rodrigues Kito. He said that Rodrigues was responsible for this "portfolio" and was very senior in the politburo. Paulo Jorge on the other hand was "part of the Government" which was sometimes not even informed of Politburo decisions.
7. Silvino said that he had been worried by South Africa's forceful reaction to the Havana statement. He said that it seemed that South Africa became angry very easily. He said that we should bear in mind "where the statement had been issued", and that President Dos Santos was under great internal and external political pressure. He claimed that neither the Angolans nor the Cubans had issued the statement to the press. When I asked him who had then publicized the statement he said that he did not know. The inference was, however, that the Soviets had been responsible for this action.
8. In reply to Silvino's request that we should not be too worried about rhetoric, I replied that the last paragraph of the statement had created serious problems for South Africa. Although the other points set out in

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the communique were negotiable the language of the last paragraph was unacceptable and it had been necessary for South Africa to react in an unambiguous fashion. It should be borne in mind in this regard that President Dos Santos was not the only person who had to take internal political pressures into consideration. Nevertheless, the South African statement, although forceful, was balanced and the questions posed by South Africa should not create any great difficulty for the Angolans. Silvino replied that he had suggested to President Dos Santos that he might resolve the issue by making a positive and conciliatory statement in the media.

9. Taking up the point of Cuban withdrawal I asked Silvino how this could be effected in the absence of peace in Angola. I said that it had been South Africa's objective to establish general peace throughout the region. This was why we had suggested a conference between all the parties involved in the conflict, including UNITA, in our statement of 11 March 1984. I said that we were very concerned that there would be no stability in our region until peace had been achieved in Angola. Silvino answered that President Dos Santos was extremely sensitive about the question of UNITA and the matter had not been raised during his recent visit to Cape Verde. However, he was sure that the matter would eventually be broached in future direct discussions between South Africa and Angola. He would consider raising this question with Dos Santos if we specifically requested him to do so.

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He repeated that it was, however, a very sensitive issue.

10. Silvino said that he was sure that the Cubans had resigned themselves to the withdrawal of their forces from Angola. He himself had undertaken a visit to Eastern Europe at the end of last week to establish what Eastern European attitudes would be to Cuban withdrawal. He had had no trouble with the Czechs. The East Germans had been more difficult but, after intensive discussions, had accepted his point of view. Silvino added, however, that there was another East European power with global ambitions which was not happy with these developments. (It was of some interest to note that the Cape Verdeans were evidently anxious that news of my visit to Praia should not leak out to the Soviets, as had been the case with my previous visit. On this occasion Silvino took the precaution of instructing that my air-ticket from Sal to Praia should be issued in a false name.)

11. Silvino told me that the meeting of the five Portuguese-speaking African countries which will take place in Maputo from 1 April 1984 would have as its main purpose the issuing of a declaration which would support the Mozambican and Angolan policy of rapprochement with South Africa. He said that he hoped that the five States would be able to organize general African support for the current initiatives in southern Africa, including support from the 'radical' African

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States. I replied that I hoped that the declaration which the five States would make in Maputo would not include a "last paragraph" similar to the last paragraph of the Havana communiqué. He assured me that this would not happen. Silvino said that he would be leaving Praia on Thursday 29 March 1984 and if we wished to convey a message to President Dos Santos through him it should reach Praia before that date. After his visit to Maputo Silvino would pay official visits to Zimbabwe and Zambia.

12. I presented Silvino with copies of the Nkomati Accord, the Prime Minister's and President Machel's statements of 16 March 1984, as well as other relevant documentation relating to recent developments in southern Africa. I also told him that Mr C Coetzee, the SAA representative at Sal Island, would provide him with a video recording of the Nkomati ceremony. He was very pleased to receive these documents and said that he would immediately convey them to the President.

13. It was clear that Silvino was satisfied with recent developments in southern Africa. He reminded me that he had told South Africa earlier that Mozambique and Angola were seriously interested in establishing peace with South Africa. At the same time he made no secret of the fact that there were certain matters of which he had not informed me. It may be relevant in this regard that Mr Coetzee of SAA told me that on Saturday 24 March 1984 a Boeing 727 had arrived from Dakar full of Africans and that there had evidently been a major

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meeting between them and the Cape Verdeans on that day. When I asked Silvino whether a further meeting had been arranged between the Angolans and the United States he said that he had no definite information in that regard. Once again, however, I received the impression that he possibly knew more about this than he was willing to tell me. However, one thing appears to be clear and that is that he believes that the Cubans will be withdrawn from Angola.

D W Steward

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SWA SECTION

26 March 1984

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