


WORK 15

IN PROGRESS



OCTOBER

1980

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Editorial

THIS will be the last issue of WIP for 1980. We have set ourselves the task of bringing out six issues during 1981.

The break until WIP 16 appears can be used to consolidate the project in several areas. The editorial group will attempt to establish contact with as many of our distributors as possible, to discuss the project, ask for constructive criticisms, elicit articles and stimulate research and investigation.

We ask distributors to ensure that WIPs are reaching readers and not gathering dust in cupboards. Assess whether you are taking too many or too few copies, and let us know about groups who do not receive WIP, but could both contribute to and benefit from the project.

The editors also ask distributors and individual readers to pay owing amounts as promptly as they can to maintain the financial self-sufficiency and independence of the journal.

Individual readers, groups and organisations are invited to participate in the project by passing WIP on to friends, commenting on the publication, suggesting issues to be covered, contributing documentation, articles, debates and information.

We hope to strengthen our pattern of distribution through groups, and to avoid commercially-based individual distribution as far as possible.

Remember that WIP publishes work in progress - where information presented sometimes suggests directions, analyses and implications; material is presented for debate and criticism rather than as definitive or final statements. For example, the article on Inkatha and the schools boycott in this issue has been presented as work in progress, and we ask for further comment and material on this undoubtedly controversial organisation and on political processes in the bantustans in general.

The debate around community organisation is also continued in this issue and we hope that further contributions in this area will be forthcoming.

To those readers who receive WIP on group distribution schemes, but are likely to lose contact with distributors (eg students leaving university at the end of the year), we do suggest that you subscribe to WIP so as to avoid missing future editions.

-THE EDITORS.

The nature of Work in Progress, which is to stimulate debate and present controversial views, ensures that the opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial collective.

Thanks to all contributors for the articles submitted, and to Jacqui Humphrey for photograph on back cover.

This issue of Work in Progress edited and published by an editorial collective, of 40 Jorissen street, 2001 braamfontein, and printed by sached, 54 simpsons street, 2001 Johannesburg.

Understanding the Community Councils Act

IT must be noted that these 'Impressions' relate to the initial Community Councils Act (125 of 1977) and do not take into account the amending legislation. For example, the Community Councils Amendment Act (28 of 1978) 'allows the minister to declare a by-election to fill seats on a community council either left vacant in the main election or vacant due to resignations, deaths, etc. Previously vacancies were filled by designation by the minister' (Survey of Race Relations, 1978:333).

1. What is a Community Council?

- It is a body of persons elected by residents with Section 19 rights from a particular area to carry out certain functions and duties in that area.

2. What power does the Minister of Co-operation and Development and the Administration Boards have over the Community Council system?

- The Minister takes the decision to establish a Community Council by notice in the Government Gazette. Prior to such decision he is required to consult the Urban Bantu Councils and Bantu Advisory Boards in the area. If none exist he is required to consult the residents in a manner he thinks fit.
- The Minister has the power to dissolve any Community Council at any stage, after consultation with the relevant Administration Board, when he deems it in the public interest

or when he is requested to do so by that Community Council.

- The Minister directs what powers and functions a Community Council shall have after consulting with the relevant Administration Board and that Community Council. These powers and functions, described below, are limited by statute.

- The Minister has the power after consulting the relevant Administration Board and a Community Council, to withdraw any power vested in a Community Council and may in turn confer or impose certain powers so withdrawn on the relevant Administration Board.

- The Minister or any body or persons authorised by him may take such steps as he may deem necessary to ensure the continuation of the functions of a Community Council.

- The Minister after consulting the relevant Administration Board and Community Council has the power to make regulations or apply existing regulations affecting a wide range of Community Council activity including elections to Community Councils, periods of office of members, their conditions of service and powers and duties, conduct of meetings, employment of staff, control over financial affairs and any other matter the regulation of which is in the opinion of the Minister necessary or desirable for the effective carrying out of the Community Councils Act.

3. What are the compositions, powers and

functions of the Community Councils?

- A person who is not a citizen of the Republic of South Africa (eg a citizen of the Transkei or BophuthaTswana) is not qualified to be a member or vote in the election of a Community Council.

- Where there is a shortfall in the number of persons elected to a Community Council or where no persons are elected in an election, the Minister has the power to designate so many persons not exceeding the shortfall in members, to the Council. (See the introduction above for an amendment to this provision).

- It is a punishable offence for a member or a person in the service of a Community Council to disclose information acquired by him in the course of his duties except under certain circumstances.

- Powers which may be vested in the Community Council by the Minister include matters relating to the administration and allocation of housing, the prevention and combatting of unlawful occupation of land and buildings, the approval of building plans and private dwellings, the removal and destruction of unauthorised or abandoned buildings or structures. The promotion of the moral and social welfare of persons living in its area and the promotion of sound community development. The administration of sport and recreational facilities and library services. The maintenance of services determined by the Minister.

- A Community Council may control and manage a community guard in its area.

- A Community Council may make recommendations to the Minister over a range of issues including area layout and renovation, transport services and schools.

COMMENT

IT is the intention of the Nationalist government, through the Community Council system, to grant a measure of self government to urban african communities. The system was designed to replace the ineffective and unpopular Urban Bantu Councils and Bantu Advisory Boards and has been advertised as a progressive and enlightened development in government policy as it affects africans in urban areas.

What is immediately evident is the crucial role which the Minister of Co-operation and Development plays in the operation of the Community Council system. His power over the Community Councils is absolute. The Community Councils in turn have no independent powers to determine the development of urban african communities.

The limited powers which they are accorded by statute lie totally within ministerial discretion. In effect the Act allows for aspects of township administration and policing to be placed in the hands of the Community Councils. These powers may be withdrawn at any stage by the Minister and placed in the hands of the Administration Boards and the South African Police.

The provision relating to operational secrecy is ominous and may inhibit free and open discussion of Community Council decisions.

The system is in itself inherently undemocratic. Thousands of migrant workers living in urban areas are not eligible as members nor may they vote in Community Council elections. Should those who are eligible to vote decide not to participate in elections, the Minister may step into the breach and designate persons as members of

the Community Council. (See comments in introduction).

The abiding impression one has of the Community Councils Act is that it seeks merely to replace white functionaries with black functionaries in the overall administration of the townships. What Bantu Affairs Administration Boards used to do the Community Council will now do. If they co-operate all will be well. If there are disputes and differences, the Minister may withdraw their power. There is no fundamental alteration in approach. The power to determine the destinies of africans in urban areas still lies very much in the hands of the state.

Community Councils: Control and Co-option

THE massive upsurge of popular struggle over the past months appears to be having its effects on the planning and implementation of the South African state's 'new' constitutional dispensation. Indeed, in recent weeks, two of its major planks - the 'Black' and 'Coloured' Councils - have been dropped with unsurprising rapidity (not to mention considerable side-stepping and double-talk

courtesy of PW Botha). The confusion and uncertainty obviously existent within the ranks of the dominant classes over the so-called 'constitutional question' has been mirrored by policy decisions taken about a lower level of state functioning: that of the community councils.

Here too, it is clear that things are not what they should be. On July 31, the Minister of Co-operation and Development (CAD), Piet Koornhof, acting on the request of Soweto's 'mayor', David Thebehali, announced that elections for the Soweto Council (scheduled for September 27) would be postponed to 1982 (RDM, 01.09.80). The government, Koornhof said, was to introduce legislation in 1981 providing for the development of community councils into fully-fledged local authorities - as recommended by the Riekert Commission. Council elections, therefore, should wait for this new era to dawn; all those councils whose elections fell before December, 1981, were eligible for this postponement - and all they had to do, like Thebehali, was ask.

The fact that the election for the widely discredited Soweto Council faced an enormous popular stayaway from the polls, in the context of mobilization over the issue of increased rents, was, of course, not mentioned.

The general reaction of community councils to Koornhof's statement is now awaited - although hardly with excitement.

Since the promulgation of the Community Councils Act in July, 1977, some 208 councils (with 1 500 councillors) have been established all over South Africa. A further 50 to 100 are still to come. The community council strategy represents a form of attempted state

restructuring at the local level on the part of the dominant classes - a response, to a large degree, to the intensified popular struggles of the 1970s. Although their operation and activities often appear futile, ridiculous and comic, nevertheless as state created vehicles for co-optation and incorporation, diversion and fragmentation, and, ultimately, division and control of the african dominated classes in the urban townships, these are in need of some analysis.

Questions such as:

1. How and where the Community Councils (CC) Act has been implemented?
2. What class forces do community councils (CCs) represent and how effectively?
3. What forms of resistance have been shown to their operation?
4. How is this operation to be seen within the entire complex of capital and the state's administration and control of the reproduction of its urban workforce?

should at this stage be posed, even if "answers" are difficult.

Of course, attempts at control and division of the dominated classes in South Africa's cities and towns are hardly a recent development. The supposedly new, super-improved CCs are direct descendents of their notoriously ineffectual predecessors: Advisory Boards and Urban Bantu Councils.

Advisory Boards were established in terms of one of the provisions of the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. The amendment and consolidation of the Act in 1945 made no difference to their functioning as purely consultative bodies - which usually met once a month with the local authority in charge

of the control and administration of townships to discuss problems and make recommendations (which were usually ignored). A relatively small proportion of township residents were eligible to vote for the boards, and they tended to be monopolized by the most conservative section of the african petty bourgeoisie - often for their own narrow aims.

'Channels' of co-optation and control, the boards were unable - and in most cases unwilling - to take any action on popular issues such as rents, transport and living conditions. It seems that they often spent enormous amounts of time considering questions related to trading licences, freehold land and better salaries for their members. Looking at the activities of the community councils in the early 1980s one wonders how much things have changed!?

In 1961, Advisory Boards were replaced by Urban Bantu Councils. This proved to be a change in name and not function, which remained purely advisory and consultative. As such, the UBC's activities usually met with large-scale apathy on the part of most township residents all over South Africa: the last three elections for the Soweto UBC, for example, (with once again only a small proportion of registered inhabitants allowed to vote) having percentage polls of 32%, 21%, and 14% respectively. As with Advisory Boards, the true role of the UBCs - as state created organs of division and control, allowing more efficient administration of the urban townships - was realized by the people.

Notwithstanding this recognition of Advisory Boards and UBCs as instruments of the oppressors, the question of participation

in these bodies was often a much-debated one among political organizations. The South African Communist Party, for instance, was involved to some extent in the operation of ABs in the 1940s. In the 1950s there was some debate in the ranks of the African National Congress (ANC) over the issue of participation in ABs and such institutions, with the weapon of boycott being seen in strategic, rather than purely 'moralistic'/'principled' terms. In this context we cannot go into further detail: it is necessary to realize, however, that the question of participation in the CCs of the late 1970s and early 1980s is hardly one without some historic roots.

It has already been suggested that the CC strategy represents a form of attempted state restructuring on a local level. Here, of course, it is important to recognize the fact that under capitalism, CCs (and similar institutions) 'are ... and have always been an aspect of national government which in turn is part of the state' (Cockburn, 1977: 2). The often repeated call from community councillors and the like for full municipal autonomy along the lines of white municipalities often seems to (unsurprisingly) miss the point that CCs and white municipalities are just different forms of the local capitalist state, and as such, fulfil the essential function for the dominant classes of reproducing in part the capitalist system in South Africa as a whole.

Previous articles in WIP have detailed the 'policy' of Total Strategy followed by the dominant classes in South Africa in response to the crisis conditions of the late 1970s. And it is quite clear that the

creation of 200 Community Councils must be viewed in the context of the glorious era of Wiehahn, Riekert, Urban Foundation, Jen Lombard, etc. Here, it is on two levels that we should see the operation of CCs:

1. The need of the dominant classes, in a period of crisis, to extend participation in the political structures of the (up to now) racially exclusive state. Thus, CCs: a 'new' way for some 'Urban Africans' to participate in the running of their townships (and, therefore, their lives). Low level politics and a strategy for incorporation of parts of the urban african working class and petty bourgeoisie - a strategy which appears now to be in some disarray. Hence the wait until 1982...

2. With capital and the state finding it increasingly difficult to provide some of the 'services' necessary for the reproduction of the working class, it is now becoming vital that 'black communities ... bear to an increasing extent a greater part of the total burden in connection with the provision of services in their own communities' (Riekert Commission). Thus, Community Councils are given 'municipal status'; and told to collect the rents (a question dealt with in WIP 12). The legislation that, according to Koornhof, will be passed in 1981 will, perhaps, clarify the situation in regard to this.

It is now possible to examine the functions and powers ascribed to CCs by the 1977 Act. This is done briefly here - as the Act is covered in another article in this issue of WIP. The context in which the Act was passed - wide-scale militancy and mobilization of the people of Soweto, leading to the effective destruction of the Soweto UBC and the rise of the Committee of Ten in June 1977

- is well-known (see WIP 10) and is not analysed to any extent here. However, one important point should be made: the powers and functions of Community Councils, according to the Act, do have a certain degree of 'flexibility' - and how the councils have been (and are) implemented in different townships is crucially dependent on the level of militancy there, the forms of organisation existent (notably of the 'Civic Association' type) and the resistance to their operation.

The Act details certain powers and responsibilities which the Minister of CAD may place on CCs. The most important of these are:

1. the allocation and administration of the letting of housing and dwellings;
2. the approval of building plans;
3. the removal of unauthorised dwellings - and the prevention of unlawful occupation;
4. the maintenance of 'services' in the townships;
5. the provision that members can serve on area school boards;
6. the allocation and administration of school and church sites;
7. the allocation and administration of trading sites;
8. the 'advising' and assisting of bentustan representatives in the townships;
9. the levying of dog (and other unspecified) taxes.

Most important, however, is Section 5(1)(n) of the Act, which gives the Minister the power - after consultation with the appropriate Administration Board - to hand over to a specific Council powers, duties and responsibilities not specified in the original Act. In other words, powers can be passed down from Boards to CCs. Although,

in theory, this is meant to help CCs to attain 'full, independent municipal status' - as state officials so consistently and eagerly put it - the story in practice is a different one. The handing down of powers from Administration Boards can only go a certain distance ... and no further. Thus, influx control, for example, is always in the hands of the Boards (and it would be naive to imagine otherwise). Koornhof stated at the inauguration of the Diepmeadow Council in December, 1978, that 'The Act is a vehicle for a purpose. If the purpose cannot be achieved by the vehicle, I will change the vehicle to suit the purpose' (Informa, Oct 1979). The limits on the old vehicle are very much inbuilt features of South African capitalism, however. Thus, WRAB's new chief director, CJ Bezuidenhout, speaking in May this year, stated that Administration Boards would exercise 'creative withdrawals' from the controls in african townships. At the same time, though, creativity notwithstanding, 'there would always be room for the board as a co-ordinating body somewhere between local government and central government' (Star, 21.05.80).

It is this relationship between Admin Boards and CCs which has caused community councillors all over the country much heartache and many a sleepless night as they ponder the nightmare issue: 'are we in charge of runaway vehicles with no effective powers?'

How, then, have Community Councils been established all over South Africa - in over 200 townships - since roughly the beginning of 1978? The procedure seems to be as follows:

1. The Department of CAD gazettes that

a CC is to be established in a particular township - this usually within a period of six months.

2. The Admin Board responsible - often in consultation with the then existing form of representation (UBCs usually, but sometimes still Advisory Boards) sets a date for an election.


3. The election takes place. Depending on the size of the township, it is divided into wards. Some elections have taken place along 'ethnic' lines, while others have not. Only registered inhabitants of the township may vote, along with hostel dwellers.

4. The (hopefully) 'elected' CC negotiates with the appropriate Admin Board as to its duties and decides what powers are to be transferred.

5. In a heart-rending induction ceremony, the CC is inducted. The document handing over powers is signed by representatives of both the CC and the Board. This is usually effective for a year. A high-powered state official - in most cases seemingly the Deputy Minister of CAD, Dr G de V Morrison, who seems to have made this somewhat of a speciality - gives a speech, showering forth such paternalistic brilliance as 'People have to crawl before they can walk' (he said this at the induction of the Guguletu Council in September, 1979 - Sunday Post, 30.07.79).

6. The Community Council crawls into full action.

This process has been repeated roughly 200 times in South Africa over the past 2 1/2 years. Step 6 is, of course, not the final one - CAD reviews the transfers each year and on a basis of performance or 'necessity' hands down further powers. These additional



Soweto's Community Council chambers at Jabulani. These were inherited from the old Urban Bantu Council.

transfers often seem to have taken place on a fairly ad hoc basis: often, it appears, dependent on the sanction of Frans Csonjé, Deputy Secretary in CAD (and the official with overall responsibility for Admin Boards and CCs) or similarly placed functionaries.

Information about elections is usually sketchy, with the obvious exception of Soweto. What follows below, therefore, are some preliminary reports, gleaned largely from newspapers.

The story of the two elections for the Soweto Council in February and April, 1978, is well-known. In spite of pamphlets from the sky, Connie Mulder's promise of eventual

autonomy for Soweto, the release of Motlana and other members of the Committee of Ten, and the provision of special by-elections, the percentage polls were a pathetic 5,6% and 6% respectively. In the second election only 3 600 out of an eligible 60 000 voted (itself a tiny figure considering the size of Soweto). The present position of the Soweto Council vis a vis rent increases and related issues was analysed in JIP 12.

Early in 1978 elections were held in a number of townships. The poll percentages, in many cases, were significantly higher than in Soweto. A few examples are, Daveyton (19,59%), Kwa-Thema (19,75%), Vaaldriehoek (25%), Grahamstown (25,01%),

Fort Beaufort (70%), Bedford/Adelaide (40%), Bloemfontein (29%), Ermelo (32,6%), and Port Elizabeth (11,2%). Of interest here - although this is a broad generalisation - is the fact that percentages in rural towns are usually higher than those in cities. The importance of the artificial situation of tribalism/ethnicity in voting is difficult to gauge at this stage; it is clear that further information on elections/composition/operation of CCs - notably in smaller towns - is urgently required.

Such information would enable us, for instance, to assess the significance (if any) of the induction (following elections) of Councils in the past year in such places as Guguletu, Mamelodi, Gaerewind (Kimberley), Kagiso, Kattlehong, Tsakane (Brakpan) and Mhluzi (Middelburg). These inductions were marked by a handing down of powers from Admin Boards; this initial transfer, however, appears to have been, in all cases, a very limited one, even within the extremely circumscribed powers CCs can exert.

It seems that CCs generally are to acquire powers in the same piecemeal way as the Soweto Council was granted its duties: firstly, given control over housing matters (as specified in the Act), permission to establish community guards (also as in the Act) and its own treasury (for Soweto in June, 1978); then more control over its own financial affairs (June, 1979); its own salaried officials (November, 1979); and seconded Admin Board officials to operate under its control (December, 1979).

Quite clearly 'municipal autonomy' is still a long way off if and when the state 'gives' CCs powers in this way. Rather, the

strategy is one that ensures responsibility for providing township 'services' falls directly into the laps of the 'elected' CCs. 'The Community Councils must consider matters and take the rap if things go wrong' as ex-director of WRAB put it (S Tribune, 04.05.80). Or, from the perspective of a Soweto councillor, 'The council has been given the power to control and draw its budget. But it is broke' (Post, 25.10.79). And it is then, of course, that rents are raised ... and the chickens come home to roost for the CCs in the form of mobilization and resistance against their actions.

But before looking at this resistance it is necessary to look at what class interests CCs represent, given the balance of class forces in particular townships and in South African society generally at this point. Notwithstanding the crudity of the formalisation, the Councils can perhaps best be seen as the quintessence of petty bourgeois politics. Their elected members drawn from the ranks of the traditional and new petty bourgeoisie (traders, bureaucrats and professionals largely), the Councils - and their national organ UCASA (Urban Councils Association of South Africa) - ceaselessly articulate demands over such issues as freehold land tenure and business rights. The distance from the discourse and practices of the working class is marked - as from the realities of exploitation. Given too, the Council's objective function as organs of control, this is hardly surprising.

Interesting in this regard, is the fact that via the agency of CCs, the South African state seems to be successfully creating its own small-scale localised, Matenzimas and Mphahane. Community councillors

often spend a large amount of their time in attempting to increase their own allowances/salaries (often R150 to R200 per month), awarding their friends and family members (not to mention themselves!) trading licences and sites, buying themselves 'mayoral' cars and liquor cabinets, beating up their enemies with their own private police/vigilante forces, and so on.

Agencies of control and division, created by the state to extend effectively meaningless 'political' rights to a section of the urban dominated classes and to ensure that the townships - site of the extended reproduction of capital's workforce - 'pay their own way' and monopolised by a small (and often corrupt) segment of the petty bourgeoisie; the picture painted up to this point of CCs is a bleak one. And that the true functions of CCs in some areas has been realized is evidenced by the lack of participation in these 'instruments of the oppressor'. There is not the space here to overview adequately the debate over participation - which, as we indicated earlier, has long historic roots - in CCs. While bodies such as the Committee of Ten, Soweto Civic Association and PESCO (while it effectively operated) have maintained fairly consistently, a stand of non-participation ('Until and only when that day comes that we blacks have representation in the central government would people like myself agree to serve ... The community councils are a non-event and I refuse to dignify them with a comment' - Motlana, Post, 21.05.80) Inkatha's position has been more fluid (and shifty). The 'possibly yes - possibly no' stance of 1978-9 was supplanted by a definite 'no' in January,

1980 - this over the question of participation in Soweto elections (in Natal, percentage polls in CC elections are said to be high as a result of Inkatha encouragement and enthusiasm). Then, in April this year, came Buthelezi's statement on CCs in Vosloorus (significant, as the level of CC organisation on the East Rand appears to be the highest in the country):

I say to you bluntly: do not be ashamed to enter the fray at the level of Community Councils ... (they)... are not the vehicles of individual enrichment. They must be turned into chariots which rush us into battle' (Star, 14.04.80).

However, despite Buthelezi's fiery imagery (drawn, it seemed, straight from 'Ben Hur' or suchlike) by late July there had been second thoughts, and Peter Davidson, Inkatha publicity officer on the West Rand, stated that Inkatha would not take part in the Soweto elections - until the Council was made financially viable, a process he seemed to equate with giving it the land it controlled and the houses on it.

Obviously, if the land belonged to the people, they wouldn't resist paying higher rents, Davidson was implying, and only then would Inkatha be prepared to have anything to do with the CC. With Inkatha's statement, the Soweto elections began to look more and more of a no-hoper; Koornhof's postponement a few days later was not unexpected.

However, it is, of course, not sufficient to examine the issue of participation in CCs with reference solely to bodies such as those referred to above. The position and electoral stand of those parties which actually nominate candidates for election, for example, necessitates examination. (The Sofasonke Party, standing in Soweto in 1978 on the

planks of demanding 1/ freehold land tenure; 2/ the abolition of influx control (!); 3/ electrification, for instance).

The levels of political organisation and mobilization in particular townships is also vital to know, as is the level of popular militancy. And related to this is the question of resistance to the activities and operation of CCs. Information on this is sketchy, but in addition to recent action taken on rent increases we can list the following instances as examples:

1. The fire-bombing of members of the Kagiso UBC (and one Soweto councillor) in March, 1978 (Post, 02.03.80).
 2. The resistance to the renaming of Port Elizabeth's two townships by the CC - from Red and White Locations to Masanguanaville and Cetuville respectively (the second being the name of a councillor). This was described as 'absurd, stupid, unwarranted and smacking of self-aggrandisement' (Sunday Post, 13.07.80).
 3. The fight of the residents of Mbekweni (Pearl) to have the CC's election declared invalid - which the Supreme Court in Cape Town eventually did in June this year (Grassroots, 3).
 4. The attempted attack on Josiah Matjila, the chairperson of the Vaal Community Council, in Sebokeng in late July after rent increases. Two body-guards were injured as Matjila was driven away in a police car, with warning shots being fired as people stormed and stoned the van.
- More instances such as these could be quoted, and further information would be most desirable. (It would be interesting, for example, to know the community's attitude to and actions towards the CC in, say, Fort

Beaufort - elected on a 70% poll, as was noted earlier - a town now undergoing generalised popular 'unrest'). In any event, it seems clear that the CC strategy will not be implemented without considerable popular struggle and resistance.

And this brings us back to the beginning of this article, for the announcement of the postponement of the Soweto Council elections - and the apparent rethinking of the Community Council strategy - is directly related to the resistance engendered by the operation of the Councils.

It does not seem essential here to summarise the main thrust of this article; the creation of Community Councils, it has been suggested must be seen as one of the responses of the dominant classes (in the context of intensified and persistent popular militancy) to the needs of

1. somewhat extending 'participation' in the political structures of the state. This has necessitated the establishment of yet another 'puppet' institution (which is not to deny that the possibility of such an institution becoming the arena of struggle and politicization exists - crucially dependent on the balance and configuration of class forces in a given period), manipulated and controlled by reactionary petty bourgeois elements;

2. greater control over the administration/reproduction of capital's urban workforce - and the necessity of shifting the responsibility of the provision of services on to the backs of the popular classes.

This survey of the genesis and operation of the CCs has been, however, somewhat schematic. Areas which have not been covered

in any depth - and should perhaps be the subject of further investigation and research - are:

- the question of community guards. The Act provides for a Community Council to manage and control such a guard in its area. How do these guards function? What is their relation to i. private police forces (such as Thebehali's notorious All Nation Police Force); ii. SAP; iii. Makgotla (a very neglected subject); and iv. Bantu Commissioner's Courts;
- the internal organisation of CCs. How do the committees appointed function? What is the role of opposition parties? This leads on to ...;
- regional and national organisation of CCs. On national organisation, UCASA was formed in October, 1978, and has 1 000 out of 1 500 councillors as members (organised regionally) at present. It holds regular conferences, chats now and again to Koornhof and his functionaries, and considers itself a 'major spokesman for urban blacks' (RDM, 22.07.80). At its most recent meeting, the Association resolved to tackle issues like finance of the Councils; deficits; 99-year lease and leasehold in general; housing shortages; unemployment; and transport. Its activities should be monitored;
- the question of financing of Councils has not been considered at any length here. The Browne Commission's first report seemed to duck the issue somewhat, and it remains an important pre-occupation of Councils - and the opposition to them. UCASA, for instance, outlined in April six steps the state should take: to give annual grants to Councils (as is the case with bantustans); to write off deficits of all councils immediately; to take white Admin Board officials from the payroll of CCs; to give interest free loans to Councils; to establish a development fund for urban african areas; to phase out Admin Boards;
- the relation of Councils to NAFSOC, Soweto Chamber of Commerce and Industry, etc. This relation often appears to be a somewhat problematic one, given the Councils' penchant for issuing trade licences to their family and friends. What will be the effect of the recent announcement by Louis Rive that limited

- industrial development can occur;
- the relation of Councils to the whole Louis Rive/ECOPLAN, etc, initiative should also be considered. And, also, of course, that to the Urban Foundation;
- finally the location of the CC strategy to the entire restructuring of urban control in the 1970s has not been adequately theorized and detailed. The Council-Admin Board relation is vital here, as is that of the Councils to CAD (and, most relevantly, Koornhof). The entire chain of command needs some urgent attention.

With Louis Rive's 'fantastic mission' (and indeed it is) coming to fruition, with Community Councils drawing up wild and extravagant budgets to 'run' their own townships, and with the popular resistance to the operation of the Councils on the increase, all these questions are worthy of some attempt at an answer. For, in spite of the strategy being in somewhat of a state of flux at the moment, the legislation the state is cooking up for CCs for 1981 will be of some relevance to contemporary struggle.



Community Organisation - a response

INTRODUCTION.

WHAT IS progressive community organisation? An article on this topic in Work In Progress 11 suggests that such organisation is the opposite of what is usually called 'community development'. The article further argues that the progressive organisation of communities has to move into the realm of political struggle - away from helping the poor and towards organising the working class against exploitation. The 'problems of the poor' are the

"logical outcome of a weak and disorganised working class which because of its lack of strength is unable to win the victories necessary for it to improve its lot in the short term, and to gain political power in the long term" (WIP 11:36).

The WIP 11 article therefore points out the need to 'restructure the system'. The major problem with what is referred to as 'community development' is that it ignores

"the basic prerequisite for any such improvement in the quality of life of the working class: its organisation as a political force" (WIP 11:36).

But how is this political organisation to occur? How is the system to be restructured? The WIP 11 article suggests activity, which

"aims at providing the working class with the organisational strength to look after its own interests, to win higher wages, better working conditions and....to win from the state the kinds of services and amenities necessary to ensure a healthy and human living environment, an environment which is controlled and determined by the working class itself" (WIP 11:39, my emphasis).

This seems to suggest that the political organisation of the working class should follow the lines of Western European social democracy where through the organisation of a strong labour movement, the working class tries to force concessions from the capitalist class. These concessions are sometimes implemented through a particular type of state, namely the 'welfare' state.

Where does organisation of the working class in the community fit into this social democratic view? The WIP 11 article takes note of the importance of trade unionism in organising workers at their place of work. It then goes on to suggest that there are other areas where organisation can be progressive, and gives two reasons why organisation in the community is important: firstly, the article argues that political organisation of the working class in the community is important because of the state's inadequate provision of basic services to the working class. For example,

"it is only as a collectively organised force that the working class will be able to demand a well run national health service that provides adequate care for all" (WIP 11:40).

Political organisation of the working class in the community thus exerts pressures on the state for better conditions outside of the factories.

Secondly, the article argues that community organisation is important because it aims at people controlling their own lives and institutions - creating a living embryo of the new society in the womb of the old.

In response to all this, I will argue that the WIP 11 article's assumptions about political organisation of the working class are possibly reformist, and therefore limited. I will further argue that this is because the article lacks a clear outline of the relationship between workplace, community and the state - and that as a result it offers little direction as to how community organisation relates to 'restructuring the system'.
'COMMUNITY ORGANISATION'.

Community organisation covers a wide range of issues - including poor housing, high rents, bad health facilities, low standard municipal services, busfares, etc. Organisation around these issues is grouped together as community organisation because it involves problems and organisation outside of the workplace. Because these issues are outside the workplace, they often affect more groups than just the working class. And because community organisation is organisation in communities, it often combines these different groups, with their different problems and demands, into one body.

Problems like rent increases and high busfares affect mainly the working class. The bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie can usually afford to pay rent increases, and avoid high busfares by using their own cars. Quite often the demands that these two classes make in community organisation are

not aimed at changing the ghetto, but at getting themselves out of it! For example, the demands for blacks to buy property in any area is clearly not a demand which would benefit workers already struggling to buy food and clothing, let alone being able to buy private houses. Different classes will thus feel the same problem in different ways, and will have different types of demands.

In analysing community organisation it is therefore important to see whose problems an organisation takes up, and which classes directly control the organisation. It is important to see whether the strategies and methods of community organisation bring large sections of the working class into mass political organisation - or whether initiative and struggle is taken into the hands of a small leadership involved in top-level negotiations and costly legal battles. Finally, it is important to see how the organisation of the working class in the community relates to organisation in the workplace.

COMMUNITY AND WORKPLACE - THE DIVISION.

In everyday life a line is drawn between the workplace and the community. This division in fact reflects the structure of capitalist society, and mirrors the distinction between the 'political' and the 'economic'. Pre-capitalist societies had little physical or social division between workplace and community. Economic exploitation took on a more directly political form than it does within capitalist production.

This was because the pre-capitalist exploiting classes usually did the exploiting directly through the state. Capitalist

society is different because although the state helps in exploitation, it does not itself do the exploiting of labour. The state helps, for example, to force peasants off their land in order to create a labour force for the capitalist class. This gets the system of capitalist production going. In South Africa, the state helps in exploitation by distributing workers to certain economic sectors (farming, mining, construction) by using the pass laws, influx control and labour bureaux.

The state also safeguards exploitation by protecting private property and keeping 'law and order', as well as fostering economic growth, building roads and railways, and printing and controlling money.

But despite all this, the state in capitalist society is outside the basic way that exploitation takes place. In capitalist society, the exploiting class does not have to directly use the state to carry out the exploitation of the direct producers. The workers - having been separated from their land and other means of subsistence - can only survive by selling their ability to work to those who own the farms, mines and factories.

The employers buy the workers' ability to work, and make surplus value and profit by not paying for all work performed. Because workers have no other way to make a living, they have no choice - within the system - but to sell their labour and be exploited.

Under capitalism, then, there is a separation between exploitation and the state - a separation between the economic and the political. This is what is behind the division of workplace from community.

Exploitation takes place in the workplace and looks as if it has nothing at all to do with the state; in contrast, community problems are seen as the fault of the state. This often gives rise to separate and parallel working class struggles: trade unions try to win more from bosses; civic associations try to win more from the state. Such struggles accept this separation as a given fact of life, and assume conditions in the workplace and in the community can be improved by pressure in both areas.

COMMUNITY AND WORKPLACE - THE LINKS.

Under capitalism, working class reality is split between the seemingly 'apolitical' workplace and 'political' civic and community life. But although there is this basic separation, the two areas are also linked and interdependent. It is within this basic framework of the separation and the links between workplace and community issues that progressive community organisation can be grasped and understood. Progressive community organisation deals with those issues outside of the workplace which affect the working class. But because the working class is also directly involved and affected by what happens in the workplace, the two spheres are interlinked.

Firstly, problems like high rents and busfares in the community are directly affected by the exploitation in the workplace through the wage which has to meet rent and transport costs. Poverty in the home is caused by exploitation in the workplace. Certain working class problems experienced outside of the workplace are therefore directly related to relationships within the workplace - and the grievances can lead to

organisation for a better deal in both workplace and community.

Secondly, many other working class problems in the community and also - in the last resort - caused by the relationships in the workplace, but less directly. Poor sanitation and health services; and bad roads, street lights and recreation/sports facilities seem at first to be the fault of the state. Through these sorts of community issues, working class grievances often focus on the state rather than on relationships in the workplace. But a closer look shows the reason why the state has come to provide these services - and why it gives them so poorly - is because of the nature of capitalist production.

Historically, the capitalist state has developed a 'welfare' role where it acts to make sure that individual capitalists, in cut-throat competition with each other, do not exploit the working class so much that it cannot reproduce itself. In its responsibility to reproduce the working class and keep the system going, the state may sometimes bring in minimum laws for wages and maximum working hours. It may also do things like provide housing, education and transport. But these services cost money, and will ultimately mean that there is less money for capitalists' profit and reinvestments. So it is not surprising that, even with working class pressure on the state, these services are usually little more than the barest minimum needed to keep workers alive, get them back to work each day, with a basic education and in a certain minimum state of health. (This is the reason why, in capitalist society, organisation to win concessions from the state - as suggested

by the WIP 11 article - tends to be reformist)

Given the 'apolitical' nature of immediate workplace grievances, and the inadequate welfare role played by the state outside the workplace, it is only to be expected that civic issues and the state have become important arenas of struggle under capitalism. Workers' struggles - although caused in the last resort by the failure of capitalist production to reproduce and fulfil them as humans - are not only against employers in the workplace, but also aimed at the state in the community.

THE STATE, WORKING CLASS ORGANISATION, AND THE COMMUNITY.

If working class problems in the community are caused in the last resort by exploitative relations in the workplace, then organisation against the state that leaves workplace relations intact is reformist organisation. The question is then whether community organisation has any role to play in moving beyond the struggle for concessions and reforms, and whether it can develop into a struggle to transform the very nature of the state and system.

This question of transforming the state raises the issue of participation/non-participation in local structures of administration and control, and I will discuss how this issue relates to working class organisation in communities.

Reformist community organisation argues for participation in bodies ranging from local councils to municipal health clinics in the belief that there is no need to transform the state. It is seen as a neutral body, and the issue is only who rules within the state. For reformists, the capitalist

separation between the state and exploitation is taken as a given fact of life - only the government within the state needs changing. On this argument, it is possible to use state structures to win better conditions in the community.

Against this, a second view of community organisation has steered clear of state bodies. Instead, non-state bodies have been set up to counter official institutions - eg residents' associations to fight management committees; civic associations to oppose community councils. The here seems to be to try to build a second state - an independent working class controlled state structure - alongside the first, but still often reflecting its separation from exploitation. Sometimes this decision is made after assessing the tactical limits of participating in certain state bodies. But sometimes it stems from a hardline principle of non-collaboration.

This non-collaboration approach often misunderstands the nature of the capitalist state. In this view, the state is only and totally an arm of the capitalist class. Certainly the capitalist state is not a neutral body which can be used to achieve the goals of any social class which might - in theory at least - be able to gain control of it. But it is also inadequate to see the state as a simple tool of the ruling class which it uses at will. Rather the state is itself an arena of struggle and conflict. It must then be asked, if community organisation hopes to promote working class struggle within the state, what are the limits and possibilities for 'restructuring the system' through this arena of struggle?

I have argued that the organisation of

the working class in the community faces the problem of leaving exploitative economic relations in the workplace intact. Does this mean there is no importance in organising workers in the communities - that community organisation has no role, and is doomed to reformism? .

I suggest that the community organisation of workers is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, in terms of support for workplace struggles, community organisation is clearly important. The success of the Fattis and Moni's strike and boycott bears this out. And the financial support, pressure on township butchers, red meat boycott, and community appeals to the unemployed not to scab on the strikers, were all important parts of the Cape Town meat strike.

It is in this light that one can understand the meatworkers' slogan, "the struggle of the meatworkers is the struggle of the community". The slogan would here be understood to be calling for solidarity with the demands of the meatworkers. The assumption in this understanding is still that there are two parallel struggles, one in the community, and one on the factory floor.

There is, however, a second way of understanding the slogan. Instead of two parallel struggles, the slogan could be read as referring to one struggle - that of the working class. Thus the struggle of workers in the community is essentially the struggle of this same class in the workplace - but a struggle which requires victory in the workplace in order for a successful change in communities to occur. In this understanding, community support

for workplace struggles would not be based on moral conviction and sympathy with a 'separate' struggle, but based on an awareness of the very real preconditions for success in community struggles.

But there is more to community organisation than simply providing support for the more fundamental workplace struggles. Rather than falling away once workplace struggles have been won, organisation of the working class in the community is important in its own right, and with long-term significance.

This is firstly because class relations do not only exist in the workplace, but also exist - and need to be changed - in the community. Secondly, a new state structure cannot simply be a structure based only on mass democratic organisation in the workplace. A state structure based only in the workplace cannot provide for the collective needs of the community like health, housing, public transport and recreational facilities. This is where community organisations form "the embryo of the new society in the womb of the old".

CONCLUSION.

It would seem from all this that establishing a new social order which thoroughly serves the working class would involve not the (limited) use of the capitalist state (which is external to exploitation) - but rather its radical transformation into a new mass democratic organisation which unites workplace and community organisation. It is thus working class struggle which organisationally combines workplace and community issues that provides the germ of a new social order.

In the light of this goal, participation in capitalist state structures cannot be an end in itself. The capitalist state remains outside of relations of exploitation and cannot therefore be used to transform these relations. But a new state structure that unites democratic workplace and community mass organisation cannot be built overnight. Neither can it simply be built next to the capitalist state. It is necessary, then, for working class organisation to make tactical use of the capitalist state in order to advance the cause of building new structures which span workplace and community.

Participation in and winning concessions from the capitalist state can play an important role in building up working class organisation and confidence - and finally in demonstrating the structural limits of the reforms granted by the capitalist state.

Organisation of the working class in the community is, according to this argument, a vital part of social transformation. Much research needs to be done on the role of community organisation in linking community and workplace, state and production relationships.

Categories of Resistance

IN THE past, Work In Progress has featured summaries of political trials, as well as some in depth investigations of specific trials. Other contributions in WIP, such as the "Chronology of Conflict" in number 13, have relied on court records to present material on forms of resistance in current South African society.

This focus has, in general, not concerned itself with the strictly legal or procedural basis of trial proceedings, and there are a number of reasons why political trials have provided material of interest to people not professionally involved in the legal process. Some of these reasons are dealt with below.

The availability of information on the activities and directions taken by the dominated classes in South Africa is severely limited. This lack of information is partly due to the fact that a large number of resistance organisations have been banned, and their publications, statements and debates may not be legally distributed within the country. Where such groups are active in the organisation of popular resistance, as in the case of the ANC, SACP and to some extent the PAC, large gaps in the analysis and understanding of conflict exist within even informed political circles. To some

extent, material presented in the proceedings of political trials provides insights into those organisations involved in resistance activity.

Not only the banned status of certain active organisations, but also increasing state censorship makes important information unavailable to groups within South Africa. Acts covering the fields of publications, police, defence, 'Key Points', 'Internal Security' and many other areas deny members of all social classes information on the various dynamics which are shaping both the present and the future in South Africa. Again, to a limited extent, the study of political trials can provide some of this information.

This situation is made worse, in that even the limited areas available for information gathering are not used to the full. The commercial press, research workers and other groups like universities have not explored to the full the possibilities of making available more information than currently forms political consciousness within South African society. The refusal of, for example, the press and universities to take the long-term struggles of the dominated classes in South Africa seriously, except with the intention of controlling and weakening such struggles, makes the lack of information on conflict and resistance even more acute than the banning of organisations and the censoring of material necessitates.

Apart from providing important information, political trials also give an indication of the level and intensity of popular resentment and organisation which is present within the dominated classes. For example, the relative lull in popular

struggle during the second half of the 1960s is reflected in the fact that few trials of political activists were heard during that period. In the same way, the rebellions of 1976 and 1977 gave rise to a vast number of political trials in the courts, indicating the widespread nature and extent of popular resistance during those years.

The trials brought before court are also an indication of long term trends, both as far as resistance activity is concerned, as well as possible state response to such activity. For example, during the period 1974 to mid-1976, there was a marked increase in the number of political trials taking place. This was an indication that both resistance to the ruling classes, and the strengthening of opposition organisations, was increasing.

Possible state response to resistance is also reflected in trials: for example, the charging of a number of BPC and SASU leaders under the Terrorism Act, despite the fact that their activities had been non-violent and overt, was an indication of the ruling class' attitude towards the black consciousness organisations then active in South Africa. The banning of those organisations in October 1977 confirmed in a very stark way the state attitude which had already been displayed when leaders of SASU and BPC was jailed for between 5 and 6 years at the end of their trial (see S vs Cooper and others for details).

But having suggested certain ways in which the study of political trials can be useful in understanding society, it must be noted that trial material suffers from important limitations: any attempt to study

trials as an indication of popular resistance must be approached with care, because there is no direct relation between conflict in society, and the political trials which that conflict gives rise to.

Trial records are inadequate as source material for the following reasons:

- * they tend to be incident, rather than process oriented. It is only the events and activities around specific incidents which are probed in trials, rather than the total contextualisation of those incidents within the history of struggle, resistance and contradiction within society. For example, in a trial where a person is charged with attacking a police station, it is highly unlikely that evidence would be heard on why the dominated classes view police stations as symbols of oppression, how an isolated attack on the police station fits in with an organisational programme, and why certain organisations and groups have undertaken a programme of armed struggle. In much the same way, trials focus on individuals, not on the activities and interests of social classes. The very fact that law views the individual separately from his or her material class position, and does not accept the antagonistic nature of relations between classes, is one of the reasons why political trials reflect social conflict in a distorted, unclear manner.
- * Those involved in the administration of law tend to want to reduce social conflicts to crisp and clear legal issues, and this is a process which distorts the relationship between the trial and the series of events it deals with. Events, conflict and reality itself are complex, and often contradictory. Because

individuals are to a large extent formed by the way they experience reality, their activities and actions often reflect the contradictory nature of the society they live in. The attempt to reduce such complexity to a series of crisp legal issues is a factor which makes the political trial of only limited use in analysing and documenting popular struggle and resistance.

* The nature of trial procedure also distorts the relationship between real social processes, and trials. The presence of a prosecutor, trying to prove a case, and an accused often attempting to minimise his or her involvement in the events under consideration, means that aspects of the actual occurrences are lost or altered when dealt with in a court hearing.

* A final factor to be remembered in the study of trials is that only activists apprehended by the state are brought to court. This means that only a limited number of people involved in struggle and resistance are put on trial, and that in all the remaining cases where activists are not arrested, the study of political trials reveals nothing about the activities of the oppressed classes.

Bearing in mind the limitations set out above, it is possible to isolate some long term trends in resistance activity by tracing the course of political trials. Subsequent to the banning of the ANC and the PAC, and the state's uncovering of the Rivonia plan, the first indications of armed guerilla struggle emerged. During 1967 the ANC formed a military alliance with ZAPU, and guerilla fighters from these two organisations fought Rhodesian security forces on Zimbabwean soil. In these clashes,

a number of ANC guerillas were killed, while others escaped or were captured by security forces. More than 13 of this group were tried by the Smith regime, and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 20 years to life. During May 1980 it was reported that 13 ANC guerillas held in Zimbabwean jails had been released as part of a pre-independence amnesty for political prisoners.

However, some of those involved in the ANC - ZAPU alliance found themselves on trial in South African courts. Benjamin Ramotse, tried in 1970, claimed that he had been kidnapped by Rhodesian forces in Botswana, and then illegally handed over to South African authorities. His claim that he should not be tried in a South African court because of the unlawful nature of his arrest was turned down, and he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

Fana Mzimela was found guilty of undergoing military training under the auspices of the ANC, and in 1972 he too was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. A third member of the ANC group who fought with ZAPU during 1967 was James April. In his trial, it was found that he had left South Africa in 1962, and after receiving military training in East Germany and Russia, he joined a group fighting on Zimbabwean soil. He subsequently escaped to Botswana, avoiding Rhodesian security forces, and after undergoing further training of a non-military nature, returned to South Africa. Arrested by the police, he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

These trials reflect the initial period of ANC guerilla activity, undertaken with ZAPU in Zimbabwe. However, within South Africa there were indications of organised

activity as well. During 1969 11 men and a woman were charged under the Terrorism Act. The state claimed that between 1962 and 1968 they had been active as ANC members and supporters, and conspired with Braam Fisher, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Joe Slovo, Oliver Tambo, Duma Nokwe and other ANC and SACP leaders.

11 of the accused were found guilty of going abroad for military training, finding ways for trained guerillas to enter South Africa, searching for submarine landing sites along the coast, encouraging others to undergo military training, and assisting guerilla fighters in South Africa. Sentences ranging from 5 to 20 years imprisonment were imposed on those found guilty.

During the same year (1969), 22 people were charged under the Suppression of Communism Act in Pretoria. The state claimed that as ANC members or supporters they had distributed ANC pamphlets, investigated targets for sabotage, devised means to obtain explosives, and discussed the question of contact with guerilla fighters returning to South Africa after periods of training. After two trials in which the charges were substantially the same, the accused were acquitted on a legal technicality, but served with banning orders on release from prison. (For details of the two trials, see S vs SR Ndou and 21 others, and S vs Ramotse and others).

Despite the indications of increased guerilla and guerilla-support activity towards the end of the 1960s, the early 1970s were characterised by a relative lull in organised resistance activity, and this is shown in the isolated nature of the political trials of this period. During 1971

a number of supporters of the African Peoples' Democratic Union of South Africa (APDUSA) were convicted of recruiting people for military training, mainly in the Pondo-land area. In 1972 Essop, Moodley, Essak and Desai were charged with the production and distribution of ANC and SACP material in South Africa. Ahmed Timol, a security detainee who died while in police detention featured prominently in this trial, and at its conclusion all 4 accused were found guilty of Terrorism, and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment. However, Moodley and Essak were acquitted on appeal, while Essop and Desai served their sentences.

During 1973 two non-South Africans, Moumbaris and Hosey, were charged together with Cholo, Mpanza, Mthembu and Sijaka. Moumbaris and Hosey were found guilty of providing support and assistance to trained ANC guerillas, including the supply of arms, ammunition and radio contact. Moumbaris was also found guilty of searching the Transkeian coast for suitable places to land guerillas, meeting guerillas in neighbouring territories and transporting them into South Africa, and distributing ANC pamphlets. He received a 14 year sentence, and was serving it when in December 1979 he escaped from Pretoria's maximum security prison. Hosey served 5 years. Their co-accused, Cholo, Mpanza, Mthembu and Sijaka were found guilty of undergoing ANC military training; helped into South Africa by Moumbaris, they had intended to recruit and train other guerilla fighters for ANC activity.

By 1975 a younger generation, many of whom had been influenced by the black consciousness organisations, were taking the lead in militant activity, some of which

gave rise to court cases. The most prominently featured trial of this period was that of various black consciousness leaders (S vs Cooper and others). Here the activities of SASU and BPC were put on trial under the Terrorism Act. At the end of 1975 Eric Molobi was charged with inciting people to undergo military training, distribution of pamphlets, and attempting to involve people in acts of sabotage. Found guilty on some of these charges, he was sentenced to 5 years.

Early in 1976 a number of people associated with the National Youth Organisation (NAYU) were charged with conspiring to form underground cells to study and gather information on military installations; investigating ways of using the labour force to cripple the economy; and recruiting people for military training (see S vs Molokeng and others).

During 1975 and the first half of 1976 there were indications of an increasing number of people leaving South Africa to undergo military training, mainly under the auspices of the ANC. Stanley Nkosi and, Petrus Mothlanthe were found guilty of undergoing such training in the first third of 1976, and sentenced to 10 years each. In the trial of Mosima Sexwale and others, a number of ANC guerillas were found guilty of undergoing military training during the first half of 1976.

However, the events of June 1976 and after gave enormous impetus to the trends already noticeable during the 18 months preceding mid 1976. From the trials which took place in the post June '76 period, it is possible to categorise the changing forms of resistance emerging within South

Africa. These categories are based on changes in trials over a period of time: they are accordingly abstract and suffer from most of the limitations mentioned earlier in connection with the study of political trials.

The categories isolated also show a certain chronological development: while activity in one category has not ceased, it has tended to be overshadowed by new forms of resistance as conflict has intensified within South Africa. But it should be noted that individual trials do not fit neatly into each category: in many cases activity falling into a number of the categories of resistance are dealt with in one trial. There are also a number of important forms of resistance which are excluded from what follows: these relate to a large amount of organised mass resistance, taking the form of stay aways, strikes, boycotts of buses and schools, etc. The mass involvement in these forms of activity cannot be expressed, even inadequately, in trials, and they are accordingly excluded from the categorisation presented below.

1. Politicisation and educative activity:

To some extent, much of this activity preceded the events of June 1976, for example the work of organisations like BPC, SASU, and SASM. The SASU/BPC Terrorism Act trial of 1975 - 76 reflects one form of this activity, while the cases of Suttner, Holiday, Rabkin and Cronin, and Jenkins and Lee deal with another aspect. Here, intellectuals involved themselves in the production and distribution of ANC and SACP literature on a wide scale. Offences in this category have usually been charged as Terrorism, although in some cases the

Suppression of Communist/Internal Security Act has been used.

2. 'Spontaneous' (ie not organisationally linked) resistance:

This has invariably emerged in periods of intense political crisis, such as the rebellion of 1976 - 77, and the current period of resistance associated with the schools boycott and other activity, most pronounced in the Western Cape. Such resistance has often focussed on selective symbols of oppression, such as Bantu Affairs Administration Board offices, township beer and liquor outlets, buses, Bantu Education schools, etc. There have also been attacks on individuals perceived as 'system men', eg headmasters, UBC/community council members, policemen and particularly exploitative traders. Activity falling within this category has occasionally been charged as Sabotage or attempted murder, but more commonly as arson, public violence or malicious damage to property.

3. Recruitment for military training, and assisting recruits to leave the country to receive training:

Immediately after June '76, trials covering these forms of activity increased considerably as more and more politicised scholars left South Africa and found their way into the training camps of the ANC and the PAC. A well-known example of a trial covering this form of activity was the Bethal PAC trial (S vs Mothopeng and 17 others), where 16 of the accused were found guilty of offences relating to PAC activity, and sentenced to periods of imprisonment ranging from 15 years to one wholly suspended sentence.

4. Related to the above are cases dealing with attempts to leave the country with the intention of undergoing military training.

A large number of trials of this nature were held during the 1976 - 78 period, and there are still cases of people being apprehended by police while leaving the country to receive training.

5. The undertaking of organisational work within South Africa for unlawful organisations has usually been charged as an offence under the Terrorism Act, and in some cases the Internal Security Act. A recent trial involving the provision of strategic information for the ANC is an example of such activity, namely the case of Renfrew Christie, who was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for undertaking research into energy matters, and supplying the ANC with the results of his research.

The activities of Moubarris and Hosey, described above, also fall within this category of organised resistance.

6. As those who left the country in the wake of June '76 underwent training in the camps of the ANC and the PAC, so an increasing number of guerilla fighters returned to South Africa. A number of these guerillas were arrested before undertaking any activity, and were charged with undergoing military training "with the intention of endangering the maintenance of law and order". As the number of guerillas returning to South Africa rose, so another offence emerged in political trials - that of harbouring or giving assistance to guerilla fighters. In these cases, family members were sometimes charged with assisting relatives who had undergone military training, as in

the trial of Kate Serokolo and 2 others, and the current case of Mzinyathé and Bentley; in this matter, Bentley is the stepfather of Mzinyathi, and is charged with harbouring him, knowing that he had undergone military training.

7. The final category of resistance to be extracted from political trials is the one fast becoming most common in the courts. It reflects the growing intensity of armed struggle in South Africa, and deals with actual guerilla and sabotage activities. Charges relating to these activities often include the possession of arms, ammunition and explosives.

Slightly earlier cases of this category include those of Solomon Mahlangu, executed for his limited role in the Goch Street shooting of June 1977; Mosima Sexwale, who was found guilty of, inter alia, throwing a grenade into the cab of a police vehicle in order to escape from custody, and was sentenced to 18 years; and Naledi Tsiki, who was found guilty of sabotaging a railway line in the Northern Transvaal during 1976, and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment.

More recent cases include the Pietermaritzburg Treason Trial (S vs Sekete and others), where evidence was led of running battles between ANC guerillas and South African and BophuthaTswanan forces, and the current trial of Lubisi and others, where the accused face charges of Treason, murder, and Terrorism relating to the siege at a Silverton Bank, and the attack on a police station at Soekmekaar.

These rather abstract categories of resistance partially reflect certain forms of conflict within society. As mentioned earlier, a number of factors make it difficult to analyse and monitor the nature and intensity of that conflict. Despite the limitations outlined above, the study of political trials enables us to form some impressions on resistance to the nature of South African society, as well as the degree of support enjoyed by banned organisations active amongst the dominated classes.

Onverwacht: 'ethnic' division and oppression

OUTSIDE Thaba Nchu in the Orange Free State, on the main highway to Bloemfontein, there is a sign marked Uitzicht, pointing to the south-west. The public road is wide, rough and heavily rutted. Long before it reaches Uitzicht, which is a small railway siding near the Rusfontein dam, it passes through a gap in a low ridge of hills crossing the western boundary of the Thaba Nchu reserve. Beyond that gap, 12 kilometers from Thaba Nchu town, lies one of the largest resettlement slums in South Africa. It is officially known as Onverwacht, but the people who live there also call it Botshabelo, Place of Refuge. It was barren veld in May 1979. Today it is still a vast parade of shacks and tents and numbered toilet stands, occupied by more than one hundred thousand people. Why?

The story of Onverwacht shows what has been happening throughout the rural areas of South Africa in the late 1970s. Black labourers and their families are expelled from white farms. Illegal 'squatters' are harassed by municipal police in 'white' South Africa (the hated 'blackjacks') and by bantustan police in the black reserves. The 'surplus appendages' of the apartheid state - the sick, the unemployed, the aged, the wives and children of migrant workers - are squeezed onto remote and isolated dumping grounds. Meanwhile political responsibility for the stagnant dustbins of white prosperity

is displaced from PW Botha to the bantustan leaders; a continuous rumble of discontent in the black townships is choked by 'sneeze machines' and the rest of the South African state's techniques of repression; and the international media speculate over hints of significant reform.

Because of its historical association with the Seleka Rolong, a branch of the Tswana people, Thaba Nchu is an enclave of BophuthaTswana and became 'independent' as part of that bantustan in December 1977. But the african population of the Orange Free State as a whole is predominantly Southern Sotho. Their official 'homeland' is Qwaqwa, otherwise the magisterial district of Witziesshoek, in the north-eastern corner of the Free State on the border of Natal. Qwaqwa is a tiny, mountainous and barren area of 48 000 hectares. Its de facto (actual) population in 1970 was 24 000, representing less than 2% of the 1,36 million people identified as members of the 'South Sotho national unit' and, accordingly, as citizens of Qwaqwa by law (de jure). Nearly 90% of this population were resident in 'white' South Africa; and 8,4% were in other bantustans than Qwaqwa, mainly the Transkei and BophuthaTswana. The estimated de jure population of Qwaqwa in mid-1978 was 1,79 million. But far more important than the absolute increase in numbers is the changes



1976: Soweto students demand release of detainees and an end to Bantu Education.

which have taken place within the last decade in the de facto distribution of this population.

In the first place, hundreds of thousands of people in the Orange Free State have been 'relocated', mainly from 'white' areas, both rural and urban, to the two established black reserves - Lwaqwa and Thaba Nchu. These population movements have worsened the crises of poverty and unemployment which were already evident in the black reserves. Lwaqwa in particular has experienced an influx on a staggering scale. Its estimated de facto population in 1980 is 300 000 people, so that average population density is now 622 people per square kilometer, compared with 54 people per square kilometer in 1970. Residents describe the place as one big location.

In the second place certain conflicts have emerged in Lwaqwa and Thaba Nchu. These are the result of enforced 'ethnic nationalism' (is the bantustan policy). Recent events in Thaba Nchu illustrate the vicious consequences of the fact that the pieces in the ethnic jigsaw simply do not fit; and the appearance of Onverwacht in 1979 represents a clumsy attempt to accommodate the various 'ethnic' groups in the area.

By the early 1970s there was an ethnically mixed population in the Thaba Nchu reserve. The Basotho were probably in a numerical majority, but they were politically subordinate to the Barolong Tribal Authority. Many more Basotho left white farms, the small holdings around Bloemfontein and the small dorps all over the Free State, and drifted in to the existing villages known as Sultfontein I, II and III; and to the Barolong freehold farms and Trust villages. A large concentration

of illegal squatters developed to the north of Thaba Nchu railway station in an area which became known as Kromdraai. It had been demarcated as grazing land, but thousands of people moved there apparently because plots had been fraudulently 'sold' to them or because they had been led to believe that stands would be allocated to them. According to a press report


It is the rejected who come to Kromdraai - those who can no longer work, those who cannot 'fix up their passes' - from the small dorps and farms all over the Free State. The authorities of Thaba Nchu (in BophuthaTswana) do not want them and say they must go to their own place - Lwaqwa. But Lwaqwa is far away and overcrowded already. (Voice, 08.04.78).

Initially, an attempt was made to deport the squatters to Lwaqwa. But mass immigration continued, and the issue developed into a confrontation between politicians of BophuthaTswana and Lwaqwa respectively. A Lwaqwa cabinet minister complained that South Sotho in Thaba Nchu were discriminated against in respect of work permits, residence rights and language of instruction in the schools. In turn, he was accused of interfering in the internal affairs of BophuthaTswana (see the Seata/Ngake correspondence in The Friend, 27.09.76, 05.10.76, 18.10.76, and 30.10.76).

By 1978 the population of Kromdraai was estimated to be 38 000 people. They were living in poverty and squalor, in shacks roughly constructed from mud-bricks and corrugated sheeting. They were regularly harassed by the BophuthaTswana police as 'illegal foreigners', and this pressure was intensified shortly after 'independence'. Several massive raids took place in 1978. On April 24, for example, 301 people were arbitrarily arrested, their children

intimidated, their livestock dispersed and impounded; some people were shot, others raped. Those charged and convicted for squatting were fined R40 or imprisoned for 40 days in Bloemfontein jail, by arrangement with South Africa. Another big raid on December 21, 1978, led to R60 fines or 60 days imprisonment. The practice became lucrative for the BophuthaTswana authorities. On several occasions, indeed, the South African police intervened to persuade the BophuthaTswana police to behave more moderately. Basotho tenants in the Thaba Nchu 'locations' also complained of exploitation and harassment by Barolong landlords.

During 1977 and 1978, various negotiations took place between BophuthaTswana and Lwaqwa and the South African government over the provision of land for the relocation of Basotho from Thaba Nchu. A land swap was arranged by which 25 000 hectares of compulsorily purchased white farms on the east bank of the Modder river would be used both to enlarge the Thaba Nchu enclave and to create a South Sotho city to the west of it. Removal of the Kromdraai squatters to the area known as Onverwacht began in late May 1979 - in winter - and was completed by December of the same year. People were provided with numbered toilet stands and had to build their own accommodation from whatever materials they were able to obtain. Most of the shacks are haphazardly constructed from corrugated sheeting - secondhand, scarce and expensive - and they are extremely hot in summer and bitterly cold in winter. Basotho were also removed from the Sultfontein settlements, such as Ma Ntsiang near Waghorn station in the east of the reserve, Paradys in the north and Dipudungwana in the south.



People are still pouring into Onverwacht from elsewhere in the Free State, courtesy of GG (GG refers to the South African government, being derived from the numberplates of official vehicles). Many people use Thaba Nchu as a staging post, so that the areas in the reserve from which Basotho have already been removed have rapidly filled up again. They qualify for stands in Onverwacht by producing

1. a Qwaqwa citizenship card,
2. a valid reference book,
3. a marriage certificate

and by paying R1 for the allocation. But Sotho identity is not an indispensable credential for obtaining Qwaqwa citizenship, with the result that there is a significant

Xhosa minority in Onverwacht. Chief Minister Kenneth Mopeli of Qwaqwa is acknowledged not to practice discrimination in this respect.

Conditions are very bad. Most families are grossly overcrowded. They live in tents or shacks on plots of 30 x 15 meters and share a bucket toilet which may be emptied by lorry twice a week. There is no privacy. Water is scarce, despite the provision of pipes and tap outlets in three of the four sections occupied by July 1980 (A, B, 'Singles' and D; toilet stands in E had been laid out and dumping of people began there in July 1980). There was an outbreak of typhoid early in the year. This was denied by officials in Bloemfontein and Pretoria. On July 9, 1980, there were 258 'adult' graves and 269

'children's' graves in the cemetery: a stark indication of high infant mortality.

Unemployment is also very high. Local opportunities are confined to a few temporary construction jobs for GG at rates substantially lower than for similar work elsewhere. Few white employers visit Onverwacht for contract labour; those who do often go back on the terms and wages offered for employment. People bitterly resent the bureaucratic vicious circles which prevent them (1) from seeking work at all (the soekwerk stamp) and (2) from seeking it outside Onverwacht. Even when men are contracted through the local office which serves as a labour bureau, they are seldom offered, irrespective of their qualifications and experience, anything

other than unskilled manual labour ('pik en foshel') at rates which cannot feed their families. Men trudge daily to the offices of the labour bureau, an ex farmhouse several kilometers away from the slums, and despair of any prospect of improvement. Many others do, however, commute daily to Bloemfontein: at peak times 50 buses carrying at least 70 people each way may be seen. The journey takes one hour each way and costs R1 single or R10 for a monthly ticket.

Women are far worse off than men. It is not uncommon to hear of a domestic servant who, as her household's sole breadwinner, rises at 4 am in Onverwacht to travel to her employer's house in Bloemfontein, and works a 6 day week for which she is paid R25 or R30 a month. Out of this she must find R12 for the monthly bus ticket before starting to feed her family. Women are also stopped from engaging in their own small scale domestic enterprises such as brewing beer or hawking anything from knitted hats to sheep's entrails.

Residents of Onverwacht spend an enormous amount of time, energy and money in overcoming or avoiding the bureaucratic checkpoints that limit access to residential sites, to reference books, to workseekers' permits, to jobs, to local services, to pensions. Three examples of this follow. Of course individuals' particular circumstances differ, but the experience of the impediments described is general and widespread.

A. A man who had worked for seven years on annual contracts for Corman Long in Vanderbijlpark, earning R42 a week in 1980, found that, once his family had been moved from a farm near Tweespruit to Onverwacht in late 1979, he could no longer afford to

maintain himself in the Transvaal and send his family adequate remittances. So he left his job on July 2, 1980, and began the search for new employment nearer home. He went immediately to Bloemfontein, where he found a job, illegally, as a driver for a transport delivery company, and was also 'endorsed out' of town under the 72-hour rule. On July 9 he was at the Onverwacht office to get a work-seeker's permit, so that he could return to his prospective employer to get registration forms, which must be filled in at Onverwacht and then returned to the 'pass' office at Bloemfontein so that he could be given a stamp permitting him to live and work in a prescribed area. This involved at least three return journeys between Onverwacht and Bloemfontein, at his own expense, and further queues and delays at every stage of the transaction. And he would be very lucky if it all worked out.

B. A woman who was born at Bloemfontein in 1910 had spent much of her adult life on one of the smallholdings outside the town, near Ferreira station, working on and off as a domestic servant. She moved to Onverwacht in July 1979 with some of her family who had, since 1974, rented a place to live in Kromdraai. On her arrival she applied for a pension at the Onverwacht office but was told that she was "too young". So she returned to the Ferreira smallholding "where she had grown old", and enlisted the help of her daughter's employer in Bloemfontein in making a pension application there. By May 1980 they had received some papers which had to be completed at the Black Affairs Commissioner's office in Bloemfontein, and then returned to Pretoria. This involved a further indefinite period of

uncertainty and delay. Meanwhile the old woman returned to the Ferreira smallholding to await the approval of her application, and had to beg the present owners for permission to stay with a black family employed by them. She was still waiting there in July.

If her pension came through and she was able to return to her family at Onverwacht, she would still have to travel from Onverwacht to Ferreira to receive it every two months, since an attempt to transfer payment to Onverwacht would not be worth the further trouble and delay that they knew from experience would arise. Only one member of a household of ten - one of the old woman's daughters - was in regular employment, as a domestic servant. She had to leave her husband and young children in order to stay in Bloemfontein, visiting home once a month, because she could not afford the daily bus fare from Onverwacht. Little as it is at about R50 every two months, a pension is a vital source of income for such families.

C. A man born in 1942 began his working life as a farm labourer, moving with his family from the Dewetsdorp district to farms in the Brandfort and Jesselsbron districts. At the beginning of 1974 he took a mine contract at Welkom, paying R14 a month to rent a place for his family to stay on a white farm outside the town. In addition, his wife had to work for the farmer without payment in the weeding and reaping seasons. At the end of 1975, through knowing some of the workers there, he was able to get a job with Boart Drilling for R120 a month, compared with his earnings at the mine of R70 a month at that time; and he was able to 'fix up' his pass accordingly. His family remained on the farm, his children

unable to go to school, until December 1979, when they were evicted by a new owner who did not want to farm his land as a labour reserve. His wife and children were arrested and fined R90.

He was able to arrange for them to go and stay in Onverwacht where his brother-in-law was already established with his family. Their stand is intolerably crowded as a result, and he was anxious to register at Onverwacht so that he could be allocated a stand of their own. His wife could not do this in his absence because the office would insist on seeing her husband's 'pass', and he could not risk remaining in his job at Welkom without his 'pass'. So in February 1980 he gave up his job and came 'home' where he was only able to find occasional piece work. They registered for a stand in June 1980, but were told, with everyone else resident at Onverwacht, that they were unlikely to be given a stand until August 1981, since the priority was to remove people from 'ethnic oppression' in BophuthaTswana. It was now extremely difficult for this man to find another job.


Despite all this, the people from Kromdraai in particular express some relief because they are no longer subject to arbitrary arrest and intimidation by the BophuthaTswana police. In the Qwaqwa election of March 1980 they voted solidly for the ruling Dikwankwela party because they believe that Chief Minister Mopeli persuaded the South African government to provide a refuge for the South Sotho who were being harassed in Thaba Nchu. Mopeli thus gained considerable political credit for leading his subjects "out of the land of Egypt into the land of Canaan". It remains to be seen how

quickly this credit will evaporate, since he is unable to provide land or jobs for them. One focal point of popular resistance is the schools, which are grossly overcrowded and where facilities are utterly inadequate: 600 students were reported to have stormed the police station on July 11, 1980. Another focal point of resistance is the forced auction of livestock which people brought with them to the D section from the Trust villages and elsewhere.

The tragic irony of this episode in the appalling story of South Africa's internal refugees is that, according to press leaks during 1979, Thaba Nchu has been excluded from the Van der Walt Commission's proposals to consolidate BophuthaTswana.

The idea of surrendering Thaba Nchu is certain to bring heartache to BophuthaTswana President, Chief Lucas Mangope, as it has been in the hands of the Tswana-speaking Barolong tribe for 150 years. Nearly 70 000 Basotho are reported to live in the area today (RDM, 27.09.79).

We still await the report of the Commission, and the government's reaction to it, but if the speculations are confirmed the boot will be on the other foot and thousands of Barolong are likely to be trekking far to the west, to the main areas of BophuthaTswana.



GENERAL NEWS

RDM, 03.09.80.

Resettlement 'slum' closed to the Press

By CHRIS FREIMOND
Southern Africa Bureau

THE Press has been barred from investigating conditions at the vast Onverwacht resettlement area, 70km from Bloemfontein, where community workers claim up to 100 000 people are living in a squalid slum.

The Chief Commissioner in the Department of Co-operation and Development in Bloemfontein, Mr H A Dreyer, said yesterday that the ban was a Ministerial directive.

An official at the department's Pretoria office, Mr Bill Meintjes, said a permit to visit Onverwacht could be applied for, but he doubted if it would be granted.

"At the moment they are resettling families and they don't want people running around there," he said.

It is reliably understood that a Government inter-departmental liaison committee — that meets regularly in Bloemfontein to discuss matters of mutual interest — has been most anxious that reports of conditions at Onverwacht do not appear in the newspapers.

Most of the people at Onverwacht are South Sotho who were removed from the Kromdraai squatter area at Thaba Nchu in BophuthaTswana, 10km away.

According to the authorities, the squatters moved voluntarily, but sources claim that alleged harassment by BophuthaTswana police at Kromdraai made their lives unbearable and they were relieved to move.

The area is hidden behind a range of low hills south of the Bloemfontein-ThabaNchu road and is not signposted. It will probably be incorporated into the QwaQwa homeland eventually.

The official figure of 51 000 people at Onverwacht has been disputed by community workers, who believe the true num-

ber may be double that.

Another 2 000 families — probably well over 12 000 people — still have to be moved there from white farms in the district.

In the next 20 years officials expect the population of Onverwacht and the neighbouring Vaalkraal township — to which people will begin moving from Bloemfontein next year — to reach 200 000.

The unofficial figure will probably be far higher.

Although the move to Onverwacht began in June last year, the vast majority of people still live in Government-supplied tents or wood and iron shanties.

It is understood that originally people were told they could only build houses with baked bricks, once building plans had been approved.

But Mr Dreyer said yesterday that people could build traditional-type houses with unbaked bricks or any other materials — but not shanties.

Fourteen cement-block houses had been or were being built.

He was confident that eventually everyone would build a permanent home, but could not say if or when this would be enforced.

He denied a claim by community workers that people were moved to Onverwacht before adequate facilities had been provided.

Bucket toilets were erected on each 15m-by-30m stand. At first local boreholes and tankers provided water, but there were shortages.

This year water pipes were laid and a tap provided for every fifth stand, but according to sources in Onverwacht, the supply is erratic.

After unrest there earlier this year, when pupils overran the local police post and rampaged through the area, there is a ban on open-air political gatherings.

As mentioned above, students at Onverwacht were reported to have attacked the local police station on July 11, 1980. The Star newspaper of that date reported the incident in this way:

A policeman was stabbed and a woman shot when schoolchildren at Onverwacht settlement near Thaba Nchu attacked the police station yesterday.

About 600 children boycotted the eight schools in the settlement and at about 9am moved through the streets setting alight vehicles, a shop and plundering two other shops, the Divisional Inspector of Police in the Free State, Colonel J. ... her said.

The crowd then moved to the small police outpost and confronted the policeman on duty. The policeman was stabbed with a knife and while unconscious was robbed of his firearm, Colonel Fisher said.

A shot was fired with the firearm and a black woman was wounded. Police retrieved the policeman's gun. About 20 youths were arrested.

Resentment against Qwaqwa Chief Minister, Kenneth Mopeli, surfaced at Onverwacht on Sunday, September 14, when he addressed a crowd of about 2 000 at the resettlement area:

Two men, armed with a petrol bomb and revolver, were arrested by BophuthaTswana (?) Security Police while the Chief Minister of Qwaqwa, Chief TK Mopeli, was addressing a crowd of 20 000 at the Onverwacht resettlement camp near Thaba Nchu.....

The two men, who were apparently disguised as women, were arrested amid strict security precautions to protect Chief Mopeli after rumours of a possible assassination attempt against him at the meeting.....

Chief Mopeli proceeded with his speech and in an interview yesterday said he would continue to move among his people without fear, as they were in his protection. (Star, 18.09.80).

Rents: Soweto

IN PREVIOUS editions of Work In Progress it has been suggested that, in addition to factory floor issues, there are 'community' conflicts and matters which are of direct concern to working class organisation (see for example the editorials in WIP 12 and 13, the contributions on bus boycotts in WIP 13, and the debate on progressive community organisation which is continued in this edition). In the article that follows, this question is explored in relation to rents in urban african townships.

In almost all Transvaal townships rents have recently risen sharply; and in Soweto, for example, rent payments will double between August 1980 and April 1981.



Why are rents such a controversial and explosive issue in the townships? After all, payment for accomodation is something members of the working class are burdened with in all capitalist societies. To understand the way in which the payment of rental relates to the whole administration and control of the african working class, we have to go back to at least 1972/73, when the various Bantu Affairs Administration Boards were set up by the state to rule and manage african townships outside of the bantustan areas. Before this period townships had been under the control of local municipal authorities, and while this form of administration was deficient and unacceptable to township residents, there were aspects which were not as harsh as the subsequent rule of the administration boards.

A few municipalities subsidised their dormitory townships, both directly and indirectly. For example, in the last year that it was responsible for administering Soweto, the Johannesburg City Council directly subsidised Soweto to the amount of R2-m; there was also an 'indirect' subsidy in that part of the cost of township administration was absorbed by the City Council's own departments and administration.

During 1972/73 the central government removed control of african townships from local authorities, and placed them directly under 22 newly created Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (BAABs); from then on the administration of all african townships outside of the bantustans fell under these boards.

The principle that the BAABs were to be self-financing, and have no financial claim on the central state, was enforced by the government. In practice this meant that the

BAABs were expected to provide all services and infra-structure previously provided by the city councils or peri-urban boards, while at the same time creating financial self-sufficiency. In other words, most of the money required for the upkeep and development of african townships had to be provided by the residents of those townships.

Urban african townships contain no business or industrial centres; nor do they have any of the other conventional bases for taxation necessary for municipal administration in capitalist societies; this lack of a material base on which to ground township administration is itself a result of the particular way in which capitalism took root and developed in South Africa, and the manner in which the state has controlled the working class and the conflicts brought on by capitalist development.

The absence of a financial base for the administration of townships has meant that the BAABs, limited by the necessity for financial self-sufficiency, have relied for their major sources of income on rents from trading sites, houses and beds in municipal hostels, as well as on the sale of beer and liquor over which the BAABs have maintained a monopoly.

Thus for example the 1978/79 West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) budget planned for an income of R75 200 000; the components of this income were broken down as follows:

Housing rental	30 151 400
Levies	10 777 000
Sale of beer	16 300 000
Sale of liquor	16 800 000
Sport etc	525 000
General income	660 000

(Source: Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1978:337. SAIRR).

(Levies involve amounts paid by employers to the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards, and are calculated in relation to the number of african workers employed, whether the workers are housed by the employer or not, and whether the nature of the work performed is domestic labour or industrial/commercial).

As can be seen, almost the total WRAB income was derived from rentals, levies and sale of liquor and beer. This heavy financial dependence of the BAABs on the sale of alcohol is reflected in the percentage which this income comprised of total income for the year ending March 31, 1977:

<u>Board:</u>	<u>Income from alcohol sales as % of total income:</u>
WRAB	40%
Western Transvaal	66%
Southern Transvaal	55%
Northern Transvaal	63%
Highveld	55%
Peninsula	46%
Midlands	53%
Northern Cape	53%
Drakensberg	66%

(Source: Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1978:338. SAIRR).

This dependence on the sale of beer and spirits proved to be financially disastrous for the BAABs subsequent to the rebellions of 1976 and 1977. BAAB buildings in general, and bottle stores and beer halls in particular, were frequent targets for stone throwing and arson attacks, and it seems that attacks on liquor outlets reflected general resentment against the local representatives of state policy (BAAB), as well as the social effects of a 'booze economy' encouraged by the boards within townships. For example, all WRAB beer halls, and all but one bottle store, were destroyed in the mass action which followed the shootings on June 16, 1976. The financial effect of this was dramatic: during the

1975-76 financial year, WRAB derived a profit of R6 391 000 on beer and liquor sales; by 1976-77 this profit had dropped to R3 444 000 (Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1977:399); actual income from alcohol sales during this period dropped from R38-m to R22-m.

It can accordingly be seen that the question of rents in a township like Soweto is linked to a whole series of broader issues: the financing of townships, state policy that BAABs should be financially self-sufficient, the situating of african classes in segregated residential areas without commercial and industrial sites of any consequence, the way in which consumption of liquor and beer is encouraged by the BAABs, etc.

Rent payments in african townships actually include a number of different components, and the amount paid for each component goes up to make the total monthly rent bill. The term 'rent' covers house rent, which supposedly allows the BAABs to recover the cost of building and maintenance; site rent, which is meant to cover the cost of original land purchase, access roads, drainage, health and ambulance services, and administration costs; service charges, which are meant to cover the costs of electricity, water, sewerage and rubbish removal; and a schools levy.

The 1977 rents issue in Soweto.

By the end of 1976 it was clear that WRAB was suffering a severe financial crisis, partly as a result of the decline in income from the Soweto liquor and beer trade: this had been brought about by the destruction of

bottle stores and beerhalls in the aftermath of June 1976. What was previously a small surplus in WRAB budgets had changed to a deficit of R11-m in the proposed 1977-78 budget, and WRAB began recalling some of its short term investments in an attempt to offset its immediate financial crisis. The board also approached the Department of Bantu Administration for a loan of R6-m, but in terms of the government's policy that BAABs must be self-financing, only R1,5-m was granted.

In presenting the 1977-78 budget the WRAB chairman claimed that it would be necessary to increase site and hostel rentals to offset the deficit in finance. Site rents were to be increased from R6,25 to R11,50 and the cost of beds for the 45 000 men housed in Soweto's single sex hostels was also to rise. Soweto student leaders called on WRAB not to "repeat the mistake made by certain officials of Bantu Education in 1976", and on April 23 a public meeting of Soweto residents resolved not to pay the proposed increases.

Four days later, on April 27, thousands of schoolchildren were joined by their parents in an anti-rents march through Soweto. After discussion between police and leaders of the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC), police agreed not to intervene in the demonstration, which marched on to the UBC chambers at Jabulani. The building housing the UBC was stoned, and police broke up the demonstration with teargas and bullets.

The SSRC issued a pamphlet setting out their attitude on the proposed rent increase:

We want to make it abundantly clear to the WRAB authorities that we are sick to the core of our hearts of all these

promised facilities and improvements being dangled over our heads without being implemented.....

1. Have our pay scales been increased to meet the already rocketing cost of living?
2. Have our pay scales been increased to meet the proposed rent increment?
3. The answer is NO of course.

The proposed high rents therefore will be used for the following:

1. Building bottle stores, beer halls. (The people registered their feelings against these, but still the WRAB which is 'interested' in our welfare is prepared at all costs to re-build them).....

To the WRAB we want to make it very clear that houses from where people have been evicted will never be occupied.

Anyone found paying the proposed increment, causing others to be evicted, will be dealt with accordingly.

We appeal to our parents not to pay the proposed increments.....

Harassment or no harassment, eviction or no eviction.

WE BOYCOTT THE PROPOSED RENT INCREMENT.

(source: S vs Twala and 12 others, exhibit B15).



Demonstrators opposing the 1977 rent increase march through Soweto on their way to the Urban Bantu Council Chambers.

As opposition to the increases grew, then deputy minister of Bantu Affairs, Willem Cruywagen, stepped into the arena in an attempt to take the pressure off WRAB and the central government. He revealed that as early as February 1977 the UBCs of Soweto, Dobsonville and Krugersdorp had been consulted on the proposed rent increase, as had the Mohlakeng and Bekkersdal Advisory Boards; of these, only the last-mentioned had refused to support the increases. Cruywagen claimed that the UBCs had understood why the increases were unavoidable, and had agreed to them.

To some extent, Cruywagen's tactic was successful: popular anger was directed towards the UBC in Soweto, and the SSRC began a campaign to close down the UBC immediately. Members of the UBC admitted under pressure that they had known about the increases since early in 1977, but claimed that they had been told by WRAB that they were merely being informed on the rent rise, not consulted.

In calling for the resignation of UBC members, the SSRC argued that

"The fact that they (UBC) were told of the new rent increases as early as February and that they have not mentioned this to the people who supposedly elected them shows that they conspired with WRAB to add this heavy burden on our people".

The SSRC also argued that the UBC had "constantly been used by the authorities to oppress their own people" (Star, 27.04.77).

David Thebahali, then chair of the UBC, immediately took a UBC delegation to Cape Town to meet with Cruywagen, and at the end of April it was announced that the proposed rent increases would be suspended for a month while alternative sources of income were looked for.

The SSRC campaign against the UBC intensified, and individual members began resigning. Within a few days of meeting with SSRC members, Thebehali resigned, and further resignations brought the number to 23 - over half the members of the council. WRAB was forced to suspend the UBC, although it appears that a Thebehali-led clique continued to 'informally' meet with WRAB officials at its Albert Street offices for the rest of 1977. Out of the situation leading to the collapse of the UBC, a new state strategy - that of the community councils - was introduced to african townships.

The UBC

"was intended to deceive people in Soweto into thinking that they had some form of political representation, and to disguise the absolute power of the Minister and his Department. It was also intended to legitimate that power by making it appear that it was exercised only after the representatives of the people had been consulted. The clearest... example of this policy at work was the rents issue. The mask of the UBC was finally stripped away, however, when Cruywagen let the 'cat out of the bag' with his claim that the UBC had been consulted and had consented to the higher rents" (Kane-Berman, 1978:208-09).

The proposed rent increases were not implemented after a month, but in July 1977 WRAB asked the central government for permission to implement increases, and in October it was announced that site rentals would be increased in 3 stages of R1,75; in December 1977, April 1978 and July 1978. The Department of Information dropped 120 000 pamphlets over Soweto, trying to persuade residents that the increases were in their own interests. In December 1977 slogans appeared in Soweto opposing the first stage of the increase, but residents were reported

to be paying the increase (Star, 25.10.77; RDM, 02.12.77).

Can the Soweto rents conflict of 1977 be seen as a working class issue? There seems to be no reason why progressive community groups could not have organised the working class within Soweto to fight the intended increases. The issue affected those workers holding section 10(1)(a) or (b) rights in terms of the Urban Areas Act (ie workers continuously resident in Soweto since birth; legally resident in Soweto for at least 15 years, or having been employed by the same employer for at least 10 years), and who rented houses from WRAB. People without 10(1)(a) or (b) rights may not rent houses in townships, although certain dependents of lawful renters with 10(1)(c) rights may be on housing permits and occupy (but not rent) a house.

Contract and migrant workers legally in the urban areas (those with 10(1)(d) rights) are not permitted to live in township houses, but are accomodated in hostels and compounds. They are not necessarily directly affected by a rent increase, but in the case of the proposed 1977 increases, hostel rents were to be raised at the same time as house rents.

The fact that the increases affected both hostel and house-dwelling members of the working class in Soweto, coupled with the way in which the BAABs control and administer the working class in the townships, suggest the importance of the rents question for progressive and working class interests.

However, the question of community organisation is a difficult one, given that there are non-working class groups in the community (Soweto in this case), while on

the factory floor organisation involves only members of the working class. A rents issue in an urban township affects not only workers, but also petty bourgeois elements - although it affects members of professional and trading classes in a different way to the working class. But the danger in such a situation is that petty bourgeois interests take control of, and direct organisation around, a community issue such as a rents increase; in this case the working class is treated as a passive observer and follower, while non-working class interests fight out the issue through petitions to authority, legal action, press statements and similar forms of activity. The working class does not actively participate in its own organisation, directing its struggles, but is expected to passively accept victories gained 'on its behalf' by other class interests: this is clearly not working class or progressive organisation.

Despite the danger of anti-democratic, non-participatory activity on the part of petty bourgeois interests, the organisation of the working class in the community seemed structurally possible in the case of the 1977 Soweto rents issue. However, as the debate on this question in WIP suggests, there are a number of strategic and tactical questions to be considered in this regard, some of which are briefly listed below:

- a). given that a community involves more than one class, how does progressive community organisation assure the dominance of working class interests over other class interests, especially where no working class political parties exist?
- b). how does the organisation of the working class in communities avoid the traps of a

limited, issue-oriented approach, rather than organisation which has as its goal the transformation of the state?

- c). how are community and factory organisation to be linked, especially out of the context of a national working class political party?
- d). how does community organisation relate to national struggle, avoiding the dangers of becoming community specific?

The current rents issue in Soweto.

Some of the issues and questions raised above emerge from the rent struggle of 1977. How relevant are they in 1980 - the period of Riekert and community councils, 'total strategy' and Louis Rive? Has the manner of administering, financing and controlling the african townships altered to such an extent that the significance of township rents has lessened?

In his report, Riekert wrote that

In principle it is desirable for black communities to bear to an increasing extent a greater part of the total burden in connection with the provision of services in their own communities.... the Department (of Cooperation and Development), the administration boards, the community councils should initiate purposeful programmes of action in order to recover more and more of the cost of services from the black communities themselves.

The first budget proposal put before the Soweto community council by WRAB in 1979 involved a deficit of R25,4-m. The budget involved the following:

capital expenditure, to be financed	
by loans	R19,8-m
current expenditure	R46,8-m
current income, mainly from rents	R21,3-m

This left a deficit of R25,4-m, part of which

was to be financed through WRAB beer and liquor profits and employer levies; however, after this income, a deficit of R22,7-m remained.

According to an official from the Department of Cooperation and Development, the Soweto community council was given two choices in regard to this budget: either the filling of vacant posts and maintenance work could be cut down on, thereby decreasing expenditure; or these could be pushed ahead with, in which case rents would have to be increased to meet expenditure (Kane-Berman, 1980).

The community council made its 'choice': early in August 1979 Thebehali - recovered from his UBC experience and now chairman of the community council - announced a rent increase of about 100%, to be implemented in 3 stages (September 1979, January 1980 and August 1980). At this stage, average Soweto rentals were R19,50 per month, and according to Thebehali they would rise to R36,62.

Reaction was immediate: Motlana's Committee of 10 called a public meeting where the increases were rejected, while opposition groups within the community council itself petitioned Koornhof not to raise the rents. A meeting called by these opposition groups rejected the increases, while at a Committee of 10 meeting 1 000 people resolved not to pay any increases imposed on them.

At the end of August 'Promises' Piet Koornhof pledged that Soweto rents would not go up at present, as his Department of Cooperation and Development was still waiting for a final 'decision' on the issue from the community council. Opposition community

councillors retorted that WRAB, not the community council, actually controlled rents.

By late March 1980, when the community council met behind closed doors to consider the new proposed budget, rents had still not been increased. At this meeting, an increase of R12,20 in 3 stages over 9 months was proposed by Thebehali. Shortly after this suggestion, anti-increase meetings were held in Soweto by the Soweto Civic Association, as well as the opposition parties within the community council, and early in May there was an arson attack on Uncle Tom's Hall, which is used as a rents office in Soweto.

In June the chairman of WRAB announced that the rent increase in Soweto was definitely on - "its just a question of time" - and early in July Thebehali announced the new increases. Rents were to go up by R13,05 per month, but the increase was to be staggered in three stages of R4,35 to be introduced on August 1, October 1 and February 1, 1981.

The finalised budget for 1980 - 81 involved a gross outlay of R38-m, the major items involved being

building and services	5 500 000
water supply	7 700 000
electricity supply	3 100 000
health services	1 400 000
staff salaries and wages	5 400 000
sewerage fees	4 000 000

The rent increase will yield an additional amount of R5-m, but this will still leave a deficit of R13-m in the 1980-81 budget for Soweto.

The various components of the R13,05 increase are as follows:

water on unmetered sites	2,00
sewerage and purification	3,00
special electricity levy	1,30
planning fee to meet cost of professional engineers	,30
insurance of houses	4,39

However, this amount of R13,05 is not the only increase currently affecting Soweto residents: as was widely reported, a loan of R442 000 000 (including interest) was raised for the electrification of Soweto - and it is the residents of the township who will have to repay both the loan and interest over time. As can be seen from the breakdown of the components of the rent increase listed above, Soweto residents are already paying a special electricity levy towards the repayment of this loan. This special monthly levy will progressively increase, and current WRAB projections are that it will rise to R17 per month by October 1990. For example, the special levy will rise by another R1,00 on April 1, 1981, bringing the total rent increase in Soweto up to 100% in the 9 month period August 1, 1980 - April 1, 1981.

Electricity rates themselves have increased 400% since May 1980. Until then, Soweto residents were paying 1/2c per unit; this increased to 1 1/2c, and on October 1, 1980 increased to 2c per unit of electricity used.

Opposition to the increases.

Since the first phase of the increase was implemented, there have been a number of responses by various groups: some opposition has involved direct demonstration and protest, while other opposition strategies have revolved around public meetings, a petition to Koornhof, and a call on residents not to

pay the increases.

In mid July a group of about 70 women stormed the house of community councillor Ephraim Tshabelala; he told the women that the community council had not raised the rents, and he knew nothing of the increases.

Makgotla leader Siegfried Manthatha announced that he and his followers had decided to pretend they knew nothing about the increase. "We are simply going to ignore all these statements made by the Soweto Council chairman and refuse to pay", he said.

Various moderate-conservative groupings in Soweto, related either to the old UBC or opposition parties within the community council have threatened to take court action against whoever is responsible for the increase (community council? WRAB? Cooperation and Development?) These include the Sofasonke Party, Makgotla, Soweto Federal Party, Soweto Ratepayers Association and the Soweto Residents Committee.

The Committee of 10, 14 branches of the Soweto Civic Association, and AZAPO (Soweto branch) have called on residents not to pay the increases. Frans Kodi of the Soweto Federal Party, and an opposition community council member, opposed this call not to pay the increases:

"I cannot encourage such a thing because these people may be thrown out of their homes and we will not have the power of helping them. Neither the Committee of 10 nor members of the opposition (in the community council) have power of rehousing a convicted tenant.....Usually in these cases where people are told not to pay increased rents, it is the ordinary man who gets kicked out of the house. Almost all the people who incite people not to pay rent have bought their houses and do not stand chances of being kicked out" (Sunday Times, 03.08.80).

Tom Manthatha of the Committee of 10 called on people not to accept occupation of houses of residents evicted for refusing to pay the increases, and to report to their local SCA branch if WRAB officials refused to accept payment of the old rent amounts: such cases were occurring at certain rent offices.

However, the tactic gaining most prominence involves a court action, opposing the rent increase: this is being brought by Committee of 10 member Lekgau Mathabathe. The respondents of the application are

- The Minister of Cooperation and Development;
- WRAB;
- The Soweto community council;
- The administrator of the Transvaal.

Mathabathe is claiming that, in order for rents to be raised, the approval of the Transvaal administrator is needed, and that it was not sought in this case. A number of public meetings have been held by branches of the SCA and Committee of 10 since the ban on public gatherings was lifted, and some of these have been well attended (over 2 000 in some cases). At these meetings, residents have on occasion pledged not to pay the rent increases. The Committee of 10 has said that it will take court action against WRAB if people are evicted from their homes for refusing to pay the rent increase (Post, 29.08.80).

The increases are by no means confined to Soweto: almost all townships in the Transvaal face continuing rent rises over a long period, and the first phase of these increases has been implemented in most areas over the past few months. The financing of the african townships is clearly not an issue

which can be dealt with out of the context of the form of capitalism in South Africa, which has dictated that townships are physically separate areas, some distance from the centres of business, commerce and industry, and that they are administered as separate areas where control of the workforce is the major factor.

The involvement of the community councils in the rent increases is in some ways similar to the behaviour of the old Soweto UBC; but the community councils are more directly linked into the contradiction which faces "township development" and "improvement in the quality of life" advocates: massive amounts are needed to provide the most basic of services in the urban townships; yet the state insists that these amounts are to be obtained from the residents of the townships themselves. If the community councils are to provide any material benefits for township residents, this can only be done at the cost of raising rents enormously (witness the way in which Soweto is being forced to pay for its electrification programme).

To take the case of just one township in South Africa - and one in which conditions are better than in many other african areas - Soweto. Community council director of finance, IM Florence, estimates that the figure at current prices needed to 'upgrade' Soweto in terms of road improvements, sewerage, drains and housing is R1-billion, and that "the money will have to be repaid by Soweto like any other local authority".

Notes.

For important background material to the question of rents and the financing of townships, see the following:

1. Rents: paying for incorporation. Work In Progress 12, April 1980.
2. Shoes without laces? The financing of urban black townships, with special reference to Soweto and the Soweto Community Council. John Kane-Berman, mimeo, SAIRR 1980.
3. Kane-Berman, John. Soweto: black revolt, white reaction. Raven Press, 1978.

Rents: Mondlo

MONDLO - described as a 'hotbed of hatred', roads unlit and dusty, crime and disease common, in the two new schools the pupils have to sit on the floor. A Star newspaper report on the township was headed 'One would expect to find guerillas there' - a reference to the arrest of ANC fighters Boyce Bogale and Thomas Mngadi in this township earlier this year (see report on the Silverton Trial in the Courts section in this WIP and also in WIP 14).


The population of about 35 000 is composed of people from farms (ex labour tenants) and from the townships around the Northern Natal towns of Dundee, Vryheid, Glencoe and Paul Pietersburg. For example, the population of Bhekuzulu location at Vryheid was going to be the first township moved as a whole (Sunday Post, 14.01.79). Many of these people have already moved to Osizweni and Nqutu, where yet another township is said to be planned.

In 1973 Dr Anthony Barker mentioned that there were '3 000 dwellers in loaned tents ... in 1963' at Mondlo.

Earlier this year it was reported that residents at Mondlo owed the KwaZulu government no less than R194 000 in outstanding rates (RDM, 17.04.80).

Rates had been increased from 84c to R6,40 (!) a month, but 99% of residents refused to pay this additional amount. The increase was said to be necessary to pay for piped water for each plot and for rubbish removal.

The increase had caused a lot



Broken windows at the Urban Bantu Council Chambers, Jabulani, after the rents demonstration of April 1977.

bitterness in the township and KwaZulu Minister of the Interior, Dr Frank Mdlalose, reportedly got a stormy reception in the township when he visited in an attempt to break the boycott. Dr Mdlalose did, of course, also feature in a similar role during and after the Newcastle-Madadeni-Geizweni bus boycott of 1975.

This reflects the hazards of attempting to maintain a supposedly popular role with the well-being of 'the people' rhetorically uppermost, while being structurally involved in economic schemes (rather than involvement in the obviously reproductive roles of administration, education, welfare and ideological control, as well as repression. An example of clashes in the sphere of reproduction - that of education - is discussed elsewhere in this issue of WIP). It is this involvement in economic schemes that brings KwaZulu bantustan authorities into direct conflict with 'the people'.

The bitterness in the township was also reflected in the resignation of 10 of the 11 members of the Mondlo township council, and the formation of a committee under the chairpersonship of local Inkatha leader, Gregory Zulu. This committee of residents was to take up the issue of the refusal to pay the rates increase after the resignation of the township council.

Paul Nhlapo, former 'mayor' of Mondlo, and the person directly blamed for the rent increase, had had six shots fired at him, being hit twice.

Nhlapo said in a later interview (Star, 20.08.80) that despite the fact that Inkatha claimed a membership of 300 000 this was inflated as there were not that many paid up

members. Of the 35 000 township residents only about 500 were 'known and active members'. Nhlapo said that he was thinking of resigning from the movement, which was called, in the article, 'the instrument used by Ulundi ('capital' of KwaZulu) for local governance'.


It was reported that shooting had been heard in the township late at night on several occasions earlier this year.

It is clear, if one looks at the sources of 'own revenue' for KwaZulu (in other words, money not received from the central government) where potential points of conflict lie. This money is very important to the bantustan authorities as it is the only money that gives them a degree of 'independence' from the central authorities. But, on the other hand, this money has to come, disproportionately from the pockets of the working class, from wages. This is the case because so little productive activity is undertaken in these

areas, which would allow taxes to be levied on wealth produced by the working class but after they had been paid their wages.

In 1973/74 just under R9-million out of R11,6-million came from 'taxes and levies' and 'townships' (rates and rents). In 1974/5 R14,3-million out of R16,8-million came from these sources, with an astronomical rise in the amount from taxes.

As commentators on this bantustan have said, 'Since ... over four-fifths of revenue comes from a fixed personal tax and from housing and hostel rentals, it is clear that raising revenue from these sources will be painful and politically unpopular' - this seems to be quite an understatement, especially if bus fare increases (in which the KwaZulu government have a direct stake) are also taken into account. (See the discussion of the Madadeni bus fare increases and the Seshego bus fare increase in this issue).



The house in Mondlo township where alleged ANC guerillas Boyce Bogele and Thomas Mngadi were arrested in possession of arms and explosives.

Natal Education Boycott: a focus on Inkatha

THIS article has its limitations. It is not intended as any final statement or analysis of the Natal boycotts, but rather as a springboard for further research.

It was written collectively.

INTRODUCTION

'Inkatha has grown both in stature as a movement and in its capability to win the struggle for liberation. Any movement that has developed to the extent of being able to base its mass action on a sound theoretical basis is indeed already half-way in the liberation struggle'.

'We have the correct strategy and we have the right leader. All we must continue to do is to provide and see to be providing a solid following' (Dr OD Dhlomo, Secretary-General of Inkatha and Minister of Education and Culture, addressing Inkatha Youth Brigade on Sunday, 14.09.80) (Natal Witness, 16.09.80)

ORIGINS OF THE BOYCOTT IN THE WESTERN CAPE

06.04 The education boycott was initially mooted when Western Cape coloured high school representatives met over the Easter weekend to discuss longstanding grievances with 'coloured' education. They threatened a schools boycott, in support of the demands, which they required Minister Steyn to fulfil by the end of the week. They deplored the low standard and poor conditions of their education, specifically

mentioning lack of free text-books and inadequate buildings and facilities. They demanded a 'free education system'; the reinstatement of three teachers dismissed from Crystal Senior High who had supported their grievances; and a general pay increase for teachers.

13.04 The following weekend 20 representatives decided that Steyn's response did not materially change the position of coloured education. Steyn refused to re-employ the teachers, their positions to remain vacant for coloured teachers to replace them, and made qualified, long-term promises about text-books and buildings.

The boycotts would go ahead.

18.04 25 000 students and scholars had already joined the boycott which spread beyond Cape Town to three coloured high schools in the Transvaal. The latter protested in demand of 'equality of education'.

19.04 A committee of 61 representatives of Cape educational institutions was formed. It called for a mass education boycott in the Western Cape from 21.04 to 25.04.

NATAL ADOPTS THE BOYCOTT

The education boycott took root in Natal, firstly among coloured students but was

quickly adopted by the Indian community and a minority of African students at higher institutions. (The emphasis of the national boycott was on solidarity across racial groupings. For clarity in the South African situation 'racial' categories are specified).

21.04 Sechet, a coloured Teacher Training College, was the first institution in Durban to take a stand. They declared a one-week boycott in sympathy with national demands, their own emphasis being on the national pay disparity between black and white teachers and the College's poor sports facilities where, for example, soccer is played on tarmac.

22.04 The boycott ranks were quickly swollen by coloured high school pupils (3 000 from three high schools - Sechet, Fairvale and Wentworth).

The boycott gained momentum at other educational institutions besides Sechet. Natal Medical School protested against racial and inferior education for all blacks. They were joined by University of Durban-Westville students and black students at the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg and Durban. Durban University white students convened a sympathy boycott, maintaining that education is a basic human right.

23.04 A number of Indian high schools and the Springfield College of Education joined the boycott. Indian solidarity with the boycott was described, despite press reports, as not only in support of their colored peers, but that they were 'also black students who wanted a better deal in education'.

The boycott spread in Natal, beyond Durban, northwards to Haritzburg, and south to Harding.

In Natal police repression intensified. Police took a hard line in efforts to contain the boycott, using teargas, batons and making arrests.

24.04 Indian scholars from a number of schools who had organised buses to a mass meeting at the UDW, which increasingly became a meeting point during the boycott, were prevented by police from attending. Teargas was used to disperse 300 Centenary High scholars marching to the same gathering.

In Chatsworth, at Meadowland and Wittekop Indian High School, witnesses maintain that students were baton charged by police after being told by police to return to classes or go home. The police deny this, but it was said that 10 scholars were arrested, charged and released.

A march of coloured scholars from Wentworth to neighbouring Fairvale High was disrupted with teargas.

25.04 By this date, almost every indian and coloured high school in and around Durban and the North Coast of Natal, was boycotting. In fact, nationally, only in Northern Natal, Northern Free State and Namibia did police divisions report no incidents.

A SUMMARY OF NATAL STUDENT BOYCOTT DEMANDS

Bachet Training College:

- 1) came out in sympathy with Cape scholars;
- 2) in sympathy with national demands;
- 3) demanded a higher standard of education, more text-books and higher salaries for teachers.

University of Natal Medical School:

- 1) noted the need for a united effort in any stand taken against the injustices of the laws of the SA government;

for a real attempt at enlightenment about local, national and international issues that has bearing on our people's struggle against oppression

to embark immediately on a symbolic boycott of all academic activities

to register support of Cape and elsewhere

to use the time to implement the programme of education and re-education of our own student body about issues affecting the black man (sic) in SA and to sensitize it to the condition of the black man (sic) in SA specifically and in Africa in general;

- 2) protested at 'racial and inferior education'.

University of Durban-Westville:

Made the following demands -

- 1) non-racial education
- 2) free compulsory and relevant education for all
- 3) all education institutions open to all
- 4) a single system of education under one department
- 5) parents and academics should decide on the type of education relevant for their children and the community
- 6) students should have the right to decide the content of syllabi
- 7) educational facilities should be provided in relation to the real population strength and open to all people, irrespective of race, sex, colour or creed.

The grievances articulated were similar to those resounding nationally during the boycott. The demands above are important in that they make a direct link of education and the community. The demand for parent participation in planning education can be seen as arguing for the right of community-expressed needs in the content of education. At a student body meeting at Natal University Medical School it was resolved to pledge support to organisations such as the Durban Housing Action Committee, who were fighting a rent increase by the Durban City Council. In this manner a

broadening of the struggle is expressed by the students.

NATAL COLOURED AND INDIAN COMMUNITY RESPONSE

Natal coloured and indian parents solidly supported the student boycott. They separately (on 24.04 and 27.04, respectively) responded by immediately calling meetings in support of student demands and to prevent victimisation of students. They elected committees to provide concrete assistance - one such group established a feeding scheme.

A similar threat as had been made by Cape parents was voiced in Natal - parents might use the two non-violent means at their disposal: withdrawal of their consumer and labour power from the economy, if students were in any way intimidated for their boycott action (Daily News, 28.04).

A joint Natal Parents' Support Committee, representing 30 parent committees, was formed to co-ordinate black parents' support and to work closely with the Natal Students' Action Committee (NSAC). A six-person delegation from the Natal Parents' Support Committee (NPSC) was dispatched to Minister Steyn with an ultimatum. Also a ten-person joint parent-student committee was elected to investigate the education crisis nationally.

Such unified, overtly expressed parent support is not to be mirrored in the african parents' response. Although largely supportive in Kwa Mashu, as will be indicated by an initial meeting turnout of 1 000 parents (11.05) and only minority groups actively forcing students back to school or protecting students writing exams, parental response was muted. This was probably due to the vindictive approach of Inkatha towards active adult supporters of the boycott. It would be

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important to investigate the composition of the vigilante groups that acted on behalf of Inkatha against boycotting students and their parents. It is also significant, and needs exploration, that Umlezi parents and students were largely opposed to the boycott.

In Natal coloured and indian teachers were not reported as having taken a significant stand for or against the boycott. In the Cape and the Transvaal teacher organisations threatened to stop work in solidarity (Sunday Times, 04.05). A minority of teachers appear to have attended parents' support meetings in Natal.

From the african teaching community a few sympathetic members attended the pro-boycott meetings. There was, however, no strong encouragement from this sector. The majority seem to have been represented in their views by the Natal African Teachers' Union (NATU) who, on 02.06 urged boycotters to return to school. While they sympathised with student grievances, they argued that only negotiation after a return to classes could hope to succeed. The NATU also maintained that it has its own channels through which dissatisfied teachers can voice their discontent. Besides, it has a 'code of ethics which guides our general behaviour in accordance with recognised ethical standards and we dissociate ourselves completely from anybody who engenders disharmony and encourages strife among pupils, schools, teachers and the community'.

Many principals, nationally and throughout all groupings, played an antagonistic role towards the boycotts, on behalf of the state and of Inkatha. They were the vehicles through which directives, school closures, and student

suspensions were conveyed and, in fact, it was often at their insistence that police intervened to forcibly control students within school grounds. A major exception was a body of Cape principals who refused to act as agents of the state.

Two very different approaches were evident in the indian community with the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) actively in support of the boycott, to the extent that some of its prominent members were detained. The SA Indian Council (SAIC) representatives called for students to go back to classes. They were said to have made their point, and were accentuating only the negative aspects of their education system. Through the SA Black Alliance (SABA), the Labour Party and the Reform Party were identified with what will be shown to be Inkatha's reactionary stand on the students' boycott.

EXTENSION OF THE BOYCOTT TO AFRICAN STUDENTS

Very little was reported in newspapers on african participation in the early stages of the boycott.

21.04 As early as this date the Capa Committee of 61 was reported to have had african schools represented on it when deciding on a mass boycott for the week 21.04 to 25.04 (Natal Witness, 21.04.80). The schools mentioned were Langa and Fezekia High.

850 african students from the Nathamal Nyaluza Secondary School in Grahamstown joined in the boycott immediately. The Rand Daily Mail (10.05.80) reported that they were given an expulsion warning if they persisted with their three-week old boycott.

22.04 As previously mentioned, african medical

students and the Black Students Societies on university campuses in Johannesburg and Natal joined the boycott.

28.04 1 500 african scholars from four schools in Mamelodi township, outside Pretoria, encouraged by a meeting held by Cosas, joined in a sympathy boycott, as well as in protest at the arrest of 32 african scholars en route to the unveiling of Solomon Mahlangu's tombstone. Their attempt to call a mass boycott by the 33 000 students in the township was unsuccessful.

FOCUS ON NATAL AFRICAN EDUCATION BOYCOTT

Kwa Mashu, a township to the north of Durban but delineated within KwaZulu, was the first and only area in which the african schools boycott grew, despite the state and Inkatha's attempts to control it.

01.05 1 500 african scholars from Mzuvele Secondary School in Kwa Mashu marched to Isibonelo High, intending to encourage other schools in the township to join them in the boycott. Riot police intercepted them and, operating on a 'divide to rule' policy, they separated the scholars into three groups along the railway line opposite Isibonelo. The scholars dispersed under a hail of stones that were reportedly thrown by passengers from trains and onlookers (Daily News, 01.05).

Private and police cars, as well as Putco buses were damaged. The police followed the scholars, firing on them with teargas.

A looting spree took place in the township later that day. A township spokesperson didn't believe that scholars were responsible for the stoning and looting incidents - 'There are bad

elements who are provoking these attacks. And some of the children caught up in the havoc are simply following suit. But the majority are trying to keep it non-violent', he said (DN, 02.05).

A section of the marching column (430 people) headed for Dr Dube High. A spokesperson for the KwaZulu Education Department reported that when Dube scholars refused to join them they stoned windows of the school. This school was financed by an Urban Foundation loan to KwaZulu (Natal Mercury, 02.05).

Another contingent of the column walked to nearby Newlands East, hoping to link up with coloured colleagues. However, they allegedly found the latter in their classrooms, so returned.

At the outset of the boycott the police called on the support of the KwaZulu government to intervene in order to control the boycott situation.

02.05 Police arrests of students totalled 50, but this included both Chatsworth and Kwa Mashu scholars in separate incidents. They were later released into the custody of their parents.

INKATHA'S INITIAL RESPONSE

Inkatha made the same call as the state with regard to the boycott: the scholars must return to school. They should refrain from the boycott which Inkatha described as extreme, violent action, in opposition to the movement's non-violent strategy. In its explanation of the cause of the boycott, Inkatha resorted to similar scapegoats as the state: outsiders, agitators, and troublemakers.

02.05 Ndlovu, Assistant Secretary for Education in KwaZulu, called on scholars to keep calm and go back to school. They should state any grievances they have, but limit themselves to dialogue. They should not become involved in the struggles of teachers and other groups, and he emphasised the seriousness with which his department would regard their being incited by coloured and indian students (NM, 02.05).

Following this admonition, Dhlomo, Minister of Education and Culture in KwaZulu, praised three schools for refusing to be intimidated and for following the (Inkatha) President's policy of non-violence (DN, 02.05). These same schools later came out in support of the boycott.

Buthlezi sympathised with the grievances of coloured and indian students and scholars, but called on african scholars and students to remain uninvolved - thereby ignoring that they shared common grievances. He argued that they must discipline themselves if they wanted to avoid falling into the hands of black and white extremists (Sunday Times, 04.05).

09.05 Several thousand african scholars from four high schools in Kwa Mashu and one each in Umlazi and Lamontville gathered at a KwaMashu cinema and decided to continue their boycott in defiance of pleas by KwaZulu and Inkatha officials. A student spokesperson maintained that the KwaZulu government was powerless, could achieve nothing on their behalf, and that it was merely a 'post office' for the central government. They, therefore, would pursue their own struggle against the education system in which clearly

the state and Inkatha were closely associated. Inkatha's response was muted in the face of such blatant rejection.

SE Mtolo, the mayor of Kwa Mashu and a member of Inkatha's Central Committee, said he regretted the pupils decision to persist with the boycott. Dhlomo refused to comment (NM, 10.05).

11.05 Parents, teachers, scholars and students met in a Kwa Mashu cinema to discuss the boycott. The 1 000 parents present condemned Bantu Education and elected a parents' committee to support the pupils and students in their demands. The grievances were: enforced uniforms; lack of qualified teachers; inadequate schools and overcrowded conditions; poor sporting and other facilities. No threat was made to withdraw their consumer and worker power by african parents in Durban, which contrasts strongly with coloured and indian communities nationally.

One parent described Bantu Education since its inception in 1953, as changing only in name, but essentially still inferior and racial education. This analysis is inaccurate in one important respect - 'Inkatha' in all KwaZulu schools since 1979 (see box below).

INKATHA AND EDUCATION.

Recent trends indicate that Inkatha aims to be absorbed into the existing structures of power with South Africa's capitalist economy. The Inkatha Institute reveals a drive towards the incorporation of Inkatha into a position of power in planning and implementation of reformist change in South Africa in various fields. This was demonstrated in the economic sphere at a recent meeting of the Pinetown and New Germany Chamber of Industries. Buthlezi called for the forging of partnership links with industrialists. Because of the way in which Inkatha has

defined itself as a political force, we find that in certain instances state strategies and Inkatha strategies are complementary. The Inkatha Institute signifies a culmination point in Inkatha's development politically.

Inkatha politicians frequently use the concept of 'liberation struggle' rhetorically. What Inkatha means by liberation struggle remains ill-defined by them. However, in the light of the above, Inkatha's struggle appears reformist in nature - a struggle for the redistribution of power and wealth within the existing confines of existing relations.

An education system is a dominant ideological apparatus through which the ideas, values and norms of the ruling class are transmitted. In 1979 Inkatha was in a position of strength in relation to exploiting the avenues of ideological insertion in KwaZulu schools. "Inkatha" was introduced as a 1 hour per week compulsory subject at all levels of schooling. The Inkatha syllabus is a far-reaching and all embracing attempt at preparing KwaZulu school children for their "role in the liberation struggle". The establishment of a syllabus with its emphasis on the Youth Brigade clearly is an attempt to provide the youth with avenues for channeling growing political awareness and the need for political participation and involvement. It is intended, simultaneously, to draw them into Inkatha structures.

The inculcation of Inkatha ideology is implemented in varying concentrations and complexities from 'Sub-A' to Form V. This calculated attempt at mobilising strong and unified black youths in support of Inkatha aims is carried through specifically set out content courses. They are:

1. Inkatha.
2. History of Black Africa.
3. African culture.
4. Modern life styles.
5. Environmental studies.
6. Religious studies.
7. Practicals.

The content of each course provides insight into Inkatha's direction. The "Inkatha" section deals mainly with the history of the movement, organisational structure, significance of the constitution, discipline and conduct of Inkatha members, role of leaders and led, role of the Youth Brigade and the importance of rallies, leadership and training.

The "Modern life styles" section develops thinking along the needs and problems of rural and urban life; Africa and

economic development and the need for african business enterprise.

"Practicals" include singing and dance, and self defence, among other activities.

The nature of Inkatha ideology to which the youth are exposed is mediated partly by an appeal through traditional customs and norms. Through the Inkatha Syllabus, Inkatha attempts to mould and harness the black youth into the force needed for the strategy of Inkatha developed by the petty bourgeois and conservative traditional leadership in KwaZulu.

A parent argued that Bantu Education (BE) is an education of domestics and labourers and not to train men and women to take their rightful place in the future of South Africa. Another parent spoke disparagingly, questioning which government was in control: 'We are told that the KwaZulu government is our government but yet we find that it has no power'. This is a similar assertion to that made at the previous student meeting and the challenge that Buthelezi, Inkatha and KwaZulu were determined to disprove by attempting to control the boycott.

The parents were adamant that there were no agitators behind the boycott, but rather legitimate grievances voiced over the years.

12.05 The boycott had, by this time, 100% participation in Kwa Mashu, but was minimally supported elsewhere in KwaZulu (5 schools were involved in Umlazi and only one known to be boycotting in Lamontville). Parents and the majority of scholars in Umlazi were said to be opposed to the disruption of classes by the boycott. The five Umlazi schools maintain they were persuaded against their will to join the boycott (NM, 13.05). Even Kwa Mashu scholars attending schools in Umlazi

attempted to catch their trains, but were picketed by scholars and prevented from doing so on 14.05. Clearly different responses were articulated by Kwa Mashu and Umlazi communities. Umlazi represents more of an Inkatha stronghold than Kwa Mashu. It is suggested that an examination of the class structure of the two townships may throw some light on the different responses, perhaps revealing Kwa Mashu as having a broader working class base than Umlazi.

INKATHA'S RESPONSE

Rather than attack the underlying causes of the mass dissatisfaction, a conspiracy theory was adopted as an explanation, and a strategy of stamping out the boycott at all costs followed.

Threats were made hinting that Zulu anger might ominously overstep the bounds of a non-violent strategy. Inkatha's target was a list of agitators who were 'orchestrating' a challenge to Inkatha's power. For an organisation that aspires to be non-ethnically based the description of these scapegoats was racist and ethnic in nature. It was emphasised that Inkatha has a strategy for the liberation struggle, although it was never elaborated. However, it was asserted that this blueprint does not include an education boycott nor recognises the leadership of 'children'.

12.05 A 4 1/2 hour debate, 2 1/2 hours behind closed doors and 2 hours in public, was held on the boycott in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA). Buthelezi threatened to adjourn the KLA so that Inkatha could deal with people who were organising and agitating

among african school children in Kwa Mashu.

A statement of this nature indicates the interesting relationship between Inkatha and the KLA, as well as highlighting a mystificatory analysis of the real causes of the boycott.

Buthlezi listed those 'agitators' as including: 'pundits from Reservoir Hills' (an indian residential area); 'intellectuals from the University of Durban-Westville and the Black Medical School'; 'activists sitting in white newspaper offices' - he specified reporter Subramoney, then of the Daily News, who was warned by a KLA member that he must be very careful because he was very close to the Indian Ocean and that the Inkatha current was very strong.

This response was elicited because Subramoney was the only reporter not rejected by Kwa Mashu scholars at a meeting when black Ilanga reporters were chased out.

Buthlezi included three black lawyers in his list of agitators. He argued that they were soliciting funds overseas to defend cases arising out of the boycott. The lawyers were named by Assembly members as Mxenge, Poswa and Skweyiya, who were decried as Xhosa-speaking, Transkeian scavengers.

These agitators were said to be non-Zulu, 'political opportunists', 'paid imbeciles' and an 'extra-Natalian radical faction' who sent their children to elite Swaziland schools. Their motivation, according to Buthelezi, was to 'challenge the Zulu people through Inkatha'. The Assembly members elaborated further, saying that the instigators 'think the Zulus are easy prey, and they want to 'convince the world that the youth was spurning the leadership of Inkatha'. Buthelezi threatened: 'I wish to issue this warning. Behind the facade of



Dr Oscar Dhloomo, secretary general of Inkatha, Chief MG Buthelezi, and Mr Gibson Thula, Inkatha's urban representative in the Transvaal.

courtesy and smiles that you see on the face of the Zulu there is an anger the like of which does not exist in any other group in this country'. After this display of chauvinism, an Assembly member crudely assured that 'we will go and get them'.

Education and Culture Minister Dhloomo stated that the government knew of and sympathised with the grievances of 'the students. In fact, they were part and parcel of the liberation struggle being waged by Inkatha. He argued that Inkatha has a 'clear strategy' of which 'the boycott of classes and the breaking down of school buildings is not a part'.

He insisted that they were 'not prepared to be led by children', that 'we do not believe that children have the intellect to devise strategies under which the Black man (sic) is to be liberated'. He referred to 'our foolish children ... being led by instigators, are breaking down the very structures which their parents have sweated to put up'.

This tactic to drive a wedge between parents and students/scholars was frequently exploited by Inkatha during the boycott.

Dhloomo introduced a resolution strongly warning parents supporting the boycott, and scholars not re-registering at schools on Sunday, 18.05, and back in classes on Monday,

that they would be 'severely dealt with'.

Justificatory and self-legitimizing comments were thrown to the community: "we must not be blamed for any action we take... we must not be blamed if we lose patience". It is through comments such as the above that the mask of a so called non-violent strategy drops, and Inkatha is exposed in a violent and repressive organisational light, favouring reformist change.

It was decided that the 130-strong Assembly attend a meeting of residents, parents and scholars at the soccer stadium in Kwa Mashu on Sunday 18.05, at 8 am. After the Assembly all the Durban members left for home, and attempted to diffuse trouble in the township. Methods of achieving this aim were not defined.

12.05 In preparation for the rally, the

KwaZulu government made statements and, with the help of Inkatha members, distributed pamphlets calling for: attendance at the stadium meeting, compliance with the de-registration drive, and a tough expulsion threat if all did not return to school on Monday, 19.05.

16.05 600 students met at the Kwa Mashu

cinema to plan their strategy for the forthcoming stadium meeting. KwaZulu officials tried to break up the gathering. Police dispersed the crowd with teargas, but not before the students had released the handbrake of a KwaZulu official's car which subsequently crashed.

18.05 10 000 people (it is disputed to be half this figure) attended the rally at the Prince Magogo stadium in Kwa Mashu.

Umlazi supporters of Inkatha had formed a self-appointed impi guard at the gates the previous evening and during the meeting marched around the outside wall. Inkatha officials were apparently disappointed at the poor turn-out of Kwa Mashu supporters for this task. The aim of the impi was to safeguard their chairman who admitted that he had had a threat to 'tear (him) to threads if (he) came to Kwa Mashu'.

Significantly absent from the meeting were 500 student and scholar boycotters who held their own gathering at the cinema. The South African security police escorted two student delegates to the stadium with a request that Buthelezi address this separate meeting. They were refused by Mr Mthethwa, the minister of justice in KwaZulu, who declared that it was not Zulu tradition for youth to approach their elders with such a demand, and that furthermore it would not be granted because they had all been invited to attend the one big function. After reporting back to students and scholars one of the latter returned to say that they would still not come to the stadium because they feared being assaulted.

A 200-strong impi, wielding knobkerries, spears and knives, marched from the stadium to confront the students and scholars but police intervened. The same impi, after repeatedly harassing a religious minister, Mr Mbambo, for allegedly being behind the boycott, eventually stormed the stage at the stadium, to which the minister had been called to speak. The impi assaulted him. Inkatha officials and police had to rescue him. Buthelezi was seen to reprimand the impi. During the proceedings, a Ms Mnguni, a

Kwa Mashu councillor, was also attacked by angry women for the same reason.

These incidents serve as a forceful warning to those who opposed Inkatha's wishes, whilst at the same time bolstering Buthelezi's image as a moderate man.

INKATHA RALLY SPEECHES.

Buthelezi maintained that KwaZulu and Inkatha placed 'education as a priority', and that 'no other race group faces as enormous an obstacle' of disadvantage in this field; hence, while believing in the 'oneness of blacks', (he quoted participation of Inkatha in the SA Black Alliance as evidence of this, yet so far members had not called on Inkatha to adopt a common strategy in the boycott), called on black scholars, rather than staying away from lessons, to 'get as much education that is available as possible. This is far better than no education at all'. Buthelezi validated this stance to scholars by explaining: 'Everyone of you who perseveres through school into high school has before you the possibility of leading a liberation battalion in the market place and in the factories'. He did not contemplate the alternative that schooling attempts to train a passive, disciplined population and workforce.

He reiterated his perception of a 'total onslaught against Inkatha' by 'scrawny, scraggly, tattered cockerels, a new inclusion being the trade union movement, dancing to the tune of pied pipers from an international band orchestrated by no-good clerics (the churches joined his list of agitators), and long-haired intellectuals', amongst whom he specified the 'brave new

left writing Marxist analysis on Inkatha's role'. He once again warned the opposition to Inkatha that although he was personally committed to non-violence the anger of the people may result in cracked skulls.

Finally he belittled protest politics, the 'stupidity of school boycotting' which 'clamoured for the white boss to give us better goodies'. However, he certainly did not envisage its replacement by revolutionary politics, and the question of how exactly Inkatha intends to achieve social change remains.

Dr Dhlomo, KwaZulu Minister of Education and Culture provided the apology for KwaZulu's provision of poor education and emphasised its redeeming hard-won features. Because of KwaZulu's stand against independence it received no assistance from the central government: hence funding was short and relied on parent contributions. However KwaZulu was against Bantu Education. It had reduced mother tongue instruction and he announced that Matriculation and Standard 8 examinations would be written under the Natal Education Department rather than the National Education Department. This reformist approach fails to critically assess the quality and content of white education, which it attempts to adopt.

Dhlomo excused the overcrowding of classes by mentioning that many Johannesburg students had been enrolled after the Soweto schools boycott of 1976 (Natal Mercury, 19.05.80).

19.05 With Inkatha's encouragement to stop the boycott at all costs and Umlazi's record of minimal involvement in the stay

away from classes, residents assaulted Kwa Mashu students allegedly brought to vocational schools in Umlazi to persuade scholars there to withdraw from lessons.

Meanwhile in Kwa Mashu the minister of Justice, with the support of Kwa Mashu councillors, attempted to arrange police protection for scholars who might want to return to school. Later, on 22.05, a few Kwa Mashu parents armed with sticks and knobkerries routed boycotting scholars, some of whom were forced back to classes. This is the first reported instance where Kwa Mashu parents acted overtly against their children, and it appeared to involve a minority of Inkatha supporters.

INKATHA 6th ANNUAL CONFERENCE ADDRESS.

In an address to the 6th annual conference of Inkatha, Buthelezi admitted the organisation's failure in its responsibilities- it had so far been unable to contain the school boycotts and undisciplined scholars. From this experience, he said, Inkatha should learn some lessons. He outlined two possible future strategies.

Firstly he proposed the closing of Ngoye University and opening a new one, a 'true university of the people of KwaZulu'. This would stop students being subjected to tuition by academics whose aims conflicted with those of Inkatha. Buthelezi, as Chancellor of this institution, and due to preside at the forthcoming graduation on Saturday, 24.05, had been warned by the boycotting students through their SRC spokesman, not to arrive accompanied by an entourage of Inkatha members in uniform and bearing arms. When he ignored this warning and approached the

university with an impi, students attempted to prevent their entry in a scene of violence and arson. After the meeting the SRC president was assaulted. Finally the students called on Buthelezi to resign as Chancellor at a student body meeting the following week, on 27.05. He refused, indicating that he was not appointed by the students but elected by the university Council and would see out his 7-year term 'as a service to blocks' (Daily News, 28.05.80).

Secondly, he insisted,

it is time for Inkatha to establish training camps where branches and regions are schooled in the employment of anger in an orderly fashion....to be able to control riots....to conduct meetings in the middle of chaos which other people try to create. We need to tone up our muscles so that the dove of peace sits easily on the spear'.

He is clearly referring to training impis and to the establishment of a paramilitary force. He had previously defended the impi's role in the stadium meeting when they were accused of disorderly conduct. He proclaimed them an integral part of Zulu tradition and the Zulu nation (Natal Mercury, 20.05.80).

KWAZULU/INKATHA DIRECTIVES.

A directive was sent from Ulundi ordering all scholars to be back in school by Friday, 23.05. Principals were enlisted to hand over names of those still boycotting by this date to the KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture.

The deadline for returning to school was extended to Friday, 30.05, and Buthelezi released figures to the Assembly that showed a marked increase in Kwa Mashu school attendance. The Natal Witness (29.05.80) however, still reported it to be below 50%.

A few schools admitted that less than a quarter of scholars were present (Mzuvela and Isibonela where the boycott first began were amongst these latter). The Chlanga School scholars had that day walked out en masse due to discrimination against them by the staff.

The threats Buthelezi now issued increased in magnitude. Boycotting scholars no longer had intimidation as an excuse, for instance, as Inkatha officials and a few Kwa Mashu parents guarded students wanting to attend the Mzuvela school. He could no longer give them grace, he said, and they would face instant dismissal.

INKATHA ABDUCTION.

28.05 11 students (some from Mzuvele High) as well as a few people known to be non-students (at least 2 were workers), were forcibly removed from their homes by a group of adult male Inkatha members late on the evening of 28.05. Some were initially taken to the garage of Benghu, a KwaZulu MP, ostensibly for interrogation. All were later assembled at C Section Hall in the presence of the Regional Secretary of Inkatha, Mr Mjwara, and a Kwa Mashu councillor and Inkatha member, Mr Mkize, who were to accompany them to Ulundi.

They were loaded into a kombi in the early hours of 29.05, and deposited at the Inkatha offices for a lecture on Inkatha and its role in the liberation struggle, and then led into the Legislative Assembly of KwaZulu. Here they were announced as instigators of the boycott and were required to explain the reasons behind continuing the boycott. Significantly, they were not asked to

elaborate on the grievances motivating the boycott. They were then handed over to a Major in the KwaZulu policeforce to be 'spoken to' and for protective custody.

On their return to Kwa Mashu they were forced to attend an Inkatha meeting at C Section Hall, where their names, addresses and schools were noted to show how serious the members were in carrying out the threats they made: to destroy their homes, assault them and their relatives, and ensure they were detained. These warnings have since all been implemented against some of the students and their families. The detention of a few of the same students shows especially the close association between Inkatha and the state in repressing the boycott.

Buthelezi described in the Assembly how a counter-attack had been staged by Gugulabashe School students in Kwa Mashu when they were urged to join the boycott. Because of such intimidation he found it necessary to go back on previous directives - absent students would not necessarily be expelled. However, those not sitting for half-yearly examinations would not be accepted in schools in KwaZulu.

Buthelezi and the Assembly managed to identify further 'agitators'; Fort Hare students had joined the Medical School students and, disguised in balaclava caps, were stopping students trying to go to classes. An unidentified white man was said to be paying students R10 each a day for staying out. The SAP and BOSS were probably responsible, they claimed, because they refused to take strong action against students. The latter's neglect spurred Buthelezi to introduce, under the Police Bill, the need for KwaZulu to have an

independent police and security police force. It seems that they would be commissioned to do a better job than the state forces were capable of.

02.06 - 07.06 Open violence engulfed Kwa Mashu, harassment and assault being conducted by roaming groups, largely adults alleged to be Inkatha supporters. The violence was aimed against boycotting students. Many of the students required medical treatment at the local polyclinic. Attorneys intervened on the students' behalf, requiring police to halt the rampage of assaults. Ms Mnguni, widely known to have challenged Inkatha over its boycott stand, after being personally assaulted at the stadium meeting had stones pelted at her home. There were other incidents of similar intimidation.

On the other side, the Inkatha office was the site of an arson attack. A KwaZulu MP, Mr Bhengu, felt it essential to establish an impi guard at his garage after it had been set fire to. He blamed ANC-inspired youth and adults for the attack on Inkatha supporters.

08.06 5 000 people, including Labour Party leaders, attended a prayer meeting at the Prince Magogo Stadium.

INKATHA SPEECH.

Conscious of Inkatha's weakness in the face of mass boycott action, Buthelezi used this opportunity to discredit the ANC. He distinguished between the irrelevant fringe strategy for liberation conducted by the exiled ANC, and Inkatha's claimed mandate by the people to wage the liberation struggle.

He described the ANC as the oldest liberation movement in Southern Africa, yet its dreams and efforts had not borne fruit. It could not hope to adequately communicate with the masses nor intimidate the white minority by an isolated refinery attack, however much publicity it received, whereas Inkatha could marshal consumer and worker power for change. He did not try to identify when Inkatha has, or will, pursue this power struggle.

Students and scholars would only understand the superiority of Inkatha's role in the liberation struggle if they continued with their education. It was up to students to come to him with realistic concrete schemes of how to achieve reform. He set out only two options for the struggle: radical change of the socio-economic and political system of South Africa, and survival in suffering. They are not alternatives, according to Buthelezi. Those who refuse the second challenge have no right to respond to the first.

10.06 The KwaZulu government sent a circular to school principals which they had to read three times to scholars in the morning assembly. It reasserts the KwaZulu government's rejection of Bantu Education, and emphasises their awareness of students' legitimate grievances. It points out that the Zulus have moved furthest away from Bantu Education because of action taken by the KwaZulu government. However, it once again rejects boycott action. It outlines a resolution passed in the Assembly this year to appoint a commission of enquiry to do away with the philosophy underlying Bantu Education. This would be subsumed under the Buthelezi

Commission (which has a research institute attached) to consider the collective destiny of all the people in Natal. One of its tasks would be to study the education system. The acceptance of Inkatha's constitutional proposals for Natal by the wider community preoccupied Buthelezi during the boycott period, and is likely to dominate Inkatha strategy in the future. It would be interesting to pursue the influence this had on the movement's conservative stand in the boycott.

16.06 A spate of violence ensued in Kwa Mashu. 77 buses were stoned, six bus drivers were injured, 3 robbed, and 40 Administration building windows smashed, allegedly by youths in Kwa Mashu. Six youths were arrested in connection with these incidents. Another three buses were stoned the following day, bringing the total to 80, 60 of which belonged to Putco. Damage was estimated at R7 000.

No analysis was undertaken by Inkatha of growing student frustration. Despite their continued boycott protest, the struggle for change was being smothered by the combined forces of the state and Inkatha. Rather, debates on strategies for change were confined to the higher echelons of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.

23.06 In the light of boycott action it was suggested, at the Inkatha annual conference, that the Natal African Teachers' Union co-ordinate workshops to explore possible improvements in the quality of education. Youth Preparedness programmes in which, amongst other input, would be lessons in self-defence, and parent-teachers associations to improve communication would be discussed. Besides

being an enquiry into preventative reform, it could be that Inkatha was attempting to assure, through these programmes, better control over students, parents, and teachers for the future.

03.07 Every conceivable pressure was utilised to get students to return to classes on the first day of the third term. The Natal Medical School and the University of Durban-Westville had gone back on 30.06, and the coloured and Indian schools boycott was terminated nationally at the beginning of July.

In Kwa Mashu students resolved to continue as their demands had met with no response. On the other hand, principals decided to sit down and talk with students in a desperate attempt to return to 'normal'. The battle of forces - the boycotting students versus Inkatha and the state - faded in Natal when classes were eventually resumed. It continues among African students in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and the Orange Free State.

CONCLUSION

The boycott of black educational institutions in Natal highlighted the limitations of student boycott by itself in the face of state power. Of great value, however, was the 'crisis' of a mass student boycott which forced Inkatha, despite claims of representing the youth, workers and middle-class interests, into revealing a reactionary tendency in this situation. Inkatha was unable to respond positively to the student struggle, offering no concrete alternative, and in a rejected position revealed these reformist and conservative tendencies.

COURTS

PRETORIA TREASON TRIAL.

1. Ncimbithi Johnson Lubisi (28),
2. Petrus Tsepo Mashigo (20),
3. Naphtali Manana (24),
4. Ikanyeng Moses Molebatsi (27),
5. Hloliile Benjamin Tau (24),
6. Phumulani Grant Shezi (24),
7. Jeremiah Radebe (26),
8. Boyce Johannes Bogale (26),
9. Thomas Mngadi (29).

As detailed on pages 39 - 41 of WIP 14, the 9 accused listed above currently face charges of High Treason, murder, attempted murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances, as well as alternative charges under the Terrorism Act.

The crux of the case revolves around the attack on the Soekmekaar police station, and the siege at the Silverton branch of Volkskas bank early in 1980. In addition to these incidents, out of which the charges of murder, attempted murder and robbery emerge, the accused are also alleged to be ANC members, to have undergone military training in ANC camps (mainly in Angola), to have been in possession of a large amount of arms, explosives and ammunition, to have investigated certain targets for the ANC (police stations, a petrol storage tank, and the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board). There are also charges of establishing ANC bases, and recruiting people for military training.

The state case is now nearing completion, and the trial has been

adjourned to mid October to allow for defence preparations. The state has not alleged that the accused were physically responsible for the death of 2 women at the Silverton bank, nor has it claimed that all the accused were involved in the Soekmekaar attack or the planning of the bank siege. What the prosecution does claim is that each of the accused joined and participated in an ANC conspiracy to overthrow the state; that the Silverton and Soekmekaar incidents were part of that general conspiracy, and that the accused are all accordingly responsible for acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. For example, the three ANC guerillas actually present at the Silverton siege (Humphrey Makhubo, Stephen Fanie Mafoko and Wilfred Madela) were all killed in the police raid on the bank; but in terms of the alleged conspiracy, and a legal doctrine of common purpose, the state holds the accused responsible for the acts of the 3 dead guerillas.

The state has led evidence in 3 major sections:

- * the attack at Soekmekaar;
- * the siege at Silverton;
- * the specific involvement and acts of each of the accused.

Categories of witnesses have included

- * accomplices of the accused;
- * police witnesses;
- * people involved with the accused but not held to be accomplices by the state;
- * hostages at the Silverton siege.

One of the state's first witnesses was Lieut.-Col. Hermanus Stadler, who testified that he could be considered as an expert on the ANC. According to his testimony, the ANC was formed in 1912 as the South African Native National Congress, but later changed its name. In 1944 the ANC Youth League was formed under the leadership of inter alia Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo. The Youth League introduced a more militant atmosphere into the ANC, and during the 1950s a programme of demonstrations and passive resistance took place.

In the mid 1950s the Congress Alliance was formed. This involved an alliance between five organisations - ANC, Congress of Democrats, Coloured Peoples' Congress, South African Indian Congress and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). The Freedom Charter was adopted as the policy of these organisations after it was drawn up at the Kliptown Congress of the People.

Originally purely an african nationalist organisation, a split emerged in the ANC in about 1958 between the Charterists and the Africanists. The Africanists broke away from the ANC and formed the PAC which was anti-communist and had only african members. The ANC, according to Stadler, admitted members of all racial groups, and was influenced by a communist perspective.

After the ANC was declared unlawful in 1960, a military wing known as Umkonto

we Sizwe (MK or Spear of the Nation) was formed, and saboteurs who were arrested were found to be part of MK. Nelson Mandela was the first commander-in-chief of MK. A blueprint for guerilla warfare was drawn up and put into operation, which provided for sending people for military training, attacking targets, and distributing propaganda material.

The aims of the ANC, according to Stadler, included the violent overthrow of the government, founding of trade unions, strikes, protest marches, boycotts and distribution of propaganda material through pamphlets, posters, radio, records and tape recordings.

Stadler also referred to the assassination of people regarded by the ANC as traitors, such as Leonard Nkosi: a commander of one of the first ANC guerilla groups to fight in Zimbabwe in 1967, he was arrested in Durban and subsequently gave state evidence in a number of Terrorism Act trials. In 1970 he joined the security police, and remained a member until his killing in 1977.

Under cross examination, Stadler said that to have lasted all these years, the ANC must be accepted by black people. He also said that there was great rivalry between the ANC and PAC: both had, for example, claimed responsibility for the recent attack on SASUL, but "we don't pay much attention to the PAC because it is such a small faction", said Stadler.

Another major state witness, who in terms of a court order may not be identified, was claimed by the state to be an accomplice of the accused. After

completing his military training in Angola, he was appointed head of the ANC's Southern Natal Region. His duty was to organise attacks on targets of an economic, military and political significance. Among the targets he listed were Pik Botha, the judge in the Pietermaritzburg Treason Trial, Lieut. Col. Stadler of the security police, oil refineries, security police and state witnesses in Terrorism Act trials.

On December 27, 1979, the witness gave himself up to the police. He identified most of the accused as having undergone military training in ANC camps in Angola. In March 1979 he had carried out a mission to sabotage the Port Natal Administration Board building, but this had failed when a detonator did not go off as planned.

Another accomplice witness who may not be identified testified that, after receiving military training, he returned to South Africa and gave himself up to the police. He then led them to a hide-out of a group of guerillas where a gun battle took place in which a guerilla was killed.

Other important evidence led by the state came from police and hostages at the Silverton siege, police present at the Soekmekaar attack, and police involved in the arrest of two of the accused in Mundlo township, near Vryheid. According to a police witness Thomas Mngadi, accused number 9 in the trial, attempted to escape from the Mondlo house in which he was staying when police arrived. Arms and explosives were stored in the house. The police witness

testified that police chased Mngadi, firing shots at him before overpowering him in a struggle.

Evidence has also been led on ANC bases, arms caches and dead letter boxes uncovered by police at Kwaikhema near Springs, Ga-Rankua, Soekmekaar, and near Durban.

The trial is due to resume in mid-October in the Pretoria Palace of Justice.

TERRORISM ACT TRIALS.

Thandi Ruth Modise (21), Moses Nkosi (24) and Aaron Slim Mogale (21):

Charges: Modise is alleged to have undergone military training in ANC camps in Angola and Tanzania, and returned to South Africa during 1978. During March 1978 the state claims that she set fire to piles of clothing in Johannesburg branches of Edgars and OK Bazaars. Modise also faces charges of possessing arms, ammunition and explosives, and investigating police stations and a Krugersdorp Bantu Affairs Administration Board with the aim of sabotaging them.

Nkosi and Mogale are alleged by the state to have harboured Modise on her return to South Africa, and storing a firearm and explosives belonging to her.

Much of the trial has revolved around the admissibility of statements made by two of the accused while in security police custody. Modise testified that she had been assaulted by police to make a confession, and Nkosi has claimed that he made a statement to avoid being tortured: "I thought that what had been done to others would be done to me too: I had not heard of

anyone who had been to John Vorster Square who had not been assaulted", Nkosi told the court.

A senior Johannesburg district surgeon who examined Modise while in detention, Dr Norman Jacobson, testified that in his opinion, "lengthy periods of interrogation ...could constitute an assault. I believe, and I have seen, that the Security Police subject detainees to strenuous interrogation".

Asked by the defence how a person could injure themselves while in police custody, security police witness Edward James Tierney claimed that at John Vorster Square "the floor is so slippery that a person can fall and injure himself or even fall while sitting on a chair".

Judgement on whether the statements involved are admissible as evidence against the accused will be given on October 22, when the trial resumes.

(Kempton Park Regional Court).

Marius Kuteka (40) and Hendri Kariseb (45).

Charge: The accused are alleged to have assisted SWAPO guerilla fighters by providing them with food and accomodation, and a plan of farm buildings of a farm near Grootfontein where they were employed. The farmhouse involved was subsequently attacked by guerillas on February 17, 1979.

The farm owner, JFL Louw, told the court that the 2 accused had been among his most trusted workers, and both were foremen. Prior to the attack, one of his workers had warned him to be careful because Kariseb was 'SWAPO oriented'. On the day of the attack, he had instructed Kariseb to run to a nearby farm to warn the family there that 'terrorists'

were in the area. He refused to do so, telling Louw to "save your breath". (Windhoek Supreme Court).

Athlone Khima (32).

Charge: The accused was alleged to have recruited 2 people for military training, namely Johannes Nkabela and Johannes Nkosi. Nkosi, a member of the police who wanted to join the security police, and was suspended from duty at the time of the trial, was found to be a dangerous and unreliable witness by the presiding magistrate.

Verdict: Not guilty.

(Pretoria Regional Court, 15.09.80).

Thabo Makunyane (24) and Ephraim Mogale (23).

Charge: Makunyane, a student at Turfloop University, and Mogale, president of COSAS, faced charges under the Terrorism and Internal Security Acts. They pleaded guilty to certain Terrorism Act charges, involving the promotion of ANC and communist objectives, forming an organisation known as the Communist Advance Movement, forming youth clubs to promote 'unrest', and distributing unlawful literature.

Charges related to recruiting people for military training were withdrawn against the accused.

Sentence is due to be passed on both accused at the end of September.

(Pietersburg Regional Court, 01.09.80).

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TRIALS.

Ian Msekeli Mfijima (30).

Charge: The accused, a journalism student at Rhodes University, pleaded guilty to two charges under the Internal Security and Unlawful Organisations Acts. In a statement handed in to court, Mfijima said that he had

received several pamphlets, books and a tape from the ANC in Lesotho. He had shown these to various people. He was not an ANC member, although he had come to know something about their courier system used to get material into South Africa.

Verdict: Guilty on both counts.

Sentence: 8 years, of which 3 years were conditionally suspended for 5 years.

An appeal against sentence has been noted, and a bail application was brought by the accused. This was refused by the presiding magistrate on the basis that the ANC might assist Mfijima to flee South Africa.

(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 11.09.80).

APPEAL PROCEEDINGS.

James Daniel Mange (24).

Mange was sentenced to death for treason on November 15, 1979, by Justice Hefer sitting in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court (see WIP 10 and 11 for details of the trial proceedings). It was found that he had prepared an attack on a police station and local magistrate at Whittlesea, near Queenstown, and had led the group intending to undertake the attack. Only his arrest for a traffic offence, according to the trial judge, prevented the attack taking place.

An appeal against the death sentence was argued. Counsel for Mange accepted the trial judge's findings that he had undergone military training, but disputed certain other findings. These were all based on the evidence of one accomplice witness, whose evidence was not challenged because, at that stage of the proceedings, the accused had chosen not to be defended, and refused to participate in the trial.

It was also submitted, on behalf of

Mange, that the trial judge's perceptions of him had been clouded by the atmosphere of the trial, where the accused refused to participate, were contemptuous of court proceedings, sang and disrupted the hearings.

In the judgement handed down, the Chief Justice upheld the appeal against the death sentence, and substituted a sentence of 20 years imprisonment. Chief Justice Rumpff said that while South African courts had thusfar been lenient towards offences of treason, a complete change of attitude would be neither surprising nor unjustified. At present South Africa was being subject to "blatant terror", said the judge.

I use the word 'terrorism' to describe violent attacks on, inter alia, completely innocent persons - more often than not committed by people from the Republic who have undergone military training in foreign countries. Trained terrorists seek....to kill innocent people in order to overthrow the State. This is terrorism in any language".

(Appeal Court, Bloemfontein, 11.09.80).

Jeremiah Kgokong Majatladi (23), Thami Gerald Mkhwenazi (38), Ronald Ephraim Mamoepe (18), Lebogang Christy Mokone (18), Petrus Karel Senabe (22), Andrew Mosti Phala (18), Deacon Sikibela Mathe (22), Cornelius Mpheti Leeuw (18), and a 16-year old youth.

As reported in WIP 12, pp41-43, the accused were convicted under the Terrorism Act and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment (Majatladi and Mkhwenazi), and 5 years (the other 7 accused). The trial magistrate found that Majatladi and Mkhwenazi had conspired to assist others to leave the country for military training, while the other accused were found guilty of either

recruiting, or being recruited, for ANC military training.

The appellants have submitted that the sole and only interest of Mkhwenazi in the other men accused with him was to write a story about them in Post newspaper and also to further his career as a journalist.

Mkhwenazi also claims that it was not his intention to assist others to leave the country for military training.

As far as the other accused are concerned, the appellants have argued that

The court should have found that the version of the accused that they wanted their photographs taken so that these could be publicised in the newspapers in the event of their being detained was reasonable and possibly true.

The state has argued that the photographs were taken so that they could be published after the men had left the country for military training.

Judgement has been reserved. (Pretoria Supreme Court).

2 youths. On April 6, 1978, a group of youths aged between 14 and 16 were found guilty of Sabotage in the Port Elizabeth Regional Court, and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment each. (These are presumably some of the children Pik Botha denies are serving sentences on Robben Island). They appealed against conviction to the Eastern Cape Supreme Court, but this was turned down. 2 of the youths further appealed to the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein, and in September 1980 the appeal was upheld, and sentence set aside.

It was found that the trial magistrate had acted irregularly by refusing to accept

a plea of not guilty by the accused's legal advisor, and then directly questioning the accused at length, thereby obtaining certain admissions highly prejudicial to the accused.

(Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Bloemfontein, 11.09.80).

LABOUR ACTION general

Itereleng Workshop for the Blind (Ga-Rankuwa): See WIP 13, page 32, WIP 14, page 50 for earlier events at the workshop. 41 of the 300 workers who had earlier lost their jobs were refused reinstatement and paid 'back pay' running from R21 to R28 - this for workers who had been at Itereleng for up to 27 years.

One worker said that Itereleng still fell under South African authority and that the supposed BophuthaTswana authority and responsibility was being used as a 'shield' by the management and the Transvaal Society for the Blind (see Star, 11.09.80).

Frametex (New Germany): See WIP 13, page 35, WIP 14, page 53 for reports.

'Fears of generating further industrial unrest' were said to be behind the reconsideration by Natal Attorney-General Rees of charges against 298 Frametex workers (Star, 05.09.80).

The charges and summonses were under the

Black Labour Relations Act, and related to strikes by about 6 000 workers at Frim group factories during May of this year.

Workers could pay admission of guilt fines of R30 by end September, or appear in court on October 1. The Federation of SA Trade Unions (FOSATU) said that workers had been advised not to pay fines, and that the summonses had not been individually served but simply left at the factory in one batch.

City Deep Abattoir (Johannesburg): Meat inspectors refused to accept an increase in the slaughterline speed from 10 to 11 carcasses per minute. They walked off the job twice, the first time on Wednesday, August 27.

Ben Kruger, chairperson of the Abattoir Corporation, said that the inspectors were being unfair in that the line was designed for 12 carcasses per minute and had been running at 10 per minute.

Slaughterers worked through the night on Thursday to catch up on the backlog of 1 500 sheep.

Border Boxes (East London): Post reported (11.09.80) that the entire labour force at this factory refused to work after the chairperson of their workers' committee had been fired.

They said that the foreman had threatened to fire all committee members who were also members of the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAMU).

About half of the labour force of 64 were reemployed on Thursday, September 11 (RDM, 12.09.80).

Majolica Pottery (near Roodepoort): Workers

went on strike briefly after a fellow worker in the despatch department was fired - allegedly for being away from work because of illness.

The worker involved, Ivy Masigo, said that she had produced a doctor's certificate.

The secretary of the Building, Construction and Allied Workers' Union, Frank Mohlale, the union representing the workers at Majolica, said that the strike had rapidly spread to other departments (Post, 17.09.80).

Batawanagere Transport (Mabopane Depot): Grievances over the pension scheme led to a strike at the firm during the week ending Friday, September 12.

D Viljoen, general manager of Bophutha-Tswana Transport Holdings, said that there had been no 'organised strike, but admitted dissatisfaction over pensions and that some services could have been affected.

Also see references in WIP 8, and WIP 11, pages 29-30, to this transport company and labour dissatisfaction.

Amalgamated Packaging Industries (Industria, Transvaal): Twenty-five workers, transferred two weeks earlier from Fuchs (Alberton) to the API plant, refused to work on Friday, August 29.

Their complaints related to transport and accommodation problems caused by the transfer. It meant that the shifts they worked inconvenienced them with regard to transport arrangements - the firm's suggested solution was to house the workers in a hostel at R20 per month, and refused to provide them with transport.

All 25 workers were paid off.

Mpumalanga Bus Company (Hammerdale, Natal): Scant information indicates that bus drivers at a bus company operating a service between Mpumalanga township and Cato Ridge and Pinetown went on strike over the dismissal of a fellow worker (Daily News, 22.08.80).

Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg): A 'go-slow' by editorial staff on this newspaper was reported in the Natal Mercury (06.08.80).

This action was taken in protest at breakdowns in the electronic editing equipment, and took the form of one-hour stoppages after every breakdown.

News service to the Natal Mercury and the Cape Times (both morning papers) was also affected.

Public Prosecutors (Johannesburg magisterial district): A mass resignation by 30 prosecutors (all white) was reported in late August - said to have been in protest at low salaries and the high and rising cost of living in Johannesburg.

This seems to be in line with the dissatisfaction among professionals at the erosion of the value of their salaries, pointed to in WIP 13, pages 32-34 (for example, among teachers, nurses, journalists).

The resignation and previous shortages of prosecutors has meant that certain cases have had to be postponed, that staff have been transferred, and that some courts have had to be temporarily closed (for example, in Soweto and Orlando). (See, for example, Sunday Express, 24.08.80; RDM, 25.08.80).

Collendale Cannery (East London): Still community and workplace 'unrest' continues in the Eastern Cape. Schools and factories

are two of the most important arenas for the struggle at present.

On Wednesday, August 27, the entire workforce at Collondale Cannery was fired. This assault by management followed a brief stoppage in demand of the reinstatement of 'retrenched' fellow workers.

Six (later changed to five) members of the workforce at the Cannery had been 'retrenched' 'because work ... was slack'. However, one of the six was the chairperson of a workers' committee elected as a result of organising activity by the African Food and Canning Workers' Union (AFCWU), an unregistered union that had asked for company recognition.

Management demanded to deal only through the liaison committee when workers asked for an explanation for the 'retrenchments'. Workers were ordered to leave company premises.

When workers gathered at the factory the next day (28.08.80) they were met by three officials from the Department of Manpower Utilisation who said that they were there to resolve the strike. This was rejected by the workers who demanded to negotiate directly with management.

Security police ordered workers to disperse. Management issued a deadline for return of Friday, August 29, to the workers.

The AFCWU met with management on Friday, but the latter were adamant that negotiations could only follow a return to work, that these would take place through the liaison committee, and that the 'retrenched' workers would not be reinstated.

Workers were fired and told that they could reapply on Monday, September 8, for jobs. However, workers did not accept their pay, said

the AFCWU.

A week later (September 5) workers from Collondale, and also from Ray-Lite Batteries and National Converter Industries (see WIP 14), decided to return to work only when their representative unions had been recognised and workers' committees accepted. The unions involved in these demands from 2 000 workers are the AFCWU and the SAAWU.

However, management from the three plants said that replacements had been taken on from the unemployed in the Eastern Cape.

On Monday, September 8, some workers returned. Rodger Tilney, managing director of Collondale said that as many as 100 had returned, while another 150 were employed from workseekers who had not been at the firm before. The AFCWU denied this and said in a statement on 16.09.80 that 90% of workers were still out, that normal production had not resumed, and that the company was approaching individual workers to return while also attempting to recruit labour tenants with the assistance of farmers.

The sacked workers have called on other cannery workers to refuse to handle unprocessed pineapples from Collondale, and for the community to boycott Collondale products.

Five members of the SAAWU (including the acting secretary, Thozamile Gqweta) are facing charges under the Riotous Assemblies Act, while BP Norushe is in detention.

We would like some of our readers in the Eastern Cape to send us articles and information on factory and community struggles.

Johannesburg Municipal Workers: This strike was also covered in WIP 14.

Four executive members of the Black

Municipal Workers' Union (BMWU) were detained after the strike. Joseph Mavi, charged under the 'Sabotage Act' (minimum sentence 5 years, maximum sentence death) has been released on R500 bail. The case has been postponed to September 29. Mavi has been dismissed by the Johannesburg Municipality and is out of work. While he was in detention his wife, Ruth, received a donation of R100 from the Putco bus drivers in an expression of solidarity.

Philip Mlamini (general secretary of the BMWU), charged under the same Act, has been released on bail of R1 000. His case will also resume on September 29.

Gatzby Mazwi, charged under the same Act, has been released on bail of R500, while Hope Mamobolo was released from custody on August 29 with no charges laid.

Of the 1 000 workers bused back to the bantustans, both Gazankulu and Venda 'governments' confirm that they have had no contact with them. The men have not reported to magistrate's courts within the areas, as required to do by law.

Meanwhile dumped workers have started arriving back in Johannesburg, complaining of starvation and the extreme scarcity of jobs in the bantustans, particularly in the Transkei. By September 3, 300 people were known to be back. The returning workers are being helped to survive through a fund administered by the BMWU. The Roman Catholic Church greatly boosted the fund by contributing R5 000. Strikers keen to return to work with the Municipality are encountering considerable obstacles and resistance. Only a few workers have been reinstated. The WRAB has asked Venda and Gazankulu to

provide alternative workers.

Meanwhile the BMWU's rival, the Union of Johannesburg Municipal Workers, has come out in favour of the striking workers, and called for the reinstatement of all of them. Mavi has not been impressed. He has made a scathing attack on what he sees as 'cashing in on the plight of the workers' and asks, 'Where were they when people asked for wage increases?' (Star, 09.09.80). Probably being registered.

The BMWU is receiving new members daily.

Turner Brothers (Eastern Cape): All 27 workers stopped work after the dismissal of the chairperson of their workers' committee.

No further information available to the editors.

Table Bay Cold Storage (Cape Town):

We reprint, below, a letter in connection with the meat strike (from RDM, 27.08.80):

I WOULD like to comment on the article (RDM July 21) by industrial relations adviser, Mr Andrew Levy, in which he urges employers to adopt a more conciliatory and realistic attitude towards strikes and, indeed, to the trade union question in general.

In the Financial Mail (Aug 1) he is further quoted as saying that "the (Johannesburg City) Council has its head in the sand".

We concur with his assessment of the council's handling of the recent municipal workers' strike. However, actions speak louder than words, and it is unacceptable that Mr Levy should place himself in the vanguard of enlightened management. It is important to note that Mr Levy is NOT a dispassionate observer of the recent spate of strikes.

In fact he was the industrial relations adviser to the employers in the recent Cape Town meat strike and acted as their principal spokesman at a number of meetings. In this case the line adopted by the employers deviated considerably from the enlightened prescriptions which their adviser Mr Levy so frequently espouses.

In his "Mail" article Mr Levy states that "with all the talk of change, and the new deal, many employers continue to handle strike action with antiquated methods, regarding strikes as a sign of disloyalty, ingratitude, the work of agitators, and responding by firing their employees, and refusing to confront the issues giving rise to the action." We agree.

But precisely this "head in the sand" attitude characterises the handling of the recent meat strike.

The issues involved in the strike are well known. Approximately 50 workers at Table Bay Cold Storage, after weeks of requesting that management recognise their democratically-elected committee, went on strike. The management's response to this was a catalogue of all the "antiquated methods" cited by Mr Levy in his article: resisting "negotiation and discussion and investigation"; accusations of "agitators"; wholesale "firing of their employees"; hiding behind "statute books" and the "red herring of unregistered unions". In short: "refusing to confront the issues giving rise to the action".

As Mr Levy says, unsuccessful strike handling will inevitably "widen the issue in dispute". And the issue was dramatically widened when two weeks later the rest of the meat industry came out in support of the striking Table Bay workers.

In the intervening two weeks the workers in all the meat factories had attempted to discuss the issue at Table Bay Cold Storage with their employers. Their efforts proved fruitless. Indeed the employers actually prepared themselves for an industry-wide strike.

When the 500 meat workers walked out they informed management that they were walking out for one day in solidarity with the Table Bay workers. On their return they were locked out by the employers (assisted by squads of riot policemen). The issue "widened".

The workers received the support of Cape Town's entire African and coloured community, a large section of the enlightened white public and their representatives and, without exception, the English-language Press.

The moderate nature of the demands, the workers' commitment, and the extent of public sympathy failed, however, to impress the employers.

The immediate legacies of their obduracy are 500 starving meat workers and their families, and an entire industry which must have suffered a severe financial setback in the short term and is now employing a less productive work force than might otherwise be the case.

The long-term legacy is more profound. It is the existence, in Cape Town, of 500 starved, determined and embittered workers (and the thousands who supported them), whose anger and understandable bitterness will be directed not at the "agitators" (for there were some) but at the employers who so consciously refused to heed their voice.

And this is important. For as long as there are "meat employers" and "Johannesburg City Councils" they will, in the eyes of the workers, be the benchmark for all employers. Those employers who adopt a more conciliatory approach, those who take heed of Mr Levy's words, will not receive a second thought, as long as the actions of prominent employ-

ers — like the most employers — belie these fine words.

Is it possible that the State actually prevented the meat employers from following the conciliatory path suggested by Mr Levy? If that is so it is important that it be made known. It is however unlikely that the State would have been able to prevent an amicable settlement of the Table Bay issue, around which all subsequent action hinged. It is clearly for Mr Levy to explain the startling deviations between his words and his deeds.

Perhaps the explanation is to be found in Allister Sparks' words: "Many employers are able to fibrise about the need for black union rights and discuss it in their board rooms, yet when they actually come face to face with black aspirations and demands they seem to panic and become irrational. They revert to traditional South African responses and begin threatening to call in the police, or to fire the lot and pack them off to the 'homelands'".

Please forgive the lateness of our response. Until very recently I and four of my colleagues were detained in prison in Cape Town, an important institution in the industrial relations system adopted by the meat employers. — DAVID LEWIS, Organiser, Western Province Workers' Union, Athlone, Cape.

© This letter was referred to Mr Levy, who declined to comment. — EDITOR.



Interview: a miner

"The mine is a grave from which
a men will not return".

The substantial part of this article is devoted to the single experience of a black migrant worker, Mtati, from the Transkei who took his first job on a gold mine at the age of 18. Mtati clearly describes the hardship which is involved in a days work on the gold mines. Working on the mines has always been an unpopular job among black workers. This is largely due to the low wages, long working hours, the extremely dangerous working conditions and the bad living conditions.

Workers today as well as in the past have fought against such conditions of exploitation. This resistance has involved mass desertion, refusal to be recruited, as well as trade union and strike action. Even though working on the mines is clearly unpopular, many workers have at one time or another worked on mines. This is because in the past there have usually been mining jobs available, while other better jobs have been 'scarce'.

Initially the migrant labour system assisted mining capitalists to force people into working on the gold mines. The structures of control initially developed by the mining industry were later changed and extended into a wider system of control — a central feature of which is a sophisticated labour allocation network. Through this network, labour from the bantustans is channelled into the most undesirable job sectors. The more favourable higher paying jobs (eg clerical and factory work) have been largely reserved for those workers who have urban rights.

Due to resistance from South African workers against working on the mines, the bulk of mine labour was at one stage recruited from outside of South Africa. Mining employment was generally seen as one of the last resorts before starvation. However the conditions in countries surrounding South Africa were such

that workers from those countries were forced to accept mining contracts. In 1974, 75% of the mines' labour force came from outside of South Africa.

By 1976 the pattern was changing dramatically. Malawian labour had been withdrawn after the 1975 air disaster, and the Mozambique border had been temporarily closed for recruiting purposes.

The Malawian air disaster and the border closure forced the mining industry to raise its wages in order to attract labour (this was cushioned for them by the rise in the price of gold). At the same time the unemployment situation in South Africa was reaching such proportions that, together with the tightening up of the labour control system, South African workers from the bantustan areas were being forced to accept jobs on the mines which they would never have accepted in the past.

While in certain bantustan areas workers have managed to resist mining jobs almost completely, the Transkei has traditionally been a major internal recruiting area for the mines.

From the beginning of the mining industry, a situation of dependency on mining employment was created in the Transkei. This was done through a network of traders who used methods such as cattle advances, bribery and misrepresentation to induce Transkeians to work on the mines. This historical dependence was maintained by the extension of the mine recruiting networks and the development of a rigorous system of labour control.

At the time of the labour crisis on the mines, people in the Transkei were being especially hard-hit by the deepening unemployment and the tightening up of labour control mechanisms. At the same time the mines went on a massive recruiting drive throughout the rest of the country, incorporating new areas into their network.

The resistance by local workers to mining jobs was being broken down. By 1978, 55% of the mines' labour force was being recruited within South Africa.

The situation now in the Transkei and in other bantustan areas is very different to that of 1975. Desperate workseekers are being turned away from mine recruiting centres in their hundreds.

MY NAME is Mtati. I am now 41. I came from Queenstown. I can tell you about the time that I worked on the mines. I went to the mines because I wanted to see them. Miners always have money. The money is too small in Queenstown. It was in 1957 when I joined at Mzilikazi. I was eighteen and I had standard six.

I was first at Venterspoort where I worked for three years. Then I was at West Driefontein where I did two joins from 1961 to 1976. Nothing changed to make things better while I was there but I hear they are paying more now.

At WNLA (the recruiting organisation) when we joined we had medical examination, injections and X-ray and our passes stamped. At the mine we started at a school for testing where they show you drilling and how to shovel. Then there was another school down the mine where we learned again for ten days.

They test you there to see who can be baas boy. You take things like buttons with GZ or CZ, GC, MG, and then put them in the right glass. And other tests like that. I did well in the tests. I was a baas boy on all three joins.

The worst thing about the mines is that it is heavy work. All the jobs are hard work.

We must wake up very early. We must be at the face to start work at 7am. If you want breakfast you must get up at 3am. If you get there late they say - no more, it is finished. For breakfast we get isidudu, bread and coffee. You have to be there early to get it.

The compound is close to the bank. We walk there. There are so many people to be

taken down. Thousands. We wait and they take us down about 5am. There are two lift cages. One goes up while one comes down. They take 20 upstairs and 20 downstairs. If you go down 20 stations it takes half an hour. I do not know how many feet deep it is. On the way we must stop and get into another lift cage which goes down again.

From the station it is far to the face where we work. It is an hour walk from station to face. We must be there by 7am to start. The whites come down last and do not have to wait at the bank.

We work in a Section. We always work at the same face. There are maybe five or six Sections on a station. There are maybe 30 or 50 workers on a Section. One chief and three white bosses. We are four baas boys. There are eight drill boys with eight spanner boys. Then maybe eighty shovellers. Then there are six tram boys. One of them can push the trams that we fill. There are also twenty timber boys.

When we get to the face it is my job to spray water to settle the dust. Work must start with shovelling from last night's blasting. We must clear the way so the drillers can start. We do not spray anymore. There are water sprays on the drills. We drink the water for the drills because it is an hour walk to the station for water. The water is bad. We also have no toilets. We just do it there.

It is hard work. It is very hot and you sweat so much. We are all wet with sweat. We work in trousers, boots and helmets. Sometimes people just fall down where we're working. It's just too hot.

The drill boys hold their drills against

the rock. They must drill six or eight feet so that the dynamite is deep. It takes them half an hour. They drill twenty, thirty holes in one shift. That rock is hard.

The shovellers must then shovel the rock to where the tram lines begin. Sometimes this is far. The passages are too narrow. They shovel the rock from one man to the next in a line, from one spade to the next. Maybe the line is long. Two, three, four hundred yards. We work in the dark. Just with a helmet light and battery on your belt. You can see the gold in the rock in the light.

The shovellers fill the trams which the trammers then push back to the station. The rock gets taken up in big pipes.

We have no tea time. No food. No rest time, we must work right through. We stop work at 4pm. Before we stop we must put the dynamite charges in the holes we have drilled. The whites do that. We then walk back to the station and they blast the face. Nine hours work.

The whites get boosted first. We get out at about half past five or six. You get cold waiting to be taken up. There are ventilation pipes as big as a man. They make winds blow down the tunnels. It is not at the station like it is at the face. You cannot take down a jersey. There is nowhere to put it. If you kept it with you it would get wet with sweat.

Back at the compound we have dinner. It is pap and stew. It is the same every night. We get it twice on Sundays. The pap is cooked in big pots - they use a spade to stir it with. It is dirty food. It has no taste. They do not peel the potatoes, the carrots or the onions. They put the leaves of the carrots in. For meat in the stew we

get amathumbo (offal) and intloko yiinkomo (cows head). They cook the meat and vegetables in one pot until it is soft. Twice a week we get brisket to grill on the stove in the compound. There is no milk, no fresh fruit. You mustn't spend your money on food or you will have no money.

When I started on the mines in 1957 I got 30c a shift. In 1965 I got R6,75 a month. They give you R2,00 per month and you get the rest at the end of the contract. When we get our pay at the end of the month we get weighed and we get an injection. You have to have the injection. When you ask them what it is for they do not tell you - they just say it is for strength.

After eating you go to sleep. We do not work on Sundays. Then we only wake up at

7am. We get lunch and supper. The same stew. We spend the day sleeping or washing or we go to the beerhall in the compound. Maybe we go out. Some men sleep out and just come in for work.

We only get public holidays. Easter, Republic Day, New Year's Day, Christmas Day. We get no holidays. You must finish that join first. We get no sick leave. You must work or be in bed. There is a hospital. Someone who is ill or not strong enough gets surface work. Sometimes you get tired. You feel like you cannot go to work. But you must not feel sick and lonely you must just finish that join. One day I did not go to work. I was found guilty and they gave me twenty days in jail. The mine magistrate sentenced me. I had to spend twenty days shovelling coal and I got



COMPOUND AT CROWN MINES - CONCRETE SLEEPING BUNKS HAD BEEN IN USE THE YEAR BEFORE AND ARE THE NORM IN ALL OLDER COMPOUNDS. CROWN MINES COMPOUND WAS DEMOLISHED IN 1980. (PHOTO: LES LAWSON).

no pay. That only happened once.

People get sick. Some people get boils all over them. The mines are dangerous. Many people die from accidents. The roof can fall. Most die from explosions in the walls when smoke comes out and kills them. There are injuries from the drills, from flying stones or they cut off fingers, toes or whole arms.

The mines pay when a miner must be buried. But they do not wait for the family for the burial. If the family demands the body they cannot get it.

There is a lot of smoke from engines and diesel drills. One ventilation pipe pushes clean air in and the other takes dirty air out. But the pipes are far from the face. I know two men who had phthisis. One was a shoveller and the other a driller. We had X-Ray every six months. Then they were told that they had phthisis. They were taken away. I do not know what happened. They went to hospital first.

The compounds where we live house twenty, forty eight or thirty two men. There is a stove and there are cement double bunks. We sleep on mats on the cement. Mattresses are not allowed, only pillows. You must bring your own blanket. There is no cupboard just a rack to put all your things on. Like in a train. They only wash and sweep the compound once a month. There are lots of fleas and bed bugs. There are water flush toilets.

That is what my time on the mines was like. I worked there for nine years and things never changed. I finished in 1976. You are a man when you come back from the mines. I am not working now. I am looking for work.

communities and transport

This section is included under our general feature on Labour Action as we believe that the issue of mass transport is basically an issue that affects the working class most directly and dramatically. This means that the working people of South Africa and their organisations, or sympathetic organisations, should attempt to prevent conflict over transport inadequacies or costs being used by other classes and groups for their own personal interests.

Many examples could be found where individuals or organisations have used community anger to advance themselves politically or financially. This has to be guarded against. See the WIP editorials in numbers 12 and 13, and the articles on rents, transport and education in this and earlier issues.

Previously, in WIP 10, we had provided information on the 1979 bus boycotts in Natal. In WIP 13 we printed two contributions on bus boycotts, while the discussion on events in the Western Cape also took up this issue.

Below we supply some limited information on several attempts to increase fares and resistance shown to this and the inadequate services provided by many companies.

It is intended to analyse the Putco application for increases in fares in the Johannesburg area, and subsequent events, in a future edition of WIP. Articles on this issue and information that we could use, should please be sent to the editors.

Johannesburg: The bus fares on all white, coloured and indian buses rose by 10% from September 1. These buses are run by the City Council. A similar increase is expected for african buses by October 1, stated the report.

The department's general manager stated that these were the first increases in two years, and that the service would still run at a R10,5-million loss - a loss that is made up by ratepayers.

Gazankulu: Powers concerning road transport within Gazankulu were transferred from the central to the local government on July 1. From that date road carriers in Gazankulu lost all rights to appeal to the National Transport Commission. All complaints and enquiries were to go to the Gazankulu Road Transportation Board.

This appears to be the case in most of the bantustans, and serves to partially deflect another conflict point onto the regional authorities.

Lukoto Bus Service (Venda): 28 students started boycotting the Lukoto Bus Service on April 28 and were still hiking to and from school on May 13 (Post, 13.05.80) in protest against raised bus fares and poor timetables.

The buses charge R5,00 per month for a 10 km route. A rival company charged the same for six months on the same route.

A petition has been handed to the Venda Transportation Board for consideration.

Atteridgeville and Sealeville Taxi Owners' Association: ASTOA increased its fares by 10c on each fare from May 8. The rival organisation, the Sealeville and Atteridgeville Taxi Club (a commuters organisation?) called on residents not to pay the increase.

The president of ASTOA claimed to know nothing of the increase. Stickers announcing the rise carried the signature of the secretary of ASTOA.

Lenasia: Two buses from Lenasia to the Johannesburg city broke down on September 17.irate commuters phoned the Star newspaper saying that this was a common occurrence. Workers expected at work by 07h00 only arrived that morning at 08h30. They complain that their bosses don't believe them about the buses, and dock their pay.

There were threats to burn the buses out of anger and protest. A call was made for a train service to assist commuters and to break the hold of the monopolistic bus service.

Phoenix: Phoenix residents called for major improvements to their bus service (Daily News, 22.07.80). They maintain that there are not enough buses available at peak hours, jeopardising the jobs of workers who continually arrive late.

By 22.08.80 the Phoenix Working Committee had stepped in to devise protest action to improve the transport facilities in Phoenix. They liaised with the Phoenix Bus Owners Committee for changes.

Follow-up meetings have been planned.

Natal: In November and December, 1979, some of the bus boycotts in Natal were still going

on, especially those on the South Coast. Action was, however, still being taken against 'pirate taxis' (a term that probably includes sympathisers giving lifts to boycotters); and in December the boycott was said to be tailing off. The buses of the KwaZulu Transport Company's Trans-Umzimkulu Transport service were said to be 75% utilised.

In early 1980 it was said that 85% of workers in the Port Shepstone area were using buses, and that the rest had bought bicycles or were taking taxis (see Transvaler, 13.02.80).

The KwaZulu Transport Company is owned jointly by the KwaZulu Development Corporation (the KDC) and the Corporation for Economic Development (CED). The ten directors (of whom five are Africans) are appointed by the CED, KDC and the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA).

At the end of January, 1980, six men were found guilty on counts under the Riotous Assemblies Act. The charges had related to attempts to enforce the bus boycott in the Maritzburg area. They were all sentenced to R60 or 60 days on the first count, five were sentenced to R100 or 90 days on a second count (these relate to gathering unlawfully and failure to disperse). One of the accused was sentenced to R50 or 60 days for intimidation of commuters.

In June the Ezakheni Bus Transport Company (also owned by the KTC) was in the news when two men were arrested in connection with the sale of fake bus tickets in Ladysmith.

Wembezi: Workers started the long (29 km

return) walk between this township and the industrial area and homes and gardens of Estcourt on Monday, July 28. They were boycotting the Kanyani Bus Company because of a 20% fare increase that came into effect on that day (from 25c to 32c for a single fare).

Company director, ME Cebekulu, said that the boycott was 'unnecessary' as the fare increase only applied to casual tickets, while season tickets remained at the same price, thanks to a subsidy he received from the state.

The state stepped in with the usual tactics - cars and 'pirate taxis' were stopped on the road between Wembezi and Estcourt, and employers transporting workers were turned back by officials said to be from the Natal Transportation Board. Riot squad police were brought in from Ladysmith. Five women were arrested on the first day.

On Thursday, July 31, Cebekulu left for Ulundi to discuss the boycott with Interior Minister Mdlalose. Cebekulu revealed,

perhaps with some bitterness as his was the only company in the district involved in the boycott, that pamphlets had been distributed the previous week calling for a boycott, and another pamphlet had praised the boycotters for their unified stand.

All buses belonging to Kanyani, except for one running empty, had been withdrawn.

On Sunday, August 3, a meeting attended by more than 1 500 residents was held in Wembezi. The meeting resolved to continue the boycott, decided to send a delegation to Ulundi, and to ask Mdlalose to ask the Road Transportation Board (RTB) to stop harassing private cars transporting boycotters.

KwaZulu Ministers were able to be rather smug about this issue as the Kanyani Bus

Company probably does not belong to the KTC, and were able to say that the boycott was a local issue and did not concern the KLA.

The Estcourt Chamber of Commerce called a meeting of Wembezi council representatives, RTB, police, Justice Department, commuters and business - 'very little was achieved'. Mayor of Estcourt, Roger Ramseyer (also Estcourt Chamber of Commerce vice chairperson), said that they had 'learned a lot' - 'but all we can do is ask our members to explain in detail to their staff the inevitability of price rises' (!) (Natal Witness, 07.08.80).

The latest news WIP has available relates to a meeting held in Wembezi (on the weekend of August 23-4), once more attended by more than 1 500 people. The meeting said that the boycott would continue until a new bus company was operating in the area.

Anger was expressed at a RTB decision not to grant further transport permits in the area while Kanyani Bus Company still held a licence. M Cebekulu 'was no longer wanted by the community, even if he reduced fares, because he had failed to meet residents to discuss the issue' (Natal Mercury, 26.08.80). KLA members attended the meeting.

During the same weekend one of the Kanyani buses caught fire at a bus rank.

Ladysmith-Ezakhani: Fares were reported to be increasing from July 28, on the same routes as those on which the 1979 boycotts started. The increases were said to be much lower though (up from R2,10 to R2,25 for a five-day return ticket, as compared to the attempted increase in 1979 from R2,10 to R2,80).

The lower increase was possible because

People say that the Government must take over our buses. And people say they are fighting discrimination - but the buses in Cape Town are not segregated.

You know, the only reason that fares on Government buses are lower than bus fares, is because there is so much less subsidy for bus fares.

Page from City Tramways propaganda material, referred to in next column.

of a 'substantial' subsidy from the Department of Transport to the KTC-owned Ezakhani Transport Company.

As in the Wembezi case casual tickets are not subsidised and would, therefore, rise from 45c to 55c (single ticket from Ezakhani to Ladysmith).

The Ladysmith Chamber of Commerce said that subsidies could only be short-term solutions.

Negotiations for fare increases in the Newcastle and Vryheid districts in Northern Natal were also said to be in progress at the time of the report (Natal Witness, 18.07.80).

Cape Town: In WIP 13 (July) this bus boycott was discussed. Now, in September, the boycott is still in operation.

The owners, City Tramways, had spent a reported R25 000 by mid-July in propaganda. At this time it was reported that the boycott was still 100% effective from Crossroads, Gugulatu and Langa, while about 50% of people from other areas were still boycotting (Sunday Times, 13.07.80).

Police baton charged workers who had been boarding 'pirate taxis' - this happened late in July. Strong action was being taken to force 'pirate taxis' off the road in an attempt to break the boycott. Reports spoke of arrests of drivers of vehicles, damage to their vehicles and even confiscation of cars and lorries, but also of continued solidarity and defiance by the communities involved.

The state was somewhat embarrassed when news leaked out of the 'anonymous' pamphletting action by a secret committee established by the cabinet to break the boycott. Cape Times editor, Tony Heard, was visited by the security police in connection with the intended publication of minutes of this committee.

The committee consisted of representatives of the Departments of Co-operation and Development, Indian Affairs and Coloured Affairs, the security police, and the army. It issued pamphlets anonymously, such as the one purporting to be from taxi owners and calling for an end to the boycott.

Foreign Affairs Minister, Pik Botha, issued a statement saying in part:

The committee in question was established by the Cabinet and the Cabinet instructed it to plan and implement actions designed to combat the unrest

and violence which was building up, inter alia, as a result of the schools boycott earlier this year...

The committee initiated various peaceful actions that contributed to the prevention of violence and the avoidance of loss of life. The committee also distributed factual information to refute the lies and deception spread on a large scale by subversive elements.

In some cases anonymous pamphlets were prepared and disseminated by the committee because the committee considered this to be the most effective way to counter unrest and subversive plans and of helping to maintain order. The pamphlets reflected the opinions and attitudes of a considerable proportion of the general public.

The Government wishes to state categorically that it will not hesitate to maintain law and order with all the power at its disposal (Sunday Tribune, 03.08.80).

Botha later said that he would 'do it again, if necessary'.

On August 11 violence broke out again after police had once more acted against 'pirate taxis' and their passengers. People died in the vented anger of the communities.

Johan Bernard, managing director of City Tramways, admitted a few days later that Tramways inspectors were reporting 'pirate taxis' to the authorities. A community leader said:

This action of the police and the Road Transportation Board officials has simply made people angrier and more united because they can see that the Government is helping City Tramways. Instead of making the company look into its fares, they came in with sub-machine guns and dogs and tried to force the people to board the buses.

It has been an education for some of the people to see how the Government works together with business. They must just realise that the people are not going to go back to buses until the fares go down (RDM, 13.08.80).

Mankweng (Lebowa): Bishop Barnabas Lekganyane of the Zionist Christian Church owns a fleet of buses operating in Lebowa. Complaints about the service provided were discussed at a meeting held at Turfloop in February this year.

It was decided not to boycott the Bakwaduba buses but to elect a steering committee to discuss the matter with the bus company management.

Babaleqi (border industrial area): Workers in this notorious low-wage area (see WIP 8) were hit in March this year when the Botlhaba Tswana Transport (BTT) company announced fare increases. The BTT is a subsidiary of BophuthaTswana Transport Holdings (Pty) Ltd.

The BTT said that it was necessary to increase fares from end-March as running expenses were continuously increasing.

The increases would affect workers living or working in such places as Majaneng, Hammanakraal, Tweefontein and Boschpleas.

On Sunday, March 23, a meeting was held at Temba, Hammanakraal, to protest the increases. The meeting was called by the Moretele Regional Authority (MRA) consisting mainly of Moretele tribal chiefs. An earlier meeting between the MRA and the BTT management had ended in deadlock.

The outcome of the meeting is not clear, but BophuthaTswana security police detained a Post reporter for a day in connection with the meeting. The reporter, Malose Matsemele, was accused by the security police of helping to organise the meeting.

Bloemfontein: Fares increased from 15c to 20c from Mangaung township to Bloemfontein on August 18. Twenty-nine municipal buses

were subsequently stoned by protesting crowds of commuters.

Pretoria Area: In February this year it was announced that Putco had applied for bus fare increases in the Pretoria area, once again attributed to rising costs of fuel, spares and vehicles.

Protest meetings were called, complicated by one Joseph Gomba of the Black Unity Express Bus Service (BUEBS) who invited Cosas to his first meeting (Post, 21.03.80). Gomba said that he had 600 buses 'idling in readiness' for the day when the non-black firm Putco driven out of the townships. This claim was denied by Putco who said that their previous contact with Gomba pointed to 'his ... inability to operate even a single bus within 10 kilometres of his house, never mind the 600 busses that he alleges are "riding in readiness"' (Post, 02.04.80).

In August Joseph Gomba said that he had been called to Compol (security police offices in Pretoria) to talk about his criticism of the community council's failure to talk to Putco about fare increases. He said that his interrogator was 'friendly and sympathetic towards his appeal as a transport man' (Post, 28.08.80; Star, 28.08.80).

The Atteridgeville and Mamelodi community councils warned of the consequences of a fare increase and said that it was causing bitterness.

The complaint from Gomba was, however, that while the community councils might express opposition they did very little in the way of practical measures to prevent the fare hikes from taking place.

In August it was announced that fares on Putco buses in Pretoria's townships,

and certain parts of BophuthaTswana and Lebowa would increase. The increases of 7% on season tickets and 13% on cash fares on average, had been approved by the National Road Transportation Board and the Boards in BophuthaTswana and Lebowa to come into effect at the end of September.

A meeting of the Vulamulo Civic Party of Bernard Ndlatzi (a Mamelodi councillor) attended by 300 people in Mamelodi, threatened Putco with a bus boycott.

Putco initially said that they would go ahead with the increases despite boycott threats, but it was reported (Post, 10.09.80) that these would not come into effect at the end of the month (September) as planned.

Daveyton: The East Rand Administration Board (ERAB) and the Daveyton community council run the Daveyton Bus Service. At the community council's monthly meeting in June it was decided to increase fares, except for scholars. This followed a previous decision, in May, to increase fares, a decision that was lifted after denials by both the community council and ERAB that they were responsible for the increase.

These denials and the suspension of the increases followed strong community protest.

After the June meeting there seemed to have been some further confusion, this time related to the size of the loss suffered by the DCS (one report said R185 000 and 'mayor' Matriel Mphosi said that the loss was R1-m).

The increase was also said to be necessary to raise wages and improve the service. Not that such seems to have been happening in this regard as Daveyton residents staged a protest at the bus station in Daveyton on the extreme over-crowding on buses - this in

August.

Duduza: The Nigel town council owns the bus service that operates in this township. Towards the end of July the council decided to increase fares. However, the Duduza community council had not been consulted, and opposed the increases. This led to a suspension of the increase for one month, during which time the Duduza community council said that it would ascertain the feelings of residents on the issue.

A meeting was planned for Sunday, August 24, and residents rejected the proposed increase, and said that they would not pay it until they had seen the Nigel town council's financial statement on the bus company.

The Nigel town council then took a different direction in the face of the community rejection of their plans. They said that they could not accept the residents' meeting decision as the final word, but would have to consult 'works committees (and liaison committees) at various firms and industries in and around the town before making a final decision' (RDH, 29.08.80).

Tebane Moloi, of the Duduza community council, said with some insight that as works committees were management stooges, the 'fact that the town council has to confer with these committees means that they want to introduce the new fares regardless. They are merely looking for excuses'.

At the end of this month (September) the Nigel town council is to report on the increase. However, James Nkosi and Johnny Nkote of the community council have said that 'workers will walk' rather than pay more.

It appears that not all community councils are to be condemned outright. It

probably depends on their relationship to the specific issues on which decisions are to be taken or leadership given. In this case of the Duduza bus fares the decisions relate to a body outside the community council sphere of involvement. However, for the dominant trend see the articles on community councils and rents in this issue of NIP.

Seshego: In March, 1980, Bill Brooks of the Lebowa Transport Company (running 245 buses) announced that the company (LTC) had applied for an increase in fares. Increased operating costs were advanced as reasons for the application. LTC said that the Departments of Transport and Co-operation and Development were subsidising workers' fares, so that in some areas they paid only R2,00 out of a total weekly fare of R11,00.

In July the increases were granted, to go into effect in August. This was said to cover all routes in the Pietersburg, Potgietersrus and Transon districts, as well as the four buses operated by the Gazankulu Transport Company (a subsidiary of the LTC).

Immediate opposition was expressed by Chief J Mopho (opposition Lebowa People's Party), Hesley Lekote (Seshego Welfare Organisation), and the Seshego Village Committee (SVC).

At a meeting arranged by the SVC and by the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) on the weekend of July 19-20, workers threatened to boycott buses. Leaders Rephehu of Azapo and Rev Maletji of the SVC denounced the LTC's black directors, Lebowa cabinet ministers, and the Lebowa Transportation Board (LTB). The LTC was said to belong to a 'government subsidiary'. The Lebowa Transport Company is part of the vast CED

(Corporation for Economic Development) network, through the Lebowa Development Corporation. Representatives of the various bantustans sit on the boards of directors of their specific Development Corporation.

It was decided that commuters would walk the 12 km between Sashego and Pietersburg when the increase came into effect. A few days later the LTC announced that the increase had been postponed beyond the end of July.

The postponement was brief. Less than a month later Brooks of the LTC said that fares would increase from August 25. The SVC reacted quickly by reaffirming the previous month's boycott decision, and called on people to use the 'black-owned company' - the Namba Nya Bus Service which runs between Sashego and Pietersburg, but is not allowed into the Sashego township.

UT Singate of LTC called on the 'maturity' of the people of Lebowa to ignore the boycott.

The boycott got under way on this route on Monday, August 25, but apparently not on other routes into Pietersburg. Many workers arrived late. Lebowa police clashed with pupils who had stoned buses in Sashego, shots were fired and at least 11 pupils arrested. Pupils were boycotting classes in sympathy with the action taken by their worker parents.

Traffic police, taking what must be 'step one' in the 'boycott-breakers' handbook', ordered people out of unregistered cars (called 'pirate taxis' in other situations) on the outskirts of Sashego on the first day of the boycott. But even the LTC admitted that about 60% of the 4 000 commuters were participating in the boycott, while Brigadier

W van Zyl, chief of Lebowa police, said that the boycott was 90% successful (Post, NBP, 26.08.80).

A fire damaged an office at one of the Sashego schools.

On Tuesday, August 26, people from Flood River and Perskribult (Nmutung-Ue-Perekisi) joined the boycott. Pupils stoned buses.

An interesting aspect of the boycotts, that are now in their fifth week and spreading, is that privately-owned bus companies in two instances are running very much cheaper services than those that are being boycotted. And yet these companies have not been granted permission by the Lebowa cabinet to operate into the townships. The LDC-owned LTC does operate into townships. These bus services are D Harris' (a black man) Namba Nya Bus Service (between Sashego and Pietersburg) and Nisaba Bus Service (operating in Nkowanokou near Tzaneen). A rather simple explanation of their being black has been offered in the newspapers, but this does not go far in coming to an understanding of the operation of transport companies (does it mean that black people are bad capitalists?)

By Wednesday, August 27, residents of Lebowaqomo (40 km from Pietersburg) expressed their solidarity with the boycotters and regret that the distance involved made it impossible for them to join the boycott.

Sixteen youths appeared in the Sashego magistrate's court charged with public violence. The case was postponed to September 10, but no reports appear to have been done on the outcome.

Chief Rammupudu, Lebowa Interior Minister, called a meeting of the bus company SVC and Sashego town council, and Lebowa

government representatives. This first meeting ended in deadlock. It was revealed, though, that the Lebowa cabinet and not the Lebowa Transportation Board had approved the increases.

Of course, the Lebowa Legislative Assembly is caught in the same trap as has been pointed out in the case of KwaZulu. The LDC is presented as representing the Lebowa people or Lebowa government in its (LDC) ownership of the bus company (Lebowa Finance Minister, LC Mothiba, is one of the African directors of the bus company).

Dr Phatudi and his government are, therefore, helpless beyond voicing support for the plight of boycotters, and try to deflect attention away from the immediate issue of bus fares onto wages (not that this is wrong in itself). This strategy can also not work for very long (if, on the off chance it is successful) as high wages would mean less investment in these low-wage bantustan 'growth point' or border areas.

The boycotters were also calling for the LTC to drop people in town and not on the outskirts at the Polokwane Centre with its four liquor outlets - 'where our people were encouraged to squander all their earnings in liquor'.

The Rev Malotji, whose SVC called for the boycott with the Sashego branch of Azapo, said in an interview that he saw his role 'as continuation of evangelism'. He explained that the SVC had been formed in 1979 but that it had been inactive - when fares were increased last year there was protest but no action. He gave credit for the present boycott to the people of Sashego.

A further meeting was arranged between

the Lebowa Legislative Assembly (members and the LTC. After this meeting, on August 29, Dr Phatudi ordered Lebowa police to stop harassing motorists who were giving lifts to boycotters and to remove road blocks.

Tension existed, and probably still does, within the Seshego community between Azapo and the Taxi Association over the latter's refusal to lower fares for the duration of the bus boycott.

Buses were removed from Seshego depot on August 29 and parked at the local SA Airforce base, presumably to protect them from stone throwers.

On Saturday, August 30, it was announced that the fare increases had been suspended for two weeks. Fortunately the community was not as optimistic as the Sunday Post with its 'bus boycott victory' headline, but decided to continue the boycott, asking for a reduction of fares and improvement in the service offered (for example, that there should be no charge for luggage, and that the LTC should not drop passengers at Polokwane Centre). These decisions were taken at a meeting of residents.

Rev Melatji said that the suspension was an attempt to 'lure them back to the buses in order to destroy their unity'.

On the night of Tuesday, September 2, two buses to Moletsi were stoned as they passed through Seshego. A further meeting between Lebowa authorities, the SVC, Seshego township council, Pietersburg town council and the LTC ended in deadlock. Jack Botes of the town council said that fares would have to go up more if workers were not dropped at the outskirts of the town.

Botes said that town council labourers earned R70 per month and the Administration

Board workers earned between R70 and R80.

The mass meeting on Sunday, September 7, said that the LDC-owned LTC must go. The meeting was addressed by Mamabolo Rapheau and KH Molosi, local Azapo leaders, Rev Fialatji of the SVC and Lebowa Legislative Assembly members. Freedom songs were sung and poetry read by the Turfloop students.

The LLA members present said that they would not negotiate with the Lebowa government until it allowed the Namba Buya Bus Service to operate in Lebowa, and would boycott the opening of a road to the Lebowakgomo industrial area (where most industries are LDC-owned).

On 'political' reasons for the boycott one speaker said: 'What is politics? Politics is your four-room matchbox, it is your five grown-up children sharing a room with others sleeping in the kitchen, it is increasing bus fares while workers are paid R35 per month'. This was loudly acclaimed.

A pamphlet distributed at the meeting called for the formation of a trade union to negotiate a minimum wage for the area.

On Wednesday, September 8, Phatudi and his cabinet, Dr J Adendorf, chairman of the LTC board of directors and chief of the CED, and bus company officials met.

The Pietersburg Sakekame said that only 'the most unskilled workers' (probably the vast majority) were earning less than R100 per month.

Large companies had started making their own transport arrangements for their workers.

During the week starting Monday, September 15, the boycott spread rapidly, caused by the end of the suspension and the reintroduction of increases on all LTC routes

except for those in Seshego. At Lenyenya township (near Tzaneen) a bus was hijacked by students from the Seboys High School - some were arrested. At Sekaba High School students refused to board buses.

At Gaflohofoya (also near Tzaneen) a bus was damaged when commuters stoned it. Workers walked from Rolepo and Rokokane townships to Pietersburg. Lt-Colonel P Moloto of the Lebowa police said that buses had to be escorted by police.

The boycotts continue.

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We publish below an index to the major articles which have appeared in the first 15 issues of WORK IN PROGRESS. The articles are gathered together under very general subject categories for reference purposes. The index has been produced for two reasons: firstly, a number of readers have not received all copies of WIP, and this should assist these readers in getting a fuller picture of the WIP project. The second major reason for producing an index is to make the material published in WIP accessible to a wider group of people than it has thusfar reached.

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
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