

The
ZAPU and ZANU
GUERRILLA WARFARE

and

**The Evangelical Lutheran Church
In Zimbabwe**



Ngwabi Bhebe

STUDIA MISSIONALIA UPSALIENSIA LXXII

**The ZAPU AND ZANU Guerrilla
Warfare and the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe**

by
Ngwabi Bhebe

**Associate Professor of History
UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE**

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Preface

This book is a product of some fortuitous events and of the efforts of many people and institutions. On the fortuitous side, in 1984 during the preparation for the ZANU Congress, the first to be held in an Independent Zimbabwe, I happened to be in the group of historians who were asked to carry out interviews with ZANU officials and former ZANLA combatants so that we could prepare the historical part of the Presidential Report to Congress. For days I sat in the Studios of the Department of Information probing the war-veterans and listening to their blood-curdling and awesome experiences. At the end of the exercise I was left in no doubt that the full story of the war had not yet been told and that I should one day put aside some time to make my contribution to one of the crucial episodes in the history of our nation. At the time I also lacked the angle of approach to the subject since I did not want to repeat what David Martin and Phyllis Johnson had done in their celebrated account of the ZANU war.¹ Moreover I remained deeply concerned about the way only the ZANU side of the struggle was unfolding while the ZAPU side remained an almost completely uncharted territory. The political conditions brought about by disunity in the country discouraged anybody from trying to search for the ZAPU's story, while the ZAPU politicians and former ZIPRA combatants chose to be tight-lipped. Even personal relatives who had some knowledge of the ZAPU story studiously refused to be drawn into conversations verging on the war period.

My problem began to resolve itself in 1987 when the then Professor of Religious Studies and Theology, University of Zimbabwe, Carl F. Hallencreutz, soon to become my mentor and best friend, provided me with the angle I had all the time looked for by asking me to participate in the project which materialised in the book, *Church and State in Zimbabwe* and I wrote a paper on the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe and the war of liberation.² Thereafter I found myself irresistibly

drawn into the subject of the war and the church in Zimbabwe and I resolved to study it to its logical conclusion. Moreover unity between ZAPU and ZANU was soon achieved and the ex-ZIPRA combatants who had hitherto been reticent to speak about their part in the war suddenly opened up, so that this book in part tries to show the side of our struggle which we have not heard about before.

As I have indicated already the success of this whole project has depended on many institutions and people and I am greatly indebted to all of them. Even though in some places I may sound somewhat critical of the episcopacy of my church, I must record my sincere gratitude and indebtedness to my bishop, J.C. Shiri, for reposing so much great trust in me by allowing me to look at all the recent records of the church which are available in our church headquarters in Bulawayo. If I have abused the privilege I have done it most inadvertently and unintentionally. Otherwise I have been all the time conscious of the fact that many characters I am dealing with are alive and therefore must be accorded the absolute confidentiality they deserve. I have also tried to apply the same rule to the materials which I gathered in Uppsala in the Church of Sweden Mission Archives and in Stockholm in the SIDA Archives. In a war situation so much suspicion and bitterness flows quite freely more than in peace times among people and that stuff is abundant in the oral testimonies which I have gathered among the church workers, the combatants and the political and ecclesiastical leaders. Only when it has been absolutely critical to prove a major point in my argument have I reluctantly brought in such types of evidence.

My study could never have succeeded without the funds to enable me to chase after informants who were scattered all over Zimbabwe. The funds were provided by the Research Board of the University of Zimbabwe, which again shouldered part of the expenses of my trip to Sweden. I can only hope that this study will serve to vindicate my deserving of such support.

I want to thank all my informants who are listed in my list of sources towards the end of the book and to mention the following by name is not to minimise the contributions of the rest. A cursory look at my footnotes will show that all the testimonies were crucial in understanding the subject. But I must mention the following for special reasons. I first appreciated the complexity of the war of liberation from the testimonies of Lt. General Rex Nhongo (now Mujuru) and Air Marshal Josiah Tungamirai, both of whom had participated in the opening of the

northeastern ZANLA front. These two together with the late William Ndangana, a man of immense memory, enormous sense of history and scrupulous decency, were my truly first teachers on the subject.

On the ZIPRA side I shall for ever remain indebted to my own relatives, Miss I.C. Mavuwa and the Bhebe brothers, all of them former combatants, who spent hours explaining the complicated recruitment, military training, operational structures, and many other details of the ZIPRA and the war, which no ordinary person, other than a relative, could have had the patience to do. A reading of this book will further reveal my great debt to Dumiso Dabengwa. Dabengwa not only gave me the longest interview of all, lasting ten hours, but he also used his influence to open many ex-ZIPRA doors to which I would most probably have had no access.

I have benefited in more ways than one from my close association with Professor Hallencreutz, a man of immense erudition and massive industry as well as warm heart. The bulk of the first draft was written under his kindly but highly critical guidance and most generous hospitality in Uppsala. He read the whole draft and made enormous changes and suggestions all of which improved the quality of the work greatly. He spent several sleepless nights translating my archival materials from the Church of Sweden Mission and SIDA. So much of him has gone into this book that it is in reality a joint piece of work.

I shall for ever cherish the great patience with which Miss Emerentia Naka, who typed the entire manuscript, bore with my seemingly endless alterations of even entire chapters.

Finally to my wife, Faith, who has borne so well all those lonely days and hours while at the same time she has maintained, in spite of her own most demanding professional duties, a domestic atmosphere absolutely conducive for my intellectual fulfilment, I owe a debt which life itself cannot repay.

Footnotes

1. Martin David and Johnson, Phyllis, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe. The Chimurenga War*, London, Faber, 1981.
2. Carl F. Hallencreutz and Ambrose M. Moyo (eds.) *Church and State in Zimbabwe*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1988; see also pp. 163-194 in the same book.

Introduction

My current study must be understood in the context of some of the recent works, especially those of David Lan, Professor Terence Ranger and Norma J. Kriger together with the current Ph.D. research endeavours of two of my students, Sr. Janice McLoughlin and Air Marshal Josiah Tungamirai. It is therefore necessary for me to begin by indicating some of the things that they have said or are going to say in order to properly locate some of my points of departure from their studies.

Dr Lan has concentrated on the northeast of Zimbabwe, the area in which the war of liberation as conducted by the Zimbabwe African National Union's (ZANU's) Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) took a decisive turning point in the early 1970s. The major break-through for ZANLA was the successful implementation for the first time in the history of the struggle in this country of the Maoist political mobilization of the rural masses. The mobilization was so successful because ZANLA guerrillas carefully identified the grievances of the peasants which they then professed to be the major causes of their own fighting. Besides, as Dr Lan has shown in his deservedly celebrated book, *Guns and Rain*, the guerrillas discovered that the local spirit mediums enjoyed a lot respect of the peasants and therefore made attempts to woo them to their side in order to win the support of the peasants as well. Once won the spirit mediums co-operated with the freedom fighters in recruitment, politicisation and bolstering of the morale of the fighters by giving them their religious blessing. As Ranger points out in an attempt to draw contrasts between the northeast of Zimbabwe and the Makoni district, the spirit mediums in the northeast had maintained a strong influence from early colonial days so that they were able to play a considerable role in the recent war because that area had remained "largely unaffected — by the commercialisation of African agriculture or by any acute shortage for subsistence production," as compared to the

Makoni area. In that Dande or northeast area Dr Lan has been able to demonstrate the critical role played by the Shona spirit mediums in the last war.

Though like Lan Professor Ranger focused on the role of the peasants in the last war, he, however, addressed a much larger political landscape in an attempt to seek the roots of the peasants' consciousness, how that consciousness was similar or different from that of the Kenyan or Mozambican peasants, and how it merged with the efforts of guerrillas especially in Mashonaland to sustain the peasants in the war and to enable them to sweep Robert Mugabe and ZANU into power during the first independence elections. Ranger shows how grievances over land deprivation and the colonial discriminatory practices in the marketing peasants' agricultural products constituted the major bases of the Zimbabwe peasant consciousness. Thus in a passage which links succinctly peasant consciousness with the liberation struggle, Ranger says:

By the time the guerrilla war began — peasants had a long tradition of understanding what had been done to them. They knew that their land had been taken in order to establish white commercial farming and ranching; they knew that the Rhodesian state had discriminated in favour of white agriculture and had intervened in their own production in intolerable ways. Locally they fought during the guerrilla war for the recovery of their lost lands; nationally they desired a transformed state - a state that would back black farming against white, rather than the other way round. This transformed state would no longer interfere in peasant production but would content itself with ensuring high prices, good marketing facilities, supplies of cheap fertilizer and so on. This was the nature of peasant class consciousness by the 1970s and it was fully adequate to sustaining the horrors of a guerrilla war, even if it may not prove adequate to sustain and increase agricultural productivity in an independent Zimbabwe.

During the war the guerrillas encouraged this type of consciousness. They intensified the sense of resentment over the lost lands; generalized it by showing how land alienation had affected everyone in the whole country; and promised that when a ZANU/PF government came to power the lost lands would be returned.³

It was this neat dovetailing between the peasant consciousness and the guerrilla war which enabled the peasants to participate actively in the liberation struggle by disrupting the colonial civil administration and undermining white rural economy.⁴

In his discourse Professor Ranger also looks at what he describes as "the religious consequences of the rural crisis of the late 1940s and of the emergence of radical peasant nationalism." Apropos of this theme Ranger argues that in the guerrilla war "spirit mediums became more significant than ever." Indeed, he says, "Peasant religion formed an indispensable part of the composite ideology of the war." He points out that this was so because of four reasons. The first reason was that even though there was some rural despondency and despair following the colonial crushing of open African nationalism as a prelude to the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) the peasants in fact quickly recovered their determination to oppose colonial oppression. Secondly Ranger says that the traditional religion and spirit mediums in which the nationalists and anthropologists suddenly showed such interest in the 1950s and 1960s were in fact an integral part of "the stage that peasant consciousness itself had reached at that time." The mediums were therefore far from being an invention of the intellectuals which were then popularised by some enterprising and talented spirit mediums. But "they were significant to peasant radical consciousness precisely because that consciousness was focused on land and on government interference with production; above any other possible religious form the mediums symbolized peasant right to the land and their right to work it as they chose." In other words, Ranger declares, "mediums had already become important as articulators of radical consciousness even before guerrillas entered the rural areas." When the guerrillas came, the mediums "offered the most effective means of bringing together peasant elders, who had hitherto been the local leaders of radical opposition, with the young strangers who entered each rural district, armed with guns and ready to administer revolutionary law. Hence not only peasants but also most guerrillas themselves came to draw heavily on the religious elements with the composite ideology of the war."⁵

Thus both Ranger and Lan have found that spirit mediums played a crucial role both in the mobilization of the peasants and in bolstering their morale to sustain the whole burden of the war. Moreover in some cases the spirit mediums' influence penetrated even Christian mission

properties so that not only in the ordinary rural places but in the mission farms as well many Christians of different denominations "had all come to recognise the mediums as the controllers of the agrarian cycle." The point which is relevant for our current study is that both Lan and Ranger have conclusively established the critical role of Shona religion and institutions in the war of liberation.

As shall become apparent in this study, I make no serious attempt to refute or confirm these two scholars' findings because that is not the thrust of my study. But before I indicate the complex thrusts of my preoccupations I must also refer to the rest of the studies with a bearing on my own, starting with Kriger's recent dissertation on "Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: peasant Perspectives, since published."⁶ Dr Kriger criticises Professor Ranger in particular for what she describes as his use of external rather than internal factors to account for the peasant support of the liberation struggle. She argues that the colonial African society in Zimbabwe must be divided into its various components, such as the elite (especially the rural teachers, health workers and businessmen), the youth, women, adult males, chiefs and so on, and that each of these groups' behaviour in the war must then be carefully examined. She thinks that a completely different picture from that presented by Professor Ranger begins to emerge when one adopts that line of investigation, especially with regards to the youth and women, whom she finds to have joined the war as a possible means of fighting and protesting against their low status and oppressed conditions in the 'traditional' society. Secondly, she has no problem in explaining the war participation of the rural middle class since it was that same class which had always led the nationalist struggle. Finally, she finds the participation of the male adults, the dominant group in 'traditional' society, which also stood to lose most in a war that was likely to liberate the youths and the women, to have been largely motivated by fear - fear of being coerced or violently punished by guerrillas for being sell-outs or collaborators of the colonial regime. It is this element of coercion which distinguished Dr Kriger's study from anyone else's, while her version of the class analysis of the peasants is definitely a distinctive and illuminating contribution to the understanding of the last war.

This leaves me with my two students Tungamirai and Sr. Janice, both of whom are addressing different aspects of the war from the above. Air Marshal Tungamirai, himself a former ZANLA combatant and provincial Commander of the Tete Province which coincided with northeast Zimbabwe, is investigating the purely military and technical aspects of the war, paying particular attention to the ZANLA programmes of recruitment, training, equipment, deployment, logistics, strategies and actual fighting. Sr. Janice on the other hand has decided to follow her teacher's footsteps by looking at the ecclesiastical aspects of the war with special reference to the Roman Catholic Church. Because of her extensive and penetrating scrutiny of Ian Linden's book *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, I have wisely avoided a similar exercise in case I steal her thunder.⁷

Thus other than Sr. Janice, what I have set out to do in the current study is a bit different from the rest of the studies I have cited. Even then there are many areas of my work which are fully not in accord with certain points made by Ranger, Lan and Kriger, I agree entirely with and therefore tend throughout my study to take for granted the peasant grievances as analysed by Lan and Ranger and I also concur with much that is said by Kriger about the youths and the elites.

But because Mberengwa, parts of Mwenezi, Beitbridge, and Gwanda, districts inhabited by the Karanga, Venda, Pfumbi, Ndebele and Sotho do not have strong territorial spirit mediums such as are found in Makoni and Dande, that aspect of the Shona religion which dominates Ranger's and Lan's study is absent from the present. Instead these parts of Zimbabwe are dominated by the Mwari cult, which even though Ranger and Mark Ncube have recently shown that it had some significant role in the post-independence political disturbances in Matebeleland, I have not attempted to investigate its possible role in the last war. In other words 'traditional' religion has not been part of my preoccupation in this study.

Another major difference of my work from those of Ranger, Lan and Kriger is that, indeed at the risk of provoking further outcry of indignation from Professor Ranger especially for not taking heed to the call by political leaders and others for a 'people's history, I have not written about peasants *per se*. Instead I have written about the peasants, especially their elites (headmasters, pastors, teachers, nurses, school children, etc) in the mission stations, including political leaders and guerrilla combatants.

Having indicated my areas of agreement with and differences from those who have gone before me I proceed to state briefly the substance of my discourse. My chief aim in this study is to look at the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the turmoil of the last war, especially its responses, adjustments, participation, its human and infrastructural damages, etc. Because of its historical close relationships with its mother Church of Sweden I explore its ups and downs, its heroic exploits, and so on also in relation to its parental body. This leads me to some international dimensions of the war of liberation in which I try to seek favourable contexts for the involvement of the Church of Sweden not only in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe (ELCZ) but also in the refugee programmes in Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana. I argue that Sweden's close co-operation with the liberation movements and the general support for liberation movements' ideologies which accommodated ecclesiastical institutions and Christianity, made up the favourable environment in which both the local church and the Church of Sweden were able to play their constructive roles both during and after the war. But the discussion is much more complex and involved than that.

I think a word is necessary concerning my choice of the ELCZ. I was born and brought up and I still belong to that Church, so that I combine personal experience and research as a basis for my insight into that Church. The ELCZ is also located in southern Midlands and Matebeleland where all the warring factions fought, including the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), ZANLA, the colonial forces, and later those of the Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole. This area therefore provides an ideal opportunity to compare the impacts of the various forces on the church.

Thus Chapter 1 is primarily for background information, and the only innovation I introduce in the already known story is to delineate quite clearly three phases of the war. Phase one which was dominated by ZAPU and its African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) ally runs from 1964 to 1969. The second phase which was dominated by ZANU runs from 1970 to 1974; while the third and decisive phase which was dominated by both liberation movements runs from 1975 to 1979.

Because one of my chief arguments is that the ideologies and strategies of the various warring factions largely determined their impact on the ELCZ and the latter's responses, I devote Chapter 2 to these issues. I attempt an analysis of the evolution of the socialist ideology of ZAPU and ZANU in the context of African socialism, the experiences of the

Russians, Chinese and Mozambicans, as well as the local and international ecclesiastical favourable atmosphere. I argue that the Zimbabwean Marxist-Leninism which accommodated Christianity was born out of these concrete circumstances which were very different from those of other nations where socialist regimes refused to co-operate with the church. I also show how the garbled apartheid ideology of the Rhodesian whites was just as anti-communism as its parent South African one, so that the colonial state tried to put every security resource at its disposal to destroy the liberation movements internally and externally. In the process of trying to destroy the guerrillas the colonial regime adopted measures which brought about untold suffering on the civilians and the church did not escape the colonial battering either. Indeed in terms of strategies I argue that the two liberation movements impinged upon the ELCZ differently because ZANLA imposed more demands on the church and the peasants through their Maoist political mobilization, restructuring of semi-liberated zones and through heavy dependence on civilians for material support than the ZIPRA which relied on the purely military approach and left the political mobilization and collection of material support from the civilians to the ZAPU political structures and officials. But the ZIPRA also weighed heavily on the church and the civilians through its aggressive recruitment drives from 1975 to the end of the war.

Chapter 3 gives the history and state of the ELCZ by the time of the outbreak of the war, emphasizing all its three missions, education, medical, and evangelical, all of which embedded it in the lives of the peasants of southern Midlands and Matabeleland. I also emphasize its indigenization - a characteristic which sharpened its responsiveness to its followers fortunes and misfortunes. In a brief review of the economic situation of Southern Midlands and Southern Matabeleland I try to show why the ELCZ which was located in such an impoverished area responded readily to the liberation forces which promised to change the political economy of its peasant followers.

In Chapter 4 and 5 I look at the actual encounter of the church with the warring forces and the consequences of that encounter. One thing which emerges quite clearly especially in the Eastern Deanery is the co-operation which ZANLA forces received from the various church centres - a co-operation which went a long way to sustaining the war in terms of financial and other material support, including medical supplies. Even though contradictions, altercations and other forms of misunderstandings

often arose between the liberation forces and the ecclesiastical workers, the general atmosphere was one of minimising them and emphasizing areas of common interest in advancing the war effort. One point which emerges in the church from a structural point of view is that during the war the central church government and administration which were based in and operated from Bulawayo were alienated from their rural parishes and that disjuncture was not remedied until during the post-war reconstruction. Moreover in the whirlwind of the war with its many pressures and demands some church institutions were closed down and even destroyed, while others remained open throughout the war. It is part of my task to suggest reasons for the closure or non-closure of the various church centres.⁸

Chapter 6 takes the discussion to the international arena by looking at the withdrawal and later reinvolvement of the Church of Sweden in Zimbabwe and the refugee camps in the neighbouring countries against a background of Swedish governmental commitment to co-operation with both ZAPU and ZANU. This remains the pattern throughout the war and at independence the Church of Sweden comes back to Zimbabwe under new forms of agreement which emphasise the changed political status of the country but acknowledge the need for close co-operation between the two churches in order to enable the ELCZ to carry out its mission effectively and to work with the new government for the development of the country generally.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that while both Professor Ranger and Dr Lan have shown how Shona traditional religion was woven in a complex manner in the fighting ideology of the peasants especially in Dande and Makoni; our study produces an equally interesting facet of the same war where both local and international ecclesiastical institutions were equally committed to the same war on the side of the liberation forces. The medical and financial support and the recruiting possibilities offered by the Church institutions to the liberation forces were very important for sustaining the war effort. In the conclusion I pay more attention to the post-war problems in the ELCZ, some of which can be traced to the war itself and the disunity of the country.

Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that my study takes place in the wake of the unity accord between ZAPU and ZANU and when it is for the first time possible to interview ex-ZIPRA combatants. I have used such interviews extensively.

Footnotes

1. David Lan, *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*, Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985.
2. Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, A Comparative Study*, London, James Currey, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1985, p.190.
3. *Ibid.* p.177.
4. *Ibid.*, pp.180-182.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.
6. Norma J. Kriger, "Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Perspectives," The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Political Science, November 14, 1988, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992
7. Ian Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, London, Longman, 1980.
8. J McLaughlin, "The Catholic Church and Zimbabwe's War of Liberation," Ph. D. Thesis, University of Zimbabwe, 1991.
9. I have also dealt with some of these issues in "Healing the War Scars in the Evangelical Church in Zimbabwe," Bhebe and Ranger (eds) *Society*, ch. 7.

1 An Overview of The War

Introduction

The liberation struggle in Zimbabwe which between 1964 and 1980 took the form of guerrilla warfare was actually the culmination of a long process dating as far back as 1893 and which over the years had developed through various distinct stages. The initial stages of the struggle were characterised by a total rejection of western imperialist capitalism, so that the Ndebele in 1893 and later the Ndebele together with the Shona in 1896/7 strove not to reform white rule but to throw the whites and everything they stood for out of the country. The defeats in the wars did not entirely cow the Africans; instead Africans changed from the use of pre-colonial methods of warfare to the use of new forms of protests which have been ably discussed by Professor T.O. Ranger in *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia*. In this long period between primary resistances and the rise of mass nationalism Africans organised petitions to the British government to ask for a fair division of the land between themselves and the white settlers; organised protest groups against their disfranchisement; engaged in strikes, boycotts and dissertations for fight against brutal economic exploitation particularly in the mines; and sometimes also resorted to religious protests which were expressed through independent churches and watch tower movements. In the 1950s these protest movements were replaced by better organised mass nationalist parties which sought to achieve independence by constitutional means, and these served to prepare the ground for the armed struggle.

The first African mass political party was the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress which was launched in Salisbury on the 12th September 1957. To mobilize both the rural and the urban Africans it tried to articulate their major economic, social and political grievances. In the

rural areas it concentrated on the adverse effects on the African population of the discriminatory land legislation, such as the Land Apportionment Act, which placed the major part of the country in white hands and herded the Africans into small reserves where they were soon overcrowded and could hardly raise enough food for subsistence; the Land Husbandry Act, whose net effect was to cut down on the amount of land and the size of the livestock per family as well as to totally dispossess many people of any means of livelihood. The nationalists also demanded the dismantling of the Native Department, which was the epitome of the whole colonial oppressive system. The African National Congress attacked the discriminatory system of education which was weighted in favour of primary schools and not secondary and vocational institutions. Total exclusion from political participation as well as the refusal of the colonial regime to legalize any form of African collective bargaining for reasonable wages and other conditions of work further drove the Africans to embrace nationalism on a large scale. When the African National Congress was banned in February 1959 its membership stood between 6000 and 7000 and it had about 40 branches spread throughout the country. Even though it pursued basically peaceful means it nearly succeeded in making the rural areas ungovernable by inciting the peasants to disobey the colonial officials who were implementing the Land Husbandry Act.³

The Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC) was succeeded by the even larger and more militant National Democratic Party (NDP) which was formed in January 1960. Unlike its predecessor, which had concentrated mostly on domestic opposition, the National Democratic Party also tried to put some pressure on Britain so that the latter might set in motion the decolonisation process in Southern Rhodesia. Indeed a constitutional conference was arranged by Britain in 1961 but unfortunately the results of it turned out to be far less than what the majority of Africans had wanted. The Africans rejected the 1961 constitution and instead turned to violence in an effort to produce better political concessions from both Britain and the Rhodesian settlers. When the National Democratic Party was banned in September 1961 and was almost immediately reconstituted under the name of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) political violence was continued. When justifying the banning of the Zimbabwe African People's Union in September 1962 the colonial government gave some indication of the extent of the violence carried out by the party's activists. 33 petrol bombs had been used at different times to cause damage to property, 18 schools

and 10 churches had been burnt, and 27 attacks had been directed towards communications.⁴

But these acts of violence failed to produce the desired results and instead pushed the white electorate in December 1962 to elect a Rhodesia Front (RF) government whose avowed policy was to retain political power as well as economic and social privileges in white hands for all times. It therefore tightened security laws and the African nationalist leaders in frustration began to blame one another for the lack of progress. Joshua Nkomo, who was the president of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, came under severe criticism from his colleagues who accused him of indecisiveness and other weaknesses. When they could not dispose of his leadership, they formed a rival party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), while Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) reconstituted itself as the People's Caretaker Council (PCC). The result was that from August 1963, when the split occurred, to 26 August 1964, when both organisations were banned, they were locked up in mutual violence in an attempt to destroy each other. The banning of the parties, the incarceration of most of the nationalist leaders and the unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesia Front regime in 1965 clearly demonstrated to the Africans that the route to independence would only have to be by the armed struggle.

The present chapter is thus a brief survey of the war of liberation and I propose to introduce a new chronological order into the discussion, which divides the war into three phases. The first phase runs from the independence of Zambia in 1964, which offered the two Zimbabwe political parties opportunities for external organisation of their military offensive, to 1969, when ZAPU liberation efforts were completely paralysed by a political crisis which was only resolved with the break up of the external section of the party into ZAPU and FROLIZI in 1971. The first phase, except for the highly publicised ZANU battle of Chinhoyi in 1966, was dominated by ZAPU and its ANC of South Africa ally. The second phase extended from 1970, when ZANU entered into an alliance with FRELIMO, leading to the launching of the struggle through the northeast of the country, to 1974, when the ZANU efforts were disrupted by an internal rebellion and other external forces. The fighting during this phase was borne almost entirely by ZANU. The third and final phase runs from about 1975, when both movements made concerted efforts to pull themselves out of their temporary setbacks and launched their decisive struggle which led to the Lancaster peace agreement of 1980.

1 ZAPU's War and The Party's Political Crisis 1964 - 1972

a) New Challenges

According to J.R.D. Chikerema, the Vice President of ZAPU until 1971, the decision to engage in the armed struggle and to send people for military training dated as far back as 1960. But at that time the struggle was not conceived in terms of mounting a guerrilla warfare but in terms "of carrying out acts of sabotage which were considered relevant to bring forth fear and despondency to the settlers in Rhodesia in order to influence the British government and the foreign settlers in Rhodesia to accede to the popular revolutionary demands of the people of Zimbabwe." This is clearly confirmed by the recollection of Dumiso Dabengwa, one of the chief moving spirits and architects of ZAPU's army and a prominent youth participant in the politics of transition from the peaceful to the violent phases of the struggle, who points out that early military training was meant to complement and intensify the sabotage activities of the youth wings of the NDP and ZAPU. Dabengwa says that he and other youth activists such as Pilane Ndebele, now a legal practitioner, Akim Ndlovu, the first ZAPU army commander and later its Secretary for Defence, and Bernard Mutuma, who joined ZANU at its formation in 1963 and immediately became its youth leader in Bulawayo, were from 1960 onwards not only critical of the pacific approach of the older nationalists but they also initiated in Bulawayo and in the surrounding white farms violent acts of sabotage which included the blowing up of electricity supply installations, maiming cattle, setting fires to chicken runs and piggeries, and taking terrorist measures against people and their families who were considered to be collaborators of the white regime. At first the weapons of the activists consisted of simple petrol bombs and other explosives made out of materials stolen from the neighbouring mines. The range and sophistication of weapons improved when the first groups trained under ZAPU returned from Ghana and China in 1962 and 1963 and brought to the youths new knowledge of the use of hand grenades and pistols (mostly smuggled from Zaire where a war was going on) and of the manufacturing of home made bombs. However, a major change in the conception of the struggle, both within ZAPU and ZANU, came about in 1964 when it became obvious that the Rhodesian Front regime intended to ban the nationalist parties as well as to detain most of

the leadership and when it was further apparent that the sporadic acts of sabotage carried out by rag-bags of trained and untrained people, who were inadequately armed, were as much failing to influence the whites to change their policies as they were simply exposing the youths to arrests by the police. Moreover the whole exercise sometimes proved to be even more dangerous to the youths themselves than to the enemy when explosives exploded in the hands and houses of their untrained users, killing not only themselves but also their families.

Furthermore, the ZANU motivation to engage in the armed struggle was inherent in that party in that right from its inception it intended to distinguish itself from ZAPU and all the other previous African parties by intensifying violence against the colonial state. It was in the context of all these factors that the idea of launching a properly organised military assault against the white monopoly of political power and economic privileges from external bases, preferably from Zambia, which was becoming independent, was born. Zambia, as it shall become apparent, had the added advantage of having Zimbabwean African families who had migrated there for agricultural and other employment opportunities during the hey days of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and many of these people supported either ZAPU or ZANU.

Thus in February 1964 ZAPU decided to send out part of its national Executive, consisting of Chikerema, George Bodzo Nyandoro, the National Secretary, Jason Ziyapapa Moyo, the National Treasurer, George Silundika, the National Secretary for Publicity, and Edward Ndlovu, the Deputy National Secretary, to Zambia to go and organise the struggle from there. It was this leadership which met with quite a number of youths who were escaping to Zambia from possible arrests for their sabotage activities to plan an overseas military training. The first to be sent to the Soviet Union in 1964 were Dabengwa, Akim Ndlovu, Ethan Dube, Edward Bhebe, Gideon Ngoshi, Joseph Nyandoro, Ambrose Mutinhiri, Jabulani Ncube and Robson Manyika. At the same time others were sent to Bulgaria, and a small number to China and North Korea, so that when they finally all returned in 1965 and assembled together with those who had trained even earlier they were about 60 altogether. Even before the return of these groups ZAPU had been able to send more recruits for training. In November 1964 Algeria offered the party training facilities so that it was able to send there a group of 120 recruits, eighteen of whom (including Nikita Mangena who was to become one of the most distinguished ZAPU's military commanders) were trained as officers. In 1965 another group of 36 recruits which was split into smaller groups was

despatched to different socialist countries for specialist training, including trade unionism. 10 of this group were sent to the Soviet Union to train first in political ideology and later in guerrilla warfare. By January 1967 all these people were back in Tanzania and also by then the OAU Liberation Committee had negotiated with the Tanzanian government for military bases for liberation movements and ZAPU was allocated one of these at Morogoro. It was here that in July 1967 a group of 19 ZAPU instructors, including Sam Moyo, who remained in this position for a long time and trained the vast majority of the early ZAPU combatants, and Nikita Mangena, began the task of localising military training as it were, so that only those earmarked for specialist and other advanced training were sent overseas or to other African countries, such as Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia, Ghana, Algeria, and later Angola. The two advisors on the ZAPU's military training localisation scheme came from Egypt and Algeria, and the Morogoro camp opened with 250 recruits. Being new in the field the ZAPU instructors took a year to fully train their first recruits; but when the next batch (which included the later army chief, Lieutenant-General Mujuru) came in 1968 the instructors had become adept in their profession and took only six months to graduate their class. By 1968 it therefore seemed as if ZAPU had reached a stage where it could fight effectively in that it was able to produce a steady supply of trained personnel to reinforce and replenish its fighting forces. But this good start was in 1969 almost completely disrupted by the political crisis occasioned by disagreements between Chikerama and J.Z. Moyo.

b) Early Ventures in Zambia

To be sure the years up to 1966 were almost in every respect inauspicious for launching guerrilla warfare from Zambia. To start with ZAPU had no bases where it could properly organise its army. Instead, as the various combatants returned from their military training they were placed in the private homes of supporters in Lusaka, on the farms owned by Zimbabwean families where they disguised themselves as ordinary labourers and in peasant homes to live like ordinary villagers. No command structure existed either. It was important that the Zimbabweans kept this low profile. As Akim Ndlovu, the first ZAPU army commander, explained, members of the Rhodesian security forces who still enjoyed freedom of movement in Zambia in the wake of the break up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland could have easily kidnapped the ZAPU trained

personnel. The second major problem related to the procurement of arms. The early arms to be brought into Zimbabwe and to be used by the youth wing were bought through the black market in such war torn zones as Zaire and some of the weapons which were used in the joint operations between ZAPU and the South African National Congress were secured in that manner. Even when from 1966 onwards Socialist and progressive African countries began to supply weapons to liberation movements under the auspices of the OAU Liberation Committee, and were cleared by the Tanzanian military authorities, it was very difficult to move such arms into Zambia because the latter was still afraid of being attacked by Rhodesia. So the arms had for a long time to be smuggled across the Tanzanian/Zambian border until ZAPU had slowly built up sound working relationships with the Zambian Army. From that point onwards the arms were delivered from Tanzania to the Zambian army and handed over to ZAPU, which stored them in a series of carefully constructed underground bunkers along the Zambezi valley.¹¹

The precarious arms logistics and early insecurity of the party in Zambia, which were compounded by the natural misunderstandings arising out of the diverse military traditions under which the first combatants were trained in different countries, reflected themselves further in the lack of a commonly agreed strategy. As we shall see, this tended to produce cases of indiscipline (or 'carelessness', as Dabengwa calls them) which frequently exposed the combatants to the enemy prematurely and forced them to fight unplanned pitched battles. In any event the organisation of the army and the infiltration of the combatants into Rhodesia took shape slowly. It appears that some of the military personnel took the initiative, independently of the political authority, to form their command structure and to choose their commanders in 1965. Akim Ndlovu was chosen to be the commander with Robson Manyika as his deputy, while Dumiso Dabengwa was made Chief of Intelligence and Reconnaissance. They did not give this armed wing of ZAPU any name then: they only knew themselves as part of the Special Affairs Development falling directly under the Vice-President of the party, Chikerama. Apparently there was quite some debate concerning what strategy to adopt.

Because of the later confusion, especially among historians and other commentators, as to what was or was not ZAPU's early strategy it is perhaps necessary to record in some detail some of the views and thoughts which went into the launching of the first guerrilla attacks. As

Dabengwa puts it: "we (the military cadres of ZAPU) then got together and decided on what was to be done... We discussed the issue that we were coming from various countries and obviously opinions on strategy were different. Certain people felt that we should all go into the country and start organising guerilla activities. Others wanted us to use the Castro method, viz., that the whole group should go into the country and start to carry out operations, recruit and train people inside the country so that we could enlarge our army that way. Others felt that no operations should be undertaken right away. Instead we should send a few people into the country to go and recruit more cadres and bring them out for training. That process was to be continued and maintained until we had a sizeable army after which we could then start operations. A third school of thought advocated for the setting up of a command system. Have rear bases and headquarters in Zambia, which would send in some people into the country, charged with the task of recruiting more cadres and where possible carry out limited operations. This view received more support than any other and this was what we recommended to the political leadership. They accepted our recommendations and asked us to form a common structure, which we did."¹² Clearly therefore and quite contrary to popular opinion, the situation was far from being simply a matter of the politicians imposing a strategy on the army or from one of simply lifting a ready made approach from some country. Even though the three top commanders had all trained in the Soviet Union it was quite apparent from the initial debates that a conscious attempt was made to evolve, perhaps by adaptation of other peoples' experiences, an approach with its attendant tactics best suited to the Zimbabwean case and circumstances.

With the command structure in shape, Dabengwa, as the Chief of Reconnaissance, together with his team, was immediately asked to map out and physically test as many crossing points as possible on the Zambezi river right from Kazungula in the west to Feira in the east. As soon as the points were identified Zambian local fishermen were hired for a small fee to cross one or two ZAPU trained personnel at a time. These people were lightly armed, strictly for their own defence, each with either a pistol or a submachine gun and a limited amount of ammunition. Their mission was to travel to certain specific points in the country where they would work with ZAPU officials in recruiting and sending people to Zambia for military training. These efforts were rewarded with a trickle of recruits crossing into Zambia. By late 1965 more and more trained personnel was returning from different countries and it was decided to

combine limited aggression in the country with the recruitment exercise, so that units of the size of a section each were infiltrated across the Zambezi at Mana Pools east of Chirundu and just to the east of the Victoria Falls. In the words of Dabengwa, the mission of these two units, "unlike the first units of one man or two men, was to actually look for targets which they thought they could attack, be they military targets which they thought they could use surprise tactics, that is attack and disappear or other installations which they thought they could attack, damage and disappear into the wild bush. This was the basis on which the two units were into the country."

During the long and arduous journey which takes two days on foot across the Escarpment from the Zambezi river to the settled areas, the eastern group was spotted and surprised by the enemy and in the ensuing fight few were killed, two were captured and the rest escaped and disappeared. The western group reached the populated area but was sold out to the enemy by people unsympathetic to the liberation cause and a few more were lost in the fighting that followed. ZAPU thus lost valuable manpower in these battles which did not produce encouraging results and also went unpublicised because the Rhodesian security forces at the time insisted on fighting what they called 'silent war'.¹³ Up to today these early ZAPU efforts remain unrecognised so much so that the nation commemorates April 28, 1966, when the battle of Chinhoyi (see pp. 31-38) was fought by ZANLA forces as the beginning of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe.¹⁴

These costly early experiences caused some rethinking in ZAPU and attempts were made to remove earlier deficiencies in the strategy. Up to the end of 1966 no attempts had been made by the party to bring together in one camp all the trained personnel, so that units which were infiltrated into the country were constituted on an *ad hoc* arrangement and most likely at the last minute. There is no doubt that some of the early errors were forced on the military by the politicians who wanted action and immediate results. This comes out quite clearly from the recollections of the then army commander, Akim Ndlovu, who says that as they were slowly planning their operations and building up the army, they were bombarded "with outcries from the political leadership both inside and outside the country, (who) were getting impatient with what they considered to be our delay in launching the armed struggle. What they wanted was to boost political morale at home and to secure support from our outside friends. Meanwhile from a military point of view (and in the light of earlier failures) we couldn't afford to be adventurous and reckless with other people's lives."¹⁵

The military leadership therefore simply suspended operations from end of 1965 to mid-1967 in order to attend to matters of organisation and effective orientation of the cadres. The new approach involved the bringing together of all the forces trained in different parts of the world for an integration exercise in which also it would be possible "to draw upon (past) experiences and to bring about some awareness among (the) cadres of the situation they were likely to encounter in the country; to teach them what to do in order to avoid the mistakes of the previous groups." For this purpose a camp called Nkomo was established 25 kilometers outside Lusaka on a farm of one of the ZAPU supporters called Matyenyika Ndlovu. It was further found that to send two or so small units to operate in such a big and well defended country as Zimbabwe was unrealistic and that it was premature to carry out any offensive operations. The best strategy therefore was "to put in as many men as possible that would work quietly inside the country, recruiting and carrying out local training of recruits and these people would only go into military action after they had reported back to headquarters and indicated that they were ready to carry out operations." ZAPU therefore spent the whole of 1966 and part of 1967 preparing for this strategy, in which a large group of men would be sent in through the northwestern part of the country with orders to split once in the country into smaller units of a section, which would then spread themselves in the western communal areas.¹⁷

c) **The ZAPU-ANC Accord**

In the midst of these preparations the ANC of South Africa entered into an alliance with ZAPU, which was announced by Chikerema and Oliver Tambo, the Deputy President of the ANC, on August 19th, 1968 as follows:

We wish to declare here that the fighting that is presently going on in the Wankie area is indeed being carried out by a combined force of ZAPU and ANC which marched into the country as comrades-in-arms on a common route, each bound to its destination. It is the determination of these combined forces to fight the common settler enemy to the finish, at any point of encounter as they make their way to their respective fighting zones.¹⁸

Even though the force was certainly trained and equipped to take on a conventional army, the bit in the joint statement about fighting the common settler enemy to the finish was intended for propaganda purposes. Yet the whole ZAPU/ANC alliance and the pitched battles fought by the forces of the two parties in 1967 and 1968 immediately drew criticisms from their counterparts in ZANU and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) of South Africa, which criticisms have since obscured the actual strategy of the ANC/ZAPU military and the motives behind it. At the time the PAC scoffed at the whole idea of the two allies trying to fight a regular army using conventional tactics and ZANU angrily attacked the alliance on the ground that it led to a concentration of South African and Rhodesian enemy forces. (This was of course before ZANU itself had gone into an alliance with FRELIMO in Mozambique and provoked increased Portuguese-Rhodesian military cooperation, especially from 1973 onwards.)¹⁹

Indeed the fundamental reason for the alliance, as is indicated in the joint statement, was, as in the case of ZANU in Mozambique, to provide the *Umkhonto WeSizwe* (the fighting wing of the ANC) with transit facilities through Zimbabwe across the Limpopo to South Africa. George Silundika, ZAPU Publicity and Information Secretary, made the same point in 1972 and 1973 when he said, "... the purpose of this joint ANC/ZAPU action was to enable the ANC comrades to pass through Zimbabwe and into South Africa, and for ZAPU guerrillas to move into various zones of operation within Zimbabwe. We intended to avoid the enemy whenever possible, but with an understanding that in case of a confrontation fighting would be immediate and joint. So, when the enemy spotted some of our combined units before they reached their destinations, there was indeed heavy fighting. This occurs in all revolutions - in your planning you have to include the battles you hope to avoid."²⁰ Even though it is now becoming increasingly apparent from some of the members of the then Rhodesian security authorities that South African military involvement in Rhodesia was occasioned by the ANC/ZAPU alliance,²¹ at the time of planning and launching of the joint forces the two parties believed that not only South Africans but even the Portuguese were having military cooperation with Rhodesia. As George Nyandoro, the General Secretary of ZAPU, put it on May 16, 1968: "The alliance, in fact, should have been born long ago. South African fascist troops have been in Rhodesia for many years now, assisting the Smith

regime, and ANC guerrillas trained outside can't enter South Africa except through Zimbabwe. As Smith, Vorster and Salazar join forces in their counter-revolutionary crusade, so must the Liberation Movements of Southern Africa draw closer together in the efforts to crush the imperialist and white settler regimes and liberate their countries."²² Furthermore the ANC, in pleading with ZAPU for the formation of the alliance, pointed out that their guerrillas who tried to pass through Botswana, which had just achieved its independence on 30th September, 1966, and was still in no position to do anything that might be interpreted as hostile to South Africa, were often intercepted by the Botswana Police and returned to Zambia. Considering that South Africa was already assisting Rhodesia, as the two parties believed then, in tracking down ZAPU and ZANU guerrillas, the ANC argued that it made good tactical sense to cross to their country through Zimbabwe and, if forced to do so, fight the South Africans on Rhodesian soil. This was therefore the basis on which ZAPU and ANC of South Africa sent into Zimbabwe 3 platoons (2 ZAPU and 1 ANC), altogether forming a unit of about 100 men, in July 1967. The crossing operation was done almost 20 kilometres east of the Victoria Falls and it took two nights to get all the men across together with their reconnaissance team which guided them right up to the Wankie National Park.²³

The instructions from headquarters were that once they got to the National Park the ZAPU contingent would first split into 4 units, so that the first unit would go to Wankie area, the second to Lupane, the third remain in Tsholotsho and the fourth was to accompany the ANC comrades and see them across the Limpopo before returning to their operational areas of Kezi, Gwanda and Beit Bridge. Further instructions from headquarters, Dabengwa tells us, were that the ZAPU guerrillas "were again to recruit, to train locally or inside the country such recruits and, wherever possible, they were to look for targets which were within their means of attack and such targets should be away from their bases, which they could hit and disappear and travel perhaps for two days back to their bases, so that they don't give the enemy the opportunity to start looking for them in an area where the attack would have been made."²⁴ Clearly the intention was not to engage the Rhodesian army in a conventional fight but to recruit and build up a large ZAPU force in the country.

But two things betrayed the guerrillas just as they were splitting up for their various assignments. First there was a case of blatant indiscipline when one of the ANC comrades refused to walk all the way to the

Limpopo and chose to go by lift in a car as far as Bulawayo, where he drew the attention of the Rhodesian security system when he stole a motor cycle and tried to cycle to the Plumtree border post with all his military equipment. He was arrested at a roadblock and apparently under torture revealed the whereabouts of his colleagues, who also were apparently beginning to be careless with their footprints in the National Park, which were soon spotted and reported to the Rhodesian security forces by the Game wardens. The Rhodesians mounted their biggest ever military action and in a series of engagements, during which they were soon reinforced by South African forces they fought for the whole of August and September and experienced the toughest resistance from some of the best trained guerrillas in the civil war. The Rhodesians apparently killed 30 guerrillas, captured the same number and the rest escaped, while they lost 7 of their own men and had 14 wounded. In Ken Flower, the Director-General of the Central Intelligence Organisation's assessment, the ZAPU/ANC combined force was "defeated only by the Security Forces' air power, mobility and much greater effectiveness in communications and medical services."²⁶ Some of those who escaped to Botswana commanded by John Dube, later ZAPU's Chief of Operations, were arrested by the Botswana Police without any resistance (following strict orders from Headquarters in Lusaka never to fight the Botswana police) and were released later to go and join their colleagues in Zambia. Still yet some escaped and disappeared in the communal population where they remained until they were able to establish links with their Headquarters and to carry out recruitment.²⁷

Towards the end of 1967 ZAPU and their ANC allies decided on fresh operations, this time through the northeast of the country and their new contingent largely trained in Cuba was similar in size to the Wankie one. More preparations went into the operation than were involved previously. A reconnaissance team and a few top commanders were sent to go and stay with the men inside the country for three months so that they could make sure that the logistical infrastructure was properly laid out. As Dabengwa puts it: "We pushed through right up to the Sipolilo area. Lots of ammunition was taken in and lots of stores of food and clothing were taken in. The idea this time was that these men were going on a similar mission as that of the last group, but to do recruitment on a bigger scale, and they had a better rear base created for them so that they should not rely only on the local population. But that they should have a strong back up for food, for arms, etc.; so we created a lot of ammunition dumps in the

area; right from the Zambezi up to almost Sipolilo Escarpment.²⁸ The setting up of dumps and pushing in of war materials, clothing and food was going to be a continuous process to make sure that as the army grew largely through local training as well as through reinforcements from Zambia the combatants would not run short of the essential supplies. The idea again was that the Zimbabwean units should break up into smaller ones so that some would go into the Kariba area, some to Bindura, some into Chinhoyi (including Musengezi) and the rest into Mazoe where it was thought there were good targets. Again, as on the previous occasion, and when the groups had just started to split, some carelessness was committed. Two combatants went to bath in the Hunyani river and when they came back to the camp they did not cover their footprints as per standing security regulations. The type of boots worn by the ZAPU fighters had a sole which left a mark shaped like the figure '8' and the game wardens had already been warned after the Wankie confrontations to be on the look out for such footprints. On this particular occasion the game wardens and police were able to track down the guerrillas to their Sipolilo hills base camp. The Rhodesians together with their South African allies once again mounted a large operation into which nearly all the available ground and air forces were hurled. In the ensuing running battles the Rhodesians claimed to have killed 69 guerrillas, captured 50 and to have lost 6 of their own men. Quite a number of the guerrillas, however, escaped and melted in the rural African population. Up to 1969 the ZAPU Headquarters in Lusaka was still receiving messages from these guerrillas.²⁹

All these defeats forced both ZAPU and the ANC to have a re-look at their strategy, their recruitment programmes, and the strength of their personnel.³⁰ Thus in May 1969 the ANC held a conference at Morogoro in Tanzania which sought to find ways and means of accelerating the 'armed confrontation with enemy'. The Morogoro conference, it was later reported, "examined in detail various aspects of (the ANC) struggle, — carried out a thorough review of (the) strategy and tactics, programmes and policies —." Members of the ANC were called upon to redouble their efforts "to eliminate flaws in our work and create and maintain an increasingly more efficient machine for the prosecution of our struggle at all levels whether we operate in South Africa or from outside its borders."³¹ That the same exercise was going on in ZAPU was indeed indicated by Vice-President Chikerema in a *Grenada* television interview on January, 1970. Chikerema clearly showed that the party was

moving away from the position of considering the armed struggle as a brief affair designed to frighten Britain into intervening in Rhodesia on the side of the Africans, but that it would be a 'protracted struggle', lasting perhaps more than five years. Contrary to what David Martin and Phyllis Johnson say, Chikerema did not change his mind from that position three months later, during the political crisis. The two authors unfortunately misquoted Chikerema, who was only describing the situation as it was way back in 1960, when the use of violence was perceived by the nationalists in a completely different light from the prolonged struggle which was about to be launched in the 1970s. In any event ZAPU did not have the full chance to effectively review its approach to the war because of the crisis which overtook it and disrupted its fighting programme for a long time.

d) Brief Assessment

A much more adequate discussion of the strategies of both ZAPU and ZANU will be done in the next chapter. At this stage it will suffice to indicate some of the serious deficiencies in the approach of ZAPU to the struggle in the 1960s, especially in relation to the Rhodesian forces. First, to reach their targets and operational areas ZAPU guerrillas had to traverse the vast unpopulated and sparsely populated Zambezi valley and escarpment, where they were easily spotted by the enemy and forced to fight battles which, to use Silundika's language, they had hoped to avoid and in which they were vastly outnumbered as well as outclassed by the superior mobility of the enemy, who further employed air power. Attempts to create a self-sufficient force in terms of food supplies and clothing in 1968, only served to isolate the guerrillas from the people "and greatly facilitated the task of the security forces." There were also cases of indiscipline and carelessness, indicating unwarranted disregard for security among the guerrillas, which often led to premature exposure to the enemy. Finally, as shall be explained more fully in Chapter 2, ZAPU's style of political mobilization was completely different from that developed by ZANU and tended to encourage further the isolation of the ZAPU forces from the people.

e) **The J.Z. Moyo and J.D. Chikerema Crisis and Recovery**

These early setbacks nearly totally paralysed ZAPU's war efforts. Serious disagreements emerged in the external leadership of the party over the respective roles and powers of each of the five leaders, especially those of Chikerema, the Vice-President; over the relationship between the political and military wings of the party; and over the recruitment and training of cadres. As accusations and counter-accusations of corruption, lack of consultation by the Vice-President and of incompetence were flung at each other, particularly between the major contestants in the drama, Chikerema and J.Z. Moyo, the quarrel soon degenerated into a regional division of the Shona on the one hand and the Ndebele and Kalanga on the other.³⁴ The crisis provoked a rebellion in the ZAPU army so that some guerrillas led by Walter Mthimkhulu arrested some top commanders and members of the External Executive and threatened to kill them unless they resolved their differences and put the struggle on a proper footing again.³⁵ This led to the intervention of the Zambian government and army not only to save ZAPU officials from the rebels but also to try and assist in the resolution of the political crisis. Both the rebels and their prisoners were confined to the Mboroma camp near Mukushi in northern Zambia. To avoid the rebellion and crisis from engulfing the whole of ZAPU, the Zambian government secured the cooperation of the Tanzanian government to put a total blackout of news and a ban on communication between the ZAPU representatives in Dar es Salaam as well as the recruits who were training at Morogoro in Tanzania on the one hand and the ZAPU guerrillas and officials at Mboroma on the other. A similar ban was imposed on any communication between Mboroma and the military camps near the Zambezi river. No arms were allowed to be shipped from Tanzania to the ZAPU military camps. Everything in terms of fighting came to a standstill and remained so until Chikerema announced the formation of a new political party (FROLIZI) on the 1st October 1971 and thereby indicated clearly that the ZAPU split could no longer be prevented. The Zambians then brought together all the ZAPU guerrillas at Mboroma and asked them to choose whom they wanted to follow - Chikerema and George Nyandoro, or the Mthimkhulu group, or ZAPU led by J.Z. Moyo, Silundika, Edward Ndlovu and Jane Ngwenya. Consequently the ZAPU army found itself split into these factions and further when some of the guerrillas decided to cross over to ZANU.³⁶ Even though some ZAPU officials today tend to give higher estimates

of the remaining ZAPU forces, it appears that the figure of about 80, which is mentioned by Cephas Cele, who was the commander in charge of the ZAPU military camps in Zambia and responsible for infiltrating the fighters into the country, and Sam Moyo, the commander of the Morogoro training camp, is more realistic.³⁷

After the split ZAPU had to start from scratch, by introducing new party and military structures, and by engaging in an aggressive recruitment and training programme of the military personnel, while limiting operations to acts of sabotage such as planting land mines in places close to the Zambian border. As J.Z. Moyo indeed put it in a letter to the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) in 1972; "At the end of the crisis in October, 1971, members of the National Executive, the Party's Representatives in various countries, cadres in military camps and representatives of Trade Unions, engaged in two months of exhaustive consultations aimed at the reorganisation of the External Mission in order to relaunch the armed struggle on an improved basis."³⁸ These people held their largest ever external conference at their Chikwenga Military Camp and resolved to set up a Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Council (ZPRC). The ZPRC was responsible for the administration of the party's military and political affairs, planning strategy and acted as the overall directing and commanding structure of the army. It was made up of 4 members of the National Executive 6 External Party Representatives, 2 Trade Union Representatives and 26 Officers from ZIPRA. The same conference constituted the High Command of ZIPRA consisting of 6 people and several regional commanders. Alfred Nikita Mangena who until then was working as one of the instructors at Morogoro, was called up to Zambia to head the army, with Lookout Masuku as his deputy. The spirit behind the formation of the ZPRC was to avoid a recurrence of any person in the party becoming a dictator as in the case of the former Vice-President Chikerema and further to ensure the participation of all wings of the party in the development of the struggle. The ZPRC thus decided on the general policy and strategy and left their implementation to the War Council, the Executive organ of the ZPRC and the rest of the command structure of the army.³⁹

In the meantime ZAPU was also under immense pressure to demonstrate that she had achieved stability and was in a position to fight. SIDA, about to become the biggest financial supporter of the Party (see also pp 52-53) had awarded but did not actually hand over financial and

other material assistance to ZAPU in the financial years 1969-70 and 1970-71 amounting to 85,000 Sw Crs. altogether on account of the internal party crisis. It was in the spirit of trying to prove to such friends as the Swedes that ZAPU was back on its feet that the party tried to pre-empt any possibility of unity between the new FROLIZI of Chikerama and ZANU, by deciding "to establish working relation with the other liberation movement in Zimbabwe - ZANU in the form of a Joint Military Command, by carrying out limited military actions in the country."⁴⁰ The Joint Military Command, which was still born, was intended to serve as a basis of unity between ZAPU and ZANU. The limited military operations on the other hand, were reported by J.Z. Moyo towards the end of 1972 as follows:

Following the end of the crisis and the reorganisation of ZAPU's External Mission, we have re-activated the armed confrontation in Zimbabwe.

On August 3, 1972, ZAPU fighters blew up a goods train near Thompson Junction on the Bulawayo-Victoria Falls line, the driver and his firemen being killed on the spot. On August 29, 1972, at Mana Pools Game Reserve in the Urungwe District, ZAPU fighters blew up a Rhodesian Army truck, killing seven soldiers. On the same day a car driven by a white farmer was also blown up resulting in the farmer losing his leg. On October 29, 1972 at Impampa in Binga District, ZAPU fighters blew up another Rhodesian army truck and killed six soldiers.⁴¹

These acts of sabotage and moves towards unity with ZANU by ZAPU were sufficient to convince the Swedish government that ZAPU had put its house in order sufficiently to qualify as a liberation movement worthy of support. The Swedes not only reinstated the annual grants by a payment of an initial sum of 50,000 Sw Crs. to the party's Zimbabwe African People's Welfare Trust account in Lusaka, Zambia, but also by allowing ZAPU to appoint Dr. Phinias Makhurane, then a Research Fellow at the University of Uppsala, as its Acting Representative to Sweden. However, it must be emphasised that from its recovery in 1972 ZAPU only engaged in acts of sabotage for publicity's sake and to maintain the image of a fighting organisation. Its emphasis until 1974, as

it shall become apparent, was on recruitment in order to lay the foundation of a long drawn out struggle. In the meantime the initiative in the armed struggle passed on to ZANU in the years between 1969 and 1974.

II. ZANU Takes The Initiative 1969-74

a) ZANU's Early Moves

Similar transformation in the conception of the struggle as happened in ZAPU in the early 1960s took place within ZANU. From its inception ZANU, as already indicated, intended to distinguish itself from ZAPU and the other previous parties by intensifying the use of violence against the enemy. But the clashes with ZAPU absorbed most of its energies at the beginning. Even before it was banned ZANU was able to demonstrate that it meant to translate into action its policy of confronting the enemy with force when it deployed the "Crocodile Gang" in June/July 1964 and also launched a programme of military training. The "Crocodile Gang" was a ZANU group of fighters led by William Ndongana, who was to become the Deputy Minister of Defence after independence was won, which operated in the eastern districts of the country. It was not trained but used basic weapons, such as home made long knives, and crude road blocks of stones to stop potential victims on the main roads. On the 4th July 1964 the group stopped a car near Melsetter, in which Mr Petrus Oberholtzer, a Rhodesian Front branch chairman, was travelling with his wife and child. Mr Oberholtzer was immediately stabbed to death and therefore became the first white victim of the war.⁴³

The qualitative change towards more organised and disciplined use of violence by ZANU began to emerge with the adoption of a positive military training programme. From the beginning the programme was firmly associated with the Chinese model. The first group to be sent for training by ZANU consisted of students originally sent to Egypt by ZAPU but who subsequently rebelled against Joshua Nkomo's leadership and joined the new party when it was formed in August 1963. They included Emmerson Mnangagwa, Minister of State in the Prime Minister's office at independence and later the Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. They were dispatched to China in September 1963 and remained there until April 1964. In China they were exposed to three

types of training. The first two months were devoted to ideological learning. "We were schooled on the thoughts of Mao Tse Tung," Mwangagwa says, "mass mobilization, guerrilla warfare where the guerrillas are supported by the masses, distinguishing Mao Tse Tung's thought from the way the October Revolution was conducted". The teaching stressed the crucial importance of the support of the rural peasantry in guerrilla warfare. After that the trainees were transferred to an infantry academy where they spent "another two months doing drill and weapon training." From there they were taken for another two months "to a military science academy where", Mwangagwa recalls, "we were taught how to manufacture things like plastic caps, handgrenades, anti-personnel mines, anti-tanks mines, etc., and what chemicals to find and how to manufacture these in mountains, in conditions that are not scientific, utilising the natural environment, getting certain chemicals from ordinary commercial chemicals..."⁴⁴ On their return home Mwangagwa and his comrades were deployed by the party to commit acts of sabotage, such as blowing up bridges, petrol stations, railway trucks, etc. Even though they put to good use their knowledge of the manufacture and use of explosives, they were not accorded any chance to employ fully their Chinese training. The party still believed that it was possible to frighten the British and the Rhodesian white settlers to a negotiating table by a few sporadic acts of violence. So until they were arrested in late 1964 their knowledge of guerrilla warfare had not been fully exploited. But what was significant about the Mwangagwa group was that it formed the first nucleus of Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU, and it was also the first group to establish concrete links with China.

The next step was not only to get people trained in China but also to make sure that such training could be made available to a lot more cadres and on a permanent basis by producing Chinese trained Zimbabwean instructors and by having Chinese military teachers brought to ZANLA camps which were, as in the case of ZAPU, granted under the arrangement with the OAU Liberation Committee by the Tanzanian government. The story of trying to bring nearer home the Chinese revolutionary experience began when Robert Mugabe, then Secretary General of the party, negotiated for training facilities in Ghana and was able to send in August 1964 at first a group of all men who were shortly afterwards joined by another batch of 40. The teaching was done by both Ghanaian military officers and some Chinese instructors and for six months the ZANLA

trainees learned mainly weapon handling, repairs and the use of explosives.⁴⁵

It was from this group that 4 were selected to go to China for advanced training in order to produce local instructors. From the end of March to the end of May 1965 the 4 cadres were put first through the Peking Military Academy where they "learned about recruitment of new cadres, leadership, materials of war and strategy". From there they were taken to Shanghai "which had been used as an underground base during... (the Chinese) war of liberation." The idea here was to expose the ZANLA cadres to the Chinese experience of operating inside enemy territory. They stayed "there for one month learning how to mobilize the masses, recruiting and other underground work." The availability of such well trained men and the unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965 by the Rhodesian whites forced ZANU to step up its military training programme by obtaining bases in Tanzania where a lot more Zimbabweans could be transported at far less costs than to China. Bernard Mutuma, who was to become Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Mines, was commissioned to open the Itumbi camp, and William Ndangana, who had led the Crocodile Gang, and Felix Santana, who had also trained in Ghana and China, went to open the Chunya camp. Within a short time ZANU was able to produce a batch of not less than 62 well trained cadres.⁴⁶ It was from this group that the guerrillas who fought the first highly publicised battle against the Rhodesians at Chinhoyi in April 1966 were selected.

The Chinhoyi and other related groups showed quite clearly the gross deficiencies of the strategies which characterised both liberation movements at the beginning of the war. The ZANU Revolutionary Council, under its External Chairman Herbert Chitepo, was in 1966 more concerned to earn international publicity, recognition and support than to prepare for a protracted struggle. It therefore infiltrated its cadres with orders to commit acts of sabotage and to attack the enemy in places that were likely to produce maximum publicity. It was in that context that ZANU infiltrated 20 guerrillas across the Zambezi with instructions to divide into 4 sections, each of which had its own target. One section commanded by Chigwida had orders to go and blow up the Beira-Umtali oil pipe line. The unit was betrayed by a contact before reaching its target and out of its 5 members 4 were rounded up and 1 was killed by the Rhodesians.⁴⁷ The second section consisting of 6 guerrillas, commanded by Mukuti was assigned for operations in Fort Victoria but was again

rounded up before it reached its operational area. The third group operated in the rich Hartley farming area. The fourth achieved some fame by engaging the Rhodesian army in a pitched battle. Its assignment was to attack the white farmers in the Chinhoyi area, but only after blowing up the Hunyani main bridge that linked the area and the town of Chinhoyi with Salisbury and also after causing a black out in the little town by destroying the electric power lines. But to obtain food they were forced to make contact with a local chairman of the party and it was during one of the visits to that official that they were spotted by an informer who reported them to the Rhodesian security agents. Within hours their hideout had been located and surrounded by the Rhodesians so that they were compelled to fight a pitched battle to defend themselves. For several hours they gallantly fought back against overwhelming enemy ground to air forces but in the end all the seven guerrillas were killed. Meanwhile the Hartley guerrillas had managed to evade enemy detection until the 16th of May, 1966, when they invaded a white farm owned by J.H. Viljoen and killed him and his wife. They were then hunted out, captured and put on trial in February 1967. Two were sentenced to death while the remaining two were sentenced to a total of 24 years in prison.²⁸ Needless to say such massive losses of well trained manpower were demoralising to the party and indicated the need for proper planning and preparation before infiltrating the guerrillas. The Revolutionary Council therefore set up the Military Planning Committee which slowly shaped the strategy for a protracted guerrilla struggle.

b) Dare reChimurenga

The review of the failures of the 1960s by ZANU revealed, just as in the case of ZAPU, shortcomings in the party's military strategy as well as serious geographical and demographic difficulties associated with efforts to launch the liberation struggle from Zambia. It became apparent that the mere shooting of a few whites and isolated acts of sabotage were unlikely to bring down the colonial regime; so only a protracted struggle was likely to dislodge the enemy. The Zambezi river posed a big problem in that once the guerrillas had crossed it they could not easily escape back to Zambia if they found themselves confronted by superior forces, while reinforcements and more supplies of equipment could not be easily rushed to their aid. Because of the sparse population in the Zambezi valley, which was not politicised either, the guerrillas were easily located

and forced by the enemy to engage in battles for which they were least prepared. The colonial regime soon constructed the Binga road to facilitate efficient daily patrolling so that it became increasingly difficult to cross the Zambezi valley without clashing with the enemy. All these helped to shape the new ZANLA strategy which involved the reorganisation of the party, increased recruitment and training of cadres, collaboration with FRELIMO, political mobilization and catching of arms in the country.

One of the major steps taken by ZANU in 1969 was an attempt to free the military from excessive domination by the politicians - a situation which had obtained under the regime of the Revolutionary Council. In 1965 when the Revolutionary Council was set up only 5 of its 17 members represented the armed forces. At that stage, as William Ndangana put it, "There was no High Command, we were officers attached to the political body".⁴⁹ The pressure for the separation of the military from the general party affairs became apparent in 1967 when, as the general staff of the army increased as the result of the rapidly expanding army, it was decided to form the Military Planning Committee. Though chaired by Noel Mukono, the civilian Secretary for Defence, the rest of the committee - Josiah Tongogara (Assistant Secretary for Defence) William Ndangana (in charge of military camps) Bernard Mutuma (logistics and supplies) and Cletus Chigowe (reconnaissance) were all trained guerrillas.⁵⁰ Substantial improvement in the organisation of the party was achieved in 1969 when the exiled leaders of ZANU set up *Dare reChimurenga* (the War Council) made up of eight members, all of whom were politicians with no military training, and the same meeting also took the major step to upgrade the Military Planning Committee to the status of the High Command, which even though still chaired by the civilian Mukono was composed entirely of trained officers. The guerrillas were now able to plan effectively for the protracted struggle and, without appearing to be disobedient to the politicians, to ignore some of the ill-conceived instructions from the civilian leaders, which were often more designed to create some favourable impression on the international arena than to win the war in Rhodesia. The removal of the politicians from the purely military affairs was also imperative because they could not always be trusted to maintain the secrecy that was so crucial in guerrilla warfare and the guerrillas sometimes suspected that the civilians leaked information which often led to their betrayal in the operational areas. Complete autonomy of the army finally came in 1973 when Tongogara became

Chief of Defense and replaced Noel Mukono as the Chairman of the High Command and representative of the army on the *Dare reChimurenga*.⁵¹

The reorganisation went hand in hand with the recruitment and training of guerrillas at Itumbi in Tanzania. The recruitment was exceedingly slow because it had to be done among the Zimbabweans who had migrated to Zambia during the years of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and also among the young men who continued to run away from Rhodesia in search of employment and education opportunities. It must be remembered that ZANU at the beginning did not enjoy, both inside the country and in Zambia, the same advantages as ZAPU because having recently broken away from ZAPU she was still a minority party. She therefore struggled even harder than ZAPU to find recruits until she opened the northeastern front and began to politicise the people in the country. Nevertheless in 1969 ZANU was able to gather a team of 45 trainees who were instructed by 8 Chinese who arrived in January of the same year. When in 1970 the 45 finished their training their places were taken by another group of 52 which moved to the new and bigger Mgagao Camp near Iringa. Recruits increased in late 1972 when ZANLA stepped up its infiltration of arms into the country and thereby impressed the people with its determination to fight. The training itself included the use and maintenance of weapons, physical fitness, tactics, and political education. In political education the writings of Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung were at the core and students were encouraged to achieve an in depth understanding of these by means of study and discussion groups. Political education further encompassed knowledge of mass mobilisation and analysis of the economic, social and political grievances of the Africans in Zimbabwe, so that the students could not only understand why they were fighting but also identify squarely the enemy. Students had to know the history, geography, climate, flora and fauna of their country, all of which enabled them to understand their people and enhanced their ability to survive as well as to strike the enemy in the protracted war where it hurt him most.⁵²

This theoretical learning was considerably complemented by the practical experience gained by ZANLA through co-operation with FRELIMO. From 1968 to 1970 ZANU officials negotiated with FRELIMO with the object of obtaining permission to penetrate Zimbabwe through the Mozambican Tete province. For a long time FRELIMO hesitated granting the transit facilities because it considered ZANU to be a rebel

group from ZAPU, the latter which like FRELIMO, enjoyed Moscow's support and therefore making the two natural allies. Moreover, FRELIMO had already initiated negotiations with ZAPU and the ANC of South Africa in 1968, offering them transit facilities through the Tete Province of Mozambique. The discussions and agreement first took place at the political leadership level and then were referred to the military commanders for implementation. Akim Ndlovu and Dumiso Dabengwa, the ZAPU army Commander and Chief of Intelligence and Reconnaissance respectively, and Joe Modise and Walter Mavuso for the ANC met in Lusaka with the military leaders of FRELIMO, Samora Machel, first President of Mozambique, and Joaquim Chissano, now President of Mozambique, and decided on a programme of implementing their military cooperation. The first step was to send a consignment of arms which the Mozambican comrades needed immediately, in a truck driven by Killion Dube, a ZAPU member from Kezi. The second decision involved the sending of the ZAPU deputy commander, Robson Manyika, to Tete to go and work with FRELIMO while studying the conditions so that ZAPU would be in a position to know how many people and with what type of training and equipment to send, what kind of operations these people would undertake and in what direction they would go. In the middle of all this the J.Z. Moyo - Chikerama crisis set in, preventing ZAPU from following up the agreement. This left ZANU to inherit not only the FRELIMO offer but also the gains achieved by Robison Manyika, who defected to ZANU to escape paralysis and virtual inaction in ZAPU.⁵³

Because ZAPU was then totally disabled by the Chikerema split and because ZANU showed that it was gearing itself to resume the war in earnest FRELIMO provisionally agreed to work with the latter and that inaugurated a relationship which transformed ZANU into the major fighting force in the Zimbabwe war up to 1977 and also began a bond of friendship between the two parties which was to outlive the war. Thus in mid-July 1970 a team of 4 ZANLA combatants was selected to go and work with FRELIMO in the Tete province, then under the command of the seasoned Jose Moyane. Moyane later recalled what it was exactly the ZANLA were to learn from FRELIMO. ZANLA guerrillas, he said, were to study "how we started fighting and after the fighting began what problems arose. They visited all the sectors of operations and saw how we organised the soldiers and how we organised the population. They were integrated into the process and saw all the problems associated with armed struggle - success, failures, difficulties and how they were over-

comed. The experiences were transmitted to the comrades." Even though one or two were soon replaced by others because of their negative attitude, the rest so avidly availed themselves of the FRELIMO experiences and so effectively transmitted them to ZANLA that when the latter resumed the war in the northeast it had shed off many of the serious blunders of the 1960s. By 1971 ZANLA was confident enough to begin laying the groundwork for the war. A group of 60 combatants was detailed to carry out the caching of arms. They transported the weapons on foot, from the FRELIMO base of Chifombo to the Zambezi valley in two relays at a time, with each leg of the relay lasting about 3 days. From the Zambezi valley the arms were carried by the local peasants.⁵⁵

c) The start of the People's War

In the meantime for operational purposes ZANU called the northeast of the country the Tete province which was first divided into two and later three sectors - the Nehanda, which was under the command of Rex Nhongo; Chaminuka sector under Kenneth Gwindingwi and the Takawira sector. We get some idea of how the arms were infiltrated into the country and also how some effective working relationship was soon achieved between guerrillas and local people from the recollections of commander Rex Nhongo.

In 1971 the area of operation was divided into three sections... I was in charge of Nehanda sector. We crossed the Zambezi. The material that we had left in the Zambezi valley was quite a lot and we could not carry it all. I was commander of twenty-one people so I asked for the people's (Zimbabwean people) help. We organised the masses, we found three hundred to four hundred people willing to carry our weapons in Nehanda sector but they did not know what it was that they were carrying. They came one night and spent the day with us. We were about 2 kms inside Mozambique. They wanted to know what we were asking them to carry and we told them that there were radios for sale and we would reward them for their services. They carried the weapons to Chiweshe village - about 4 kms away. We then told the carriers the truth that it was war equipment. These

people were happy to hear this and said they would help us carry again as long as it was equipment for use in liberating the country, we quickly moved the equipment to different parts of the sector. We sent some to St Alberts and some 10 kms north of the Centenary. We then went back and found another five hundred villagers and carted more weapons. There was no problem. They knew that these were weapons of war in form of radios. The enemy did not know what was happening.⁵⁶

Not only were the people happy to participate in the caching of arms but they also responded supremely well to the ZANLA recruitment programme. The ZANLA High Command decided that in addition to the caching of arms which would ensure a steady supply of weapons in the operational areas it was also vital to build up a reserve pool of trained personnel in the rear bases which would guarantee continuous reinforcements and replacement of combatants as the latter got killed or disabled in action at the front. An additional reason for an active recruitment programme, according to Rex Nhongo, was the need for ZANU to be recognised by the OAU. "At the first meeting at Chifombo", Nhongo recalls, "... We resolved that we would recruit more trainees so that ZANU would be recognised by the OAU. What happened was that when the group of forty-five and the group of fifteen left Tanzania (to go and transport the arms), there were very few recruits left behind. Therefore it was a problem for *Dare reChimurenga* to go to the OAU and say we had some fighters, when we did not have any..." In the Nehanda sector therefore Nhongo decided that before any fighting could begin his group should carry out massive recruitment. Consequently, he says, "We managed to recruit three hundred and fifty. This was the first group that we recruited that left for (Tanzania). We recruited another four hundred." As this second group was crossing the Zambezi fighting in the Nehanda sector could no longer be avoided because the enemy seemed to intensify his surveillance and was therefore threatening to take the initiative. The guerrillas decided to strike first. Thus the opening of the Tete province was a colossal breakthrough for ZANLA's new strategy of conducting a prolonged armed struggle which needed to be sustained by a steady supply of weapons, a continuous stream of recruits, and local support of the people. Moreover, once the war resumed the OAU recognised ZANU as one of the strongest liberation movements in Zimbabwe and authorised its Liberation Committee to supply the ZANLA with war material.⁵⁷

Indeed Martin Meredith in his book *The Past is Another Country* shows how ZANLA in 1972 wormed its way into the confidence of the peasants and thereby earned the latter's fullest co-operation by professing to be fighting for the redress of their grievances, by working closely with their religious authorities and by pointing to the example of FRELIMO next door which was rolling back Portuguese imperialism. "The essential factor was then support of the local population", says Meredith. "To overcome initial doubts," he goes on, "ZANU officers played on grievances over taxes, government conservation measures, poor soil; they pointed to the success that FRELIMO was having in Tete; and of crucial importance, they persuaded the local spirit mediums, in whom the tribesmen had implicit faith, of the legitimacy of their cause".⁵⁸ The role of the *mhondoro*, who cooperated with the guerrillas, in the northeast of Zimbabwe during the late war is the subject of a detailed and excellent study by David Lan. Lan shows how when the guerrillas first came into the northeast of the country were taken to the *mhondoro*, who had a tradition of resistance against colonial rule and its attendant cultural influences. The *mhondoro* soon achieved political power and enormous influence, both of which were transferred by the people from the chiefs, who were puppets of the white rulers, and thrust upon the spirit mediums. The guerrillas, who were always pragmatic and ready to use whatever institutions were powerful enough to advance their war efforts, quickly cooperated with the *mhondoro* and used their influence to mobilize the peasants effectively.⁵⁹ Some spirit mediums joined the guerrillas in their rear bases in Mozambique where they blessed the combatants and their arms so that they could be attended by success in the operation areas, while others secretly toured the villages in the communal areas persuading the people to cooperate with the freedom fighters. The local people were soon so won over that they maintained absolute secrecy over the activities of the guerrillas. "For six months", Meredith tells us, "while the guerrillas were building up an extensive network in the northeast, no word of their activities reached the administration. With local support, the guerrillas located sage infiltration routes and suitable spots for arms caches, they recruited hundreds of (local people) and porters and sent others to Tete for crash courses in guerrilla training; older men and women were enlisted to supply food. Hundreds of tons of arms and medical supplies were carried across the border and, until 1972, the supply column, on occasions more than one hundred strong, managed to avoid army patrols. Local (people) hedged to cover their movements by driving cattle in the wake of the tracks".⁶⁰

Enjoying all these advantages of careful planning and preparation, ZANU, though forced by enemy attacks to resume the war when the party would have preferred to extend the period of political mobilization and recruitment, was able to sustain the struggle for two years from October 1972 to mid-1974. It was indeed a demonstration of how ZANLA had assimilated Mao's lessons as well as the FRELIMO example on the waging of a protracted guerrilla warfare and also how the liberation movement had successfully adapted such teachings to their own Zimbabwean circumstances. The Nehanda, Chaminuka and Takawira sectors covered the communal areas and the adjacent European commercial farms in the administrative districts of Sipolilo, Centenary, Darwin, Rushinga, Bindura and Mtoko. ZANLA guerrillas divided themselves into small sections of not more than 7 fighters, who struck at widely dispersed targets, and laid mines and ambushes in places far apart and with such relative co-ordination that they achieved some of the cardinal objectives of guerrilla warfare as laid down by Mao, viz. to harass the enemy, to attack his weak spots, to force him to disperse his forces, and for the guerrillas to maintain superior mobility so as to deliver a lightning blow and withdraw quickly.⁶¹

On mobility in particular the overall commander of the Nehanda sector, Rex Nhongo, says when they started attacking targets in Centenary in 1972 "the enemy thought they had closed us in but we would attack then spend two days and two nights walking back. If we attacked an area we would not stay, we would walk for twelve hours going back so that they would start searching after we had left. This helped us a lot and the comrades realised that this was the way to stay alive". Moreover if the guerrillas thought that the enemy had intensified surveillance in the operational areas and there was no chance of using local hideaways without being detected they would withdraw for a long time to the FRELIMO bases just across the border until enemy activity had scaled down.⁶³

In the meantime the Rhodesian security forces only tasted of the renewed war and of the significantly strengthened ZANLA forces by more thorough training and more advanced weapons than had been the case in the 60s on the 10th October 1972 when the guerrillas were forced to fight a pitched battle for the whole day. At the end of the day the guerrillas, who had lost only one person, scattered and then re-grouped after 10 days. In late November the Rhodesians had occasion to see for themselves the sophistication of ZANLA weaponry and to learn of the

support the movement had among the local people when one of their patrols in the Mzarabani communal area ran into a big column of porters carrying a large quantity of military equipment. These confrontations in which the freedom fighters were forced to fight by the enemy and therefore did not enjoy the advantage of taking the initiative forced them to go on the offensive. Thus on the 21 December a Nehanda sector section of 7, which was commanded by Jairos, decided to attack the homestead of the Altena Farm in Centenary. They first cut off the telephone wires and planted land mines on the road leading to the farmstead. They then opened fire on one of the houses in which the children of the family and their grandmother happened to be sleeping and wounded one child. When the Rhodesian security forces came to investigate the shooting they were hit by the landmines.⁶⁴

Meanwhile the Altena family sought refuge in a neighbouring farm which also two nights later was attacked by the guerrillas using a rocket and grenade. This time the owner of the Altena farm was also wounded. The guerrillas escaped after looting the farm store and burning down some workers' residences and a Muslim worshipping place.⁶⁵ Another Nehanda sector section also planted three landmines in different parts of Centenary, two of which were hit by army trucks while the third was hit by a civilian motorist. At the beginning of January 1973 the guerrillas operating in the Chaminuka sector decided to consult one of the local spirit mediums of *Chaminuka* who lived in one of the farms called *Gwerevende*. This was one of the ways in which the guerrillas mobilised the people and directly involved them in the conduct of the war. As Tungamirai, who was to become Air Marshall in Zimbabwe, remembers those consultations with the medium:

At dusk there was drum beating and we went through the ordeal of eating unsalted meat. The medium told us that the war would only be fought and won by twelve men. That was unbelievable. That we should first of all attack Mount Darwin and the Europeans would flee to Bindura then to Shamva then to Harare and the war would be over. That the leader should go back and find the biggest gun and use it to overthrow the Government.⁶⁶

Even though the messages of the medium sounded fantastic, the fact that the guerrillas went through the consultation motions and even

appeared to obey some of the advice certainly helped to cement their relationship with the people and to draw the latter fully into the war effort. Indeed that night nine of the guerrillas went to attack Mt Darwin while three of them remained behind to destroy one of the major local bridges with landmines.

The same guerrilla group attended a similar consultation ceremony on the 11th of January. "It was usual," Tungamirai says, "to take off our shoes and put our guns in a hut while the ceremony went on. We were sitting like this with drums beating when the enemy came in search of us. Somehow they had tailed us. Someone shouted that the whites had come and we quickly put our shoes on and went for our guns. We ambushed them, killing two and capturing one man, we put the two bodies in the Datsun Pick-up the fleeing security forces had left behind and Cephas drove to Nyakasikana where we burnt the truck and with the help of the villagers dug a trench, buried the truck and covered up the top with grass to stop the security forces finding the trench. Then we crossed back to Mozambique."⁶⁷

Clearly the collaboration with the local spirit mediums enabled the guerrillas to turn the struggle in the northeast of the country into the people's war, in which they participated cheerfully by helping to destroy enemy property, supplying information on his troops' movements, and by feeding the freedom fighters. With regards to feeding, Rex Nhongo later recalled that they had problems persuading the Malawian immigrant workers who were the majority employed in the farms to give them food. But they had not the slightest problem obtaining food in the communal areas "because the people understood what we were fighting for" so that they even willingly slaughtered their domestic animals to ensure that the fighters were supplied with fresh meat. The guerrillas had thus established that crucial rapport which according to Mao is essential to ensure the freedom fighters' long survival in the enemy's rear or territory. Meanwhile the captured prisoner who was taken to Mozambique was Gerald Hawkesworth, a white land inspector and therefore an enemy of the communal peasant in that he was associated with the evils of the Land Apportionment Act and its related Land Husbandry Act. Again following Mao's injunction that guerrillas should destroy the enemy "by treating his captured soldiers with consideration," ZANLA treated Hawkesworth well until his release in Dar es Salaam at the end of the year. This was meant to counter the Rhodesian propaganda which portrayed the freedom fighters as *magandanga* (terrorists or bandits, evil destroyers of life and

property). ZANLA sustained their spectacular war efforts in the northeast until mid-1974 when their insurgent activities were completely disrupted by internal upheavals and external destabilizing forces.

d) The Rhodesians' Response

In the meantime, while Ian Smith acknowledged as early as the 4th of December 1972 that in the northeast "the security position is far more serious than it appears on the surface," he did not intend to defuse the situation by peaceful methods. Instead he and his security forces wanted either to flush or wipe out the guerrillas both by military and tough administrative measures by mounting the operations code named Op. *Hurricane*. As an indication of the way the Rhodesian regime intended to root out the guerrillas by force, on the 1st of January 1973 it extended the national service in the armed forces from 9 months to one year. Eight days later the Rhodesian government closed the border with Zambia hoping that that would intimidate Kaunda into restricting the activities of the guerrillas. The latter had no effect since the Zambians were determined to support the liberation of Zimbabwe, so that even when Smith reversed his decision and decided to re-open the border three weeks later Kaunda simply refused to rely on the Rhodesian railways. Internally Smith adopted brutal counter-insurgency against the guerrillas and the peasants who supported them. First government officials were empowered to summarily impose collective punishment on the villagers if one of them was suspected of collaborating with or supporting the freedom fighters. If the villagers could not raise cash fines, their livestock was seized instead. In February 1973 the regime grew even more ferocious in its treatment of the peasants, particularly in the Chiweshe communal area which bordered the Centenary white farms. All schools, clinics, churches, grain mills, shops and businesses in the communal areas, in the farms and the Chesa Purchase Area were shut down at the same time as the security forces were unleashed to sweep the area. "Aircraft dropped thousands of leaflets displaying close-up pictures of the corpses of recently killed guerrillas and offering rewards for information". The peasants were also told that their closed institutions and facilities would be opened as soon as they gave information leading to the apprehension or killing of the guerrillas. Thousands of peasants were also removed from the border, "screened and resettled in other districts". Their houses and other forms of property which could not be moved were destroyed or confiscated. The

border with Mozambique was declared a 'no-go' area where people were shot on sight. The transit camps hastily put up for the peasants to stay before being resettled had no sanitation and health facilities and were so overcrowded that children and babies frequently got wiped out by outbreaks of cholera and measles. In the rest of the northeast communal areas, the regime tightened its control of the peasants by setting up local militia who were commanded by especially trained but often cruel District Assistants (DAs); roads were built; and protected villages established.⁷⁰

Certainly these measures were ill-conceived, cruel and therefore in a large measure counter productive. Smith believed that peasants supported guerrillas not out of a genuine desire to get rid of deep-seated grievances but out of intimidation by the freedom fighters. He therefore thought that he could easily win over the rural masses by tough action or show of strength. Unfortunately colonial deprivation and oppression over the years had been so much that when peasants saw their own sons who were not only well armed with Chinese and Russian fearful guns but were also willing to die, they also became overcome by an incandescent resolve to endure whatever counter-measures were adopted by the Rhodesians. With the rapidly rolling back of Portuguese imperialism next door in Mozambique people were given hope that the liberation process, though painful, would materialise soon in freedom. In fact when the Rhodesian regime resorted to collective punishment and confiscation of livestock, peasants preferred to donate them to freedom fighters across the border. For instance, when William Ndangana was arrested by the rebels in December 1974 and taken to one of ZANLA camps called Teresera I, he had occasion to witness the extent to which the peasants of the northeast were prepared to sacrifice their property in support of the liberation war. At Teresera I, Ndangana says, "There were five hundred people and one hundred and eleven cattle. Each day two bulls were slaughtered to feed the people because there was no other food. The people of Mount Darwin area had started giving the freedom fighters food until none was left then they resorted to giving cattle".⁷¹

But to say all this is not to imply that the Smith regime's measures were entirely not attended by some success. They did produce collaborators among the peasants, who were prepared to pass information on the movement of the guerrillas. The collaborators were either voluntary ones or those who were forced to produce information after severe and brutal

torture. Guerrillas soon developed devices to stem that flow of information. Those who willingly collaborated with the regime were apprehended, tried in front of their own people and if found guilty as traitors they were executed or severely punished.

But to avoid peasants being unnecessarily subjected to torture by the regime, when a ZANLA group was fed by villagers, the latter were permitted to report the event to the security forces twelve hours or so after the freedom fighters had left. Martin Meredith, in his excellent book *The Past is Another Country*, however suggests that the Rhodesian counter measures were apparently so successful that for ZANLA: "To bolster their ranks, they embarked on a largely unsuccessful campaign of abductions in the border region". He cites the abortive abduction of 280 children and staff from St Albert's Mission in July 1973.⁷² There is another dimension to the St Albert's episode which suggests that the abduction was undertaken by Thomas Nhari (Raphael Chinyanganya) in a bid either to outdo or match the spectacular recruitment successes of Rex Nhongo, who in less than a year had gained 750 recruits and as a result was a rising star in ZANLA ranks. Nhongo says that he had been commander in the Nehanda sector for a long time when he got a message from his superiors at Chifombo that he was wanted to attend a *Dare* meeting to review the whole war situation. Before going back he asked for a strong person to come and replace him as a commander.

The freedom fighters wanted a strong man to command them, ... T. Nhari was sent to replace me. I knew him well because we had trained together in Bulgaria and Tanzania. He was well trained so I was satisfied. I went back and at Chifombo on the Zambia-Mozambique border, I met Cde Tongogara, Chigove, Mayor Urimbo and others. We greeted each other happily. I had spent two years inside. We discussed matters then at 8.00 p.m. while listening to the news we heard that all students at St Albert's had been taken by guerrillas. This was amazing to us because it was not in our strategy that students should be taken. We wanted students to be left to their books. But Nhari was now of the opinion that I had beaten him to it. That I was famous because of the way I had recruited so he wanted to cover up once and for all. He recruited the whole school forcibly. After seven days Nhari arrived with three girls and one boy out of four

hundred. He had forced those students with no experience. This did not please us. Up to now I think this is where the problem of Nhari and his friends wanting to take over our Party started.⁷³

The St Albert's students and their teachers were victims of some power struggle and competition for recognition for heroic achievements within ZANLA. They were not abducted due to any recruitment difficulties experienced by the movement. In fact that could never be the case because once the Rhodesian regime began to harass peasants, refugees started drifting to the liberated zones or the ZANU/FRELIMO bases in Mozambique and it was from those refugees that most recruits were obtained.

e) **Swedish Assistance to ZANU**

That ZANU no longer had the problem of recruitment becomes even clearer from the story of the increasing Swedish support for ZANU's humanitarian projects and programmes, whose size tended to match the refugee problem handled by the liberation movement. It is a fact which was also acknowledged by all the liberation movements in Southern Africa and in the former Portuguese territory of Guinea Bissau that the size of the Swedish material and financial support to each of the movements was in fact a realistic indication of the intensity of its fighting and consequently of the magnitude of the refugee and related problems it was handling. As Edward Ndlovu, ZAPU's External National Secretary, rightly quoted one of the SIDA brochures, Sweden was "the first nation in the Western world to allocate government funds for humanitarian assistance to the National Liberation Movements in Africa."⁷⁴ Indeed this was demonstrated by the financial figures which were proposed by the SIDA's Advisory Refugee Committee in Lusaka to be the basis for negotiations for the aid to each of the liberation movements for the fiscally year 1974/75. Astrid Bergquist, head of the Committee in Lusaka, reported to the SIDA Head Office in March 1974: "The Committee decides for PAIGC cooperation amounting to 20 million Kronor, for FRELIMO 15 million Kronor, for MPLA 4 million Kronor in addition to the reservation for 1973/74, — for SWAPO and ZANU at least 500,000:- and at most 1 million Kronor and for ZAPU 50,000 for its Welfare Trust."⁷⁵ The financial ranking which put ZANU well above ZAPU

indicated the real fighting commitments and refugee responsibilities of the two parties as reflected in their requests for assistance and as perceived and assessed by the Swedish Embassies in Zambia and Tanzania independently and informally with the cooperation of the O.A.U. Liberation Committee.⁷⁶

Even though Swedish direct aid to one of the Zimbabwe liberation movements, ZAPU, as we have seen (pp. 35-36), was first granted but not actually paid sometime in 1969, Swedish expressions of solidarity with the oppressed masses of Southern Africa dated as far back as the 1950s. As far back as then Swedish intellectuals, editor and churchmen who were familiar with the situation in South Africa and Southern Africa in general were helping to shape public opinion against apartheid in South Africa and colonialism in Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. By 1962 Swedish public opinion was sufficiently strong to enable the government to produce "policy guidelines for Swedish development cooperation", which ultimately paved the way in 1964 for a Swedish "government proposal for Special funds for educational purposes in Southern Africa, and the setting up of a special committee to give advice on the development of a programme for this assistance." The first to benefit from all this was FRELIMO when Sweden gave financial support to the Mozambique Institute, which cared for Mozambican refugees, in Dar es Salaam and was set up in 1964.⁷⁷ Direct support to the liberation movements of South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories was formally sanctioned by the Swedish Parliament in 1969, and the support was said to be limited to humanitarian and educational aid.⁷⁸ This opened the way for both ZANU and ZAPU to seek Swedish aid for their refugee programmes.

ZANU perhaps put out its feelers for Swedish cooperation and assistance in 1969, but certainly at the beginning of 1970 the party made definite moves to establish relations with Sweden. In April 1970 Richard C. Hove, ZANU's Secretary for External Affairs, held discussions with SIDA officials in Stockholm in an attempt to persuade them to help finance "the establishment of a ZANU office in Stockholm to take charge of our affairs in Scandinavia". Although the request was turned down a way out was suggested "that SIDA would be prepared, if (ZANU) sponsored a student, to give such a student a scholarship on less strict terms than normally required of ordinary students - that is, that the grant would not be withdrawn because the student had not passed his exams." This enabled the party to appoint Mr Sydney Sekeramayi, who already

held a SIDA scholarship, and he represented the party for the whole of 1971 after which he was replaced by Claude Chakwenda.⁷⁹

Apart from formal diplomatic links, the party requested financial assistance on the basis of the humanitarian programme it was running, looking after the school going children and families of detainees. In response to the formal application signed by Mr Herbert Chitepo, ZANU National Chairman, on the 30th March 1972, SIDA, on the recommendation of its Advisory Refugee Assistance Committee in Lusaka, decided to give the party a grant of 70,000 Sw. Crowns. SIDA left the door open for further ZANU requests for assistance by asking the party to submit by March 1973 its account of the use of the grant together with a request for a fresh grant in the Swedish fiscal year 1973/74.⁸⁰

Because of some of the spectacular ZANLA military exploits which marked the inauguration of the people's war in the northeast in the latter part of 1972 the Secretary for External Affairs, Richard Hove, had little difficulty in justifying the party's request to SIDA for financial assistance for the year 1973/74. His application for assistance not only smacked of someone glorying in the good work of his forces in the operation field but he was also able to indicate how the enemy reprisals which were often directed against the defenceless civilians had suddenly increased the refugee responsibilities of the party. Richard Hove's letter in fact made the party's case by reviewing briefly the events, as admitted by the Rhodesian regime itself, leading to the intensification of the ZANLA war in Rhodesia. He reminded the party's supporters of how the Rhodesian regime had announced that it had uncovered a ZANU hide out in Salisbury, forcing the party to change its plans of launching the struggle immediately to working quietly inside the country. When ZANLA increased its preparatory activities in the northeast of the country the Rhodesians accused FRELIMO in October 1971 of operating in their country. Soon these activities were considered too wide spread in the northeast that Ian Smith proclaimed the road linking Malawi and Salisbury "a security risk and that people who used it did so at their own risk." It was only "On December 21st 1972," Hove declared, "(that) the regime admitted the first encounter with ZANU fighters," even though "encounters between the combined Rhodesian and South African forces and our people had long started." The response of the Rhodesian regime to ZANLA's intensification of the war had been to mete out brutal measures to the civilian population which was accused of providing sanctuary for the combatants.

The Smith regime has, however, over-reacted to the events inside Rhodesia and in doing so it has taken to bombing of areas suspected to harbour freedom fighters and these areas are populated by civilians. Only last week the regime announced the arrest of 180 people for having rendered assistance in one form or another to freedom fighters. In fact, our information is that the number is much higher and, too, that the police and army terrorise the people in an attempt to get information of freedom fighters.⁸¹

The bombings and other repressive measures, according to Hove, were producing hundreds of refugees who were running into Mozambique. "No doubt we can and are using some of these people," he said. "But we are overwhelmed with the problems of feeding and clothing them. We have among these people women and children. The problem of medicines and medical care has become terribly acute and I am writing to request whether you could, through your contacts, raise us the following:

- a) medicine (list attached)
- b) mobile clinic (vehicle fitted with two stretchers, etc)
- c) tinned foods
- d) second-hand clothing."⁸²

The ZANU application had no difficulty in securing a sympathetic response from SIDA through its Advisory Refugee Assistance Committee, except that the request did not contain vital information such as the exact figures of the refugees and their whereabouts. SIDA in fact got the wrong impression that ZANU was applying for assistance on the basis of their refugee responsibilities in Zambia when as a matter of fact the party's major cares were now "along the border between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia," an issue clarified by the ZANU leaders (Richard Hove, Secretary for External Affairs, and S.V. Mutambanengwe, Political Secretary, and M.K. Hamadziripi, Treasurer) at a meeting held with SIDA officials in Lusaka to assess the ZANU application on the 23rd February 1973. On the 9th of March 1973, Richard Hove was able to elaborate in writing upon the magnitude and location of the existing and anticipated refugee responsibilities of ZANU, in the wake of its intensification of the war effort. Thus Richard Hove presented the refugee problem as follows:

a)	The number of refugees:	
	November 1972	71
	December 1972	198
	January 1973	378
	February 1973	465
	March 1973	209
		<u>1 314</u>

- b) (i) *Pipeline: Those known to have passed the front-line bases number more than 300. The front-line bases are well within Rhodesia and it is possible they can be joined by others. But they can also be attacked, arrested, bombed and or dispersed by the Rhodesian Security before crossing the Mozambique-Rhodesia border.*
- (ii) *Expected inflow: The Smith regime has obviously over panicked and in the process has resorted to massive bombing of civilian areas, communal punishments, arrests, detentions etc. The sum total of all these barbaric measures is that it will make it difficult for a lot more of our people to stay within the country. We do our best to discourage people from fleeing the country but we nonetheless expect an increased flow of people as the struggle intensifies.⁸⁴*

The difficulties of ZANU relative to the refugees were compounded by the fact that the party could not have easy access to Zambian hospitals nor was the Zambian government prepared to have the Zimbabwe refugees and war casualties publicised for fear of providing the Rhodesians with excuses of conducting economic and military reprisals. For instance, not only had the Rhodesians closed their border with Zambia

recently, but they had also planted landmines in Zambia which had claimed many lives of Zambian citizens, all in an effort to put pressure on the Zambians to stop supporting Zimbabwean liberation movements. The consequence was that ZANU could not take its war victims to Zambia for medical treatment, except the very serious ones, and could not allow its international supporters including the SIDA Advisory Refugee Committee to visit its refugee camps to assess problems for themselves. Instead SIDA relied on the views of the Zambian Refugee Service and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, who apparently had some means of finding out the true position and indeed discovered that "there (was) an urgent need of the medicine and goods for persons who (had) been forced to leave Southern Rhodesia", by ZANU's intensification of the war in the northeast.⁸⁵

At the meeting held in Lusaka on the 19th of September 1973 between the ZANU representatives Herbert W. Chitepo, Mukudzei M. Mudzi, Henry M. Hamadziripi, Noel Mukono and Richard Hove and the Swedish officials Kurt Kristiansson and Bo Wilen, both of the SIDA office in Lusaka, and Stig Lovgren, Purchase Section, SIDA, (Stockholm) and Anders Mollender, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Stockholm), ZANU was not only promised a fresh grant of 200,000 Sw. Crs. for the 1973/74 financial year but its 1972/73 grant of 70,000 Sw. Crs. was raised by an additional sum of 100,000 Sw. Crs. ZANU's highest priority was to get money to purchase a farm in Zambia "to house dependents of ZANU-members and others who (had) fled from Rhodesia and sought refuge with ZANU." Since the farm had not been mentioned in the initial application in February it was decided that the party should give two alternatives of priorities - one containing the farm and the second without the farm.⁸⁶ In the event SIDA approved the alternative which allowed ZANU to purchase land for its refugees, even though in the end ZANU did not buy the farm but spent the whole grant on the immediate needs of the refugees, such as the purchase of food, fabrics, medicines and also photographic equipment and paper for publishing ZANU propaganda to counteract the Rhodesian efforts in that direction.⁸⁷ The major point to observe is that ZANU's intensification of the war in the early 1970s and the brutal reactions of the Rhodesian regime which were directed at the ordinary people led to some firm and institutionalised relationships with such friendly donor countries as Sweden. ZANU was now seen as the principal fighting force in Zimbabwe whose humanitarian responsibilities were mounting each year and were therefore requiring corresponding increase in annual aid.⁸⁸

This point was made by Herbert Chitepo, the National Chairman of ZANU, in his request for assistance from SIDA of the financial year 1974/75. He wrote: "With the increase of ZANU activities inside the country and outside, it has also increased the number of people who fall under the care of our Party. The increase means increased obligation and responsibility to the Party of providing welfare and social services for our people. Moreover, besides the above obligation and responsibility, ZANU has a duty to counteract the enemy's devastating propaganda. This can only be effectively countered by the Party having a Publicity Department which runs a true and effective information service to enlighten our people and our friends all over the world as well as reminding our foes about the true situation in our country. There is also great need for the Party to carry out political education amongst our people."⁸⁹ Consequently ZANU needed Swedish aid amounting to 1.2 million Swedish Crowns. In the negotiations between ZANU and the Swedish officials the total grant to ZANU for 1974/75 was finally reduced to 860,00 Swedish Crowns and later raised to 872.000. Essentially what was eliminated were the requests for an agricultural programme because the farm had not yet been purchased and the importation of agricultural equipment required the concurrence of Zambia as the host country. Otherwise the Swedes gave ZANU 345,000 Sw. Crs for the transfer of food supply, vehicles, medicine, clothes and equipment for the Information Department; and 315,000 for the Zimbabwe Welfare Trust Fund.⁹⁰

This increased Swedish support for ZANU was happening against a background of both the intensified ZANU guerrilla warfare and of immense political changes in Southern Africa. The liberation struggles in the Portuguese colonies had produced a coup by some military officers in Lisbon in April 1974, which signalled the beginning of the decolonization of the Portuguese colonies. The imminent transfer of power to the African liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique was pregnant with immense security and political implications for South Africa and for Rhodesia in particular. The process too had implications for the manner in which Great Britain perceived to be the best manner of securing her economic and other neo-colonial interests in Southern Africa. Any political, military and diplomatic adjustments in the region by Britain and South Africa, which might involve Rhodesia, were bound to affect the attitude of the various Southern African black states supporting the liberation movements, such as Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania.

It was in the context of those immense imminent changes in Southern Africa that Chitepo expressed to his Swedish supporters his broad fears and hopes, outlined how he thought ZANU should react and then delineated what he thought should be Sweden's appropriate role. Chitepo did this in a private conversation with the Swedish Minister Gustaffson in Lusaka on the 30th October 1974, and the conversation was of such importance that it must be referred to as fully as possible. It showed Chitepo's tremendous capacity for foresight which apparently served as a basis for his forwarding planning. It contained elements of the explanation for his stubborn refusal to be involved in the Kaunda-Vorster detente negotiations as well as in the related scheme of uniting ZANU and the other African parties, which perhaps contributed to his assassination on the 18th March 1975. The conversation also contained indications of how ZANU rated her strength and the state of her fighting inside the country.

According to the summary of the conversation written by one of the Swedish officials, Chitepo presented his perceptions of the situation in Southern Africa in following manner: "The new situation in Mozambique would not in any major way affect the development (of the liberation struggle by ZANU) in the short term perspective. At least not as long as Mozambique wasn't completely free with FRELIMO in power. An independent and free Mozambique would provide two major advantages. The one and positive was that Southern Rhodesia would be totally surrounded by countries which supported the liberation struggle. The possibility for Southern Rhodesia in such a situation to defend its frontiers would be considerably reduced. However in such a situation the struggle had to be intensified..."⁹¹ Chitepo's prediction was also that the changes in Mozambique would be a mixed blessing for the struggle in Zimbabwe in that Great Britain would intensify its efforts to conclude a peace settlement with the Rhodesians, which would be intended to save its own and some foreign interests and to secure the power of the Rhodesian settlers and not to achieve real power for the Africans. To support his contention Chitepo reminded the Swedes about the British previous support for the settlers and that some Rhodesian security forces had got their training in Britain. Moreover the British Government, Chitepo observed, had in the past tried to sell a similar solution to the Commonwealth countries. But he was convinced that the vast majority in Zimbabwe, including some supporters of Muzorewa would be opposed to such a solution. The immediate effect of a British compromise, Chitepo

thought, would depend on the reaction of the white people and on what role South Africa was prepared to play in the situation. Moreover even if there were rumours that South Africa was prepared to withdraw its forces from Rhodesia, ZANU could not believe such rumours because South African support for the Rhodesians was simply considerable. Even though the ANC of Muzorewa appeared to both the British and the Smith regime to be the likely basis for their sell-out compromise, the latter were going to encounter considerable problems from the hardliners in the ANC itself and from the fact that a solution which excluded the two liberation movements of ZAPU and ZANU would never work. "A too fast agreement," Chitepo feared, "would today limit ZANU's possibilities to achieve a satisfactory solution as the balance of power was negative from the point of view of the liberation movements. It was thus important to continue to expand the civilian and military activities of ZANU." His overall estimation of ZANU's strength then was that its fighting forces were "involved in areas of a total amount of 50,000 sq. miles and with a population of 3,000,000. He did not claim that these areas were yet 'liberated' as there were still Rhodesian forces. The number of trained ZANU soldiers was roughly 2,000 whilst 3,000 were under training. In addition there were around a thousand members and even more sympathisers."⁹²

In fact Chitepo thought that the British strategy of a sell-out compromise was more dangerous to the interests of the Africans than the Smith regime, which he thought was so morally bankrupt as to be even repulsive at times to its own supporters. For instance, the regime had become so desperate, Chitepo observed, as to bomb the ZANU headquarters in Zambia, causing considerable damage to the property. It was against that background that Chitepo appealed for Swedish support mainly in two areas:

1. Sweden should continue to support ZANU as the most vital force in Zimbabwe. In addition Chitepo wanted that Sweden should resist any suggestion whatsoever from the side of the British to support a situation which did not entail majority rule.
2. For its protracted struggle ZANU wanted to appeal for considerably increased support from Sweden with a somewhat different composition due to its intensified activities. (ZANU wanted) vehicles, teaching equipment and even technical assistance.⁹³

On the question of whether the situation did not require greater co-operation between ZAPU and ZANU, Chitepo's response was that ZANU wanted to strengthen its forces first. He also thought that ZAPU had deteriorated militarily as well as in membership, so that ZANU's recent efforts to co-operate with ZAPU had apparently been met with discouraging results.⁹⁴

In fact Chitepo concluded by making a forecast that "an initiative from England and Smith in order to reach a new solution for the future of Southern Rhodesia could come sooner than anybody expected. How different countries would respond to such a compromise formula was not yet clear. That held true for such countries as Malawi, Zambia, Botswana and Lesotho. Tanzania would continue to support the liberation movement."⁹⁵

Chitepo of course was a bit off the mark in that in his scenario Britain was the protagonist in the sell-out compromise when in fact as the *detente* exercise unfolded the chief players were South Africa and Zambia. Chitepo had further predicted the co-operation of Muzorewa's ANC but had underestimated the potentially decisive impact of the solution on ZANU itself and the likely active co-operation of ZAPU, especially its leader, Joshua Nkomo. Even though he did not articulate his fears most explicitly, he did not underestimate the likely disruptive impact of such a solution on the liberation struggle, even though his fears tended to emanate from the unpredictable reaction of Lesotho, Zambia, Malawi and Botswana, rather than from his own party and its armed wing yet it was the upheavals provoked within his party by the *detente* which posed the greatest danger to the progress of the liberation struggle and led to his own tragic and untimely death, hardly five months after his insightful analysis of the imminent changes in Southern Africa following the liberation of the Portuguese territories. But it is most likely that when Chitepo, at the invitation of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, visited Sweden to hold top-level discussions with the Swedish Foreign Ministry officials and the SIDA authorities on the 16 to 20th November 1974,⁹⁶ he was in a position to predict the nature of the Rhodesian settlement which would be a concomitant of the *detente* between South Africa and Black Africa, to indicate ZANU's opposition to it as well as to the unity of ZANU with ANC and ZAPU, and to press for increased Swedish support for ZANU's protracted liberation struggle.

The disruptive effects to the liberation struggle of the *detente* will be considered shortly. What needs to be observed at this point is that 1974 marked the end of an important phase in the war, which had gone on from

about 1969 and was almost entirely dominated by ZANU. If we use Swedish assistance to ZANU as an index of the intensity of the party's fighting it is noteworthy to see that the grants increased from 170,000 Sw. crs. for the year 1972/73 to 200,000 for 1973/74 and to 872,000 for 1974/75, making a total of 1.242 million Sw. crs. in a period of three years. For the corresponding years ZAPU received only 50,000 Sw. crs., indeed, indicating the Swedish low rating of ZAPU's war efforts and humanitarian responsibilities compared to those of ZANU in those years. Between 1969 and 1974 ZANU had been able to enter into an alliance with FRELIMO, which led to enormous changes in the relative strength of the party and its fighting capacity. This had been the result of opening the north east front which brought the ZANLA into fairly heavily populated African areas where recruitment for cadres was easy, mass mobilization could be practised and guerrilla warfare along Maoist lines launched. The brutal reaction of the Rhodesian regime tended to be a blessing in disguise in that it produced mass refugees who flocked into Mozambique and came under the direct control and care of ZANU. It was from those refugee communities that further fighting forces were recruited.

Indeed it was during this phase that the refugee factor, which was to become the decisive element in the winning of the war in the third and final phase first became a reality. A pattern thus began to emerge whereby the liberation movements would infiltrate their forces for both political mobilization and guerrilla fighting, which were mostly carried out in the rural African areas. The Rhodesians would respond with measures directed at both destroying or flushing out the guerrilla forces by means of repressive reprisals on the civilian populations who would be suspected of harbouring the guerrillas. Such measures would send thousands of refugee civilians fleeing into the neighbouring countries where they would come under the immediate care and control of the liberation movements. The same refugee communities would be the main sources of the guerrilla recruits for the liberation movements, thereby guaranteeing ever expanding liberation armies. By the end of 1974 ZANU was enjoying advantages of the refugee factor, while for ZAPU that was something still in the future. But the end of 1974 was also pregnant with events which disrupted ZANU's fighting programme up to 1976 and further paved the way for the third and final phase of the war, which saw the equal participation of the two liberation movements, even though they employed contrasting approaches to the struggle.

III Converging And Contrasting Efforts 1974-79

a) Introduction

This was the last and decisive stage of the war. Its main features were the various attempts by both movements to overcome some of the difficulties brought about by the *detente*. Among other things the front-line states tried to unite the two fighting forces; ZIPRA and ZANLA, but to no avail, so that the two armies fought separately. ZANLA enjoyed greater advantages than their ZIPRA counterparts because of the independence of Mozambique which soon opened the whole Rhodesian eastern border for both guerrilla infiltration and for the exodus of the refugees. ZAPU also engaged in vigorous recruitment and, aided by the repressive measures of the Rhodesian regime which uprooted many families and school children across into Botswana, where they were transferred by air to Zambian refugee camps, soon enjoyed almost the same advantages as ZANU, at least in terms of readily available people for military training. This enabled ZAPU to open what it termed the northern and southern fronts, which when combined with ZANLA eastern thrusts resulted in the complete encirclement of the enemy. With their forces thinly stretched on the ground, their military and civilian casualties rapidly mounting by the day and noticing the guerrilla forces visibly growing from strength to strength, the Rhodesians decided to give in and to go for a peaceful settlement at the end of 1979. In this section no attempt will be made to give an exhaustive discussion of all the aspects of this phase of the war, but merely outline the main events. Further aspects of the phase will be dealt with in Chapter II.

b) Internal Strife in ZANU

The internal strife in ZANU which included a rebellion and the assassination of Chitepo was closely associated with the *detente* in the second half of 1974, which involved promises to Zambia by South Africa and the Rhodesians of security of trade and food, if the Zambians would support an internal settlement in which Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU, Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU and Abel Muzorewa of ANC participated. The Rhodesians must have been confident of the success of a settlement,

following some of the homework of their Special Branch personnel. On the ZANU side Sithole had been manipulated while in prison so that he promised to renounce violence if a peaceful solution to the country's political situation could be found. Assurances of co-operation in such a settlement had also been obtained from Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Joshua Nkomo's forces were then very weak and based mostly in Zambia so that the Zambian government must have given assurances that it would be able to put pressure on Nkomo to accept the settlement. What was, however, unknown to many concerned in the whole exercise was that Sithole had been virtually deposed from the ZANU presidency by his colleagues in prison and virtually replaced by the Secretary General Robert Mugabe. Besides, when the *detente* plan together with its precondition of the unity of all the political parties was presented to the ZANU external leadership under Chitepo, the latter rejected it outrightly. In other words when on the 7th December 1974 the four African leaders (Nkomo for ZAPU, Sithole for ZANU, Muzorewa for ANC and Chikerema for FROLIZI) signed the Declaration of Unity the majority leaders of ZANU both in prison and outside the country were uninterested in the whole thing. When the second stage of the *detente*, the constitutional conference, was proposed ZANU put the last nail into its coffin by setting preconditions it was certain the Rhodesians would reject.⁹⁷

While the Rhodesians were apparently still working out ways of rejecting the ZANU demands, Chitepo was assassinated. Chitepo's death was closely related to the internal rebellion which in turn had some connections with the *detente*. Towards the end of 1974 a group of combatants led by Thomas Nhari (whose real name was Raphael Chinyanganya) tried to stage a *coup d'etat* against the *Dare* and the High Command. Apparently the revolt started off on the basis of genuine grievances but degenerated, as it progressed, into a regional conflict between the Manyika and Karanga. Moreover, there is now evidence pointing to some instigations by the Rhodesian Security forces. Before the *coup* in Lisbon in April 1974 the Rhodesian security people had established working relationships with their Portuguese counterparts in Mozambique along their common border. After the FRELIMO take over it appears the relationships and regular contacts between the border officials, most of whom on both sides were security personnel, continued. It was those channels which apparently were used by the Rhodesian members of the Special Branch to make contacts with a group of ZANLA fighters under Nhari, which normally operated in the Nehanda sector of the northeast

operational area. The contacts took place at a time when arrangements were underway for the abortive ceasefire which was to precede the Rhodesian constitutional conference. In that confusion and confused period when all sorts of rumours were flying around it must have been possible for the Rhodesian Special Branch to pass on false information about some imminent or actual peace in the country especially to the guerrillas in the bush who had extremely limited access to accurate information because of the slow means of communications with their Headquarters and also lack of radios, etc. We saw how ZANU was only beginning to set up a Department of Information by means of a grant from Sweden in order to counter Rhodesian propaganda. In those circumstances ZANLA combatants must have been easily influenced against their leaders by the Rhodesian Special Branch people who also claimed definitely to have access to accurate information. Such instigations were likely to succeed first because of Nhari's sullen resentment after his superiors' disapproval of his abduction of the St Albert's school children and secondly because of genuine grievances felt by the combatants at the front. During this period when ZANU gained the upperhand as the major fighting force in Zimbabwe the party was expanding its army more rapidly than it could effectively equip, feed and cloth it. The problems of shortages for the army were compounded by the rapid expansion of the civilian refugees which the party had also to look after. Extreme sacrifices were therefore called for and the conditions for the combatants tended to grow worse. It was in that context that the rebels led by Nhari complained that the members of the High Command led an easy life at Headquarters in Lusaka while they suffered from hunger, lack of proper clothing and from lack of sophisticated military equipment. Slowly the rebels were manipulated by a Manyika faction in the *Dare*, which wanted to gain the upperhand in the army and party over the Karanga, so that the rebellion spread from the front through the camps in Mozambique and eastern Zambia to Lusaka itself. The important point to observe here is that when all this was going on ZANU could not go on with the war. It was not until the beginning of January 1975 that a start was made in the containment of the rebellion. Tongogara led 200 newly trained guerrillas to go and rescue some of the members of the High Command who were held by the rebels as hostages in the camps in Mozambique. The suppression of the rebellion was completed at the beginning of February when the chief rebels, Thomas Nhari, Dakarai Badza, Fidian Kashiri, Cephasi Tichatonga, Siza Molife, Sam Chandawa and Timothy Chiridza were all rounded up and executed.⁹⁸

When the party had hardly licked its wound it suffered the second blow which nearly crippled it completely, when its external leader, Herbert Chitepo, was killed by a bomb blast at 8 a.m. on the 18th March 1975. The Rhodesian security people, who had apparently participated in setting in motion the process, had been carefully following the upheavals within ZANU and knew fully well the regional tensions between the Manyika and the Karanga in the wake of the suppression of the Nhari rebellion. Infact this state of affairs in the party was not at all a secret in Lusaka, Zimbabwe and among the Zimbabweans living in London. The Rhodesian secret service people did not need to think hard to know that a carefully planned assassination of Herbert Chitepo would not only disrupt ZANU's war effort but would spark off accusations and counter accusations between the Karanga and Manyika, with the whole situation being probably aggravated by some unscrupulous Zezuru trying to fish in troubled waters. Moreover Kaunda's reaction was not unpredictable. He wanted his *detente* to succeed and he wished it to do so preferably with his friend Joshua Nkomo being at the helm of the unified nationalist movement. Chitepo's adamant refusal to unite with ZAPU therefore constituted an obstacle to the Zambian leader's aim. In the circumstances, the Rhodesians calculated, Kaunda was likely to take advantage of the death of Chitepo either to force ZANU to integrate with ZAPU or to crush that party by closing ZANU bases in Zambia. If all this sounds too neat to be true, it has only to be remembered that regionalism or tribalism for Zimbabweans is their heel of Achilles and was even more so during the liberation struggle. Indeed the murder of Chitepo by the Rhodesians was followed by the arrest of no less than 70 of the ZANU military and political leaders, which left only Rex Nhongo as the senior military personnel.¹⁰⁰ ZANU detainees were not released from the Zambian jails until October 1976 so that some of them could join their new leader Robert Mugabe, who had ousted the discredited Ndabaningi Sithole.

c) **A Renewed ZANU**

The removal of Sithole as leader of ZANU in 1975 freed ZANLA from many of the forces which had hampered it from pursuing the liberation struggle, moreso that it coincided with the independence of Mozambique, which opened up the whole eastern border of Zimbabwe, which had no natural barriers such as the Zambezi, for guerrilla recruit-

ment and infiltration. In August 1975 the rump of ZANLA command, after the incarceration of the rest by the Zambians, opened negotiations with Mozambican the government to use their country as a launching pad of the liberation struggle.¹⁰¹ But Samora Machel, the President of Mozambique, like the other front-line presidents, viz. Nyerere, Kaunda, and Khama, was anxious that the resumption of the war should be jointly undertaken by the two liberation movements - ZANLA and ZIPRA. Even though ZANLA would have preferred to go it alone without what they regarded as being encumbered with a ZAPU alliance, they found themselves with no choice but to accept the partnership. The reluctance of ZANLA to join hands with ZIPRA was understandable in that for almost three years ZANLA had fought the war when ZIPRA did very little fighting. In fact, the fact that ZIPRA did not open up the northwest front in 1972-74 meant that the enemy was left free to concentrate his forces against ZANLA¹⁰² in the northeast. Furthermore, ZAPU had far less trained fighting men than ZANU. When ZANU was negotiating with the Mozambicans she had more than 2,000 trained men at Mgagao ready to be deployed. Moreover an inspection of the refugee camps in Mozambique also revealed thousands of Zimbabweans, three-quarters of whom were school leavers and school children all of whom were eligible for guerrilla training. At that stage ZAPU could not boast of such a pool of refugees from whom to recruit cadres. Such an advantage, as we shall see, was still a thing of the future for ZIPRA. However ZANLA could not resist the merger with the ZIPRA without seriously jeopardizing their fighting capacity. The frontline presidents and the OAU Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee, Hustin Peters, almost ordered Rex Nhongo and his colleagues to unite with ZIPRA. The predicament of ZANLA was not only in terms of being denied bases in the frontline countries; the movement had no money either. When they renounced Sithole's leadership he retaliated by freezing ZANU's banking accounts in Dar es Salaam. Nobody was willing to give them money except on the basis of unity with the ZIPRA. All these practical considerations compelled ZANLA to form the merger with ZIPRA, which became known as Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) in November 1975.¹⁰³

d) **Consolidation of ZIPRA**

As we have already noted in the ZAPU camp, from the re-organisation following the J.Z. Moyo-Chikerema crisis until the combined South African-Zambian *detente* initiatives in the second half of 1974, the strategy pursued by the War Council, which consisted of J.Z. Moyo as Chairman, Dumiso Dabengwa as Secretary and the Army commander Mangena and his Deputy Lookout Masuku as ex-officio members, concentrated mainly on recruitment, engaging in sabotage acts only to maintain the party's credibility as a fighting movements. Five platoons were successfully infiltrated into the country with strict orders not to fight but simply to recruit and send men out of the country and also to explain to the party structures how the recent political crisis had been resolved. The recruits were to be sent to Botswana where they were to declare themselves to be refugees and wait to be picked up by ZAPU officials and be flown to Zambia. ZAPU was so successful that at the beginning of 1975 she had 137 recruits ready for training at Morogoro and another 800 in Zambia waiting for their turn to be placed in the training camps.¹⁰⁴

It was, however, in the midst of all this that the Declaration of Unity of the 7th December 1974, which was meant to seal the unity of the African political parties of Zimbabwe under the umbrella of the United African National Council of Bishop Abel Muzorewa was signed. This aspect of the *detente* exercise marked the beginning of the concerted interference in Zimbabwean nationalist politics by the frontline states of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana. As already pointed out *detente* led to a rebellion in ZANLA, to the murder of Chitepo, and above all to the halting of ZANU liberation struggle. In fact it had a similar effect on ZAPU as well. The recruitment, training and military operations of ZAPU were completely stopped. The Zambian government put a stop to the flow of arms to ZIPRA, while the Tanzanian government refused ZAPU to train its recruits at the only training camp of Morogoro. To make matters worse ZAPU, ZANU, ANC and FROLIZI recruits were forced to live together at the various camps, leading to terrible and bloody factional fights at Mboroma, Morogoro and Iringa, and many young men and women lost their lives in these places. Even when the Victoria Falls Conference, which was meant to try and solve the Rhodesian problem peacefully and for which the signing of the Unity had been a preparatory act, proved a fiasco and the liberation movements correctly felt unbound by the terms of the Unity, the frontline states, this time together with the

OAU Liberation Committee, persisted in trying to foist some artificial unity on the Zimbabweans. This time the frontline states, especially Julius Nyerere, who was apparently motivated by his differences with Joshua Nkomo, and Samora Machel, who had risen through the ranks of the liberation army to become President of Mozambique and therefore saw no reason why the ZIPRA and ZANLA Commanders should not follow his example, tried to push out of the way the political leadership and to force the military wings to unite. They threatened not to release the arms held by the OAU Liberation Committee in Tanzania and to close all the military bases and training camps in Tanzania. The Tanzanian government actually arrested Sam Moyo, the chief instructor and camp commander of Morogoro and followed this later in 1976 by closing down ZIPRA training facilities in Tanzania, while Machel, in a bid to keep the politicians away from ZANLA, confined Robert Mugabe, the future President of Zimbabwe, to Quelimane. All these pressures produced the uneasy unity of the fighting forces in the shape of the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), with a joint military high command of 9 ZANLA and 9 ZIPRA, which was formally constituted on the 17th January 1976.¹⁰⁵

e) **Attempts at Co-ordination**

The ZIPA arrangement was a complete failure in military and political terms. To start with it brought to the fore the differences in the approaches to the liberation struggle between the two movements. The differences will be discussed more fully in the next chapter; for the moment suffice it to say ZANLA was influenced by the Maoist style of guerrilla warfare while ZIPRA was influenced by the Soviet Union. The result was that the ZANLA emphasised political mobilization while ZIPRA concentrated on purely military operations. Secondly at this stage ZANLA had more trained personnel and a lot more recruits in the refugee camps of Mozambique than anything ZIPRA could boast of. Therefore it appeared as if ZAPU was holding back its fighters, leaving ZANLA to do all the fighting. The trouble was that the two movements apparently never told each other of their respective actual strengths in fear of exposing their weaknesses. The plain truth was that ZIPRA only had in reserve, if we might call it that, the remainder of the 800 after the factional shootouts at Iringa, who had then been transferred to Morogoro and the 137, popularly called 'Bouncers', who were undergoing some training at

the same Morogoro camp. The majority of the trained personnel (about 200) were airlifted by Gordon Munyanyi, ZIPRA Chief of intelligence, to go and be integrated with the ZANLA in Mozambique. The majority of the High Command and regional commanders also went to Mozambique, leaving only Cele, Lookout Masuku and Elliot Sibanda in Zambia. In fact ZIPRA was not able to resume the fighting until August 1976 when it began to deploy part of the 800 group, who had now transferred from Tanzania to Zambia, where they finished their training at the new camp of Mwembeshi.

But there was a further and even more emotional reason why the ZIPA could never work and ended up in factional fights. The two armies had been born and nurtured in the politics and violence of the split between ZAPU and ZANU and when the guerrillas underwent their training in their respective camps one of the major aspects of their political education was the history of their respective political parties, especially the justification of their existence in relation to the others. Each party projected itself to its recruits as the only revolutionary party which represented most effectively the interests of the masses. The political commissars who were the lecturers also made it a point to extol the 'wisdom' and political dedication of their leaders, who were contrasted with the "tribalistic", power-hungry and misguided leaders of the rival parties.

The whole process was of course dynamic as well as full of contradictions, especially as some of the once popular leaders fell from grace and they themselves became discredited and the subject of vicious political abuse. Examples of this were many but two should help to illustrate the point. When George Nyandoro, an extremely sharp and articulate politician, was still Secretary General of ZAPU and was deeply involved in the building up of the ZIPRA, he had nothing good to say about ZANU. He saw ZANU as a movement formed by an elitist group of opportunists, who had climbed "on the nationalist bandwagon in order to gain personal positions of power." They had formed ZANU after failing to topple the ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo, "who didn't share their reactionary ideas". This way they had hoped to "split the nationalist movement — with the help of their old settler friends and British and American imperialists". Moreover, Nyandoro said, ZANU should have long died a natural death because it had been rejected by the masses. But it continued to exist through the efforts of some Tanzanian government

official who had pushed its acceptance throughout the world.¹⁰⁶ When Nyandoro himself with Chikerema split from ZAPU to form FROLIZI they were subjected to similar, if not the same, venomous attacks by their former colleagues. They were described as divisionists who had “attempted to mislead the Zimbabwean people by appealing to tribal sentiments and chauvinism - turning Shona-speaking Zimbabweans against the Ndebele speakers.” They were said to have used the Shona in order “to advance their narrow selfish interests. In the end, when it became clear that they had failed to attain their objective, this group of opportunists showed its true colours. On October 1st 1971 the former ZAPU Vice President, James Chikerema, and Secretary General, George Nyandoro, formed Frolizi — an organisation based on exiles and without origins among the Zimbabwe masses.”¹⁰⁷ It was the same thing in ZANU when the once popular and first president of that party, Ndabaningi Sithole, fell by the wayside. It was soon revealed by those who remained in the party that even at its formation some members had raised strong objections to his presidency. “The hard-core founders of the party,” it was later said, “had even contemplated initiating a move to choose another leader in Sithole’s place at the first ZANU congress at Gweru in May 1964.” Apparently his ‘quisling’ nature soon surfaced, leading to his denunciation by his fellow leaders in 1974.¹⁰⁸

Such was the writing and re-writing of party propaganda, which was so effectively inculcated into the liberation recruits and combatants that it became almost taboo for them to be associated with members of a rival party, let alone to be led by the leadership of such a party. Needless to say, it was either the height of folly or callous cynicism on the part of the frontline states and the OAU Liberation Committee to throw together such deeply divided units of guerrillas without the involvement and guidance of their political leadership. Many of these young men and women ran away from the rural schools and areas where the politics of the split between ZAPU and ZANU was unknown because it had taken place when the nationalists were barred from holding rallies in the communal areas. Moreover the vast majority of the recruits and combatants of 1976 were mere toddlers in 1963 when the split happened and had therefore no other source of information on the history of ZAPU and ZANU, except to believe implicitly everything they were taught by the party officials in the refugee and training bases. Unity, under the circumstances, could only start at the leadership level, which in turn would change the political teaching from the divisive to solidarity propaganda.

Apart from its being doomed to fail because of its ill-conception by its advocates, ZIPA planted seeds of discord in ZANU, which later involved some force to correct. By excluding the political leadership ZIPA actually raised a Third Force among the liberation movements, so that even after it had proved unworkable and was abandoned some people in ZANU continued to subscribe to it and thereby produced disunity in the party. Such dissidents were Dzinashe Machingura and Elias Hondo, who led a group which criticised the political leadership as made up bourgeois elements which were not entitled to their positions. The dissidents had to be arrested and removed from the party in January 1977. The same thing happened again in January 1978 when a group of 133 tried to stage a coup and had to be arrested and detained with the help of the Mozambican authorities.¹⁰⁹

Of course ZIPA produced some advantages for the two organisations. ZAPU used the infiltration facilities provided by the easy movement between Mozambique and Zimbabwe to start its biggest ever recruitment programme between 1976 and the end of 1977. Instead of engaging in fighting ZIPRA combatants were urged by their commanders "that once they arrived in Rhodesia they should desert, head for Matebeleland, get recruits and then leave the country with them for Botswana, from where they would be flown to Zambia for training." And ZIPRA aimed at building as large a force as that of ZANLA.¹¹⁰ The ZAPU leadership in Lusaka quickly complemented the efforts of their recruiting combatants by negotiating with the Botswana government in 1976 to allow what they euphemistically called refugees to enter their country from Zimbabwe so that they could be transferred to Zambia, where, it was said, the party had programmes and educational facilities for them.¹¹¹ Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, the resulting efforts were spectacular so much so that the numbers of refugees in Botswana and Zambia grew by leaps and bounds. This enabled ZAPU to build two armies - a guerrilla force and regular contingent.

f) Fresh ZANLA Thrusts from Mozambique

Meanwhile the failure of ZIPA meant that ZANLA was left to fight the war alone from Mozambique from September 1976. The formation of ZIPA which in the end permitted ZANU to operate along the whole of the Mozambique/Zimbabwe border, which did not have natural obstacles of

the same magnitude and awesomeness as the Zambezi river and the enormous and uninhabited escarpment, had almost incalculable advantages which the party indeed exploited to the maximum benefit of the struggle. Indeed, as Joshua Nkomo puts it, "(the) border is mostly forest and mountains with good cover from the air - excellent guerrilla country. ZANLA forces were able to penetrate the easier frontier facing them in much larger numbers, in groups of up to a hundred."¹³ Thus ZANLA were able to move both their troops and military equipment from Tanzania and to base themselves in Mozambique, with their Headquarters on a farm at Chimoio. Under the umbrella of ZIPA ZANLA were able to obtain money by borrowing from the Tanzanian government on the promise that it would be repaid by the Liberation Committee of the OAU. Even the Nigerian leader General Olusegun Obasanjo was so delighted with the materialisation of the long awaited unity between the fighting movements of Zimbabwe that he is reported to have given Rex Nhongo US\$6,000,000 in cash in a suitcase as Nigeria's immediate contribution to the war effort in Zimbabwe.¹⁴ Such was the most touching and bottomless goodwill shown to Zimbabweans in their hour of need by the rest of Africa.

Whilst they may have let down their well wishers by failure to unite, the Zimbabweans certainly acquitted themselves supremely well in the central and priority task of mounting a fierce struggle for their country. Under the leadership of ZIPA, the liberation movements decided to divide the country into three operational provinces called Tete (which was in the north), Manica (the middle of the country) and Gaza (the southern part of the country) (see Map 1). ZANLA retained the Tete province where they had been fighting since 1972 and probably because they had more manpower they also undertook to infiltrate the Manica province as well. ZIPRA were left to start the war in the Gaza province. But when the ZIPA fell apart, the ZANLA disregarded this agreement and infiltrated the Gaza province as well.

Between May and August 1976 ZANLA infiltrated a large number of guerrillas into the three provinces whose task was to harass the enemy by attacking the farmers in their isolated homesteads, laying landmines on routes used by enemy troops, assaulting centres of colonial power such as district and police stations, blowing up railway lines and bridges and ambushing enemy convoys. The result was that the Rhodesian regime recorded no less than ninety incidents in the Mount Selinda area alone from February to June. Such incidents became even more frequent in July

and early August, so much so that the regime thought of striking a blow on ZANLA, which it thought would cripple the movement once and for all. It decided, as part of its massive military response code named Op. Thresher, to attack Nyadzonya, the most populous refugee camp in Mozambique with over three thousand people on the 9th August 1976. The massacre raid resulted in the death of no less than 1,2000 innocent people.¹¹⁵ The savage wiping out of the defenseless refugees did not deter ZANLA from continuing the war. If anything the war effort was intensified, especially following the restructuring of the party.

The re-organisation of the party followed the abortive Geneva talks in late 1976. The talks required that all the internal and external political parties participate, and Robert Mugabe, the ZANU Secretary General and therefore the natural successor to the deposed Ndabaningi Sithole, was chosen by ZANLA to lead the ZANU team to Geneva. Mugabe, who had never believed that the ZANU detainees in Zambia had had anything to do with the death of Chitepo but that if anything the Chairman of the *Dare* had been murdered by the Rhodesians possibly with the connivance of the Zambians, refused to go to Geneva unless his colleagues were released from Zambian jails so that some of them could form part of his delegation. He was so adamant and so insistent that even the British Government, among others, joined him to force Kaunda to release the ZANU officials. Thus with many of the members of *Dare* and the High Command available in Mozambique in 1977 it was possible first as we have seen, to purge ZANLA of some dissidents who after enjoying power in the absence of their senior colleagues were refusing to relinquish it, and to restructure the party. The major aspect of restructuring was to convert the *Dare* into a vastly enlarged Central Committee, which took into account the interests of the various organs of the party. For the efficient prosecution of the war the High Command was left as a separate unit but the top five of its members, Josiah Tongogara, Charles Dauramanzi, Sheba Gava and Josiah Tungamirai represented the army in the Central Committee. The same meeting which achieved the re-organisation of the party confirmed the Secretary General Mugabe as the leader of the party.¹¹⁶

With the re-organisation of the party accomplished ZANU was able to attend to the war. Thousands upon thousands of refugees continued to pour into Mozambique because of the easy access to that country from Zimbabwe. Huge camps were set up for them at Dondo, Chimoio and

Tembwe. With such a vast pool of potential recruits the party opened about seven training camps in Mozambique in addition to the few which still functioned in Tanzania. By 1978 the party had so many recruits that it was unable to offer them training facilities, so that it was decided that where extra arms were available, especially from deceased comrades or captured from the enemy, training should take place in the war zones so as to save the party the effort of taking too many people to Mozambique. All these guerrillas were deployed throughout the eastern half of the country along the three operational provinces and sectors. They destroyed most of the administrative infrastructure and further turned the rural population through politicisation and mass mobilization against the colonial authorities, including the chiefs. This way rural peasants were made ungovernable. The colonial army either abandoned the defence of the communal areas in order to go and defend what were considered to be vital settlers' economic interests in the urban areas, to defend plantations and transportation networks or to set up a few base camps in a few chosen places. Such base camps were meant to remind the rural African people that the settlers had not been completely defeated.

A similar process, as we shall see, was taking place in the north where ZIPRA opened its northern front and in the south where it opened the southern front. Guerrilla fighters were infiltrated across the Zambezi river and across the Botswana border so that together with ZANLA operating from the eastern side they completed by 1978 the encirclement of the Rhodesian army. The Rhodesians indeed acknowledged the encirclement by launching their defence operations right round the country - so that by 1978 they not only had Ops. Hurricane in the northeast and Thresher in the east, but also Ops. Repulse in the south, Tangent in the west and Splinter in the northwest. In addition in 1977 and 1978 Rhodesian forces intensified what they regarded as preemptive action, which meant an attempt to cripple the two liberation movements by massive bombing raids of their rear training bases and refugee camps. Even though these actions led to untold losses of lives both in the Mozambique and Zambian refugee camps, they did not deter the continual flow of guerrillas into the country and their rapid process of knocking down colonial power structures and bases in the rural areas and thereby rolling back to the cities the colonial army. Indeed as H. Ellert, in his authoritative study of the *Rhodesian Front War*, tells us apropos of the level of success of the liberation movements in the war by 1979:

Units of both ZIPRA and ZANLA, in their respective operational sectors, were by now openly parading and showing military authority in rural areas which had long since fallen under their effective control. By the eve of the Lancaster House Constitutional conference in 1979 the security forces were confined in mine-protected vehicles moving by day in heavily armed convoys. Rural base camps were often subjected to attack by night with mortar, rocket and small-arms fire.¹¹⁷

Clearly Rhodesian settler power was virtually on the verge of collapse under the weight of guerrilla bombardment.

Conclusion

This outline has therefore tried to show the military build up of the liberation movements from the nationalist and early failures of the nineteen sixties, through the disruptions of the liberation programmes by political crises, to the successful operations of the late 1970s. Only hints have been made here and there at the various strategies adopted by the two liberation forces. Yet it is the contention of this study that the ideology, strategies and tactics of the two forces together with the strategy of the Rhodesian forces, determined their impact on and their relationships with the Evangelical Lutheran Church during the war. The next chapter will therefore attempt some detailed account and analysis of the various military approaches and their operationalisations on the ground in general before focusing on their specific impact on the Church in Chapters 4 and 5.

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2 Ideologies and strategies of the Liberation movements and the Colonial State

Introduction

Having surveyed the actual struggle for Zimbabwe it is necessary before we proceed to church developments during the war to devote this chapter to a comprehensive analysis of the political ideologies and military strategies of the three principal warring forces, i.e. ZAPU and ZANU on the one hand and the Rhodesian settler government on the other. As stated in the introduction in this book my major argument is that the ideologies and strategies of these warring forces in a decisive way influenced the christian involvement in the liberation struggle.

As already noted the role of religion proved to be quite important in the second war of liberation in Zimbabwe. In academic discussions so far particular attention has been devoted to the remarkable interaction between guerrillas and traditional religious institutions in the popular mobilization programmes of ZANU in certain sectors of the country. Church apprehensions concerning such interactions have sometimes been suggested as one factor influencing and sometimes inhibiting the christian involvement in the struggle.

My focus in this study and indeed, more particularly in this chapter, is decidedly different. I will show how the ideologies and strategies of ZAPU and ZANU were developed:

- (i) in the context of their dialectical inter-relationships with the failures, setbacks, and successes encountered and experienced at the various stages of the liberation struggle;
- (ii) in the light of the objective socio-economic and political conditions of Zimbabwe; and
- (iii) in view of the ideological positions and military traditions of their main international supporters i.e. more especially the socialist countries which provided arms for the struggle.

This means that I will explore certain aspects of a Marxist and, indeed, Maoist policies of religion and how such policies were employed in the cause of the struggle. It is in this light that I will examine Church developments in South Western Zimbabwe during the war. This implies a deliberate attempt in highlighting how the position of christianity, i.e. the major churches and their missionary and local authorities in the process was shifting quite significantly (if not radically when compared to the situation at the time of the Russian and Chinese revolutions) from that of an open and somewhat close alliance with the colonial forces and capitalist imperialism, and moving towards accommodating, and sometimes giving material support for the promotion of, the aspirations and efforts of the liberation movements striving to free their people from colonial bondage and to raise them from the abject poverty imposed by colonial exploitation. In other words, the late twentieth century ecclesiastical favourable atmosphere together with other more specific factors will be seen as facilitating working relationships between the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the socialist oriented ZAPU and ZANU - a rapport which naturally always provoked vindictive and brutal reprisals from the security forces of the self-appointed anti-communist settler state. However, as the story and argument unfold, it shall become apparent that the relationships were not as straightforward as all that. A lot of contradictions manifested themselves in the policies, behaviour, operations, responses and actions of the political leaderships, their military cadres, the peasants and other groups whom they sought to liberate, as well as in the Church and its officials and among the colonial forces. However as stated already the primary objective of this chapter is to elaborate on the evolution of the guiding political ideologies and military strategies of the competing forces and how these ideologies and strategies interacted with the role of the churches.

I. Ideologies for combat

Both ZAPU and ZANU professed scientific socialism, especially at the zenith of their struggle from 1976 to 1979. The chief exponents of scientific socialism in the two parties were always careful to explain that their organisations embraced the ideology slowly and as part of the qualitative transformation of their struggles from the reformist era to the radical and revolutionary stages of the armed struggle. Even though perhaps the military and moral support of the socialist countries - especially that of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China - must have been decisive in influencing the parties to adopt scientific socialism, this was rarely, if ever at all, admitted by the political leadership. If anything, especially at the beginning when the movements were at their most vulnerable and therefore most defensive, the leaders mounted stiff resistance against being seen as proteges of either the East or West. My first task in this Chapter, thus, is to highlight the gradual adoption of socialist ideologies by the two main liberation movements.

a) First Representations of Socialism on the Nationalist side

In his presidential address at the ZANU inaugural congress at Gweru on 12 - 13 May 1963 the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole vigorously protested against his party being accused by the Rhodesian Front government of adhering to Communism. He charged the white settlers with malicious distortion of the ZANU ideology and made it clear that his party was not seeking to build a Zimbabwe which would be a carbon copy of the East or the West. After all, he said, it was impossible to import a system which had been developed and perfected in different circumstances and try to impose it as a way of life on Zimbabwe. ZANU was therefore opposed to being misconstrued as a "rubber-stamp of either American capitalism or communism". ZANU in fact wanted to pursue its "own ideology of socialism best suited to Zimbabwe's conditions". "The history of one people," Sithole reminded his audience, "is not that of another, and this is why it is so revolting to us when we are asked to choose between the West and the East. We don't want to choose to be like anybody else. We just want to be ourselves."¹

Indeed these strong objections by African nationalists to being identified especially with the communist countries were prompted by two things. The first was a tactical one by which the nationalists hoped to avoid giving the Rhodesian white settlers, a group of self-appointed frontline defenders of 'Western civilization',² the excuse of banning African parties and then hypocritically parading to the western world as heroic fighters against the so-called dangerous communist system. The second factor emanated from the fact that nationalists, especially in the early 1960s, apparently believed in the so-called African socialism which was eloquently articulated by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.

His brand of African socialism held that within the peasantry there existed "a spontaneous tendency toward socialism; and ... that class differences among Africans [were] so minimal as not to constitute a problem."³ Nyerere's view was articulated by the then Secretary General of ZAPU, Nyandoro, in May 1968, when he said, "the ideals of socialism" were becoming "a factor, a point of serious discussion" within his party. He asserted: "Traditionally" Zimbabweans "had no capitalism — and the social fabric contained many collective aspects and principles of mutual responsibility and aid." "Much of this remains even today," he said, "particularly in the countryside, where most of our people have not yet been drawn into the capitalist relations of production. So in terms of socialist ideological training, what needs to be done is to sharpen our people's awareness of certain fundamental tenets of socialism which are practised traditionally. Then it will not be very difficult to introduce and teach scientific socialism — for it will not be an entirely new thing for the masses to comprehend. It must be said that the only real exploiters known by the present generation of people in Zimbabwe have been foreigners - white settlers from Britain and South Africa. These are the people who have established capitalist industry and farming in our country, who have sucked the wealth out of our land and labour, and who have been oppressing us. So the struggle is seen by the masses as being between the whites and blacks. Very few Africans have acquired any real wealth in Zimbabwe and they are merely agents of the capitalists who may own a small shop, engage in petty trade, etc., and who get some crumbs which fall from the master's table. The settlers think they are creating a middle class with these people. But such Africans are not really capitalists, not really rich - though psychologically they are made to believe that they are capitalists. As for the broad masses of the people, they accept ZAPU's socialist class."⁴ These were the beginnings of the embracing of the

socialist ideology by the nationalists of Zimbabwe, which were most likely based upon Julius Nyerere's *Ujamaa* romanticisation of the African pre-capitalist societies, which were believed to have no competition for accumulation of wealth, where nobody starved, and where the concept of exploitation had been introduced by the white foreigners.⁵

From the stand point of religion or Christianity African socialism had the advantage of having no basis in the dialectical materialism and the class struggle but in the "attitude of mind" and the natural harmony in the pre-capitalist societies. Indeed African socialism, as expounded by Nyerere one of its most lucid philosophers, held that land, one of the chief means of production, was given to society by God.⁶ In the circumstances African socialism did not envisage any ideological conflict between it and religion, and in fact it might be said that it encouraged society to have faith in God, who was so good to society as to have provided it with its principal source of wealth. Furthermore the only recognised conflict which existed in the colonial society was the one generated by the imperialist intruders, made up of speculators, looters, and people who pursued wealth, not for the comforts that it could provide them with, but as a means to dominate others in society. Lacking ideological differences with religion, the African socialists of Zimbabwe therefore tended to judge missionaries by the criterion of their position in relation to the colonial oppressive system and the white settler regime. This was made quite clear by, among others, Joshua Nkomo, when in 1964 he urged missionaries to act as the conscience of the people in Rhodesia and exercise their right and duty to make their voices heard on the crucial issue of majority rule. If missionaries failed to do so they would serve to destroy the Church in the country.⁷ That the church was being judged on its opposition, collaboration, acquiescence or neutral record in relation to colonialism in Africa and in Zimbabwe in particular was indeed made even more explicit in a commentary by ZAPU on the meeting between the Pope and the leaders of FRELIMO, PAIGC and MPLA, which was published in the official ZAPU organ, *Zimbabwe Review*, No. 9-10, September - October 1970. Having indicated how the colonising countries had used "religions only as a vehicle for inhuman ideas" and also as an opium of the colonised to blind and calm them in the face of oppression and exploitation ZAPU went on to point out:

The present trend by young militants to despise and, in many cases, dislike the propagators of the Christian faith is caused by atrocities perpetrated on the majority by fascists like Caetano, Vorster and Smith who profess to be acting on behalf of Christianity. It should be pointed out that those who feel strongly that the Christian Church should be protected and promoted must take a decisively strong stand against these fascists and not hide behind excuses about why they do not call a spade a spade.

We differ with some Church leaders in Zimbabwe because they wish to settle for what they term a moderate racial policy - while we demand the complete and unconditional destruction of all forms of oppression.⁸

There were therefore at the beginning of the struggle no irreconcilable differences between the nationalist socialism and religion, if anything the potential for harmonious relationships during and after the struggle was immense, if only the Church chose to support the suffering majority.

However, as the struggle intensified and more contacts were established with the socialist countries the nationalists moved further and further towards embracing dialectical materialism and revolutionary socialism, so that the position of the Christian faith and the Church received a sharper focus in relation to the revolution. The new socialist ideology was now conceived in terms of the class struggle in which contradictions were noticed on two levels, i.e. first between the imperialist exploiters and oppressors on the one hand and the masses on the other, and secondly, within local class categories. Perhaps not to dissipated revolutionary forces it was proposed that the two sets of contradictions be tackled in two stages. The first stage involved unifying all the democratic and anti-imperialist forces in order to destroy and seize power from the settler state and then at a later stage in the transition and construction era to tackle the internal contradictions among the broad masses.

Furthermore, this evolution of the nationalist socialist ideology was taking place not only on the basis of increased contacts with Marxism-Leninism but also in the context of the ideological debates which served as a prelude to the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s in the People's Republic of China as well as the situation in Mozambique.

In the meantime the ideological development took place simultaneously within ZAPU and ZANU and finally attained its best form of articulation in Robert Mugabe, who of all the leaders tried hard to spell out the dialectical relationship between socialism and the armed revolutionary struggle in Zimbabwe. The first shift from the romantic African socialism to something based on the proper analysis of the colonial society and a clear statement of what was to be done was by the brilliant ZAPU Publicity and Information Secretary, George Silundika, in response to an interview question by the OAU Liberation Support Movement which was published in 1974. Silundika said that ZAPU wanted to replace the colonial system in Zimbabwe with an economic system which would benefit the masses. He saw the people of Zimbabwe as being victims of the twin products of colonialism - racism and capitalism, the two evils through which the people had been exploited for generations. Racism in Southern Africa, he pointed out, had worked to produce a type of capitalism which was almost entirely different from the classical one of "the working class versus the bourgeoisie", because in the racist capitalism "an African worker and a white worker doing the same job belong objectively to different classes, even though they are both workers. Racism enters to create a privileged minority within the working class." In the Zimbabwean revolution therefore the task was to eliminate both racism and capitalism in order to arrive at a socialist state.⁹

It was the recognition of this complex nature of the Zimbabwean colonial capitalist system that Mugabe, the clear sighted and consistent ideologist and supreme leader of ZANU from 1975, proposed a two stage revolutionary struggle. The first involved the resolution of the contradictions bred by the historical domination of the Africans by the whites. As he put it: "it should be constantly borne in mind that our revolutionary process being a historical social process carries with it from the social past to the social present, and in terms of our present and future attainable goals, not only the antithetical burden of the reactions of two broad *racial communities* (my emphasis) historically locked up in bitter conflict and within that broad conflict situation, that of the deepening strife between the existing classes but also the synthetical and therefore more positive burden of mobilizing those groups which constitute the motive force of the Zimbabwe revolution." Mugabe indeed identified those groups which were tending towards a revolutionary coalescence in an antagonistic strife against the dominant racial group and the regime that superintended and safeguarded white socio-economic interests. He further urged

on the party the need to mobilize those democratic forces. As he put it: "Thus, our peasantry (middle, poor or landless) the workers, our youth, students, intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie and even those religious groups and persons who support the national liberation struggle, should be constituted into a national democratic front to be violently pitted, as democratic anti-settler-imperialist forces, against the colonial system, [and] its regime". In this "revolutionary national struggle for national liberation and national independence," Mugabe warned about the inevitable fact that national renegades, reformists and "reactionary puppets of history" would fall upon the party and thereby constitute themselves into a national problem which would have to be dealt with perhaps at a later stage in the revolutionary process. Meanwhile, he said, "The cementing bond between the national democratic forces is, of course, their common suffering, their common opposition, their common aspirations and their common national destiny." Mugabe also reminded members of ZANU not to forget the international dimensions of the struggle and the need to unite with all the progressive forces at that level as well in order to crush bourgeois empires and replace them with national democracies as a prelude to socialist transformations. He called on the party's Central Committee, members of the High Command and General Staff down to the commanders of the army's sectional units to familiarise themselves intimately with the party's ideology as based on Marxist-Leninist and Mao Tse-tung Thought. "Nevertheless," Mugabe went on, "since the requirements of our present situation demand an alliance with such progressive forces as may not have the same ideological orientation with our Party members, the bond between us and them must be that defined above - our commitment to the overthrow of settler - imperialism and achievement of popular democratic power. Within the Party, however, ideological education must continue to intensify."¹⁰ This then was the two-step revolutionary programme, which would start with the overthrow of the colonial state and the setting up of a democratic regime and then apparently be followed by a socialist revolution.

When ZAPU proposed the formation of the Patriotic Front in 1976 as a step towards "the greater unity of all anti-colonial forces" or towards building "a broad front against colonialism and imperialism", it showed indeed the extent to which its ideological orientation as well as development was almost identical with that of its sister liberation movement. In fact ZANU embraced the unity proposal in line with its revolutionary programme which included collaboration with all local and international

progressive forces, and the two parties produced a unity document which spelled out in the clearest and most succinct fashion their revolutionary priorities:

- “1. the primary objective of the P[atriotic] F[ront] is to liquidate colonialism, imperialism and racism - hence to overthrow the racist regime.
2. to create a national democratic independent state of the people of Zimbabwe.
3. to establish a socio-economic order that will eliminate all forms of capitalist exploitation of man by man - hence to create conditions for a full-scale social revolution.
4. to guarantee national peace, security, equal rights and happiness for all in a free Zimbabwe.”¹¹

b) Obstacles or Partners? - the view of the Church

Having, thus, articulated a clear cut ideological stance of socialism adjusted to Zimbabwean conditions the nationalist leadership had to review and spell out anew its policy on religion. To appeal to traditional religious institutions was nothing new as a means of popular mobilization. But what about the churches, which easily could be seen from a Marxist-Leninist position as an obstacle in the revolutionary process? The issue became acute at a time of mysterious killings of missionaries both in Matebeleland where ZAPU operated and in Mashonaland where ZANU was active.

Even though it was most likely the Selous Scouts of the Rhodesian security forces who committed the murders and then blamed them on ZAPU and ZANU in order to discredit them in the church circles, the killings were done in such a manner that it was almost impossible to establish the truth and the liberation movements, whose press was not read in the country so that their denials were unpublicised, were of course at a disadvantage.

Perhaps even more serious in so far as the churches perceived their future survival in Zimbabwe is concerned were the expressed fundamental contradictions between religion and materialism on the ideological level as the restrictive policies vis a vis the churches and other religious groups of the communist and socialist countries which provided moral and material support to the Zimbabwean liberation movements.

To put this concern in its proper context it is necessary to outline some of these contradictions and illustrate actual communist policies of religion and to explore further how the nationalist ideologies saw the churches as potential allies in the struggle.

What naturally frightened missionaries, local Christians and other religionists in Zimbabwe on hearing about the adoption of Marxism and Leninism by both ZAPU and ZANU was the knowledge that the world views of Christians and materialists were diametrically opposed to each other; or, as one Chinese theoretician put it expressively, the two world views were "as irreconcilable as fire and water."¹² It therefore appeared that if the liberation movements won the war in Zimbabwe they might put a stop to the churches, or, at the very least, make conditions difficult for Christians to operate.

Of course both Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung, the two outstanding revolutionaries who had successfully interpreted and put into practice Marxism by setting up two big communist states, had suggested peaceful co-existence between religion and communism, but certain special circumstances prevailing in and around their societies tended to promote violent relationships between the two forms of thought. The violent interactions arising out of those peculiar circumstances became accepted, especially in the West and among the settler societies of Rhodesia and South Africa, to be the inevitable and inherent situations wherever the two systems of beliefs encountered each other- and, it seemed, no alternative was conceivable.

In the meantime both Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung, though calling for the elimination of religion among the workers in a communist state, ruled out completely the use of violence or coercive measures to accomplish such a task. In his *Socialism and Religion*, Lenin pointed out, "Our Party is an alliance of conscious, advanced warriors striving for the liberation of the working class. Such an alliance cannot and should not be indifferent to such an expression of unconsciousness, ignorance, and stupidity as religion. We demand the complete separation of the Church from the state and the use of pure ideological weapons and only ideological weapons, the use of our press and our discourses, for struggling against the mist of religion."¹³

Lenin went further to advise that in trying to eradicate religion special care must be exercised to avoid injuring the feelings of the believers. As he said it himself: "The Party tries to destroy completely the relations between the exploiting classes and the religious propaganda

organisations and at the same time to liberate the labouring masses actually from religious prejudices, and for this purpose, it organises the most extensive scientific education and anti-religious propaganda work. It is necessary, at the same time, to take care to avoid hurting the feelings of the believers, for hurting their feelings will only consolidate their blind belief in religions.”¹⁴ It is important to note that Lenin’s vehement and sometimes vituperative anti-religious posture does not arise just out of the godlessness of Marxism, but even moreso out of the Church’s collaboration and close identity of interests with the corrupt and exploiting ruling classes of Russia. Yet Lenin still felt that, other than the de-establishment or separation of the Church from the State which apparently was to be done administratively in the Communist State, no forceful measures beyond the persuasive means should be employed against religion and its believers.

Such a peaceful procedure was whole heartedly endorsed by Mao Tse-tung in China when he wrote in *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People*: “We may not use administrative orders in eliminating religion. We may not force people to give up idealism or force them to believe in Marxism. All problems of an ideological nature, all controversial problems within the ranks of the people can be solved only by democratic means and by means of discussion, criticism, persuasive education. No attempt may be made to solve them by means of coercion and suppression.”¹⁵

But this attitude in China changed as the result of the American imperialist intervention in Korea in the early 1950s, when protestant churches were called upon by their Chinese government to minimise their connections with the Americans who were using the churches and some of their missionaries in China to advance their imperialist objectives. Therefore the Chinese churches were called upon to transform themselves into self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating units, which might apply to the Chinese government for subsidies to run their social services facilities, such as schools and hospitals. Nor was the rupture between China and the American missionary churches made any easier by some of the resolutions of the World Council of Churches, whose origins were immediately traced by the Chinese people to the American imperialist power house. Indeed in 1951 the Chinese leaders of the protestant Churches and organisations came out very strongly against what they believed to be the American imperialist manipulation of the World Council of Churches. They said that the vast majority of the christians in the world were good. The leaders went on:

It is the wicked imperialists who use the church as their tool of aggression. In July, 1950, the Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches met in Toronto, Canada, and passed a resolution concerning the war in Korea, branding the North Korean government as an aggressor, and appealing to the United Nations to exhort member nations to take part in 'police action' in Korea, and opposing the signed appeal of 500 million people (The Stockholm Peace Appeal) against the use of atomic weapons.

This resolution of the World Council of churches echoes the voice of the United States Congress. If one examines this truth-distorting resolution of the World Council, one can see that the World Council is the tool of Wall Street, and of that instigator of the Korean War, Dulles. We express our wish to expose U.S. imperialism, which during the past period of over hundred years had made use of the church's work in evangelism and cultural activities to carry out its sinister policy.¹⁷

This Chinese fear of the American use of the christian churches as a cloak for their imperialism accelerated the Chinese state drive towards nationalization of the social services under the control of the christian organisations, which was achieved by the end of 1951. In 1954 and 1957 the Chinese government also severed completely all forms of foreign control of Chinese churches. Thereafter in the period just preceding the Cultural Revolution the Chinese mounted a systematic effort to discredit missionaries by exposing some of their acts of collaboration with imperialists both in China and elsewhere. Peoples of the third world, including those of Rhodesia who were actually mentioned, were warned to be on their guard against "Yankee Imperialist Cultural Aggression", and the ever changing strategies of missionaries.

It was said that in the past American missionaries had run schools and hospitals in Africa and Asia in order "to poison the minds of the local people. They used this means to gather local information and carry out subversion in co-ordination with the political, economic and military needs of the U.S. Government. But now, the mounting struggle for liberation in Asia and Africa has compelled U.S. imperialism to

modify its tactics and adopt more hypocritical and covert methods in its missionary activities overseas. American missionaries today profess support for national independence and sympathy towards social progress so that they can worm their way into local mass movements, and sidetrack them into a path of 'reformism' and away from anti-imperialism and revolution." It was added that the missionaries had begun to employ the tactics of the indigenization of worship and personnel in order to win the local believers.¹⁸

On the surface, therefore, the Chinese Communist state activities and policies towards the church gave missionaries little room for comfort but instead drove them into a state of anxiety, especially in Zimbabwe which was threatened by a Marxist-Leninist oriented revolution. What seems to have escaped many missionary policy makers and their followers were the special circumstances shaping the Chinese attitudes. It did not occur to the christians that the Chinese were in a defensive position against American imperialism as well as against what they perceived to be a pernicious use of the church by the imperialists, and that, given a correct, concerned and committed attitude of the missionaries towards the plight of the colonial peoples, an alternative and harmonious relationship between a Marxist-Leninist state and religion was possible.

Still with a view to illustrating what frightened the missionaries and their local christians in Zimbabwe apropos of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and their failure sometimes to perceive the objective conditions of each case, we shall give the Mozambican example which was only next door. Both the Chinese and Mozambican cases are important in that they influenced the liberation movements and even more directly Robert Mugabe, who was to pilot Zimbabwe's relations with the church.

The Church and State relations in Mozambique soon after independence were the worst compared to anything that obtained anywhere else in Africa, and the tendency among the christians both in Mozambique and the rest of Southern Africa was to blame the FRELIMO Marxist state. The situation deteriorated to its worst at the end of 1978, compelling all the parties concerned (i.e. officials of the party, the central and provincial government officials and the bishops of the Roman Catholic Church of Mozambique) to meet and try to resolve their differences. The church

made a long list of charges and complaints against the government, which amounted to accusing the state of imposing, against the constitutional law, severe limitations on the freedom of worship and of movement of the church workers; the leaders also accused the state of encouraging the militants to ridicule christianity and its followers and of imposing atheism on the people.

The state officials did not try to refute the charges as such but produced an eloquent record of the Catholic Church's collaboration with the former colonial state against the people of Mozambique. The government officials pointed out that the Roman Catholic church had entered into a number of agreements with the fascist regime of Portugal, which gave the Catholics monopoly of evangelizing the colonies of Portugal. The missionaries too had to be Portuguese, thereby excluding not only Protestant Churches but any foreign missionaries. These agreements had helped to consummate the relationship of the church with the fascist government of Portugal so that the two collaborated most effectively and intimately in exploiting the Mozambicans and in the acts of repression against their legitimate quest for independence. Since the record of the church in education, health and other social services for the people of Mozambique was almost nil; the government officials could only observe that the *raison d'etre* of the Roman Catholic Church in the country had been simply to be in the forefront of the Portuguese cultural imperialism. Because of all these and many other negative aspects of the church the independent government of Mozambique had nationalised education and health and had found no reason whatsoever to make special concessions to the Church.¹⁹

In fact the government officials made it plain to the bishops that their attitude to the church had nothing to do with the fact that they were Marxist-Leninists but that they had been compelled into the position they took by the historical behaviour of the Church in Mozambique. "There is a fundamental difference between the Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique," the officials said, "and the Catholic Church in other countries as, for example Poland, Hungary or the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria. These Churches have been identified with the people for over a thousand years. The priests were not standing with the foreign oppressors, the bishops were not on the side of the foreign aggressors. They participated in the patriotic struggle, they stood with the people. These Churches participated in the formation of the nations. Our nation had to take from over and against the Church."²⁰ In short the point which stands out about Mozam-

bique, as in the other two cases that we have examined, where the Marxist-Leninist ideology was applied, is that special circumstances within and outside each of them determined the nature of their relationship with the christian churches, and that otherwise peaceful and mutually beneficial co-existence was possible between the two beliefs. Indeed one of the Chinese influential theoreticians argued that even though communism and christianity were irreconcilable, unity between the communists and the christians in China for instance was possible in the political realm on the basis of the country's 'Common Program' which provided for the freedom of religious belief and worship within the framework of the consciousness of the patriotic duties and obligations to the fatherland.²¹

Zimbabwean nationalist leaders and members of the High Command of the two revolutionary liberation movements were very much informed about the Church and State relations in China, the Soviet Union and Mozambique, especially the latter where Mugabe was based and where he often conducted political business matters with his ZAPU counterparts. They were further aware of the alternative models such as the Ethiopian - Church harmonious relations or the North Vietnamese state relations with the christians and Buddhists, where socialist regimes related peacefully to the religious organisations.

In the end the Zimbabwean revolutionary Marxist-Leninists were repelled by the unproductive and unconstructive mutual animosities between the Mozambican government and the Roman Catholic Church and opted for harmonious and mutually beneficial relations with the church.

Later on in this chapter I will give evidence of the way in which Robert Mugabe combined his recognition of Marxist-Leninism with a generous recognition of the church as a partner in the struggle. At this point I want to proceed and illustrate how this search for peaceful relations with the church was enormously facilitated by the general shift of the christian world towards sympathising with and even providing material support for the liberation movements and by the objective conditions pertaining to the church's recent political record and social welfare programmes in Zimbabwe.

c) **Christian support for the Liberation Movement**

So far as the international situation was concerned Zimbabwean liberation movements must have been influenced in their attitude towards the churches by the historic decision of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches in 1969 to set up a Special Fund within its Programme to Combat Racism (PCR).²² At the end of 1974 both ZAPU and ZANU had each received a total amount of US\$30,000 from PCR. Even though the Roman Catholic Church which was quite strong in Zimbabwe, was not, other than its Netherlands section, an active participant in the World Council of Churches, it made its own impact on the liberation movements from a different and still influential direction, when "in 1972 the Rhodesian Catholic Bishops Conference established on recommendations from the Vatican its Commission on Justice and Peace". It became one of the most vocal means of disclosing cruelties committed on the Africans by the Rhodesian security forces and advanced legal assistance to people entangled in the meshes of the Rhodesian security laws.²³ In Rhodesia itself, many church leaders (both Catholic and Protestants) came out in full support of the liberation movements and were therefore arrested and detained or deported from the country. Moreover, as we shall see, local christians and their parish leaders supported in many ways freedom fighters operating in their respective areas.

All these points of cooperation and many other areas of mutual benefit between religious organisations and the people of Zimbabwe were acknowledged by Robert Mugabe, in his statement of policy towards the Church (see also, pp. 270-272), during an interview with Sr Janice McLaughlin, who also served as a concrete example of the ecclesiastical personnel's direct participation in the liberation movement. She had not only been deported from Rhodesia for her leanings towards the liberation movements but she had decided to go and work in the refugee camps in Mozambique. Robert Mugabe started by noting how at the initial stages of colonialism in Zimbabwe churches had collaborated with the colonial state and how in the latter years they had shifted their ground to support the African political aspirations, especially as a result of the rise and growth of nationalism. Moreover, in the operational areas local christians were offering material support to the guerrillas. Mugabe also said that his party had good relations with the church because most of its members had been educated in mission schools and

at the same time the reality of the influential position of the churches in the country simply demanded that the party cooperates with them. "We maintain that as we operate in the country just now," he said, "the reality of our social religious system must be taken into account. The Churches, by and large, are the dominant influence among our people. They have established schools, hospitals and clinics in the rural areas and they are there to serve the people. We have adopted the policy that we must deliberately work together with them, seek their assistance, get them to understand what we are fighting for, that our cause is not anti-christian - it's anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism - and that the Churches should assist us in attaining the objective of a just society. So wherever we operate we appeal to the Churches for help. We appeal to them to allow us to politicise the people under their control because we believe that everybody must be mobilized so that the total commitment of our people can be achieved." Mugabe further emphasised the compatibility of christianity and Marxism-Leninism, inspite of the latter's godlessness of its materialism. He did not think that "Marxism-Leninism runs counter to Christian practice, if one emphasizes practice. I think the organisation of society on Marxist-Leninist principles is the best thing that could ever occur in the sphere of trying to get people to work together towards building a harmonious society." Finally he made it clear that Zimbabweans were not going to apply Marxism-Leninist principles in the same way as they had been applied in the Soviet Union, or China or in Mozambique. "These principles as we apply them," he said, "must take into account our own local situation, our history and traditions so that we end up with a system that is in accord with the aspirations of our own people."²⁴ In short concrete conditions of the Zimbabwean situation dictated cooperation between the church and the liberation movements during the war. This would also influence developments in independent Zimbabwe.

However before turning to the military strategies of the two movements, a brief look at the Rhodesian white settlers' ideology, especially in so far as it had a bearing on church and state relations, is necessary.

The Rhodesian settlers' ideology, especially under the Rhodesian Front regime, was to all intents and purposes imported from the South African system of apartheid. It was first given a systematic explanation by the distinguished Rhodesian settler and Prime Minister, Godfrey Huggins, in the 1940s, who talked in terms of the two main races as developing on the basis of two pyramids in which the Africans were to be

dominated in all aspects of life by 'a benevolent white aristocracy'. When he later wanted to persuade the British government to accept and assist in the Rhodesian settler imperialist expansion to the north to dominate and exploit the Northern Rhodesian mineral wealth and the Nyasaland cheap African labour under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Huggins changed his slogan to 'partnership', which of course he bluntly defined as describing the relationship between "the rider and the horse".

When the Federal experiment collapsed under increasing African nationalist pressure and the Rhodesian settlers elected their Rhodesia Front government, they became more explicit about their policy of separate development. Instead of calling it apartheid, the Rhodesians called it provincialization. Its concrete foundation was the Land Tenure Act of 1969, which sought to separate the Africans from the whites more definitively than before on the basis of separate land ownership. The Africans were deprived of any land rights in the urban areas which then became designated white areas. The powers of the chiefs and their rural councils were carefully increased so that they could constitute the basis of separate regimes for the African people. It is not necessary in the present work to go into the details of the Rhodesian brand of apartheid ideology, except to emphasise that it was a somewhat diluted version of the South African system, but still with many of the obnoxious trappings of the parent one.²⁵

One of its most objectionable trappings, which is of special interest for our study, was its pious and hypocritical refrain about its being anti-communist. Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister throughout the war of liberation in Zimbabwe, arrogantly thought that the settler dominated Rhodesia was 'an oasis of order' and a bulwark against communism, which was fast consuming the independent African countries to the north. He was sometimes puzzled by the criticism he received from some of the western countries, which he thought should be in the best position to appreciate his crucial role as the defender of 'Western civilization' against communism. He could only explain such behaviour of the west on the basis of the fact that it was itself thoroughly permeated by communism.²⁶

Apparently such was the Rhodesian settler scare of communism that when the Cubans backed by the Soviet Union became directly involved in Angola, the Rhodesian whites could not rule out the possibility of the Cubans invading their country as well. In the event, it was said, South

Africa and the western countries would be forced to come to the settlers' aid.²⁷ The blind fear of the communists, who were closely identified with the liberation movements of ZAPU and ZANU, buttressed the will of the Rhodesians to fight African freedom fighters with crusadal zeal and cruelty. Any civilians or institutions (rural churches and their personnel especially) suspected of being associated or collaborating with guerrillas had to be destroyed by murder or closure or severely restrained by intimidation, brutal torture or detention without trials.

A series of security decrees and laws existed to enable the security forces to conduct the anti-communist crusade 'effectively' and without being entangled in the, nonsense, of violating so-called civil rights and liberties. These were conveniently suspended in the operational areas, which at the height of the war covered all the rural African areas.

Such therefore were the ideologies of the warring forces in Zimbabwe - the anti-communist apartheid versus revolutionary Marxist-Leninist socialism. But to understand how they operated and sought to translate themselves into reality we must go on to survey the military and political strategies with which they were closely identified. Again these, like their ideological counterparts, were not static, but kept on changing as the result of new experiences in the different stages of ever intensifying struggle.

II Strategies in the War

The ideological development of the nationalist movements which entered into an uneasy alliance in 1976 in the Patriotic Front seemed to converge remarkably well. The choice of military strategies, however, provided distinctly different options due to varying historical circumstances which I have illustrated already in the previous chapter. These different options affected developments within the Patriotic Front during the final phase of the struggle as well as during the first years of independence. I shall now explore these differences at some depths starting with a summary of the historical evolution of different strategies of ZAPU and ZANU.

a)

The Decisive Choice

ZANLA strategy was almost in complete contrast to that of ZAPU and this contrast has been drawn by none other than Joshua Nkomo himself, the political leader of ZAPU and the supreme commander of its ZIPRA armed wing from 1977 to the end of the war. Shorn of the negative aspects the following statement by Nkomo succinctly portrays the difference between ZANLA and the ZIPRA: “[ZANLA] adopted a policy of forced political indoctrination of the local population - in Shona they called it *pungwe*, meaning compulsory all-night mass meetings. ZANLA, in fact, operated as a political force, while ZIPRA had to behave in a strictly military way.”²⁸

There were several reasons which accounted for the differences between the strategies of the two sister liberation forces. The first one was that of the levels of the support each party commanded or thought it commanded inside the country. When the two parties were banned in 1964, ZANU had hardly had a year of existence and in most of that time she had been locked up in factional fights with ZAPU, especially in the townships of Harare, so that she had had very little time to build up a mass following in the rural areas. ZAPU on the other hand must have for some time continued to enjoy a mass following, principally a legacy of the many years' efforts of the united nationalist movement. As we shall see, unfortunately ZAPU believed this to be the case throughout the war and therefore did not counter the ZANLA political mobilization which in the end eroded her following to a minority status at the independence elections.

The second fundamental reason for the differences in strategies was that of the different traditions inherited by the two liberation movements. While ZANU was principally influenced by Mao's mode of guerrilla warfare ZAPU was influenced by the Soviet Union and Cuba and the latter tended to emphasise military success over political mobilization to impress and win the support of the people. Moreover there were differences between the two parties' conceptions of how much could be accomplished by guerrilla warfare.

Even though ZANU's long term goal must have been to develop her guerrilla warfare to the Maoist Phase Three - the stage during which the enemy is destroyed by conventional military operations, it is quite conceivable that the party believed that Phase One and Two would be

sufficient to reduce the country to an ungovernable state and force the regime to negotiate. In any event this had worked in Mozambique, where the party operated from. From the way the party put everything at its disposal, in terms of personnel and armament it would appear that that was the overall calculation of ZANU. ZAPU in the meanwhile believed in the use of a limited number of guerrilla forces to harass, tire the enemy and create semi-liberated zones as a prelude to the launching of conventional forces which would hold the ground won and also serve as backup means or rear base for further advances by the guerrilla units. Indeed, as shall become apparent, this was the basis of ZAPU's so-called Turning Point Document of strategy.

Finally, as has already become apparent, when the war resumed in 1976 ZANU enjoyed an initial advantage over ZAPU in terms of recruits. Zimbabwean refugees found it easier to cross on foot and in large numbers into Mozambique, than to do the same into Zambia. Thus ZANU had a lot of ready refugees, whom she politicised and from whom she built a large army, when ZAPU struggled to recruit cadres through the long and difficult route via Botswana. But by the end of 1977 this disadvantage had been overcome and that was why the two forces tended to complement each other by 1978 to the extent of encircling the enemy (see p. 76-77)

This summary survey should suffice as a background for a closer look at the actual strategical alternatives pursued by both ZANU and ZAPU.

b) ZANU's Popular Mobilization

ZANU, as we have seen in Chapter 1, entered the decisive stage of the war in August 1976, after the virtual collapse of ZIPA experiment. Both its military and political operational objectives were an adaptation of the Maoist strategy for guerrilla warfare, which ZANLA had decided to adopt after the failure of the 1960s incursions. A good account of the implementation of this strategy is given by Paresh Pandya in his *Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga*. ZANU proceeded in accordance with the three stages of guerrilla warfare which were outlined by Mao Tse-tung. As Tungamirai put it: "Firstly the enemy is on the offensive, secondly the guerrilla takes the offensive then there is a stalemate, e.g. in Mutoko we moved freely with no enemy attacks. Our war had got to the stalemate, in this area we did not get to the stage called positional warfare whereby freedom fighters hit targets in the town. Our war ended as guerrilla

warfare. Positional warfare would have meant fighting pitched battles in the towns for days, so our war was cut short".²⁹ In other words when the war ended in 1980 ZANLA were basically still in the first and second phases of the revolutionary struggle, especially in the newer operational provinces of Manica and Gaza, and perhaps only contemplating the possibility of the third phase in the older province of Tete.³⁰ The major task of ZANLA was still primarily that of the politicisation of the masses by means of the *pungwe*, which were political rallies of villagers held at night, as well as that of the replacing of the colonial administrative institutions with the ZANU party structure.

All this was indeed in keeping with the Maoist teaching that a revolutionary party and its armed wing must aim at setting up a state within a state, in which to build the main forces in preparation of the final and decisive assault. Thus Tungamirai tells us that ZANLA operated on the basis of "two types of structures [which] were military and political. The operational military structures were divided as follows: Tete (North East) led by myself as Provincial Commander, Manica (East Central) led by Sheba Gava, and Gaza (South East) led by Rex Nhongo. These were sub-divided into sub-regions called sectors, and further sub-divided into detachments. So we [also] built [corresponding] political structures with a cell or village, a branch [and] then a district. The cells were made up of villages, e.g. Nyamukoko in Mutoko. The cells were small because we were afraid of the security forces finding out. They were not as big as today's cells but they were structured according to Central Committee Regulations as drawn by the Commissariat Department. They took over the work of political education."³¹ But the process of political mobilization and restructuring of the society served several other purposes which helped to meet the needs of the guerrilla army. In the process the people were so won over to the side of the just war that they became like water and the guerrillas the fish who inhabit it. In the Zimbabwe context the villagers, including rural mission schools, clinics and hospitals and businesses began to give massive support to the freedom fighters in terms of supplying food, clothing, money, information on the movement of enemy troops, medicines, etc. (see Chapters IV and V).

We get some idea of how ZANLA, to meet their own daily needs at the same time as they advanced the interests of the party and the struggle in general, went about reorganising villagers from the recollections of Mufaro Mpofo, who became one of ZANLA district court officials in Mberengwa in 1977. He says that the freedom fighters first

appeared in his home area in 1976 and contacted people first in order to obtain food. "They would come," he says, "and ask the people to cook food for them. But one homestead usually could not cook enough food for a group of freedom fighters. Some of those groups were quite large." So they were forced to send small boys and girls, who were to become permanent messengers for the freedom fighters and were called *zvimijiba* (males) and *zimbwido* (females), "to tell neighbouring homes to also supply food but secretly. So the cooking had to be done at first in small groups of adjoining homes so that the presence of the guerrillas was not leaked to the enemy. When the food was cooked it was carried to the place where the freedom fighters would be hiding. The women, to avoid being detected, carried *sadza* (mealie porridge) in the baskets and other vessels which they used everyday for instance to fetch water from the wells and rivers. After feeding, the guerrillas would sometimes require blankets to cover themselves at night. Then the same homes that had cooked the food would supply the blankets." When the guerrillas disappeared in the morning, the villagers would go and collect their blankets. "This was the pattern at the beginning of the war. It was soon discovered that the burden of the war - particularly the supplying of food and blankets - was falling on the shoulders of a few homes which were located near the Mwenezi river and the neighbouring hills, which were frequented by the freedom fighters. Those who lived away from those hiding places were not affected at all. That's when we got involved in *mushandira pamwe* (co-operatives). Villages began to be identified with particular camps or bases. Each base now had a chairman who organised the cooking of food, supplying of blankets, and the calling of meetings. In our communal area there was for instance Base raMbuya (Mai Makiwa at headman Mariba's place) near Mazetese. Then came Vukwari Base; then came Gamatokisi Base (near headman vaGodi); near Sviba there was Gukurahundi which was formed later in 1979... The chairmen of the bases were elected by local villagers on the basis of their being reliable people... These bases later became known as branches, with branch chairmen. The cooking of food and supplying of beddings were now carried out by the branch villages, and with that organisational arrangement the food supplies were made very efficient because we were now all as villagers working together. This is how we got organised - to start with we had cells formed, which coincided with villages falling under particular headmen. Thus headman Ndara with his people formed a cell; Zenda as headman also had to form another cell, and so on. These with other cells then met to form

a branch under Chairman Sengi Maginya at Vukwari... The cells, though called by the name of the headmen, were given new designations such as 'A' cell or 'E' cell. Cells could be four or five to form a branch... In short we had a new organisation which replaced the rural colonial organisation under the headmen, the chiefs, the district commissioners and their courts. Our new organisation was thus as follows:

- (1) *a cell*, which coincided with a headman's area villages. But the Chairman had to be elected. For instance Ndara was replaced by Monias Tera Moyo, elected by the people.
- (ii) Branch or Base - coinciding with several cells. The Chairman was elected by the people, e.g. Vukawari or Chirambe base."³²

It is also important to see how the people soon took the initiative to organise themselves in accordance with the party structures. In order to make sure that innocent people were not unnecessarily accused as traitors and then killed by the freedom fighters villagers set up their own branches and 'overall' courts which investigated and tried cases of people brought before them on the charges of being sell-outs. "At first," Mpofo tells us, "I was the Chief's Court Clerk. When that legal arrangement was abolished by the guerrillas I was elected to the freedom fighters' court in our area. What that meant was that there were branch or base courts, and five or more bases or branches were grouped together under an overall court. We who were in the latter court tried cases from the local branches and we were elected by the people. This was because in time people had noticed that it was important to take charge of their own affairs and to organise themselves in such a way that they had their own trusted people to control their lives. This was because at the beginning so many people were killed by the comrades on flimsy grounds and because they were reported to the comrades as traitors by their enemies. The comrades had not the means or the time to find out the truth and they did not know the local situation, so that they tended to believe easily what they were told. That way we lost many people executed by the guerrillas, many of whom were innocent. That was when 5 of us were elected to the overall court. That was Sengi Maginya from Vukwari; I, Mufaro Mpofo, was elected at Gamatokisi; Ndlovu was elected at Gukurahundi; Chomupani was elected at the Matewa base; then there was Mavumba ... We were the final court and there was no one else above us. We really saved so many lives of people who were reported out of sheer hatred and local jealousies... The

freedom fighters respected our court and only took action on our recommendation. We never tried any other cases such as those involving adultery, theft or anything like that. Our courts simply concerned themselves with cases of traitors." These new people's courts as well as the related party political structures were part and parcel of the whole process of supplanting colonial rule in the communal areas. The whole approach of setting up new structures of authority created, as we shall see, conflicts in the missions which had boarding schools. Students, teachers and ordinary workers who had grievances against their local authorities tended to seek resolutions of these in the people's courts, if they were available, or to seek the direct intervention of ZANLA combat units in the missions. Discipline in certain places became impossible to enforce.

The whole process was reinforced by the vigorous programme of politicisation which was done during the *pungwe* or nightly rallies. These were held in the bushes or hills, or any place where there was enough natural cover to conceal the people from the enemy. A typical rally consisted of a long political address by the political commissar of the combat unit, and it was punctuated by the singing of the Chimurenga (or war) songs and dancing to the tunes of those songs. Political messages covered the socio-economic and political grievances of the Africans and how these were rooted in the colonial domination and therefore the need to abolish the system altogether. The songs were based on the traditional tunes, while the messages were designed to drum home the evils of colonialism, the importance of the party, and the role for the armed struggle in the destruction of oppression and exploitation. In other words the songs served to cultivate political awareness and also to strengthen the spirit of aggression among the people against the enemy.

Other references were made to the legacy of Nehanda or more local spirit mediums. The political messages and some of the themes of the songs sought also to mould the African determination to destroy the colonial system in the crucible of African culture and thought. As a consequence many of the songs appealed to the ancestors for guidance, for protection, for inspiration and for courage. It was in such areas of the struggle which sometimes approximated ancestor worship and achieved implicit or explicit anti-christian overtones that instances of conflict with the church teachings emerged. Sometimes the clashes in the teachings of freedom fighters and those of the church conflicted so seriously that church attendances and other forms of public witnessing of the word of God were affected.

In terms of fighting ZANLA forces adhered to the Maoist approach of avoiding confrontation with superior enemy forces and concentrated on selecting enemy targets for destruction by “surprise attack, sabotage operations, ambush and use of landmines”. Such targets included all institutional and personnel expressions of the enemy’s political, economic and social domination and exploitation in the communal areas, such as:

- Government Department of Internal Affairs and its personnel such as district officers, district commissioners and district assistants.
- Military and police outposts.
- Military and police convoys.
- Strategic infrastructure such as railway lines, stations, power lines, roads and bridges.
- White farmers and their homesteads.
- Farm stores and cattle dips.
- Chiefs and headmen.³⁵

The destruction of some of these targets produced contradictory behaviour and responses in the rural populations and their institutions. By the time of the war the interdependence between the rural areas and the towns had increased to the extent that some places could not survive or maintain their subsistence living standards without regular supplies from urban areas of foodstuffs, clothing, drinks (soft and hard ones), tobacco, agricultural implements and their parts, lotions, hospital and clinic medicines and other supplies.

Furthermore contradictory behaviour emanated from the nature of the colonial system and its institutions, so that many of the targets which intrinsically served as means of exploitation and oppression often assumed the deceptive appearances of benefitting the people. Consequently there were often disagreements or just sullen acquiescence on the part of the rural population in the destruction of what they considered to be useful public utilities but dubbed enemy targets by the freedom fighters. The

ambiguous nature of the colonial system of exploitation therefore tended to produce a few men and women in the rural communities who stood up or even sought means to collaborate with the enemy forces in defence of what they thought were useful things such as bridges, dip-tanks, grinding mills, clinics, etc. Such people would find themselves branded collaborators or sell-outs and be killed. Mission institutions suffered greatly in all these ambiguous situations. But of course all this suffering which people and their institutions had to bear only served to indicate the complex and painful nature of destroying an entrenched colonial system. It also demonstrated how the Maoist guerrilla warfare involved a total war to destroy the enemy by systematically weaning the masses away from him.

Indeed the comprehensive nature of the strategy of ZANLA forces and their party was well articulated by Robert Mugabe himself in his New Year's Message of 1979 when he proclaimed "The Year of the People's Storm - *Gore reGukurahundi*". ZANLA forces were tasked to consolidate the liberated zones and ensure their defence by means of building local people's militia forces; they were exhorted to extend the frontiers of the liberation struggle to all the corners of the country; they were urged to destroy many more enemy administrative and military installations; to destroy further enemy economic targets and to liberate and turn many farms to the land hungry peasants; to institute "programmes of self-reliance in production and construction, education and culture, health and sanitary work in all the operational areas." In terms of political organisation and politicisation Mugabe called on ZANLA and local party activists to build "greater identity between the Party and the people by involving the people in the administration of freed areas through the creation of village and district committees under the general direction of the Party, as well as by assigning them action programmes against the enemy, thus recognising the salient principle that the decisive weapon in our struggle is the people; to raise the level of political consciousness of the people and to recruit more cadres for military training.³⁶ This was a programme which was truly in line with the Maoist injunctions to turn a guerrilla war into the people's war because the people are the decisive force or power. As Mao himself put it: "weapons are an important factor in the war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by the people."³⁷ In short,

ZANU, following Mao's teaching used both ZANLA forces and the masses as political and military weapons. ZIPRA operated differently from ZANLA.³⁸

c) ZAPU' Military Strategy

As far as its military activities were concerned ZIPRA had inherited the partisan strategy mainly from the Soviet Union. This type of warfare had first been employed on a large scale by the Spaniards against the French army of occupation in 1808-1814. Even though the approach involved some political mobilization of the ordinary people, the support of the people was almost taken for granted in that it was supposed to be generated by their natural hatred of the foreign domination, which was often exacerbated by the enemy's exploitative and brutal measures. Sheer abhorrence of the foreigner, it was assumed, compelled the oppressed people to give assistance to the combatants and even forced them to take matters into their own hands by committing whatever acts of sabotage against the enemy and his property.³⁹

For ZIPRA this complacency or indifference towards political mobilization was made worse by the fact that at the beginning of the war ZAPU had a greater following in the country than ZANU because both parties were banned when ZANU was still in its infancy. As already noted throughout the war ZAPU thought she commanded a majority and that the party was kept very much alive by the underground structures which had been carefully constructed as early as the days of the N.D.P. Indeed T.G. Silundika, the ZAPU Publicity and Information Secretary and one of the chief architects and ideologists of ZIPRA, was in no doubt about the survival of his party after it was banned. "In 1959, when preparing for the formation of the National Democratic Party (NDP)," he said, "we decided it was necessary to also set up an underground structure... Therefore, even before the NDP was officially launched, clandestine cells had been set up. And if anything happened, the cells were to take up the work of the branches. In 1962 when ZAPU was banned, and again in 1963 following the Cold Comfort Conference, most of our leadership was in fact arrested and detained. It was only due to our underground structure that ZAPU could continue. Since then we have succeeded in developing a *modus operandi* by which communication has been maintained between the various levels from the top leadership to the cells! Our

organisational principles are understood by the membership and every comrade works with the understanding that, as a member, he or she is bound by the rules of the ZAPU constitution... Fortunately, we have never suffered a total obliteration of our structure... Thus, although underground, ZAPU functions in many ways were similar to the way it did before the ban. The duties of each member include attending meetings at which party information is made available and political education is carried out. Members at each level have to participate in and support all Party activities carried out in their area..."⁴⁰ Right up to the end of the war ZAPU believed its party structures were intact. When ZANLA were busy politicising the people and thereby making large parts of the country ungovernable for the Rhodesian regime ZAPU continued to place its faith in the 'underground' cells and party structures.

Thus instead of wasting time, as it were converting masses, ZIPRA were supposed to devote their time exclusively to fighting the enemy. Political education was the preserve of the underground party officials and other activists, who in fact constituted the sole link between the people and the combatants. These officials collected money and handed it either to the guerrillas operating in their area or to Lusaka. Moreover at the beginning of the war ZIPRA were supposed to be self-sufficient in arms, clothing, medicines, intelligence, etc., and they looked down upon ZANLA methods of political mobilization as something which exposed the innocent civilians to massacres by the enemy. Consequently, ZIPRA had an efficient department of logistics which established underground stores of arms, food, clothing, medicines, etc. in the operational areas. If ZIPRA found themselves cut off from their underground stores and in an area where there were no party structures and officials, they survived by raiding the local stores for food and other needs, which was in sharp contrast to ZANLA, who organised the people right from scratch to support them.⁴¹ As shall become apparent, however, ZIPRA dependence on the local population tended also to increase as their forces operating in the country grew and it became impractical to depend on supplies from Zambia. But even at that stage the relations between the combat units and the people in the operational areas were conducted strictly through their political commissars and the party officials.

The resumption of the war after the ZIPA fiasco almost coincided with the death in January 1977 of the Vice President, J.Z.Moyo, who had headed the War Council and this forced Joshua Nkomo to take over the

overall direction of the war. The new War Council had Joshua Nkomo as Chairman and the other members were Akim Ndlovu, Dumiso Dabengwa, Samuel Munodawafa and the Army Commander Alfred Nikita Mangena and his Deputy Lookout Masuku. The new Council drew up a whole new strategy which was both ambitious and radical compared to anything thought of previously. Its principal aim was to create semi-liberated areas in northern Zimbabwe which would constitute the new headquarters of the ZAPU liberation struggle. This required the concentration of all the ZAPU military forces and energies in the area. As Dabengwa recalled: In order to implement the new strategy "we were going to concentrate our forces in the northern part of the country so that they would create a buffer zone from which they would push inwards creating semi-liberated zones. Once these semi-liberated zones were created we would then move in more forces to defend the semi-liberated areas so that headquarters personnel - both political leadership and the military command would then move in and occupy those areas and we would be able to drive our thrust towards the actual main targets - the cities and the Rhodesian army targets - which were all situated in the middle of the country next to the cities, such as in Gweru, the Thornhill Base, the New Sarum in Harare, the Petrol Reserves in Harare the Chemical industry in Kwekwe which manufactured the napalm bombs, etc."⁴² The culmination of this thinking was crystallized in the document of the strategy of the Turning Point, whose broad outlines were discussed and adopted by the Revolutionary Council held in Zambia sometime in 1977 and was attended by no less than 600 delegates representing the armed forces, party missions in Africa and abroad, trade unions, and many other organs of the party. It was generally felt that the time had come to seriously prepare for the eventual final assault on the white power in the country.⁴³ The plan was prepared in the light of historical experiences elsewhere regarding guerrilla wars. It was said that many of these guerrilla wars had terminated with the guerrillas trying to negotiate with the enemy and then ending up with their ideas and main objectives completely diffused. ZAPU wanted to anticipate all that by winning a total victory involving the surrender of the enemy which would enable the party leadership to take over the country. Thus in 1977 a lot more guerrillas had to be trained and pushed into the northern part of the country at the same time as a conventional army with its command system was being put into shape. In so far as specialist personnel and military equipment for the regular army were concerned, Dabengwa said: "We had already sent in 1976

young fellows to train as pilots, aircraft technicians, tank drivers and tank mechanics. We had already acquired most of the armour like tanks, armoured cars, armoured personnel carriers, and we had acquired sophisticated crossing machinery equipment." 1979 was the year in which it seemed sufficient preparation had been done to enable the regular units to cross into Zimbabwe.⁴⁴

Such an ambitious strategy could only be successfully implemented through the support of a programme of massive recruitment as well as training in guerrilla and conventional warfare. Indeed between 1976 and 1978 ZAPU was preoccupied with the building of this vast war machine that some of their most spectacular and heroic exploits in the war were performed particularly in the field of recruitment, which, as it must always be borne in mind, was far from being an easy operation considering the costs of circumventing the Zambezi barrier. As we shall see in the last three chapters, it was in fact in this area of her operations that ZAPU impinged most significantly on the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe and ended up involving more international ecclesiastical interests in the war in Zimbabwe. In the present chapter, however, only an indication of the recruitment programme will be given.

For a long time ZAPU's recruitment, like its infiltration of the guerrillas, was greatly hampered by the Zambezi river, so that the party depended on a trickle of young men who went to Zambia to escape unemployment in Rhodesia. Such people could never go in large numbers in case they raised the suspicion of the watchful Rhodesian security agents. The big break through came in January 1977 when three ZIPRA combatants under the command of Moses, *alias* Timothy Dube, or Bob III abducted Manama Secondary School children in Gwanda District and successfully drove them to Kobojango, where they were picked up by the Botswana Defence Force and taken to Selibe-pikwe and then to Francistown. By the time they got to Francistown the original 300 or so students had had their number swollen up to over 1,200. From Francistown the 'Manama Group', as they came to be known, were ferried by light aircraft to Lusaka and then to the ZAPU reception camp of Nampundwe.⁴⁵ This was a veritable break through for ZAPU and its recruitment programme in that from the experience of handling the Manama Group the Botswana people, their authorities as well as some international organisations established efficient facilities for handling Rhodesian 'refugees' in transit to Zambia. In particular it became the established task of the Botswana Defence force to ferry with its trucks the waves upon

waves of these refugees from Kobojango, the first major stop in Botswana where people arrived on foot, to Francistown where they were airlifted to Zambia.⁴⁶ The Botswana corridor to Zambia soon accorded the same advantage as was being enjoyed by ZANU in Mozambique in terms of having a huge pool of refugees from whom people were selected for guerrilla training.

Moreover the Botswana refugee corridor was established when the atmosphere in Rhodesia was growing more and more conducive for guerrilla recruitment. By 1977 Radio Maputo and Radio Lusaka were beaming a lot of propaganda by ZANU and ZAPU concerning the escalation of their efforts and the successes they were scoring and the two parties were urging the sons and daughters of Zimbabwe to come forward and take up arms to topple the oppressive colonial regime. This propaganda and the inspiring liberation songs which accompanied it won the hearts of the young men and women so much so that they needed little prompting to cross the Mozambique and Botswana borders. The brutal counter-measures adopted by the colonial security forces simply drove out young men and women. Unemployment among school leavers was yet another factor forcing the young people to join the liberation movements as a form of occupation. The youths also ran away to escape being drafted into the national service in the Rhodesian army. All these factors combined with the intensification of recruitment by ZAPU. Dube and his team, for instance, roamed the Gwanda - Beit Bridge - Mberengwa rural areas on a recruitment mission. They set up a large recruitment base at the Namande hills in Mazetese communal area, where they openly drilled their recruits so that they could gain the necessary physical fitness for the long march to Kobojango in Botswana. (See map 2) At one time they kept no less than 50 recruits in that base who were fed by the local peasants. From Namande the recruits were marched to Botswana along a well established route which went through the communal areas where ZAPU supporters provided them with food and other needs.⁴⁷ (see also Chapters V and VI) Because of all these efforts, the refugee camps in Zambia were soon flooded with young men and women who were simply itching to receive guerrilla training so that they could return home to fight. Indeed at one time in 1977 the Nampundwe reception camp had over 10,000 refugees. Just like its sister party ZANU, ZAPU was soon unable to cope with the number of young men and women coming forward for military training and decided to open up schools for formal education, indeed to the utter disappointment of these youths who wanted nothing but guns to go home and fight.⁴⁸

The first was Nampundwe, which throughout the war served as the reception camp, where people were sorted out according to age, sex and physical fitness. Small boys, mainly under the age of 16 were separated and at first had a school established for them in April 1977 at Nampundwe itself. But not long after that the Rhodesians bombed the camp and it was decided to move the little boys for their own safety to a new site and school which was called J.Z. Moyo Camp No.1. All the women and the young girls were also immediately separated from the males and taken to Victory Camp, just outside Lusaka. It was here that a school was set up for young girls. But both Victory Camp and J.Z. Moyo No. 1 camps were again bombed by the Rhodesians towards the end of 1977 and male school children had to be moved about 700 kms north of Lusaka where the J.Z. Moyo No. 2 camp was built as a school for them. The Rhodesians still threatened to bomb this area as well and the children were finally moved to J.Z. Moyo No. 3 beyond the town of Solwezi near the border with Zaire. By 1979 the party had three educational institutions - J.Z. Moyo No. 3 with 12,000 children, Victory Camp with 8,000 girls and the Technical College at Kafue for technical training and for those who were disabled in action.⁴⁹

By March 1977 Freedom Camp had well over 1,000 young men at any given time awaiting to go for military training. As we saw in Chapter 1, after the quarrel between Julius Nyerere and the members of ZAPU, the latter's only training camp at Morogoro in Tanzania had been closed down towards the end of 1976, leaving Kaunda with no option but to allow the party to start its training programmes in his country. Other than Mwembeshi, which was the first training camp to be established by ZAPU in Zambia, the party opened C.G.T. 1, C.G. T. II, C.T.T. and Koimba for men and Mukushi camp for females. All of them trained combatants for guerrilla warfare, and the courses ran for up to 8 months. After that initial training some were selected to go for specialist courses in different African and overseas socialist countries, some went to train in conventional warfare and the rest were infiltrated into the country to reinforce the fighting units. Each one of those camps was capable of handling at least 1 000 trainee combatants at any one time, so that ZAPU must have been producing by the end of 1978 at least 6,000 trained guerrillas every 8 months or so. Before Mukushi was bombed in October 1978, it was also producing at the rate of two battalions or nearly 1,000 female combatants every six or so months.⁵⁰ At Mulungushi on the other hand, people who were trained in the various camps and in different parts

of the world were integrated and initiated into the arts of conventional combat by the Zambian army officials.

With all these training facilities and a rapid, if not excessive, inflow of recruits ZAPU was in a position to concretise its plans for the implementation of the Turning Point. Indeed she had sufficient manpower to have a brigade that was being integrated by the Zambians in Mulungushi, some of whose battalions were crossing the Zambezi at the time of the Lancaster talks.⁵¹

The full implementation of the Turning Point depended on the availability of semi-liberated zones in Zimbabwe. The available information indicates that in 1979 ZAPU guerrillas in the northern front had established areas where it could have been possible to bring in regular units for holding the won ground and perhaps to use it for further inward gains; at least this was the view of both the commanders of the guerrillas in the country and the overall military planners at the Headquarters in Lusaka. A brief survey of their guerrilla military thrusts from 1976 to 1979 helps to show the grounds for their optimism.

ZIPRA dated the resumption of their war operations after the collapse of ZIPA in Mozambique and their expulsion from Tanzania to the 6th August 1976 when they had successful contact with the Rhodesian Defence Regiment and killed 7 Rhodesian soldiers, and captured 7 rifles, 2 MAGs, an alpha 76, boots, uniforms, rag sacks and a few utensils, which were taken by Deputy Commander Lookout Masuku to the OAU meeting of 1976 as concrete evidence of ZAPU's active war efforts.⁵² This had followed Kaunda's acceptance of accommodating ZAPU military camps as well as the use of Zambia as a launching pad, which had led to ZAPU's deployment of eight sections (representing almost her entire military strength available at the time in Zambia) along the whole Zambian/Zimbabwe Zambezi border from Feira to Kazungula. Thus there were a section operating from Feira, a section in Mushika opposite Kazangarare, a section in Chirundu, a section in Nyamomba operating in the Kariba area, a section in Sinazongwe, a section in Chipepo, a section in Kabanga and a section in the Livingstone area. These sections operated on a commando basis and therefore made periodic crossings into Zimbabwe to carry out minor operations such as ambushes, raids on police stations and on other enemy economic installations, to lay mines, etc. before going back to their Zambian bases. By early 1977 the strengths of the sections were considerably boosted by the arrival of the 'Bouncers' and other reinforcements from the group of 800, leading to a change in tactics

and operations. Decision was taken to make guerrilla units to stay permanently in the country. Even the initial system of relying on food supplies from Zambia had to be stopped in favour of obtaining the food from the country. The people were slowly accepting to feed combatants as they saw the latter gaining the upper hand in the operational areas. By mid 1977 ZAPU had an estimated strength of 3,000 guerrillas in the country all concentrated in the Northern Front. With the stepping up of the training in Zambia as a result of the successful recruitment programme a second front was opened from Botswana called the Southern Front.

The advanced nature of the guerrilla war soon necessitated a reorganisation of the fronts and the retirement of the old commanders with their places taken by the younger generation, who were coming from the 'O' and 'A' level schools. To begin with Nikita Mangena, who had successfully rebuilt the army almost from scratch after the disruptive political crises, was killed in June 1978 when his vehicle detonated a landmine laid by the Rhodesians in Southern Zambia, and his place was taken by his Deputy Lookout Masuku. It became possible to retire by appointing them into diplomatic service the old guard commanders - such as Cephass Cele, Sam Moyo, Report Mpoko, Gordon Munyanyi, etc. - all who had been at it since the early 1960s. The High Command was also expanded to take account of the expanded nature of the guerrilla operations. The most important personnel in the High Command structure were now the Commander Lookout Masuku, his Deputy Ambrose Mutinhiri and Chief of Operations, Elliot Maseko. In the operational field Rodwell Nyika commanded the Northern Front, while Carlson Mudzingwa commanded the Southern Front.⁵³

Logistics were vastly improved with the introduction of big and inflatable canoes and rubber boats donated by the German Democratic Republic, which were used to transport personnel reinforcements and military equipment across the Zambezi. All this was backed up by the introduction of radio communications in 1978 so that each platoon commander in the field in Rhodesia was supplied at first with a Russian 6-cell battery HF radio with a range of about 1000 kms, which weighed 3 kgs. The facility enabled the commanders to communicate with the Lusaka Headquarters. At a later date radio communications were further improved with the acquisition of the 3-9-3s which had a better capacity. It was therefore easy to order quickly equipment and personnel reinforcements.⁵⁴ With all this infrastructure which enhanced the efficiency of the guerrilla operations, the ZIPRA in 1978 and 1979 made major thrusts

which saw them gaining the upper hand over the Rhodesian forces in many of the African areas north and south of the Plumtree - Kwekwe railway line; these areas included Zowa, Chenjiri, Tsholotsho, Lupane, Lower Gweru, Gwanda, part of Mberengwa, Filabusi etc. The party had put in the country as many as 4,500 guerrillas by the end of 1978 and so much of the rural colonial administration had been demolished so that some structure was needed at least to mediate in quarrels involving freedom fighters and the population. On the guerrilla side five regional commanders who were also members of the Revolutionary Country - Richard Mataure in the Urungwe District, Mabuku in Plumtree, Gedi Ndlovu in Lupane, Todlana in Tsholotsho and Carlson Mudzingwa in the Mberengwa - Beit Bridge - Gwanda districts - were given the task to deal with civil matters in their area.

Civil administration was done through and with the assistance of the ZAPU party structures which resurfaced as soon as the people gained confidence in the guerrillas. As Richard Mataure, one of the regional commanders combining military and civil responsibilities, put it: "There had been a ZAPU infrastructure which had been lying low since the early 1960s. When this infrastructure realised that the liberation forces were getting on top of the situation it gained confidence and resurfaced. It resurfaced all the way from Dande, Chipuriro (Sipolilo), Kazangarare, Vuti West, Vuti East, Urungwe, Magunje to Zvimba. Thus we had the leading members of the party - such as the Mashayangombe of Zvimba, the Bhebe of Chitomborwizi, the Jamela of Chenjiri, the Chambati of Magonde etc - suddenly resurfacing and openly reorganising the party for administrative purposes. With the help of these people and the party structures we felt as if the whole northern front was totally liberated. Our forces were now making plans and indeed beginning to strike targets in Harare using as their bases Zvimba, Mhondoro communal areas and Musengezi African purchase Area. But by this time we were rapidly moving into the ceasefire period. Our strength had increased enormously. Soon we went into the Assembly points and the exercise was complete."

But just before the exercise was over it had become apparent that enough semi-liberated areas existed to permit the crossing of the regular forces to go and hold the ground and consolidate the gains as the second step before moving in the entire Headquarters from Lusaka. "The reports we got from the Northern Front," Dabengwa says, "were particularly encouraging to the extent that in 1979 our strategy was to send in regular units into the entire northern part of the country. Our first regular battalion

went into Tsholotsho in August 1979 just when the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher was organising Lancaster Talks during the Commonwealth Conference in Zambia. At any rate we were not fooled by Thatcher's pronouncement and we were going ahead with our plans. We decided that the rest of the regular units would move in the Summer of 1979 when there would be enough cover from the green vegetation on the ground and when there is enough water from the rains for our forces to drink. In 1979 in November we were going to send in more battalions but we were caught up in the Lancaster Talks."⁵⁶ The two other battalions which were ready for infiltration were stationed as follows: the one commanded by Madyiwa (now Colonel Khumalo in the Zimbabwe National Army) was stationed near the border on the Zambian side at Bwemunyama and the second one under the Northern Front overall commander Rodwell Nyika was just on the other side of the Mana Pools. The Rhodesians, who were fully aware of the unfolding Turning Point moved into preemptive action by attacking Nyika's battalion using the Air Force and units of the Rhodesian Light Infantry.⁵⁷

Pertinent to the understanding of ZAPU's strategy is also the party's definition of liberated and semi-liberated zones. This must also be understood in comparison to the ZANU's definition of the same zones. ZANU defined as liberated, areas in which its forces operated and moved freely, where enemy military and administrative structures had been completely destroyed and replaced by the structures of the party and its armed wing.⁵⁸ ZAPU on the other hand emphasised military superiority, and where its armed wing had the upper hand that was considered to be a semi-liberated zone. ZIPRA in fact talked of three operational zones - the Green, Yellow and Red. The Green zones represented the areas which they said were under their control. "We meant," one of the Bhebe Brothers explained, "that we could walk about from sunrise to sunset, without encountering enemy opposition". This had nothing to do with the control of the masses as in the case of ZANLA. In the Yellow zone the ZIPRA expected to encounter the enemy anytime. "In the Green zones, the fact was that even though the enemy might be present he avoided starting a fight because he knew he was outnumbered and was no match for ZIPRA forces. The Yellow zone was highly contested and the enemy and our forces were evenly matched or balanced. The Red zone was entirely under enemy control."⁵⁹ In short for ZIPRA the defeat of the enemy had nothing to do with the Maoist winning of the hearts and minds of the people by the guerrillas but had to do with the attainment of a

military superiority. Indeed this was confirmed by Dabengwa who said: "To us the Green Zone, to use the language of the Front, meant semi-liberated, in other words [guerrillas] were almost in complete control of that area. The enemy was scared to come into those areas. The enemy knew the ZIPRA forces were lodged in those areas but dared not venture into those areas. We called such areas semi-liberated zones. They knew that if they drove into those areas they risked being ambushed or blown off by landmines. They decided there is nothing to protect in those areas anyway. After all the population in such areas was invariably predominantly African and therefore could be abandoned. In these areas the enemy had literally withdrawn. Our intention was now to move in with our regular forces and Headquarters to hold those areas. The Yellow were contested areas and the Red were the areas where the enemy was boss."⁶⁰ In short, many parts of the communal areas in the Northern Front were considered by 1979 more or less semi-liberated in that the enemy had abandoned them so that they were ready for occupation by the regular forces.

A further important point to make is that while liberated zones were being established in the Northern Front, the Southern Front, where the Evangelical Lutheran Church was involved, was a new operational area where the Rhodesian forces were putting up a lot of resistance. Consequently, as we shall see, while the church suffered from the heavy demands for material support from ZANLA and as the result of the massive ZAPU recruitment programme, many of the Church followers were being killed, tortured, and so on by Rhodesian forces in the process of defending their ground and their ideology. The population tended to be subjected to less physical suffering wherever one of the contending forces was almost in full control of the area and to worst in highly contested or, to use ZIPRA language, in Yellow zones. In order to fully understand the new challenges that churches in Zimbabwe had to face during the war we thus have to briefly assess the strategic options of the Rhodesian Security Forces.

d) The Rhodesian Response

Indeed the Rhodesians used many means of counter-insurgency which brought about a lot of suffering in the country and in the Zimbabwean refugee camps in the neighbouring countries. The fundamental aim

of the Rhodesians was to try and win the war against freedom fighters by direct military means and through "the use of torture and psychological terror in trying to 'convince the minds and win the hearts' of the people." For the purpose of achieving its military objectives the Rhodesian regime had at its disposal armed forces with a potential strength of up to 111,550 men and women by September 1977.⁶² This Rhodesian Security Force was divided into the Army, the Air Force and the British South Africa Police (BSAP). The army was further divided into regulars and territorials. Territorials were made up of compulsory conscripts drawn from the male whites, Asians and coloureds aged between 18 and 50 years. After being subjected to national service ranging between periods of three weeks and eighteen months during which they received their basic military training the conscripts were then liable to operational duties for periods of up to four months per year.⁶³

The regular army had five units - the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Special Air Service, Selous Scouts, Grey Scouts and Rhodesian African Rifles. Of special interest to us because of their unusual operational tactics and devastating effects on both the local and refugee populations were the Special Air Service and the Selous Scouts. The Special Air Service received the most extensive and intensive type of training and only the toughest and most intelligent of the white combatants ever qualified to serve in the unit. The three years of training were made up of "free-fall parachuting, tracking and bushcraft, advanced signals, demolition, handling canoes and boats, diving, physical fitness, first aid, etc." They were also supposed to be fluent in Shona and Ndebele. The Special Air Service concept had its origins in the British army during the Second World War when it was felt that small groups of combatants were required "for in-depth penetration operations behind enemy lines, where, because of the great numbers involved, the element of surprise was often lost. What was needed was a unit which could combine minimum manpower demands with maximum possibilities of surprise."⁶⁴ The concept was translated into the Rhodesian war when deep penetration operations were mounted from Rhodesia into Zambia and Mozambique in order, it was said, to take on both the ZIPRA and ZANLA in their own ground, something which the ordinary forces could not do. The idea was also to try and defeat guerrillas by destroying their base areas, training camps and courier lines. In the end the Special Air Service units did not concentrate on guerrillas but literally went on a spree to destroy underfunded civilian refugee camps and thereby caused the greatest numbers of casualties of the whole war.⁶⁵

The second arm of the Rhodesian forces which inspired terror among the African civilians, both inside and outside the country were the Selous Scouts. Formed in 1973, their role was to gather intelligence and to carry out clandestine para-military operations. They were notorious for their reckless ruthlessness and most of their operations were designed to discredit the liberation movements. A former Selous Scout who deserted to join ZANU in Mozambique described the operations of the Selous Scouts in the following manner: "One of the special tasks of the Selous Scouts was to go to the operational zone disguised as freedom fighters [and to] try to find out how the freedom fighters get their support from the masses. Then they go back and tell the security forces Another task was to kill the local people in order to discredit the Zimbabwe People's Army."⁶⁶ These 'SS', as they became known after their initials which were analogous to the Fascist SS, committed a lot of murders including, as we shall see, among the church officials and workers, in an effort to turn the church away from the freedom fighters.

In addition to the SS and the Special Air Service there were also three sections of the BSAP - the Police Support Unit (PSU), the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the Special Branch (SB) which brought untold terror and physical suffering on the civilian population. The Police Support Unit was highly mobile and its men acted on their own initiative and were completely self-sufficient. The CID and SB had the task of investigating cases under the Law and Order Maintenance Act - "interrogation of captured freedom fighters and others suspected of assisting the armed struggle." They employed brutal and "some of the most sophisticated technique of torture and intimidation" to extract information from their suspects.⁶⁷ Indeed, as we shall see, many christians and church authorities suffered acts of brutality and torture from the members of these sections of the BSAP.

Moreover all these units operated with official encouragements to be brutal and had the protection of the law in their violations of the basic human rights. For instance, when the Roman Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace made exposures of police brutality on civilians, the immediate Rhodesian official response in 1976 was to urge police officers "not to be squeamish in departing from the niceties of established procedure which were appropriate for more normal times."⁶⁸ The legal sanction for the Rhodesian security forces to commit acts of murder, to mete out brutal treatment of the population, and to expropriate or destroy the people's property was provided under the Emergency Powers Act of

1960 and The Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975. The net effect of the regulations promulgated under the former Act, according to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, was that people could "be detained without trial, their homes and property burnt to the ground, a curfew imposed, businesses closed, crops destroyed - in fact, that the very fabric of life can be destroyed." More regulations also enabled the Rhodesian regime to suppress the truth on any subject it chose, so that even attempts to reveal information on the abuse of human rights could be and were frequently suppressed. The Indemnity and Compensation Act was designed to protect Government officials and members of the security forces and "to condone and cover up [their] acts of torture and brutality ... in pursuit of the war aims."⁶⁹

Furthermore, apart from the collective punishments and mass removals of peasants from the border, which we saw in the last chapter, the regime in 1973 started Protected or Consolidated Villages, "with the attendant loss for many of educational and medical facilities, personal property (including such basic items as blankets, furniture and household utensils), fields, crops already harvested, houses and buildings (including general stores and butcheries), small stock, cattle and cash."⁷⁰ This system of uprooting the rural peasants and forcing them into big agglomerated settlements was extended through the whole of the northeast, east and southeast of the country. The idea was to try and prevent the guerrillas from having access to the population. The protected villages were guarded by a Guard Force of 7,000 men, the majority of whom "were disparagingly referred to by the other [military] units as being the dregs of society," because of their immoral and licentious manner of living. They robbed, raped and savagely treated the inmates of the villages, whom they were supposed to protect.⁷¹

To inspire terror in the minds of the people the Rhodesian authorities promised "cash rewards for information leading to the capture or killings, of guerrillas" and made "threats of severe punishment for failure to do so...". Members of the Security Forces also posed as freedom fighters to test the loyalty of the peasants; they also intimidated people through the demonstration of the 'fire power of Rhodesian weaponry'; and made public displays "and disrespectful handling of mutilated bodies of guerrillas killed in action". Photographs of mangled dead bodies were displayed in public places as exhibits of 'terrorists' killed by the Rhodesian army.⁷² Indeed, as we shall see such techniques were used even in mission schools. Furthermore, many villagers lost their lives being shot

by the soldiers on the pretext that they were breaking the dusk to dawn curfews which were imposed in many parts of the country.⁷³

At the height of the war therefore the typical defence system of the Rhodesians, especially in the rural areas where there were no protected villages, was to establish army base camps in strategic places of an operational area. Such a base camp would have units of the regular army and the specialised units of the BSAP. It was from such camps that periodic invasions of the surrounding communal villages and mission stations were organised to terrorise the population out of supporting the guerrillas. Those were also the base camps where people suspected of collaborating with the freedom fighters were tortured. The base camps were in efficient communication with the main national base at Harare, Bulawayo, Gweru and Masvingo, so that they could call for reinforcements especially for the Air Force to deal with any build ups of guerrilla forces in the neighbouring areas. Whenever a mission station closed down, the Rhodesian Army did not hesitate to convert such a station into a base camp.⁷⁴

Clearly the Rhodesian regime had a vast war machine, which apart from performing the normal military operations against freedom fighters, had specialised units or sections, such as the Special Air Service, Selous Scouts, CID, SB, PSU and the Guard Force, whose activities both in the neighbouring countries where civilian refugee camps were located and in the rural areas caused untold sufferings through huge losses of lives, physical torture, psychological terror and destruction of property. Much of this violation of basic human rights was sanctioned by law through the regulations promulgated under the Emergency Powers Act and by the Indemnity and Compensation Act. The effects of the activities of the Rhodesian army on the Evangelical Lutheran Church coupled with the threats contained in the amendment of the National Service Act of 1977 to extend compulsory conscription to Africans were sometimes most disruptive.⁷⁵

Conclusion

Thus the task of this chapter has been to outline on a national level some of the salient features of the ideologies, strategies and in some cases the tactics of the three major warring forces, with special attention on those aspects that were most likely to impinge upon the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which was basically a rural institution, rooted among

the peasants. It has been possible to identify some of the ideological developments of the two liberation movements in the context of their progress in the armed struggle with reference to the ideological positions of some of their major military supporters - such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Mozambique and Tanzania.

It was clear that as the struggle intensified the ideology of the liberation movements progressed from the romantic African socialism to scientific socialism. The scientific socialism professed by the Zimbabwean liberation movements turned out to be quite accommodating to religious organisations because of the objective conditions of Zimbabwe where christian missions had made enormous contributions to the development of the African social programmes as well as because of the shift by many missionaries from their collaboration and support of the colonial regime to open support for the freedom fighters. It was therefore possible for the liberation movements to accommodate churches as part of the progressive and democratic forces to be mobilized against the colonial state in the first phase of the national revolution. By declaring themselves to be committed to a scientific socialist revolution, however the liberation forces simply hardened the resistance of the colonial state, which professed to be inspired by the determination to protect 'Western Christian Civilization' against communism, and indeed also got ideological influences from its sister apartheid regime of South Africa.

Whilst ideological developments ran parallel in ZANU and ZAPU, we have however, noted remarkable strategical contrasts between ZANLA and ZIPRA - the former having inherited the Maoist approach to guerrilla warfare and its emphasis on mass mobilization and politicization, and the latter using the partisan approach which relied more or less on the masses' abhorrence of foreign domination to gain their support. So while ZANLA went ahead to build their party in their operational areas, ZIPRA relied on their military record to inspire a resurgence of the ZAPU party structures. Indeed it was indicated that where ZIPRA operated there was some resurfacing of the party officials and structures. From the point of view of exerting pressure on the civilian population ZANLA which operated as a military and political force did more than ZIPRA, which operated merely as a military force. By 1978/79 both forces were relying on the local population for food, clothing and other living needs. Even at that point ZIPRA still tried to obtain such needs through the political commissars who cooperated with the party officials rather than through the mobilization of the villagers.

Moreover the south western part of the country where ZAPU opened her Southern Front was for her still a fresh zone of operation, so that she affected the area more through her massive recruitment programme rather than through her military activities. The Rhodesian forces meanwhile used some units whose operations brought terrible suffering on the rural people and their institutions. The next Chapter will try to outline the recent history and organisation of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, emphasising those aspects which influenced the Church's relationships with these various warring forces.

Footnotes

1. *Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Selected Documents*, Edited and Selected by Christopher Nyangoni & Gideon Nyandoro, London, Rex Collins, 1979, p.81; see also ZAPU's response to the oppressors' efforts to associate the freedom fighters with the communists, Aquino de Braganza and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds) *The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements Vol. 2, The National Movements*, London, Zed Press Ltd., 1982, pp. 96-97.
2. Meredith, *The Past is Another Country*, p.44.
3. "Interviews in Depth Zimbabwe/ZAPU No. 1 George Nyandoro," p.5.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
5. Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity: Uhuru naUmoja: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952 - 65*, Dar Es Sallam, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 162-171.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Aquino de Braganza and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.) (*The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements, Vol. 1, The Anatomy of Colonialism*, London, Zed Press, Ltd, 1982, pp.174-5.
8. *Ibid.*, p.184.
9. "LMS Ole Gjerstad Interviews George Silundika," pp. 13-14; See also de Braganza and Wallerstein, *The African Liberation Reader*, Vol. 2, pp. 99-100.
10. Mugabe, *Our War of Liberation*, p. 55-56.
11. ANC-ZAPU and ZANU, "The Patriotic Front," Maputo, January 16, 1977 attached to "Our Path to Liberation being Comments at an ANC-ZAPU Consultation and Information Meeting, November, 20th 1976."
12. Donal E. MacInnis, *Religious Policy and Practice in Communist China: A Documentary History*, London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto, 1972, p. 41.
13. *Ibid.*, pp.39-40.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.
15. *Ibid.*, p.41.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-34.
17. *Ibid.*, p.98.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 149 - 150.
19. *The Church in Mozambique, the Colonial Inheritance, Minutes of a discussion between the Roman Catholic Bishops and Government of Mozambique*, IDOC Documentation Service, Special Summer 1979 Bulletin, No. 7-8-9-July - September 1979.
20. *Ibid.*, p.28.
21. MacInnis, *Religious Policy and Practice in Communist China* pp. 30 - 32.
22. Elisabeth Adler, *A Small beginning: An Assessment of the first five Years of the Programme to Combat Racism*, Geneva, World Council of Churches, 1974. It must be noted that FRELIMO too received grants from the WCC, but among the contributors to the Fund the Portuguese branch of the Roman Catholic Church, with which the party was at war, was conspicuously absent.
23. Carl F. Hallencreutz, "A Council in Crossfire: ZCC 1964 - 1980" in Carl Hallencreutz and Ambrose Moyo (eds.) *Church and State in Zimbabwe*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1988, p. 73.
24. Mugabe, *Our War of Liberation*, pp. 153-160.
25. Elaine Windrich, *The Rhodesian Problem: A Documentary Record 1923 - 1973*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 113 - 199.
26. Meredith, *The Past is Another Country*, pp. 48 -49.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
28. Interview with Tungamirai, pp. 6-7; This agrees with the picture given by Pandya; see Pandya, *Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga*, pp 161, 181.

29. Interview with Tungamirai, p.6; For the map of the Provinces and Sectors see Ellert, *Counter-insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 42; see also Pandya, *Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga*, pp. 54 - 55.
30. Interview with Tungamirai.
31. Interview with Mufaro Mpfu, farm worker, Chiwundura, April 4, 1987, pp. 1 - 4, 14 - 15.
32. Pandya, *Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga*, pp. 133 - 143.
33. Pandya, *Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga*, pp. 133 - 143.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
35. Mugabe *Our War of Liberation* pp. 26 - 27; 88-97.
36. Pandya, *Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga*, p. 22.
37. Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p. 162.
38. Arthur Campbell, *Guerrillas: A History and Analysis*, London, Arthur Baker Ltd., 1967, Chapters 1,4.
39. "LSM's Ole Gjerstand Interviews George Silundika," pp. 5-6.
40. Interview with the Bhebe Brothers, 3 former ZIPRA combatants, Bulawayo, September 25, 1987; Interview with Phineas Rambofeni, former ZIPRA combatant and commander, Bulawayo, September 21, 1987.
41. Interview with Dabengwa, pp. 55 - 56.
42. *Ibid.*, 77 - 78.
43. *Ibid.*, 57 - 58.
44. *Ibid.*, Interview with Miss I.C. Mabuwa, History Seminar Room, University of Zimbabwe, September 11, 1987; Interview with Bernard Bova Nyanga, Kushinga-Pikelela, August 19, 1987; Interview with Mr Paulos Matjaka, J.Z. Secondary School, June 5, 1987.
45. Interview with Rambofeni.
46. *Ibid.*, Interview with the Bhebe Brothers.
47. Mr Paulos Matyaka, who was asked by Joshua Nkomo to start schools in the camps, became very unpopular for coming up with such an idea. See Interview with him.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 23 - 28.
49. Interview with Kenneth Nkala, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, Esigodini, December 30, 1989, p. 19 - 20; Interview with Dabengwa, p. 89
50. *Ibid.*, p. 10; Interview with Mabuwa, p.25; Interview with the Bhebe Brothers, p. 38.
51. Interview with Dabengwa, p. 25; Interview with Bhebe Bros., p. 40; Interview with Nkala, p. 39.
52. For many more claims of the ZIPRA operations in the north, west and south-west of the country, see "Our Path to Liberation," pp. 13 18.
53. Interviews with Mataure, pp. 1 - 6; Interview with Cele and Moyo, pp. 22 - 23.
54. Interviews with Dabengwa, pp. 68 - 69, 91 - 92; Interview with Mataure, pp. 8 - 9.
55. Interview with Mataure, pp. 14 - 15.
56. Interview with Dabengwa, p. 60.
57. Interview with Mataure, pp. 12 - 13.
58. Pandya, *Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga*, pp. 56 - 58.
59. Interview with the Bhebe Brothers, p. 37.
60. Interview with Dabengwa, pp. 83 - 84.
61. *Civil War in Rhodesia: Abduction, Torture and Death in Counter-Insurgency Campaign, A Report Compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace*, London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, September 1976, p.29.
62. *Guardians of White Power the Rhodesian Security Forces, Zimbabwe Briefing No. 6, An Anti-Apartheid Movement Publication*, (N.d.), p.4.
63. *Ibid.*, p.9; Pandya, *Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga*, p.184.
64. Barbara Cole, *The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service*, Transkei, Amanzimtoti, Three Knights Publishing, 1984, p. 5.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 9. see attacks on Chimoio, Tembue, Freedom Camp and Mukushi (even though the

- latter two may have had some military implications, they were entirely undefended), *Ibid.*, pp. 170 - 189; 226 - 232. CF Interview with Miss Mabuwa, one of the Victims at Mukushi, on the 19th October 1979, pp. 35 - 42; Interview with Nkala a victim at FC, pp. 24 - 26.
66. *Guardians of White Power*, p.7; See also J.K. Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, London, Croom Helm, pp. 124 - 131.
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 10 - 11.
68. Ellert, *Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 19.
69. *Civil War in Rhodesia*, pp. 16 -28.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
71. Ellert, *Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare*, pp. 24-26.
72. *Civil War in Rhodesia*, pp. 16 - 28.
73. *Ibid.*, pp. 29 38.

3

The Lutheran Church in the Zimbabwean Landscape

Introduction

As was made evident in the previous chapter the actual extension and vitality of christianity in different parts of Zimbabwe presented both basic ideological challenges and different strategic options in the nationalist liberation movements. In this chapter we will look more closely at Zimbabwean christianity so that we can identify and assess more precisely the dynamics involved in the church's relations with the fighting forces in the course of the war.

As spelled out already in the general introduction, in this study I deliberately abstain from making a reasonably detailed over-all-assessment and presentation of how Zimbabwean christianity as a whole fared during the war. Instead I have opted for a case-study approach, and will focus my attention decidedly on the Evangelical Lutheran Church with its primary rural base in South Western Zimbabwe.

There are three main reasons for this deliberate methodological option. In the first place I am myself born and bred in the Evangelical Church and remain a practising member of it. Therefore this is the church I know best. The story I am telling is, thus, part of my own story.

The second reason for concentrating on the Lutheran Church in South Western Zimbabwe is that this church in the middle of the 1970s when the war became intense in the area had reached a high degree of indigenization especially in the localization of its officials and workers. Its programmes made this church a natural prime target for both national liberation armies in their need for institutions able to provide them with both material support and recruitment grounds.

This, thus provides the third reason for my deliberate choice of focus. The area of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, i.e. the southern parts of the Midlands and southern Matabeleland, was part of Zimbabwe where both ZANLA and ZIPRA were active and even became involved in severe confrontations. This also affected church developments.

However we should not isolate the Lutheran Church from its wider Zimbabwean context. This denomination was a distinct local manifestation of Zimbabwean christianity with certain features of its own. Furthermore the involvement of the Lutheran Church was informed by the specific social and economic conditions in drought-stricken South Western Zimbabwe.

I. The Lutheran Church and Zimbabwean Church Geography

a) *The Historical Background*

When the nationalist struggle for Zimbabwe in the mid-1960s increasingly turned towards more militant confrontation with the colonial state and the civil war erupted christianity already had a long history in Zimbabwe. It also had, developed a certain variety both in terms of ecclesiastical structures and as far as political preferences and experiences were concerned.

Summarizing briefly Zimbabwean Church History, it is necessary to go back to the sixteenth century when Fr Gonzalo da Silveira tried to convert the Emperor Munhumutapa and his court in 1561. The missionary was killed at the orders of the Emperor, who apparently was advised by Muslim traders to do so because they were jealous of the Portuguese possible commercial success in the Shona empire. Fr Gonzalo became one of the early martyrs in the history of christianity in Zimbabwe. Gonzalo's efforts were followed by those of the Dominicans who settled on the Zambezi and operated there for a far much longer period in association with the fluctuating Portuguese colonial interests in the area. They were joined by the Jesuits in the beginning of the seventeenth century and both societies abandoned the field in the latter part of eighteenth century.

These early missionary ventures did not achieve any lasting results. The denominational structures, which since the 1960s became increasingly drawn into the struggle for Zimbabwe, had their immediate background in the new missionary ventures, which after Mzilikazi's establishment of Ndebele rule in Western Zimbabwe were spearheaded by Robert Moffat of the London Missionary Society, who came in 1859 and established the first permanent mission stations at Inyathi and Hope Fountain in Matebeleland. In the 1870s the Paris Evangelical Society, then well established in Lesotho, tried to start some work in the Masvingo area but was stopped by Lobengula, then the king of the Ndebele. Lobengula associated the PMS mission with the king of Lesotho who had recently betrayed the Hlubi chief Langalibalele to the British. Langalibalele had been engaged in a war of resistance against the British in Natal and upon being beaten in battle by the colonial forces had sought temporary and tactical refuge in Lesotho from where he hoped to renew his war perhaps on a guerrilla warfare basis. The Lesotho King, Jonathan Molapo, instead of granting sanctuary to his African brother, brought the latter into a trap which enabled the British to capture him on 11 November 1873. In stopping the PMS missionary, the Rev Francois Coillard and his party from working in his country Lobengula made it clear that he did not want people associated with the sell-out Molapo in Zimbabwe.

Not long after, the Berlin Missionary Society working in the Transvaal also sent Black evangelists into Southern Zimbabwe and these were able to preach the gospel for some time in parts of the Mberengwa and Mwenezi districts. The Catholics too sent their missionaries under the Jesuit Zambezi Mission, who were permitted to establish the Empanzeni mission in Matebeleland by Lobengula. Even though these early efforts were unsuccessful in terms of achieving large numbers of converts, they helped, through the correspondence and publications of the missionaries, to open Zimbabwe and its resources of the human souls to the gaze of the Christian world.

Indeed when the British mining capitalist Cecil John Rhodes, who had built his wealth on the South African minerals and through the exploitation of the Blacks of Southern Africa, swindled a mineral concession out of Lobengula and used it to gain permission from the British government to colonize Zimbabwe, missionary organisations both in South Africa and abroad were stirred into action. Missionaries were especially encouraged to take advantage of the new opportunities in Zimbabwe when Rhodes reckoned that if they worked among the

Africans their pacifying influence would save him a lot of money by not employing that many policemen and therefore offered the ecclesiastical institutions generous land grants on which to build missions.

Thus between the colonial invasion of Zimbabwe by Rhodes's white settlers between 1890 and 1900 ten denominations took advantage of his offer so that altogether 325,730 acres were given to the missions in land grants. This was one of the aspects of the close association of the Christian Missions with the rest of the colonial forces which the anti-colonial revolutionaries like Mugabe and others kept on referring to. In the early years missions, like any other settlers, seemed to have no scruples in participating in the general land dispossession of Africans. Even though churches in later years were at pains to explain to the nationalists and other anti-colonial critics that the land they held was not being used for commercial profit but for the social advancement of the Africans, all the missionaries imposed economic and social regulations on their properties, which clashed with the customs and traditions and restricted the economic advancement of their tenants so that the latter were forced to abandon their traditional homes and to fling themselves on the reserves which were invariably groaning under the weight of overpopulation and overstocking.

b) *Types of Churches*

This, thus, is the historical background of the churches in Zimbabwe which the liberation movements had to contemplate and relate to. However we have to look more closely at the Zimbabwean church geography in order to be more specific in our analysis of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and its interactions with the nationalist movement. In fact this church was not just a specific local manifestation of Zimbabwean christianity, it represented one distinct type of Zimbabwean churches.

Different denominations even in Africa are sometimes classified according to their alignment to established christian traditions from the West, so that they are distinguished as Catholic, Anglican, methodist, Lutheran and other churches. Another way of roughly differentiating between separate forms of local christianity is to distinguish between Mainstream Churches and independent or Spirit Churches.

In the timely publication of a comprehensive study of contemporary church history of Zimbabwe, which was pursued from 1985 to 1987 by University of Zimbabwe the then Professor of Religious Studies of the University, Dr Carl F. Hallencrautz, ventured a third way of classifying churches in Zimbabwe, which I adopt for its heuristic merit for this study.¹ Hallencrautz distinguished between (i) national churches, (ii) independent or spirit churches and (iii) mission-related regional churches.

The first type of churches has developed a programme which is inclusive in the sense that it addresses itself to both different ethnic communities on the African side and to the European settler community. Furthermore its ecclesiastical structure has, in principle, a nation-wide orientation. The Roman Catholic, Anglican and Wesleyan Methodist churches belong to this first type. Even though there are some specific regional emphases in these churches, their ecclesiastical structure and actual size of membership are such that they are organized in different dioceses or districts within one united national structure. In fact the Roman Catholic Church had by the mid-1960 formed a national Bishops Conference.

The new challenges of the liberation movements from the mid-1960 put these national church structures to test as their adherents were often violently divided along racial lines in political matters. While it appears that the Roman Catholics surmounted these difficulties chiefly because of the activities of their outspoken Bishop of Umtali, Bishop Donald Lamont, and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, which openly condemned the brutal atrocities committed by the Rhodesian forces against the African civilians, the Wesleyan Methodists and the Anglicans fared rather badly. Professor Hallencrautz in his study of the ecumenical movement among the Protestant Churches clearly shows how these 'national churches' were often dogged by immense divisions and disagreements especially at the leadership level. Particularly dramatic, for instance, was the relationship of the two bishops of the Anglican Church - the Bishop of Matebeleland Kenneth Skelton and the Bishop of Mashonaland Paul Burrough - both of whom were very strong personalities. When in 1969 the World Council of Churches set aside some money to support the liberation movements' welfare programmes, Burrough suspended his diocese's relationship with that World body while his western colleague did not do so. The same issue divided the Methodist Synod, forcing the Rev Canaan S. Banana to resign temporarily from this church.

The second group of churches delineated by Professor Hallencrautz is “regionally based mission-related churches” and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South and South western Zimbabwe is classified with this group. Whilst the national churches, too, are mission-related, in the case of the Roman Catholic Church in Zimbabwe it is in fact related to many different missions, British and non-British, the distinguishing characteristics of this second type are their decidedly regional orientation and predominant African membership. The regional focus such as the focus on Mberengwa and Southern Matabeleland of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, is determined by considerations from within the respective supportive mission as well as by so called country-agreements confirmed by national ecumenical structures.³

Within their predominant African affiliation most mission-related regional churches were sympathetic to the nationalist aspirations. However there may have been some differences of sympathies either for the internal expressions of the more moderate nationalists of the African Nationalist Council from 1970 onwards or for the more militant options advanced by the liberation movements operating from Zambia and since 1974 also from Mozambique. In this regard structural differences between the church leadership in urban centres such as Harare and Bulawayo on the one hand and parishioners and pastors on the local level tended to emerge, with the former supporting the moderates and the latter going along with the radical liberation movements.

The third type of churches operating in Zimbabwe at the time of the eruption of the war were independent church movements or Spirit Churches. These were represented by total christian communities who for various reasons had opted out of the missionary relationships of the two other main types of churches. In fact we should qualify the third type of churches by distinguishing between what Bengt Sundkler would call “Ethiopian” churches on the one hand and “Zionist” or Spirit Churches on the other. Some of the more culturally nationalist or “Ethiopian”, church movements such as the Rev E.J.J. Nemapare’s African Methodist Church did join the Christian Council since its inception in 1969. Others which opted for a more charismatic form of spirituality pursued their mission on their own. Bishop Samuel Mutendi’s Zimbabwean branch of the South African based Zion Christian Church is one of the classical examples, which also spilled over into the traditional area of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.

Parallel to developments within regionally based mission-related churches, independent church movements in then Rhodesia were in the light of the interests of their African followers, even though they were not by any means radical, supportive of nationalist objectives especially at the centre.⁴ Nevertheless all the churches in the country participated in the education, and some of them in the health programmes of the Africans, in which the colonial regimes were not interested, to the extent that they earned the respect of the African nationalists. Because of their general shift towards adopting a critical stand against the Rhodesian racist policies, churches were admitted into the fold of the revolutionary programme under the general rubric of anti-colonial democratic forces. Of course, as Hallencreutz's study shows, the churches and their authorities exhibited wide and varying degrees of opposition to the colonial state, ranging from mild opposition to outright condemnation coupled with open support for the freedom fighters. It is against this general background that we must seek some of the roots of the Evangelical Lutheran Church's relationships with the liberation movements and the Rhodesian forces.

II From Swedish Mission to Zimbabwean Church

Introduction

In 1975 when the Evangelical Lutheran Church found itself embroiled in the turbulent and violent politics of Rhodesia it had been in existence for almost seventy-five years. For the greater part of its history the Lutheran Church had operated in the rural areas, chiefly in the communal lands of Mberengwa, Gwanda and Beit Bridge districts. (see map 3) Only in the 1960s did it begin to spread into urban areas in an effort to cater for the spiritual needs of its adherents who were beginning to drift into the towns in search of wage employment. As a result the Lutheran parishes were in 1975 also found in Kadoma (Gatooma), Harare (Salisbury), Gweru (Gwelo), Zvishavane (Shabani), Bulawayo, Gwanda and Beit Bridge. Actually in the mid-1970s the Lutheran Church on the advice of its supportive body the Church of Sweden Mission had decided to move both its bishop and its headquarters from Mnene in the heartland of rural Mberengwa to urban Bulawayo.

At the height of the war, between 1972 and 1980, the Lutheran following expanded enormously in the towns, especially in Bulawayo, as many people ran away from the rural areas to the relative safety of the towns. But even then the vast majority of the Church's adherents remained in the communal lands where the war raged ferociously.

Apart from some Roman Catholic mission stations - in Mberengwa under the Bishop of Gweru and in Southern Matebeleland under his colleague in Bulawayo - and the scattered Zionist and Apostolic Faith congregations, the Lutheran Church was the dominant christian denomination in the Mberengwa - Gwanda - Beit Bridge populous communal areas. By the time of the outbreak of the war it was almost wholly responsible for all the central primary and secondary schools as well as the modern health facilities found in those communal areas.

As the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern and South Western Zimbabwe is one of the main actors in this case study we should look more closely both at its historical evolution and examine its real base. As far as the Lutheran Church History of Zimbabwe is concerned, ample use of Dr H. Soderstrom's suggestive account, *God Gave Growth*, will be made.

a) From Zululand to Mberengwa and Beyond

The Lutheran Church, like many of its sister denominations, expanded in the wake of the white settler occupation and pacification of the African societies in Zimbabwe from Zululand in South Africa, where it had been established since 1876. The reasons for the Church of Sweden Mission's extension of its work to Zimbabwe were that there were parts of the country which were devoid of missions and also the wrong assumption that it would be easy to expand the work from Zululand because many Africans in Zimbabwe spoke *Sindebele* which was related to Zulu. However, Mberengwa and Nhema in Shurugwi, which they chose for their work were *Karanga* areas, a dialect of Shona.

Unfortunately, the two Pastors Axel Liljestrand and Adolf Hellden with their Zulu evangelist Jeremias Makubu, who were sent to go and explore the new field in 1902 arrived after the spree of free land grants by Cecil John Rhodes and his British South African Company Administration was well over. The result was that when in 1904 the two pastors came to claim a field for their mission they were forced to buy the Mnene. Farm

for \$600, where other missions had got farms free of charge. Between 1904 and 1908 the new field had to be temporarily abandoned because of the lethal malaria, which had already claimed the two lives of the Zulu evangelist Makubu and Pastor Hellden's wife, Mrs Ester Hellden, and had almost incapacitated the two pastors through prolonged illnesses.⁵ Between 1909 and 1913 effectively only one missionary tried to keep the work going as well as he could but not much could be accomplished. From 1913, however, the work was put on a regular footing with reinforcements coming from both Zululand and Sweden.

The Lutheran Church like all the other churches used the three pronged strategy of evangelization through preaching, teaching and healing. Thus the pattern was born in Mberengwa of the association of the Church with schools, churches or Sunday service places and hospitals or clinics. Missionaries were often too few to cover the vast field they pegged out for themselves and moreover their experiences in South Africa had shown them that the agency of the evangelist-teachers was by far the most effective mode of winning the hearts and minds of the people.

Evangelists could use the local language, customs and proper etiquette to reach their people. If they failed to convert the old people to the new religion at least they could persuade them to allow their children to venture into the new world of the whiteman. The decision was therefore made to produce a group of dedicated evangelist-teachers, whose literacy qualifications at first barely enabled them to read, write and count. They were of course carefully grounded in the elements of the scriptures, through the memorisation of parts of the Small Catechism of Martin Luther and of key verses, such as St John Chapter 3 verse 16.

Equipped with this type of knowledge and subject to frequent visits from missionary pastors evangelist-teachers were distributed in villages to start what were called preaching places. During the week the preaching places served as schools where children, some of them quite old of course, gathered to be taught the christian doctrines, reading, writing, arithmetic and singing. At the same time the older children and adults were offered catechumen classes in the afternoons. On Sundays the same places became churches where services were conducted. In this way the work began to take shape.

In 1918 the Mnene parent parish boasted of 23 preaching places, 22 evangelists and 170 communicants. Some of the preaching places were growing faster than others and it was decided to encourage them by upgrading them into parishes so that they could also become local centres

of aggressive evangelism, capable of spawning their own preaching sub-stations. The first to qualify for the honour of the status of a parish was Masase where the missionary Vilhelm Skold, assisted by one of the first evangelists Dick Dube, was stationed. In 1923 the work at Masase had expanded to 13 preaching places and 16 evangelists.

The next parish to grow was Gomututu, to which Pastor Harald von Sicard, now famous for his scholarship on the Shona history and culture, was posted in 1932. The work also expanded tremendously in 1928 when the mission acquired ready made stations in southern Matabeleland which formed the basis of the future Western Deanery. Having started as a local initiative by christian families migrating from South Africa to Bethel, south of Gwanda, had pleaded for support from the Dutch Reformed Mission at Morgenster in Masvingo. It proved, however, to be too far to effectively administer. An agreement was reached with the Church of Sweden Mission that it would become the supportive mission. Both Richard Rickland and Arvid Albrektson, whom we later on will meet as the first bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe, were actively involved in the extension of the Lutheran work in the Gwanda and Beit bridge districts.

Apart from the preaching places the missionaries tried to develop some places into sound primary schools with better qualified evangelists so that they could qualify for state subsidies. Mnene as a parish had in 1919 20 schools with 766 pupils, while Masase also had 14 schools with 412 pupils. In 1931 the schools had increased to 47 and had a total enrolment of 2,655 pupils. The same progress was being registered in the field of health.

In 1915 a qualified nurse was stationed at Mnene and she conducted treatments in the bathroom of the mission house. As the number of patients increased she moved into the veranda. But in 1925 the hospital had acquired permanent structures and had a qualified medical doctor. With some state subsidies the hospital grew rapidly. There were also clinics which developed at Musume, Manama and Masase, so that the western mode of healing was reaching a wider African population in the area. In 1933 1,602 patients were being treated at Mnene hospital and 633 at the parish clinics of Musume, Manama and Masase.⁶

b) Towards Local Church Autonomy

As already noted the lasting Lutheran operation in Southern Zimbabwe was an extension of the Church of Sweden Mission's programme in South Africa. During an expansive period of the Church of Sweden Mission under the able leadership of its most reverend chairman, Archbishop Nathan Soderblam the Swedish mission in Zimbabwe in the mid-1920s acquired a certain amount of independence from its previous headquarters in Dundee. Parallel to these developments the emerging African church members began to press for a greater say in the running of their own church affairs. The missionaries quickly made some provision for some African participation but without compromising much of their own grip on real power. To meet African aspirations two parallel governments were set up - one for the Africans and the other for the whole church by the missionaries. Thus in 1941 a constitution was made which provided for an African Synod and Synodical Council.

The African Synodical Council was made up of representatives of all the parishes and one African pastor who was elected by the Synod. The Chairman and Secretary of the Council were elected by the Council and all the pastors of the parishes.

Meanwhile missionaries had their own Missionary Conference and Missionary Council with a Chairman and a deputy. The latter two were also ex-officio members of the African Synodical Council. The African Synodical Council was given power "to appoint, discipline and dismiss the African pastors, to propose a budget for parishes and to supervise the work in the parishes, schools and hospitals..."⁷ In the end all those powers were rendered totally meaningless because the African Synod had only the local collections under their control. The major subsidy funds which ran the Church, came from Sweden, were controlled by the missionaries.

Under this arrangement the Church continued to rely on the evangelists in the expansion of the mission field. From 1928 different missionaries devoted themselves at different times to the training of evangelists and their quality kept on improving with the improvement in the standard of education in the Church's primary schools.

In 1962 the Church had 117 evangelists, and by that time they were devoting themselves exclusively to evangelistic duties. Unlike the pastors who were paid from local funds, evangelists were paid from the funds coming from Sweden but their salaries were very low. Whilst that

explained their rapid increase in numbers, it also accounted for their inefficiency. To make ends meet they had to supplement their incomes from the Church as full time peasant crop cultivators and cattle keepers. The latter occupations tended to absorb most of their energies so that the ecclesiastical work suffered.⁸

The policy of requiring that African pastors should be paid from locally raised funds both delayed the emergence of an African clergy and smacked of sinister motives on the part of the missionaries. The local Church was so poor, for instance, that when the first African pastor qualified in 1931 he could not be ordained until 1937 because the Church could not simply raise enough money for his salary.

It seems that the missionaries employed this device to put a brake on the rise of an African clergy so that they could keep Zimbabwe as their own preserve, an extremely perplexing type of thinking especially when not enough missionaries could be found to go round the vast field. In any event what all that meant was that up to 1963, sixty years after the establishment of the Church, which now had very good teacher training facilities and a junior secondary school, the Lutherans had only produced 10 pastors.⁹

Education and health on the other hand were displaying remarkable growth. By 1952 the Church had 16,000 pupils in lower primary schools and 1,200 in the central upper primary schools at Mnene, Masase, Musume and Manama. In 1940 the Church started training its own teachers for the lower primary schools and moved into the production of the upper primary teachers in 1958. It was also recognised that to build a pool from which to recruit people to train well qualified teachers and health workers the Church needed its own secondary school and this was started in 1954 at Musume but was later finally located at Chegato, which seemed to be the least developed part of the mission field.

The health division was simply the pride of the Church. Three hospitals were growing up at Mnene, Musume and Manama, each with a few clinics around it. Mnene was the largest and most famous hospital throughout the country and it treated 4,000 patients a year. In addition Mnene started training nurses, and while the majority of the student nurses came from Mberengwa - Beit Bridge - Gwanda, some few came from all over the country, helping to spread the fame of the good work of the Church Sweden Mission far and wide. This enormously helped to instil among the people a lot of pride in and to value their Church.¹⁰ Using the three means of conversion - preaching, healing and formal education

- the Evangelical Lutheran Church on the eve of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 by the Rhodesian whites had grown to 20,240 baptised members.¹¹

In spite of all this phenomenal growth by 1963 the Church was still run by missionaries and its mother agent, the Church of Sweden Mission. They provided nearly all the missionary teachers for the teacher training school and the secondary school. At Chegato, of all the half a dozen teachers, three were missionaries, one came from outside the denomination and only two were local. Of the nursing sisters, doctors and pastors, the vast majority were missionaries. Such a situation, coinciding with the height of the African nationalist demand for majority rule as well as the crucial decision by Africans to resort to the armed struggle, only made the Africans to think that missionaries worked hand in glove with the rest of the white settlers to keep the indigenous people under colonial domination. Such African rumblings merged with the stream of the local missionary pressure for greater control of the local Church and for an episcopal type of management. The Church of Sweden Mission responded by shifting responsibility for much of the local affairs to the local Church and by granting a constitution which met the wishes of the missionaries.

The devolution of responsibilities from the Church of Sweden Mission upon the local Church was contained in the Document of Understanding signed by the representatives of the two bodies at Gwanda on March 3, 1963 and which has only received minor amendments since then in 1970 and 1980. The Document of Understanding was a landmark in the development of the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe and still remains the fundamental basis of the relationship between the Church and the Church of Sweden Mission. The remarkable character of the relationship is that of recognising the high degree of the independence of the local Church at the same time as it guarantees the flow of aid. In its preamble the Document stated that the Church of Sweden Mission recognised the self-governing status of the Evangelical Lutheran Church so that it had full control over its work and functions within the framework of the Word of God and the Holy Sacraments, according to the teaching of the Apostles and the Prophets as explained in the three Catholic Creeds, the small Catechism of Martin Luther and the unaltered Augsburg Confession. This gave the Church its permanent stamp of a Lutheran Church. The preamble further terminated the dual management of the Church by the local Synod and the missionary bodies and merged them into one. In

terms of the work of the Church the agreement said that all schools and education facilities previously registered in the name of the Mission would revert to the management of the local Church. The exceptions were the Swedish School and hostels for missionary children. All hospitals, clinics and dressing stations would also be taken over by the local Church.¹²

The second major section of the agreement related to the role, rights and privileges of the missionaries in the local Church and with regards to the Church of Sweden Mission (CSM). It also dealt with the Church's relationship with other denominations. Henceforth missionaries working in the Lutheran Church would be full members of the church with the full rights, privileges and obligations laid out in the governing instruments of the Church. Because of the racist laws of the country which disallowed Africans or their organisations to own certain properties and in certain parts of the country the CSM was obliged to remain a registered organisation in Rhodesia so that it could act as Trustee of such property on behalf of the Lutheran Church. The local Church and the CSM Board would share the responsibilities of hiring and firing missionaries. The CSM would recruit and pay the salaries of missionaries while the local Church would determine their placements and duties and recommend termination of their services. The Lutheran Church had a right to receive aid in personnel and funds from other churches and agencies, provided it also informed the CSM of such steps. The third major section of the agreement concerned Property and Finance. In 1970, "with the exception of the Swedish School and hostels all movable and immovable property of the Mission within the Church" was transferred to the Church. In terms of finance, it was said: "Towards such work which the Church is not able to support fully from its own resources or from locally raised funds, the CSM Board in accordance with its financial capacity will grant annual subsidies by way of block grants and earmarked grants. The amounts of such grants will be fixed for each year, after consultation between the Church and the CSM Board. The annual budget proposals from the Church shall be submitted by the Church Council by August 31 to the CSM Board." Finally it was made a condition that as long as the Church of Sweden Mission continued to support the Lutheran Church financially, the latter must have its books and accounts examined by an auditor once a year in order to furnish the CSM Board with a report on the use of its funds.¹³

The Document of Understanding dovetailed almost neatly with the political ambitions of the local missionaries, who wanted to be independent from the Lutheran Church in Zululand. Since the mid-1920s the missionaries had been running their affairs on an autonomous basis under their own Missionary Conference and Council, chaired by the veteran Richard R. Rickland, who had come to Zimbabwe in 1927 after serving in Zululand for 10 years. Perhaps out of the need to consolidate their autonomy as well as to fulfil the spiritual sentiments of many missionaries who had grown up under episcopal care and traditions and were rather offended to see a mere pastor, albeit under commission, exercising the episcopal duties of ordination, many missionaries in Zimbabwe wanted to see the provision of a bishop made in their Church. Apparently out of reasons of economy and in view of the fact that the work for a bishop both in Zululand and in Zimbabwe seemed inadequate to warrant two bishops, the CSM appointed only one in 1947, who was to exercise episcopal duties in both countries and was consecrated in 1949. The missionaries, however, simply refused to give up their autonomous status whose cancellation was implied by the sudden introduction of the Zulu leadership and opted to carry on with the arrangements of the missionary chairmen until such time as the CSM would see fit to appoint a bishop for Zimbabwe.

The regionalism of the Zimbabwe missionaries was quite understandable in view of the presence in the country of certain missionaries who were not only strong personalities but had also served for a long time to the extent of acquiring exclusive tendencies towards outside interferences. Such personalities included the Chairman himself Rickland, who had led the group since 1934; Pastor Arvid Albrektson, who arrived in the country in 1943; Pastor Sigfrid Strandvik, who also came in 1939; and later on Tore Bergman, who, though young, had the prestige of being the son of one of the early missionaries Johannes Bergman the renowned and influential agriculturalist at Masase. Tore Bergman, together with the tough minded first Education Secretary Rickard Stenlund, also had the prestige of being the best educated and leading educationists in the mission. These people put up resistance against absorption again by the Church in South Africa until they got their own bishop in January 1959 in the person of Arvid Albrektson.

Under Albrektson's direction a new constitution which accommodated the intentions of the Document of Understanding between CSM and the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe was hammered out and adopted

in 1962. The Constitution remained the instrument of the Church government up to 1991 after minor alterations in 1969, 1970 and 1980.¹⁴

This constitution gave the Church its form and chief characteristics which were quite apparent during the war, so that it is necessary to give a brief description of its major features.

In terms of organisation and administration the Evangelical Lutheran Church as an episcopal church is headed by a bishop who since the mid-1970s has his headquarters in Bulawayo.

Below the bishop are two deans, several pastors and evangelists. The two deans head the Eastern and Western Deaneries, the former coinciding with the Mberengwa district and the latter with the Gwanda - Beit Bridge districts. In 1975 the Eastern Deanery was made up of 19 parishes, four of which (viz. Salisbury, Shabani, Gwelo, and Gatooma) were in the urban areas; while the Western Deanery had 13 parishes, three of which (Beit Bridge, Gwanda and Bulawayo) were in towns. Headed by a pastor, each parish was made up of 5 - 12 or even 15 congregations, each of which was under an evangelist.

The basic administrative unit of the Church was the parish council, consisting of the pastor, the evangelist, lay delegates from its congregations together with the representatives of the auxiliary groups, such as the *Vashandiri* (Bible Women), the *Zvapupu* (Male Witnesses), the Youth Group and the Sunday School Teachers. The parish council was responsible for the spiritual and administrative affairs of the parish. "It should help the pastor to teach and instruct the children and adults, to reach out with the Gospel, to care for the sick and the needy, to attend to the spiritual welfare of the parish."¹⁵

The parish assembly consisting of all confirmed members was held at least once a year. It was the church assembly which was the supreme governing body of the Church. The Church Assembly, which met at least once every two years, elected members of the Church Council which was the highest executive committee of the Church and met four times a year.

The Church Council nominated three people for the election of a bishop and the Church Assembly elected one of them to be the bishop for life. "The task of a bishop is: To be a pastor for the pastors and other workers in the Church, to visit the parishes at least every third year, to see to it that the rules and laws of the Church are followed, to function as chairman of the Church Assembly, to call a pastors' meeting every second year etc." The bishop therefore was supposed to travel regularly,

visiting parishes and congregations to instal pastors and to confer with leaders of other churches.¹⁶

Although the constitution provided necessary checks and balances it did give considerable power to the bishop. It is, thus, in order to try to briefly characterize the three gentlemen, who so far have held the office of bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Zimbabwe.

c) The Lutheran Episcopate

The first bishop to rule under the constitution from 1962 was, of course, the Rt. Rev. Arvid Albrektson, who was not elected by the local Church but was appointed by the Mission. His regime lasted up to 1963 when he died rather prematurely. A chain pipe smoker, always immaculately dressed, endowed with a slightly resonant voice, eloquent in Sotho, Shona and English and dignified in manners, Albrektson will always be remembered, especially by those of us who interacted with him during our impressionable young days, as the epitome of authoritative presence.

It is indeed a pity that a man who, through many other ways evoked the admiration of Africans, should have held conspicuously paternalist views which required Africans to be grateful for what he considered to be the benefits of the colonial system. Africans were most appreciative of all the contributions the missionaries were making for their physical, intellectual and spiritual edification, but always felt hurt, if not downright insulted, if the gratitude for the service had to be demanded rather than voluntarily and spontaneously given. Moreover not everything given was good or in the correct measure or correctly done. So Africans wanted to have room for constructive criticism, rejection or modifications of what was offered. Indeed as to our gratitude for the tremendous achievements of the Church in the field of education and health, that could not be doubted, as Robert Mugabe made it quite clear during his encounter with the CSM in Uppsala at the height of the war in 1977: "There is hardly any political leader in Zimbabwe who has not received his basic education at a mission school... We are grateful for what is done and are hoping for a cooperation between State and Church in a free Zimbabwe." This was repeated by the first President of independent Zimbabwe to the different heads of Churches in Zimbabwe.¹⁷ Because of his tremendous interest in education, together with Stenlund's almost pushful demand for the development of African education, Albrektson's regime saw to the

expansion of the Chegato Secondary School, so that it rapidly developed multiple streams in order to take in as many of the primary school leavers as possible.

Bishop Albrektson's untimely loss upset the plans of the CSM which had intended him to be the last missionary bishop. Thus his successor Sigfrid Strandvik was the first to be elected under the new constitution and the last missionary bishop when he retired in 1975. He was consecrated in January 1964. Like Albrektson, Strandvik came to the episcopal office after having lived in the country for twenty-five years. He was therefore well acquainted with his flocks. He had trained a lot of the evangelists personally so that his influence extended to every corner of the mission field. Simple, warm hearted and unassuming, Strandvik had an unfathomable love for humanity which was well nourished by an intense christian faith. He quickly made people at home and always remembered people after many years, even by their names. In difficulties people did not hesitate to go to Bishop Strandvik and it always worried him that he or the Church did not have enough to alleviate the socio-economic difficulties of the people. But of course there was always the recourse to the sure comforts of Our Saviour.

When at the twilight of his episcopal guardianship his Church became intensely involved in the liberation struggle and many of his pastors became victims of incarceration by the colonial security forces, Bishop Strandvik was not satisfied with second hand reports on their welfare or their feelings. He went personally to see, speak to them and pray with them in the enemy jails. It always left the victims with a sense of renewed courage and hope and indeed with their convictions strengthened further that theirs ought not to be a racial struggle but a struggle against a system perpetrated by some greedy elements in the colonial establishment. (See Masiane's testimony in Chapter V.) Though cautious himself, Strandvik therefore was able to steer the Evangelical Lutheran Church through its transition from missionary domination to an African Church, especially as he had the knack for providing Africans with ample opportunity to enjoy their democratic rights and privileges, of course, within the framework of the Church rules and its mission.

It was under Strandvik's regime that the Church witnessed an unprecedented expansion of the African clergy. Bishop Albrektson had appeared quite satisfied with the position of only 10 African Pastors in 1963. But Strandvik found the position unsatisfactory on two grounds.

First, there were still missionary pastors, when the Church had, in terms of background educational qualifications and willingness to enter the ministry too many candidates.

Secondly the existing parishes were too big. Many of them had as many as 10 to 12 congregations, separated by very long distances so that a pastor could only visit one parish per month or two months only to go and celebrate the Holy Communion. Otherwise the whole pastoral business of home visitations, preaching and catechumen teaching was left almost entirely to the local congregational evangelists. The pastor did not know his flock by name.

Strandvik forcefully impressed the unsatisfactory position on the CSM and a big programme of producing pastors was adopted in 1966. The decision also meant that the system of paying the pastors from the meagre local revenue had to be abolished and all the pastors were paid from the central fund which was subsidized from Sweden.

Many old pastors had been trained in Zululand at Rock's Drift and Umpumulo Theological College. This arrangement was now found to be costly and unsatisfactory since the trainee were disallowed by the South African regime to go with their families. A more satisfactory alternative was found by entering into an ecumenical arrangement with the British Methodists at the Epworth Theological College. Between 1966 and 1977 the Church produced nearly 26 pastors so that she had a total of 42 of them and this eliminated the element of the missionary clergy. Even though some of the new pastors were selected from the old evangelists the majority came from the school teachers who had academic qualifications ranging from the Junior Certificate to 'O' level Cambridge School or General Certificate. In fact total localization had already been achieved among the pastors by 1975 except for the 4 missionaries who at that time were teaching in some specialist institutions, such as the United Theological College.

Perhaps the most significant measure in the process of indigenization was when Bishop Strandvik wrote a memorandum to Uppsala informing the CSM that the Evangelical Lutheran Church Council had met in Bulawayo April 22 to 23, 1974 to nominate three candidates for the election of a new bishop. The three candidates were the Rev F.K. Gambiza, Pastor of Musume Parish, Dean A.A. Noko, based at Manama Parish; and the Rev J.C. Shiri, then a Chaplain and teacher at Chegato Secondary School.¹⁰ At the subsequent elections held at Masase on May 31, 1974 the candidates got the following votes: J.C. Shiri, 66; A.A.

Noko, 51; Gambiza, 2. Therefore Shiri was elected the first African bishop and was consecrated at an impressive and well attended ceremony at Masase on the 29 June 1975.²⁰

A bit retiring and slightly soft spoken, Shiri was well suited for the post both in terms of academic qualifications in a Church which was rapidly acquiring university graduates and even PhDs as well as in terms of experience. He had been a pastor for 16 years and held a B.A. degree of the University of London from the University College of Rhodesia.

From the point of view of the way the Church behaved in the war it is necessary to delineate more broadly the roles of the different levels of the Lutheran ecclesiastical officialdom. In terms of the Constitution the bishop is a pastor of other pastors and he can easily carry out this function by meeting his pastors at his offices. He really only needs to travel to a parish centre to instal a new pastor or to dedicate a chapel. He can actually live in his offices and exercise his authority without having to go to the various parishes.

The situation for the new bishop was made worse by the outbreak of the war which rendered his rural parishes a security risk. Moreover the headquarters of the Church and the official residence of the bishop had as already noted been moved for efficient administration from Mnene to Bulawayo. This effectively distanced the bishop from the majority of his parishes throughout the war. The bishop himself admits that somewhat tenuous relationship between himself and his parishes. "From 1977 to 1979", he writes in a report, "it was very difficult for me to visit parishes openly".

I had to make special arrangements with the local authorities who knew the situation well in order to visit some parts of the Church. In some Parishes I depended on the information sent by Pastors to my office and in areas where Pastors had left for other centres, I received information from Evangelists and Christians.

Mr Edward Mangena became my *Mutumwapavi* (messenger). He bravely visited affected areas and brought me messages from the Christians and also from the boys (the guerrillas). He discussed church policy with freedom fighters freely.

He also carried to them some gifts.²¹

Thus rather estranged from the rural areas by the security problems of the war the bishop turned his full attention to the ecumenical affairs which could be safely conducted in the urban areas. From 1978 he was elected President of the Zimbabwe Christian Council, where he, with the other Church leaders participated in protesting against the conscription of African students. He also headed the Zimbabwe Christian Council Political Reconciliation Committee which tried to visit the leaders of the liberation movements in order to persuade them to lay down their arms and to seek a negotiated settlement. The latter efforts were overtaken by the Lancaster negotiations.²²

The most important point that emerges, however, is that the bishop was cut off from his rural parishes. This left the second and third levels of the ecclesiastical government to determine the conduct of the Church in the war - the pastors and the evangelists of the congregations. These together with the elders of the Church and leaders of the auxiliary groups were in charge of their parishes and congregations. As it shall become apparent, in the parishes where there were schools, hospitals and clinics the pastors and evangelists co-operated with the local teachers and health workers in meeting the day to day demands of the war. They arrived at their own individual parish working arrangements with the warring forces with almost no reference to the episcopal central authority. The good fortune of the Church was that by the outbreak of the war the pastors were locals and therefore could co-operate with their people. As we shall also see, many of them abandoned their parishes, not to run away from the liberation forces but to escape being killed by the colonial forces who soon discovered or suspected that they were closely co-operating with the freedom fighters. We shall also see examples of pastors in the process of working to meet the material needs of the war effort on the liberation side. In short during the rupture of the links between the urban central authority and the rural local power centres of the Church, which was caused by the war strains, the local officials kept the Church going, showing perhaps the amount of the resilience of the Church and its instruments of government.

d) Lay-Resources in the Church

The constitution of the Evangelical Lutheran Church certainly invests a lot of authority in the office of the bishop. But the church is more than its hierarchy. The lay-resources proved to be particularly important in the course of the war. As will be made evident in successive chapters

it was also the courageous and wise lay-persons who influenced and directed local relationships between congregational and parish structures and the liberation movements.

As already noted the constitution made specific reference to two auxiliary organs of the Church the *vashandiri* (Bible women) and the youth groups. The *vashandiri* was the strongest and most aggressive organ of the Church. The concept of the *vashandiri* was copied by the missionaries from the Methodist Church which had well organised women's movement. But it was transformed in the 1960s to include practical programmes which had a bearing on the improvement of the standard of living and way of life in the rural villages. Courses were mounted for the women at parish levels, which included sewing, cooking, child care and maintenance of the churches and chapels. While a lay teacher trained the women in those practical subjects the parish pastor concentrated on spiritual matters through bible instructions and daily devotions.

In 1976 an even more important area of training was introduced which involved teaching the women to raise vegetables in their backyard gardens and to breed rabbits and chickens. These became important sources of proteins and vitamins which were badly needed in the Mberengwa-Beit Bridge-Gwanda districts which are badly hit by malnutrition. As we shall see, this area too tended to be affected by the war situation and the women became rather frightened to hold meetings. Yet it remained throughout one of the lasting pillars of the institution. The Youth organisation was introduced in Secondary Schools by the American missionaries. It soon became popular among the school pupils everywhere in the Church but was very narrow in its activities. It concentrated on purely religious activities - prayers, choir singing and Bible studies.

In the 1970s efforts were made by the Church to regularise and strengthen the movement by giving it some permanent official structure and by financing the broadening of its programmes, especially in the area of physical exercises and camping facilities. Of course, as we shall see, this was one of the badly affected areas of the Church during the war. But both the youth and *vashandiri* organisations should be noted for their role in deepening the penetration of the church into the rural societies.²³

In order to see the contribution of the *vashandiri* and the church youth in the proper perspective we should also take a look at the comprehensive statistics of the church and summarize development in the educational and health sectors.

As far as church statistics are concerned the following table illustrates developments from 1976 to 1979.²⁴

Table 1

	1976	1977	1978	1979
Parishes	30	30	31	31
Congregations	218	218	218	217
Pastors	33	33	34	35
Evangelists	17	107	107	104
Elders: Men	—	243	236	199
Women	—	343	326	336
Catechumens	1 781	1 535	871	703
Baptised: Adults	—	864	471	567
Children	—	254	270	230
Communicants	21 046	20 817	21 294	21 373
Total No. of Christians	30 648	30 984	32 719	30 114
<i>Vashandiri</i> (Bible Women)	—	3 030	3 025	3 046
Zvapupu (Witnesses)	—	48	44	47
Sunday Schools:	—	504	431	310
Teachers	—	725	495	418
Pupils	—	14 082	10 121	8 000
Youth Groups:	—	83	71	58
Leaders	—	212	121	101
Members	—	1 239	932	813
Church Contributions in Zimbabwe Dollars:	19 475	16 134	16 466	17 339

It is worthwhile to note in passing the decline in certain aspects of the evangelical work of the Church from 1977 to 1979, particularly in the number of evangelists, Catechumens, baptisms of adults, teachers of Sunday Schools, Sunday School pupils and the activities of the Youth Groups. As shall become apparent in the succeeding discussion, with the exception of the slight decline in number of the evangelists as a result of the deaths of three of them in the war, the other statistics were adversely

affected by the exodus of the school children as they went out of the country to join the liberation armies.

In addition to the purely evangelical work, as must by now have become obvious, the church was heavily involved in education and health. In 1970, just before the church was forced by some government action to relinquish its direct running of the primary schools by handing them to the communal school boards, it had 175 primary schools with 705 teachers and 24 842 pupils, 4 secondary schools with 28 teachers and 619 students, and a teaching hospital with 5 teachers and 63 students. Of course the handing over of the primary schools to the communal boards did not at all diminish the influence of the Lutheran Church over these schools within its area. The Church continued to supply all the teachers of those schools from its secondary schools, its chapels were attached to those schools so that the Sunday School teachers and pupils, catechumens, etc. were actually drawn from those schools. Meanwhile the church retained direct responsibility over the central primary schools, secondary schools and the schools for the blind as Table 2 shows.²⁴

Table 2

	1976	1977	1978	1979
Schools	10	9	9	7
Teachers	65	65	67	70
Pupils	1 844	1 526	1 853	2 221

Again in passing we should note the decline in the number of schools between 1977 and 1979, which was the result of the closure of Manama, Masase and Chegato. But the number of pupils only declined in 1977 and began to rise again in the following year, when the Church decided to provide secondary school facilities in Bulawayo.

Parallel to the increase in the number of African pastors, the Church by 1975 had fully localised all the teaching posts and headmasterships in its schools. A lot of university training had taken place in 1960s, when some of the graduates of the Chegato Secondary School went to do their 'O' Levels either at Zimuto Secondary School in Masvingo through some

arrangement with the Dutch Reformed Church and at Fletcher High School.

A few students started going to Fletcher High School after a group of government senior inspectors of schools had visited Chegato in 1960 and had been impressed by the efforts of the Swedes and by our performance as students.

From 1961 a trickle of the best students (not more than three in my year (1963) and certainly the same number in the previous year) began to go to Fletcher. From there and from Zimuto some students qualified for 'A' Level and then for University work in the local University College, others were taken from the TI Certificate at the Gweru Teachers Training College, while a few of us (only 2, in fact in 1964) discovered purely by chance that it was possible to enter the then University of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland.

Once we pioneered the way many more followed us from our Church. Moreover the Church soon started to encourage a few more to go to Lesotho, whose University name soon changed to the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Strandvik's regime, with Tore Bergaman as the Church's Education Secretary from 1966, developed a deliberate policy of encouraging a few of their students to go to Lesotho for university education by offering them interest free loans for fees and general maintenance. Soon there was such a sizeable group of the Evangelical Lutheran Church students at Roma, Lesotho, who were so reasonably well financed as to be the envy of students from other denominations.

While some went for further studies on completion of their junior degrees, many went home to teach in the Church schools. By the beginning of the 1970s the Church was growing to be self-sufficient in secondary schools teachers, as its students returned from the local university, the Gweru Teacher Training College, Roma, and also the University of Sierra Leone, which was also one place which opened its doors to the Zimbabwean students during the war. Some of these were the teachers and headmasters in Church schools during the war.

Many of them were so politically committed to the liberation of Zimbabwe that their relations with the freedom fighters posed no problems except in terms of being caught in the act of collaboration by the colonial forces. As we shall see, some co-operated so successfully that their schools remained open throughout the war, while in the case of Paulos Matjaka, a Manama teacher and former student of the University

of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, refused to remain when his pupils were abducted by ZAPU and went with them to Zambia where he became in charge of the party's education programme among the refugees. Thus when Dzingai Mutumbuka, the first African Minister of Education at Independence, was organising the education programme in Mozambique, it was the Evangelical Lutheran Matjaka who was doing the same for the refugee children in Zambia.

In terms of health, the Evangelical Lutheran Church was virtually responsible for the services available to the rural populations of Mberengwa, Beit Bridge and Gwanda. Table 3 shows the amount of medical work done by the Church with regards to the hospitals, the staff employed and the patients treated in the first half of 1977, just before it suffered a major blow when its senior African doctor was murdered by the Rhodesian security forces.

Table 3

	Manama Hosp.	Mnene Hosp.	Masase Hosp	Musume Hosp	Totals
Beds	112	232	89	209	542
In-patients	2 113	4 209	4 042	3 786	14 150
Out-patients	4 011	3 745	4 618	5 804	18 178
Total No. Of Patients	6 121	7954	8 660	9 590	32 328
State Reg. Nurses	6	7	3	?	16
Medical Assistants	11	25	8	6	50
General Hospital Workers	34	91	26	?	151
Student Nurses	—	28	—	—	28

The Evangelical Lutheran Church also had 9 outlying clinics of which we only have statistics for the year 1977, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4

	Shashe Clinic	Zeze Clinic	Majini Clinic	Gungwe Clinic	Totals
Medical Assistant	1	1	1	1	4
General Workers	1	1	1	1	4
Out- patients	1 573	9 069	1 630	1 646	13918

Meanwhile Table 5 shows how badly affected the Church's medical work was by the war.

Table 5

	1978	1979
Hospitals	4	2
Clinics	9	1
Beds	451	341
Medical Assistants	42	32
In-Patients	5 468	5 468
Out-patients	5 891	5 891
Total No. of Patients	11 359	11 359

Clearly the Evangelical Lutheran Church was a big enterprise which affected the lives of the majority of rural people of Mberengwa, Gwanda and Beit Bridge. When these people became involved in the liberation war, which has been described as being "closer to the people than any other form of warfare so far engaged in by man, because the people are the target for every operation undertaken by the contending forces, whether political, psychological or military, and because the combatants are themselves of the people,"²⁶ it was inevitable for the Church to also get involved.

e) **The Local Base of the Church**

This survey of the lay-resources of the Evangelical Lutheran Church has brought us closer to the grassroots. In order to be fully informed of conditions within the Church as well as the causes of its substantial local involvement in the war we have to take a step further and look more closely at the actual environment of the Church. Here we do not just encounter grass-roots, indeed we come face to face with a vulnerable and drought-stricken part of Zimbabwe.

The communal areas served by the Evangelical Lutheran Church are situated in the south and south west of the country, whose altitude, excluding the mountains, varies from below 1000 feet above sea level to 4 000 feet. The area is dry and hot, and has a mean annual rainfall which ranges from a mere less than 16" to a mere 24". The greater part of the area is also located in the Regions IV and V of the Natural Farming Regions of Zimbabwe. According to Professor George Kay, Region IV has low rainfall and effective rain is between 16 and 20 inches (41 - 51 cm). It is prone to seasonal droughts and severe dry spells during the rain seasons and it can only be used for growing drought-resistant crops and for semi-extensive cattle farming. In Region V the rainfall is too low (less than 16 inches) and too unreliable even to grow drought-resistant crops. It can only be used for grazing livestock on an extensive basis.²⁷

In the meantime, because of the extensive land alienation which went on in the Mberengwa-Gwanda-Beit Bridge districts and elsewhere, when the Europeans appropriated farms for themselves and forced the Africans into smaller and smaller areas and because of the rapid human and animal population growth as the result of natural increases and the

influx of dispossessed immigrants from other parts of the country, there developed huge population pressures which in turn were accompanied by rapid land degradation and ever declining crop yields. Over the years the inhabitants of these communal areas of the south and south west were plunged into massive impoverishment, a state which apparently posed perplexing imponderables for both colonial government economic planners and academic theoreticians intent on proposing and mounting rescue operations. The situation is indeed well summarised by one of the brilliant and lucid geographers at the University of Zimbabwe, J.R. Whitlow, in an illuminating paper in which he seeks to put together some knowledge on this issue which is scattered in various publications and also to assess the potential for development of the different classes of the African communal areas.²⁸

Whitlow opens his discussion by telling us of the lack of agreement between government economic planners on the one hand and some scholars on the other about which of the African communal areas, between the worse ruined and the less ruined, should be rescued first. The government wanted to start with what were designated as the *intensive rural development areas* (IRDAs), which had actually reached rock bottom of degradation; while scholarly opinion saw little chances of success in that approach and therefore favoured a strategy described as one of applying "holding operation" in the worse [African] areas and concentrate on the 'least worst' areas" which provided "the best prospects for limited development funds." In the process of the exposition of his argument Whitlow exposes the universal economic desperation in the majority of the African communal areas, and especially those in the Mberengwa-Beit Bridge - Gwanda districts, which, as we have seen, lie in the Natural Regions IV and V, where, he says, the "rainfall is commonly low and erratic" and commercial agriculture can only be done under irrigation conditions. "In the semi-arid south-eastern and south-western parts of the country in particular," he goes on, "dry crop production is a risky undertaking with low yields and periodic crop failures being common place." Indeed Whitlow tells us that Africans were only trying to eke out a living in that part of the country by farming not by choice but by the forced circumstances of the land alienation.²⁹

Moreover even the schemes of irrigation proposed by the white colonial officials lay outside the African areas, so that Africans could only benefit from them, if they materialised at all, at the cost of major

removals from their traditional areas. Whitlow also tried to assess the agricultural potential of the African areas on the basis of rainfall, soil properties and slopes and came to the conclusion that the Mberengwa - Beit Bridge - Gwanda districts, among others, had poor to very poor potential. Indeed, from the point of view of environmental factors the areas in which the Evangelical Lutheran Church operated were during the war of liberation not only among 'some of the most populous' but were "characterised by low agricultural potential and therefore [had] limited prospects for development."³⁰

Furthermore, in Zimbabwe scientists have worked out, using a set of variables, the varying degrees of erosion throughout the country and the map which they produced shows that a large part of Mberengwa lies in the areas of critical erosion hazards, especially because of its high population density.³¹

Geographers in Zimbabwe have also looked at the carrying capacity of the different areas of the country, which is often worked out in terms of the number of people or livestock, or a combination of the two per unit area. This depends on whether the quality of the area is good or bad so that poor quality areas have a low carrying capacity and vice versa. "If the carrying capacity of the land is exceeded then land deterioration processes are initiated which can substantially lower the effective carrying capacity, thereby reducing the populations that can be readily supported in the given areas." Geographers have gone further to work out degrees of pressure on the land in relation to their carrying capacities. The well populated areas of the Gwanda-Beit Bridge districts and where the church is most represented were found to suffer from great population pressure. Mberengwa was simply hopeless in that a small portion of it was classified as having "extreme pressure" while the greater part of it was "desperate", the last degree classification of pressure. What all this means in plain language is that in Mberengwa, "Land degradation was widespread ... [perhaps] has reached such advanced stages that regeneration processes will take several decades to restore the vegetation and soil cover to a productive state."³²

A survey of the grazing status, one of the major means of livelihood in the Mberengwa-Gwanda-Beit Bridge communal areas, was carried out in the 1960s, and areas were classified as "bare, very overgrazed, moderate and good". The areas of the Evangelical Lutheran Church were again classified as "bare to overgrazed". Such areas had "very sparse

grass cover and acute shortages of dry season forage ... [and therefore] were classified as having very poor conditions". Whitlow adds that from the early sixties there were animal and human population explosions so that the conditions by the time of the war were vastly worse. Moreover over 50% of the land in the Mberengwa - Gwanda - Beit Bridge districts was estimated to be under cultivation or fallow. This in combination with the high levels of population pressure meant that the people had almost wiped out woodland resources so that they were experiencing extreme shortages of wood fuel; because of the domed rock outcrops or inselbergs, common especially in Mberengwa, it also meant that there was no more land "available for further extension of cultivation".³³

It is clear therefore that from the standpoint of the economic situation of the people, the Church operated in an area where peasants were desperate through economic hardships. Their areas were overstocked and overpopulated so that their land resources had deteriorated considerably in productivity. Because of the generally erratic rains in the areas which in turn meant frequent droughts, people were subject to frequent famines. The anger of the people at their plight was exacerbated by the fact that they were suffering in the midst of plenty.

They were indeed suffering in the midst of plenty when taking into account the mineral wealth and vast land resources to which they had no access. Both Mberengwa and Gwanda were and are centres of vast mineral deposits and mining activity. The deposits include gold, asbestos, chrome, iron and emeralds. The vast wealth generated by these minerals never came to the local people but was shared between the multinational co-operations and the colonial state in Harare. Consequently peasants always looked for any opportunity to plunder this wealth. Indeed when the security situation was at its weakest as the result of increased guerrilla activity peasants took the first opportunity to pilfer in a variety of skilful ways the precious emerald nuggets from the Sandawana Mines near Chegato and Masase Mission stations and sold them to unscrupulous white smugglers in Harare and Bulawayo. Many peasants made sufficient incomes in the war from this type of mineral stealing as to be able to survive while others actually made some fortunes as to move into transport and retail businesses. Whenever the mines were abandoned because of the deteriorated security situation, as happened at Nyala and Rhonda near Musume mission, peasants descended swiftly upon any property which could not be carried away - especially building

and fencing materials. Some homes of the daring and enterprising peasants changed and assumed a modern outlook as a result of the stolen building materials. The major point to observe here is that peasants were desperate and therefore supported the liberation movement which weakened the colonial security situation and offered opportunities for a better life through the plunder of the capitalists' property.

The same situation of the peasants suffering in the midst of plenty equally applied of course also to land and grazing resources. Just across the boundaries of their overpopulated and overgrazed communal areas were acres of lush (especially in summer) under-utilized ranches. When the peasants' livestock consisted of literally moving bags of bones because of perpetual undernourishment the whitemen's cattle just across the barbed wire fences which separated the communal areas from the commercial farms were bursting their skins with fatness.

It was indeed least surprising that the peasants of the Mberengwa - Beit Bridge - Gwanda supported the freedom fighters, and, to be sure, did not care whether they were ZAPU or ZANU - the important thing was that they both promised to liberate them from their desperate impoverishment. In fact, once the managers of the local ranches in Mberengwa - Beit Bridge - Gwanda abandoned their farms in fear of being killed by guerrillas, peasants cut off fencing wires, let their cattle to graze in the farms and also killed the white men's cattle to feed themselves.

If there was anywhere in Zimbabwe where peasants moved quickly to occupy the farms at the appearance of the freedom fighters, it was in the Mberengwa - Beit Bridge - Gwanda districts. The liberation war was greeted as a truly liberation war.³⁵ The Church could not fail to succumb to the pull effect of its followers, at least in so far as this meant supporting guerrillas. In short the land hunger of its followers to some extent predisposed the Evangelical Lutheran Church to support the liberation struggle.

To further appreciate the close relationship between the peasants and their church it must always be borne in mind that, except for the Nursing Sister Guramatunhu, who was in charge of the Mnene Hospital throughout the war and came from the Makoni district in the eastern part of the country³⁶ (where, as Professor Ranger has shown, the land hunger was equally desperate)³⁷ all the clergy and the health and educational leaders, professional employees and ordinary workers of the Evangelical Lutheran Church - right from the bishop to the evangelist of a congrega-

tion, right from the headmaster to the school clerk, and right from the only medical doctor to the nurse maid - were born and received the greater part of their early education in the Mberengwa - Beit Bridge - Gwanda districts and only a few of them had left their area for short periods to go and acquire whatever professional qualifications were not offered locally.

All of them had their real or permanent homes in the impoverished communal areas of those districts. They shared their incomes and wages with all the members of their immediate and extended families. The remunerations tended to be even too little in the frequent years of droughts and famines. The majority of them also belonged to the most embittered section of the communal population because they had grown up when their areas were already over populated and overstocked and could therefore not get any plots for ploughing or for grazing their livestock. The land shortage had started much earlier on in the mid-nineteen fifties³⁸ and had grown worse over the years, as we have already seen.

Clearly in so far as the Evangelical Lutheran Church followers and their Church leaders were concerned, their relationship with and responses to the plight of the peasants and vis-a-vis the liberation struggle were not cast in the mold of the two kingdoms as suggested by the Rev Dr Soderstrom. Indeed Dr Soderstrom's suggested scenario of a christian being a citizen of two worlds - the secular and the spiritual³⁹ - may have applied in some churches elsewhere in Zimbabwe, but certainly not in the Evangelical Lutheran Church. The Church through its followers and leaders was simply part of the one kingdom, the impoverished and suffering rural African kingdom, which looked up to the freedom fighters for liberation.

In the next two chapters, it will of course, be suggested that the Church institutions represented the most developed parts of the rural areas in which they were situated and that they were able to offer a great deal of financial and other material support to the liberation movements. This must however, be understood first in relative terms of development against a background of general abject poverty and underdevelopment.

Secondly, it should be remembered that whatever meagre incomes were made by the peasants, most of them went to supporting their Church in the form of school fees, hospital fees, Church fees and weekly collections. But the major support for the running costs and most of the

amount of money that had built the Churches, Clinics, Schools and Hospitals came from the Church of Sweden Mission together with some niggardly subsidies from the colonial state. In other words the Church institutions represented the concentration of the little wealth the poor hinterlands were able to generate as well as the little cash flow from outside the area. In reality the Church's base was the impoverished peasants and therefore the Church during the war, just like its people looked up to the freedom fighters for liberation, especially, as we shall see, as it hoped that a free Zimbabwe might uplift its people from poverty and enable them to support its financial independence from Sweden.

Conclusion

In conclusion it must be observed that the CSM together with the Evangelical Lutheran Church had by the time of the outbreak of the war invested a lot of money in the development of their mission, so that it had an impressive physical infrastructure which was accompanied by a number of well qualified education, health and ecclesiastical personnel. The chief centres, such as Masvingo, Mnene, Musume, Masase, Manama, Zezani and Shashe, all which were in the rural areas, were by Zimbabwe standards, and indeed by any other African rural standards highly developed population settlements. The biggest of them had boarding facilities either for primary pupils or secondary students studying for Junior and 'O' Level certificates. Mnene, Musume, Masase and Manama also had big hospitals with maternity and general medical wards together with other forms of accommodation for the many patients who could not find room in the regular wards. In addition each centre had excellent houses for the teachers, nursing staff, headmasters, doctors and general workers. By the time of the outbreak of the war the centres were provided with piped and running water and electricity. The populations at the centres attracted various business enterprises, so that there was a prosperous township attached to each centre, consisting of general dealers' stores, butcheries, bottle stores, hotdog stores, grinding mills and so on.

The dominant feature of each centre which underlined the very purpose of the village or town was the church building of superb architectural design and of imposing proportions as well as solemn appearance. On Sundays the whole population of students, teachers, nurses,

doctors, patients, and general workers together with their families, filed into the church for christian worship and their colourful sight in their best attire was always a memorable spectacle to a visitor. During month ends when there were Holy Communion Services, the worshippers streamed from the vast periphery served by the main station and it was always impossible to fit all the participants in anyone of those big churches at once, so that they had to receive the Holy Sacrament in groups. All this was a measure of the extent to which the Lutheran Church had penetrated deeply and widely in the rural areas of Mberengwa, Beit Bridge and Gwanda. The influence of the healing mission of the Church was clearly demonstrated by the vast numbers of people who received medical treatment at its clinics and hospitals; while from the point of view of education the Church not only ran boarding schools but also possessed hundreds of village schools with thousands of primary school children. This then was the vast, well entrenched Lutheran Church, which between 1975 and 1980 found itself between the anvil and hammer of the war of liberation in Zimbabwe.

In fact due to the impoverishment of the rural base of this Church there were strong sympathies among its members in favour of the liberation struggle. The organization of the church was such that it could make considerable grass-roots responses without having to seek the immediate approval of the central authority and without jeopardizing the integrity of the whole Church. Besides the majority of the local Church leaders - the pastors, evangelists, elders, teachers, headmaster, nurses, doctors, etc - were educated or trained at the height of the mass nationalist movement and therefore did not require much persuasion to sympathise with the guerrillas. Moreover the majority of them had radios, which they tuned in the evenings to Radio Lusaka (Zambia) and Radio Maputo (Mozambique) to listen to the liberation messages, exhortations and propaganda, which purported to give the progress of the struggle in terms of how far the forces had penetrated into the country, so that when freedom fighters announced their arrival in the Mberengwa - Gwanda - Beit Bridge areas Church authorities were not surprised. Finally the Church was situated in one of the worst hit areas by colonialism, to the extent that the people hardly raised enough food for subsistence, while a lot of their livestock was dying away because of lack of pastures and surface water. Land hunger was turning the people into ready supporters of the liberation struggle.

Footnotes

1. Hallencreutz, "A Council in Crossfire", p.53.
2. *Ibid.*, Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, pp. 174-175.
3. Hallencreutz, "A council in Crossfire," p. 54.
4. Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, p.75.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-25; Per Zachrisson, *An African Area in Change: Belingwe 1894 - 1946: A Study of Colonialism, Missionary Activity and African Response in Southern Rhodesia*, Bulletin of the Department of History, No. 17, University of Gothenburg, 1978, pp. 282-283.
6. Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, pp. 34 - 57.
7. *Ibid.*, p.72.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 79 - 80.
10. *Ibid.*, 98 - 102.
11. *Ibid.*, p.85.
12. *Ibid.*, 123; S.K.M.A., A628, Document of Understanding signed Ruben Josefsson, Uppsal, July 21, 1971 and S. Strandvik, Bulawyo, August 25, 1971, pp. 1-2.
13. *Ibid.* pp. 2-3.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 117 - 124.
15. Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth.*, p. 126.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 127; E.L.C.A., Matopo House, "Five Year Plan, E.L.C.R.," 1975?
17. Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, p. 139; see also S.K.M.A., A 62 81, "President [C.S. Banana] Urges Churches: 'Re-Examine Your Stance,'" *Press Statement*, Department of Information, March 2, 1981, p.2.
18. Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, pp. 148-153; see the list of all the Pastors in 1975, E.L.C.A., Matopo House, "Five Year Plan," p.3.
19. S.K.A.M., A6203, Strandrik's Memo, 1974.
20. *Ibid.*, Strandvik's telegram to the Mission; Shiri, *My First Decade*, pp. 49-51.
21. Shiri, *My First Decade*, pp. 59-60.
22. *Ibid.*, pp 244-246; Hallencreutz. "A Council in Crossfire," pp. 89-1-1.
23. Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, pp. 140-146.
24. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, *Evangelical Lutheran Church in Rhodesia Statistics, 1977*, p.8; *Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe Statistics, 1978*, p. 8; *Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe Statistics, 1979*, p.8.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
26. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, *The position of schools, 1976*, by the Secretary for Education; *Evangelical Lutheran Church in Rhodesia Statistics, 1977*, p. 8; *Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe Statistics, 1978*, p. 8; *Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe Statistics, 1979*, p. 8.
27. Arthur Campbell, *Guerrillas: A History and Analysis*, London, Arthur Baker Ltd., 1967, p. xi.
28. George Kay, *Rhodesia: A Human Geography*, London, London University Press, 1970, pp. 2-21.
29. J.R. Whitlow, "Environmental Constraints and Population Pressures in the Tribal Area of Zimbabwe," *Zimbabwe Agriculture Journal*, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1980; see also J.R. Whitlow, "Land Use, Population Pressure and Rock Outcrops in the Tribal Areas of Zimbabwe Rhodesia," *Zimbabwe Rhodesia Agriculture Journal*, Vol. 77, No. 1; J.R. Whitlow, "An Assessment of the Cultivated Lands in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, 1972 to 1977," *The Zimbabwe Rhodesia Science News*, Vol. 13, No. 10, October 1979.
30. Whitlow, "Environment Constraints," pp. 173-176.
31. *Ibid.* p. 176.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 176-77.
134. *ibid.*, pp. 177-180.
35. For the distribution of mineral deposits, see Key, *Rhodesia*, p. 137.
36. For the distribution of mineral deposits, see Key, *Rhodesia*, p. 137.
37. I personally moved around first in 1978 and then in 1980 to see how the peasants had responded to the opportunities offered by the liberation war. The Liebigs Ranch (kwaMashiri) just cross the Mwenezi river and a few kilometres from my home was extensively occupied by peasants and many homes had fenced their yards with fences cut from the ranch. In 1987 I travelled extensively with my cousin Philip Bhebe, then Provincial Administrator, Matabeleland South, and saw a lot of farms which had been occupied by peasants during the war, which the Government was trying to make up its mind on whether or not to condone such occupations.
38. See Chapter IV on Mnene.
39. Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*.

4 The War and The Western Deanery

Introduction

As a mission-related regional Church the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe is particularly interesting as it is deeply rooted in a section of Zimbabwe, where different ethnic groups co-exist. It draws its membership mainly from Karanga-speaking Shona in Mberengwa and from Sotho and Venda-speaking communities in the Gwanda and Beit Bridge districts. Administratively speaking this ethnic diversity is reflected in the structural division into two deaneries, the Eastern having its rural base in South Western Midlands, the Western in Southern Matabeleland.

Both deaneries became actively involved in the war but local developments reflect certain interesting differences. In the west ZIPRA had the predominant initiative and developments were affected by its partisan military strategy and its massive recruitment drives. In the East local Lutheran congregations became drawn into ZANLA's massive popular mobilization campaigns. However this general characterization of local developments should not obscure the fact that the two liberation movements were involved in both deaneries.

As already noted studies of the struggle for Zimbabwe have so far given nearly exclusive attention to the broad popular mobilization strategies of ZANLA. Very little is known of ZIPRA's local programmes and interaction with christian parishes and congregations. For this very reason it is important in this study to begin our grass-roots examination of local developments within the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe during the war with an account of what actually transpired in the Western Deanery. Also from the point of view of the chronology of internal Church developments, what happened in the West - not least at Manama on 30th January 1977 - proved to be both traumatic and far-reaching.

However within the Evangelical Lutheran Church the developments from the late 1976 had their important antecedents in the politics of the ANC of Muzorewa.

I. The Legacy of African National Council

a) A Team of Radical Pastors

The Evangelical Lutheran Church first got involved in politics through the activities of some of its radical pastors and lay workers when they joined the African National Council (ANC) of Abel Muzorewa and Canaan Banana and campaigned for the rejection of the constitutional agreement between the British Conservative Government and the rebel regime of Ian Smith in 1971/72. The radicals' parish postings made them to be strategically well placed to influence nearly all the communal areas of the southern districts. The Revs. Elias Masiane at Shashe and Arote Vellah at Buvuma campaigned in the Gwanda communal areas, while the Rev. Nkane Alfred Ramakgapola at Beit Bridge operated in that district and parts of Mwenezi. As the Rev. Ramakgapola put it:

When the ANC was formed by Muzorewa and other people such as Rev. Banana, pastors and ministers, including myself joined hands to influence the people. I was given the task of organising the Beit Bridge area, on the eastern side towards Chikwarakwara area. We wanted to make sure that the people understood that what the Europeans were trying to agree among themselves was not good for the Africans. We coordinated with Rev. Masiane and others in the Gwanda - Beit Bridge - Shashe areas. We were so effective in our task that when the Pearce Commission (which tested the acceptability or non-acceptability of the British-Rhodesian constitutional proposals) came the masses were able to show their utter rejection of proposals so that we had been able to support the nationalists who were in prison.¹

From that time on the radical pastors of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and other Church workers became targets of suspicion of the CID agents and the police and were therefore closely watched. Their positions became worse when one of them, Rev. Masiane, was elected to the Executive of the ANC as Secretary of the Education Committee, which soon made itself notorious in the eyes of the Smith regime because of its critical attitude towards the system of African education. In 1974 the committee held discussions with the colonial education officials during which it deplored "the bottleneck in the Rhodesian education system which only allowed a few African students to qualify for university education". It pointed out that "the whites were a minority in the country and yet at the University our [African] students were in minority while the white students formed a majority". The committee condemned the vocational F2 schools and said that a lot more could be achieved in the education of Africans if those schools were turned into general secondary schools. In view of these and many other considerations which adversely affected the educational advancement of the African children in the country, the committee asked the colonial government to relax regulations pertaining to the issuing of passports so that the ANC might send students overseas for training.²

Even before permission could be granted, Masiane and his committee went ahead and advertised in the papers that any Africans with five 'O' levels were eligible to apply for one of the 800 scholarships tenable in England. The only condition was that the successful applicant must have a valid passport to enable him/her to travel to Birmingham where the old Zimbabwe students would see to the rest of the arrangements, such as placements, etc. By June 1975 the committee was flooded with and was busy processing applications from the education starved and unemployed African children. The Rhodesian Government refused to believe that the young boys and girls were being sent to Britain but that the whole thing was a vast trick orchestrated between the ANC education committee, and in particular by Rev. Masiane and his radical colleagues in the southern districts of the country on the one hand and the Zimbabwean nationalist students in Birmingham on the other, to recruit African children to go and train in guerrilla warfare in Zambia and Mozambique.³ The Smith regime resolved to smash the whole thing at its source by arresting Masiane, Ramakgapola, Vellah, Rev. I. Gumbo, who was in charge of the Chitripasi mission in the Mwenezi district, and Albert Malala, Youth Secretary of the Church at Manama. They were tortured and forced to sign confessions that they had been recruiting young

Africans for guerrilla warfare training in Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique. While Gumbo and Malala were eventually released, Vellah, Masiane and Ramakgapola were tried and although the allegations against them could not be proved they were in the end detained at Wha Wha prison where they remained until released by the Muzorewa government in 1978.⁴

Even though the Rhodesian regime failed to prove its case, the Evangelical Lutheran pastors were not entirely innocent of the charges levelled against them. Rev. Gumbo was stationed at Chituripasi, a popular route that passed through Chikwarakwara and was used by young men and women to go to Mozambique for military training. The area around Manama was a popular recruiting ground for ZAPU, which collected its young men and women and led them to Zambia via Botswana. Shashe mission, as we shall see, was also a popular crossing point for recruits into Botswana. It is most likely that most of the pastors actively supported the ZANLA and ZIPRA recruiting programmes as Rev. Ramakgapola did. He tells us that in July 1974 he was transferred to Manama mission from Chituripasi, where he was in danger of being killed by the Rhodesian security forces because of his active involvement in politics. He says:

My transfer to Manama coincided with the time when there was change in Mozambique. The wind of change was blowing through this country from Mozambique. Many people were flocking out of the country to Botswana and through to Zambia. Towards the end of the year and early 1975 a lot of young people including our pupils from the mission were crossing into Botswana. When that happened and the police came to the school I was the main suspect of recruiting people for the liberation war because of my previous record during the Pearce Commission.⁵

Indeed it was not just mere unfounded police suspicion which made him a target; in fact during my interview with him he admitted his involvement and seemed to have done it with a free conscience in that he had the biblical justification and the support of the pronouncements of such an august body as the World Council of Churches. When asked whether he had participated in the recruitment of guerrillas, he replied:

Of course these charges were not trumped up, even though we strenuously denied in court that we were involved in recruiting freedom fighters. We were going from place to place organizing... when I say so many people left Manama, I am talking about students of the age of about 18 leaving school for the struggle. These were young people, 18 - 21 years of age who were unemployed... In fact from the ages of 15 to 30, such people were simply flocking out to neighbouring Botswana.

I can say that their exodus was organised because we were telling them actually how the Mozambicans had liberated themselves. So they left with the knowledge and full conscience that they were going to be trained and come back to fight for their country.⁶

Rev. Ramakgapola and his colleagues saw no contradiction between their position as ministers in a Church which advocated peace and their role as recruiting agents for liberation movements which intended to overthrow the colonial regime by violence. As he put it:

As a minister you did not try to justify violence but you asked yourself the question if these whites did not accept peaceful change, was it right to leave them to continue to commit injustices in the name of Christianity. You came to a stage where you said, well if these people cannot accept democracy [is one not justified] to overthrow them by force rather than to leave them to continue to commit evil in the name of Christ...

I [also] had read a lot about the statements of the World Council of Churches in connection with combating racism, which basically said we cannot rule out the use of violence against a group of people who practised the use of or ruled other people by the use of violence. So that it must be permissible to use moral or physical violence to change a situation. So at a certain point we came to the conclusion that we were forced to use violence by some people who were using violence against us. In fact the whites themselves

were committing moral and physical violence against us in the name of Christianity. As they said, they used violence in defence of Christian civilisation.

Moreover the Bible teaches not racial inequality but the equality of all men. Africans were only asking for freedom and for the right to share with the whites the wealth of the country.

We had no problem urging the young to go and join the liberation movements. Even when it came to our fellow Christian missionaries. We always asked them why they did not condemn the soldiers of Smith when they slaughtered our fellow Africans. We also pointed out that our freedom fighters were going to train to fight the Rhodesian military forces and the forces of oppression and not to kill women and children.⁷

b) A Challenge to the Church

Clearly the radical pastors had thought out their own position in relation to the liberation movement and came to the conclusion that they must be involved in the violent overthrow of colonialism. Moreover they did not intend to be involved as mere individuals but also wanted to see the Church as a whole participating in the struggle on the side of justice, viz - the side of the majority. Just before the arrest of the pastors the Smith regime tried to put pressure on the last missionary bishop of the Church, Sigfrid Strandvik so that he might persuade his pastors to stop their political activities. When the bishop approached Masiane, the latter reacted almost emotionally, "... my people are suffering economic disadvantages at the hands of the Rhodesian whites. Do you want me to stop my involvement in politics and leave my people to continue to suffer?" Masiane goes on: "Then I quoted Romans 12 which says that the Church must suffer with those who suffer and must rejoice with those who rejoice. I also added that if I was going to be arrested and suffer with my people I did not mind."⁸

The need to associate the Church as a whole with the plight and general suffering of the people again came up sometime in 1975 when the attention of the Church Council was drawn to the predicament of some 'refugees' who had been uprooted from Mt Darwin in the northeast of the country where they apparently were supporting ZANLA forces and dumped all the way in Beit Bridge. Bishop Strandvik, who chaired the Church Council meeting, read a letter from the refugees requesting blankets, clothing, and even food. One of the elderly pastors must have echoed what was in the mind of the majority of the old pastors when he said "*Ah vakomana tikafidha vanhu vanga vachifidha magandanga tichakaura.*" (If we provide food to people who are under punishment for feeding "terrorists" we shall be in trouble with government). For thirty minutes the bishop tried to coax the old pastors to give some material support to the refugees but to no avail. At last and to the utter disbelief of the old pastors Masiane proposed and was seconded by Vellah that the church give the refugees Z\$1 000.00. Masiane recalls: "all these old people were looking at me in amazement... They were speechless. I added that if the Church was going to suffer in any way for that let it suffer... I also challenged anybody who was against the idea to voice his opposition there and then or else for ever hold his peace. Nobody was brave to oppose us." The radicals therefore wanted to involve the whole church with its top hierarchy into the struggle for freedom. But their removal through detention in the middle of 1975 meant that only the old and cautious Church leaders remained and they carefully avoided taking sides between the warring forces, so that in the end the Church got involved in the struggle at the levels of parishes, congregations, schools and individuals while the Church Council remained somewhat neutral and detached.

II. The Church's Interaction with ZIPRA

It was both through direct military operations and, on an even grander scale through its comprehensive recruitment drives from the break down of the Geneva peace talks in 1976 that ZIPRA placed the Western Deanery in a new context. The most far-reaching event was, of course, the abduction of a substantial number of school pupils from Manama on 30th January 1977. Before we look more closely into the preconditions and ramifications of this event we have to begin by noting the extent and procedures of the recruitment drive and some concrete cases of direct encounters of ZIPRA guerrillas and local congregations.

a) **ZAPU Recruitment Gains Momentum**

Following the failures of the Geneva negotiations the ZAPU programme of recruitment from 1976 was like that of ZANU. It was further boosted by the rising unemployment of the school leavers and by the decision of the Smith regime to compel those who had reached the age of military training to join the Rhodesian army. Both school leavers and old pupils preferred to join the liberation armies to going for the Rhodesian national service. Moreover whenever pupils left a mission, or a mission was suspected of collaborating with the liberation forces the Rhodesia forces would invade it, harass everybody in the mission through interrogation and torture, and then collect a few key persons for special torture in their military and police camps. Such violence put to flight many mission people across the borders as refugees.

It was in the context of all these factors that the Rambofeni and Bhebe Brothers group left the country and further helped to illustrate how recruitment through Botswana had become an established system. Phineas Rambofeni was the headmaster of the Shashi primary school. Before the arrest and detention of the Rev. Masiane in 1975 Rambofeni, his seven members of his staff and the evangelist Shoni Moyo worked with the pastor to politicise the local people as well as to encourage the young people to go for the liberation struggle. Even when Masiane was removed, the group joined hands with the Rev. Ezekiel Gwathe, the new pastor in charge. At first, because the Shashi mission is only 1 km from one of the points used by people to cross the Shashi river into Botswana the mission people's task was to provide food and resting accommodation for the ZAPU recruits. Rambofeni and his colleagues taught the local people to the extent "that feeding and housing the recruits was taken as part of one's contribution to the struggle". Besides the people learned the importance "of utter secrecy in the whole struggle. Even children got to appreciate the need for secrecy. Each time the recruits arrived and were given a place in a home, children were told that the visitor was an uncle, brother, sister or aunt". At first the recruits passing through Shashi came in small groups of two or three. But in 1977 when recruitment was stepped up and morale was boosted by the Manama abduction, which we will come back to, they came in groups of 20 or 30 persons. "What we would do", recalls Rambofeni, "when they came asking for the routes was that we would split them into smaller groups of ones or twos and then share them within the villages around

Shashi mission. They would spend a night in the host homes. As they slept we would then go and spy out to see if the route was clear of the enemy troops or CID agents. They would spend the following day resting. During the night of the next day at midnight we would take them across the Shashi river. By instruction some would use the Kobojango route to Bobonong and Selibe-Pikwe. Others would leave Shashi and use the Limpopo route which took them to the Baines Drift, which was called Maropong and they would be picked up by cars to Selibe-Pikwe.”¹⁰ As the number of recruits increased they began to attract local school children as well so that on the 18th February 1977 13 of them together with evangelist Shoni Moyo crossed the border into Botswana.¹¹

That however sparked off trouble with the Rhodesian security forces. Both headmaster Rambofeni and the Rev. Gwathe were picked up for heavy interrogation. During the April school holidays the headmaster, his staff and other local people (thirty-five persons altogether) were again picked up for interrogation and for two weeks’ temporary detention at Gwanda. The position became even worse after June when the ZANLA forces began operating in the area and using the mission staff and facilities.

In September 1977 the CIDs came and picked up 4 young girls for interrogation at their Thuli Camp and it became quite clear that the school girls, if subjected to torture, would reveal the activities of their teachers and other members of the local community. That was what forced Rambofeni and two of his teachers, John Matsetu and Emphraim Sibata, to run away to Botswana. They followed the Limpopo route, which Rambofeni knew very well as he had done several recruitment errands along it. When they got to Litswe Limumti, where there was a big ZCC church and decided to have a day’s rest 47 of their school children caught up with them and declared that they too wanted to go and train in order to come back and liberate the country. The Shashi school was only a primary school so that the ages of those children ranged from 12 to 15 years. By the time they reached the Baines Drift their number had again increased to 71 as more pupils and teachers caught up with them. When they reported themselves at a local police station the police immediately phoned the Botswana Defence Force and within four days trucks had come to pick them up and drop them at Selibe-Pikwe, where they “found thousands and thousands of people... Some came from the Manama direction, some from the Kezi direction and others from Beit Bridge.” Here they were graded according to ages; those who were old enough

were earmarked for military training and the very young ones were sent to school as soon as they got to Zambia. Rambofeni himself did military training in Zambia and when he became commander he was sent to the Soviet Union for further training.¹² Meanwhile the exodus of students and their teachers and the further harassment by the Rhodesia security forces brought the Shashi Mission to complete ruin as the pastor and the nurse in charge of the clinic also ran away.

According to a report of the Kafusi Parish, ZIPRA recruitment through Botswana got under way in 1976 so that by the time the Manama and Shashi students together with their teachers were involved, the programme was dramatically expanded and that was quite apparent from the records of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, which was monitoring the position in Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique.

Thus Manama students were soon combined with those from the British Methodist and the Congregationalist schools of Tegwane, Inyathi and others. The result was that Botswana registered 21 8000 new arrivals from Zimbabwe in 1977 alone and 18 000 of these had been transferred to Zambia, where there were already 30 000 Zimbabweans all of them refugees - a euphemism, as we have seen from Dabengwa, of recruits. 6 000 of all these refugees in Zambia were school children for whom a school was being built. In 1978 again 25 300 refugees arrived in Botswana and 18 600 were flown to Zambia, so that by the end of that year there were 45 000 Zimbabweans in Zambia. In fact at the end of the war it was reported that the numbers of the so-called refugees from which ZIPRA recruited for military training were 50 000 in Zambia and 23 000 in Botswana.¹³ Apart from being indicative of the spectacular success of the recruitment programme of ZAPU these figures also reflect the strain on the Evangelical Lutheran Church and more particularly its Western Deanery. This has already been indicated when discussing the statistics of the church in Chapter III.

b) Early Encounters

When the war was resumed from Mozambique in 1976 under ZIPA the instructions from the ZIPRA section of the organisation to their combatants who were being infiltrated was that the latter should rapidly move into the western part of the country where they would recruit cadres and



Robert Mugabe, leader of ZANU delegation to the 1976 Geneva Talks with Olof Palme, the distinguished leader of the Swedish Democratic Party, then leader of the Opposition in Sweden, a western country which between 1977 and 1980 gave the largest financial support to ZAPU and ZANU. The photo was taken by the Rev Dr Tord Harlin in Geneva on 19 November 1976.



Joshua Nkomo inspects ZIPRA forces in Zambia after taking full charge of ZAPU'S struggle following the collapse of the Geneva Talks in late 1976 and the death of Vice President J.Z. Moyo in January 1977.



School at ZAPU Camp in Zambia



Young boys at a ZAPU refugee camp in Zambia, singing. U.S. Smith Uyoyoga Phansi
(Smith will kneel down/brought down to his knees)



One of the ZANLA detachments which operated around Masase Mission. The picture was taken by Harlin at the time of the ceasefire.



Chegato, Mberengwa. The Mwenezi bridge blown up by ZANLA guerillas in 1978




ZANU delegation meets Church of Sweden Mission Officials on 19 September 1977. From left to right, Stina Karlton, Rev Dr Tord Harlin, Mrs Sally Mugabe, Robert Mugabe, professor Carl F. Hallencreutz, Catherine Garanowako, Tore Bergman and Rugare Gumbo.



Robert Mugabe, leader of ZANU delegation and Professor Hallencreutz, Chairman of the ZANU-CSM meeting in Uppsala, 19/9/77.



A Village Health Worker at Minene. (photo taken in 1983)




A Hutano health village at Mnene, (Photo taken in 1983).



A Bread bakery Group at Chabwira, Mberengwa.



Product of waterdrilling at Mapate, Gwanda, following vashandiri's appeal for provision of accessible clean water.




Picture showing destruction of dormitories and toilets at Chegato Secondary school by village looters following the closure of the school in 1978.



Villagers also stripped roofing materials of the Chegato Church building, shown here.



Bishop J. C. Shiri and archbishop Olof Sundby sign the new Document of Understanding between ELCZ and CSM in 1983. Mr Tore Bergman looks on standing between the two seated signatories.



- KEY
- MAIN ROAD
 - MAIN RIVERS
 - ROUTE USED BY ZIPRA RECRUITS
 - MISSION STATION
 - MILITARY CAMP
 - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
 - COMMUNAL AREA BOUNDARY
 - DISTRICT BOUNDARY

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

COMMUNAL AREAS AND SOME ROUTES
USED BY ZIPRA RECRUITS

cross them into Botswana for air lifting to Zambia for training. As has just been made evident this programme had an immediate impact in the Western Deanery so that reports from its parishes started talking of young men and women rapidly crossing into Botswana.

ZIPRA's encounters with local congregations and parishes were not always smooth as shown in some of the following cases starting with Kafusi Parish.

(i) Kafusi Parish

The new conditions are reflected for instance in the 1976 Annual Report of this parish, which is the extreme western part of the Church. "We thank God who guided us through 1976 and leads us into the new year of 1977", wrote Pastor T. Mate Nare of Kafusi. "1976 was the year of fear and a bit of progress in our Parish. It was and still is the year of fear as boys and girls disappear everyday, security forces running up and down, freedom fighters fishing boys and girls outside the country and many boys and girls running out by themselves; parents remain crying for their children; churches remain empty." In fact in the first twenty-two days of January 1977 alone the parish lost over 105 boys and girls,¹⁴ recruited for training in Zambia through Botswana.

At the end of 1977 the same parish could not account for the whereabouts of 400 of its members perhaps also recruited through Botswana. By 1978 the recruitment programme and the fighting in the Kafusi Parish was sending waves of fear everywhere so that even the pastor and his evangelists were afraid to go about their religious work freely. The low participation of the christians in Church life reflected itself in the failure for the first time in the parish's history to reach its budget. The Rev. T. Mate Nhare, Pastor of the Parish captured the mood of the situation in his annual report for 1978. "The Lord is powerful and works through out the day, the week, the month and the year," he said. "In every congregation I came during the course of the year I was asked this question, (Pastor, do you think that we shall be able to celebrate Christ mas?). Fear! Fear! is found in every living mind. Fear is found in our christians, pastors, deans and bishops. No one is able to give courage to the other; each one tries to find his/her safe place to remain there."¹⁵

He went on to report the failure of the parish to raise its financial commitment for the year and said everybody including the evangelist

attributed that to the fact that "a) Most of our Christians moved to Botswana; b) abduction was severe in our parish; c) people are afraid to come to church."¹⁷

The pastor, however, thought that perhaps the chief reason was that everybody, including himself, were too afraid to render their christian obligations and duties because of the intensification in every respect of the war activity. The situation got to its worst in 1979 when most of those who had not been recruited or voluntarily crossed the Botswana border joined the many internal refugees by going to the urban areas. As Pastor Mate put it in his slightly melodramatic fashion: "1979 was a wonderful year in my parish. It had looked as if no one was going to remain in it; people fled to Botswana in numbers, some in nearest towns like Gwanda, Collen Bown, West Nicholson and Bulawayo. Animals like cattle, goats, cats and dogs became wild" because apparently they had been abandoned by their owners. The attendance at the services was as low as two or three people per chapel or church.¹⁸ The recruitment programme and the subsequent military operations thus had a negative impact on the Kafusi parish, even though it remained open throughout the war.

(ii) *Meeting ZANLA at Shashi (The Rev. Gwate and Nurse Madongo from Shashi)*

As ZIPRA were recruiting, ZANLA in fact carried the fighting as far as Shashi, which is next to the border with Botswana. Rev. Ezekiel Gwate, who became closely connected with activities of both ZANLA and ZIPRA and was the Pastor of Shashi, from 1975 tells us that by June 1977 ZANLA forces, had penetrated the country from Mozambique up to Beit Bridge.

"On the 14th July 1977", Gwate goes on, "the first group of the ZANLA touched Shashi". Arriving at about 7 p.m. they collected the Pastor and Nurse Madongo, who was in charge of the clinic and took them to the nearby hills. On reaching the hills they found that the local villagers had also been rounded up including some people who were suspected to be traitors and the latter were being tried before being subjected to a thorough beating. The political commanders of the group were also busy giving political lectures. While the two men who were accused as sell-

outs were being punished the nurse and Pastor Gwate were taken aside to be given their duties. Rev. Gwate says:

“The commanders said, we have called you aside here because we know you are understanding people. We want to tell you our aims so that you might be in a position to assist as much as possible. This is the first and last day that you will ever be brought up here. You will not be required to give us blankets or food. You have just come to witness the introduction of our business. What we want is that we should be supplied with medicines. We want the nurse to arrange the supplies of medicines. We have called you aside so that all those people should never know the role you will be playing. We have also realised that the Pastor has a car so that he is in a position to help us by going to Beit Bridge whenever we need something from there.”¹⁹

From that day on until he was flushed out of Shashi by the colonial forces in September 1977 Gwate would, whenever called upon to do so, wear his clerical collar in order to avoid suspicion at road blocks and drive to Beit Bridge where he would collect food supplies, clothing, drinks and tobacco from a contact called Chivi, who owned a general dealers' shop in town. Nurse Madongo also faithfully packed the kits of medicines, which Pastor Gwate would take to the hills where ZANLA had their bases. But then on the 22 September 1977 the police raided the Shashi Mission, arrested the Pastor and the nurse and subjected them to harrowing interrogation, so much so that when the police left both church workers decided to abandon Shashi because they knew that the police, especially the Selous Scouts would return one of the nights and murder them. Between 1978 and 1980 Pastor Gwate was posted at his home parish, Gungwe, where he continued with his collaboration and this time with both ZIPRA and ZANLA. He now worked with the Headmaster of this school, Sijiye, who owned a shop in the local area. They used Sijiye's shop licence to purchase the supplies for the guerrillas at Gwanda and Beit bridge.²⁰ Rev. Gwate, Nurse Madongo and Sijiye represented a classic case of the use of the Church's personnel and medical institutions and the relationship between these people and the liberation forces was so harmonious as to permit the church to play a supportive role in the war.

(iii) *Zezone*

But the relationships were not always harmonious. On the 6th January 1978 ZANLA attacked the Zezone Mission and caused a lot of destruction to the mission property. Pastor A.B.C. Siwela reported on the sad incident:

They knocked off the telephone and carried it away. Cut off the wires. They also cut down the net wire for the parsonage from corner to corner. They also went to the clinic and broke windows and then collected all the drugs and medical instruments. Broke the doors.

All this happened in my presence. When I questioned them why they were doing that they said it was government property. They even took the money from the clinic. They thought that the clinic was run by the council ... as far as I can see the clinic is beyond repair.²¹

After destroying as much as they could "They also wrote on the walls everywhere. They wrote; ZANLA, ZANLA, ZANLA, CLOSE THIS DON'T OPEN IT ANY MORE. FOLLOW US IF YOU WANT. ZANLA FORCES". That marked the end of the Zezone Mission. Apparently the major reason why the ZANLA ordered the closure of the mission was that the colonial soldiers visited the mission almost on a daily basis, coming from their rest camp which was just across the Mzingwane river and not very far from the mission. In the circumstances there was no way the guerrillas could have made effective use of the mission facilities without jeopardising the lives of the mission workers. They thus decided to shut it down.²²

(iv) *Gungwe*

In the meantime Gungwe, the third clinic in the Western Deanery was closed as the result of ZIPRA activities. In 1977 ZIPRA came twice to the clinic, the neighbouring business centre, and the local council building and collected medicines, money and other goods. As they were departing on their second visit they clashed with the local Chief Mathe's

three body guards and killed two of them. As Mrs M. Noko, who was the clinic nurse recalls:

The chief phoned the soldiers. Many truck loads of soldiers came. Some soldiers had dogs and others were on horse backs. That was a terrible day. The soldiers seemed to be overreacting and there was every chance that if we were not careful we might be killed.²³

The nurse was subjected to some rough interrogation concerning the medicines she had given to the guerrillas, on whether she had treated any of the injured guerrillas and whether she knew where they had gone from the clinic. The treatment by the soldiers was so frightful that the clinic staff decided to abandon the place.²⁴

However the most dramatic developments evolved around Manama and it is to these that we devote the remaining portion of this chapter.

III. The Plight of the Manama Students

a) Manama Abduction

In their Southern Front ZIPRA were more noted for their recruitment programme than for their fighting. It was in fact in this area of their war activities that they performed some of their most spectacular heroic and daring acts and indeed thereby affected the church most gravely. The most dramatic episode in this regard was the abduction of the Manama Secondary School pupils on the 30th January 1977. What was surprising about the whole event was that it was carried out with the full knowledge of the community around the school, of the school authorities and the Rhodesian security forces.

Sometime before the schools opened apparently some ZIPRA addressed a meeting at Mapathe about 8 kms from the school and just across the Thuli river. During that meeting ZIPRA told the people that they would collect the Manama pupils and apparently even mentioned the date on which they would do it. As a result of that Rhodesian soldiers were stationed in the school during the long vacation and used to sleep in the

school dining room. But when the school opened they shifted to the nearby business centre and made regular patrols of the schools. Yet on the day of the abduction the whole thing was carried out so efficiently and with such lightning speed that the soldiers had no chance of knowing what was happening until the children and some of their teachers had left.²⁵

The abduction of 500 to 700 people from Manama was done by only three guerrillas, two of whom are remembered as Cde Moses *alias Dube*, Bob II and Cde Sibanda. Cde Moses came from Gungwe mission and therefore was familiar with the terrain, the local Basotho people and their language. Moreover the whole group was well trained militarily and that must have contributed to the efficiency with which they went about their task.²⁶ Miss I.C.Mabuwa, one of the girls who was only 14 years of age when they were abducted, vividly recalls what happened on that fateful Sunday when they were driven on foot to Botswana.

On that particular Sunday we attended our service nicely. But when we came out of Church people remarked about something which seemed rather strange or queer. In the Lutheran Church everybody is expected to stand up and go and make his offering.

On that day we all remarked about a woman who was putting on a black maxi dress. Her body structure was rather strange. She looked like a man and no one knew her. She was putting on a wig. And some people said that that person was a man and not a woman. Those who had been sitting next to her said that her voice sounded male. In the end people simply said, well we shall find out in the fullness of time.²⁷

When the time for the evening prayers came the bell was rung in the usual manner at 6.30p.m. to summon the students to the assembly hall and nearly everybody picked up their Bibles and hymn books and rushed to the hall. Everybody thought it was their time-keeper who was ringing the bell. "But when we got to where the bell was being rung," Mabuwa remembers, "we found that the time-keeper was not the usual one. The time-keeper was now the woman in the maxi, whom we had seen in the church earlier in the day. He had pulled up his skirt and was now exposing his trousers. But he still had his wig on. He was very rough. He said 'you are having a nice time when some of us are fighting a war.' He then

shouted. 'Four Markers!' - and we had no idea of what he was talking about. So he said, 'line up in the way you do when you are going to church...' He ordered us to throw away our Bibles. He said that they were books which the Boers used to hood wink and deceive us."²⁸

From Manama some teachers were also collected, viz. Paulos Matjaka, Obert Matshalaga, Philemon Chizana, G. Makwati and Jason Noko together with a student teacher Bernard Bova Nyanga, who happened to be visiting a relative in the mission. Just as the march got out of the school fence they met the Parish Pastor Albert M. Ndlovu who was driving to the business centre with his one year old child. The guerrillas stopped him and ordered him to leave the baby in the car and join the march. At the hospital the youngest nurses were also picked up. On crossing the river Thuli all those who could demonstrate that they were cripples or had severe health problems were sifted out then left behind. At Halisupi School headmaster Marx Mereko Madongo and another teacher were picked up and they brought to the group a radio, which was necessary in order to follow the news concerning the movements of the Rhodesia security forces.

That the whole exercise was an abduction there could be no doubt even though as we shall see later that was strenuously denied by the Botswana authorities, ZAPU officials and the students themselves. The moment it was announced that they were being taken to war, "People started crying," Mabuwa recalls. "I cried and my sister did the same, and she said there are two of us, me and my young sister, please leave my sister. They said everybody was going. They said their own brothers and sisters had already died in the war. Some pupils were saying they were the only ones in their mother's houses". But they were all forced to go except the cripples and those who happened to dodge from the evening prayers that Sunday.²⁹

By the time they came to Botswana their number was reduced to about 350. Many had been brave enough to run away in the night. Those who remained were now being driven to go on by sheer fear, while some, especially the older ones were beginning to find the whole idea of joining the liberation struggle fascinating and attractive after all. Fear arose out of the constant intimidation the pupils were subjected to by the guerrillas³⁰.

For instance as they were approaching Kobojango, the first major settlement in Botswana, the guerrillas decided to tell them the truth concerning the whole exercise. They told their captives that by abducting

them they had acted illegally both according to international law and the Botswana law. But they had taken the Manama pupils and others by force "because they thought that if they relied on persuasion alone it would take a long time to gather sufficient manpower for the liberation struggle." However if the pupils told the Botswana authorities that they had been recruited by force they would be returned to Rhodesia. If that happened the guerrillas would not leave them alone; they would follow them and recapture them. So to show the Botswana authorities that they had voluntarily left Zimbabwe for the war they told them to elect a committee which was to speak on their behalf. As it turned out they had picked up some elderly people on the way, who together with their teachers, were willing to be spokesmen and were enthusiastic to co-operate with the guerrillas. "They were the first to come forward to be elected into the committee and were now assisting in making sure that we did not run away."³¹ In fact after that two of the guerrillas returned to Rhodesia and left the group to go on under the rule of fear as well as the compulsion of the committee. Besides, from Kobojango they were transported to Bobonong, Selibe-Pikwe and Francistown by the Botswana Defence Force trucks, so that it appeared safer to keep on going than to try and run away. Moreover the group kept on growing bigger and bigger as the students were joined by many other people who had left the country earlier on, whether voluntarily or by abduction. At Bobonong they were joined by 600 who had come from around Kezi and Manama itself and spoke mostly Sotho and Kalanga. By the time they left Selibe-Pikwe for Francistown they were no less than 1 200 and they were all known as the 'Manama Group'.³²

The only other opportunity offered to the Manama pupils to return home was when the Smith regime arranged transport for the parents, the ELCZ pastors, Dean Noko, E. Shumba, O.M. Shiri, E. Gambiza and Gwate, and two Roman Catholic priests to go to Francistown to try and persuade their children to come back home. But before the pupils could meet their parents the guerrillas held meetings with them either at night or early in the mornings when the Botswana officials had left for or not arrived from their homes and told the pupils that buses had been sent from Rhodesia to come and fetch them. They warned the pupils that if they tried to return in the buses they would blow them up with land mines. "But they would not aim at killing us. Instead they would try to recapture us alive and bring us back this time as prisoners of war".³³

To the young people with no knowledge of the limitations which the guerrillas were operating under in Botswana, which acted as a transit country for recruits but strenuously wanted to appear to the Rhodesian regime not to be collaborating with either ZAPU or ZANU in their war efforts, this type of intimidation was so effective that when the parents interviewed their children the vast majority of the latter flatly refused to go back home. Many of them simply told their parents that they had voluntarily left the country in order to go and train as guerrillas. They would only come back either when the country was free or as freedom fighters to smash the colonial government.³⁴ One of the parents was Wilson Chivalo Mboyi, the Boarding Master of Manama Secondary School, and he had two sons who had been abducted. He interviewed his younger son first. Mboyi remembers that: "We spoke in our language Venda and I said, 'son we are going back home'. His reply was that he could never go back to the country of the Boers again. He was going to die pressing ahead escaping the Boers". He succeeded in persuading the elder son only by lying to him that he had made arrangements for him to go to school outside Zimbabwe.³⁵ In the end the parents succeeded in bringing back only 52 children, mostly young girls.³⁶ The rest were flown to Zambia where most of them went through military training and a few of them were sent for further studies in such areas as medicine, agriculture and other fields denied to African students in Rhodesia.

b) Some Immediate effects of the Manama Abduction

The Manama abduction was a shattering and shocking experience for the Evangelical Lutheran Church both from the point of view of the parents and of the ecclesiastical authorities. Pastor Gwate said that he had no children at the school but his brother had a son, his wife had a brother, while the nurse at the Shashi clinic, Mrs Ndongo had two daughters, all of whom were schooling at Manama. He says, "It was a distressing moment for all of us at the [Shashi] mission station. The nurse at Shashi was crying. She was a widow; she had looked upon the two daughters as her company for life. Now they had left for an unknown destination."³⁷

One of the parents whose husband was already behind bars for his support for the guerrillas at Musume Mission, indeed echoed many parents' feelings when she described her distress at the abduction of her son at Manama:

I am in a big shock after the abduction of Manama children. You know some were very small. Among them is my small boy [who] is only 14 years. I hardly rest because I don't hear about them. I read in our paper that 15 of them were shot dead. This shocked me. I will do everything and my life to rescue my son. My husband is behind bars. I am the only one out to help these children. Is there a possible way of doing something for these children? Can I get any help because his time I am sure will come where he can decide to give his life for his country when he is still so young I feel duty bound as a mother to do my part.³⁸

It was such heart-rending lamentations from the parents of the Manama children which, as we shall see, completely changed the course of history in terms of forcing the Church of Sweden to change its policy of dissociating itself from liberation movements because of their violence to one of deep involvement and commitment to the ZAPU/ZANU refugee programmes in Zambia and Mozambique.

Even such a stalwart supporter of the liberation movement as the Rev. Arote M. Vellah, a man who had worked assiduously to build up the atmosphere conducive to recruitment by the liberation movements, before being thrown into detention at Wha Wha was deeply affected by the abduction which included one of his young children. As he wrote to the bishop from detention on the 5th February 1977:

I wish to express my deep sorrow and grief on what has fallen us at Manama. As you know that my son Lytton has been one of those at Manama, surely as a father, you must be quite sure that I fully share the grief and [am] very worried. Following what is written in the Newspapers closely, I become more encouraged on the stand being taken by parents, that if possible they be allowed to cross into Botswana to get the children back.

I plead that if there will be any church official going to Botswana with parents, that person pleads on my behalf for the release or return of my son Lytton Vellah (aged 14). This is my decision and feeling and totally believe from the story that my son was abducted unwillingly.

Secondly, please contact my family, if not possible for the church official to represent me; then one of my relatives could join the convoy to Botswana if this plan succeeds.³⁹

Indeed Bishop Shiri in his reply to Vellah summed up the severe trauma that was reverberating throughout the Church when he said:

It was a very big blow to the Church and to individual parents and our educational progress at Manama Secondary School. I should have written you earlier but this blow was too grave and I was involved in many problems in connection with Manama. All was tried but very few pupils were prepared to return. It is a pity that your son also did not want to come back.⁴⁰

While the Lutheran Church was thus writhing under the shock and pain inflicted by the abduction, for ZAPU the episode was a resounding and dramatic victory for its recruitment programme. First, the pupils and other voluntary refugees who joined them on the way were the first and biggest single group to be successfully taken from Rhodesia through Botswana to Zambia and they enormously boosted the party's military training programme. Secondly the route via Botswana became an established one so that later recruits and other forms of refugees found that the Botswana, their authorities and some international organisations had set up transit camps with efficient and relatively comfortable facilities at Kobojango, Bobonong, Selibe-Pikwe and Francistown. This was the result of putting into effect the lessons learnt from handling the large so called "Manama Group". At the same time the Botswana Defence Force accepted as its normal role the ferrying by army trucks of Zimbabwean refugees from Kobojango to Francistown. In the third place, the whole spectacular event captured the imagination of the youths of Zimbabwe and inspired them with a strong desire to go and join the struggle. Consequently, what had hitherto been a trickle of refugees crossing into Botswana soon turned into a huge flood as school leavers flowed steadily across the boarder with a view to be flown to Zambia for military training. By this one blow ZAPU had conquered the inhibiting thought among potential recruits of transversing the whole of Botswana in order to get to Zambia. It became common knowledge among the youths that facilities existed for the assistance and transportation of people through Botswana

to Zambia. In this way ZAPU began to enjoy almost the same advantages as ZANU of a steady flow of recruits.

c) Continued Developments at Manama

In the meantime Manama Mission and parish were badly affected by the abduction of the school children and the subsequent conversion of the school into a military camp by the Rhodesian soldiers. The hospital remained functioning, but under extremely difficult conditions until it was ordered to close down by the Rhodesians in August 1979. Apparently all the parents came to the school from as far afield as the Eastern Deanery to collect whatever of their children's belongings they could identify under the supervision of the Boarding Master Mr Mboyi. Once that was done the Rhodesian soldiers occupied the school and converted the headmaster's house into their headquarters, which they fenced off from the rest of the school. Nobody was allowed to visit the house without a special permission from the soldiers.

The Boarding Master was supposed to guard the school property, but when the soldiers started looting school property and he tried to complain to them they threatened to beat him up or to shoot him. As the school property was being stolen and the Church's head office was informed, the bishop's office in Bulawayo seemed entirely unhelpful or simply impotent to do anything.

When it was felt that the Boarding Master was interfering with the illegal activities of the soldiers, the latter sought a way of removing him from the scene. Some girls and a nurse from the hospital were collected on the 22nd December 1978 and severely tortured so that they could give false information that Mr Mboyi and one of the nurses were collaborating with the guerrillas. The girls broke down and made the necessary false confessions. Mboyi and one of the nurses were collected by the security forces and detained in the Grey's Inn and Khami Maximum prisons in Bulawayo for four and half months.

The nurse was so badly affected by the prison experience and the torture that she became mentally unbalanced and has remained so until today. With Mboyi out of the way the soldiers first took his personal property, such as his wife's motor cycle and his own car for their own use and completely destroyed them. They also took school beds, chairs, benches, tables and so on and transferred some them to their two local military bases - Nhwali and Kafusi again for their own use and these have

never been recovered again either. Perhaps most disheartening was that the Dean of the Western Deanery and the bishop, even though informed of the destruction and plundering of the school and its property, not only confined themselves to telephone communications but they apparently could not think of a better plan to safeguard the school property.⁴¹

The mission was gradually converted into a terrifying torture camp by the Rhodesian security forces. When the soldiers camped at the mission, recalled Mr Mboyi, "they started torturing the people. People were arrested in the neighbouring areas and brought to Manama camp. There was a big hole that had been dug at the camp. Persons would first be driven into the dark hole. Then next they would be undressed and be beaten while naked. The idea of driving somebody into the dark hole was to frighten the prisoner by giving him the impression that he was going to be buried alive. The hole was dug in such a slanting manner that an ordinary adult could not enter it standing but entered it by crawling." The whole exercise together with the threats of being buried alive was meant to engender claustrophobia and panic in the victim so that he or she was amenable to confessions, even false ones. "From the hole one was taken to a beating place," Mboyi said. If he still had not broken down he was subjected to electric shocks in a naked state.⁴²

According to the victims, very few people ever went through the whole range of the stages of the torture without confessing, even lies to save themselves the suffering. After that such people were not immediately released but kept as virtual prisoners performing such duties as fetching firewood for the fuel for the camp. The effect of converting the mission into a torture and war prison camp was that parishioners deserted their Church and only the pastor and the nurses, before the hospital was ordered to close by the soldiers, came to Church.⁴³

The Rhodesian security forces were ordered to abandon the mission by their headquarters on 15th August 1979 and the pastor in charge reported to the bishop that they had apparently left with the school property which they had been using. "The things they had borrowed from Mr Mboyi," he said, "such as refrigerators, furniture, beds and the like," they apparently took away. "One of the officials had come to confirm that those things were borrowed but nothing had been left." Moreover once they left the mission people expected them to come back anytime and order the shutting down of the place.⁴⁴

In fact the bishop informed his Church Council on October 19, 1979 that security forces had closed down the hospital on the 10th September 1979. On that day the soldiers had said, "by 12 o'clock there must be no

soul walking in the mission," recalled the nurses, "and by 3 o'clock all the mission keys must be delivered at the District Commissioner's office in Gwanda. Fortunately we saw Manala who was working in Gwanda and we gave him the keys to take to the D.C. Those we could not take to Bulawayo we locked up in the garage and maternity ward. By 10 o'clock everybody was gone except two nurses who also vacated the place by 5 o'clock.⁴⁵

In this way Manama Mission can be said to have been abducted twice and from two opposite directions. After independence it was a shared concern for the local Lutheran Church and CSM to rehabilitate the station so that it could cater anew for the needs of its surrounding community.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen how ZAPU and ZIPRA from late 1976 activated and implemented its military strategy in South Western Zimbabwe. Particularly its massive recruitment drives immediately affected the Western Deanery of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. From the side of the liberation movement this Church was seen as an institution and community of people which were potential allies in the liberation movement. Contradictions emerged, however, when ZAPU displayed forceful means to abduct school children and thereby producing protests from the children's parents. Contradictions too surfaced when, as in the case of ZANLA, because of the suspicion that the facilities might be used by the enemy, they ordered the closure of the Zezane clinic. Moreover the collaboration of the Church, at the grassroots level, with the liberation movements provoked the retaliatory wrath of the Rhodesian forces. This led to the closure of some missions and to the conversion of others into the torture and war prison camps. In all this participation by and the suffering of the grass roots of the Church, it appeared at best that the central administration was indifferent and at worst that it leaned a bit on the side of enemy forces.

The real drama of this chapter took place at and around Manama from 30th January 1977 until independence. Issues involved captured the attention of the World Press and international ecclesiastical and non-governmental organisations.

We will return to this international dimension after having dealt with the events in the Eastern Deanery where the Church mainly interacted with ZANLA.

Footnotes

1. Interview with Rev. Nkane Alfred Ramakgapola at his Bulawayo residence, September 29, 1987, p.1.
2. Interview with Rev. Elias Kalibe Masiane at his Bulawayo residence, September 29, 1987, pp. 1 - 3.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Interview with Masiane; Interview with Ramakgapola; Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, pp. 175-6; Tord Harlin's Personal Collection, Uppsala, To My Friend Dr. H.Soderstrom: Letter of Arote Vellah, Lutheran Pastor and Political Prisoner at Hwahwa(sic) detention camp, Gwelo, November 15, 1976.
5. Interview with Ramakgapola, pp. 2-3.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 4 - 5.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 6 - 7.
8. Interview with Masiane, pp. 5-6.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 17 - 18.
10. Interview with Rambofeni, pp. 3-4; 5-6.
11. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Rev. E.D. Gwathe, Shashi Parish, to the E.L.C.Z., March 3, 1977.
12. Interview with Rambofeni; see also interview with Gwathe.
13. S.K.M.A., 1980: 6A, A6241, Telex from Representative Holland Commission on Southern Africa in Salisbury, January 13, 1977.
14. E.L.C.A. Matopo House, T. Mate, Kafusi 1976 Annual Report, January 22, 1977.
15. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Pastor T. Mate nare, Kafusi Annual Report for 1978, January 15, 1979.
16. *Ibid.*,
17. *Ibid.*
18. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Pastor T. Mate Nhare, Kafusi Parish, 1979 Report, March 7, 1980.
19. Interview with Rev. Ezekiel Gwathe, Provincial Administrator's Office, Gwanda, June 9, 1987, pp. 10-11.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-30; Group Interview of the Nurses, Manama Hospital, June 8, 1987, pp. 1-3.
21. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Rev. A.B.C. Siwela to the Bishop, January 9, 1978.
22. Group Interview of the Manama Nurses, pp. 4-6.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 11.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.
25. Interview with Miss I.C. Mabuwa, University of Zimbabwe Seminar Room, September 11, 1987, pp. 1-2; Interview with the Bhebe Brothers, p.1; Interview with Mr Paulos Matjaka, former teacher at Manama Secondary School, in his office at J.Z. Moyo Secondary School, June 5, 1987, p. 1; Interview with Wilson Chivalo Mboyi, Gwanda, June 6, 1987, p.2; S.K.M.A., A6221-155/77, The lists of the names of the students and their teachers who were abducted.
26. Interview with Bernard Bova Nyanga, Kushinga-Pikelela, August 19, 1987, pp 11-12.
27. Interview with Miss Mabuwa, pp. 2-3.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 4 - 5.
30. Tord Harlin's Personal Collection, Uppsala, Rev. Litsietsi Dube to The Harlins, February 17, 1977; S.K.M.A., A6221-155/77, Tore Bergman to Ratie Mpofu, February 9, 1977.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-11.
32. Interview with Nyanga, pp. 6-8; Interview with Bhebe Brothers, pp. 17-19; Interview with Matjaka, pp. 8-18.
33. Interview with Miss Mabuwa, pp. 13.
34. Interview with Gwate, pp. 3-6; Tord Harlin's Personal Collection, Uppsala, Rev. Ezekiel

- D. Gwate to Dr. T. Harlin, March 10, 1977, in this letter Gwate, who was among the parents who went to Francistown gives a detailed account of the whole trip; See also Litsietsi Dube to the Harlins, February 17, 1977.
35. Interview with Mboyo, pp. 9-10.
 36. *Ibid.*, Litsietsi Dube to the Harlins, February 17, 1977.
 37. Interview with Gwethe, p.3.
 38. S.K.M.A., A6241-248/74, A parent Ndlovu to T. Bergman, March 2, 1977.
 39. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, J.C. Shiri, Bishop to Rev. Arote M. Vellah, Wha Wha Detention, to Bishop J.C. Shiri, February 5, 1977.
 40. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, J.C. Shiri, Bishop to Rev. A.M. Vellah, March 22, 1977.
 41. Interview with Mr Mboyo, pp. 13-14.
 42. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23; See also Group Interview of the Nurses.
 43. E.L.C.A., Matopo House Manama Annual Report for 1978; Manama Annual Report for 1979.
 44. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Rev. Vellah to the Bishop, August 15, 1979; Minutes of the Meeting of the E.L.C.R. Church Council held at Bulawayo, October 19, 1979.
 45. Group interview with the Nurses, pp. 18-19.

5

The War in The Eastern Deanery

Introduction

Having surveyed developments in the Western Deanery we now move on to a similar analysis of what transpired in Mberengwa. Here again the war accelerated from the late 1976 onwards; but in the Eastern Deanery it was primarily ZANLA which put the Church to test.

At that time ZANLA had gained considerable experience of popular mobilization in Northern Eastern Zimbabwe where that method proved effective by appealing also to traditional religious institutions. ZANLA had also achieved a certain amount of insights into local Church conditions and how to interact with local congregations and mission centres. In the course of 1977, however, some ZANLA evolved a more critical stance towards christianity evolved in certain quarters when Bishop Muzorewa of UANC and the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole, the former head of ZANU, entered into negotiations with Ian Smith with a view to agree on an internal settlement and later on even developed auxiliary armies of their own.

In this chapter I draw heavily on interviews with local pastors, nurses and headmasters who were involved in keeping Church institutions going in the Eastern Deanery during the war. These highlights reveal both challenging theological discussions with ZANLA guerrillas as well as interesting shifts of loyalties from a more moderate form of nationalism of UANC towards the racialism of ZANU. In the course of my presentation I will also draw attention to the courageous and continuous services of lay-persons who saved the day for the Lutheran Church and gave it a promising start for full fledged involvement in national reconstruction after the war. I will explore in some depth what transpired from 1976 until early 1980 at the main mission centres.

I. The Eastern Deanery as a War Zone

According to Bishop Shiri the trouble overtook the Church without any warning at all but with a resounding bang; that was the abduction of the Manama Secondary School pupils across the border into Botswana and the subsequent closure of that school on 30 January 1977. After that, catastrophic events seemed to follow each other with amazing rapidity. There was the Chapungu Chehondo battle at Chegato Secondary School on 23 April 1977; the murder of Dr Mushori Zhou in May 1977; the temporary closure of Masase hospital on 15 November 1977, which was followed by the permanent closure of the same hospital, the Secondary and Primary schools, and the church in November 1978; the closure of the Chegato Secondary School at the end of 1978; the destruction of Mazetese in 1978; the temporary closure of Musume Secondary School in February 1979; and the closure of Manama hospital as well as the removal of the Bible School from Masvingo to Bulawayo in August 1979. All these events and many others threatened the very survival of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and it is worthwhile examining some of them in more detail in order to appreciate their impact on the Church and its followers, to establish some of the relations that emerged between the missions and the freedom fighters, and to find out why some missions closed down while others did not. In order to sharpen our perspectives, however, we must add a few observations on the military situation in Mberengwa.

a) The Strategic Value of Mberengwa

Even before the dramatic events at Manama Secondary School, the eastern parts of the Eastern Deanery were already under the war zones in 1976. Both liberation movements (ZIPRA and ZANLA) and the Rhodesian forces were lodging themselves in the area. This area became a highly contested zone because of mineral wealth from the chrome mines, and further east, of the iron mine of Vuhwa Mountain.

Both mineral ores were important commodities of sanction-busting, with iron ore being exported to Austria and chrome to the United States of America. Guerrillas naturally wanted to stop the business and in the end they succeeded in crippling the chrome mining and exports but failed

to stop the export of iron. The result for the Mberengwa area (the Eastern Deanery) was that the Rhodesian forces lodged themselves in strategic places - the Nyala Chrome Mine, Rhonda Mine, Masvingo next to Vuhwa Mine, Humbani and Keyara next to Masase Mission. (see map 2)

It was from these bases that the Rhodesian security forces conducted their raids on the local build-ups of guerrillas and on the surrounding villages to destroy civilian property as a means of retaliation against suspected civilian assistance to the guerrillas. Rhodesian bases were also used for torturing civilians and for displaying whatever civilians and freedom fighters killed in action. Moreover when the guerrillas first arrived they assumed an overly aggressive posture which frightened the christians, especially in the remote parishes and congregations, such as Mutuvi, Chingezi, Mavorovondo or Jena Primary School and congregation.

b) ZANLA's Initial Measures and the Rhodesian Retaliation

In the remote congregations and parishes christians were outnumbered by backsliders (former christians who had taken to polygamy and other anti-christian manner of living). Here the guerrillas, encouraged by the majority, adopted the nationalist approach of emphasising African cultural aspects in their propaganda to the extent of being anti-christian. All this was possible when the freedom fighters had not yet discovered that even christians were behind them. Indeed the guerrillas were so indiscrete in their treatment of christians at the beginning that they sometimes later regretted their actions and had to apologise.

As we shall see, that was what happened at Musume, when on their first arrival in the area guerrillas went to address a rally at the hospital and pastor Rev. S.C. Ndlovu and the nurse in charge were subsequently arrested for failing to report the presence of guerrillas. This nearly led to the closure of the hospital on which they so much depended for drugs. The tone and pace of the war, however, were set in those remote places such as Jena, a former church primary school and still functioning as a local congregation centre and Mutuvi itself, which first moved into the war situation in 1976.

ZANLA, resumed its programme of fighting in earnest after the collapse of ZIPA in August 1976 which reached the Nyamondo area in October of that year. The first group of ZANLA included Chapungu, who

will feature prominently in the following pages. As soon as they got into the area they wanted to test the commitment of teachers to the liberation struggle and the first to be arrested and to be beaten for being suspected to harbour questionable or doubtful political views was the headmaster of the Jena Primary School, Mabunu Hove, who was in fact sold out by a colleague.

When the guerrillas had satisfied themselves of the strong commitment of the teachers to the liberation struggle a dynamic working relationship developed between them. The headmaster was supposed to collect school fees and forward them to the government through the District Commissioner at the Mberengwa District offices. He did not. Instead he collected the money and gave it to the guerrillas for their upkeep.

The teachers also organised themselves into a local ZANU Committee which purchased and raised chickens and also organised bags of mealie meal for feeding the guerrillas. The teachers went to purchase goods in town for the guerrillas using the headmaster's car, whose seats were carefully torn for the purpose of concealing the goods at road blocks.

Soon all this was suspected by the Rhodesian forces and they actually went out of their way to try and destroy the headmaster because it was thought that he was at the centre of the collaboration. The Rhodesians believed that if they could break the headmaster, as the most respected person in the area, of his support to the guerrillas, many people would stop doing the same. It so happened that some children actually saw guerrillas visiting the headmaster's house and when they were asked by the Rhodesian security people they told them of the event.

The headmaster, a few school children and old women were immediately collected and taken to Nyala for interrogation and for brutal torture. The interrogation went on for two days and among other means of inflicting pains on the victims was to make them lie and form a door mat for the soldiers who said that as it was raining they did not want to soil their polished boots in the mud. After being released on this first occasion, the headmaster was again collected ten times for the torturing exercise, and after the tenth time he decided to escape by joining the guerrillas when they went back to Maputo for the replenishment of their ammunition.

But before he left he had had to witness the killing of so many of his school children and to perform the most revolting exercise at the hands

of the Rhodesians. One day some of his female pupils and old women went to feed a section of guerrillas at the regular meeting place in a nearby hill. The Rhodesians attacked the place using planes and helicopters just as the headmaster and one of the assistants were also going to the place to confer with the guerrillas. 15 of those women and school children were killed on that day and the two school teachers survived by taking cover under a big tree. When the planes left the two teachers gave themselves up to the soldiers conducting mopping up operations. The two were made to load the dead bodies into one of the helicopters which was ferrying the corpses to the trucks waiting by the roadside.

As headmaster Mabunu Hove recalled the horrible experience: "We were made to carry the corpses with our bare hands and on our shoulders into the helicopter. The helicopter was only carrying batches of 3 corpses at a time. Both Obed (the Assistant teacher) and I accompanied the first batch to the road where the army trucks had been left. After unloading Obed remained undressing the corpses while I was flown back so that I could load into the helicopter the remaining 12 corpses. After all the corpses had been brought to the place where the trucks were and after they had been all undressed - they were just laid on the road naked. Then we were ordered to load them in one of the trucks and we were driven to Nyala, the main army camp. When we got to Mataga shopping centre, the shoppers were ordered to come and view the corpses. It was said, 'Come and see, today we killed so much game'. At Nyala we unloaded all the corpses again and Obed went to clean the blood from the truck, while I was ordered to arrange all the 15 corpses so that they were in a sitting position. It was such a difficult task to make those dead people sit because they had already grown stiff. They were arranged in those positions so that they could be properly photographed and filmed for the television. In fact I would be holding the corpse so that it would be in a sitting position when it was photographed by the newsmen and filmed by the TV crew." After this gruesome task Mr Hove ran away to Mozambique.² The subjection of the headmaster and his teacher to the disgusting performance was indeed calculated to stop them from giving support to the guerrillas.

Moreover the Rhodesians did not just use direct methods of killing people, but they also in the process of destroying foodstuffs in order to deny guerrillas access to food began a scorched earth policy which threatened to starve the local people to death so that the church had to

come in to save them. The Mutuvi parish was most unfortunate in that it became involved when the Rhodesians were still strong in the area, before they had been humbled by landmines and ambushes; so they were still able to drive into the villages to terrorise civilians. In 1976, for instance, the Rhodesian soldiers drove to Mutuvi Mission and apparently destroyed green crops in the fields and burnt down six villages, enumerated by the Parish Pastor J.S.Moyo as Meketo, Zvinavashe, Hlanai, Shumirai, Funny and Ramunyenyewa. All these villagers were rendered destitutes.³ At the beginning of 1978 the same Pastor wrote his Bishop in Bulawayo to say: "Once again, about the same time as last year, I am sadly giving you and the Christian Care a list of homes burnt down by the same men [the Rhodesian soldiers] as last year. The following homes were burnt to the ground on the 15th March, 1978:

1. Hlangano Dube	1 wife	3 huts	3 granaries	4 children
2. Elias Duve	1 wife	3 huts	3 granaries	5 children
3. Tafirei Gumbo	3 wives	10 huts	9 granaries	21 children
4. Muneri Duve	unmarried	2 huts	2 granaries	staying with grandmother and 3 young brothers
5. Ndukwana Duve	1 wife	3 huts	4 granaries	5 children
6. Josefa Nyati	1 wife	2 huts	1 granaries	2 children
7. Murambwi Moyo	2 wives	3 huts	2 granaries	8 children
8. Arinos Moyo	1 wife	2 huts	2 granaries	4 children

Tafirei Gumbo's son was shot and killed on the 7th March. These people have suffered a great loss. They have absolutely no food. There is a lot of starvation in the area this year. Their cattle were driven into their fields to destroy the crops just at the time as they were burning the homes. They have no blankets not even one, have no clothes, each person remained only with what he or she had on."⁴

II. Decisive Development at Church Centres

As an intense war zone from the late 1976 Mberengwa, thus, forced the Eastern Deanery with its parishes and congregations to steer on a more dramatic and calculate course. Local initiatives and innovations were called for and adopted and those were in fact taken and pursued. It is to those that we now turn.

a) **Early encounters in Chingezi, Mavorovondo and Masvingo**

The destruction of the property and means of livelihood soon spread to other parts of Eastern Deanery and the Church consistently tried to step in to alleviate the suffering of the civilians. Thus in July 1977 Pastor Lazarus Hungwe of Chingezi was advising the Church Treasurer in Bulawayo not to cut down on his annual budget for helping the people whose property had been destroyed.⁵

Hungwe recalled in an interview with me that guerrillas had arrived on a reconnoitring mission in his parish at the end of 1976. In 1977 they then came in full force. They were gathering people in different parts of his parish forming them into cells and base branches. They were also holding meetings to teach the people the purpose of the war and to inform them of what help they wanted from them.

The pastor and the teachers started helping the guerrillas, giving them food, clothes and other necessities. Rhodesian soldiers invaded the parish to destroy that relationship and went round burning people's homes so that at least 40 villages were completely destroyed. Pastor Hungwe got some financial assistance from the Church of Z\$1 000.00 to distribute to the destitutes. The second time the Rhodesians came in and found people holding a meeting at the regular base and massacred them, leaving orphans, widows and other destitutes. Again the Church came with some financial help of Z\$600 which was distributed to the affected civilians.⁶

From the christians' point of view their fear was not just that of physical harm from the Rhodesian army but also of the under currents of the anti-christianity contained in some of the liberation movements's propaganda. This position tended to be true in the remote missions which did not have enough economic base to produce strong financial and other material support for the war effort, which was distinguishable from the other villagers. In such places the christian influence could be ignored. That was the situation at the small and newly upgraded parishes such as Mutuvi and Mavorovondo. Thus the Mutuvi Pastor, J.S. Moyo, indicated how his congregations were diminishing in numbers and the manner in which christians were becoming frightened to be identified publicly with their faith apparently as a result of the rumoured or actual anti-christian teachings of ZANLA in the area in 1976:

In this Parish at this time, most people live under doubt of their course. Our Parish is in the war and as such, almost everyone lives in fear. Our Sunday Services have lost their flavour. The attendances have dropped and some members have hidden their Bibles and membership cards. War has come as a temptation. This is the time when the Parish needs prayers and God's proximity than any other time. Our Christians in this Parish need prayers from all Christians everywhere. They live under the rule of fear. I asked my evangelists to bring all membership cards to me, and one of the evangelists could not get the cards because Christians either hid them or burnt them. He found out that Bibles have been hidden in caves or granaries. He asked these members why they do that, they only said that they were afraid. There is a lot of false tales about this and about that, I do not think that Christians should yield to these false tales. Besides all these fears etc. there are still very strong faithful Christians. They have their Bibles in front of them and they allow the Bible to speak about the situation. One of the Christians once said to me: 'This is the last war, we should stand firm in Christ as did the twelve when most followers had deserted Jesus.'⁷

These anti-christian rumours combined with the insecurity of the situation seriously eroded the parish of its attendances indeed. "Most Christians, [and] even some Church workers were frightened by the existing unrest in the country," the Mutuvi pastor reported in 1977. "I have met two to six Christians at some congregations."⁸ The situation was worse at Mavorovondo, which was sandwiched between the Rhodesian security base at Humbani and the ZANLA forces which tended to frequent the secure hills in the midst of the parish and which was also remote from the big centres. "The forecast plans for the months", wrote the Mavorovondo Pastor in June 1977, "are only written for goodness sake as a rule. The position here is getting so critical that we do not know what may happen today or tomorrow. There is all sorts of everybody. Bullets fly over house tops like birds flying in the air. Gunshot sounds are becoming a normal sound like motor car sounds in the town".⁹ The same Parish showed a real decline in every aspect of the Church by the end of 1977. "There has been a very severe decline at Mavorovondo parish's church work for the year 1977. First Church attendance was very poor for

nearly every congregation. People in very little numbers everywhere in the Parishes. Infant baptism which was very high last year as much as about 22 children baptised, was only six this year. Total baptism for the year was only 56 against 105 for last year - infant and adult. Some thought of [many things] to be the reason for failure of church work. As this place had a lot of defence force movements, some people have expressed fear of movement over weekends as most incidents took place over the weekends. Sometimes shooting enclosing the whole Parish would go for a week or so. Sometimes gun sounds started on Sundays as people started to prepare for church services."¹⁰

Moreover freedom fighters were said to be attacking the christian religion and some christians were influenced by their teaching. "People have accepted the diverse teaching as the best to live by. 'There is no God - *pirai midzimu* (worship your ancestral spirits) *Jesu Mwari wavarungu* (Jesus is a whitemen's god). There is God but no Jesus'. This has been highly accepted by some Christians here in the Parish".¹¹ Similar anti-christian teachings were reported at the Chegato Parish in 1977, while the second danger which threatened to cripple the Chegato Parish was that the colonial soldiers frequently picked up the christians on their way to Church in order to go and torture them in their camps so that they could reveal the whereabouts of ZANLA fighters.¹²

While it is true that the liberation forces at times attacked christianity it is quite evident that most of it, apart from testing the sincerity of the christians in the participation of the war, was mere rhetoric and the guerrillas never went out of their way to prevent people from going to Church. Moreover some of the pastors in the war zone undertook some of the most daring missions in the service of ZANLA. Much of the commitment of the pastors in the liberation struggle was of course grounded in Black or radical theology. This comes out from the testimonies of the various pastors who lived in the war zone parishes throughout the war and had occasions of direct confrontations with freedom fighters on aspects of christianity.

Pastor Lazarus Hungwe of Chingezi Parish gave a typical example of an argument between himself and the liberation people. "There was no conflict between the Christian message and the revolutionary teachings," Hungwe said, "although I still remember the question that was directed to me in connection with love. One Comrade said, 'you are a pastor and we know the Bible says thou shall not kill. Yet we are freedom fighters and are trained to kill. How can you love us?' I said the word love implies and indeed involves sacrifice and the freedom fighters are sacrificing

their lives for the liberation of our country. So in that big sacrifice, I said, I saw love. They were sacrificing their lives for the country, our country and my country, which I loved. I therefore said I loved the country and all those who were sacrificing their lives for its liberation. There is no way I could say as a Minister I am opposed to all killing. I could not allow the whites to just dominate and exploit us because I was a Minister. So circumstances were forcing us to kill. From that the freedom fighters realised that I had the right attitude towards the war. This was not actually a conflict but a dialogue between me as the pastor and the freedom fighters. There were no conflicts because we worked closely with them and knew the purpose of the war and we support it. We stayed with them until the end of the war.”¹³

The same situation of having dialogues with the guerrillas obtained at Masvingo Mission where Pastors Aynos Moyo and Obed M. Shiri were in charge. But their experience also showed how a situation could get out of hand, especially if it might involve a matter of losing face in front of a rally, so that either the political commissar or pastor had to give up the argument if violence was to be avoided. In other words emotive issues and matters of faith were better not raised at a gathering as happened in the following instance. The Rev. A. Moyo, Pastor of Masvingo and teacher of the evangelist school there, recalled that there were no real conflicts between the Church and the freedom fighters, except that at times the commissars, apparently noticing the presence of the local pastors and therefore intent on embarrassing them, would shout such slogans as ‘*pasi naJesus!*’ (down with Jesus!), ‘*pasi navarungu*’ (down with the whites), and that “the Bible is a bad book, we shall burn it,” etc. But at the end of it all people just went to Church and the boys [guerrillas] didn’t come on Sunday to disturb our worship. Even if we found them teaching people on Sunday and we requested them to allow the people to come to Church to worship they would allow us and the people to go ahead with our religious activity. So most of the talking or anti-christian propaganda had become a kind of rhetoric to the people. Those who stayed with them knew that the boys would say those things but if one went to Church no harm would come upon him or her.”¹⁴

In spite of this understanding Rev. Obed Shiri one time tried to contradict a slogan by a political commissar and the incident could have ended violently if Rev. Moyo had not intervened to persuade his colleague to stop arguing. On that occasion the political commissar said, “*pasi naJesus*”. He said Jesus was an oppressor. Shiri, seeing the christians who were there decided to respond. And Shiri said, “Jesus Christ was not

an oppressor. He was the son of God and he was a liberator. The guerrillas insisted that Jesus was an oppressor and quoted the fact that Jesus was a Jew and Jews were helping the Smith regime through South Africa by sending for instance Vampire planes which were harassing the freedom fighters. And so the combatant was angry with Shiri, when the latter continued to refute the former's statements."¹⁵

In the end Moyo stopped the argument by advising his colleague to shut up. In the meantime the Rev. O. Shiri remained one of the biggest supporters of the guerrillas and because he had a car he used it to run errands to town for the freedom fighters. Many of the groups of the freedom fighters who operated in Mberengwa, even as far as Chivi, would send letters to Shiri with orders, "sometimes with money and at other times without money, asking Shiri to go and repair watches, buy shoes, clothes, tobacco and other items".¹⁶

He became such a reliable messenger in the area that when a ZANLA platoon wanted to go and blow up parts of the Zvishavane Mine town they sent him to go and draw a map of the town, "showing the roads, stores and everything - in other words to produce a clear and comprehensive sketch map of the Zvishavane Mining Town." Shiri went ahead and drew up the plan.¹⁷ Even though the sketch map was not in the end used by the guerrillas because their plans were upset by happenings elsewhere in the operational area, what was most remarkable indeed was the willingness of pastors, as exemplified by the Rev. Shiri, to support and collaborate with the freedom fighters in their prosecution of the war to the extent of direct participation. In the end the Rev. Shiri's war activities were terminated when he was intercepted and arrested at a roadblock by the Rhodesian police on suspicion that he was running errands for freedom fighters in 1979. He was detained in Zvishavane for heavy interrogation for over a month.

Moreover Masvingo Mission became a special target so that Rhodesian forces, which for sometime had been cleared from the area, fought back ferociously to protect the nearby Vuhwa iron ore mine and succeeded in August 1979 to wrestle the mission from the guerrillas. Thereafter the mission was converted into a base with a garrison of over 1 000 soldiers and auxiliary troops. The Rev. Aynos Moyo with his class of evangelists had to abandon their school and mission and transfer their work to Bulawayo.

Before leaving Masvingo it is important to note how some of the pastors' commitment to the liberation struggle, like that of the Rev. Hungwe and the others, was grounded in Black or radical theology. When

asked whether during the war he found that christianity was threatened by the revolutionary teachings, the Rev. Aynos Moyo quickly responded in the negative and said:

If anything I felt we had to rethink our theology and I started embracing seriously Black Theology. In one encounter I had to propound on my Black Theology because I had already started reading it. In this instance it was a question of colour because the combatant challenged me to explain the colour of Jesus. He said you people paint the devil black and you paint the Angels white and this is what you teach people. I said, no, the colour is irrelevant, the colour is a mere symbol. So I believe if I were, as an African, to dream about Jesus I would dream of him as a black man. And so too the white man has a right to see Jesus as a white man. That's why the whites have been producing literature and painting Angels white: it was because they had a monopoly of Christianity. We could paint the same Jesus black and no harm would come of that. On that day there was a lot of noise during the heated argument and the people present were afraid. For almost three hours we were locked up in the serious debate with the combatants.¹⁸

Indeed at the end of the debate the combatants confessed that they valued the discussion and that they had had a chance to learn a lot they had not known before. The influences of Black Theology were thus not only helping the clergy to accommodate the revolutionary struggle but the guerrillas as well as to see christianity in a favourable light.

In rounding up the brief discussion which is based on experiences from Chingezi, Mavorovondo and Masvingo missions it is important to observe some of the characteristic features which remained dominant in the relations between the Church and the different fighting forces. First the clergy, the lay workers, and ordinary christians came out readily in support both morally and materially of the guerrillas, with the full conviction that the struggle was justified and that it was their own war. Of course, there were contradictions here and there emanating from some nationalist emphasis on African culture; but these never produced physical violence or clashes.

It is noteworthy that the pastors dismissed the anti-christian pronouncements by the guerrillas as mere rhetoric. While the guerrillas' tactics involved the destruction of what they considered to be things of economic interests to the Rhodesian state, the Rhodesian forces on the other hand produced a lot of suffering among the peasant civilians through their scorched-earth policy, bombings of gatherings and arrests and torturing of people suspected of harbouring guerrillas. There again the Church stepped in to alleviate suffering by giving financial support to the destitutes of the war. To a large extent, these remained some of the chief characteristics of the Church's relations with fighting forces, except that the big missions were able to render greater financial and medical support for the guerrillas. Of course such resources were not always sufficient to avoid conflictual relationships. Developments at Masase illustrate the positive and negative aspects of the relationships.

c) **Contradictions at Masase**

The closure of Masase was slightly different from that of Manama in that it did not entail the abduction of the students and moreover it came after some prolonged interaction between the Masase community and the two warring sides. A pattern of stable and regular contacts, punctuated by frightfully violent episodes, emerged between Masase and the freedom fighters. When the closure of the centre came about it was an anti-climax, in that after weathering down some frightful turbulences, only a doubtful rumour of an imminent battle in the mission grounds between the warring forces was sufficient to put to flight the whole population of Masase, leaving behind deserted buildings and other valuable property to be looted and destroyed by the surrounding communities.

The first encounter between ZANLA forces and the people of Masase was at the beginning of 1977, when the teachers were all invited to go and meet a reconnoitring contingent under the command of Simbi Dzinogayana (a Chimurenga name) in the neighbouring bush. At that meeting the ZANLA advance party explained the aims of the liberation war, how the war was being prosecuted, how long they expected the struggle to last, how they expected the people to support the war effort, and the role of the bases or camps which they were fixing. They said that they were advancing west and north with the aim to finally encircling the white centre of Bulawayo. The teachers were given a free chance to ask as many questions as they wanted and they were in conference with the

guerrillas from the early hours of the evening to 3 a.m. the following morning. After that meeting that group vanished from Masase;¹⁹ but this inaugurated regular visits from other freedom fighters.

On the night of February 23, 1977, when the students were holding their evening prayer, in the dining room where they had their evening studies, a group of 10 guerrillas, led by Cdes Majaravanda and Elliot Churu, appeared. They introduced themselves as ZANLA forces, which had previously marched the Manama students across the border into Botswana, and they said that they had come to collect the Masase boys and girls in order to take them to Mozambique for military training. In the end the latter turned out to be only an empty threat and of course the reference to Manama was also not correct since the abduction had been carried out by ZIPRA; but the students were ordered to go to a place just outside the hospital, where they found the rest of the Masase people consisting of the Primary and Secondary School teachers, the nurses, the pastor and his staff, the general workers and the patients who were well enough to walk, already assembled. From 9 pm to 12 midnight, the guerrillas spoke of the various ZANLA military exploits and achievements in the current war, talked about the aims of the war, tried some political education, commended to the gathering ZANU as the only revolutionary party of the people of Zimbabwe, and started to teach the gathering Chimurenga songs, which were not new to the people anyway, as they all listened to Radio Maputo, which popularised them. After that the guerrillas disappeared into the night. From then on, however, freedom fighters came every two or three days during the study time in the evenings when all the students were gathered in the dining room and spent thirty or so minutes talking about the war.²⁰

Apart from the visits to the school, guerrillas invited the Masase people to come to the bases which were set up in the hills and valleys around the mission. The bases were meeting places of both the mission community and the surrounding villages. It became important right from the beginning to divide the burden of the war as equitably as possible between the mission and the villagers. Guerrillas needed cooked food, blankets, and water, which the villagers could very well supply and those became the tasks of the ordinary people. The mission people who received salaries and wages were assigned responsibilities which required ready cash, such as providing pocket money, buying clothing, watches, cold drinks, beers and tobacco. The mission too, with its

hospital, had the central role of supplying medicines. By the end of 1977 this division of labour between the *povo* (ordinary people) and the mission elite was well established.²¹ Indeed the amount of financial support for the war effort by the mission employees was quite substantial. As Mr Shumba, the former headmaster of Masase described it:

We paid quite a lot for the war effort in money terms. This was an on-going thing. We would divide the financial requests equally among the teachers. Well, since they need so much and we are so many, let each one of us pay so much. If we had no cash, then I would go into the Church or school fund to make loan advances. At the end of the month I would then collect the money from the teachers and other workers concerned. Some very few people did not honour their obligations. Altogether, when we added it up at the end, when we had to tear up what we considered to be incriminating evidence to the Smith forces, it came to \$6,500. I had kept a proper record of our payments to the guerrillas in the log register which I kept in the school safe. And those cash payments were made in a space of less than two years. Besides this was on top of what many members of staff were required to pay whenever they visited their homes.²²

Guerrillas first asked for medical supplies through the headmaster, who advised them to approach the sister-in-charge directly. "I thought that asking medicines through me was dangerous because should the sister be cornered by the colonial forces she would say it was the headmaster who told her to give away the medicines." With that minor hitch sorted out, the medical supplies flowed freely to the guerrillas.²³

This support went side by side with fairly regular gatherings at the bases. As Mr Shumba again put it: "We would just see a person coming to us with a note, inviting us to go to the base for a meeting. Sometimes only teachers were invited, at times only school children, and at other times both." It is important to know that no one group of guerrillas spent more than one day in one base, and each group operated in any one locality for a very limited time. They were afraid of being betrayed to the enemy.²⁵ Thus the detailed relations between Masase Mission and the guerrillas also varied from one group to another. Some groups were extremely friendly while others were somewhat hostile to the mission. Some groups caused much headache to the headmaster because of their

keen interest in the young female students, which affected the general discipline of the boarding school. In most cases the whole situation depended on the commanders. If the commander had a firm grip on the discipline of his subordinate comrades there was no trouble at all, but if the commander was a weak one, then his comrades bullied the civilians, causing all sorts of misunderstanding with the local communities. On the whole, however, between February 1977 and August 1978, Masase Mission enjoyed generally good relations with ZANLA forces, relations which indeed guaranteed substantial and massive support, both materially and morally, for the peoples' war by the Masase people.²⁶

Towards the end of 1978 the situation at Masase changed because of a combination of factors, including jealousies among the secondary school teachers which attracted the intervention of guerrillas, the presence of an unruly ZANLA group, the increasing pressures of the enemy soldiers on the Masase community and ZANLA bases, and the death of one or two Masase people. All these factors were inseparably related, and they combined to create an uneasy atmosphere, leading to the sudden flight of the Masase people from the mission and its closure.

In September 1978 a new group of freedom fighters came into the Masase area. It consisted of nine comrades; it included such fighters as Bucks One and Jerry and was commanded by Cde Nhamo. The Nhamo group was characterised by strange behaviour and made demands on the mission which were outside the agreement entered into with the previous groups. When they first came they did not, to start with, contact the headmaster and his teachers but they simply invited some school girls to the base. At the base itself they did not only sing and dance to the Chimurenga songs but they also played records and radios. Even stranger was the fact that the guerrillas not only told the headmaster and his staff that they intended to operate around Masase for a long time, but they also wanted the boarding school to start supplying cooked food to the base. Then one day the villagers spent the whole day at the base singing with the comrades; in the evening when the headmaster and his wife were already in bed they were woken up by a loud knock at their door. On getting out of the house the headmaster found it surrounded by armed guerrillas, who were shouting, "Get out together with your wife and walk to the base." At the base there was no old person whatsoever but female and male youths who said that the old people had gone to their homes leaving the message that as soon as the headmaster was brought he must

be killed together with his wife. Noone could explain why the headmaster had to be executed, and so in that confusion the headmaster and his wife were released. But the following morning at 9 a.m. an elderly messenger came with a note to the headmaster from the comrades, which read in Shona: *Kana takamutadzirai musauya kana tisina kumutadzirai muuye. Tisu vana venyu.* (If we wronged you don't come, if we didn't wrong you come. Signed by your children.) The meaning of the message was that if the headmaster turned up at the base, it meant that he was admitting that he was guilty. Indeed when he turned up in the company of two other teachers the comrades shouted that he was guilty. What quickly emerged too on that day was that Commander Nhamo had little grip over his group. In fact this was apparent when Nhamo said, "We don't seem to be getting what is going on. It seems there are people who have ill-feelings against you (the headmaster). These people have reported to the Cdes. The Cdes are now bitter against you and think that you are working for the Rhodesian forces." Finally it became clear that the Cdes were bitter against the headmaster because he frowned upon the female students who frequented the base at odd hours. All in all it was clear that the whole trouble arose because Nhamo was a weak commander, the group stayed too long in one area and got involved in local gossip and jealousies. Indeed, the news of the misbehaviour of the Nhamo group soon reached the area Commander Chuma CheZimbabwe, who was operating beyond Musume Mission and he summoned the group and disbanded it. Chuma CheZimbabwe then made a trip right up to Masase where he met the headmaster, the teachers, both male and female prefects of the school, and the villagers and smoothed over matters. But the whole episode left the headmaster, his wife and many teachers absolutely shaken. The headmaster's wife in particular was now constantly urging her husband to leave Masase.²⁷

Also pressing on the Masase community with increasing intensity and brutality were the Rhodesian soldiers who established a permanent camp at Humbani, not very far from Masase, and used both the Humbani camp and the Masase shopping centre called Keyara, as interrogation and torturing places for civilians. After the Smith-Muzorewa agreement of 1977 Masase area became a ground for active recruiting the unemployed youths who were trained into auxiliary forces at Masvingo (Fort Victoria) on a farm called Maybrooke. But the pressure was even more direct on Masase than that. For instance one day a girl called Emina, a nurse-maid

at Masase hospital was apparently taken by the Rhodesian soldiers and tortured until she revealed one of the bases of ZANLA forces. The Rhodesians quickly mounted a ground to air surprise attack on the comrades and a full-scale battle started near the mission. One of the casualties was Mehlo Siziba, an old worker at the mission, who had witnessed the interrogation of Emina and had quickly cycled to the base to warn the Comrades that their hide-out had been exposed. Some say he was hit by a shrapnel in the head and others say he was shot by the Rhodesian forces deliberately but he died on the spot.²⁹ The death of Siziba brought home in a vivid and bloody way how the Masase community was trapped between the warring forces, making the people more anxious to leave the place.

Even more traumatic an experience for the Masase people was the execution of the nurse-maid, Emina, by the freedom fighters. The comrades carried out their own investigations and later said that they had found out that Emina had betrayed them to the soldiers. The comrades said that they had been informed that Emina was popular both with the Rhodesian soldiers and with the comrades, so that she was passing information freely between the two camps. Moreover it was alleged that on the day of the battle Emina had been seen in one of the Rhodesian helicopters pointing out the bases. She was arrested and brought to her home, which was not very far from the school.

Everybody from the school, the hospital, and from the local villages, was invited to come and witness her execution. One of the comrades who had been her boyfriend was chosen to carry out the execution. She was told to say her last words and she repeated Jesus's message when he was crucified: "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do." (Luke 23:34). The guerrillas promptly denounced Jesus himself as a common thief, who had stolen two donkeys before he went to Jerusalem for the last time. With that the boyfriend emptied a magazine of, some say 32 and others say 41, bullets into her head which was completely smashed. When the crowd was asked to file past her they found that only her neck remained hanging on one shoulder with blood gushing out from it as if from a horse pipe.

To a religious community as that of Masase the following event was even more significant. A meteor flew across the sky with a loud buzzing sound and with such brightness that it lit the whole ground where the people were assembled and everybody, except the guerrillas, ducked for

cover thinking they were under attack by the Rhodesian army. To the Masase Christian community the freedom fighters had killed an innocent soul as evidenced by the star which seemed to respond to the words of Jesus Christ and this only increased their nervousness. The following morning the whole hospital staff ran away to their homes. The fear was that the Rhodesian soldiers would come to torture people in order to find out where the girl had gone; for she had been buried in her room and people were told never to say what had happened to her except to say she had gone to Bulawayo, or Gwanda to look for a job.³⁰

Meanwhile the execution of Emina ushered in difficult times for the Masase students. The situation was made worse by the plans of the Smith-Muzorewa regime to draft secondary students into the army. Guerrillas would come to the school at night to denounce the Smith-Muzorewa regime and its military plans; then in the morning the racist forces would come and collect some boys and girls - particularly the prefects - and take them either to Keyara township or the main camp of Humbani for interrogation and torture. At night the same boys and girls would be required by the comrades to go to the base to report on what they would have told the Rhodesian soldiers. All this went on for days, but there was no mention of closing the mission either by the guerrillas or the Rhodesian army.³¹

On the day the school was closed Rhodesian soldiers collected 6 students for interrogation at Keyara and then released them. On their return to the school, some two girls went straight to the base to report what had happened. Early that evening some guerrillas happened to be in the school, and the male students implored them to relieve them of the torture and harassment by Rhodesian soldiers, by taking them right away for military training in Mozambique. In short, the students had reached a breaking point and could not take any further harassments, and they needed a very small cause to run away from the school. That evening, between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. some girls returned from the base and started a rumour that there was going to be a battle fought in the school between the forces of liberation and the Rhodesians, and the rumour spread like wild fire among all the students and it had an electric effect on them. No student waited to verify the truth of the rumour. The headmaster says, "I tried to stop them but it was impossible. They were just throwing their boxes all over the place and running away. Even my own relatives came and dumped their boxes at my house and disappeared. Nor could I ever find out who had brought the news of an impending battle at the school"³².

The following morning the headmaster cycled with another teacher to the base to find out whether the guerrillas had ordered the closure of the school and the latter said that they had had nothing to do with the disappearance of the students. The guerrillas also allowed the headmaster to report the whole tragedy to the Church authorities in Bulawayo and to the police at Mberengwa. The Rhodesian army showed no interest whatever in what had happened. It was conclusively clear from both sides - the Rhodesian army and the guerrillas - that they had not had a direct hand in the closure of the school, which was soon followed by the flight of the hospital staff and the pastor and his assistant. In a few days the headmaster and his teachers packed their belongings and also disappeared, leaving Masase a ghost village. For purposes of comparing with later events at other missions, it is necessary to point out that Masase property was not looted nor the buildings of the mission destroyed until after a month or so.³³ At Chegato, as we shall see, the looting of property and the destruction of buildings was instantaneous.

To round off the Masase story, it is clear that between February 1977 and September 1978 the people of Masase entered into cordial and useful relationship with the freedom fighters. The employees of Masase became a vital source of financial support for the liberation forces in the area, providing them with pocket money, and money to purchase clothing as well as many other necessities. Masase was able to supply the comrades with medicines. The fact that Masase had a boarding school and a church, which always had ready cash meant that the comrades were assured of money whenever they needed it, since the headmaster and his teachers had somewhere to borrow. More or less the same type of understanding emerged between the guerrillas and the people of Chegato mission until the end of 1978, when the school was also forced to close down.

c) The Drama of Chegato

Unlike at Masase where an advance and reconnoitring group warned the people of the impending full-scale invasion by ZANLA forces, at Chegato people were taken completely by surprise. One night in November 1976 a group of guerrillas came, woke up the teachers, students, and workers and gathered them in the middle of the school. The guerrillas said that they had come to introduce themselves as ZANLA forces and to tell

the mission that they were operating in the neighbourhood of the school. They told the gathering that they were related to the ZANLA forces which had closed St Albert Mission, which had been very much in the news previously and one of them kept on saying he was looking forward to doing the same at Chegato. Undoubtedly the people of Chegato were terrified by the sudden presence of freedom fighters and by their apparent lack of security consciousness and their total disregard of a possible confrontation with the Rhodesians. Indeed, some teachers nervously pleaded with the comrades not to speak too loudly in case they were overheard by the Rhodesian security forces which might be hiding in the school hedge. But that only made the comrades to speak more loudly and to challenge the Smith soldiers, if they were anywhere nearby to come forward there and then for a showdown. That shook the mission gathering even further. But there was no incident and the guerrillas disappeared into the night, leaving the gathering to disperse.³⁴

Following this meeting, the guerrillas established several bases in the neighbourhood of the school. The first base was at Magavakava out-school. Everybody was at first required to go and attend political meetings at the base, where political lectures were delivered by the comrades. People were also instructed about their exact roles in the struggle, viz that it was their duty to support the freedom fighters materially. The headmaster, teachers, pastor and other employees of the secondary school quickly organised themselves and chose what they thought was their appropriate role in the war - a role that was to set them apart from the rest of the people. The cleavage between the employees of Chegato Secondary School and the general community around adversely affected the survival of the mission. The Chegato employees thought that they could best contribute to the people's war effort by concentrating on those aspects that required ready cash only, and leave such mundane chores as the supply for cooked food, blankets, and water to the ordinary villagers.³⁵ In time too it became understood between the Chegato employees and the freedom fighters, that the former were sufficiently aware politically as to require little or no further instructions from the guerrillas, and therefore became exempt from the frequent gatherings at the bases.

The teachers and other employees of Chegato played their role effectively. They organised themselves to the extent of having a treasurer, Mr Tera Mberi, one of the teachers. They also agreed on how much they were each to contribute to the war fund per month. They each gave

themselves code or Chimurenga names, which they used when at the base and when making their financial contributions to the war fund. They agreed on a way of communicating with guerrillas, so that the latter, whenever they wanted something from Chegato, wrote a letter and included the secret code number 7. It was a number which was known only by the leading *mujiba* (war messenger) of Chegato and the teachers themselves. The pastor, the Revd W. Musekiwa, cooperated fully with the rest of the Chegato people and even got himself the code name Effort.³⁶

Just like the Masase, the Chegato employees fell back regularly upon the resources of the school to keep up with their contributions to the war effort. One time a request came from the guerrillas, asking for jeans, jackets, shirts, boots, cigarettes, and several other articles, worth \$600.00. Treasurer Mberi declared that there was only \$200.00 in the war fund, and yet the goods were needed in a matter of two or so days. Such sudden and urgent requests were quite normal and in keeping with the way the guerrillas operated. The latter were highly mobile and only stayed in a locality for at most a week, changing their bases daily. Thus teachers could only cope with the demands of such groups which came and left rapidly, if they had some back-up means beyond their monthly salaries; school funds and credit facilities with big firms in Bulawayo and Zvishavane served just that purpose. On that particular occasion when the teachers could not meet the \$600.00 bill, the headmaster Elifas Chenyika authorised one of the teachers, Nelbert Chinyoka, to go and buy the goods at Vulcan Trading Co. (1958) (Pvt) Ltd. Wholesale Merchants, 75 Fife Street, Bulawayo, using the school account. The use of the school account had the further advantage of disguising the destination of the goods at the Rhodesian security road blocks which operated all along the road between Bulawayo and Mberengwa.

The huge cardboard box full of clothing and other supplies easily passed the road blocks because it had legitimate documentation from the headmaster Chenyika and the wholesalers as destined for the Chegato pupils. Meanwhile, and by way of illustrating how such purchases were frequently urgent as well and how impatient the highly mobile guerrillas could be, the freedom fighters arrested the old headmaster, Chenyika, and held him hostage until teacher Chinyoka delivered the goods. In the event the goods were brought to the freedom fighters as per their order and Chenyika was released. At the end of the month the treasurer made his

collection and paid off the \$600.00 bill.³⁷ Normally, however, the requests were for goods worth smaller amounts or just for pocket money, which the treasurer met comfortably from the running war fund.³⁸

Two events, however, shook and horrified the Chegato community before it was overtaken by the even more shocking closure of its mission. Those were the killing right in the school of the freedom fighter Chapungu Chehondo and the blowing up of the nearby Mwanezi bridge of Tandav-arayi. Both events raised apprehensions about the community being caught between the warring forces and the possibility of a blood bath at the school. In 1977 the school got news of a guerrilla called Chapungu Chehondo, who was performing extra-ordinary deeds of bravery in the war.

Chapungu seems to have first come into Mberengwa together with other guerrillas in 1976, because in February/March that year he was seen and fed with other fighters at Mwembe by teacher Chinyoka and his people.³⁹ In October 1976 Chapungu and others, such as Cde Pasipanodya, were operating further down in Nyamondo,⁴⁰ and in April 1977 he had broken away from the others and come up again as far as Mnene, where he was destroying enemy property.⁴¹ By the time he came to Chegato he had become the most sought after Rhodesian enemy because of his war deeds in Mberengwa.

On 23 April, 1977 the legendary Chapungu Chehondo appeared in person at Chegato Secondary School on a tractor which he had temporarily seized from a local businessman called Makiye. He was carrying his variety of weapons - AK rifles, RPGs, a bazooka and revolvers, all of which he deposited in Mr Kenny Nyati's house, one of the teachers who later became High Commissioner to Zambia. Chapungu Chehondo appeared most unconventional in his conduct of the war. Indeed that was the view of teacher Chinyoka, who happened to be on duty that Saturday when Chapungu entered the school.

Chinyoka says that Chapungu came and introduced himself to the pupils who all rushed to him in excitement. "I also went to see him and he introduced himself as Chapungu Chehondo. I said to him, 'Look it is broad daylight. You can't just walk into the school with all that military equipment. It is not safe,' he replied that the tractor would be driven back to the owner. Meanwhile he would concentrate on the rally which he wanted to have in the school. He said that it would be held in the school assembly hall and that he had invited all the surrounding villages to attend as well. Indeed when the rally was finally held people were so many that they could not fit in the school assembly hall."⁴²

The rally started at 12 noon and went on until 2 p.m. Nyati tells us what happened and about the fear that gripped the people. "When we were gathered in the hall he (Chapungu) went on the stage and started singing Chimurenga songs. He taught us how to sing some of them and then he went on to describe the struggle. The odd thing which scared us very much was that all this was taking place inside a building. What we had learned from previous contacts with the guerrillas was that ZANU guerrillas never went into anybody's house. But here was now a guy addressing people in a hall. We were imagining that Smith's planes could come any time and bomb us. We were most frightened."⁴³

In fact the Rhodesian forces were not far from the scene, because when Chapungu had finished his address and was just about to have his meal at Mr Nyati's house at 3.30 p.m., they drove into the school and went straight to the headmaster's house to ask where Chapungu was. Chapungu escaped unnoticed but left behind his military equipment, which became a big problem for Nyati and his wife as they tried to hide it away.

Discovering that their quarry had temporarily slipped off, the Rhodesian soldiers withdrew, but not very far from the school. They used the rest of the day to gather reinforcements from their main camps in Mberengwa, such as Humbani, Keyara, Nyala and Vuhwa. Chapungu came back at 5.30 p.m. to eat his "lunch" at Mr Kenny Nyati's house. The knowledge that the Rhodesian security forces were in the vicinity made Nyati and wife exceedingly nervous and they urged Chapungu to leave. But he took his time over his meal and showed no sign whatsoever of wanting to leave. Only after what seemed an interminable time did he collect his things and, to the great relief of the Nyati family, said good-bye.

But exactly at 9 p.m. Chapungu showed up again and this time demanded to be shown one of the female students' hostels. As soon as Chapungu got into their hostels, the young females gathered around him and he entertained them with war stories and by teaching them Chimurenga songs. There was quite jolly singing which went on until long after the hour when there should be lights out and silence in the students' hostels. The school deputy headboy went over to silence the girls, only to be ordered by Chapungu to join his audience. It was in that deafening noise when two Rhodesian soldiers - a black and white one - suddenly got to the door without being seen by Chapungu. They even signalled to the girls to move away from him. By the time Chapungu noticed what was happening

and tried to defend himself, it was too late. The Rhodesians fired first and it is said that he died in crouching position holding his bazooka in readiness to fire. Two girls were killed with him and the deputy headboy who was fatally wounded died later. Several girls were injured.

The following morning the whole school was called to come and view the dead Chapungu after he was tied to the back of an army truck and driven round the Mberengwa district for display to the people. He was finally buried at Chamakudo near Musume Mission and by that time he was in an advanced state of decomposition.⁴⁴

The Chapungu episode which left three students dead brought the war vividly and concretely to the Chegato community in 1977. In other words, the community was no longer sacrificing for a distant war but was now losing lives as well.

The next shocking experience was that of the destruction of the bridge on the Mwanezi river some time in 1978. Mr Chinyoka says that the incident took place when there was already an understanding between the teachers and the comrades that the former and their wives were no longer supposed to go to bases at night, unless something unusual was going to take place. "When that bridge on Mwanezi was blown up," says Chinyoka, "everybody was required to be at the base, except one person, headmaster Chenyika, who was told to tell the security forces if they came and found the place deserted that everybody was out at the base... We immediately realised the seriousness of the occasion. But no one told us what was happening - we could only see the mujibas carrying logs to the bridge. We were sitting at the base and there was a lot of singing and dancing. At 12.45 a.m. we saw something like a flying red-ball going for the river. Where it was shot from we couldn't tell, but suddenly there were two huge explosions... We were numb with fright. A few minutes later we were ordered to stand up and we parents were told to walk away to our respective homes. There were no explanations." The Tandavarayi bridge was severely damaged. The following day the Rhodesian forces poured into the area, and many teachers were so frightened that they ran away from the school for two to three days. Thus the incident added to the uneasy atmosphere prevailing in the school as a result of the war situation.

Pressure on the Chegato committee also came in the form of demands for recruits by the Rhodesian army. Towards the end of 1978 headmaster Chenyika received a large batch of forms from the Muzorewa-Smith regime requiring him to complete them indicating male students of a certain age who could be eligible for compulsory military service. The comrades were aware of the Muzorewa-Smith plans and were waiting to

see the reaction of the mission. The mission authorities were therefore caught in a trap; if they did not complete them the Muzorewa-Smith regime would pounce on them and charge them with breaking the law; if they complied guerrillas were certain to take punitive action against them as an enemy institution.

The headmaster and the staff therefore sought the advice of the comrades who ordered that the forms should not be completed. Two comrades came up to the school to collect all the forms, except one at the back of which they wrote a message to the Muzorewa-Smith regime, that the freedom fighters had confiscated all the forms and burnt them. The guerrillas indeed burnt some of the forms in the school grounds and took away the rest. The headmaster was also instructed to phone the Mberengwa Police Station and tell the member-in-charge what had happened. When the police came the headmaster simply said he had been forced to give away the forms at the point of a gun and that was the end of the story for the time being.⁴⁶ But it was obvious that the Muzorewa-Smith regime was sure to come back, for not to do so would be an admission on its part of defeat by ZANLA forces. Meanwhile the latter would never allow recruiting by the enemy to go on in their midst. In short the mission was heading for a certain bloody disaster in which it was not only the prize of the contest but also very likely the battle ground of the two sides. Fortunately, this was not to be because of the permanent closure of the school at the end of 1978.

There was something inexplicably strange about the closing of Chegato in that the local people turned against the mission which had existed in their midst for thirty years. The destruction and looting of the mission by the local people was thorough. Much of this was witnessed by teacher Chinyoka, who had gone away for the weekend and came back on Sunday as the people were helping themselves to the mission property.

He says that as he approached the school on Sunday he met a lot of pupils running away from the school, who told him the mission had been closed the previous night. "I drove into the school," he says, "and it was chaotic. There was a lot of plundering and looting. The povo were collecting all that they could lift. They were taking beds, even pupils (personal) trunks, boxes, (school) chairs, anything they could get hold of and lift. It was serious. And do you know what they were saying? We take that which does not belong to anybody (*zvisina mwene*). You would find some who were carrying bags of mealie meal, chairs, beds, boxes, and at some point I found a lady who was carrying a big bottle from the laboratory which was full of preserved snakes... I then saw people

fighting over the spoils. Some would move the things from the school, dump them outside the fence and then rush back to fetch some more. But then those outside the fence would loot the things already looted by others, and then fights would start between the stage one looters and the stage two looters. It was dramatic and confused. Some were removing doors, window frames, etc. The noise of the looters and of things breaking was simply deafening."⁴⁷

Chinyoka experienced the povo's wrath against the mission in a personal way. When he got into the school he discovered that it was only his family and the Revd Musekiwa, who had not run away. All the other staff members had left. That night they tried to sleep in their house, but the povo came and started throwing stones at the house and breaking the windows. After a few minutes the same crowd moved over to the Revd Musekiwa and did the same thing. Chinyoka says he peeped through the window and was able to recognise several people whom he had known and had worked at Chegato. Yet they were as furious against him and the school as anyone else. The Chinyokas managed to take as much of their belongings as they could and slipped off to have a night's sleep with friends outside the mission. When they came to the house the following morning it had been broken into and "taps had been opened and left running; some had excreted in the house."⁴⁸ The latter was the most extreme demonstration of hatred.

After looting all the moveable property, the people started removing corrugated iron from the roofs and the rafters, window frames, doors and door frames. For purposes of stealing these things, families agreed to divide the buildings among themselves. Some even chose the church building but with unfortunate results. One teacher from Chingechuru tried to steal the roofing of the church and fell, fracturing himself badly, and nobody tried the same thing again. But the heavy church mukwa benches were sawn into two or three pieces and carried away so that today they can be seen at beer drinking places, serving as seats for customers, around Chegato. It was indeed a sad ending of Chegato mission. As Chinyoka put it, "Chegato took years to build. But it was levelled to the ground in a matter of a couple months."⁴⁹ It will be possible to draw general conclusions at the end of the chapter, such as why some missions were destroyed and others not, and why some were destroyed instantaneously and why others took long to be destroyed. But even at this point it is possible to indicate some of the features which made Chegato unique among all the missions and therefore vulnerable to attacks by the surrounding villagers.

To start with, all the E.L.C.Z. central mission stations combined evangelism, formal education and medical healing. The last service entrenched and endeared the mission in the hearts of the local community in that it was rendered to everybody, irrespective of their religious affiliation. Chegato did not have a hospital and only had a boarding school for J.C. and 'O' level students, who were drawn from all over Mberengwa, Beit Bridge, and Gwanda, with only an insignificant minority coming from chiefs Mposi and Mapiravana, the two chiefdoms in which the mission is situated and should serve. The parents of these few students together with the practising christians, who always in any chiefdom formed a minority group, were unable to prevail over their fellow men who wanted to enrich themselves from the mission property.

The teachers, the headmaster and the pastor did not help the situation, when they decided to make their contribution to the war effort as a separate group from the rest of the people. The situation was made worse by the fact that buses, which before the war carried goods to the rural areas, were stopped. That meant that such supplies as bread, sugar, tea, clear beer, and cold drinks were in short supply. But because the teachers went to town in their own cars to purchase supplies for the comrades, they were able to obtain the things which the povo could not. In fact the Chegato teachers never ran short of beers and they became the envy of the ordinary people. As Chinyoka again puts it, "the povo saw us as a bourgeois type of grouping", and therefore disliked them and their school.⁵⁰ In short, Chegato Mission appeared like an alien institution which served very little purpose to the Mapiravana and Mposi communities, and the teachers' attitudes and behaviour in the war only helped to underline that feature in the minds of the people, who took the first opportunity to destroy it.

Mnene and Musume, to which we must now turn, present a slightly different picture in that they were not destroyed and they remained open throughout the war. But from the point of view of supporting the war the two missions behaved just like the others we have considered. They were fully committed to the struggle.

d) Perseverance at Mnene

Mnene's initiation into the war, unlike that of Masase and Chegato, was violent. Chapungu Chehondo whom we met last in the dramatic event at Chegato and who will again feature at Musume introduced the war at

Mnene. He appeared at church one early Saturday morning in April 1977 and began to address the people he found there. In a very short time the gathering had grown into a large crowd and was heartily singing Chimurenga songs and shouting political slogans, led by the handsome brown boy, wearing a broad brimmed hat written ZANU all over it. After some time Chapungu asked the gathering to make a collection of money for him which was done and it amounted to \$30.30. He then went to make a telephone call at the hospital and did that in the presence of the gathering. He called the District Commissioners' office at Mberengwa and challenged the Rhodesian troops to come to Mnene right away for a fight with him.⁵¹

Rhodesian soldiers took a long time to come and when they did they found Chapungu burning a Bata Shoe Co. delivery truck by the former Bishop's house, but were simply too frightened to go and challenge him. They left him alone until he had finished destroying the truck and had disappeared to Chegato where they pursued him and later, as we have seen, killed him in a students' hostel.⁵² When Chapungu was taunting the Rhodesian soldiers and burning the Bata Shoe Co. property, the Mnene people were of course gripped with the fear of a possible battle in the mission. In the event that did not happen. But the war situation was brought into their midst in an even more horrible and inhuman manner when the Rhodesian soldiers brought Chapungu's decomposing corpse all the way from Chegato and forced everybody at Mnene to come and view it.

A month later, on 18 May 1977, Mnene Mission sustained another rocking shock when their medical doctor, Mushori Zhou, was murdered by the Rhodesian terrorists, the Selous Scouts, in cold blood. Mushori Zhou became a marked man among the Rhodesians because he supplied medicines to freedom fighters, treated people who were injured by Rhodesian soldiers, and travelled all over Mberengwa on his medical visits to the different E.L.C.Z. mission hospitals unescorted and without running into a guerrilla ambush or land mine, so that it was said he worked with the freedom fighters. On the night he was killed, two Rhodesian terrorists sneaked to his house at 8.30 p.m. They pretended to be guerrillas who had come for his medical assistance. "The wife says that his killers came and knocked at his door saying, Doctor, Doctor come out, we have a list of things which we want you to supply us with, we are the Comrades!"⁵³

His wife pleaded with him not to go out of the house, but he said he could not turn down a request from the boys. As soon as he opened the door, one Rhodesian terrorist grabbed him, pulled him away from the door and then shot him three times through the heart." "Then early in the morning," says Mapolisa, "a convoy of army trucks went past here (his shop) going to the Hospital. The soldiers said, 'Your doctor has been killed, we always told you that terrorists (guerrillas) are murderers, look now they have killed your doctor. You call them comrades, look now they have killed your doctor, what are you going to do!'"⁵⁴

The killing of Mushori Zhou in such a way that it would appear as if the comrades had done it was designed to shock the people of Mberengwa, who depended on Zhou, out of their support for the freedom fighters. Unfortunately the plan did not work because the murder was so plainly out of tune with the manner in which the guerrillas executed the people they branded as sellouts. Guerrillas never killed sellouts in a sneaky, cowardly fashion. Instead, an accused was arrested and brought before a large gathering of the local villagers; a charge was put before him and he was sometimes tortured to force a confession out of him or he was simply shot after he had been given a chance to admit or deny the charge. Justice there was none in the comrades' court, but the punishment of execution was public never in hiding. The idea was that the punishment should serve as an object lesson to other possible sellouts.

In the case of Mushori Zhou, very few people if any at all, in the whole of Mberengwa were deceived by the Rhodesian terrorists. Moreover, the Rhodesians calculated that since Mushori Zhou was the only black Lutheran doctor, servicing Musume, Mnene and Masase, his removal would lead to the closure of all those hospitals and thereby not only deprive the comrades of any source of medical supplies in the district, but also turn the population, which would have no hospitals, against the freedom fighters whose presence they would see as the cause of their predicament. In the event, neither were the people turned against the freedom fighters, nor were the three hospitals closed down in 1977. Mnene hospital continued to function under Sr Cecilia Guramatunhu, a dedicated and courageous woman originally from Rusape.

After these initial shocks the Mnene community adjusted admirably well to the war situation and proceeded to play its part in the people's war effort effectively. In the forefront for the mission were Sr Guramatunhu herself; Mr Philip Mapolisa, an old resident of the Mission and now a businessman, owning a grocery shop next to the hospital; Mr Benanda Marufu, the headmaster of the Primary School; the Revd A.Z. Gambiza,

the pastor in charge of the mission; and the Revd.M. Moyo, the then Dean of the Eastern Deanery.

Once guerrillas established bases around the mission and began to make demands for clothing, pocket money and other necessities, these people came together and decided to set up a war fund. Sr Guramatunhu was chosen the treasurer and chairlady of the whole mission. Everybody who was employed - the nurses, teachers, business people, the ministers of religion, and others - paid \$8.00 per month to the war fund, while those who earned low wages paid \$1.00 per month. At the same time, the hospital and the school opened separate accounts at Mapolisa's shop, so that if they got requests from the comrades in the middle of the month when they were short of cash they would get the necessary goods. In fact at the end of the war the Primary School was able to settle its accounts but the hospital was not able to pay off a debt of \$300.00 which Mr Mapolisa has since written off.⁵⁵ Mr Mapolisa too became handy in that his licence was used to order goods as if they were for his shop, when in actual fact they were destined for the comrades.

Mnene, unlike the other E.L.C.Z. Mission centres, is located on a mission farm which does not have ordinary villagers, except mission workers. Whereas at Masase and Chegato the cooking of food for the comrades was left to the surrounding villagers, at Mnene that task fell squarely on the mission workers themselves. At first people tried to cook individually, but it was found that they had little time to do so since they were employed full time. Sr Guramatunhu decided that the comrades should be fed on the hospital food. "I instructed the cooks," she says, "to prepare enough food for the patients and a little more for the boys as well. Or if the boys came after hospital meal times, we simply used the hospital cooking facilities, mealie meal, meat and vegetables to prepare their meals."⁵⁶ Tea, bread, biscuits and cold drinks were supplied by Mr Mapolisa.

Mnene played a vital role in the supply of medicines to the freedom fighters. The mission is situated in such a manner that for miles there was no other place where medicines could be obtained, except at Mnene hospital. The next hospitals should have been Musume and Masase but both these hospitals depended for their drugs on Mnene, where there was the only medical doctor who could order them from Salisbury. When Mushori Zhou was killed and his assistant, Dr Charles Tichivangana ran away, the Government Medical Officer at Mberengwa, Dr Scot, volunteered to pay medical visits weekly to Mnene.

The hospital was therefore able to continue to receive drugs from

Salisbury using Dr Scot's signature. Indeed, totally unknown to Dr Scot, the Mnene leaders, under Sr Guramatunhu, approached the ZANLA forces and obtained from them an undertaking that they would never lay land mines in the Mberengwa-Mnene road on the days Dr Scot visited Mnene nor attack his vehicle. With the arrangement, the ZANLA forces operating in the chiefdoms of Mataruse, Mazivofa, Mposi, even Mataka, Chingoma and Nyamondo were able to get their medicines from Mnene and at times the latter had sufficient drugs to spare for Musume where again the freedom fighters could get them. But towards the end of the war the Muzorewa-Smith forces suspected Dr Scot to be working hand in hand with the guerrillas, and so harassed him that he left Mberengwa, and Mnene had to limp along with whatever drugs still remained in the store.⁷⁵

The rapport between the comrades and Mnene Mission was indeed amazing and Mr Mapolisa says that it was established right from the beginning when the ZANLA forces first came to operate in the area. Mapolisa says that one day a group of ZANLA came wanting to close down the mission and the hospital in particular and he was called as the oldest resident to go and reason with them. "I said," Mapolisa remembers, "look my children, this hospital is now ours, the whites (the Swedes) built this mission but they have returned to their homes. When you destroy or close this hospital you should always remember that the patients here are not white people, but your own mothers, your sisters, even us your grandfathers, we are treated right here. So if you destroy the hospital you will not be punishing any white person because there is no white man who benefits from its presence, but your own people... Moreover when you come as far as this place with so many people as you can see around - you increase your chances of being betrayed by the people to the enemy. If you want anything you don't have to come into the mission premises - you simply have to send messages of letters by mujibas. If you come into the mission, soon after you go the soldiers will follow ... and beat us and torture us, wanting us to reveal your whereabouts. In the end you will blame us for selling you to the enemy, forgetting that when you come to the hospital you are exposing yourselves to the agents of the enemy such as the police, chiefs' messengers, C.I.D. officers, all of whom are treated in this hospital."⁵⁸ Apparently after that reasoning, the comrades never again came in the day time, but at night and only to Sr Guramatunhu's house to collect their money and medical supplies, or better still, dealt with the mission through the mujibas. But of course the mission people were required to attend the political meetings at the bases at night.

The comrades so valued their relationship with Mnene Mission that

they avoided embarrassing the latter as the following arrangement shows. Soon the Muzorewa-Smith soldiers required that any visits to Mnene by freedom fighters should be reported to Mberengwa police station. Sr Guramatunhu and Dean Moyo went to consult the freedom fighters on the issue without the knowledge of the Rhodesians. The comrades allowed the mission authorities to report their presence two hours after their departure - by which time they said they would be very far from Mnene. The arrangement worked well and Dean Moyo and Sr Guramatunhu even improved on it by pretending to the Rhodesians to be loyal but frightened citizens.

"We went back to the soldiers," Sr Guramatunhu tells us, "and said, now look, if we are seen reporting the presence of the comrades by people we shall be branded sellouts and be killed. So how can we report without being noticed? The soldiers said write letters and don't append your signatures. That suited us quite well because it took such a long time to send a letter from Mnene to Mberengwa even by messenger." Later the soldiers changed the mode of reporting to one in which both Dean Moyo and Sr Guramatunhu were required to keep diaries of the visits of the comrades. Again the two informed the guerrillas about it, and also deliberately kept inaccurate and misleading diaries.⁵⁹

Indeed Mnene Mission was so committed to the people's war that after the initial reasoning with Mapolisa, it never again received adverse interference from the boys. The only threats came from the Rhodesians who naturally suspected or were told by informers that the mission supported the liberation forces. Mr Mapolisa, who was one of the leading spirits in the war policy of the mission, whose grocery shop played such a vital role in obtaining supplies for the freedom fighters, and who drove mission vehicles to go and fetch medicines and other supplies from Zvishavane, was arrested and detained twice. At one time he was taken to the Zvishavane Four Miles, the notorious Rhodesian torture camp where many people went and never returned alive.⁶⁰ One day the Rhodesian soldiers came hunting for Sr Guramatunhu, saying they wanted to shoot her because she supplied medicines to the comrades. She escaped to Bulawayo just in time, being rushed off by Dean Moyo.⁶¹

Mnene remained open until the end of the war. Clearly, having started off badly with the murder of its doctor, the mission employed every possible ingenuity to avoid closure by the Smith security forces. Besides its leaders, Sr Guramatunhu, Mapolisa and Dean Moyo decided quite early on how to continue Dr Mushori Zhou's policy of putting the mission solidly behind the forces of liberation so that there was no

question of it being closed down by guerrillas. In that way the war history of Mnene was quite different from that of Masase and Chegato, which were shut, but was similar to that of Musume to the south of it.

e) Advanced War at Musume

Musume Mission services a large area consisting of the following chieftaincies: Chingoma, Negove, Mataka, Ngungumbane, Nyamondo, Makuwerere, Mketi, and Mazetese. Just before the war the area was marked by some fairly intense mining activities, centred on the rich chrome ores at Nyala and Rhonda. Right from 1976, when ZANLA forces intensified the war they aimed at knocking out the mining economy in the area and at controlling the populous chiefdoms so that they could serve as a springboard for a quick advance into the West Nicholson, Bulawayo, Zvishavane urban complex. Consequently the area became highly contested between the liberation forces and the Rhodesia forces. By 1976 freedom fighters lodged themselves in Nyamondo and Ngungumbane and fought hard to entrench themselves so that by 1977, only heavily armed soldiers could enter the area, while the rest of the colonial agencies such as those of the Veterinary Department, the Ministry of Agriculture and of Internal Affairs had been completely routed. The same applied to the other surrounding chiefdoms. Both the Rhonda and Nyala mines were effectively brought to an end in 1977, so that Nyala was converted into a Rhodesian military camp. By the end of 1978 most of the chiefdoms were effectively ZANLA liberated zones. A different administrative and legal structure replaced the colonial one. The headmen and chiefs who had been used by the colonial administration, were replaced by the cell, base, and overall chairmen, who in many cases were personalities elected by the people and approved by the ZANLA command system. Those were the people who effectively wielded power in the Nyamondo - Chingoma - Mketi - Negove - Mataka complex of chiefdoms by the end of 1978.⁶² Rhodesians furiously refused to admit the ZANLA take over of the area, and tried to register their presence in the areas by conducting regular sorties from Nyala camp into neighbouring villages to capture civilians for torture; by launching air bombing raids on the known ZANLA bases, and engaging in many other acts of intimidation on the civilian population. Musume Mission strove hard to survive in that situation.

One man who was closely involved in the fortunes of Musume from the beginning of 1978 to the end of the war was Mr Kenny Nyati, who

became headmaster of the Secondary School and later at independence was appointed High Commissioner to Zambia. Nyati inherited the excellent relations with guerrillas which had been built by Mr Ephraim Maposa, the former headmaster of the school who was forced to resign in 1977 by the pressure of the security forces who wanted to stop his collaborating with guerrillas.

The first encounter with guerrillas came about when the legendary Chapungu was at the beginning of his career in Mberengwa in 1976 and when he was operating with a group living in Nyamondo which wanted to cripple the chrome mining operations. One day Chapungu dropped off from a bus carrying an extraordinarily heavy trunk and looking for a place to put up for the night. He claimed to have come all the way from Banket, the farming area well beyond Harare. He did not mind, he said, sleeping with the students in their hostel. Mr Maposa prepared a room for him in his own house and got students to help him to carry his heavy trunk to the room.

The following morning Chapungu had vanished. But at 9 a.m. there was a huge explosion on the road from the Nyala Mine to the Ngungumbane railway station where the chrome was loaded into the railway trucks destined for the seaports for export. The explosion was caused by one of the big transport carriers loaded with chrome, which had detonated a landmine and was therefore shattered to pieces. That was the first landmine in Mberengwa which signalled the start of the war in the district. The one man who was immediately suspected to have some knowledge or connection with the explosion was headmaster Maposa so that the police came round to his house to question him briefly and left.⁶³

The next incident involved the guerrillas actually coming to the Musume Hospital at night heavily armed and called the pastor, the Rev S.C. Ndlovu, the acting nursing sister in charge and the whole nursing staff. They lectured them on the purpose of the war and commanded them never to report the incident. A few days later both the pastor and the nurse in charge were picked up by the police for failing to report the visit of the guerrillas. At a subsequent trial the nurse was discharged on a point of technicality but the pastor was found guilty and sentenced to four years' imprisonment with hard labour. The point to observe here is that Ndlovu, like the other pastors we have already met, was prepared to risk his life at the hands of the security forces in support of the struggle. Indeed later, when the guerrillas noticed the commitment of Musume church workers

to the struggle they came to apologise for jeopardising the security of the hospital, its pastor and workers, especially since they needed the services of the hospital.

The next visit of the guerrillas was to the Secondary School where they were met with an enthusiastic reception from the headmaster and his pupils. The freedom fighters came at night and asked the headmaster to gather his pupils for a rally in the school. "I was quite enthusiastic to gather my pupils," Maposa says, "and in no time I had assembled them in that old football pitch of the mission. The freedom fighters started singing and lecturing. Everybody was happy to have the freedom fighters around. When they had finished we made a collection and gave them money." The freedom fighters had also discovered that they were risking the lives of their supporters if they disallowed them to report their visits to the Rhodesian soldiers. The headmaster was therefore not only allowed to report the visit the following morning but he was given a note which confirmed the incident. "Well in the letter the freedom fighters were scolding the Rhodesian security forces. They said that they were going to fix the Rhodesian forces and to drive them away from their Nyala camp".⁶⁴

The Rhodesians were suspicious of the relationship between the headmaster and the guerrillas but had no concrete evidence on which to nail him. But the freedom fighters came again for a rally with the students and the headmaster again reported. The involvement of the mission soon went further when Chapungu suddenly broke away from the main group and decided to operate alone. He came to the school and took the science school teacher and a couple of pupils who were only too pleased to participate in the war by carrying out an act of sabotage. They went and blew up the only bridge which connected the Mine to the railway. After that events happened rapidly and the Security people began to close in on the headmaster. Six of his pupils left the school to go and join the struggle in Mozambique and it was said Maposa had incited them to go. He was taken in for a whole day's interrogation.

Maposa felt even more insecure then when Chapungu's decomposing corpse, after being displayed all over the district was finally brought to Musume with the intention of dumping it in his house. He was saved from the terrible experience of having to live with a dead and decomposing person by some timely explosion, when a soldiers' car hit a landmine nearby. In their confusion to go and help their colleagues they dumped

Chapungu's body in one of the headman's bedrooms and he was not allowed to bury it. It was only after the local chief had pleaded with the District Commissioner that permission to bury Chapungu was secured and he was buried near Chamakudo School, a few kms from Musume Mission. Maposa could not continue any longer at the school because of fear of being killed, especially after the Selous Scouts had murdered Dr Zhou. He resigned and went to work in Zvishavane.⁶⁵

The foundations for lasting co-operation between Musume and the freedom fighters were laid. The freedom fighters collected medicines from the hospital almost on a weekly basis. The students and teachers attended political meetings both in the school and in the nearby hills. Moreover once the freedom fighters allowed the people to report their visit each time after they had left a place to the soldiers people were not afraid to interact with them. Those were the sound relations inherited by the equally skilful new headmaster Nyati in 1978. Nyati came from Chegato Secondary School, and he says that he was immediately struck by the contrast between Musume and Chegato when he got to the former place. At Musume, he says the war had reached an advanced stage, in terms of intensity and many pitched battles had already been fought in neighbouring hills. But the school, the hospital and the church at Musume all appeared quiet and normal amidst ferocious fighting.⁶⁶

At the beginning of 1978 the road between Mnene and Musume was closed. It was the only route used to transport mealie meal and other food items for the school from Zvishavane. The Rhodesian soldiers at Nyala got their supplies by air, which facility the school did not have. "We asked for permission to let the lorry carrying our mealie meal pass through. We sent school boys in all the directions in the bush to go and get permission from the guerrillas for our lorry to be allowed to pass through with our supplies. No permission was forthcoming. We became quite desperate. One of the guerrillas visited us and said, 'Well why don't you use donkey carts to go and fetch your mealie meal.'⁶⁷ That became the way out for the school. They hired people on a permanent basis to cart food and other supplies first from Masvingo Mission where they were delivered by lorries, and later, when the Rhodesian forces took over Masvingo, from Ngungumbane railway station. The school supply system soon became indispensable to the freedom fighters. "And we had this tuckshop in the school" Nyati tells us, "where we put all the items like bread and so on. And that tuckshop was the only contact which the guerrillas had with a

shop, right from Mozambique. All the rest of the shops had closed down. So they did their shopping at our tuckshop from as far away as forty miles. Some of them needed shoes, etc. And they ordered these things from town through us. So we became a necessity to them. We were able to order them clothes, etc. from Zvishavane. We could pass through road blocks, because our transporters went around with school letters stamped Government Service. Once the soldiers manning the road blocks saw such envelopes - they simply let the bearers pass without searching them. So we became quite vital in obtaining necessary supplies for the guerrilla side."⁶⁹ Because of its importance, the guerrillas never interfered with the donkey cart supply route to Ngungumbane, so that the school was guaranteed food supplies and therefore survival.

From the end of 1978, however, there were many problems rising out of the situation which threatened to terminate the life of the mission. Just before 'O' level examinations sixteen students left the school to go and join ZANLA forces. Government regulations required that the headmaster must report immediately such departure by students giving reasons for the students' failure to sit their examinations. That happened at the same time as Mr Nyati also received call-up forms requiring him to report any teachers and pupils who were eligible for the Rhodesia military services. All this put Mr Nyati in a difficult position, since whatever decision he took he was going to offend either the Rhodesians or the liberation forces. In the end he decided to offend the Rhodesians; on the examination schedule he marked 'absent' against the names of the pupils who had gone to join the war and gave no reason; and he ignored the call for information concerning the people for call-ups. Fortunately nothing happened from the Rhodesian side.

The next problem involved the cutting off of the electricity to the Musume Mission, when some people in Rusvinge cut down electric poles as part of hitting at the enemy's economic installations. The school and the hospital had to hire donkey carts on a permanent basis to collect firewood for cooking and fetch water from the river, since the water pump which was electric driven had stopped. The pupils did their bathing and laundry at the river, and were each encouraged to bring some water in a bottle or any container for washing their faces in the mornings.

The Muzorewa-Smith agreement also affected Musume Mission badly, in that the regime made its peace overtures to the freedom fighters through the mission, and the povo as well as the guerrillas interpreted the

use of the mission as an indication of its authorities' collaboration with the enemy. The headmaster was given a letter to send to the guerrillas, which invited the latter to come to Nyala for peace talks. The Rhodesian commander who brought the letter also hoisted a white flag on the church tower as a sign of the Rhodesians' desire for peace with the guerrillas. The guerrillas, through their *mujibas* made their attitude clear, particularly to headmaster Nyati. They strongly disapproved of his apparent flirtation with the enemy. In mitigation Nyati pleaded that he was powerless to prevent the Rhodesians from coming into the school to address the pupils. Besides he pointed out that whenever the Rhodesians came into the school he made a full report of their business to the comrades, but did not do so to the enemy, whenever guerrillas visited the school. "One night unknown to me," Nyati says, "the *mujibas* came, gathered everybody, including teachers. At that meeting they denounced me and said I was a *mutengesi*, sellout, because I talked to the white enemies, and so on, so the school must close. Everybody must pack and go away immediately." The pupils left but the teachers remained. What was remarkable was the attitude of the Musume villagers to their mission. Unlike at Chegato, they did not rush to plunder their mission. Instead they cooperated with the headmaster by accepting beds, mattresses and other furniture of the school for safe keeping in their homes, and the buildings were not touched for all the two weeks when the school was temporarily closed.⁷⁰

Meanwhile the headmaster, a few teachers who had not left and a number of *mujibas* were taken for questioning to Nyala by the Rhodesians. During the questioning Nyati pointed out to the Rhodesians that the school had been closed down because of the frequent visits by the army. He impressed upon the Rhodesians that by so doing they were forcing something like 600 pupils to go and join the ranks of the guerrillas and thereby worsening their military problems. That impressed the Rhodesians and they undertook never to visit the school, if Nyati re-opened it. And indeed they kept their word. On the freedom fighters side, headmaster Nyati also received a very important letter from one of the high ranking ZANLA personnel, Willie Deveteve, which simply said, "The school must not close. Keep it going. We are still talking to see who ordered its closure, and how things must be corrected. We also want to know how you will operate."⁷¹ After some hesitation, Nyati announced the re-opening of the school, by posting a notice on the school noticeboard. In two weeks, every student and teacher had come back. He also sent word

to the villagers to bring back the school furniture. "You should have seen the spectacular sight" recalls Nyati, "on the opening day, of furniture on donkey carts to be delivered to the school."⁷² Indeed it was an unparalleled show of trustworthiness by the Musume people.

The re-opening of the school, as indicated in Deveteve's letter, must also be understood in the context of the new ZANU policy concerning what the party by 1978 considered to be their liberated zones. When Mugabe, Simon Muzenda and Didymus Mutasa, Deputy Secretary for Finance, met in Maputo with a Swedish delegation to present their request for the fiscal year 1978/78 on the 26th June 1978, Mugabe stressed the new needs which had arisen as the result of the semi-liberated zones. He pointed out that when the Rhodesians withdrew from the semi-liberated area they withdrew their health services and closed down schools, so that the responsibility for providing and maintaining those facilities immediately fell on ZANU. Mugabe indeed underlined the fact that, "It is ... important that ZANU keeps open most schools in these areas."⁷³ Thus apart from the importance of Musume as a supply point for the guerrillas the mission seems to have been kept open as part of the new ZANU policy of safeguarding the people's educational and health institutions.

The next hurdle for the mission were the Muzorewa elections. There was fear everywhere that people would be compelled to vote in an effort to show the world the acceptability of the Muzorewa-Smith agreement by the people of Zimbabwe. The 600 students, the teachers and general workers were a ready target for Muzorewa to be driven en masse to the voting booths in order to swell the turn-out figures. Nyati decided to close the school a week before the end of term, so that when the election date came the pupils were away in their homes. He told his pupils that if they were asked why they had closed the school early they should say the school had difficulties with its water supplies. Freedom fighters were delighted about Nyati's trick and indeed visited him to express their sincere pleasure at his contribution to the struggle. Meanwhile the students joined their parents who slept in the hills in order to avoid being forced to go and vote.⁷⁴

When the school re-opened the following term Nyati had a chance to cement further the school's good relations with the freedom fighters and to impress them that the mission was solidly behind the liberation struggle. He was introduced to the commanders of the freedom fighters by the businessman at Remiti, Mr Kenny Mabhena, who had been in

touch with them since their first invasion of Nyamondo and Ngungumbane. In due course Nyati got to know that the school's vital role in the people's war had become acknowledged by the party officials in Maputo. Indeed one day a senior guerrilla called Chakanyuka was sent to come and tell the mujibas and the surrounding community that Musume Mission should never be shut without the authority of ZANU. This was followed by the appointment of Binga Guru, as area commander, who grew to be liked by the whole mission, and under him the mission was able to play its role of supplying clothing, medicines, tea, bread and other things which required immediate cash and which the villagers could not supply effectively and efficiently, until the end of the war.⁷⁵

It is clear that Musume Mission survived the war through the sheer will power of its people to go on in the face of big odds; it survived because of the surrounding people who loved their institution and came in to help when the fortunes of the school were at their lowest ebb; it survived because the ZANLA forces wanted it to do so especially from 1978 since it had a vital role to play as a source of essential supplies to the freedom fighters; it survived, above all, because of the astuteness and adroitness of its able leader, Kenny Nyati, who put it and its resources behind the liberation forces and at the same time managed to extract large concessions from the crumbling, but still vicious, Muzorewa regime.

f) Interactions with ZAPU

Before concluding this chapter it is necessary to look at an additional dimension of the Church's interaction with the liberation movement in the Eastern Deanery. As was in the case of the west both movements were involved although in Mberengwa ZANLA had the upper hand. However ZAPU launched extensive recruitment drives which also affected the Eastern Deanery.

After the abduction of Manama pupils ZAPU's recruitment drives in the first place concentrated on school leavers. But senior students who got wind of the programme also went voluntarily to join.

The programme was so successful and conducted with such an amount of boldness that a guerrilla preliminary training base was set up not far from the Rhodesian military base at Rhonda Chrome Mine. It is therefore worthwhile to look closely at how the programme was conducted and it is possible to do so through the experiences of the three Bhebe Brothers who were recruited from Masase in 1977.

This group was recruited through the ZAPU Namande base (see Map 2) in the Maranda communal area, which was under the command of Timothy Dube *alias* Committee Dube, most likely the Bob II who led the abduction of the Manama pupils.⁷⁶ Towards the end of 1976 and the beginning of 1977 Dube seems to have been roaming the whole area between Manama and Chegato and therefore covering also such schools and Lutheran congregations as Mavorovondo, Chingechuru, Nyororo, etc. all the time talking to students and school leavers, trying to persuade them to join the ZIPRA. He also established a working relationship with the Jeka Government Clinic so that it provided the medical needs of the Namande base. His recruitment route left Namande in Maranda Communal area and went through the Tawla Mountain range, Siyoka Communal area and Dendele Communal area to Hwali. At Hwali he would decide to cross the Shashi river either through the Shashi mission and head straight for Bobonong or through Rustler's George and then go through Kobojango. The former route must have been more popular before the collapse of the Shashi mission towards the end of 1977. Throughout most of the communal areas through which the recruits were taken there were ZAPU officials who organised their feeding.⁷⁷

It is indeed fascinating to follow in some detail how two of the Bhebe Brothers were recruited by Dube from Masase mission.⁷⁸ Combatant No. 2 completed his 'O' level in 1976 at Masase Secondary School and even before he left the school he had started having some inclinations towards the liberation struggle. Towards the end of the year he and other male students, influenced by Radio Maputo and Lusaka, which beamed a lot of propaganda relating to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, started a secret discussion group. The prominent members of the group were Combatant No. 2 himself, his cousin Bhekinkosi Masaisai, who came from Musume Mission, Lineck Wabatagore and Thomas Shumba. They held regular secret meetings at night and discussed what they called "the Wind of change which was blowing across Africa".⁷⁹

"At the time", confesses Combatant No. 2, "we did not understand what we were talking about but it later had far reaching effects."⁸⁰ The secret discussions together with the raging war in the country by September 1976 were beginning to influence him to make up his mind to abandon schooling for the liberation struggle but the whole idea was nipped in the bud when the headmaster Isaac Moyo discovered it and used his influence as one connected well with the boy's parents to dissuade him from

carrying out his resolution. But by the beginning of 1977 the ZANLA forces were operating fully in the Masase area and holding regular nightly political meetings at the same time as Dube was also actively moving around recruiting for the ZIPRA.

These pressures were happening when Combatant No. 2 was planning what to do after Form IV in the context of unemployment and the threats to be drafted in the Rhodesian army. In February he became thoroughly restive; he either had to get something useful to do or else leave home for Zambia to train as a guerrilla. As all this turmoil was tormenting his mind his cousin Combatant No. 3 disappeared. That immediately helped to crystallise his resolution and he went off looking for Dube in the Mkwabene and Chipambire hills and found the veteran recruiter in the Vubwe Mountain. Dube tested the boy's resolution and sincerity by "asking whether I did not think that I could employ my Form IV in a more profitable manner than by going to join the war. I told him that I had seriously considered my future and life prospects in the country and found that they were bleak and that the liberation struggle offered a better occupation." After that Dube took him to the other recruits where he found that one of the four recruits was his cousin Combatant No.3.⁸¹

Combatant No. 3 left for slightly different reasons from those of Combatant No. 2, even though they were related to the pressures from the Rhodesian security forces and the Manama abduction when his brother Combatant No. 1 left for Botswana with the other students on the 30 January 1977. Since Combatant No. 3's his father was a pastor of the Lutheran Church and of long standing it was not difficult for him, on his father's plea, to be transferred from Manama to Masase Secondary School. Thus he was among the Masase students who were collected for pungwe by ZANLA on the night of February 23, 1977 and had their first political education.⁸² After that the story is best told by Combatant No. 3 himself:

The following morning white soldiers came and I was called to the Principal's office to go and explain in writing how I had left Manama Secondary School. Secondly I had to explain how the Manama students had left. Then I had to complete a National Service Training Form so that I could go to Harare for military training. I refused to write down the information and even protested that I had no idea as to how the Manama fellows had left because they had done so when I was absent.

So I ran away from school and spent the whole day at home and came back in the evening... When I went to sleep... I saw a friend of mine Sidney. I confided in him that I might be collected any time by the soldiers.

On Sunday in the morning I informed the Boarding Master that I was going to teach Sunday school. We went with Sidney and met one of our friends Narius who informed us that Timothy Dube was around and he was prepared to go to Chipambire and that he too was going to depart with him. I had never seen Timothy Dube before but I had heard about him and his activities and even where he used to stay when he was recruiting in the area. He used to stay at Kefas' place. So I indicated that I was interested in contacting him and that he should take me to him straight away, because I must escape from the Rhodesian soldiers. But before we left home we wrote a small note to inform cousin Combatant No. 2 that we had gone to join the boys. So when we left it was myself, Sidney and Narius Philip. When we got to Chipambire we found Dube and also the only female recruit Trenner. When we got to Dube I was still in my complete school uniform. Dube showed concern that we as school children wanted to join the war. We insisted on being taken. So he agreed... when we were still there cousin Combatant No. 2 joined us and told us that he had got our note.⁸³

From Chipambire the recruits were taken to Mt. Namande where they stayed for almost a month waiting for further recruits. Some recruits were brought in from Bulawayo and Salisbury, but the vast majority were brought from the Lutheran parishes of Mavoronondo, Masase and Chegato. By the time they left the Namande base they were forty of them. The food and blankets were supplied by the local villagers. The local people had been mobilized not only for seeing to the comfort of the recruits but also for intelligence service. The youth in particular were so vigilant that no stranger or enemy came near the base without being detected and reported to the commanding officers. Just before the recruits left more reinforcements arrived from Zambia to protect the base. To make sure that the recruits would be fit for the long march to Kobojango where they would be carried by the Botswana Defence Force they were

subjected to physical exercises. "Every morning we would wake up at about 4.30 a.m. and do trotting as well as other physical exercises up to 7.45 a.m." The exercises were at first conducted in the communal grazing area.

After two or three weeks and when the group had grown large all secrecy was thrown to the wind so that the trotting was conducted through the local villages. For almost a week all security precautions were abandoned and every training exercise was carried out in full view of the villagers. "One of the reasons of course," says Combatant No 2, "was to boost the morale of the villagers who were so keenly supporting us and to impress them with our progress in physical fitness". Moreover when the reinforcements from Zambia arrived they came with the idea of converting the Namande base into a full military training base and actually introduced the recruits to short march, skirmishing, and a bit of judo. Dube, who was absent when all this happened, stopped any advanced training upon his return, insisting that what was necessary was to give the recruits physical fitness and some bit of knowledge of how to survive enemy attacks, such as a bit of tactics, how to take cover, how to stand against a tree, and skirmishing only in so far as it applied to running away from the enemy. After a month the Bhebe Brothers Group was considered to be large enough, to have the necessary physical fitness, and sufficient survival knowledge to undertake the long and dangerous march to Kobojango in Botswana.⁸⁵

From the point of view of the church this group, like many others like it which were drafted from the Lutheran, parishes, represented a serious drainage of the christians which, together with the frequent closure of the primary schools, showed itself in the decline of certain aspects of the church life and work. We have already discussed the relevant church statistics in chapter III.

Moreover the establishment of a ZIPRA training camp in Namande, which was supported by the Maranda communal peasants represented a serious challenge which could not be ignored by the Rhodesian army which had its bases a few kilometres away at Nyala and Rhonda. The Rhodesians resolved to flush out the ZIPRA by undermining their local support through harassment of the villagers and thereby bringing Church life and work in the Mazetese parish to almost a stand still.

As early as April 1977 the pastor of the nearby Mazetese parish chapel reported that the situation in the parish was deteriorating fast and

that it was becoming unsafe to travel long distances because of the war situation.⁸⁶ At the end of the year the pastor said that the work in the parish had been disappointing and discouraging. "There were regular check-ups made by the army and a lot of threats were imposed to make the work hard. The war situation grew very tense that most people left their homes for unknown places. Some unfortunate ones lost their lives before taking any actions, towards helping themselves. This situation went throughout the year, leaving many homes in ruins". No progress could be made in the evangelistic work, the pastor said, because the type of suffering to which people were subjected made them "immune to the Gospel of Salvation." They could not see how the Gospel could pull them out of their predicament. The *vashandiri*'s work which had always been the most aggressive evangelistic arm of the Church was "dying out". Youth work and Sunday Schools had virtually ceased to exist.⁸⁷

The final blow for the Mazetese parish came soon after the Muzorewa-Smith internal agreement, when the white troops were withdrawn from the rural areas to protect the urban white interests. Their place in the Mazetese parish was taken up by Ndabaningi Sithole's auxiliary forces. These attacked the Mazetese parish and could have killed Pastor Adam Hove but for the timely intervention of the ZANLA who mounted a counter offensive and repulsed them. When the pastor ran away the local people destroyed the parish buildings to avoid them being taken over by the auxiliaries and turning them into a torture camp.⁸⁸

III. Concluding Assessments of the Church's Involvement in the War

At this stage it is necessary to pause for a while and make a summary assessment of what the dramatic account of local developments which we have presented in the last two chapters imply in more general terms of religion and politics and Church and War. In the next chapter, we will come back to these concluding reflections, after examining the international dimension of local developments in the Eastern and Western Deanery of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe. At this point we only need to draw attention to the following two points - the reasons for the survival or non-survival of the various missions and the dialectical relationships between the Church's centre and its grassroots.

a) **Why some missions survived and others not**

During the course of this research many people suggested different reasons why some mission centres survived while others did not, and some of the reasons have been confirmed in the discussions of individual centres while others have not, and only the latter will now be discussed.

First, Mr Kenny Nyati gave a tentative broad reason for the closure and non-closure of mission stations, which he said must be confirmed or discounted by further research among the ex-combatants. He says that they discovered that the river Mundi and perhaps the Mwenezi river further down divided two sectors of the war, so that Mnene, Masvingo and Musume missions to the east of Mundi fell under sector II of the liberation war strategy and operations, while Mazetese, Chegato, Masase, Mavorondo and others to the west fell under sector III. The two sectors had different local command systems, which of course were ultimately answerable to the overall ZANLA High Command. The people who operated on the sector II side had different principles, says Nyati, and there were certain things that they did or did not do which were different from those done in Sector III. In Sector III they changed certain things and did certain things which were not done in Sector II. In Sector III they decided to close schools and that decision seemed to have been taken very early in 1978, so that by the beginning of 1979 all the major schools in Sector III were closed down. "I cannot say that this was a policy decision of ZANU High Command," says Nyati, "but the closing of schools developed into a consistent pattern in Sector III." Meanwhile in Sector III, schools operated throughout the war. Some primary school closed down initially but with time they all re-opened. Further differences between the sectors were also observable. People in Sector III played radiograms at the bases or *pungwes*. "Of course it is difficult to say how much of that type of behaviour was consistent with party policy," cautioned Nyati, "because some of the guerrillas, particularly the very advance parties, who easily found themselves tenuously controlled from the top, tended to degenerate a little in discipline." Some of those groups could be seen drinking *tobi* or *tototo*, the highly intoxicating and locally distilled liquor. Such behaviour was unheard of on the Sector II side.⁸⁹ Mr Nyati's overall observation deserves serious attention in that he taught in both sectors - at Chegato and at Musume, while his home at Mavorovondo is in Sector III, next to the Mavorovondo mission outstation and

Masase Mission both of which were closed down and almost razed to the ground.

Mr Nyati's point, however, seems confirmed only by the Chegato situation where evidence is in agreement that the guerrillas ordered the closure of the mission. At Masase, as we have seen, the students and the rest of the mission people had suffered enough tension for too long and simply panicked away from their mission. Guerrillas had nothing to do with the closure of that mission. We may also draw upon evidence from Mazetese, which was in Sector III. That mission station was closed down and razed to the ground. But its predicament was that it found itself trapped between a training and recruiting camp for ZIPRA, Sithole's *Sikuzo-apo* and ZANLA. The mission was therefore in a highly contested spot, where the conflicts of the different forces frightened the people. The *Sikuzo-apo* were in fact destructive and were caught by ZANLA forces in the nick of time before they could murder the pastor of Mazetese, the Revd Adam Hove, and they were repulsed. But the pastor ran away and the mission closed down and was later destroyed by the locals.⁹⁰ The closure of Mazetese does not confirm that the ZANLA forces in Sector III had a policy of closing down mission stations.

It has also been suggested that areas such as Mazetese, Masase and Chingezi, another mission station in Sector III, had mixed Ndebele/Shona linguistic groups and were divided between ZAPU and ZANU. The ZANLA forces, it has been said, had adopted extraordinary tactics, and even violent ones, such as the killing of suspected sellouts and the closure of schools in order to intimidate ZAPU supporters into the ZANU fold.⁹¹

There may be some truth in this. But the situation in Nyamondo and Ngungumbane, where the population is thoroughly mixed does not support this contention at all. The ZANLA forces had no difficulty in penetrating the whole area and even in establishing a base at Chief Mkwanzani, the ruling Ngungumbane's place.⁹² Moreover this view forgets the fact that at the beginning of the war ZAPU had a majority following everywhere in the rural areas, except in Chipinge and a few other places where the leading ZANU politicians, such as Ndabaningi Sithole, Herbert Chitepo, and others actually came from. That means that Mberengwa, Mazetese, Mwenezi, and southern Filabusi, were not any more difficult to win for ZANU than any other districts. What impressed the people and won their hearts for ZANU was that party's war record and

that party's active rural politicisation during the war. This was in fact also confirmed by the way the pastors and teachers in the Western Deanery supported both liberation movements. Secondly, as the Chegato case shows, the special circumstances of the station too were important in deciding its fate. Though ZAPU'S strategy was different from the popular mobilization of ZANU it is evident that the massive recruitment drives of ZAPU and ZIPRA as such were no immediate reasons for the closure of mission centres. Although the abduction of Manama school children severely affected the life of the mission, Manama was not closed down until September 1979 on the initiative of the Rhodesian security forces.

It seems therefore fairly clear that what saved some missions from closure during the war were the determination of their workers to go on against severe odds, the ability of the workers to win the support of freedom fighters through consistent policies of material contributions to the liberation war effort; the ability of the workers to play it as safe as possible with the enemy forces and, especially after 1978, the decision of ZANU to keep open educational and health facilities. There was very little evidence of serious clashes between the teachings of the Church and the aims of the freedom fighters. Where they occurred they were quickly resolved. That happened, for instance, at Masvingo where some guerrillas denounced Christianity, but never at any point prevented the people from going to Church. That mission station only closed down when it was taken over by the Rhodesian forces in August 1979.⁹³ Finally, the E.L.C.Z. missions played a vital role in supporting the war of liberation through medical supplies and through financial and other material contributions. From the point of view of the liberation movements, it seems they were happy and able to co-operate effectively with the Church people and thereby endorsing the official ideological specification of mobilizing all the anti-colonial democratic forces and the settlers' state.

b) Dialectic relationships of the centre and the local level of the Church

Our local accounts further illustrate convincingly another aspect of the Church's involvement in the War. That was the difference in perspectives, experiences and priorities of the central administration of the Church on the one hand and its local base on the other.

It proved to be most unfortunate that by the very location of the Church's headquarters in Bulawayo and the inability of the bishop to visit the rural parishes because of the war situation, the central government of the Church and its administration were rendered extremely remote and cut off from the majority of the Church during the war. Not only that but some of the decisions taken by the Church government and administration concerning church employees who were victims of the war did not only appear cruel in the extreme to those affected but could be seen as if the Church operated in collusion with the Rhodesian government. At this point too it is possible to draw upon the evidence from both the Eastern and Western Deaneries on this issue.

This unfortunate position first surfaced at Masase Hospital when it was temporarily closed in November 1977 for three months. The church treasury decided not to pay the nurses and other workers at the hospital. This led to the Medical Board of the Church to make a recommendation to the Church Council that "the hospital staff both medical and non-medical should be paid full salary for 3 months, if they happen to leave the hospital abruptly due to circumstances beyond their control. For instance what happened at Masase hospital in November, 1977. The Church Council should realise that these people are sacrificing their lives." The staff said that the Church should use the surplus made by the hospital in 1977 to pay them.⁹⁴ The Church council replied that it could not accept the recommendation of the Medical Board because the Government grants from which the Church got the money to pay the hospital staff were not paid for closed hospitals. The Church Council had in fact used the 1977 surplus to cover the short fall in the Masase Electricity and Water Account of Z\$4 131.76.⁹⁵

The Medical Board was most disappointed that the Church Council had not approved its recommendation and pointed out the gross unfairness of using the hospital surplus to pay for Electricity and Water. The Board thought that the wisest and fairest thing to have been done with the money would have been not only to use it for paying their salaries but also "for buying hospital requirements such as linen, medical equipment, utensils, fence for hospital premises, repairing broken doors and window-panes," all of which were broken or stolen when the hospital was not functioning. Furthermore the nurses argued that when the hospital was shut in November the Government grant to pay their salaries to the end of the year had already arrived.⁹⁶ The nurses indeed decided to address

their grievance to the bishop and their letter indicated that they had not only performed their duties well but even when the hospital was shut they had informed the bishop, who had not bothered to come down and see the situation for himself. Their letter stated:

Before the Hospital was closed we requested the Pastor in charge to call the Bishop, so as to make the necessary arrangements [and] that was Tuesday but the Bishop did not come. Wednesday we had to give the keys to the Pastor I/C.

All patients had left; also the sister in charge was with you there in town. To this we did not know what you exactly wanted us to do.

Above all when you asked those who were available to open the Hospital on the 18th January we were ready for work but did not commence since there was no sister. We want to make ourselves clear to you that you know we are all women and did not come to town as all others do when things go wrong. We definitely know this was not the first case in the Church. It has happened to pastors, sisters, nurses and all other or even for no reason.

Our grant came as from July to December. If it is for January the Church could pay from Masase surplus as had been recommended by the Medical Board. Even so you did not think that some of the staff members were off duty when they came back there was no work.

We do not know when people should be given their pay for notice.

We feel you treated us this way because we are not represented in the Church Council. You can call us to explain this case if you are not clear.⁹⁷

The nurses felt they were having a raw deal from an administration which was remote and oblivious of the personal risks they were taking by working in the war zone.

The same thing applied to the teachers. When the Chegato and Masase secondary schools closed down the teaching staff was still charged the December rent for the accommodation which many of them had vacated in the confusion. They therefore asked to be refunded the

rents. The Church Council said that it could not do so and reminded the teachers "that as a result of the confusion all employees in these places did not pay for water and electricity and even food Accounts for the last two or three months of the year."⁹⁸

It must be noted that to impound rents at the source of the salaries because some of the employees were indebted to the Church for certain accounts was not the right way to go about collecting debts from defaulters. The right thing should have been to assess as best as possible what people owed the Church and then asked them to pay that. Otherwise the Church rendered itself open to accusations of arbitrariness.

Even more pathetic was the Church's dismissal of the nurses in the Western Deanery, which was sudden and with very little indication as to what entitlements these people would get after so many years of service. S. Shoko, the Convenor of the Medical Board, was assigned the task of dismissing the nurses and he went about it in the fashion indicated in one of his letters:

The Ministry of Health has as from 1st January 1979 reduced the number of staff for which we have been receiving Government grants and accordingly we have reduced the staff at Manama Hospital.

We regret that we will have to give you notice that your employment with the hospital will cease as from 15 January, 1979.⁹⁹

There was absolutely no indication as to the criteria that were used to choose those who were rendered redundant. Nor was there an attempt to go to Manama to explain the position. The nurses therefore reacted, expressing dissatisfaction with the way they had been dismissed. "We the undernamed nurses hereby notify the Church Council through the Medical Board that we were not satisfied about our dismissal from work for the following reasons:

- (1) We were not given any notice...
- (2) It appears we shall not get any gratuity though we have all worked for more than twenty years in the Church.
- (3) In the letters written to each one of us notifying us to stop work, we have been told that the Ministry of Health says we are over

staffed, yet for all these years when we spoke about salary increases, the Church always told us that we were working directly under the Church.

- (4) We wonder why the Church has dismissed us without giving us even a thank you. Instead paid us half salary as if we had done something wrong. We could be happy if this could be clarified to us.¹⁰⁰

The view of the Medical Board of the Church was also that the nurses involved should be paid their January salaries in full by the Church because it was not their choice to leave employment in the middle of the month. The Church Council refused to do so.¹⁰¹

The Church definitely did have financial difficulties. It could not have raised enough money to pay people without the government subsidies. However it is quite apparent from the grievances of the nurses and teachers that there was not enough communication between the centre and its parishes in the rural areas. Telephones and letters, even in the best of times, are never the best means of effective communication especially where employment disputes are involved. Moreover, the church's apparent willingness and sometimes swiftness (probably without protest) to implement the decisions of the Rhodesian government, whose legitimacy was being challenged and was indeed the whole point at issue, cast the administration of the Church's stand in the war in doubtful light, especially in the eyes of those who were the victims of the Rhodesian war policies. It appeared as if the Church was acquiescing in situations where it could have protested, with a good chance of extracting concessions from the hard-pressed regime which was trying to retain as many friends as possible. In short, the central administration of the Church was not only remote from its people but it appeared from the point of view of those in the war zones to perhaps keep quiet unnecessarily in situations which affected its followers adversely.

Footnotes

1. Shiri, *My First Decade*, p. 151.
2. Interview with Mr Mabunu Hove, Headmaster of Musipani Primary School, April 6, 1987, pp. 7-8.
3. E.L.C.Z.A., Matopo House, J.C. Shiri to J.S. Moyo, April 5, 1977.
4. Rev. J.S. Moyo, Mutuvi Parish, to Shiri, March 12, 1978.
5. E.L.C.Z.A., Matopo House, L. Hungwe, Chingezi, to Treasurer, July 13, 1977.
6. Interview with Rev. Lazarus Hungwe, March 3, 1987.
7. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Mutuvi Parish: Annual Report, 1976.
8. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Mutuvi Parish 1977 Annual Report.
9. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Rev. Vellah to the Bishop, June 24, 1977.
10. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Annual Report of Mavorovondo Parish, 1977, pp. 1-2.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
12. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Chegato Parish Annual Report for 1977.
13. Interview with Rev. Hungwe, pp. 6-7.
14. Interview with Rev. A. Moyo, March 24, 1987, pp. 4-5.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
18. *Ibid.*, p.6; Interview with the Rev. A. Moyo, March 3, 1987, pp.1-2.
19. a Interview with Mr A. Shumba, former Headmaster of Masase Secondary School, now a teacher at Chegato Secondary School, at his house at Chegato, 7.4.87, pp. 1-2; See also Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, p. 179.
20. Interview with Ruwita, pp. 2-3.
21. Interview with Shumba, p. 2.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
24. *Ibid.*, p.3.
25. Interview with Mr Mufaro Mpofo, farm worker, Chiwundura, 4.4.87, p.2.
26. Interview with Shumba, p. 3; Interview with Ruwita, pp. 1-3.
27. Interview with Shumba, pp. 5-12. See also interview with Nyathi, a former student at Masase, in my office, 15.5.87, pp. 4 - 6.
28. See Interview with Emmanuel Ndarega Gumbo, Farm Worker, Chuwundura, 5.4.87.
29. Interview with Shumba, pp. 12-13; Interview with Ruwita, pp. 3-4; Interview with student Nyati, p. 9.
30. Interview with Shumba, pp. 13 - 15.
31. Interview with Ruwita, pp. 7 - 9.
32. Interview with Shumba, p. 16.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20, Interview with Ruwita, pp. 9-13.
34. Interview with Kenny Nyati, pp. 1-2; See also Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, pp. 178-179.
35. Interview with Mr Nelbert M. Chinyoka, headmaster at Mnene Secondary School, former teacher at Chegato, Mberengwa, at his home 6-4-87, pp. 1-2.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6; Interview with Mr G. Gukuta, headmaster of Sabi Secondary School, Zvishavane, at his school, 6-4-87, pp. 13-14; Interview with Kenny Nyati, p.2.
37. Interview with Chinyoka, pp. 3-5.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 3. interview with Nyati, p. 2; Interview with Gukuta, p.1.
39. Interview with Chinyoka, p. 1-2.
40. Interview with Mr Mabunu Hove, headmaster of Musipani Primary School, Zvishavane, at his school, 6-4-87, p.1
41. Shiri, *My First Decade*, p. 110, Interview with Chinyoka, p.8; Interview with Gukuta, p.2.
42. Interview with Kenny Nyati, p.5.

43. Interview with Kenny Nyati, p. 5.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-16; Interview in the Chinyoka, pp. 7-10; Interview with Gukuta, pp. 2-7; Interview with Sr Guramatunhu, Matron of Mnene Hospital, at Ronaldson House, 16-4-87.
45. Interview with Chinyoka, pp. 11-12.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.
48. *Ibid.*, 18-19.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17; Interview with Gukuta, pp. 14-15.
50. Interview with Sr Guramatunhu, pp. 1-3; See a popular version of the same event as given by Gukuta, pp. 2-3. Note that this latter version says the D.C.'s' court was in session and had to be abandoned, which can't be true because it was a Saturday and the D.C.'s court did not sit that day.
51. Interview with Sr Guramatunhu, p.3; Interview with Gukuta pp. 3-4, Interview with Mr Mapolisa, an old worker and tenant at Mnene, at his shop, 7.4.87, pp. 11-13.
52. Interview with Mapolisa, p.6; See also Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, pp. 180-1.
53. Interview with Mapolisa, pp. 6-7.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4; Interview with Sr Guramatunhu, pp. 6-7.
55. Interview with Sr Guramatunhu, p. 12.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.
57. *Ibid.*
58. Interview with Mapolisa, pp. 1-2.
59. Interview with Sr Guramatunhu, pp. 13-14.
60. Interview with Mapolisa, pp. 12-14.
61. Interview with Sr Guramatunhu, p. 14.
62. See interviews with Hove, Gumbo and Mpofo.
63. Interview with Mr Ephraim Maposa, Mandava Secondary School, Zvishavane, June 4, 1987, pp. 2-5.
64. *Ibid.*, p.7.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-21.
66. Interview with Kenny Nyati, pp. 22 and 25; See also Soderstrom, *God Gave Growth*, p. 179.
67. Interview with Kenny Nyati, pp. 25-29.
68. *Ibid.*, pp. 29 - 31, 41 -42.
69. *Ibid.* pp. 42-43.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-36.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
73. S.I.D.A. A, 1.12.1. ZANU, Agreed Minutes svensaka bistanet ZANU, June, 21, 1978; Agreed Minutes of Discussions on Co-operation between the Zimbabwe African National Union, Z.A.N.U. (Patriotic Front) and Sweden, signed Lennart Dafgard and Robert G. Mugabe, June 26, 1978; See also *ZANU Cde Pres. Robert Mugabe Appeals for Humanitarian Assistance for Liberated Areas in Zimbabwe*, Maputo, April 6, 1979.
74. Interview with Nyathi, pp. 43-44.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.
76. Interview with Cele and Moyo; Interview with Rambofeni, p.2; Interview with Bhebe Brothers, p.7; Interview with Nyanga, p.11; Interview with Mabuwa, p.13.
77. Interview with Rambofeni, pp. 2-3; Interview with the Bhebe Brothers, pp.12-14.
78. I interviewed Bhebe Brothers before Unity Accord in Zimbabwe and they were reluctant that I should record their names and I therefore decided to call them Combatant No. 1, Combatant No. 2 and Combatant No. 3.
79. Interview with Bhebe Brothers, pp. 3-7.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*

82. Bhebe, "Evangelical Lutheran Church in zimbabwe", p. 166.
83. Interview with Bhebe Brothers, pp. 14-16.
84. *Ibid.*
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-10, 16-17; see also Interview with Rambofeni, pp. 4-5.
86. E.L.C.Z.A., Matopo House, Rev. C. Gumbo to the Chairman of the Church Council, April 18, 1977.
87. E.L.C.Z.A. Matopo House, Annual Report Mazetese Parish 1977.
88. Bhebe, "The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe", pp. 190-1.
89. E.L.C.Z.A., Matopo House, Annual Report Mazetese Parish 1977.
90. Interview with Revd A. Moyo, in my office, 24.3.87, pp. 11-12; Interview with Mukarakati, Mufaro Mpofo, Tinofa Zhou, Emmanuel Gumbo, as a group, at Chiwundura, 5.4.87, p.3; Interview with Kenny Nyati, pp. 47-49; Shiri, My First Decade, p. 133.
91. Interview with Ruwita, pp. 12-13; and this seems to be the consensus of nearly all my informants, except Mr Mabunu Hove.
92. Interview with Mr Mabunu Hove, p. 16.
93. Interview with Revd A. Moyo, 23.3.87; see also interview with Sr Guramatunhu; and interview with Revd Lazarus Hungwe, in my office, 24.3.87.
94. E.L.C.A., Matopo Hose, Minutes of the E.L.C.R. Medical Board Meeting held at Bulawayo on 30 May 1978.
95. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Minutes of the Meeting of the ELCR Church Council held at Bulawayo 23 - 24 June, 1978.
96. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Minutes of the ELCR Medical Board Meeting held at Bulawayo on 8th August, 1978.
97. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, Mrs G.A. Dube, Mrs F.F.A. Shumba, Mrs E. Moyo, Mrs T.C. Moyo, Mrs M. Moyo, Mrs P.W. Hove, to the Bishop, Masase Hospital, August 7, 1978.
98. E.L.C.A. Matopo House, Minutes of the Meeting of the ELCR Church Council held at Bulawayo 18 May, 1979.
99. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, S. Shoko to Mrs T. Mate, January 4, 1979.
100. E.L.C.A., Matopo House Mrs M. Noko, Mrs A. Silamulela, Mrs R. Madongo, Mrs T. Mlauze, Miss S. Malamane, letter written at Tuli, Bethel School, Gwanda, *n.d.*
101. E.L.C.A., Matopo House, cc91: Minutes of the ELCZ Church Council held on 19th October 1979 at Njube Youth Centre, Bulawayo.

6 Church, Mission and Liberation

Introduction

This chapter looks at the international dimension of the struggle by way of examining the resurgence of the Swedish ecclesiastical and secular co-operation with the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe and the liberation movements, which showed definite signs of sagging after the assassination of Chitepo in 1975 and following the intensification of the war in Zimbabwe in 1976. The death of Chitepo, the attempts to unify the parties under the ANC of Muzorewa and the confusion reigning up to the Geneva conference at the end of 1976 led to the freezing of aid from Sweden. Swedish aid was not restored until 1977 when it was clear that both ZAPU and ZANU had achieved a degree of internal order and were in a position to resume serious fighting. In the meantime with the intensification of the war hurried but quiet arrangements were made to evacuate the CSM missionaries. The trend therefore was one of reducing the CSM's commitments to the Lutheran Church, which, of course, was in line with the growing autonomy of the local church.

The CSM for a long time too could not support the Zimbabwe liberation movements in Zambia and Mozambique because of its policy which prevented it from supporting violence. But the situation changed radically with the abduction of the Manama children. Both the liberation movements, which were anxious to broaden their support among the Swedish public, and the CSM authorities, who wanted to cater for the welfare of the children soon became anxious to explore possibilities of practical and mutual assistance. The CSM soon began to participate in welfare programmes among the refugees in Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique and also to seek assurances that the marxist liberation movements would guarantee freedom of religious worship in a new Zimbabwe. Moreover after the war the CSM's involvement actually

expanded as it was, like other international organisations, drawn into the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war torn Zimbabwe. This chapter explores the broadening of the CSM's intervention among the refugees in the neighbouring countries and in the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe after the war against a background of other expanding Swedish secular assistance to the people of Zimbabwe.

I. Extended Relationships

a) Resumption of SIDA Involvement

SIDA stopped any aid to both ZANU and ZAPU in 1975. In the case of ZANU, of the grant of 872,800 Sw. Crs. already made for the fiscal year 1974/75, 251,300 Sw. Crs. had not yet been transferred to the party when the freeze was imposed. The freezing of the Swedish aid marked the height of the complete disarray in the liberation process of Zimbabwe. ZANU was paralysed by the mass arrests of its military and political leadership in Zambia following the assassination of Chitepo. ZAPU was hamstrung by its alliance with the ANC of Muzorewa, by its leader's continuing negotiations with Ian Smith and, above all, by lack of a viable army. Following the Lusaka Declaration of Unity in December 1974 Nkomo, Muzorewa and Sithole tried to assert their leadership, especially over the ZANU guerrillas in Tanzania and then in the famous *Mgagao Manifesto* signed by ZANLA combatants, they were totally rejected. From there Sithole, after some nasty embarrassments in Zimbabwe, left the country for a wondering exile between Malawi and Uganda, from where he did not come back until in 1977 to join Muzorewa and others in an internal settlement. Meanwhile Nkomo jockeyed with Muzorewa and others for the leadership for the ANC at the same time as he kept talking secretly with Ian Smith until on December 1, 1975 when the two negotiators formally agreed to hold a constitutional conference, which aborted in March 1976 when Ian Smith refused negotiating a process of handing over power to the Africans.

Throughout the rest of 1975 and up to the Geneva Conference in 1976, even though she had frozen the aid, Sweden kept the door open for formal and organised requests of assistance by the Zimbabwe liberation movements. In particular, the Swedes emphasised that the funds remain-

ing from the grant already made to ZANU could be transferred either to the united ANC or ZANU for humanitarian purposes among the refugees but on condition that a proper application for them and a list of how they would be spent were made and signed by recognised leaders. Nkomo and Muzenda actually approached the Swedish embassy in August 1975 to apply for the funds and were told of the conditions on which they could be released. Muzenda and Nkomo apparently could not just sit down together to do the necessary paper work. As the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka surmised, the failure to do so "reflects a difficulty which everybody faces, ... there is not yet an administration for the receipt of assistance and there are widely different views of the most urgent needs." In the circumstances, the Swedes decided to carry over the grant to the fiscal year 1975/76 with the hope that the new ANC might shape up into a liberation movement and thereby qualify to apply for the assistance.¹

In the second half of 1976 international pressure on the white Rhodesian regime and on the nationalist leaders forced them to the Geneva Conference. Even though nothing substantial in terms of the settlement of the Rhodesian issue came out of the conference, the latter set in motion events and processes which led to the relaunching of the liberation struggle and the restoration and expansion of Swedish secular and ecclesiastical assistance to African people of Zimbabwe.

The first significant development was the formation of the Patriotic Front between ZAPU and ZANU in 1976, whose immediate aim was to present a united front at the negotiations with the British and their Rhodesian settler surrogates. The birth of the Patriotic Front generated faith and hope among the international supporters of ZAPU and ZANU that they intended to fight so much so that countries like Sweden were ready to provide immediate and expanded aid to the parties. The second outcome of the Geneva manoeuvres was the release of the ZANU political and military leadership from Zambian jails, so that in 1977 ZANU was able to reorganise itself and to step up its fighting. With a proper leadership the party was also able to enter into bilateral arrangements and agreements for aid with donor countries and agencies such as Sweden and its SIDA. The failure of the Geneva Conference, Nkomo later said, was decisive in making him to decide that there was no chance for a negotiated settlements with Ian Smith except to win the country through violence. From that conference he decided to settle in Lusaka in order to direct the liberation struggle by ZAPU and its ZIPRA wing. As

we saw, it was from the end of 1976 that ZAPU exploited the facilities and opportunities offered by ZIPA to launch its most successful recruiting campaign leading to its revival of the armed struggle on a much more determined scale. At the same time the recruiting campaign and armed struggle produced a prodigious refugee problem, which in turn increased humanitarian responsibilities for Nkomo and his party.

It was against this background of ZANU's reorganisation following the release of its leadership by Kaunda and the presence of Robert Mugabe outside the country as well as Nkomo's decision to throw his full weight behind ZAPU's armed struggle that the two parties renewed their contacts with Sweden. An exploration of how Swedish aid could be channelled to the two political parties was undertaken by the Swedish Minister of Development Assistance during his visit to Dar es Salaam on the 20th - 27th February 1977, when he met, among others, Edgar Tekere, who was then described as a member of the ZANU Central Committee, Administrative Secretary of the Party and ZANU's representative in Maputo. The meeting produced some unfortunate misunderstandings between ZANU and the Swedish officials, whose sorting out, however, helped to put Swedish bilateral cooperation with the Zimbabwe liberation movements in proper perspective.

When the Swedish Minister met Tekere the former apparently in good faith thought that the latter represented the Patriotic Front and therefore emphasised Sweden's readiness "to give humanitarian assistance to the Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe."² Indeed subsequent press reports also gave prominence to the fact that Sweden was offering humanitarian assistance to the Patriotic Front and not just to ZANU. Tekere was furious and he wanted to correct the impression that he had negotiated with Sweden on behalf of the Patriotic Front. On the 8th March 1977 he visited the Dar es Salaam SIDA office and held a discussion with SIDA official Per Lindstrom, during which it became plain that the Patriotic Front existed only on paper; otherwise the two organisations were completely separate and independent of each other.

Tekere told Lindstrom that he was extremely disappointed that the Swedish Minister had misunderstood him totally to be speaking on behalf of the Patriotic Front and that he had thought that the Swedes were aware that "ZANU continued to be ZANU and ZAPU ZAPU." Tekere expressed himself as worried about the extensive publicity of the Patriotic Front and said that its importance "had been exaggerated by everybody

except by those concerned, i.e. ZANU and ZAPU." He told the Swedes that "the Patriotic Front largely is a paper tiger and that ZANU is the party whose members are the real core of the struggle." Moreover, Tekere pointed out, in practice Swedish aid, if offered to the Patriotic Front, would be rejected because the two parties could never "accept a joint agreement". They had already rejected a similar aid package from Denmark. One of the reasons was that ZANU could never accept to receive equal treatment with ZAPU because the former had as many as 70,000 refugees to care for when at the time ZAPU had only 7,000. Tekere also claimed that there were ideological differences between the two parties - with ZANU supported by China and ZAPU by both Russia and America, which of course in the case of America, and to the extent that Tekere implied that country's government aid, was a plain lie. He emphasised that it was important for Sweden to establish bilateral cooperation with ZANU rather than channel its aid through the OAU and the UNHCR so that her friendship to ZANU could stand out clearly. Indeed, Tekere "suggested that Sweden should do as Nyerere, i.e. give verbal support to the Patriotic Front but support the different parties directly with goods and money." He concluded his discussion by giving notice to SIDA that he would be coming back shortly with an application for support for ZANU.³

Though the meeting was unfortunate in its exposure of the ugly gulf between ZAPU and ZANU, it, however, very much helped to clarify the position for the Swedes so that they could properly plan their bilateral cooperation with the Zimbabwe liberation movements. It was clear that from the ZANU standpoint the Patriotic Front was at worst non-existent or at best in the very formative stages.⁴ The ZANU view of the Patriotic Front was in contrast to Nkomo's rather optimistic assessment of the unity. In any case the conflicting views of the two parties regarding their unity left their well wishers with no option but to enter into agreements of cooperation with both organisations separately. It was along these lines that Swedish aid was accorded to ZAPU and ZANU from 1977 to independence in 1980.

b) Background to Extended CSM Involvement

The reinstatement of the Swedish secular support for Zimbabweans in 1977 coincided with the unprecedented involvement of the Swedish ecclesiastical intervention in the welfare programmes of refugees in Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique. This ecclesiastical intervention marked a dramatic reversal of the CSM's policy of withdrawing some of its support to the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe and was principally occasioned by the abduction of the Manama children and Tord Harlin's visit to Zambia to investigate the welfare of those children.

The escalation of the war of liberation in Zimbabwe after the independence of Mozambique in June 1975, which was evidenced by President Samora Machel's closure of his border with Rhodesia in March 1976, increased guerrilla activities and sabotage acts in the south east of the country, such as the blowing up of the Beit Bridge - Rutenga rail road, forced the CSM to accelerate its process of reducing its commitments to the Lutheran Church. The CSM's commitment to granting greater autonomy to the Lutheran Church had already been amply demonstrated by the election and consecration of the African bishop, J.C. Shiri, on the 31st May and 29th June, 1975 respectively. Yet in the same year the CSM still supported 20 missionaries working under the Lutheran Church. This situation was drastically reversed in 1976 when there was an exodus of the Swedish missionaries which left only 3 in the field.

The plans for a quick evacuation of the missionaries were drawn up by the then CSM southern Africa Secretary, Tore Bergman, with the outgoing missionary Bishop Strandvik and the incoming African one, Shiri, in November 1975. The plans were subsequently communicated to the representative of the missionaries in Rhodesia, Ernst Timm. It was decided that the withdrawal operation of the missionaries would involve Axel-Ivar Berglund, Secretary of the South African Council of Churches in Johannesburg, who would act as the contact man immediately outside Rhodesia. Thus when both the CSM officials in Uppsala and some of the missionaries working at such places as Musume, Manama and Mnene judged that the war was definitely spreading into the Mberengwa - Beit Bridge - Gwanda rural areas and the African church workers intimated to missionaries that their security could no longer be guaranteed, Berglund was asked to go in April and May 1976 and secretly advise both Bishop Shiri and Timm, the missionary spokesmen, to let the missionaries leave

Rhodesia. The problem of the missionaries was not just one of security. Male missionaries, especially medical doctors, were risking being drafted into the Rhodesian army.

While a number of missionaries either followed the advice of their African friends and that of Berglund and left, some for quite some time stubbornly stuck to their mission stations. Because it was a criminal offense in Rhodesia to utter statements to anyone that were considered to be calculated to cause despondency and fear, the Lutheran Church African officials, especially the bishop, found themselves in an awkward situation where they feared for the safety of the missionaries but could not find ways of telling them without risking prosecution. In fact once some missionaries started leaving the country, Bishop Shiri was visited by the Rhodesian security people who demanded to know why they were leaving. In the end Bishop Shiri secretly sent a hasty note to the CSM advising that body to send him a telegram asking him to tell the missionaries to leave the country. The following telegram was issued by the CSM to the missionaries still remaining in Rhodesia and the bishop: "Strongly repeat strongly recommend all missionaries immediate holiday South Africa stop all children must go stop Contact Berglund."⁵ In addition, instead of the usual three months allocation for the missionaries' salaries, money for only one month was despatched to Rhodesia by the finance department of the CSM. Both measures helped the missionaries who had not made up their minds to resolve to leave. By the end of 1976 the majority had left. The departure of the missionaries brought to the fore most prominently the question of the future relationships between the CSM and the Lutheran Church.⁶ (see Chapter VII).

The events which ultimately helped to fashion the new relationships between the CSM and the Lutheran Church were closely related to the form and effects of the war of liberation in the south and southwestern Zimbabwe, especially the abduction of the Manama children and the massive destruction of the mission stations. The CSM became irresistibly drawn first into the refugee welfare programmes and after the war in the reconstruction of the Lutheran Church facilities. In the post war situation new needs were identified which required more permanent involvement of the CSM, so that new Documents of Understanding had to be drawn to accommodate them. Thus it is necessary to see how the Manama abduction drew the CSM back to the affairs of Zimbabwe.

The abduction of the Manama school children at the end of January 1977 hit the Rhodesian, Botswana and South African newspaper headlines and indeed evoked sanctimonious indignation and sentiments of many of the South African and Rhodesian editorials and politicians about the cruelty of ZAPU's unreasonable involvement of children in war.⁷ The fact that the children were taken from a former Church of Sweden Mission School attracted the attention of Mr Bo Kalfors, the Swedish Ambassador to Botswana, who immediately made it one of his special tasks to summarise for his government the various press reports and to indicate the accusations and counter-accusations between ZAPU and the Rhodesian regime as well as the manner in which the Botswana government was caught in the middle of it all. Much of Kalfors's correspondence was immediately transmitted by the Foreign Ministry to the CSM; where it was carefully studied and supplemented with the personal investigations of the knowledgeable Tore Bergman, Secretary for Southern Africa, in attempt to produce a clear picture which might be used as a basis for the Mission's possible practical action. In addition parents bombarded the Secretary and individual missionaries whom they knew with letters asking them to do something about their children or at least to investigate their welfare and safety.⁸ Not only was there at the CSM Bergman, who as Education Secretary of the Mission in Zimbabwe had piloted the growth of Manama Secondary School, but there was also Tord Harlin, working for the Lutheran World Federation, Swedish Section, who had been one of the first missionary principals of the School and had therefore some personal attachment to the school.⁹ These two helped to involve the Church of Sweden Mission in ZAPU's and later ZANU's affairs. However it took a bit of time for the Church of Sweden Mission to arrive at some concrete action, so that the whole of February was devoted to trying to assess the situation from second hand reports.

Such reports included a telex sent from Selukwe to the CSM Board by some 'concerned' Rhodesian citizens, Birgit, a former nurse at Mnene, Ohlessen (maiden name) who married a Rhodesian, James Archer, working as postmen and James Archer himself, which said: "Request in interest of humanity and your own Christian ideals with the aid of Swedish Government make strongest possible representation to Botswana Zambian governments demanding immediate release and return to their homes of 400 children abducted from Manama Mission by Nkomo... As we know it stop Please advice soonest if any action is to be taken..."

Terrorists stop. These children and their parents are members of your Church stop Imagine the grief and suffering that has been caused stop Should you fail to make this effort you will stand accused of neglect of duty and this will be another nail in the coffin of Christianity.”¹⁰ While these two people were influenced by the Rhodesian media which was in no doubt that ZAPU had abducted the children at gun point, the CSM was not so certain because it was also aware of ZAPU’s and the Botswana Government’s side of the story that the children had crossed the border on their own volition. The CSM Director, Tore Furberg, therefore simply thanked them for their concern and assured them that the Mission was trying its best to assist where possible.¹¹

In the meantime the reports from Ambassador Bo Kalfors indicated that the issue was knotty and even threatened to complicate the Rhodesian-Botswana relations in that the Rhodesians were blaming their neighbour for allowing ZAPU to use their territory as a spring board for carrying out atrocities in Rhodesia. Botswana not only denied harbouring ZAPU freedom fighters but she even said that she had evidence to show that the pupils of Manama, like many other Rhodesian African refugees, had not been abducted but had run away from Rhodesian oppression. Indeed the Rhodesian Foreign Minister, P.K. van de Byle, was reported as saying that the removal of the Manama pupils by ZAPU “had complicated the relationship of Rhodesia to Botswana and he urged the Government of Botswana to co-operate with Rhodesian authorities in order to establish effective control of the common border.” The Botswana authorities dismissed the claims of the Rhodesians and stressed that the children had willingly left their country. The chief of the Botswana Police actually confirmed that the Zimbabwe nationalist guerrillas were not at all “allowed to operate on or from Botswana territory. If they did they would have been arrested by the Botswana Police Force.” Besides, if any of the refugees from Zimbabwe indicated that they had been forced to come to Botswana against their will the Police chief said, they would immediately be escorted back to Zimbabwe by the Botswana Police.¹²

As we saw, the children had been intimidated not to reveal that they had been abducted and some older pupils who had wanted to join the war had become spokesmen of the group. Moreover the so called Manama group had become mixed with many other groups and individuals who were flocking across the border in response to the massive programme of recruitment by ZAPU as well as to other economic and political pressures

and circumstances. It was in that highly mixed atmosphere that reporters from Botswana tried to gather their evidence on whether or not the pupils had come voluntarily and what they got simply confirmed the police reports that there was a general exodus from Rhodesia of Africans running away from oppression.¹³ Thus one of the Botswana reporters was told by the spokesmen of the so-called Manama group that "the Rhodesian pupils ... came fully out of their own choice." They said that they had "run away from the Rhodesian terror of the Smith Regime after a unanimous decision by their 'Youth League Group'. This decision had been part of a 'long term plan' worked out by the 'Youth League Group' outside the knowledge of the Mission school. All the arrangements in conjunction with the flight had been made by themselves, according to a Secretary in the 'Youth League' committee... Furthermore many of the school children were not strictly speaking from Manama Mission school but from primary schools under the Mission." The spokesmen told the types of harassment they were subjected to by the Rhodesians, which were forcing them to run away. All this made the children genuine refugees so that even the Botswana Government was forced to give them asylum in spite of its limited resources.¹⁴

The case of the Botswana government and the Zimbabwe nationalists that the refugees, including the Manama pupils, were flocking to Botswana on their own account was further reinforced by the fact that the Botswana authorities allowed the Rhodesian regime to send the parents of the pupils with buses to come and interview their children in the presence of the representatives of the British High Commission to Botswana, the International Red Cross and a bishop from the All Africa Council of Churches and only 52 of the youngest, mostly girls, agreed to return home with their parents. Moreover, 30 of those were reported in April to have run away again from Rhodesia back to Botswana.¹⁵ The information reaching CSM from Southern Africa, especially through the Swedish embassy in Gaborone, Botswana, clearly indicated that the issue of the Manama children was far from being straight forward and that it impinged upon Rhodesian-Botswana relations. In the event it was not easy for the Mission to arrive at a firm decision as to what action to take.

It was in that context that Tore Bergman drew up a paper to brief the Mission Board on the 4th March 1977. Bergman told the Board that the incident of the 400 children's leaving Manama on the 30th January 1977 had received considerable international attention. He drew the Board's

attention to the fact that there was no agreement among the various sources as to how the children had left. The Rhodesians insisted that five guerrillas had forced the children to march towards the Botswana border and that the aim was to secure recruits for ZAPU. It was also believed that 20 to 30 of the more mature pupils co-operated with the guerrillas to plan the abduction and to force the rest of the student body to go to Botswana.

Among the abducted were also some teachers, a pastor and some hospital staff. During the march the clergyman and some few students had managed to escape and to return to the school. The majority were taken to a transit camp at Francistown in Botswana. But the information from Botswana, Bergman said, which was said to be coming from the students themselves was the opposite of what the Rhodesians were saying in that it insisted that the pupils had come voluntarily. The children had also been subsequently transferred to Zambia, when, according to one of the latest Rhodesian reports, 15 of them had been shot by ZAPU for refusing to go for military training. Meanwhile nothing was known of the shooting by people in Lusaka. On the 1st March the Director of the CSM had appealed to the International Red Cross for information on the children to very little avail. While all this mystery persisted, Bergman went on, "the anxiety of the parents and their worry about the fate of their children" were mounting and were conveyed in the many letters to the CSM and former missionaries.¹⁶

It was this terrible frustration experienced by the Mission Board in trying to get reliable information which made them to take the unprecedented step of making their own investigations, by sending the irrepressible and ubiquitous Tord Harlin to Lusaka. Harlin gave as the background to his mission the fact that many parents had written to the CSM Board appealing to the latter to find out what had happened to their children. "It proved to be impossible to get access to reliable information via the phone or through letters. Neither the International Red Cross, nor Bishop Shiri or Nils-Gorna Gussing, the Lutheran World Federation's (LWF) representative in charge of the Zambian Christian Refugee Service, seemed to be prepared to convey confidential or politically sensitive information even if they had access to material." Harlin was therefore sent to try and gather on the spot as much information as possible about the fate and living conditions of the Manama children. He was urged never to try to plead with ZAPU for the return of the children since they had already refused while in Botswana to return home with their parents.¹⁷

Harlin's trip was important in that for the first time the CSM wanted to know, among other things, how it could be of assistance to those children. It proved very difficult for Harlin when he got to Lusaka to locate ZAPU officials. When he finally did so he was lucky to find that the ZAPU acting secretary for international affairs was Edward Ndlovu, himself a former student of Manama School, who also put him in touch with Paul Matjaka, the teacher who had left with the pupils and was in charge of the ZAPU education programme and therefore in constant touch with the children. Through Edward Ndlovu, Harlin was also able to meet Joshua Nkomo himself in the guest-lodge of President Kaunda on the 24th March 1977. Harlin indeed proved to be the right emissary to have been sent to talk to the ZAPU leaders in that he was able to achieve a high degree of sympathy with their situation, having experienced the Rhodesian situation and its conscription system. Thus when he met the ZAPU leader he told the latter that he and the CSM had details on the torture of political prisoners which went on in the Rhodesian prisons. "I also expressed my personal understanding of the claim of the African leaders on youngsters who were capable of carrying arms in a war situation," Harlin said. "I made a comparison with the harsh regulations for military service in Rhodesia, where European youngsters at 26 years of age were not allowed to leave the country if they had not passed preparatory military service. (My own son Lars would have been compulsorily called up if we had not left Rhodesia in time)."¹⁸

Joshua Nkomo assured Harlin that the Manama pupils were safe and sound. The party, he said, had no plans to put them through military training, except some of the older ones. He asked Harlin to put his request to both the CSM Board and the LWF that he wished to meet them. When Harlin suggested that the CSM might be in a position to offer assistance of the humanitarian nature, especially to the Manama pupils, because it felt a special obligation to them as the founder of the Manama Mission, the ZAPU leadership proposed to file a written application to the Board for grants "for a school and education programme called 'New Manama'". While the application was being framed, Harlin used the few days to go to Rhodesia to see the pastors in prison and detention and to see some of the parents so as to convey the good news that their children were at least reported to be alive and well in the refugee camps in Zambia. One mother of two children who had been abducted to Zambia and who attended the meeting where Harlin gave his report stood up after Harlin

had reported and said, "Thank the Mission Board for what they are doing and say that I do not want to have my children back, even if it will last twenty years; not even if I will die before they return will I have my children back as long as this country is as it now is. Tell the Mission Board accordingly."¹⁹ From Zimbabwe Harlin returned to Sweden via Lusaka picking up the project document of 'New Manama'. The whole project was estimated to cost as much as one Million and Seven Hundred Thousand Zambian Kwacha or ten million Sw. Crs.²⁰

In the end however its co-ordination and implementation was taken over by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.²¹ But what was important from Tord Harlin's mission was that direct contact had now been established between ZAPU and the CSM and that the Mission Board had been put in a position to suggest some aid to the party. In his report Harlin had also emphasised that should the Board be in a position to offer concrete assistance to ZAPU, it should do the same to the ZANU refugees in Mozambique and the ANC (of Muzorewa) in Botswana so that the church would not be seen to be taking any political sides. Moreover Harlin argued that the Church had more refugee followers, including Pastor Isaiah Gumbo, in Mozambique than in Zambia. Consequently when the ZAPU leader visited Sweden the CSM was anxious that Mugabe should do the same, which he did.²²

d) Joshua Nkomo's Appeal

Joshua Nkomo was able to fulfil his promise to visit Sweden on the 9th - 10th May 1977. It was an opportunity he used to brief fully the Swedish government on the political and military developments in Zimbabwe following the collapse of the Geneva Conference. He also was concerned to meet the CSM Board and the representative so the LWF (the Swedish Section) and explain to them the position of the Manama pupils and to clarify some points relating to the New Manama Project.

Nkomo's first major meeting was held with the officials of SIDA and the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC) in the SIDA offices on the 9th May, 1977 and as such emphasised Nkomo's need to raise aid from Sweden. Apart from himself, his delegation was made up of Amon Jirira, the party treasurer; Daniel Madzimbamuto, Special Assistant to the President; Albert Nxele, the

party Assistant Representative in Dar es Salaam; and Miss Otilia Maposa, the delegation secretary. On the Swedish side, apart from the SIDA officials, Nkomo met the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Aid and International Co-operation.

In his discussions with the Swedes Nkomo wanted first to inform his supporters of the reasons for his party's intensification of the war, the position regarding the Patriotic Front and finally the nature of the aid he was seeking from Sweden. Nkomo told the Swedes that after the collapse of the Victoria Falls and Geneva constitutional conferences in 1975 and 1976 respectively he had become totally pessimistic about any further talks with Ian Smith being ever successful. His assessment of the Rhodesian leader was that Ian Smith "was a racist with whom it was impossible to discuss the Rhodesian issue." Nkomo had therefore come to the firm conclusion that "Smith could only be defeated by armed struggle."²² In other words negotiations with Ian Smith were at an end for the time being. That was what Nkomo had also told Cyrus Vance, the American Secretary of State, whom he had just met in London prior to his visit to Sweden. Vance had come to Britain to work out a fresh initiative for the revival of negotiations on the Rhodesian problem. Nkomo found the new proposals "well-meaning but naive and unrealistic." Moreover he was utterly opposed to the intervention of the USA because the move might trigger a dangerous internationalisation of the whole issue. "If the USA should take part in a future constitutional conference," Nkomo warned, "the Soviet Union and even the Central African Empire could make the same claims." He therefore advised Vance to stay out of the whole Rhodesian question altogether. Thus with the talks virtually dead, Nkomo called on his supporters to concentrate on the armed struggle as the only option likely to produce the pre-conditions for majority rule.²³

The Patriotic Front being a subject of active discussion by the Frontline States, the OAU Liberation Committee and the Ministerial Council of the OAU in Lome and also being on the agenda of the forthcoming summit of the OAU Heads of States in Libreville in June 1977, Nkomo felt obliged to explain to the Swedes ZAPU's views and understanding of the exact stage reached by the parties on their road to unity. As already pointed out, Nkomo was more optimistic about the unity of the two organisations than Tekere, especially regarding the military wings. He said that both parties had since the formation of the Patriotic Front during the Geneva Conference tried to consolidate their

co-operation. There were efforts to have a joint army under a revived ZIPA. Nkomo deplored the fact that the old ZIPA had been allowed to disintegrate because he thought that it was very dangerous for future Zimbabwe to have two separate armies representing two different political parties. "The soldiers," he said, "had a tendency to be totally loyal to the organisation they belonged to and to see the members of the other organisation as enemies. So a similar development as that in Angola [of the bloody conflict between UNITA and MPLA] had to be avoided [in Zimbabwe] at any cost."²⁶

However, Nkomo pointed out that in spite of the joint army and the name Patriotic Front the two political parties remained different. Efforts were being made to unite the parties and he thought that if all went well the Patriotic Front would be a reality before the end of 1977. Already the Front had headquarters, he said, in Dar es Salaam and regional offices in Lusaka and Maputo. He thus preferred to speak of the Patriotic Front as "one liberation movement with two parties."²⁷ All this was in contrast to ZANU's views which saw the Front as no more than a "paper tiger."

Finally Nkomo tried to define more precisely ZAPU's needs regarding humanitarian assistance in the context of the nature and numbers of the refugees for whom the party was caring. He said that by the time he left Zambia ZAPU already had in its camps 8 000 refugees and that their number was increasing daily as they flocked from Rhodesia to Zambia via Botswana. Among the refugees were school children for whom the party wanted to provide educational facilities. There were 1 200 children of school going age in the camps but it was estimated that they would soon rise to not less than 5 000. ZAPU had handed an application for the construction of a school to the UNHCR which had been assigned the task of coordinating the project. Because of the takeover of the responsibilities over the New Manama project by the UNHCR, Nkomo said that a similar request which had earlier been forwarded through the CSM Board was no longer valid. What was of immediate concern now was the list of items addressed to the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka by Edward Ndlovu on the 16 April 1977, comprising foodstuffs, men's clothing, women's clothing, teenage boys' clothing, teenage girls' clothing, children's clothing (ages 1 - 5 years), children's clothing (6 - 12 years), shelter, bedding and other household utensils, baby clothing, 2 ten-ton trucks, 2 vans, 2 Mini Buses, 2 saloons, and 4 kombies. In addition ZAPU requested SIDA to supply medical drugs, equipment and instruments.²⁸

Nkomo's personal endorsement of the ZAPU application came at a time when SIDA was considering a similar urgent application from ZANU, which was submitted by Simon V. Muzenda, the Deputy leader of the party, to the Lusaka Swedish Embassy on the 6th April 1977. It also contained a long list of foodstuffs, clothing for different age groups and different genders, medical supplies, transport comprising 10 Land Rovers, 5 big lorries, 5 private cars, 50 scutors, 4 mobile clinics and 6 ambulances, agricultural implements, seeds and fertilizers, equipment and consumables to start a Publicity Department, educational facilities and materials, and other requirements.²⁹

Soon after Nkomo's visit to Stockholm both applications were considered by the Swedish Refugee Assistance Committee for Southern Africa, which on the 2nd June 1977 recommended that the Swedish government allocates during the fiscal year 1976/77 a grant of 2,5 million Sw. Crs. to each of the two parties making up the Patriotic Front. On the 6th June 1977 the Swedish government approved the payment of the grants through SIDA.³⁰ This marked the beginning of the resumption of the Swedish humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe which continued, as we shall see, right up to independence. In this regard, Nkomo's visit to Stockholm was successful.

However ZAPU's appeal for aid was not directed to the Swedish government alone but to the CSM as well. In order to appreciate the role of the CSM it is important to give a brief explanation of its operative relationship with the government of Sweden Churches and international organisations. The CSM was the body which organised, directed and financed the Church of Sweden missionary activity overseas, and in this case in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, the Eastern Horn of Africa and India. Because the Church of Sweden is a state church the CSM enjoyed a special relationship with the Swedish government to the extent that it could appeal directly to SIDA, for instance, for funds to finance both ecclesiastical and humanitarian projects in its overseas areas of operations. Moreover, some of the key officials of the CSM often had personal contacts with and therefore easy access to SIDA and the Foreign Ministry officials. It was in that context that the CSM had in the 1960s obtained funds from SIDA to build Manama Secondary School which was one of the victims of the war. Furthermore when in 1969 the World Council of Churches established its Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) the Swedish government posed a rare challenge to the ecumenical

organisation of the churches in Sweden in the form of matching by 50% any funds it was able to raise for the PCR. This thus created a further favourable atmosphere for the CSM to approach the government for its own programmes and projects, especially in Southern Africa where racism had to be combated.

The CSM through its LWF (Swedish Section) and Lutherhjalpen (the organ of the Church of Sweden responsible for raising funds for relief aid) belongs to the worldwide family of Lutheran churches. The CSM could therefore initiate projects and programmes in its mission field and seek financial help from its sister churches through the L.W.F.'s Department of World Service in Geneva. Alternatively it merely apprised the LWF of special needs in its mission field. That was how the LWF became involved in the Dioconic or Relief Fund in Zimbabwe which was channelled through the Christian Care by means of an ecumenical relationship of that body with the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe.

Besides the government sources and the LWF, the CSM had its own independent finances raised directly from the various parishes of the Church of Sweden. It was the recognition of this special place of the CSM in the Swedish Society and the international arena as well as of its historical role in Zimbabwe that both Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, after the former's visits, paid their special attention to that mission body.

On the 10th May 1977, a day after meeting the Swedish government officials, Joshua Nkomo and his delegation met representatives of the CSM and the LWF (Swedish Section) in the Meeting Hall of the Parish Council of the Klara Parish in Stockholm. The CSM officials included Tore Furberg (the Director), Biorn Fjarstedt, Professor Carl F. Hallencreutz and Hugo Soderstrom, while those of the LWF consisted of Ebbe Arvidsson, Thorsten Manson, Bjorn Ryman and Tord Harlim. Marika Fahlen and Marianne Sundh attended the meeting on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SIDA.³¹

Both sides took their meeting very seriously. The Swedes welcomed the first opportunity to have a face to face encounter with one of the top men in the liberation struggle and they expected him to spell out the way he saw the war in relation to the church. In his address to the meeting, Nkomo emphasised the way on which the CSM formed a vital link between the peoples of Zimbabwe and Sweden through its long history of missionary service in Zimbabwe. He referred to the case of the Manama pupils and expressed the hope that the bitter experiences which

were then suffered in Southern Africa should not adversely affect the relations between the church and the party but instead should serve to strengthen them. He expressed his great appreciation for the good work that the Swedes had done in his country. With regards to the war, Nkomo traced the struggle for freedom by the people of Zimbabwe to 1893. He pointed out that: "It was not until the breakdown of the Geneva Conference in December ...[1976] that [he] had wholeheartedly accepted that political changes in his country would come through military means." The result was that there was then an intensification of the war in the country and he regretted that one of the terrible consequences was the recent murder of the Catholic Missionaries in Matebeleland. He assured the meeting that it was not ZAPU's policy to hurt the church in anyway. Moreover, even though the liberation movements were supported by the Eastern countries, he said, it did not mean that that would lead to the coming of the communists to independent Zimbabwe. By way of explaining how he had embraced violence as a means of achieving independence, he said that for thirty years he had worked through constitutional means "without any visible results. When military means were first employed the intention had been to exert pressure in order to achieve peaceful changes. The Geneva Conference, however, had proved that this was not enough. Thus the developments after January 1, 1977, are the results of this decision to make use of violence." ZIPRA were under strict orders not "to employ violence against civilians." Nor had those charged with the task of recruitment been instructed to bring with them all school children. "I have said that the youngsters who are willing to come -let them come," Nkomo said. But that had not stopped even the very youngest ones from running away from Rhodesia so that the party now had in its camps thousands of youngsters aged between five and ten years of age. ZAPU would not employ those children in war, he went on. Instead the party would try to raise them and try to provide them with education.³²

In all this ZAPU was co-operating with ZANU and the party had also entrusted its humanitarian programme to the local representative of the UNHCR, who was a Norwegian. The UNHCR representative had access to the refugee camps but the party tried to restrict foreigners from having free access to the camps because of fear of enemy espionage. At the end of his address Nkomo handed over to the various representatives a list of urgent needs for 2000 girls and 4 000 boys comprising clothes,

hygienic articles, food, Bibles, entertainment equipment and means of transport. All the assistance was required in kind since not much could be bought in Zambia due to shortages. It was also decided that in view of the approaching winter the ZAPU request should receive immediate attention for implementation. The Mission Board would attend to the matter of school equipment for the New Manama at its forthcoming meeting of the 25th May.³³

As far as aid was concerned the meeting served to amplify points that had already been made in the Tord Harlin report after his visit in April and the meeting with Nkomo was quite timely in that it occurred two weeks before the CSM Board meeting which would consider the ZAPU application. On his way from Zambia Harlin passed through Geneva where, on the 6th April 1977, he fully briefed officials of the LWF, Department of World Service, about the Manama children and ZAPU's application for funds to set up educational facilities for refugee children.³⁴ When Harlin delivered his report to the CSM Board on the 20th April, the Board recommended that both itself and the LWF should "take up the question initially of the immediate educational needs of the Zimbabwean students in Zambia as a matter of urgency."³⁵ With the further clarification of the needs of ZAPU by Nkomo and the intervention of the Swedish government through SIDA with a grant 2.5 million Sw. Crs. for most of the material and medical needs of the refugees, the CSM Board on the 25th May 1977 decided to make two immediate grants of 11, 075 Zambian Kwacha for the textbooks and other educational materials requested by ZAPU and K1,925 for the purchase of at least 1 000 Bibles, also as requested by the party.³⁶ The airlifting to Zambia of the educational materials and text books including 100 tents for the accommodation of the school children was co-ordinated by the Norwegian Church, while the clearance of the goods in Lusaka was done by Mr Nils Gussing of the Zambian Christian Refugee Service.³⁷

Nkomo's visit to Sweden, which followed a detailed investigation of the refugee and war situation in Rhodesia by the CSM's emissary, Tord Harlin, brought to the fore the need for the Swedish ecclesiastical intervention in the humanitarian programmes and projects of the Zimbabwe liberation movements. The presence of the children, especially those from Manama, helped to force the conservative elements in the Church of Sweden who had always resisted being involved with the liberation movements because of the latter's violent approach to their

political problems, to put aside their reservations. Once the Church of Sweden, through its two outreach arms - the CSM Lutherhjälpen/Church of Sweden Aid - decided to participate in the Zimbabwean refugee and relief programmes it did so either through bilateral or multilateral cooperation in conjunction with the worldwide network of the Lutheran Churches, their national agencies and international organisations, such as the LWF. By 1978 the network was spending 4.2 million Sw. Crs. on Zimbabwean refugee and relief programmes in Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and in Zimbabwe itself. Undoubtedly therefore Nkomo's appeal was successful, while there is also no doubt that the abduction of the Manama school children by ZAPU indeed opened a new era of cooperation between the Zimbabwe liberation movements and the Lutheran Churches through the Church of Sweden's national agencies.

d) Mugabe's Policy on Religion

Robert Mugabe, who had recently been formally named the President of ZANU by the party's central committee visited Sweden in September 1977. Apart from the President himself, the ZANU delegation included his wife, Mrs Sally Mugabe, Mukudzei Mudzi, the ZANU Secretary for External Affairs, Rugare Gumbo, the Secretary for Information and Publicity, Ignatius Muzenda and Catherine Garanowako. Their programme, which started on Sunday, September 18 and went on until mid-day on Tuesday, September 20, was quite long, involved and designed to give the maximum exposure to as wide a spectrum of Swedish officials and non-governmental organisations as possible. Apart from the usual dinners and luncheons Mugabe had to hold an interview with the Swedish Television, meet the Africa Group (one of the main supporters of the liberation movements), talk to the representatives of the Swedish Trade Union Conference and the Swedish Central Organisation of Salaried Employees, meet with Mrs Marin Soder, the Foreign Minister, the officials of the Foreign Ministry, give a press conference at the SIDA offices, hold discussions with SIDA and give a talk at the Scandinavian Institute for African Studies in Uppsala and meet with members of the Social Democratic Party (headed by Mr Sven Anderson, former Minister of Foreign Affairs). At 7 p.m. on Monday, September 19, he had dinner and discussions with the CSM.³⁹

It was in fact on Mugabe's suggestion to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he met the members of the CSM Board and the representatives for the LWF, the Swedish Section. There had already been some contacts between Mr Tore Bergman, the CSM's Southern African Secretary, and Mr Mugabe and Edgar Tekere, when the two were still confined to Quelimane. From the CSM's standpoint Mugabe's visit was very important and to some extent helped to clear a lot of misinformation, prejudices and myths concerning him and his liberation movement. As Mr Bergman explained in an interview with me, people in Sweden and especially the conservative section of the Church of Sweden, which happened to give the greatest financial support to the CSM, had tremendous misgivings about supporting the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. The movements were known to get their military equipment from the communist countries and it was therefore taken for granted that ZANU and ZAPU were fighting to instal a communist regime in Zimbabwe, with all the anti-christian implications. The image which the conservatives had of Mugabe, Bergman recalls, was that of an outrageously violent looking man who strove to impose his weight and views on others. It was somewhat something of an anti-climax when on television, during his various addresses and from newspaper reports they discovered Mugabe to be a humble, softspoken and intelligent man, whose major weapon of influencing others, was the forcefulness of conviction with which he spoke and presented his case. He was, in their view, the very epitome of the contrast to the popular stereotype of a guerrilla, who apparently must be fierce, rugged, pugnacious, bombastic, and permeated through and through with megalomania.⁴⁰

This then was the leader of ZANU who, with his delegation to Sweden, met from CSM, Professor Carl F. Hallencreutz, Biorn Fjarstedt, Rev. Dr. Hugo Soderstrom, Tore Bergman and Stina Karlton, from the LWF(ss) Torsten Manson, Bjorn Ryman and Tord Harlin, and others such as Gunner Greek, Anna Greek and Johnson Gnanabaranam. Professor Hallencreutz chaired the meeting and the Secretary for Southern Africa, Tore Bergman had the privilege of being asked to suggest the topic for the meeting's discussion. Bergman wasted no time but went for the topic of supreme concern to the Swedish christians and many churches in Zimbabwe, "The Role of the Church, particularly in the current situation in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe." The CSM representatives were looking for a definite assurance that the church had a role to play, both in the war and after it and Mugabe certainly did not disappoint them in that regard.

Mugabe began his exposition of the role of the churches and the liberation struggle by giving a brief history of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe and its use without success of peaceful means to gain independence. Turning to the churches in particular he said, "Hardly anyone of my age, around 40, can speak of the development of Zimbabwe without referring to one or the other of the mission stations." He pointed out that the liberation soldiers had instructions not to destroy the churches. "Some missions," he went on, "have supported us in providing medicine and food... we fight for freedom, also for freedom of expression and freedom of religion. We fight to keep these freedoms. But you have also members of the clergy who support Smith (none from the Lutheran Church) but from the Anglican Church for instance. Fr Lewis even has a place in Smith's senate."⁴¹

Mugabe reminded his ecclesiastical hosts that the liberation movements were not asking the churches "to support the armed struggle, but the Churches are called to support the case for justice. They have at least to condemn the regime in such a way that people listen. That has been achieved by the Catholic Bishop's Conference and the Rhodesian Christian Council. Also Christian Care provides assistance," he said. Mugabe drew attention to such church personalities as Bishop Donald Lamont, the former Rhodesian Prime Minister Garfield Todd, Max Chigwida and even the later renegade, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who had distinguished themselves by their outspoken condemnation of the racist regime and by their support for the nationalist struggle. Mugabe urged the churches to speak for justice and to promote human rights. "We are glad," he said, "to be able to admit that our struggle would not have been possible to start without a certain degree of education and in this regard the Church has rendered a wonderful contribution." But the Swedish Mission had not, however, distinguished itself by condemning the Rhodesian regime.

Regarding the future, Mugabe assured his audience that he wanted to see the churches carrying on their good work. The future government might have different policies from the settler regime but there would always be freedom of religion in Zimbabwe. There was no intention to fight the Churches, nor were the churches seen as institutions of the enemy. He declared that both ZAPU and ZANU were innocent of any attacks on mission stations. "We have never done so and we will never do so. We regret all attacks on individual mission stations." Joshua Nkomo had also categorically denied that his forces had had anything to do with the attacks on the mission in Lupane. The Selous Scouts, Mugabe

pointed out, has massacred missionaries at Musami. "Why should we kill innocent missionaries?" he asked. "We have definite rules to guide our soldiers," he reminded the meeting. "Their prime duty is actually not to fight but to educate, to politicise the masses in such a way that they accept the struggle as their own." He said that the party was very strict on enforcing discipline even among the combatants. Moreover missionaries in the operational areas had been warned not to use certain roads because they were mined. But when the missionaries ignored such warnings, they unfortunately got killed. He said that he was aware and appreciative of the role played by the churches, especially through the Lutheran World Services in the refugee camps in Mozambique and in Tanzania. "We cannot ask you," he said, "for arms but for humanitarian assistance and we are grateful for that."⁴²

During questions and answers Mr Bergman wanted to know the fate of the young children who ran away from Rhodesia to Mozambique and also whether there was any possibility of providing pastoral care for people in the camps in the form of baptism, confirmation, services and Bible studies. In connection with the children Mugabe pointed out that even though they came to Mozambique demanding to be given arms to go and fight, they were not enrolled in the liberation forces. Instead they were kept in civilian camps where there were efforts to cater for their educational needs and where even the old civilians were trained as far as resources permitted, in self-help projects. When it came to the role of the clergy, ZANU was not entirely free to do as it liked, since their camps were under the joint administration of ZANU and the FRELIMO government of Mozambique. The latter at one time was not in favour of educated personnel living in the camps, so that a pastor might therefore need permission from that Government to carry out his duties.⁴³

The rest of the questions concerned the issue of practical assistance which the church could render to the refugees and that was subsequently contained in two formal documents of appeal for assistance. The first document indicated that ZANU was caring for more than 60 000 refugees of whom more than 9 000 were children of school going ages. The party also ran adult education courses, so that the biggest problem was that of reading materials and textbooks. The idea was to inculcate both in the adults and children principles of self-reliance and self-sufficiency. The courses therefore emphasised agriculture and industrial education. The party was appealing for materials published by Intermediate Technology in London.⁴⁴

The second request which was signed by Robert Mugabe himself appealed for food stuffs amounting to 93/4 million escudos, a lot of blankets and clothes, medicines and resources to enable the party to implement its various projects on self-reliance.⁴⁵ As already indicated, a lot of financial and material help began to flow to both liberation movements following the visits of both Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. However the significance of Mugabe's visit lay in his explicit declaration of the freedom of religious worship in an independent Zimbabwe as well as the willingness of his party to cooperate with the religious organisations during and after the liberation struggle. Indicative of the way the Lutheran constellation of churches welcomed Mugabe's hand of friendship was the manner in which his visit to the CSM was publicised and how parts of his talk relating to the churches were extensively quoted in the *LWF Information*, the official organ of the LWF, Geneva. The CSM and its sister national agencies, churches and international organisations were left in no doubt that the Zimbabwean revolution would not be like the Mozambican one which had turned out to be anti-christian. They thus chose to cooperate with both ZAPU and ZANU in order to set the stage for future harmonious state-church relationships.

Conclusion

The Manama exodus therefore inaugurated an important phase in the church and state relations, which culminated in the face to face dialogue between the CSM and the chief participants in the liberation struggle. Both Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe ended up coming to Sweden to explain their overall policies, especially with regards to the churches. The CSM was hesitant at first to have any dealings with the two liberation movements in case it should be seen to be supporting violence. Even though some of its officials, such as Tore Bergman and Tord Harlin, knew Zimbabweans and a lot about the nationalists they found their relations with the movements inhibited by the conservative sections of their church members in Sweden. But the Manama exodus and the worry and anxiety of the parents in Zimbabwe, who wanted CSM to be involved in the welfare of their children strengthened the hand of these officials to open direct contacts with the liberation movements in Zambia and Mozambique. The efforts of these officials were more than reciprocated

by the ZAPU and ZANU leaders, who saw the contact as a means of expanding their international relations as well as offering them opportunities to ask directly for material assistance.

During the dialogue it became quite clear that the liberation movements were not only anxious to cooperate with the churches within the framework of their revolutionary programme of mobilizing all the anti-colonial democratic forces but they promised and guaranteed fruitful church and state relations in an independent Zimbabwe. They were explicit in their affirmation that even though they were receiving military aid from the communist countries, they had the least intention of duplicating communist regimes and their religious policies in Zimbabwe. Instead their own policies would be founded on the realization that the churches had in the past played useful roles by providing welfare programmes for Africans in the face of reluctant colonial regimes. Secondly the future cooperation would be founded on the anti-colonial activities of the churches during the war. This dialogue laid the basis for the CSM's participation in the humanitarian refugee programmes mostly through the Lutheran World Federation. It further laid the basis for much greater and more effective participation in the rehabilitation and reconstruction after the war through the Evangelical Lutheran Church.

The ecclesiastical intervention in the refugee programmes of Zimbabweans occurred against a background of resumed and broadening Swedish secular cooperation with the liberation movements. Even though at first misunderstandings did arise between the Swedish Government and the liberation movements concerning the exact status of the Patriotic Front, Sweden quickly appreciated that the unity at best was in its embryonic stages and that the two parties basically fought the war separately and ran their refugee programmes separately. Thus, while recognising the existence of the shadowy Patriotic Front, Sweden decided to channel its aid to the two parties separately. Moreover, as shall become apparent below, Sweden maintained a policy of giving equal amount of aid to the two parties. At the same time the Swedes recognised that there were more Zimbabwe refugees in Mozambique than in Zambia and Botswana and decided to channel further support for them through the Mozambican government, which shared the responsibility for the refugee camps with ZANU.

II Towards Independence

Thus this part of our discussion indicates the increasing Swedish involvement in programmes of cooperation with the Zimbabwean liberation movements in the final and decisive phase of the war which extended to April 1980. These secular activities formed the favourable context within which the CSM, the LWF and the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe tried to find fresh areas of cooperation, which relationships eventually grew and matured in the programmes of reconstruction, rehabilitation and self-reliance.

a) SIDA Aid to ZAPU and ZANU 1977-8

As we have already seen, in the financial year 1976/77 SIDA committed 2.5 million Sw. Crs. to each of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. ZAPU devoted the amount to the purchase of food, clothes, vehicles and medicine for their refugee camps which carried 30,000 in Zambia and 5,000 in Botswana. ZANU on the other hand used its grant to purchase food, vehicles, agricultural equipment for self-help projects, shoes for refugees who were often attacked by rainy season parasites through their bare feet, to buy information materials and to finance their representation in Sweden. Over the above the 5 million CRs. paid directly to ZANU and ZAPU Sweden also granted 5 million Crs. to the government of Mozambique which looked after the greater number (35 000) of Zimbabwean refugees in their country. ZANU at the time only cared for 18 000.⁴⁶

For the financial year 1977/88 ZAPU, ZANU and the Mozambican government all asked for increased assistance on the grounds that the numbers of the refugees under their care had increased too. ZANU further contended that its liberated areas had also expanded. The Refugees Assistance Committee took these points into account and recommended that its government increases the grants. On the 17th November 1977 the Swedish government indeed authorised SIDA to allocate 5 million Crs. to each of the liberation movements in the Patriotic Front and 8 million Crs. to the government of Mozambique, making a total of 18 million Crs granted for the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe in that year.⁴⁷

In the financial year 1978/79 both ZAPU and ZANU again asked the government of Sweden to increase its amount of support to each of them. For the first time ZANU explicitly asked that it receives support for its humanitarian programmes in the liberated areas. Robert Mugabe, who presented and signed the application told the Swedish delegation that there was "a desperate need for medicines because the Rhodesian regime is withdrawing its hospitals. It is further important," he said, "that ZANU keeps open most of the schools in those areas."⁴⁸ Sweden granted each of the organisations 8 million Crs., making a total of 16 million Crs.⁴⁹ This amount was increased towards the end of 1978 when the two parties again approached the Swedish government with urgent applications. ZANU desperately needed assistance in the liberated areas, while ZAPU had two of its camps bombed by the Rhodesians, killing 300 refugees and injuring a lot more. Most of its food stores, medical supplies and vehicles had been completely destroyed. ZAPU needed assistance to replenish its stores, to buy artificial limbs for the disabled victims of the Rhodesian bombings and for the resettlement of the survivors in new camps located away from Lusaka, which was vulnerable to Rhodesian air raids. Each party was granted 2 million Crs. for its emergency programmes bringing the whole amount granted to the two parties in 1978/79 to 20 million Crs.

This was indeed the biggest amount ever granted by Sweden in any one year to Zimbabwean liberation movements before they formed a national government. The end of 1979 turned out to be the turning point in the history of the liberation struggle. On the 11th December 1979 the Rhodesian settlers gave up their rebellion of 1965 and Rhodesia formally reverted to its status of a British colony, when Lord Soames took control of the country. On 21st December 1979 the independence agreement was signed in London by the British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, the Patriotic Front leaders, Robert Mugabe (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and Abel Muzorewa (UANC). The ceasefire started on the 28th December and by the beginning of January 1980 ZAPU/ZANU guerrillas had orderly congregated in designated camps. The voting in the independence elections took place from the 27th to 29th February and on the 4th March 1980 ZANU was declared the winner, so that Robert Mugabe became the first Prime Minister and Head of the government of independent Zimbabwe.

In the meantime, however, towards the end of 1979 when the Lancaster settlement was concluded both ZAPU and ZANU applied for further assistance to repatriate their refugees to Zimbabwe and to feed

refugees both in the transit camps in Zimbabwe and those still remaining in Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia until the general election in March 1980. They were each given aid amounting 5 million Crs. Thus between 1977 and March 1980 the government of Sweden provided the two liberation movements with grants amounting to 53 million Crs.

In the decisive phase of the war Sweden thus became perhaps the biggest Western donor country for the Zimbabwean liberation movements. Its aid was directed towards the humanitarian projects for the refugees in Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique and the welfare needs of ZANU's liberated areas. The aid during the war laid a basis for future co-operation between Sweden and independent Zimbabwe. Indeed during the war Swedish officials in Mozambique had established some contacts with some ZANU people, some of whom became ministers at independence and were therefore seen as the means by which Sweden should establish permanent relations with Zimbabwe. "Our closest contacts during the years in Maputo," one Swedish official reported to SIDA, Stockholm "have been with Mugabe himself, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, [Simon V.] Muzenda, Minister of Civil Affairs [Richard] Hove, the Minister of Works and Social Affairs [Kumbirai] Kangai, the Minister of Housing [Edson] Zvobgo, the Minister of Transport Ernest Kadungure, the Minister of Information Nathan Shamuyarira, the Minister of Health Herbert Ushewokunze and the Minister of Youth Teurai Ropa, all of them having in one way or the other been actively involved in co-operation with Sweden."⁵⁰ Sweden was thus beginning to transform its relationships from those of government to liberation movements to those of government to government.

In fact soon after ZANU had gained an overwhelming election victory and before Mugabe could form his government the Swedish Embassy in Maputo, which had co-operated closely with ZANU during the war, was already mapping out areas of immediate and long-term co-operation with the ZANU government and advising their own government not to lose time in implementing such plans. In other words the momentum in good relations with ZANU already gained during the war should not be slowed down. The Maputo Embassy consequently produced a position paper on "Co-operation programme with ZANU/Zimbabwe" on the 4th March 1980, outlining how Swedish diplomatic contacts would be maintained with Zimbabwe in the interim, the manner in which humanitarian aid to ZANU which had already been granted would continue to be channelled and perhaps be used as a basis for long-

term co-operation, and what new areas of co-operation could be seen in the horizon from some in-depth interviews with Robert Mugabe.⁵¹

The Maputo Swedish Embassy pointed out that until formal Swedish representation had been set up in Zimbabwe, Sweden's assistance to that country should be channelled through neighbouring places especially Lusaka and Maputo. Since most of the aid to ZANU during the war had gone through Maputo, the Embassy urged that in the transitional period to formal links with Salisbury the SIDA office in Mozambique should constitute the main area of contact with Zimbabwe. SIDA officials in Mozambique would be required to make periodic visits to Salisbury to discuss with the government of Zimbabwe issues of cooperation.⁵²

Of immediate concern were the sea ports to be used to channel goods to Zimbabwe and the use of the 5 million Crs, which had been granted to ZANU in January. For a long time ZANU had received its material assistance through the ports of Maputo and Beira. Since the routes to Zimbabwe from Mozambique had been severed when President Samora Machel closed his border with Rhodesia it was now necessary for Sweden and Zimbabwe to work out channels which would guarantee that any further material aid would get to Zimbabwe. This issue together with the 5 million Crs. needed to be finalised soon by representatives of SIDA offices in Mozambique and Zambia and representatives of the new government in Salisbury.⁵³

The next urgent issue was the one of the 189 000 refugees still remaining in Mozambique. Sweden had always supported those refugees through ZANU itself and through the Nudea de Apaia, the Mozambican official agency responsible for refugees. In an interview with Robert Mugabe it had become apparent that the repatriation programme of refugees from Mozambique would be considerably slowed down for several reasons. First it had become obvious to ZANU that the colonial administration and its forces of security subjected the returners to unnecessary harassment through interrogations. Muzorewa too immediately threw his recruiters for his party among the refugees, who then used all manner of pressures to gain the support of those destitutes. The slowing down of the repatriation programme, however, also meant that fresh discussions with Nudea de Apaia and the government of Zimbabwe had become urgent in order to arrange for emergency relief for the refugees still in Mozambique and for any financial assistance to Zimbabwe for their changed programmes of repatriation and resettlement.⁵⁴

Finally the Embassy in Maputo wanted to start negotiations for long-term co-operation programme with the new government of Zimbabwe. At a meeting with the Embassy officials in Maputo during his brief visit there on the 29th February 1980, Mugabe mentioned some areas which could fall within the cooperation between Sweden and Zimbabwe. The Maputo Swedish Embassy's view was that Sweden should immediately grab ZANU's extended hand of friendship:

With the goodwill of Sweden in ZANU quarters it should be logical that Sweden should soon start more permanent co-operation with the new regime. Even if a major part of the assistance in the first place should have the form of emergency relief it is important that the amount of contacts between Sweden and ZANU should be maintained and intensified and that talks should be initiated concerning more long-term cooperation. Mugabe mentioned as possible priority areas of education and health. Earlier on also scholarships (to meet the needs in the mining sector) have been discussed on a number of occasions. We cannot expect that Zimbabwe already now will be able to present definitive plans for the structure of a long-term nature. It is important today to maintain the good co-operation which Sweden has evolved between Sweden and ZANU and to take the first contacts towards a long-term co-operation. We suggest that such contacts should be taken as soon as possible and that a representative of SIDA office, Maputo, becomes part of the delegation which shall prepare such a programme.⁵⁵

The Maputo Embassy also put a further strong reason for maintaining Swedish contacts with Zimbabwe through Mozambique. The Embassy pointed to the strong relationships between ZANU and the government of Mozambique to the extent that ZANU would maintain its office in Maputo, while trade and communications between the two countries would be restored almost immediately. "Everything indicates," the Embassy said, "that the co-operation [between Zimbabwe and Mozambique] will be very close - a co-operation which will be, mutually enriching."⁵⁶

In conclusion the Embassy summarised its proposals for action as follows:

As soon as possible: A delegation from SIDA [Stockholm], SIDA offices in Lusaka and Maputo goes to Zambia in order to define the terms of the implementation of the agreed refugee programme. Within a few months: A delegation from SIDA with a representative of SIDA office Maputo starts discussions on the future long-term co-operation and the planning of the emergency relief in Zimbabwe.⁵⁷

The coming of independence therefore offered Sweden and the new government of Zimbabwe the opportunity to transform and extend their war-time bilateral co-operation into developmental co-operation. The matter was seen especially by the officials on the spot in Maputo as one of some urgency. Indeed, as shall be indicated below, the independence celebrations were used as the occasion on which the two sides seriously mapped out their areas of cooperation. This was the background against which the Church of Sweden, through its CSM, tried to expand and extend its cooperation with its sister church - the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe, especially in the era of reconstruction.

b) The Search and Renewal of Ecclesiastical Cooperation

When the ceasefire was declared, the head of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe, Bishop J.C. Shiri's immediate reaction was to think of rebuilding his Church's schools, hospitals, clinics, chapels, churches and other related buildings and facilities. He sought assurances from both the old colonial regime's officials and top politicians of the Patriotic Front (ZAPU and ZANU) that churches would be allowed to continue with their old roles. Both the Rev Canaan S. Banana, the man destined to become the first President of Independent Zimbabwe, and Vote Moyo, a leading ZAPU politician, encouraged the Bishop to go ahead with his programme of reviving his institutions. Drawing upon the reports of the pastors, evangelists, headmasters and ordinary Christians and on a recent report by one of his pastors, the Rev L. Sifobela,⁵⁸ Bishop Shiri wrote a preliminary report which he used as a basis for approaching the CSM and other donor agencies for possible funding for the recon-

struction of the Church institutions. The report only indicated the extent of the destruction which was known and could not give any useful estimates of what it would take to either rebuild or to repair the buildings; that would await a civil and structural engineer to make the costings.⁵⁹

In Uppsala the Bishop was able to present his request to the representatives of the CSM Board, SIDA and LWF Community Department Service (CDS). This started off a remarkably well orchestrated campaign for funds throughout the Lutheran world which assumed some crusadal zeal. The aim was to get the Church's institutions on their two feet again in as short a time as possible. LWF's CDS immediately indicated its willingness to appeal for up to US\$500 000 for the "Assistance for the Re-opening of medical and educational facilities and Diaconic Fund," if the Bishop could supply the cost estimates. The SIDA people, representing the Government, listened to the Bishop but could not come into the picture until the new government of Zimbabwe had been elected. The CSM on the other hand wanted to send its "representatives to Zimbabwe so that they could report back to their Church."⁶⁰

But the Bishop wasted no time in following up the offer from the L.W.F. (CDS). By the 10th January 1980 he had a project document drawn up to appeal for the US\$500 000. It was said that the project aimed at helping the suffering population; to bring the children back to school; to assist in establishing normal order; to help in building a free and independent Zimbabwe; to restore hope and faith for people; and to promote and demonstrate reconciliation. It was pointed out that the request was being made between the ceasefire and the elections so that no long term plans could be made, since much would depend on the policies of the new government. But even at that stage of uncertainty there were "burning needs in the medical and educational fields and great suffering amongst the population." The religious institutions were in a position, provided they got some outside help, to re-open some of their old facilities. The Lutheran Church before the War, for instance, had hospitals at Musume, Mnene, Masase and Manama; clinics at Mavorovondo, Mazetese, Gungwe, Shashe, Majini and Zezani, primary schools at Beit Bridge, Mnene and Zezani and secondary schools at Chegato, Manama, Musume and Masase. During the war all clinics shut down; only Mnene and Beit Bridge primary schools remained open and only Musume secondary school survived. The Church therefore wanted funds to open Masase, Chegato and Manama secondary schools as soon as possible and to start medical work at all the clinics immediately. The Church needed

money to try and set up pre-fabricated buildings, buy medicines and educational equipment and stationary. It was urgent that the young people got back to school again. It had to be understood that the appeal was to cover the short term needs; the CDS would be coming back to its supporters with long term needs as soon as a proper assessment and costings had been carried out. "In addition to the task that can be fulfilled by the Institutions," the appeal stated, "the Evangelical Lutheran Church has to cater for other humanitarian needs which arise out of the unsettled situation in the towns, the rural areas, and possibly in connection with the repatriation of the refugees from the neighbouring countries. Negotiations are under way concerning the repatriation, and it seems likely that the UNHCR, in co-operation with the ICRC and others, will call on the LWF/WS as its operational partner to bring those refugees who will return to several border places. An appeal along these lines for \$455 000 was sent out by the Department of World Service in late December 1979. For the humanitarian needs within Zimbabwe the Lutheran Church would request a further allocation to the Diaconic Fund established in August 1978 in an amount of some \$100 000 which would be part of the request of up to \$500 000."⁶¹

Indeed it did not take long for the project to be approved so that Miss Christa Held, the Travelling representative of the LWF/CDS, wrote to Bishop Shiri on the 25th January, 1980:

It is with very great pleasure that I inform you today that the request which the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe submitted to CDS in an amount of up to \$500 000 for assistance, re-opening of medical and educational facilities and replenishment of the Diaconic Fund has been approved. This CDS Governing Committee did this with great joy and was very happy that you think there is the possibility to re-establish very soon some of those facilities which are so urgently needed. We have already the first indication for funds coming in and will certainly keep you informed.⁶²

On the 11th February the whole network system of the LWF was contacted by express mail, with each national organisation being politely apprised of the amount of contribution expected from it towards the "Assistance for Zimbabwe." It was tentatively foreseen that the following grants would materialise:⁶³

Lutheran World Ministries, USA	US\$25 000
Lutheran World Relief, USA	25 000
Evangelische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe, E.V. Germany	150 000
Canadian Lutheran World Relief	50 000
Norwegian Church Aid	25 000
Dan Church Aid	100 000
Lutherhjælpen, Sweden	150 000
Total Amount	<u>US\$525 000</u>

In the meantime the CSM also wanted to do its own rough assessment of the situation and to discuss with the ELC any future plans. The Acting Secretary for Southern Africa in the absence of Tore Bergman in the CSM was the polite but extremely articulate and erudite Rev Dr Axel -Ivar Berglund, who as we have seen was no foreigner to Southern Africa. He began to make the itinerary arrangements for his delegation soon after Bishop Shiri's visit to Sweden. On the 28th January 1980 he wrote to the bishop confirming that the consultation in Zimbabwe would take place as previously arranged from the 21st to the 26th March and that the first four days would be taken up by visits to some of the damaged places. The 25th and 26th March would be devoted to deliberations. The CSM proposed to send four delegates and the bishop would be responsible for getting together his own team, which should include persons "who would be able to give first-hand information and advice in regard how forthcoming Swedish help might best be implemented."⁶

The meeting of the two delegations took place at Njube Youth Centre, Bulawayo, on the 25th March 1980. The Swedish delegation consisted of C. Hamilton, the Vice Chairman of the CSM Governing Board, A.I. Berglund, the Acting Secretary for Southern Africa, Tord Harlin and A. Weiyel, representing the LWF(SS). The Zimbabwean side included Bishop Shiri, Dean A.A. Noko, the Bishop's Deputy, Rev J.S. Moyo, Member of DSC, Musume, Rev E.F. Moyo, Convenor of the Medical Board, Mr E.C. Hove, Education Secretary and Mr S. Mlambo, Member of the Church Council. The meeting agreed that one of the priorities was to get three medical doctors for Mnene and Manama hospitals and an engineer to look after the long-term reconstruction projects. The churches and chapels, it was said, needed not only rebuilding but also finding out whether in the reconstruction the overcrowding

which was already apparent in some churches and chapels could not be taken care of, possibly by extending the existing buildings. Some clinics which were remote so much so that there was nowhere else the people could medically be attended to, needed to be re-opened immediately. Those included Mazetese, Chingezi and Shashi. It was also thought advisable not to invest too much in terms of medical equipment, first without the advice of a qualified doctor and secondly without any knowledge of the medical policy of the new government. The next area of major concern for the ELC was to find the financial means of expanding its evangelism in the urban areas because of the increased rural-urban migrations. The ELCZ further indicated that she would in the near future require missionary doctors, engineers, sister tutors and other skilled personnel. The local Church pointed out its difficulties in raising money for the running expenses, including salaries for its pastors and other workers, and therefore appealed for "a substantial grant for about five years in which time it is hoped that the country and the Church could recover from the ravages of 7 years of war."⁶⁵ On the whole the meeting was extremely cordial; but it also, above anything else, showed through the substantial requests made by the local Church that the involvement of the CSM in Zimbabwe, inspite of the optimistic period of 7 years, would be long, if not indefinite.

In the meantime, on the 24th June 1980 Bishop Shiri was informed by the LWF that though it had not been possible to raise the full promised amount, the various Lutheran agencies and their local churches had already pledged as much as US\$399 100. At the same time on the basis of the initial positive response from the LWF the ELCZ had gone ahead and re-opened some of their schools because they had the teachers and the pupils ready to start. Masase Secondary School re-opened on the 11th February 1980 and the teachers started teaching when the builders were working on the classrooms. Manama started in Bulawayo and moved to the Mission on the 4th March. It was difficult to re-open the remote clinics because even though the nurses might be available they could not get medicines from the Government Drug Stores in town. The requisitions for medicines needed the signatures of qualified doctors and the Church had no such personnel. For the big hospitals the requisitions were sent to the bishop, who then ran around town in Bulawayo looking for a qualified doctor to sign them.⁶⁶

At the same time as the LWF was busy trying to resuscitate the old schools and medical institutions which were usable without major reconstruction; operations and investigations were underway to get assessments of the long term reconstruction programmes. In January 1980 the LWF/CDS identified Niels E. Graulund, a civil and structural engineer with his wife Hanne, a teacher and technical assistant, and offered to pay his salary so that he could assess the exact needs of the church and even supervise the initial reconstruction. The advantage of Graulund was that he had worked in Zimbabwe from 1959 to 1964 and had been involved in the construction of some of the schools and other church buildings. Graulund and his wife, who were accepted by the Lutheran Church, took up their assignment on the 10th April and worked on the project until the 8th September 1980, when they produced their final report.

The ceasefire in Zimbabwe thus signalled the beginning of a search for major co-operation between the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe and the Church of Sweden. The Church of Sweden, through its agencies, the CSM and the Lutherhjälpen, operated either single-handedly or through the vast international network of the L.W.F. The ceasefire and the new needs of reconstruction in the war-torn Lutheran Church therefore helped to renew the involvement of the Church of Sweden in Zimbabwe where it had started pulling out when the war intensified from 1976.

c) The Joy of Independence

After several years of fighting and enormous bloodshed Zimbabwe celebrated its independence with great joy on 18th April, 1980. The occasion was attended by many outside leaders, including those of the neighbouring countries which had supported Zimbabwe through offers of military bases and refugee camps. Included among the guests was a strong delegation from Sweden, whose presence was indicative of the people of Zimbabwe's appreciation for the material and moral support already rendered and of Zimbabwe's new government's awareness of the potential for broadening of the field of assistance in their independent country. The Zimbabwe leaders demonstrated the value they placed on their now long standing friendship with Sweden by their request to the Swedish government that it should send "a broadly based delegation to the Independence Day." Indeed most of the key friends of Zimbabweans

and representatives of the Swedish institutions which had supported the liberation struggle were included in the delegation, which was led by the Swedish Minister of Education.

There was also Mr Bo Heineback, Head of the Swedish Liaison Office in the then Salisbury, who had always played a key role in co-ordinating all Swedish groups with an interest in Zimbabwe as well as in making sure that liberation movements were placed in touch with those groups, Mr Per Wastberg, Author and Chief Editor of *Dagens Nyheter*, and his wife Margareta Ekstrom, who had developed into personal deep friends of Robert Mugabe, having taken a keen interest in him and kept his memory well alive whilst he was in prison by writing regularly about him for the Swedish Amnesty International; Tore Furberg, the Director of the Church of Sweden Mission; and Mr Nils Landquist, President of the Swedish Federation of Industries. There were also five officials who accompanied the delegation and who at the end of the celebration remained behind attending a regional conference to work out the aid needs of new Zimbabwe.⁶⁷

Thus the independence celebrations formed a watershed in the relationships of Sweden with the people of Zimbabwe, which up to that point had been conducted and sustained through guerrilla organisations. Both the government and the Church of Sweden began to look for ways and means of operating through formal agreements with the government of Zimbabwe and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Zimbabwe. In terms of the Swedish co-operation with the Zimbabwe liberation movements it can be truly remarked that, other than Sweden itself in relation too the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies: never before in the history of western countries' international relations had a western country, with no obligations of prior colonial ties beyond the ecclesiastical ones, responded so positively, so immediately and so generously to the pleas for friendship and assistance from, some may even say, groups of guerrillas with no track record whatsoever of ability to govern a country. Sweden earned the distinction of doing just that and after independence its aid to new Zimbabwe through official channels and non-governmental organisations quickly outstripped that of many other countries so that between 1980 and 1984, she was the third major donor country to Zimbabwe, after the United States and the United Kingdom.⁶⁸

The period 1976 to 1980 thus saw a resurgence of the Swedish ecclesiastical co-operation with the people of Zimbabwe, which had

showed signs of cooling off with the rapid escalation of the war. The major event which persuaded many church men to intervene in the welfare programmes of the Zimbabwe refugees in Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique was the abduction of the Manama children from the ELCZ. This happened against a background also of renewed Swedish secular co-operation with ZAPU and ZANU especially following the failure of the Geneva conference and the decision of the parties to revive their fighting programmes. These areas of co-operation formed a basis upon which both the Zimbabwean and Swedish secular and church forces sought at independence to build more lasting and developmental contacts. The last chapter will attempt to illustrate how these contracts from the church side were formulated and even sustained through a new and accommodating Document of Agreement.

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7 The Era of Reconstruction

Introduction

The cooperation between the Church of Sweden through the CSM and the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe was extended and even formalised by means of a new agreement during the era of reconstruction. This took place in the favourable atmosphere of harmonious church-State relations cultivated by the new ZANU-PF government as well as against a background of formal government to government co-operation for development between Zimbabwe and Sweden.

a) **Towards a Community of Interest between Church and State**

Both during and after the war ZANU predicated its revolutionary programme upon an ideology which accommodated religious freedom and envisaged a harmonious partnership between christian religious institutions and the government in an independent Zimbabwe. (see Chapter II) Robert Mugabe, the chief spokesman of the party during the liberation struggle and the new Prime Minister of independent Zimbabwe, clearly stated the place of religion and religious institutions in ZANU's Marxist-Leninist revolutionary programme. The party's socialism was stated as not anti-christian but as aiming at (among other things) mutual and fruitful co-operation with the christian churches and in that context, indeed, the party proclaimed in its election manifesto of 1980, "Freedom of Religion and an assured Role for the Church." This was a powerful plea for co-operation between church and state, which in the end produced confidence in the ecclesiastical circles to play their role in the development of the country.

A further issue which underlined an identity of interests and aspirations between the churches and the new ZANU-PF government was their

serious commitment to peace and reconciliation. In 1978 and 1979 both the Roman Catholic Bishop's Conference and the Zimbabwe Christian Council during their different missions urged the various political leaders to work for peace and reconciliation. Moreover all the churches in independent Zimbabwe subscribed to this policy and made concerted efforts to raise funds locally and abroad to rebuilt their war-torn institutions and to resettle the uprooted refugees both in the country and outside. In this way the churches smoothly fitted into the new government's programmes of reconstruction, resettlement and rehabilitation, whose vigorous implementation assumed a crusadal tone, especially in the immediate post-war era.

Even more conducive to harmonious state-church relations was Mugabe's determination in the immediate post war era to reaffirm his commitment to full co-operation with the national churches, his continued preaching of the difference between the brand of socialism pursued by Zimbabwe from other brands and his explanations of how his Marxism-Leninism was fully compatible with the fundamental christian abhorrence of some of the evils attendant upon the callous system of capitalism - such as the economic and social inequalities engendered by the exploitation of man by man.

After independence Mugabe had several occasions on which he tried to explain the ideological position of his government and how he thought the churches should seek their creative roles in the development of the country in the context of that ideology. In February and April 1982 he addressed the Roman Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Heads of Denominations respectively. On both occasions Mugabe affirmed his party's commitment to social transformation in Zimbabwe on the basis of scientific socialism, a transformation, indeed, which placed the workers and peasants or the colonially neglected and exploited sections of society at the centre. He called on the churches and other non-governmental organisations to join hands with the government in this noble task of bringing about the economic and social development of Zimbabwe. In this he saw the churches not as taking up a new task but as continuing their role which they had assumed during the liberation struggle when they refused to have anything to do with UDI and its concomitant evils. Mugabe met the church leaders again on April 5, 1983, this time to react to mounting and scathing criticisms from the Catholic Church for the manner in which the government security forces conducted their operations against dissidents in Matebeleland. He was concerned that the Catholics only criticised government forces but were

silent when it came to the atrocities committed by the dissidents. Even in those circumstances of apparent strained church and state relations, Mugabe "reaffirmed his conviction that there is a solid theoretical base for positive interaction between Church and State and he pleaded that the Churches should be attuned to the new realities of the new Zimbabwe."¹

As Hallencreutz has shown, Mugabe continued to talk to ecclesiastical bodies and all the time emphasised not only the need but also, from his government's point of view, the existence of vast areas for state and church co-operation for the benefit of the country as a whole. It was the same message which other ZANU government officials, whenever they got a chance, tried to put across. Thus Hallencreutz again concludes apropos of the Zimbabwe church and state relations under ZANU-PF that even though the ideological framework was Marxist-Leninist, the manner in which the ideology was applied allowed religion "to play a significant role in the continued social transformation" of the country,² a point which Hallencreutz again elaborates upon and tries to illustrate further in his most illuminating paper, "Ecumenical Challenges in Independent Zimbabwe: ZCC 1980 - 1985."³

It was against this background of harmonious church and state relations that the Lutheran Church, whose Bishop Shiri was the President of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches and had the singular honour of echoing Mugabe's "eloquent plea for Reconciliation and National Unity at the Independence Ceremony on April 17 - 18,"⁴ renewed and formalized its co-operation with the CSM. It is also more than likely that the extended and formal co-operation between the governments of Sweden and Zimbabwe helped to strengthen the CSM's resolve to expand its involvement in its former mission field, so that a brief look at the expansion of Swedish governmental aid to independent Zimbabwe is necessary.

b) New National Partners

At independence Swedish aid, which had hitherto been concentrated on refugee relief programmes and conducted through the liberation movements of ZANU and ZAPU or through the Mozambican authorities, was transformed and very much expanded so that it was at first directed towards the resettlement of refugees and the reconstruction of the war-

torn country. Thus in co-operation with the government of Zimbabwe Sweden granted 40 million Sw. Crs. in the fiscal year 1980-81 for projects mainly to do with reconstruction and rehabilitation. In a few years Swedish aid broadened to cover such areas as research, which fell under SAREC, support for investments and support for Zimbabwe's efforts to lessen her historical economic dependence on South Africa. In Zimbabwe itself Swedish assistance aimed at helping to raise the living standards of the rural poor masses and in the latter years Swedish aid has also moved into education and health. Starting at 40 million Crs. Swedish annual aid rapidly rose until it reached 150 million Sw. Crs. in 1987. By 1987 it was estimated that Sweden had committed to Zimbabwe a little over 1 billion Sw. Crs. of which 730 million had already been used.⁵ This massive Swedish secular aid to Zimbabwe together with the favourable religious atmosphere created by the new Zimbabwe government formed a conducive background for the re-involvement of the CSM in its former mission field.

c) The Church's Commitment to Reconstruction

The CSM responded to the appeal from Bishop Shiri for assistance in the reconstruction almost immediately. The task initially was to get the old schools, hospitals, clinics, churches and chapels going again. Unlike the schools which had teachers headmasters and pupils ready to resume their tasks, the hospitals and clinics had their war destruction compounded by the fact that there were no medical doctors and State Registered Nurses. All the missionary personnel who had run those facilities had been withdrawn by 1977, while most of the African State Registered Nurses had run away to the safety of the urban areas and the only African medical doctor, Mushori Zhou, had been murdered by the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. Yet only SRNs and qualified medical doctors could order drugs and equipment for the rehabilitation of the hospitals and also get the medical school for nurses at Mnene going.

The task fell on the CSM to find the necessary manpower as quickly as possible and on short term contracts, not of the usual two years, but of 6 month to 1 year. Members of the Mission Board organised meetings in Stockholm with doctors and nurses during which the idea was to stimulate some interest among them to go to Mnene, Musume, Manama and

Masase to revive the church's medical work after the war ravages. This was a challenge to which many of the medical personnel who had once worked in Zimbabwe and felt attachment to the country and people responded most favourably. A task force of very competent nurses and doctors, was soon raised, consisting of Drs I. Lofquist, C. Rune, L. Dahlin K. Dahlin and W. Thurfjell and State Registered Nurses Elsa Stromberg, B. Palmis, A. Nordsijo and V. Bengtsson. A much more permanent arrangement for the running of the hospitals and clinics, which is still operative at the time of writing, was found when the CSM and the ELCZ agreed with the Dienst Over Grenze (Service Abroad) of Holland that the CSM and Dienst Over Granze would supply the Lutheran Church with four doctors a year.⁶

The presence of qualified doctors in the local church in conjunction with the new government's keen interest in rural health care stimulated the Lutheran Church to broaden its health programmes as well. The new government was conscious of the fact that health was "a necessary and primary condition of development" and was further "determined to undertake a vigorous programme for the development of the country and for equal distribution of the benefits." The emphasis on health was therefore "on promotive and preventive measures and on increasing health facilities in the rural areas."⁷ The government planned to set up an integrated health service structure with graded levels of care. There would be village workers who would be the first level of contact with the community and the health system. The village Health Workers (VHWs) would refer the patients to the rural health centres. Rural health centres were being built and staffed and the rural clinics were also being upgraded to the status of the rural health centres. It also meant that rural hospitals had to be considerably strengthened in order to cope with the increased responsibilities brought about by the activities of the VHWs and the rural health centres. There was a further need for the setting up of "a number of priority primary health care programmes such as water supply, sanitary measures, maternal and child health and child spacing, nutrition education programme, malaria and bilharzia control."⁸

The implications of the government policy for the ELCZ, which ran nearly all the health services in Gwanda, Beit Bridge and Mberengwa districts, were enormous. Even after it became possible at independence to hand over responsibility for clinics to the rural councils, the Church still provided the only hospital services available, except for the small

government hospitals at Mberengwa district office, Gwanda and Beit Bridge.

It was in that context that the ELCZ drew up a Five Year Plan designed to upgrade the standard of its hospitals through provision of modern equipment and buildings and through an expanded training programme for medical assistants and other health workers. The Church also ventured into the village health care programme by setting up its own intensive pilot scheme at Chabwira in Mberengwa, which was going to act as a model and as a centre for training VHWs. While the Ministry of Health of the new government was paying for the running costs of the hospitals, some of the repair costs to the hospitals and some for the new equipment, there remained many aspects for which the Church in the true spirit of partnership with the state was expected to pay financially.

Consequently the local Church, through its parent body, the CSM, had to approach SIDA in 1981 with a view to securing funds for "new equipment, erection of some new staff quarters, extension of the nurses training school, costs for refresher courses for medical assistants and village health workers, and for the community health programme in the model areas."⁹

The local Church further decided to set up a Nutrition Rehabilitation Village near Mnene with some gift money from the Freedom from Hunger and the Lutheran World Federation. It was meant to be a highly integrated programme, offering courses in nutrition, health, and agriculture. Fifteen men and women would be selected from a village ward at a time to come to the Nutrition Rehabilitation Village for short training and they would be expected to carry their knowledge to the rest of their communities. The whole idea was to show people the relationship between agricultural activities and good health habits.¹⁰

Apart from health matters, the Church with the help and encouragement of the CSM and the LWF branched into new developmental areas designed to benefit the rural people. One of the successful programmes was that of the Non-Formal Education at Masase. It was started by a combination of initiatives from Sweden and Zimbabwe. In Sweden the initiative was taken up by the Swedish Church Study Association (SKS) which sent a delegation to investigate the possibilities of starting self-help projects and found enthusiastic reception at Masase, especially from the Rev. Lawyers Moyo, who was the pastor in charge of the mission. The main idea was to get people to organise themselves for community

development by mounting programmes which could generate income for them. Thus people started such things as dam construction to provide water for drinking and to water vegetable gardens and such crafts as sewing, basketry and bakeries. As Bishop Shiri reported in 1985: "By June 1984, 303 groups [under the Non-Formal Education Programme] had been formed with a total active number of participants of 5,506." The scheme was very popular and was spreading widely in the areas served by the Church. The money to give the programme a start was secured from SIDA.¹¹

Besides, soon after the coming of independence individuals, organisations, churches and the government started plans and programmes to re-establish, repair and improve water supply facilities. In the ELCZ it was the women who took the initiative under the leadership of the bishop's wife, Mrs Rugare Shiri, and through their ecclesiastical organisation, the *vashandiri*. It was noticed that women in the villages spent too much time walking long distances to go and fetch water for domestic use. The *vashandiri* therefore appealed to the LWF for assistance to make available in their two main districts of Gwanda and Mberengwa. The LWF supplied a water engineer and established a Village Water Supply Programme. "A detailed survey was initiated, members and pastors of [the] ELCZ as well as other members of the local communities actively provided relevant informations, advice and in-depth knowledge of the local situations and at times also transport. Special emphasis was on the involvement of women in the project implementation." Village committees were set up to pull together resources and "to provide accommodation and food for wellsinkers, supply sand, stones and bricks and to assist in the transportation. In July 1981 23 wellsinking projects were in progress." Hand pumps were being fitted. Hand in hand with the village programmes was also another LWF scheme to repair all the water supplies of the mission stations which were damaged during the war and whose cost was beyond the Church's means.

But to appreciate the mammoth task of reconstruction which lay before the CSM and its LWF network and how this was quickly accomplished we have to turn first to the assessments of the war damages by the Graulunds. Mr Graulund and his wife produced their preliminary assessment of the Church's damaged institutions on the 1st May 1980. The final report which was produced in August 1980 only served to supplement, update and, to a minor extent, to revise the preliminary report. The

fundamental purpose of both reports was "to enable the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe to present in financial terms its needs for repairing, rebuilding and re-equipping its institutions damaged during the war against colonialism." The final report tried to give a complete list of all the ELCZ real property; to explain the methods used in registering the war damages to property; to describe the general pattern of the war damage and the extent of the damage in the various places; and to give in financial terms the final assessment.

The list of property revealed that apart from 1 church centre, 1 primary school and 14 churches and chapels which were in the urban areas, the ELCZ was basically a rural Church where most of its institutions were located. In the rural areas the Church had 6 major stations, 6 minor stations with clinics and 101 churches/chapels with or without housing and offices.

Nearly all the war damages to property were registered in the rural areas and the pattern of the damages revealed that most of the buildings and other installations had been interfered with by people who were stealing things they could carry away and use in their own homes. As a result many buildings had their roofs, windows, doors, door frames, equipment and furniture stolen. Vandals had also removed or broken sanitary ware, damaged water installations and removed telephone and electrical installations. Walls had been demolished only in very few cases, while ground slabs, foundations and septic tanks seemed intact everywhere. Some wooden floors had been spoiled by rains and fire and smooth concrete floors were intact, except where door frames had been forcibly removed. "The pattern of damage to joint services," the engineers observed, "is that fences have been removed, pumps and motors removed or destroyed and minor damage is done to main water pipes. Telephone and electrical overhead fittings and wires are removed and poles cut or bent. Some telephone and electrical supply mains have been out for long distance."¹⁵

The Graulunds singled out certain stations for detailed description of the damages. Chegato, they said, was damaged most extensively compared to the whole church property. Not a single building remained undamaged, and five of the buildings had even their walls destroyed beyond repair. Fences were all destroyed, water mains were damaged and partly dislodged and pumps damaged. Electrical and telephone installations, mains and poles were destroyed and equipment and furniture all looted.

Masase, though slightly less damaged than Chegato, did not have a single building undamaged. Fence and water mains were severely damaged, water pumps either removed or damaged. Telephone and electricity mains and poles were destroyed and the electricity engine destroyed. At Masase all equipment and furnishing had been stored in the school dining hall, which had been later looted and burnt out. At Majini all buildings were damaged and most of the equipment and furnishings had been stolen. Mavorovondo and Mazetese were as heavily damaged as Chegato. But Manama and the rest of the small stations were only slightly damaged. In terms of churches and chapels, 18 of those and 2 houses attached to them were heavily damaged; 48 others and 23 parsonages were lightly damaged; and 28 parish halls, offices, etc. were also lightly damaged.¹⁶ The final assessment of the total damage to the Church's property during the war amounted to Z\$2,302,000. Of that amount the Educational Institutions accounted for Z\$1 400 000, Medical Institutions for Z\$357 000, churches and chapels as well as related buildings for Z\$442 000 and Mnene Farm for Z\$83 000.¹⁷

The big advantage for the ELCZ was that she enjoyed special relationships with the Lutheran World Federation. Even though she was dependent financially on her parent body, the CSM, she became in her own right a full member of the LWF at its Assembly held in Helsinki on July 30 to August 11, 1963. At the 6th Assembly of the LWF held in Dar es Salaam in June 1977 the ELCZ bishop, Shiri, was elected member of the Commission on the World Service. In this position, he was able to appeal for funds directly to the LWF as well as through the CSM in Uppsala.¹⁸

Even before the final report was issued by the Graulunds, the LWF/CDS used the figures in the preliminary report as a basis for campaigning for funds for the "Reconstruction Project Zimbabwe," which were intended to cover only the Educational and Medical Institutions.¹⁹ What that meant in reality was that they wanted to reconstruct the heavily damaged schools, hospitals and clinics, such as Chegato, Masase, Mazetese, Mavorovondo and Majini. This left out the problem of places worn out through neglect and disuse as well as the issue of expansion wherever possible, which related to the least damaged missions, such as Manama, Musume and Mnene. As we have seen, the CSM appealed to SIDA to cover the latter problem. Furthermore, the CSM agreed to raise the funds for the rehabilitating and rebuilding of the churches and chapels. By August 1981 it had only raised Z\$50 000 because the same

people in Sweden who were contributing to the L.W.F., Swedish National Committee, for the rebuilding of the Educational and Medical institutions where also the same people doing the same towards the churches and chapels fund.²⁰ Because of the duplication of efforts on the part of the campaigners for funds and also of the double burden this implied on the part of the givers, not only in Sweden but also in the rest of the Lutheran Christian world, the CSM appealed to the LWF to shoulder the burden of the churches and chapels as well through the Department of Church Co-operation. The latter therefore decided to grant the ELCZ US\$50 000 per year for four years for repairing and rebuilding of the churches, chapels and related buildings.²¹ In all this reconstruction the local communities had to raise 10% of the total amount needed in different ways. For schools, the amount was raised through school fees, for medical facilities the Government contributed and for the churches and chapels the local christians contributed in "labour and other services such as provision of materials." By the end of 1982 the ELCZ had virtually completed its programme of reconstruction and everything was back to normal.²²

d) The search for a New ELCZ-Church of Sweden Agreement

The heavy involvement of the CSM and its related LWF networks in the reconstruction of the war-ravaged ELCZ, its massive subvention which sustained the annual operations of the ELCZ, the identification of new needs in its former mission field as well as the new national political order which also stimulated the ecclesiastical spirit of independence from parent missionary organisations prompted both the local church and the Church of Sweden to think anew about their formal links. There was need to work out fresh instruments of co-operation which would take account of the high degree of operational autonomy of the local church during the war as well as its need for continued financial and qualified manpower backing from Sweden in its evangelistic and other developmental work in independent Zimbabwe. Both churches were especially conscious of the mutual benefits likely to accrue, for instance, from such schemes as exchange programmes - especially of their youths and key church workers.

Against that background Tore Bergman, the CSM Southern African Secretary, addressed the ELCZ Church Council meeting on the 3rd October, 1980. Bergman reminded the ELCZ Church Council of the original relationship between CSM and its mission field in colonial Zimbabwe, during which time the CSM Board planned and made all decisions for its mission. Starting from 1961 and culminating in the Document of Understanding signed in 1971 the CSM Board had devolved a great deal of the decision making process upon the local church. However, Bergman observed, since 1970 a lot of important events and developments had taken place. He summarised the developments in the local ELCZ as follows:

- The church has gained 10 years experience in determining its own affairs.
- The Church has been through several years of war with many unusual challenges against the life and faith of the Church and its members.
- During the war years all missionaries in the rural areas departed, forcing the church to accept responsibility for many new tasks hitherto cared for by missionaries.
- The church has received its first African bishop.
- The country has become an independent nation and has opened up new opportunities for the church.

There were also equally important developments in Sweden:

- There is a new awareness in the congregations regarding positive contributions that can be made to church life in Sweden by Churches in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
- New relations may develop between the Church of Sweden and the Swedish government that may have an effect on the financial resources of the CSM.
- There is a need for a more active participation by representatives from our sister churches in Africa and

Asia in advocacy work in Sweden in order to stimulate interest in other churches and cultures.²³

Bergman therefore drew attention to the urgent need for a revision of the ruling terms of co-operation between the CSM and the ELCZ. Such revision, he said, should take account also of certain basic questions such as:

- Is the basis for our co-operation still valid, in theological as well as practical terms?
- How is this co-operation going to be effective without encroaching on the identity of the parties and also recognising the right of both parties to formulate policies and to work according to these?
- If personnel is required by either party, what will be their task and what will be the terms of their employment?
- Is the Block Grant system justified? Are there other alternatives?
- How is self-reliance stimulated?
- How can ELCZ involvement in Sweden also become meaningful to the ELCZ?
- Should involvement in ELCZ by other foreign organisations and donor agencies be an issue in the new terms of co-operation?²⁴

Clearly Bergman was grappling with the thorny issue of hammering out an instrument of relationship between the two ecclesiastical bodies which would take account of the dependence for financial and skilled manpower of the ELCZ upon the Church of Sweden at the same time as it recognised the autonomy of the ELCZ and equal status of the two bodies. Bergman, on behalf of the CSM Board, was trying to coax the ELCZ to come up with ideas of how the relationship would be truly

mutually beneficial and reciprocal, with the ELCZ not just remaining in the position of a receiver but also trying to give something in return. In any event Bergman proposed that consultations on all these matters should take place in Zimbabwe some time in early 1981.²⁵

Bishop Shiri's response to Bergman's call for consultations showed how the ELCZ had grown extraordinarily sensitive to anything suggestive of infringing upon its self-rule. At the same time the bishop could not ignore his church's heavy dependence on the CSM for annual subventions. He therefore concurred with Bergman that the major topic of their "consultation should be our future relationship and how we as two Sister Churches can help each other to spread the Kingdom of God". But he added quite significantly that they must also "discuss frankly what obstacles can spoil the work and how we can sincerely work together to remove them."²⁶ Indeed the bishop urged that the two churches should identify each other's "God given talents which can be developed for the benefit of our two Churches."²⁷

While it was eventually agreed that because of prior commitments it would be impossible to hold the main consultations early in the year but on September 15th to 17th, Bergman thought that a preliminary visit from Sweden to sound the local Zimbabwe opinion on the impending changes in the terms of co-operation would be useful in so far as it might help the ELCZ to prepare itself fully for the main discussions. He proposed to visit Zimbabwe accompanied by one of the CSM Board members, the Rev Olle Joelson, who was well known to Bishop Shiri. The bishop welcomed the so-called prelude to the main consultations.²⁹

The initial visit in fact turned out to be the most important part of the whole process of consultation between the Church of Sweden and the ELCZ and the information gathered by Bergman and Rev Joelson in the end constituted the main basis upon which the legal terms of co-operation between the two churches were constructed. While the Swedes definitely had faith in the bishop and his future consultative delegation's ability to represent the views of their church as a whole they nevertheless still felt the usefulness of presenting their views to the whole church and of benefiting from the responses of as wide a cross section of the ELCZ membership as possible. The Bergman-Joelson fact finding mission was unique in the recent history of the ELCZ in that it approximated an elaborate referendum in the church to determine its relationship with its former parent church. To a very large extent therefore it can be said the

document of understanding which emerged in the consultations reflected the feelings of the members of the ELCZ. What emerged also from the findings of Bergman and Joelson were definite expressions from Zimbabwe of the continued need for co-operation between the two churches; and a sense of embarrassment on the part of the ELCZ regarding its financial dependence on the parent church, even though this was counter-balanced by the optimism generated with the dawn of national independence so that it was generally hoped that new economic opportunities would form the basis upon which local ecclesiastical self-reliance would be build. (see p. 306) The prelude mission was therefore of such critical importance in the history of cooperation between the Church of Sweden and ELCZ that it must be looked at in detail.

Bergman and Joelson made their historic visit in April 1981 and at the initial stage of their mission met Bishop Shiri in Bulawayo to fix the 15th to the 17th September 1981 as the dates of main consultation; to obtain the names of the delegates who would attend it; and to work out the agenda for the meeting. The main issue on the agenda remained the relationship between the two churches and "the implications regarding:

- 1) mission/outreach/evangelism and nurture,
- 2) economy and financial support,
- 3) missionary personnel in the ELCZ,
- 4) the exchange of missionaries between the Church of Sweden and the ELCZ, and
- 5) information."³⁰

After discussions with the Bishop the two CSM officials toured the areas of the ELCZ from the 14th to the 24th April and visited the parishes of Salisbury, Bulawayo, Mnene, Musume, Chegato, Manama and Zezani and thus covered both the urban and rural parishes as well as both the Eastern and Western deaneries. People from other parishes which were not visited were also invited to give their views and ideas at their nearest visited places. As they toured they held intensive discussions with teachers, evangelists, pastors, nurses and other layman. Their approach was to present the main issues which were on the agenda of the September meeting and then to introduce questions and problems as viewed by the CSM and to invite comments, reflections and new ideas.³¹

The first problem for discussion related to the two sister churches and their involvement in the common task of mission. The main concern

here was reduced to "how the ELCZ experienced its relationship to CSM." The visitors and their fellow local participants wanted to find out how that relationship was experienced, whether it should continue or whether it should find new expressions. The relationship was seen to have evolved from one of a missionary organisation and its mission field to one of the parent Church of Sweden and its daughter ELCR (later to be named ELCZ) in 1961. From 1961 to 1980 the ELCZ had grown in its autonomy so much so that the new relationship had become *de facto* that of sister churches. Because this new relationship had no legal standing, many ELCZ members were still stressing the image of the Church of Sweden as the mother church and it was reported that "some people even refuse to give contributions, because money from Sweden is easily available." Indeed some ELCZ regarded this church as a branch of the Church of Sweden. However with the coming of national independence in 1980 many Lutherans now wanted to see their church independent. The only worrying issue was that real independence seemed unachievable because of the financial dependence of the ELCZ on the CSM.³²

Bergman and his colleague told their hosts that the CSM's primary concern was one of mission and outreach. The question was therefore whether the ELCZ shared that concern and was she prepared to cooperate in its fulfilment. If so did the ELCZ have any areas in mind for mission work. Some members of the ELCZ thought that their church shared the concern. They wanted to see their church growing in numbers where it was already established and in the urban areas, where it had moved rather late. "The church has ignored the working man and concentrated on poor peasant women," it was pointed out. People identified further virgin fields of possible joint mission between the two sister churches, such as Gokwe, Binga, Hwange, Chikombedzi, Chiredzi, Chituripasi and Botswana. "It was suggested that the responsibility should be divided so that the CSM takes care of the capital cost, while the ELCZ provides workers and caters for running expenses."³³ The mission task indeed promised to build a long-lasting relationship of real equal participation between the two churches at the same time as it would guarantee the desired growth of the local church.

The next problem was one of finance. From 1971 when the autonomy of the local church was formally guaranteed by a Document of Agreement, the CSM supported the ELCZ by means of "an annual grant towards the running expenses of the church and a few earmarked grants."

The CSM's contribution towards the 1981 budget, for instance, amounted to 74,9%, the income from investments 12,2%, the income from local congregations 9,4% and other local income (Pension Fees and House Rents) 3,5%. Bergman and Joelson reminded the local Lutherans that the ultimate aim must be to eliminate the CSM grant. The question was how the local church proposed to do that.³⁴

The local church was concerned about the disparity between its local income and the overseas grants. The concern had mounted with the coming of national independence. "We are proud of our independence," people said, "but worried about economy." Some efforts had been made over the years to stimulate local contributions but not much had been achieved. Some people blamed Sweden for the low local contributions saying, "The CSM has spoiled the Church from the beginning by not introducing self-reliance and by making the Church accustomed to the idea that money is available in Sweden."³⁵ The local members, however, suggested that the annual Block grants must remain for about 5 years at the same time as the CSM tried to support local self-reliance projects. Before the end of 5 years the position was to be reviewed to see whether a new formula of Swedish support could not be introduced. It was also suggested that perhaps local structural changes were necessary in order to involve as many laymen as possible in Church policy matters and to stimulating interest in them in their Church. That way they might start not only contributing to the Church but they might also bring in new ideas of how the Church might achieve self-reliance.³⁶

In terms of personnel many local members expected that the missionaries who had left the country during the war would return after independence. They were thus surprised and thought Sweden was tired of supporting their Church when they saw only the medical staff, a builder and a treasurer coming on short contracts. In other words missionaries were needed and their role in the Church would never end. The feeling however was that it would be desirable to receive missionaries with skills which were not locally available in order to avoid unnecessary job competition.³⁷ It was also agreed that the two churches should institute short term exchange workers who would help to enrich each other's cultures and congregational lives. Finally the feeling was that there should be continuous flow of information from Zimbabwe to Sweden in the form of Church Council and Church Assembly minutes, annual reports and by exchange of reports, in order to make sure that the interest of the congregations in Sweden in the ELCZ was kept alive.³⁸

Thus both churches wanted their co-operation to continue on the basis of sister church relationships in which the Church of Sweden would support the local Church through personnel, annual subventions and earmarked grants to cover running costs, capital development relating to new areas of outreach and mission. Short term exchanges of personnel and flow of information especially to Sweden was felt needed in order to enrich each other's congregational life and to keep alive the interest of the Sweden congregations in Zimbabwe.

All these sentiments and findings formed the basis of the formal consultation held at Njube Youth Centre in Bulawayo in September 1981, whose importance was underlined by the high rank of the participants from the two churches. The Zimbabwe side was made up of a Church Council delegation headed by Bishop Shiri himself, who also chaired the proceedings. He was accompanied by his deputy, Dean A. Moyo, Dean L.M. Dube, Secretary for the Church Council and co-Secretary of the consultation meeting, Rev Lawyers Moyo, a member of the Church Council, Pastor in charge of Harare parish and the local person in charge of the informal education project, Rev A.M. Moyo, Chairman of the Stewardship Committee and Principal of the Masvingo Bible School, Rev E.D. Gwate, pastor in charge of Gungwe parish, member of the Stewardship Committee and Education Board, Mr E.C. Hove, Church Council Member and Education Secretary, Mrs N. Mboyi, Laywoman and Community Development trainer, Mr A.H. Madziva, Church Council Layman, Mr E. Mangena Moyo, Youth leader in Harare, Mrs A. Moyo, representative of the *vashandiri* and Mr A.D. Malala, the ELCZ's Administrative Secretary. The Swedish delegation consisted of the following members of both the CSM and the LWF (Swedish National Committee), reflecting the latter's involvement of the reconstruction programmes and development projects: Mr Carl Hamilton, High Court Judge and Vice Chairman of the CSM Board; Dr Karl-Anders Sundstrom, CSM Board member; Dr Kerstin Dahlin, CSM Board member and missionary Doctor at Mnene Hospital; The Rev Dr Biorn Fjarstedt, the CSM Director; Mr Tore Bergman, CS, Secretary for Southern Africa; Mrs Ingrid Eriksson, Chairman of the Mission Association of Sweden Mission; Bishop Helge Brattgard, Chairman of the Board of the LWF (Swedish National Committee); Mr Thorsten Manson, Deputy Director of the (LWF(SNC)); The Rev Dr Tord Harlin, Director of Studies, The Church of Sweden Department of International Studies.³⁹

The proceedings of the meeting were divided into two parts, so that the first two days were devoted to joint discussions, while on the third day the two groups separated to consider each other's written questions and views concerning a new Document of Understanding. The first part of the meeting opened with an address from the Chairman, Bishop Shiri, who urged all the delegates to discuss the issue on the agenda freely and frankly and further drew attention to the fact that the two sister churches were differently endowed by God. The import of his message was simply that the Church of Sweden had richer congregations than those of the ELCZ so that the former had a divine obligation to help the latter in its extension of the Lord's Kingdom. The Church of Sweden delegation welcomed the ELCZ's call for extended co-operation between the two churches. Both delegations were in full accord that the 1971 Document of Understanding was outdated and did not represent the autonomous status of the ELCZ nor was it suitable for some of the areas of co-operation envisaged in the future. It therefore needed to be revised.⁴⁰

Church-state relations in Zimbabwe were an area of interest to the Church of Sweden and indeed as early as February 1981 Bergman had asked Bishop Shiri to have a short presentation made on "the current political trends in Zimbabwe during the main consultation."⁴¹ Bishop Shiri personally led the discussion on this issue and emphasised the freedom of worship which was guaranteed in the national constitution of the country. In a developing country like Zimbabwe, which was also shattered by the war, the bishop said, the church was expected to perform two urgent tasks, the "rebuilding [of] destroyed buildings and the rebuilding of destroyed souls." In other words both the spiritual and material reconstruction were the urgent tasks of the church in Zimbabwe. The government of Zimbabwe through its various ministers had expressed its gratitude to the various denominations for their great work in African education and health in the past, for their role in the reconstruction and for their aid during the war. Both the ELCZ and the government hoped that overseas sister churches would not now abandon Zimbabwe because she was free. He urged sister churches overseas to now come forward with generous assistance to help the people of Zimbabwe to develop themselves and their country under conditions of political freedom. Bishop Shiri said that the Church-State relations must therefore be viewed in the context of the government's need for ecclesiastical partnership in development. The climate was indeed "very good and all who have the means

and ability to help the people of Zimbabwe can do so without fear." The Bishop was not particularly worried about the prospect of the government sometime in the future changing its mind and nationalizing church schools and health facilities. "For me this is not a problem. The government will never remove the institutions from the people," he declared. "The institutions will continue to serve the same people for whom they were built. After all what is a government?" he asked rhetorically. "The people are the government. No government will take the institutions in Zimbabwe and transfer them to South America or China." He said that the institutions were meant for the people and that way they would remain for ever. So long as the church cooperated with the government by undertaking development programmes which the former thought were good the state would appreciate such efforts. In short, the bishop was not afraid of state nationalisation of church welfare institutions and services and he thought of the government policy towards the church as quite favourable for religious growth.⁴² In other words the ELCZ represented those churches which were not wasting time and were accused by President Banana of adopting a "wait and see" attitude regarding the new Zimbabwe government. Rather it rapidly embraced the partnership with the government explicitly contained in the call by Robert Mugabe to national reconstruction and development.⁴³

The meeting further aired its views on the mission/outreach of the ELCZ and the latter appealed for more funds, and clergymen to be used for the extension of the gospel into new regions. The Church of Sweden responded most favourably to this aspect and indeed its representatives pointed out "that there was in the Swedish congregations, among those who contributed to mission work, strong concern to reach out through CSM and through the sister churches for the Church of Sweden. The CSM therefore, would put priorities on reaching some unevangelized areas and to being involved in programmes of this nature at grassroots levels. In addition to a faithful support of the general work of the sister churches there was a wish to be of help precisely at the points where the gospel could be offered in words and deeds to those who have not yet learnt of it."⁴⁴

In the medical work the ELCZ was concerned to obtain funds to enable it to adapt and expand its facilities and to train its personnel for programmes which were in line with the government priorities. The Church also appealed for doctors and nurses from abroad. In education the church

wanted to develop 'A' level classes in one of its secondary schools and to expand the rest of its schools in order to relieve the overcrowding in its boarding facilities. The church also asked to be assisted to build practical schools. Two further items which were extensively considered were stewardship and the raising of funds for the church and the need for financial help to set up women's programmes. Women formed the majority in the Church and their economic development might lead to the financial position of the Church as a whole changing for the better. Among other things, the women appealed to the Church of Sweden to find markets for women's products. The meeting thus became a forum where the ELCZ genuinely sought to make plain its basic needs for whose assistance by the Church of Sweden would constitute the basis for lasting co-operation between the two churches.⁴⁵

In the second part of the proceedings the CSM delegation reduced the whole discussion to 9 basic questions relating to a New Document of Understanding. The questions covered such areas as the willingness of the ELCZ's to be involved in and its plans and priorities of mission work; whether the ELCZ still needed missionaries from Sweden and in what fields; whether Block Grants from Sweden were the best mode of subsidizing the normal running budget of the ELCZ; whether the ELCZ had plans to increase its share of burden of its annual budget; whether the ELCZ was prepared to keep the Church of Sweden informed about donations it might receive from other sources; whether the ELCZ was prepared to offer, and in what kind, services to the Church of Sweden; and whether the ELCZ was prepared to keep the Church of Sweden informed about its activities in order to stimulate interest in itself among the Swedish congregations.⁴⁶ The ELCZ answered positively to everything and also indicated its areas priorities for its mission work. It welcomed missionaries especially in the medical work and expressed its determination to reduce its budgetary dependence on Sweden through vigorous stewardship, investments in urban properties and businesses, and through making its Mnene Farm a viable economic proposition.⁴⁷

Indeed this was the first time in the history of the Church of Sweden in Zimbabwe that it had carried out such a thorough dialogue with its daughter church. It was as if the Church of Sweden was putting its former mission field through the painful initiation ceremony into adulthood. The probing questions about finances and mission priorities were embarrassing to the ELCZ and compelled the latter to take a careful look into the

future with all its uncertainties. In the light of the current financial problems of the ELCZ which have nearly assumed a national scandal and the speedy intervention of Church of Sweden to temporarily rescue the situation, all those questions were not misdirected after all.⁴⁸ But that is anticipating the story. What was significant in 1981 was that the two churches were happy to take advantage of the favourable government policy to enter into a cooperation for the reconstruction of the war damaged Church properties and for long term spiritual extension of local Church and the development of Zimbabwe. The series of exchanges between the two churches, starting from just before independence with Bishop Shiri's trip to Sweden, through the Bergman-Joelson tour and culminating in the three days' consultations at Njube in Bulawayo in September 1981, constituted the powerful matrix of the Document of Understanding which remains the formal instrument of cooperation between the Church of Sweden and the ELCZ and came into force on the 25th May 1983. In conclusion to this chapter it is appropriate to turn to that document.

e) The Document of Understanding of (1983)

The Document of Understanding of 1983, like the previous one it replaced, underscored in its preamble those Lutheran doctrinal elements, the commitment to the extension of the Kingdom of God and the historic connections, which united the ELCZ and the Church of Sweden. Even though the Church of Sweden might be more fortunate in material wealth, the two churches felt that after 1980 only on the basis of equality and full recognition of each other's talents and potentials could they fulfil their divine obligations. Thus the Document throughout treated the two churches as equal partners, albeit the ELCZ's heavy financial dependence on the Church of Sweden. Indeed in the new era the two churches aimed at eliminating that anomaly by utilizing earmarked and project grants in a manner which promoted the self-reliance of the ELCZ.

Indeed the two churches declared that they recognised each other's self-governing status and each to have full authority over its work and functions within the parameters imposed "only by the Word of God and the Holy Sacraments as taught by the Prophets and Apostles and explained in the three Catholic Creeds, the unaltered Angsburg Confession and Martin Luther's Small Catechism." The two churches acknowledged

each other as partners in the proclamation of the Word of God and “in the building of a living and evangelizing Church” in Zimbabwe and Sweden as well as elsewhere. The two churches, the Document said, had, “on the basis of their available common resources found it expedient to combine their missionary outreach in areas of common concern.”⁴⁹

The actual terms of agreement or co-operation between the two churches covered channels of communication, the work, personnel or workers, finance, information, the work in Sweden and general provisions. Under channels of communications the two churches bound themselves to communicate with each other through their relevant administrative offices, i.e. the Bishop’s office in Bulawayo and the CSM offices in Uppsala. The ELCZ was further at liberty to communicate with any Church of Sweden dioceses, parishes, departments, or related organisations, such as the LWF (Swedish Section), etc. All correspondence between the two to be done in English.⁵⁰

Under work, the agreement covered both the continuation of tasks already jointly carried out as well as new ones. Either partner was free to call upon the other to assist in the carrying out of new tasks and either partner’s response would be determined by available resources and the manner it conceived its priorities. In any event the agreements might be necessary before new tasks were jointly undertaken. Subject to prior informing and consulting the Church of Sweden, the ELCZ was free “to invite any partner ... to co-operate in or contribute to any of its work.” The Church of Sweden was also free to contact any organisation in Zimbabwe. But if such contacts should mature into a lasting working relationship the ELCZ had to be informed and properly consulted.⁵² Under workers, the two churches defined the status of expatriate workers in each other’s church, how they would be recruited, their terms and conditions of service and how their services might be terminated.

Under finance, the idea was for the Church of Sweden to try and continue to support the ELCZ for some time to come at the same time as the two promoted the self-supporting means of the ELCZ. Thus the first clause on finance declared the financial self-reliance of the ELCZ to be a priority. But before that could be achieved the ELCZ was free to request funds from the Church of Sweden towards such work or such projects which the ELCZ was not able to cover fully from its own resources. The Church of Sweden committed and bound itself “to provide support on a long-term basis within its financial capacity.” Any major reductions in

the support or changes in the mode of support would be made only after due negotiations with the ELCZ. The two would carry out regular negotiations concerning the type and pattern of financial support and such negotiations would always centre around the basic question of promoting self-reliance in the Church in Zimbabwe. The ELCZ was to submit its annual budget to the Church of Sweden by the 31st July. Funds which were provided for specific projects or purposes could not be reallocated by the ELCZ without the prior agreement of the Church of Sweden. The ELCZ was to keep a proper record of its financial transactions and to audit its books regularly. The ELCZ was bound to provide the Church of Sweden with its annual Financial Statements and Auditor's Reports.⁵³ With regards to information it was said that information was necessary "to stimulate interest, involvement, fund-raising, and intercession" so that the two churches therefore agreed "to share information relevant for this purpose... from time to time." The Church of Sweden also noted "the expressed desire of congregations, institutions and organisations in the [Church of Sweden] to have an opportunity of sharing with parishes and institutions outside Sweden of their Christian witness and of benefiting from their particular resources." The ELCZ therefore declared itself prepared to send personnel to Sweden at the request of the Church of Sweden. The Church of Sweden bound itself to provide the necessary funding to facilitate such visits from Zimbabwe.⁵⁴ The general clauses provided for the modalities of amending or terminating the Document of Agreement.⁵⁵

Conclusion

Clearly the agreement tried to put in a legal form the special historic and spiritual bonds as well as the visionary unity of purpose which existed between the two churches. The worry to both partners was the dependence of the ELCZ upon subsidies and personnel from Sweden. It was a worry which both churches and especially the ELCZ tried hard to remedy after the signing of the Document of Agreement. Bishop Shiri, in his ten-year report produced in 1985, noted that at the signing of the Agreement the total budget of the ELCZ was Z\$663 000 and the local contribution to it was only Z\$160 352. Soon after the agreement the Church of Sweden reduced her subsidy to \$381 000 so that the local church had to raise \$282 000. Vigorous fund raising campaigns and

educational programmes for the local christians to learn to give to the church rather than to expect to receive from the latter were undertaken. These seemed to pay off in that some parishes, such as Harare and Musume, were becoming self-supporting, while contributions in all the parishes between 1983 and 1984 rose noticeably from \$66 399 to \$88 134.04. It therefore appeared that the local christians were assuming responsibility for their church. But the dependence still remained absolutely considerable because, as Bishop Shiri says, "the needs of the Church were still too high to be met locally," and because even though there were qualified Zimbabweans to occupy vacancies in the Church the latter did not have money to pay competitive salaries. The Church therefore had to ask for missionary workers paid by the Church of Sweden to take up such posts.⁵⁶ Indeed up to the writing of this book the financial position of the ELCZ remains dangerously precarious and desperate, with annual running deficits of nearly 1 million Zimbabwe dollars. The local christians have responded magnificently to the call to support their Church with contributions, so that Sunday collections have risen by about 700% between 1980 and 1988. The Churches' evangelical responsibilities as expressed through its schools, hospitals and other centres still remain too high to be catered for entirely from local funds.⁵⁷ There is definitely no end in sight to the partnership between the Church of Sweden and the ELCZ from a financial point of view.

The shaky financial position poses a real dilemma for the ELCZ with regards to its mission through formal education and health. Hospitals in Zimbabwe are required to treat certain categories of patients considered poor free of charge. Since the Church is basically rural all its hospitals cater for the poor rural masses, who because of their poverty are prone to high incidents of illnesses, hence also make heavy demands on the medical institutions. That coupled with the totally inadequate government grants produces big annual overexpenditure by the hospitals. The problem is the same in the schools; children's fees are far too low to cover the running expenses for their institutions. Yet the Church's commitment to partnership with government in the provision of social services and in the general development of the country together with its own commitment to overcoming "ignorance and superstition through sound education" and to taking "care of the sick and suffering and [the exercise of] the Ministry of the hands of Jesus,"⁵⁸ make it impossible for the ELCZ to abandon her schools and hospitals. So the cooperation between the

Church of Sweden and the ELCZ is not only desirable but imperative if the local Church is to fulfil her evangelistic and secular obligations to its followers and the nation as a whole.

In conclusion we can note how the reversal of the withdrawal policy which during the war was prompted by involvement in refugee programmes following the Manana abductions; the reconstruction programmes after the war; and the realization of the magnitude of the dependence of the ELCZ on her parent Church, have all led to relationships between the two churches which approximate the ones of the colonial period, except that the local Church is now self-governing. Up to the time of writing the ZANU-PF government of Robert Mugabe has not deviated from its commitment to the Marxist-Leninist ideology which not only accommodates but seeks active partnership with the Churches in the development of the country. The atmosphere therefore exists for fruitful and productive co-operation between the Church of Sweden and the ELCZ in the pursuit of the Holy goal of the extension and consolidation of God's Kingdom in Zimbabwe and Sweden.

Footnotes

1. Hallencreutz, "General Introduction Policy of Religion: The New Framework," Hallencreutz and Moyo(eds.) *Church and State*, p. 16; See also Sifas Zhou, "Church and State in Zimbabwe," paper delivered to the Rattrik Conference about Zimbabwe, 23 - 25 April, 1982, pp. 4-5.
2. Hallencreutz, "General Introduction," p. 18.
3. In Hallencreutz and Moyo, *Church and State*, pp. 251-311.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
5. Marika Fahlen, *Landanals; Zimbabwe*, January 1988, pp. 131-136.
6. Interview with Bergman.
7. S.K.M.A., A6281, "Health Plan For Areas Served by the ELCZ Hospitals in Belingwe and Gwanda Districts in Zimbabwe, 1981," p. 1.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 4; S.K.M.A., A6281, Tore Bergman to Dr Kurt Rune, March 23, 1981; Bergman to Bishop Shiri, June 25, 1981; Interview with Bergman.
11. Shiri, *My First Decade*, pp. 155-156; Interview with Bergman.
12. S.K.M.A. A6281, The Lutheran World Federation Department of World Service/CDS Project Request 135S, See also Olle Eriksson to Tore Bergman, November 3, 1981; Shiri *My First Decade*, pp. 161-169.
13. S.K.M.A., A6244, Niels E and Hanne, "Final Report on Assessment of Damage to the Property of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe," Copenhagen, September 8, 1980, p. 1; See also Niels E. and Hanne Granlund, "Preliminary Report on Assessment of Damage to the Property of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe," Bulawayo, May 14, 1980.
14. *Ibid.*, p.2.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
16. *Ibid.*, p.9.
17. *Ibid.*, p.10.
18. Shiri, *My First Decade*, pp. 253-262.
19. S.K.M.A., A6244, Christa Held to Bishop Shiri, June 24, 1980.
20. S.K.M.A., A6244, Axel-Ivar Berglund to Bishop Shiri, September 15, 1980.
21. S.K.M.A., A6244, Tore Bergman to Bishop Shiri, August 7, 1980; Shiri, *My First Decade*, p.151.
22. Shiri, *My First Decade*, pp. 152-153.
23. S.K.M.A., A6281-178/79, T. Bergman, "A Short Summary of the address to the ELCZ Church Council Meeting, 3rd October, 1980: Terms of co-operation between the CSM and the ELCZ", June 24, 1981, p.1.
24. *Ibid.*, p.2.
25. *Ibid.*, p.2.
26. S.K.M.A., A6281-178/79, Bishop J.C. Shiri to Mr T. Bergman, January 15, 1981.
27. *Ibid.*
28. S.K.M.A., A6281-178/79, Bergman to Bishop Shiri, February 6, 1981.
29. *Ibid.*, Shiri to Bergman, February 20, 1981.
30. S.K.M.A., A502-13/81, "Report from T. Bergman and O. Joelson from their visit to the ELCZ regarding matters related to the forthcoming consultation in Zimbabwe, September 15th to 17th 1981," April 24, 1981, p.1
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*, p.3.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
37. *Ibid.*, p.5.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
39. S.K.M.A., A6281-178/79, Minutes of the Joint Consultation between Representatives of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe and the Church of Sweden Mission held at Njube Youth Centre, Bulawayo Zimbabwe from September 15th to 17th, 1981.
40. *Ibid.*, p.2.
41. S.K.M.A., A6281-178/79, Tore Bergman to the Rt Rev J.C. Shiri, February 6, 1981.
42. S.K.M.A., A6281-178/79, Minutes of the Joint Consultation, Appendix 2, J.C. Shiri, "Church-State Relationship in Zimbabwe."
43. Hallencreutz, "Ecumenical Challenges," p. 252.
44. S.K.M.A., A6281-178/79, Minutes of the Joint Consultation, p.3.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-7.
46. *Ibid.*, p.8.
47. *Ibid.*, p.9.
48. Minutes of the 32nd Meeting of the ELCZ Church Assembly held at Chegato Mission from 18th to 21st January 1990.
49. "Document of Understanding between the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe (hereafter ELCZ) and the Church of Sweden (hereafter CS)," May 25, 1983, p.1
50. *Ibid.*, p.2.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
52. *Ibid.*, p.3.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
54. *Ibid.*, p.4.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
56. Shiri, *My First Decade*, pp. 71-90.
57. Minutes of the 32nd Meeting of the ELCZ Meeting, Appendix III, Rev H. Mavunduse, Treasurer, "Treasurer's Report to CA 32 at Chegato."
58. General Aims in the ELCZ Constitution.

CONCLUSION

Our study has shown that both during and after the war the liberation movements, especially their leaders, sought the co-operation of local and international ecclesiastical bodies. In doing so they tried to create an atmosphere in which such co-operation could take place by working out their ideologies in such a manner that though based on Marxism-Leninism they still accommodated christianity and the churches. The aim was therefore to recreate a socialist state in Zimbabwe, one of whose chief differences from some of the older similar ones, such as Russia, the People's Republic of China and Mozambique, would be its acceptance of the church and christianity as part of the nationalist democratic revolutionary forces. Many churches and their leaders in Zimbabwe as well as the international religious organisations such as the Lutheran World Federation and the World Council of Churches embraced the friendship of the ZAPU and ZANU liberation movements and thereby participated in the war, especially in refugee programmes. After the war ZANU PF, the ruling party, continued to seek the cooperation of the churches and in that context the ELCZ was able to play its part in the reconstruction of the war-torn Zimbabwe.

To say all this is not to overlook some instances of considerable friction between the liberation movements and the churches. Both Nkomo and Mugabe complained during the war to the Church of Sweden that not only that church but one or two others or their leaders had not come out in full support of the struggle or in open condemnation of the racist and oppressive regime in Zimbabwe. For their part the churches, including those which openly supported the liberation movements, sometimes condemned the freedom fighters for the killings of missionaries and the closure of some church institutions. ZAPU especially came under fire for its recruitment drives which operated even in schools, leading to the abductions of children. The latter, however, had a double effect. Whilst it evoked ecclesiastical condemnation, it also became the chief reason for the involvement of the Church of Sweden and L.W.F.

network in the refugee assistance programmes of both ZAPU and ZANU in Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique.

The instances of friction extended beyond the war as well. The state complained that the churches were not putting everything at their disposal in the development of the country along the plans of the new government, so that some of them were said to be adopting 'a wait and see' attitude. Moreover, the new President, Banana, complained that the churches were not transforming fast enough to shed off their missionary or traditional roles. Banana called on the churches "to communicate with the people, which in essence ... [meant] interpreting the Christian message within the context of African experience." He wanted the church "to re-define and re-examine itself at two levels: her theological disposition and her level of practical involvement in public life." The church was asked to discard some of its racist qualities and "to formulate new theological concepts and ways of understanding faith in accordance with the liberating praxis of the underprivileged and exploited." The church needed to fully identify itself with the people of Zimbabwe, Banana said, "by assimilating the good aspects of African culture... Once a new theology has been formulated, it becomes easier for the Church to take positive steps towards the development of the whole man, or what I may term the development of an action-oriented theology."¹

In other words the leaders of the new Zimbabwe were dissatisfied with the old missionary approach of the churches which saw the Africans as mere objects of conversion, to be discriminated against as racially inferior, and whose culture was supposed to be tainted with evil practices and had to be discarded wholesale in favour of western culture. Such churches, the leaders contended, could not have the necessary theological drive to fight for the moral and physical uplift of the Africans. The leaders wanted the new church to be an integral instrument of national development which should be fully involved in the expansion of health facilities and education, in the establishment of agricultural co-operatives, in the removal of any impediments in the development of women, and in the equipment of the youth with the necessary skills so that they might play their part in the present and future development of their country.²

In the meantime the churches had a lot to complain about against the government. As we saw in health, the government decreed free health service for the poorer sections of society and these were mostly in the rural areas where a regional church such as the ELCZ operated. Govern-

ment grants both for health and for education, where the state insisted on low fees, did not always match the costs of running those services so that the church was left with enormous annual deficits. The deficits produced so much discord in the church that they threatened the whole integrity of it. Such disparities between government policies and their financial backing were therefore causing an undercurrent of ecclesiastical mistrust of the state. Another area of discord was the handling of the dissident problem in Matebeleland. Even though the ELCZ did not go public in its condemnation of the army's indiscriminate punishing of the innocent and guilty civilians, the church, which was spread across Karanga, Venda, Sotho and Ndebele ethnic groups, found many of its followers being victims of the security operations. Many parishes of the ELCZ in the security operational areas were therefore silent supporters of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace's biting criticisms of the government.

At the time of writing government leaders are not seeing eye to eye with certain church leaders because of the latter's criticisms of the moves to establish a one-party state. Whereas during the war political leaders were happy to enjoy the support of the churches against the colonial regime today they bitterly complain about the churches and want them to shut up because they claim that they don't represent the people.

In spite of these periodic and sometimes running altercations between the church and the government there has never been any suggestion from either side of letting the relations deteriorate to the point of complete break down or impasse. If anything both sides are anxious to maintain such relationships and understanding as will allow national developmental co-operation.

Beyond the church-state relationships, the war brought about structural problems some of which have implications for the growth and stability of the ELCZ. The war, which forced the Church of Sweden to reduce its commitments to the ELCZ temporarily, permitted the latter's growth in autonomy and indigenization. Unfortunately this growth took place in the difficult circumstances in which rational planning was almost impossible because for the best part of the period the centre was alienated from the rural parishes. The Eastern Deanery, which commanded a majority, quickly dominated the ELCZ's governmental and administrative structures. The rural parishes learned to take day to day decisions some of which were far-reaching without reference to the central government and administration. The post-war period with its reconstruction

programmes which required heavy financial commitments from overseas, which were negotiated by the centre, however, enabled the centre to re-impose its authority on the rural periphery. But the centre could never wield the same unchallenged pre-war authority again.

To be sure once the reconstruction programmes were over the one issue which dominated the ELCZ was the demand for restructuring of the church government and administration in order to bring about decentralization and to permit Western participation. The first is the resistance of the parishes and congregations against the loss of the greater control of their own affairs which they acquired during the war. The second comes from regional particularist tendencies between the Western and Eastern Deaneries which were worsened during the war by the behaviour of the central administration and were not alleviated by the post war tensions between Matebeleland and Mashonaland.

Soon after the war the ELCZ Church Council set up a committee to draft a new constitution for the church which would embody the real conditions and spirit of a church in an independent Zimbabwe. The committee gathered evidence from various parishes, congregations and central administrators. The evidence was overwhelmingly in favour of some restructuring, preferably something that would recognise the regional composition of the church. While the committee felt it premature to undertake a major decentralizing exercise and opted for a minor change such as the creation of a new deanery which included all the urban areas and any rural parishes north of the Plumtree - Mutare railway line, some people, especially in the Western Deanery could not be satisfied with such apparently cosmetic changes which in fact affected the integrity of their deanery. They proposed the upgrading of the existing two deaneries into equal Western and Eastern Dioceses, with two bishops. Such a solution, they argued, would not only retain the rich and powerful parish of Bulawayo in its current Western Deanery home but it would remove the current inequality arising out of the fact that there are more parishes, congregations and members in East than in the Western Deanery.

Indeed the issue was rendered more complicated by the apparent behaviour of the central administration during the war which seemed insensitive to the predicament of some victims of the war in the Western Deanery. As I have already shown, the bishop's case in the west was always made worse by the fact that he came from the east. After the war several appointments in the central administration were made and they all

seemed to go to the east and thus it seemed to confirm almost conclusively that the bishop and the Church Council which he apparently dominated favoured his own Eastern Deanery. During the recent dissident disturbances in Matebeleland the Easterners were sometimes not sensitive to the feelings of their western war beleaguered fellow churchmen, and went so far sometimes as to insinuate that their demands for a diocese status was motivated by the general dissident attitude of their province. The church thus seemed to fail to rise above the common human frailties in order to lend a hand to the forces of conciliation and unity. The sense of resentment in the Western Deanery was thus heightened to a degree where the Deanery has so far blocked any efforts to restructure the church except on the basis of its own demands and blueprints.

Being in a powerful position on account of their majority status, which they have used to exploit the colonial missionary constitution with no guarantees for minority effective participation, to denominate the whole hierarchy of the church, the Easterners are somewhat puzzled at times by what appears to be the imperviousness of the Westerners to reasonable and conciliatory offers. Once the deanery system was rejected, both the bishop and the Easterners embraced the diocesan proposal and worked it out to almost its logical conclusion and accepted the financial and other implications involved in its implementation. Instead of two dioceses, however, the bishop proposed three, which would coincide almost with the three deaneries proposed by the previous constitutional committee. The bishop's proposal even went further by making the parishes and congregations to be responsible for most of their own administrative and financial matters. From the point of view of devolving power to the people or the local centres, the bishop's proposal was magnificent.⁴ Yet the Westerners rejected it precisely because the creation of a third diocese meant the severance of Bulawayo, the rich parish, from the Western Deanery.

The bitterness and resentment of the Westerners against domination by the Easterners cannot be solved through provision of democratic structures but by means of guaranting minority rights and effective participation in decision making.⁵

For as long as the ELCZ is ridden by this deadlock over restructuring it cannot make much headway because the tension between the two deaneries precludes any effective planning of income generating projects or of programmes for which readily available sources of finance can be

tapped. One source which remains almost untapped and cannot be exploited in the current circumstances is that of the Church of Sweden through the CSM. In the 1983 agreement the Swedes made it clear that block grants for the normal running costs of the ELCZ were a temporary measure which would be rapidly phased out as the local church gained self-sufficiency through income generating schemes. Sweden would not only finance such schemes with a promise of financial autonomy of the local church but the Swedes would also co-operate in the launching and sustaining of outreach and mission programmes. But the quarrels have so incapacitated the local church that it cannot think of income generating projects nor expand its mission field so much so that at the time of writing the Swedes have almost stopped sending money until the church can sort itself out.

Thus the war of liberation and its aftermath of the dissident problem in Matebeleland, which led to the pulling out of the missionaries and to ascendancy of the Easterners and during which the bitterness and resentment of the Westerners was allowed to grow worse, left for the church legacies which are not only stifling its growth but might destroy it as we know it today. Even though these problems are related to the liberation movements and the new government, their impact is aggravated by the utter selfishness of certain people and lack of imagination and experience of the church leaders in running large national organisations.

Footnotes

1. President urges churches: "Re-examine your stance." Press statement, Department of Information, March 2, 1981.
2. *Ibid.*
3. This is evidenced by the tension now reigning between the bishop and the association of the parish pastors, so much so that the episcopal authority has refused to accept a face to face dialogue with its subordinates on two occasions.
4. Bishop's Address to an Extra Church Assembly Number 31 at Masvingo Mberengwa 16 - 17th October 1987.
5. I have dealt with the ELCZ divisions and their resolution more fully in Chapter 7 of Bhebhe and Ranger (eds.) *Society*, pp. 147-174.

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- CC52 Minutes of the Meeting of the ELCR Church Council, held in Bulawayo 17th - 19th June, 1971.
- CC65 Minutes of the Meeting of the ELCR Church Council, held in Bulawayo on 25 - 27 April, 1974.
- CC66 Minutes of the Meeting of the ELCR Church Council, held in Bulawayo on 18 - 20 July, 1974.
- CC68 Minutes of the Meeting of the ELCR Church Council, held at Manama on 29 - 30 November 1974.
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- CC92 Minutes of the Meeting of the ELCZ Church Council, held in Bulawayo 8 January 1980.
- CC93 Minutes of the Meeting of the ELCZ Church Council, held in Bulawayo 25 April 1980.
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(b) **Medical Board Minutes**

- MB45 Minutes of the ELCR Medical Board Meeting held at Bulawayo on 30 May 1978.
- MB46 Minutes of the ELCR Medical Board Meeting held at Bulawayo on 8th August 1978.
- MB47 Minutes of the ELCR Medical Board Meeting held at Bulawayo on 16 August 1979.

(c) **SI - 1; Pastors Annual Reports**

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- C. Gumbo, Mazetese Parish, Annual Report 1976, 5 April, 1977.
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Annual Report 1979: Mudzidzi Parish.

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(d) **Statistics**

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| Bishop J.C. Shiri, | Evangelical Lutheran Church in Rhodesia Statistics for 1977. |
| Bishop J.C. Shiri, | Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe Statistics for 1978. |
| Bishop J.C. Shiri, | Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe Statistics for 1979. |

(e) **Correspondence**

File C2 contains the Annual Report of the Masase Parish for 1977; letter from E.C. Hove, Education Secretary to International Red Cross, 10 August 1979, Applying for Relief Aid towards supplementary feeding of Refugee students in Bulawayo; Letters from the Masase hospital about Nurses salaries not paid after the temporary closure of the hospital; Letter from Pastor Vellah on the Manama situation and the Manama Nurses complaining about their arbitrary dismissal.

File P2 contains Vellah's correspondence with the Bishop mostly on the ZANLA and the Rhodesian forces as they close in on Mavorovondo Parish in 1977.

Five-Year Plan, ELCR. Running Budget for Central Church Fund, drawn in 1975?

2. **SVENSKA KYRKAN MISSION SSTYRELSES ARKIV** (Church of Sweden Mission Archives, Uppsala)

The bulk of the sources which I have used is located in the following:

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, 1975:35, A6203-165/74.

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, 1977:47, A6209-28/74, A624-166/77.

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, 1980:64, As241-19/28; A6244-36/79.

A62 Zimbabwe A6244-36/79; A6269; A6281.

3. **SIDA CENTRAL ARKIVET, STOCKHOLM**

All the material on the correspondence between ZAPU and ZANU on the one hand and the Swedish Government on the other which I have used is found in

(i) 1.12.1/ZAPU

(ii) 1.12.1/ZANU

4. **INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES LIBRARY, LONDON**

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Press statement re arrest of J. Nkomo, 17.4.64

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Chinamano, Josiah, The armed struggle to liberate Zimbabwe shows up American foreign policy as an ally of colonialism in Zimbabwe; (speech ... to a meeting organised by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, Feb. 24, 1979) 1979.

Smith and his dogs of war, [1979] *Poster*.

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Nyandoro George, Interview with George Nyandoro, General Secretary of ZAPU, 1973.

5. **SCANDINAVIAN INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES, UPPSALA**

Statement of the African National Congress of South Africa, on June 26, 1969 (signed) J. Matlou (Convenor) June 26 Committee, African National Congress Provisional Headquarters, Morogoro, Tanzania.

O.R. Tambo, Speech on the Occasion of December 16, Umkhonto We Sizwe Day, December 16, 1969.

Speech by Alfred Nzo, Secretary-General, on the Occasion of the 58th Anniversary of the Founding of the African National Congress of South Africa, January 8, 1970.

6. **THE REVEREND DR TORD HARLIN'S PERSONAL COLLECTION**

a) This collection contains letters from some ELCZ pastors, some of whom had been Dr Harlin's students at the United Theological College, Harare, and letters from parents all of which have direct relevance to the church and the war.

b) There also are the papers which relate to Dr Harlin's trip to Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe after the abduction of the Manama pupils in 1977 to investigate the situation on behalf of the Church of Sweden Mission and the Lutheran World Federation. Harlin is a keen observer and a meticulous recorder of events, characters and situations. His papers therefore contain extremely useful information on the war, ZAPU officials, the Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe and the detained pastors.

c) Harlin's collection also has papers relating to the Church of Sweden Mission, Lutheran World Federation and the Lutherhjalpens, all of which organisations he was linked to throughout the war.

7. **ORAL INTERVIEWS**

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With Bernard Mutuma, Harare, 18 July 1984.

With Lt. General Rex Nhongo (Mujuru), Harare, 17 July 1984.

With H. Muzanhamo Nyazika, Harare, 30 July 1984.

With Major General Sheba Gava, Harare, 23 July 1984.

With Simon V. Muzenda, Deputy Prime Minister, Harare, 23 July 1984.

With Dr Dzingai Mutumbuka, Harare, July 1984.

With Richard Hove, Harare, July 1984.

With Air Marshal Tungamirai, 8 July, 1984.

With Kenny Nyati, Harare, 25 March 1987.

With Emmerson Munangagwa, Harare, July 1984.

With Revered Aynos Moyo, Harare, 23 - 24 March 1987.

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With M. Hove, Musipane Primary School, Zvishavane, 6 April 1986.

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With Mapolisa, Mnene Farm, Mberengwa 7 April 1987.

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With A. Ruwitah, Harare, 30 March 1987.

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With Bhebe Brothers, Bulawayo, 25 September 1987.

With Miss I.C. Mabuwa, Harare, 11 September 1987.

With Paulos Matjaka, J.Z. Moyo Secondary School, Gwanda, 5 June 1987.

With Bernard Bova Nyanga, Kushinga-Pikelela, Marondera, 19 August 1987.

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With Erica Jones, Gwanda, 9 June 1987.

With Reverend Ezekiel Gwate, Gwanda, 9 June 1987.

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With Revered Nkane Alfred Ramakgapola, Bulawayo, 29 September 1987.

With Revered Eliah Kalibe Masiane, Bulawayo, 29 September 1987.

With Phineas Rambofeni, Bulawayo, 21 September 1987.

With Dumiso Dabengwa, Bulawayo, 1 December 1989.

With Cephas Cele and Sam Moyo, Bulawayo, 29 December 1989.

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With Kenneth Nkala, Esigodini, 30 December 1989.

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
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Ngwabi Bhebe is a Professor of History and former Pro-Vice Chancellor at the University of Zimbabwe. He holds a B. A. degree from the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, where he won the Goodfellow Memorial Prize in History and a Ph.D. in Imperial History from the University of London.



He taught history at the universities of Sierra Leone and Swaziland and has held many visiting lectureships and fellowships, including the Parvin Fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; Honorary Fellow in the International Centre for Contemporary Cultural Research, The University of Manchester; Visiting Fellow, St Antony's College, Oxford University. He is a member of the Advisory Board of the **Journal of Southern African Studies** and The Advisory Editorial Board of the **Journal of African History** and is President of The Zimbabwe Historical Association.

He is author of *Christianity and Traditional Religion in Western Zimbabwe 1859-1923*; *Benjamin Burombo: African Politics in Zimbabwe 1947 - 1958* and co-editor with Terence Ranger of *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation war* and *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. Together with Terence Ranger, he co-edited two volumes on the historical dimensions of human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe and he also published several papers and chapters in journals and co-authored books as well as history textbooks on Southern Africa.

PROF T.O. RANGER ... [It is] Professor Bhebe's best book and [is] one of the most important books written about Zimbabwe's liberation war.



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