URBAN CRISIS AND THE APARTHEID STATE RESPONSE: SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSING POLICY IN THE 1980s

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DISSERTATION PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE MSc IN URBAN PLANNING (HOUSING IN DEVELOPMENT)

SEPTEMBER 1992

SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON (DEVELOPMENT UNIT)

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DEDICATED TO THE STRUGGLING PEOPLE OF OUR TOWNSHIPS

AND

ALL THOSE WHO DIED FIGHTING FOR THE RIGHT TO URBAN LAND.

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INTRODUCTION

It will be helpful to point out from the outset that there is a long academic tradition of explaining housing policy as the child of economic, social and political events. But this thesis seeks to examine the interplay between housing policy and those influences, in particular, the way housing policy creates conditions that, in turn, affect social process.

The 1980s symbolize a watershed decade in the South African urban struggles. Doubters need only consider the following facts: South Africans experienced the rise of social movements as the result of contradictions within state top-down reformist programmes which were initially pursued under the banner of "total strategy"(IDAF:) policies, and whose political demise led to the adoption of "orderly urbanization" strategy. This was followed by cracks in, and then the collapse of, the apartheid pillars, such as the pass-laws and "influx control"[1]. Indeed, this is also the decade which will be remembered for state calculated repression carried out in the name of 'law and order' against the political 'uncontrolled' and progressive squatter settlements (e.g. the Crossroads), which became a crucible of urban African shelter resistance.

On 23 April 1986, through the White Paper, the South African regime declared a new political dispensation for urban Africans, the "orderly urbanization". Thus, the inevitability African urbanization became accepted. In theory, this declaration was a significant shift in housing policy, and in a normal situation it would have meant that

[1]"Influx control" legislation, until 1986, was used to regulate the urbanization of Africans.

apartheid was dead. Africans, for the first time in the racist history of South Africa, were to enjoy South African "political citizenship" (cited in Swilling: xi). However, it has to be noted that the White Paper talked about 'orderly' urbanization - a loaded concept that is open to diverse interpretations. The question, therefore, that needs to be asked is: what did the government mean by 'orderly' urbanization? This paper is basically addressing itself to this question.

The aim of this dissertation is an attempt to expose what lies hidden behind the government's "orderly urbanization" policies with regard to housing. It looks at the above question and attempts to account for why the "orderly urbanization" policy for Africans are essentially devices of political control. This is done by presenting a critical analysis of political issues associated with the policy such as: the May-June 1986 destruction of the Crossroads squatter settlement - once the symbol of the African spirit of resistance and no surrender to apartheid strategies - by the state sponsored "witdoeke"[2]; the upgrading of the so-called identified 'oil-spots'[3] in African townships

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[2] "Witdoeke" is an Afrikaans word meaning white bits of cloth. During the destruction of Crossroads and the surrounding squatter areas late in 1985, the Government sponsored warlords led by Mr Ngxobongwana wore white bits of cloth on their heads to identify themselves; and hence the name "Witdoeke".

as a way of promoting the top-down Black Local Authorities (BLAs), the extensive amendments to Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (1986 and 1989) in order to control both legal and 'illegal' informal settlements, and the scrapping of the pass laws which regulated the urbanization process of the Africans. All these repressive and reformist manoeuvres, it is argued, were part and parcel of the counter-revolutionary strategy of the government, designed to ride out the deepening organic crisis and to retain control.

Secondly, the paper focuses on the role played by urban social movements, albeit as formidable antagonists, in shaping the evolvement of the housing policies. The housing question in South Africa, especially for Africans (the subject of this research), is interlinked with the urban social-movements. Their emergence in the 1980s was a direct response to the government's housing policies. It has, however, to be pointed out from the beginning that although these started as a response to local bread and butter issues, the apartheid system made it impossible to distinguish between local and national issues. The central government, as the command post, was then perceived as the cause of local problems, and thus the main focus of political struggles. Hence, all urban struggles became the gateway to its democratization. In short, urban social movements had been the backbone of the urban struggles for

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[3]Coupled with the wave of repression, Security Management Structures began to target specific communities for 'upgrading'. These were those areas identified by the Government as "oil-spots", i.e. political tense, dangerous and volatile. The approach was, therefore, designed to 'win the hearts and minds' (WHAM) of the target communities and hence the strategy is also known as WHAM.

better housing policies. They actualized the concept of "dual power" in the 1980s by creating alternative people's structures of management (e.g. the street committees). So, then, to understand their historical development, together with their liberation action, becomes a prerequisite of having an insight to the evolvement of the housing policy. Who they are? What keeps them going? Where lies their base? This paper further addresses these questions.

My hypothesis basically argues that the dramatic events of the 1986 "orderly urbanization" for urban Africans whose origins can be traced back to "total strategy", albeit on paper, marked a major shift in racist housing policies, and represented not a change of heart on the part of the regime, but the adoption of a more sophisticated strategy under the new reformist and militarist leadership of President P.W. Botha. It was essentially part of the apartheid system, though in a very shrewd way, which hoped to defuse the revolutionary anger by sharing "collective consumption" without losing political control (employing both reformist and repressive measures). The central argument then is that "orderly urbanization" housing policy should be understood as a complex interplay of forces from above and below, but whose concealed desire was to politically control the Africans, thus perpetuating the old order in a more 'civilized' way. An underlying argument put forward is that the regime, faced with the 1984-86 unprecedented situation of mass insurrection that threatened white hegemony in urban areas, as well as international isolation, was forced to adopt a counter-insurgency strategy.

The essay is divided into <u>four sections</u>. The first chapter focuses on the <u>theoretical framework</u> based on Castells' work of "collective consumption". The second section covers the period of <u>the apartheid 'golden age'</u>: 1948-1970s. The third section

periodizes the "stick and carrot" characterized history of State Top-down reform policies: The first phase (1979-1985), i.e. the Militarization of the Urban Question, focuses on the eruption of the organic urban crisis and the state's initial response. The second phase (1986-90),i.e. "Orderly Urbanization", analyzes how the State reforms brought about some contradictions, i.e. led to unintended political consequences which paved the way for the collapse of the apartheid housing policies. The fourth section focuses on the Urban Strategies In Post 1986 and the Recapturing of the Role Played by Urban Social Movements in the evolvement of the housing policies.

CHAPTER I

1.1.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

This section is set to examine the contention that urban conflicts/crises have been shaped by wider social and economic pressures. The focus is exclusively on the Marxist approach, as expounded by Manuel Castells. This has to be perceived within the context of Castells' endeavours to contexualise the theoretical 19th century laissez-faire capitalist-based Marxism in the light of the empirical 20th century welfare state interventionist policies, which seem to have undermined the class-based revolutions. According to Allan Cochrane, Castells' major concern is to establish the link between the following four main 'realities' and the fundamental structural tendencies of monopoly state capital:

> (a) the growing concentration of the population in enormous urban areas;
> (b) the increasing intervention of the State in the distribution of amenities and urban development;
> (c) the development of an urban social movement;
> (d) the increased concern of official agencies for urban issues (Cochrane: 30).

1.1.1 CASTELLS'S THEORY OF COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION:

From a Marxist point of view, Castells has argued that the social problems of the city are the product of capitalism rather than of urbanization. He, therefore, derives his concept of "collective consumption" from the notion that Monopoly Capitalism leads to the centralization of business organizations in the main cities, thereby encouraging

immigration from surrounding areas. Capital is often unwilling to provide some means of reproduction of labour power (i.e. housing, health facilities, education, transport, etc.) when that provision does not yield the average rate of profit, and so it is left to the State to do so. The urban problems are then over "collective consumption" which have been "socialized (as opposed to being individualized through the market) and administered by the State" (P.Saunders: 106). So, "collective consumption", refers to welfare capitalist state intervention through the provision of urban facilities.

Castells argues that the primary function of "collective consumption" is to help the reproduction of labour power necessary for the capitalist system to survive (Castells 1977b: 440). Thus "ensuring that the modern worker is not only healthy, housed and rested, but materially satisfied with capitalism, feels cared for rather than exploited" (Slattery: 35). The worker would subsequently "work efficiently, rarely challenge or question the inherent inequalities of capitalism but rather accept it as fair and just" (Slattery: 36). In summary, Castells is arguing that urbanism is not the cause of crisis. The urban problems are essentially a spin-off from the requirements of modern capitalism for a readily-available pool of workers.

Stemming from the above assertion on "Collective Consumption" the questions that then need to be addressed are: why sudden massive state intervention? What are the consequences of such intervention? The reasons behind the former could be complex. However, Castells has identified the crisis as mainly the manifestation of contradictions within the economic situation between the key elements of production and consumption (Castells 1977a: 270). Saunders simplifies this statement by arguing that "there is a tension between the allocation of resources to the (generally unprofitable but necessary) process of consumption" (Saunders: 109). In the housing context, this

could be understood against the common reluctance of capital to invest where there is a high risk of not yielding its sole objective of maximizing profit. This could be due to many factors such as "the long rate of capital rotation, the unprofitability of building to rent, the constant possibility of state regulation (e.g., rent control), and the low rate of profit due to the generally small scale of industry (Saunders: 108).

All in all, for Castells, "collective consumption" has become an ideal mechanism of "class control, materially and ideologically" (Slattery: 36). The welfare capitalist state is not a promoter of the public interest but an instrument of class control. Although it has a great deal of autonomy from the class structure, thereby enabling it to act as the arbiter between factions of the bourgeoisie (e.g. the businessmen, financiers, property developers, etc.), the state always operates with the long-term aim of preserving capitalism (Slattery: 36). The creation of welfare, in essence, is therefore an attempt to promote and preserve the market.

The intervention aftermath, however, is a collective response from the recipients. Put another way, the issue of "collective consumption" becomes politicized. Each urban grievance becomes more politicized as it is seen as the state's responsibility to provide such facilities (Castells 1977b: 64). In times of deep economic crisis (like the present world recession) characterized in Britain by business failures and individual bankruptcies, which occur every 90 seconds of the working week, and totalled 39,353 for the first six months of 1992 as compared with about 60,000 in 1991 as whole (Guardian: 18.8.92); nearly 3 million people on the dole (ITN 12H30 News: 18.8.92)[4], rising in July 1992 by more than 95,000, the 27th consecutive monthly increase

[4]In Britain dole is money that is given by the government to people who are unemployed. It is given at regular intervals, e.g. every two weeks.

(Guardian: 14.8.92); falling house prices, and the high level of interest rates; the government comes under political threat because it is unable to meet the demands of all the people in terms of housing, health, education, etc.

Urban protest groups organized around collective issues emerge, and the government becomes the focal point of protest. These protest groups attempt to achieve a fundamental shift in the dominant type of social relations in the interests of the working class. Indeed, certain issues may unite both the poor and middle-income groups in the interest of better service provision (Castells 1983: 173). Castells believes that if such urban protest could be fused into full urban social movements, such power on the streets might transform the society into a social revolutionary force (Slattery: 37). For Castells, then, urban protests if not properly nurtured might end up being a "consumer trade unionism" (Saunders: 112) whose pre-occupation would be based on bread and butter issues with little or no interest in the fundamental significance of capitalist production relations. As Lenin argues: "left to themselves the working classes will not progress to a revolutionary class-consciousness that will incite revolution (M. Kimmel: 119).

Urban social movement for Castells, therefore, can be defined as:

> "the system of practices resulting from the articulation of a conjuncture of the system of the urban agents with other social practices, such that its development tends objectively towards the structural transformation of the urban system, or towards a substantial change in the balance of forces in the class struggle, that is to say in the power of the state" (Castells 1977a: 263).

1.1.2 EVALUATION:

Despite Castells' great contribution and influence in urban studies, his work is not without blemish. Scholars such as Pickvance and Saunders have identified what they consider to be a number of 'fundamental limitations and weaknesses' in his work. For example, Saunders, analyzing the conservative British and American contexts, in contrast to Castells' radical situations of Chile and later France and Italy, suggests that most protests over collective consumption do not lead to demands of radical nature or formation of inter-class alliances. Most protests are territorial in nature and in terms of the scale of demands, typically react to an existing proposal rather than suggesting broader changes (Saunders: 110). He claims that this is the underbelly of Castells' work. But Castells has also warned of the danger of an urban movement not becoming a fully-fledged social movement in the absence of the political organization or a vanguard. He argues for the fusion of the urban protests over shortfalls in the provision of collective consumption into social movements if social change has to be realised. Despite his criticism of Castells, Saunders does acknowledge that Castells pointed out the importance of the right political organization on the ground: "France and Italy" (and indeed Chile), unlike Britain and America, "have effective and highly organized communist parties which are capable of directing sporadic urban protests and integrating them into the broader working class movement" (Saunders: 17).

Another critic of Castells' earlier thesis on social movements, C.G. Pickvance, argues that they are not the only agents of social change in a society. Using the British political system as the basis of his argument, he claims that the interaction and confrontation of the opposing political parties at Westminster affect change. Democratization through 'autonomous' local authorities, thus empowering people at

local levels, argues Pickvance, is not the consequence of the social movements. He has further dismissed Castells' later work on social movements becoming an "interclassism", or forming a broad political front against the state as an 'urban fallacy' (Saunders: 118). He accuses Castells of trying to sell a popular alliance. Pickvance's criticism of "interclassism" is further taken up by J. Fiori (during seminar discussion) who argues that Castells' claim is an exaggeration which is 'unrealistic' in the contemporary capitalist world. He claims that the idea of multi-class becomes wishful thinking where there is very little evidence in reality. At the other extreme, R. Pahl has rejected the concept of "collective consumption" as meaningless and he states it needs to be abandoned:

> "What is the precise distinction between the personal and the collective consumption of any facility? It cannot be the cost of the facility, it cannot be the nature of the facility, it cannot be the ownership of the facility or the way it is used. If we cannot define a collective mode of consumption, how can we continue to use the term meaningfully? (cited in P.Saunders: 122).

Although I regard such criticism as sound, given the contexts within which they were analyzed, they are beyond the scope of this paper. My major concern here is to attempt to show that Castells' theory is an appropriate tool for understanding the South African urban struggles, and where contradictions arise these will be noted. The potential of social movement in conjunction with political parties and trade unions in transforming society into a revolutionary force, which was so criticized and abandoned by Castells himself, together with some elements of his later work on multi-class alliance against Monopoly Capitalist Class are relevant in the South African context.

1.1.3 SUMMARY:

In conclusion, it has to be acknowledged that Castells has abandoned some of his earlier radical ideas which are the main focus of criticism. Nonetheless, it has to be emphasized that Castells approach certainly highlights some of the issues associated with the urban struggles. It takes us a long way from non-structuralist, voluntarist theories of urban sociology. The crucial point Castells is making is that the increased collectivized nature of consumption, which is necessary for the capitalist system to survive, leads to the increased likelihood of urban social movements. They arise to challenge the social order that is inadequately providing facilities for them. "They open up new fronts in the class struggle, and they open up new alliances as well" (Saunders: 113). Indeed, they become one of the axes of social change in advanced societies. All in all, Castells is asking why the state has become interested in urban problems, and his answer covers, or is based, on wider economic and political crises. Through this, he has managed to formulate a theory of social change; the structural foundations of a theory of "collective consumption", a very useful concept in understanding the urban political realities which have to do with housing. To dismiss it as having no place in the study of the urban question, I believe, would be grossly unfair and wrong.

CHAPTER 2

2.1.0 THE APARTHEID 'GOLDEN AGE': THE LEAD UP TO THE 1980S:

Housing policy in South Africa has to be seen in the light of "influx control" and the "pass laws". These were designed to control and regulate the migration and settlement of Africans into the urban areas. The aim was to create a coordinated policy to integrate and regulate labour markets in different economic sectors (Hindson, 1986:32). Africans were seen as 'temporary sojourners' in white urban areas, who were allowed in only as long as they were useful as labour. The basis, in various forms and guises, for African urbanization and housing policy was the (in)famous Stallardist[5] doctrine that:

> "the natives should only be allowed to enter urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases to minister" (cited in Hindson, 1986:36).

The basis of the migrant labour system, the dominant form of exploitation, was that reproduction of the labour force would occur in the 'reserves'. While the daily reproduction of labour power necessarily took place near the mine or factory, the social cost of those not actually on the job was absorbed by the surviving elements of pre-capitalist production in the rural areas (Wolpe, 1972). Capital paid, and still does in many areas, low wages because the cost of long term labour reproduction took

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[5]After the Stallard Commission of 1922 that was set up to look into Transvaal Local Government. This involved, inter alia, determining strategies to control the entry of Africans to towns and governing their urban residence.

place cheaply elsewhere.

Despite all attempts to prevent migration to the urban areas, and to control the movement of labour, the number of urban Africans constantly grew. Between 1911 and 1921, the numbers grew at a rate of 105% per annum (Hindson, 1986: 33). The increase of women grew at a rate of 401%, indicating a process of permanent settlement. By the 1920s, official reports were acknowledging that an increasing number of Africans had lost their material ties to the reserves and were completely dependent on wage labour (Hindson, 1986: 33). However, the dominance of migrant labour meant that employers still paid wage rates determined by the supply of single migrant men, whose families were partially supported by a decreasing production in the reserves. The poverty of the urban African population was exacerbated by insanitary living conditions, high rents and the high cost of basic necessities (Hindson, 1986: 34).

In the period before 1920, housing for the poor - both whites and blacks was the voluntary responsibility of municipal authorities (Hendler et al, 1986: 196). This was generally confined to local slum clearances, to remove Africans into locations, and minimal rehousing projects. Most urban Africans rented houses and land from the municipalities, and there were a few freehold townships, such as Alexandra and Sophiatown in Johannesburg. Following the influenza epidemic in 1918, and the ensuing commission of enquiry, a Housing Act was passed in 1920. This provided for low interest rates on state loans for the construction of assisted housing. Local authorities became responsible for initiating, constructing and managing the housing scheme and grants were made for specific racial groups (Hendler et al, 1986: 197). Black and white workers were segregated through the control of housing.

The Urban Areas Act, amongst other measures, enabled white controlled municipalities to raise loans through the "Native Revenue Account". This was financed by rents, profits from services and, above all, profits from the municipalities' monopoly on beer brewing. In other words, the poorest classes of society, whose wages barely covered subsistence, bore the major costs of housing (Stadler, 1979: 26). The small amount of housing that was built was bleak and regimental, and Africans preferred the existing freehold townships, notwithstanding their overcrowded slum conditions (Stadler, 1979: 27).

2.1.1 CRISIS AND RESPONSE:

The situation continued to deteriorate. Increasing capitalization of agriculture, combined with drought and overcrowding in the reserves continued to drive Africans into the urban areas. A fledgling manufacturing sector, financed by independent and mining capital, began to expand rapidly in the 1930s. This led to growing demand for semi-skilled labour, at that stage provided by white, and therefore more expensive, workers. At the same time, white and black unemployment was growing, intensified by two depressions (Hindson, 1986: 43). Although work for those in employment in the formal sector rose during this period, the cost of living rose faster.

The expansion of the industrial sector from the late 1930s, led to the temporary relaxation of "influx controls" during the Second World War. This freed up African migration to the cities. This expansion created a demand not just for a larger work-force but for a qualitatively different kind. While organised commercial and industrial capital required a more permanent, "stable" work-force, individual employers often

preferred the services of cheap unskilled rural labour. As these new recruits became more familiar with the urban job market, however, they moved on to better paid jobs, leaving vacancies for more "rural labour" (Posel, 1991: 21). There was, thus, a high turnover of labour in the cities, undermining any government attempts to eradicate the "surplus" African population from the urban areas.

The emergence of a large, permanent African proletariat saw an upsurge of popular struggle on all fronts (Wilkinson, 1983: 67; Block and Wilkinson, 1982: 18). The wartime boom had secured higher wages in the industrial sector, through the strengthening trade union movement and the penetration of black labour into jobs previously reserved for whites. At the same time, inflationary pressures increased the cost of living. Strike actions and riots in the townships became widespread. The housing crisis also brought the urban African population into confrontation with local authorities over lack of housing, high rents and poor services (Hindson, 1986: 57). Between 1936 and 1946, the urban African population had grown by 57.2%, from 1.1 million to 1.8 million (Posel, 1991: 20). The housing shortage became chronic. By 1947, some 154,000 houses were needed for African families alone (Morris, 1981: 36). Consequently, land invasions and squatter movements sprang up, the most notable and successful being James 'Sofasonke' Mpanza (ed. Swilling, 1991: 14) in Johannesburg. Thus, people solved their housing problems outside the normal exchange market or process of production (cf.p 39).

Coupled with expectations of post-war reforms which were not realised, the appalling urban conditions of Africans "produced a volatile political climate in which the issues of everyday material existence - housing, transport and food prices - became charged with political significance" (Wilkinson, 1983: 68). The State was forced to respond. In

1946, the Fagan Commission was set up to enquire into "influx control" legislation. Reporting two years later, it accepted the permanent urban presence of the African population, whose living conditions could only be solved when they were paid adequate wages:

> "We doubt whether any wholly satisfactory solution will be found until the need for such economic adjustments (in the cost of accommodation) disappears and the labourers by their own productive capacity attain a position in which they can make their own arrangements on an economic, not a sub-economic basis" (cited in Wilkinson, 1983: 68).

The Commission recommended that Africans build their own houses with a freehold on the land, giving them a "permanent stake in the system". Again, the emphasis was on workers providing their own housing at costs and standards they could afford. But, it has to be acknowledged that the work of the Commission represented some progress and some improvement to African condition.

The State and employers, recognized the link between wages and living conditions, or more specifically, housing. It was a problem that "constantly exercised the authorities" (Stadler, 1979: 24). The Young-Barret Committee[6],reporting in 1935, remarked that "the only reason why the rental charged must be sub-economic is the manifest inability of the natives to pay rents based on the costs of houses constructed of durable materials and by European labour" (cited in Pigott, 1986: 100). Rather than calling for higher wages, they (the ruling power elite) looked for ways of reducing the costs of housing.

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[6]A government body set up to enquire into, and report on, the "question of residence of blacks in urban areas" (Morris, 1981: 29).

The Smit Committee, reporting in 1942, recognized the economic importance of a healthy work-force. It called for increased wages, improved housing and a range of welfare measures to improve urban living conditions (Hindson, 1986: 56). In order to reduce the costs of living, it proposed that all work "which (the Africans) are capable of performing for the benefit of its own people" should be reserved "in the area set aside for Native occupation" (cited in Pigott, 1986: 101). Whilst recognizing the long term need for higher wages and better living conditions, the logic was clear, if contradictory: housing built by skilled white labour is too expensive for African workers with low wages, therefore cheap African labour should be used to produce cheaper housing for themselves. This provided a "two-fold benefit". It was not until the 1948 elections, however, that these proposals were to be fully implemented.

The Smit report, as with so many others, was to be confined to academic history within a few months of its publication. The election of 1948 was to bring a change of government with the promise for whites of their continued privileged status in society. This was to be through a complete restructuring of the fundamental principles of African urban policy. Ironically, despite the rhetoric, it was under the banner of apartheid that the government accepted the need for housing the urban African work-force.

2.1.2 THE ENTRENCHMENT OF APARTHEID HOUSING POLICY:

The platform of 'swart gevaar' (i.e. black danger), on which the Afrikaner National Party came to power, returned to the Stallardist doctrine that "the native in the white urban area should be regarded as a visitor who has come to offer his service to his

own advantage and that of the white man" (Sauer Report, 1948; cited in Wilkinson, 1983: 69). However, ideology had to be combined with the existing realities. The State was confronted with two contradictory forces: the requirements of industrial and mining capital for increasing labour and the irreversible urban migration of Africans on the one hand, and racist political doctrine on the other. The urban crisis of the 1940s severely hampered the new government's manoeuvering. As Legassick (1974: 18) says, "the Nationalist government could not, any more than its predecessor, ignore the structural crisis which required the state to involve itself more directly in the reproduction of labour power". Whatever the long term goals of industrial decentralization[7], it was recognized that there had to be a transition period of industrial growth at the existing urban centres (Legassick, 1974: 19). Thus, the requirement for the provision of African housing was inevitably linked to "influx control" (Pigott, 1986: 161).

Three major political processes can be identified in housing policy in this period: greater "influx control", intensified racial segregation and the desire to reduce the "financial burden" of blacks in the white areas on the State and local government (Morris, 1981; 42). Numerous legislative measures aimed to curb African urbanization and restructure the urban labour market. An "urban labour preference policy" was instituted, giving municipalities the powers to direct and control labour, maximizing the potential of existing urban workers and excluding new migrants (Posel, 1991: 21). Urbanized workers were also given "residential rights" and the right to refuse

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[7] Industrial decentralization, one of the policies of the new Nationalist government, was the process by which the State hoped to move industry away from the 'white urban areas' to the boarder areas within the 'reserves'. The principle was that the industry would be in "white South Africa" but the labour force would live in the 'reserves', taking care of their own subsistence and reproduction. It would also remove the threat of large concentrations of urban African populations (see Legassick, 1974).

employment if they so wished. This contradiction was firmly entrenched in Section 10 of the Native Laws Amendment Act in 1952[89].

The role of housing in social control, at the forefront of the government and local authorities' minds, was spelt out by the then Secretary for Native Affairs:

> "Only by the provision of adequate shelter in properly planned Native townships can full control over urban natives be regained, because only then will it be possible to eliminate the surplus Natives who do not seek an honest living in the cities" (cited in Pigott, 1986: 164).

The presence of large numbers of urban Africans was perceived as a very real danger to the stability of the cities. The government feared that Africans may again take political control of the situation through squatting. This fear was combined with the need for a new form of labour (Posel, 1989). To quote Cooper (1983: 32) "the problem with illegal space...was not that it failed to produce a work force quite cheaply, but that it reproduced the wrong work-force for the postwar economy...(it) gave rise to the wrong kind of city". Slum and squatter removals were utilized in conjunction with conventional housing schemes.

The government had to reconcile a broad-based demand for the use of skilled African labour to cheapen the costs of housing construction, with the protectionism of white building workers (Wilkinson, 1983: 73). A limited number of training schemes for African building workers had been in operation since the war, but the white building

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[9] This recognized the rights of urban Africans who had resided there continuously since birth, had lawfully resided for 15 years, or had worked there for the same employer for 10 years (ed. A. Lemon, 1991: 6).

workers' strike in 1947 and others, threatened industrial action kept in check any government proposals of expanding them (Wilkinson, 1983: 73). The 1951 Native Building Workers Act, despite objections from employers and liberals, introduced a "job colour bar" in the expansion of these schemes. This prevented the use of this African building workers outside the townships. African workers were employed in direct labour organizations by local authorities to build houses for rent in the designated townships. This training was accompanied by the development of "large numbers of simple, serviceable Native houses, designed to allow for their construction by Native building workers who (were) not required to show the same standard of skill as demanded from European artisans" (cited in Pigott, 1986: 186). In this way, cheap labour was to produce items of consumption for its own cheap reproduction.

The question of finance was still unresolved. The principle that housing should be on an "economic" rather than a "sub-economic" basis continued to prevail. The government and local authorities were concerned to provide only the minimum for those most in need. Yet, this was the great majority of the urban population. The Department of Native Affairs expressed the opinion that "though wage levels have risen and cost of living allowance have been added to normal earnings, these increases have not bridged the gap for the bulk of the Native urban population between economic dependence and independence" (cited in Wilkinson, 1983: 77).

Who was to pay remained a "three-cornered conflict of interest" (Block and Wilkinson, 1982: 24) between central government and the employers. The government's finances were severely affected by a downturn in the economy following the war and immediate postwar boom. The Treasury had to slash financial proposals for a five-year programme from 18.5 million British pounds to 8.5 million British pounds (Wilkinson,

1983:76). It proposed that employers should contribute towards housing costs. This provoked an outcry that production costs would increase and smaller struggling businesses would be jeopardized. Industry was already paying high taxes, it was argued, so employers should not have to pay for a "nation-wide responsibility" (Pigott, 1986: 169). At the same time, local authorities were adamant that the financial burden should not be imposed on them and their white rate payers. In the light of the growing urban crisis, employers reluctantly gave way. The State prevailed, and the Native Services Levy Act was passed in 1952. Through this legislation, employers contributed towards a massive programme of family housing and township services for settled urban Africans. Beer sale profits and rents continued to make up the State's contribution.

The provision of public housing also involved a restructuring of the State apparatus responsible for its management (Block and Wilkinson, 1982: 24).Following the installation of the new government, there was a gradual shift of power from the National Housing and Planning Committee[10] to the Department of Native Affairs, the backbone of apartheid policy. In 1957, the Bantu Housing Board was established, consisting solely of members selected by the Minister of Native Affairs. Under various changes of names, this body was to control the content and direction of African housing policy until 1982 (Block and Wilkinson, 1982: 24).

The implication of apartheid housing policies logically entail the spatial segregation of the urban African workers. The space of production was separated from the place of consumption and reproduction. In earlier years, as it was to be later on, family life for

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[10] A semi-autonomous management body originally set up in 1944 to replace the Central Housing Board which had been instituted under the 1920 Housing Act.

migrant workers had been far away in the reserves. For the permanent urban African population, this geographical gap was reduced but still stringently maintained. Separate locations were to be provided for the African work-force,

> "...an adequate distance from white townships...separated from the European areas by an area of industrial site where industries exist or are being planned; preferably within easy transport distance of the town or city, preferably by rail and not by road transport;...(with the) provision of suitable open buffer spaces around proclaimed location areas... and a considerable distance from main and national roads" (Verwoerd in 1950 cited in Pigott, 1986: 169).

In this way, control was to be maintained. Ironically, this plan led to high costs of transport, access and infrastructure. No subsidies were provided for these items. The costs of these items of consumption were to lead to major confrontation during the 1950s.

The evolution of a policy framework for State intervention in the production and provision of housing was matched by the development of the technical means for its implementation (Pigott, 1986: 214). Since 1947, the National Building Research Institute had been looking into "scientific" ways of reducing building costs. Areas of investigation included finding "minimum standards below which no dwellings could be erected", optimum housing layout and density criteria, and research into alternative materials and cheap construction methods for "urban Bantu housing" (Wilkinson, 1983: 80). The "scientific" research was combined with skills training of African labour, creating a productive work-force to build this rational housing.

The first township to be built along these lines wa Kwa-Thema in the Johannesburg region in 1950. Five sub-committees of the NBRI examined the various aspects of

housing costs including structure, building materials, overheads and profits of building contractors, "unorthodox" methods of construction and the efficiency and productivity of labour (Pigott, 1986: 184). Further refinements, such as reducing yet further space and materials standards, led to the development of the standard four-room 51/6 and 51/9. Rows upon regimented rows of these houses, popularly known as "match-boxes", were to dominate the African urban landscape, in "archipelagos of relentlessly impoverished 'suburbs'" (Wilkinson, 1983: 83).

Alongside conventional housing projects, sites and services schemes were incorporated into housing projects to reduce costs still further. Built as a complement to conventional housing, they were to be replaced at a later stage by permanent shelter, either by the residents or the municipalities. The site and services schemes were a means by which the State could provide housing fast enough to respond to the urgency of the situation, whilst not drawing excessively on funds intended for conventional housing in the "properly planned townships" (Wilkinson, 1983:78).

The series of measures outlined above were to form the backbone of the South African State's housing policy until the 1960s. Between 1948 and 1962, an average of 11,386 houses for Africans were built annually. This compares with the 1,573 built annually between 1920 and 1948 (Bloch and Wilkinson, 1982: 26). The peak was reached in 1957/58 when over 11,000 houses were built by the Johannesburg municipality alone. The cost of individual houses was reduced to 150 British pounds(Pigott, 1986: 233). Many of these houses were reduced to two rooms or less. In continuing efforts to reduce costs, items that were not "absolutely essential" were deleted (Pigott, 1986: 221). The picture of housing construction was uneven across the country. Responding to specific local political and economic pressures, local

authorities reacted differently (Morris, 1982: 66). For example, in Durban, where the 'reserves' bordered the "white areas", only 5,115 houses were built during 1957 and 1960, whilst 1,576 hostels for single migrants were built. In Cape Town, historically a "coloured" area, virtually no African housing was built[11]. Pretoria saw the establishment of a single township, providing 12,438 dwellings up to 1958.

Despite the claim by the Department of Native Affairs in 1955 that the "solution of the Bantu housing problem has now reached... the end of the beginning" (cited in Wilkinson, 1983:65), the story was far from over. Resistance in the urban areas continued. In previous years, struggle had focussed on the lack of State intervention in the sphere of consumption. Now that the State had intervened, the issues became even more politicized. Squatter removals and slum clearances (used to remove African freehold rights, e.g. Sophiatown) raised protests not only from Africans but from white liberals too. Increases in rents and transport, to minimize State subsidies, provoked widespread rent and bus boycotts. Industrial African workers still could not afford to pay "economic" rents, as their wages declined cyclically during the late 1940s and 1950s (Hindson, 1986: 68). Once again, the links between production and reproduction were made. Despite increasingly repressive "influx control" measures, urban migration continued apace. Between 1951 and 1960, the urban African population increased from 2.3 million to 3.4 million, an increase of 47% (Posel, 1991: 26). Many of these ended up in the squatter areas and remaining freehold townships (of which there were a few), rather than the strictly controlled "model townships".

The spiralling urban resistance through mass action, boycotts, strikes and civil

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[11] The Nationalists introduced a "Coloured Preference Policy" in the Cape in the mid-1950s to compensate "coloureds" for their loss of the franchise.

disobedience and State response culminated in the shooting of volcanic anti-pass demonstrators in Sharpeville on the 23rd March 1960. This marked the beginning of a second , more violent and sinister process of 'ethnic cleansing' phase of apartheid policy. Urban and housing policy was reversed in a concerted effort to expel Africans from the "white urban areas". Between 1969 and 1982, an estimated more than 3.5 million Africans were subjected to forced removals (IDAF: 19). This marked the significant political role played by the Homeland system, particularly between 1963-73, in attempting to 'solve' the 'racial question'(Davies: 33). This was an elaborate attempt to answer the whites' fears of African political domination created by growth of cities, by returning to the social and physical divisions which existed many years before. But, the situation became not conducive for the smooth operation of the capital, and hence "between 1960 and 1963 South Africa experienced a net outflow of foreign capital of between 60% and 134% of the levels of the inflow recorded in 1958" (Davies: 27). Nonetheless, despite the swift "Machiavellian" style of the reign of State terror, the content of urban struggles, albeit its dented structure, remained intact. The history of these struggles is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3.

3.0 STATE TOP-DOWN REFORM PROGRAMMES:

The apartheid political repression that followed the 1961 anti-pass Sharpeville Massacre seemed to have ushered in a period of stability which subsequently re-attracted foreign capital during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The conditions favoured the ruling power elite and the capital whose consolidation and initiative created 'the golden age of apartheid'(Davies: 30). This meant the growth of the industrial sector with the need for a skilled labour-force. Strict pass and influx control gave way to tolerance of the 'illegal' work-force whose low-wage ensured maximum profit.

However, the failure of both the State and capital to provide affordable housing for the labour force, which was still regarded as the 'sojourners' in 'white' urban areas, created a crisis of reproduction which gave rise to land invasions and the mushrooming of squatter settlements which were often below socially acceptable standards. "With the collapse of reserve production, labour market manipulation by the state was no longer adequate to secure (RE)production of labour power" (Hindson: 82). The State was forced to intervene, albeit within the strategy of regulating African Urbanization, in a massive way. New housing projects within the Bantustans using "funds from the Bantu Revenue Accounts of the Bantu Administration Affairs Boards" (Hindson: 82) were undertaken. Many huge townships such as Mdantsane near East London, Zwelitsha near King Williamstown, and Umlazi near Durban, were incorporated into the Bantustans "within reach of major industrial and commercial

areas" (Hindson:). Workers were able to commute daily between work and home. Thus, the government thought it had solved, once and for all, the problem of the capital demand for a settled labour force within the context of its racial policies. Consequently, there was a decline of African housing construction in 'white' urban areas, and the expansion of single-sex hostel accommodation. From the early 1970s up to the 1980s, the government almost stopped providing public housing for low-income groups.

Following the international outcry against pass and influx controls which destroyed the fabric of many African families, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development announced in 1973, limited urban reforms that were designed to co-opt "key workers" (Hindson: 81). They were entitled to be joined by their "wives" in urban areas, but not their "children" (Hindson: 81). This was to be guided by the availability of a 'suitable' housing as understood by the government. All in all, the late 1960s and early 1970s, witnessed the use of material constraints, i.e., accommodation and employment, coupled with tolerance, as a mechanism for regulating African urbanization. Deproclamation of townships and controls over squatting and illegal settlement helped to regulate African urbanization (Hindson: 82). Nonetheless, the decline of the economy in the mid-1970s, coupled with the political mobilization heralded by independent trade unions, saw tolerance giving way to active State intervention.

PHASE 1: 1979 - 1985

3.1.0 "TOTAL STRATEGY": THE MILITARIZATION OF THE URBAN QUESTION

By the early 1970s, the State's urban policies of the 1950s and 1960s had resulted in a qualitative decline in the living conditions of urban Africans. The advance of popular urban struggles were not confined to trade unions, whose 1973 Durban spontaneous industrial strikes spread throughout the country signalling the first cracks in the 'golden age', and other forces emerged in the late 1970s, particularly among students.

The dominant ideology of the time was the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) with 'war' cry such as: 'Black man, you are on your own, rise up and fight back the white oppressor'. This is the political movement which was able to instil the then missing spirit of anger and hatred for the system and indeed, resilience, and helped to focus the urban struggles. A number of community based social movements sprang up, particularly among the youth. The apex of this phase was the explosion of the 16th June 1976 Soweto urban struggles which put the plight of urban Africans at the top of the agenda of both the capital and State.

The country-wide urban struggles, with growing links and greater unity at different levels, that followed, shocked the ruling power elite to the core. They completely transformed the urban question from that of the 'golden age' of the 1960s to a deep organic crisis which denied the regime strategic political initiative. It is important to note that what ignited the urban crisis was the issues closely related with State provision of "collective consumption", i.e. the Bantu Education and housing. They

become a rallying point around which the people were mobilised for broader national political issues that challenged the legitimacy of the State. Even the government appointed Cillie Commission, that was assigned with the task of establishing the root causes of the conflicts, fully agreed that these were:

> "a great shortage (of housing), overcrowding, lack of funding, too-high rents and the serious lack of services and facilities in most Black townships" (Morris cited in Smith: 44).

The imposition of the Community Council Act of 1977 in the townships, whose major role was the administering of housing and raising revenue mainly through rents and service charges, fuelled the already volatile political situation. In Soweto, social unrest and militancy led to the collapse of the Bantu Council after the rent increase, and saw the emergence of one of the first contemporary urban social movements, the Committee of Ten (CoT). The rejection of the Community Councils (CCs) and the emergence of opposing community based social movements was a common trend throughout South Africa which became a vivid rejection of top-down representation offered by the Bantu Councils.

The urban organic crisis led to fright and disappearance of foreign capital, the "collapse of the economic, political and ideological conditions which had hitherto sustained a form of capital accumulation based predominantly on cheap, unskilled black labour" (Davies: 37). Given the deep nature of the crisis, the regime was faced with two possible choices: either to go all out for a counter reign of terror as in the 1960s, or adopt a "carrot and stick" strategy, i.e. a reform of the apartheid structures coupled with the 'necessary' repression which would ensure perpetual white political control. The latter was most favoured by the government's most powerful allies, the

monopoly capitalist class forces represented by big businesses, whilst "large sections of white petty bourgeoisie and white labour have been opposed to all attempts to modify 'traditional' apartheid, fearing that this was the first step in a process of sacrificing their privileges" (Davies: 37). They yearned for the re-introduction of the reign of terror that brought them the old 'golden age'. The political differences in their way forward brought about a irreconcilable schism within the old white nationalistic alliance. In the ensuing political struggle, the monopoly capital, with the backing of top echelons of the military who had the political insight of the present, past and future, prevailed.

The Transvaal Chamber of Commerce advocated the need for the creation of an African middle class. There was then a feeling that if Africans could be given their share of the capitalist cake, all would be well. They would not only just be able to defend the system, but be actively interested in defending the system. However, the existing apartheid structures, as they were created for solely top-down white domination over Africans, could not cater for this new situation. It thus became an urgent matter to restructure the apartheid mechanism of political control. The first and foremost stumbling block towards this goal was identified as the then right-wing Prime Minister, with his past Nazi connections (B. Bunting: 97), J.B.Voster and his heir apparent, Dr Connie Mulder. In a palace coup that followed, which was preceded by the Monopoly Capital Class promoted Information (or Muldergate) scandal[12] that destroyed the political standing of Dr Mulder, he was superseded by the militarist and

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[12] In an attempt to counter the 'anti-South African' propaganda, that followed the 1976 Soweto Urban Struggles, the Information Department was used to establish many internal and external pro-government fronts funded by tax-payers' money. Inevitable, millions of the South African Rands (currency) became unaccounted for. Dr Mulder became one of the victims of the scandal that followed.

reformist power block led by the then Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha in September,1978. The new power bloc made up of the "Securiotat" and Monopoly Capital brought new initiatives and set the stage for new top-down urban reforms.

The urban reform process that was adopted in the late 1970s became known as "total strategy". In essence, the approach aimed at promoting and protecting 'free enterprise' in South Africa from what was regarded as the 'communist total onslaught'. Briefly stated, this described the militarization of the white society against what the military generals perceived as the 'communist total onslaught' upon 'democratic' South Africa. This concept referred to a strategic perspective that was first spelt out in the government's 1977 White Paper on Defence. According to the White Paper:

> "The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields - military, psychological, political, sociological..." (Idaf: 75).

Over the years, South Africa's generals assumed increasing executive control (IDAF: 75). By early 1978, the military and police establishment had become the dominant force in the government, and through the National Security Management System it largely directed the regime's strategy during the successive State of Emergency imposed after the nationwide uprising which began in September 1984. At its apex was the State Security Council which, although technically a committee of the cabinet, usurped many of the cabinet's executive functions. Under the State President, it drew together senior cabinet ministers, military and police commanders, the head of the National Intelligence Service and the civil servants heading government departments (Idaf: 75).

This strategy, based on the sophisticated exercise of winning the "hearts and minds" of the target urban Africans, became a new gate-way for state intervention. Cole has identified four key government initiatives to this effect: "the Riekert Commission to investigate urban policy; the Wiehahn Commission to examine industrial relations; the President's Council to look at a new Constitutional framework; and the State Security Council to explore a coherent National Security Strategy" (Cole: 18). But, a further initiative, albeit the brain-child of the business community, should be included here: the creation of the Urban Foundation whose initiatives have left an indelible mark on the South African housing policy. In short, all these housing policy linked reformist initiatives, as argued below, were part of an attempt by the power ruling elite "to reconstitute the means of domination on terms favourable" (Cole: 18) to themselves. All but one initiative, the Wiehahn Commission which complements the Riekert Recommendations, are analyzed.

3.1.1 THE RIEKERT COMMISSION:

Basically, the Riekert Report of 1979 on Manpower Utilization proposed a relaxation on the mobility of urban African labour whilst, at the same time, motivating an intensification of control over non-urban labour. The Africans were to be divided into urban 'insiders', with permanent rights to live in urban areas, and rural 'outsiders' with less access to the urban areas than before (M. Sutcliffe: 89). In other words, "influx control" was to be intensified over the Africans without Section Ten (1) a,b, c rights[13],

[13]This Act recognized that urban African who was born in an urban area, or who had been working for a single employer continuously for 10 years (or 15 years if for several employers) was entitled to residential rights.

thus claiming to protect the urban 'insiders' from the would be rural 'outside' invaders. Large increases in fines for 'illegal' employment and residence were to be imposed. Directly put, the "burden of influx control was too be placed on employers and townships households" (Hindson: 84). So, the spirit of privatization of the urban question was set to take shape through the Riekert Report recommendations.

The failure of the Commission to question one of the pillars of the apartheid policy - the Bantustan system - and its insistence on dividing Africans into 'insiders' and 'outsiders', justifies the argument that it hoped to make the system more comfortable. By endowing the 'insiders' with "urban citizenship" (cited in Swilling: xi) rather than "political citizenship" (cited in Swilling: xi), the State's assumption was that Africans were more concerned with the provision of "collective consumption" rather than the democratization process. By flooding them with capital, or by meeting some of their urban demands, the urban social movements would be drowned and the revolutionary spirit would consequently be watered down. In short, Riekert encouraged the government to embark on a course that would guarantee its sharing of "collective consumption" with African 'insiders', without threatening their (white) monopolistic hold on political power. Africans, as whole, were still to exercise and enjoy their political rights in their respective 'tribal' homelands or in Black Local Authorities (BLAs) in urban areas (M. Sutcliffe: 89).

The Riekert proposals were later given material sustenance by three Koornhof Bills re-introduced in 1982 as the Black Communities Development Bill, the Black Local Authorities Bill and the Orderly Movement Settlement of Black Persons Bill (Cole: 18). In terms of Cole's analysis, the latter, despite its failure to reach the statute books, was specifically aimed at crushing growing informal squatter settlements in the urban

areas (Cole: 18). The Bills relating to the creation of African local authorities did, however, reach the statute books. The discredited 'Community Councils' (CCs) were to be superseded by local authorities, i.e. the BLAs, thus 'empowering' the urban Africans. It was further wished that the political decentralization would subsequently lead to privatization of township housing and services. The private sector and the community, through the BLAs, were expected to take over the housing market. Central government would then withdraw from the market. So, the Riekert recommendations were designed to enable the efficient operation of the market. Simply put, it was hoped that they would be able to unleash the market forces which would in turn ensure the withdrawal of the State and promotion of privatization. However, as argued later (cf.p 51), their assumption was wrong.

Nonetheless, "the flight of impoverished Africans from the country-side to the cities and the mushrooming of peri-urban squatter settlements inside and outside the Bantustans" (Hindson), coupled with the ANC's clarion call to make South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable, rendered the Riekert recommendations on influx control futile. The ANC's call involved land invasions and the erection of squatter settlements, such as Crossroads in the Western Cape, on 'all' open urban spaces. This 'uncontrolled' African urbanization resulted in an increase of "the growth rate from 3.2% per annum before 1980 to approximately 5,5% per annum in the post-1980 period" (M. Sutcliffe: 88). The poor, therefore, regressed in order to progress, and these land invasions were not just symbols of mass protest against the racist housing policies. By solving their housing problems outside the process of production (often at socially unacceptable levels), the poor endeavoured to redefine the process anew. In such similar situations, the concerned people, organized around social movements, have every political right to lobby for state's intervention. Such intervention would

ensure the transfer of the "Means of Collective Consumption" to the community, and further help to facilitate the process of commodification. The failure to intervene would mean a slow process of commodification during which many participants, i.e. the economically weak/vulnerable, would be expelled and replaced or bought out by the rich.

Those Riekert recommendations which promoted the idea of the creation of local authorities and the privatization of the welfare were implemented, and they gave birth to social movements on a national scale. They ignited the mass urban insurrection of the 1980s that actualized the concept of "dual power", with the urban social movements controlling the townships which had became a "no go area" for the government.

3.1.2 THE NEW CONSTITUTION:

Following the Riekert Commission's recommendations of turning Community Councils into fully-fledged local authority status, the first Black Local Authority Act came into effect in August 1983. The National Party government set up a new political dispensation in terms of racial tricameral constitutional arrangements at local, regional and national levels, inter alia, for urban Africans' participation in their 'general affairs' government. With housing as their primary administrative function, the BLAs became immediate political enemies of the township communities. They were seen to be responsible for rent increases, poor housing conditions and inadequate services. In response to the entire three-pronged Koornhof Bills package, in August 1983, an alliance of an estimated 700 progressive and predominantly community and labour

based organizations, representing an estimated 2 million people under the common banner of the Freedom Charter (Wolpe, 1988: 78), formed the United Democratic Front (UDF). The use of rent-boycotts by urban social movements (the major source of income for the BLAs) became the significant tool for undermining the smooth running of the Black Local Authorities. For example, during the national rent-boycotts, one of the then least politicized areas, Natal, was able to inflict a deficit of an estimated R2.5 million (c.$800, 000).

The creation of the UDF was, therefore, the revival of the extra-parliamentary politics, and providing a legal forum in which people fought for both "collective consumption" and their "political citizenship" (Ibid:xi). It brought together people from all political persuasions in a National Democratic Struggle (NDS), and managed to attract into its fold even the inorganic intellectuals, i.e. the white democrats, and set the scene for an unprecedented development of social movements in South African history. The past differences which prevailed between "production and reproduction terrains was now welded into a common arena within which Black urban struggle was waged" (cited in Smith: 48). It was these differences which had been exploited by the system in the late 1970s, when the then less politically aware 'amagoduka' (i.e. 'migrant' workers in single-sex dormitories) refused to be politically 'dictated' to by township 'schoolboys' and resulted in state instigated 'father on son' violence.

The phenomenon of interclassism emergence resulted in "the wedding of production-based and consumption-based struggles" (cited in Smith: 47). Castells' notion of interclassism struggle was, therefore, realised through the formation of the UDF in South Africa. Perhaps, the question of institutionalised racism which had been declared a heresy, a crime against humanity, by the international community the world

over actualized all this in South Africa.

However, it has to be pointed out that Castells' later argument of urban social movements autonomy from the political parties does not hold in the South African context. The South Africa urban struggles, with both class and racial contents, has shown that the survival and political impact of these urban social movements depends largely on their close relationship with the political parties. In line with the earlier radical work of Castells, the UDF could not have survived the test of time without the ANC's vanguard support. It was led by the ANC stalwarts at all political levels, and became the mouth-piece of the then banned ANC. Furthermore, I would argue that Castells' notion of social movements' autonomy from the political parties is the under-belly of his theory. My basis of criticism is that in any democratic system, the route to authentic corridors of power is realistically through the political parties. Given the context within which Castells wrote his later thesis, it becomes confusing and absurd for him to think that the social movements would have prevailed in their endeavours without political parties.

In the context of escalating political mobilization, struggles on the ground - including those being waged by urban squatter communities - sparked off widespread civil unrest between 1984/87, leading to the collapse of many of these bodies under the weight of election, boycotts and assassinations of councillors. Thus interclassism urban insurrection paved the way for the defeat of influx control. By 1984, largely as a result of wide-scale land invasions and squatter resistance that followed, local officials in places like Western Cape were openly admitting (to the embarrassment of the central government) the failure of influx control. The consequences of their confession was the tumble-down of some of the anti-African urbanization laws like the

Coloured Labour Preferential Policy (CLPP), and the introduction of the 99 year leasehold for Africans in the Western Cape. However, the government thought that through the restructuring of the local governments it could still salvage some political control, and hence stability, throughout the country. This became a priority.

During the peak of the 1984 urban struggles, the BLAs were inaugurated and forcefully imposed on urban Africans. In an attempt to overcome 'non-collaboration' strategies, the following legislation was enacted by the government:

(a) The Regional Services Councils Amendment Act (No.49 of 1988): To grant the Provincial Administrator the right to perform the duties of a local authority where it refuses or fails to perform duties as laid out by the Administrator. As part of this process, the appointed township administrator is deemed to be the local authority and represents its interests on the relevant RSC.

(b) The Black Local Authorities Amendment Bill (June 1988): To further empower the Provisional Administrator to order a person or body to act for a local authority where it is found that the object of legislation is being frustrated. The Administrator may remove a person from elected office if she/he fails to take office or refuses to participate in the lawful proceedings of a local authority. Where there are no elected officials, e.g. through en masse resignation under community pressure, the Administrator can appoint members to manage or control the authority until an election can be held.

(c) Proclamation R97 of 1988 (Emergency Regulations), read with Government Notice 1112 of 1988: To prohibit the activities of 18 organizations, including the UDF, AZAPO, the National Education Crisis Committee, township and youth organizations. To ban any attempt at initiating or encouraging boycott tactics, which includes the October 1988 municipal elections. By implication, the boycott ban also appears to disallow participation by UDF and AZAPO groups.

(d) The Promotion of Constitutional Development Bill (June 1988): On the 20 June 1988, President P.W.Botha announced plans for a National Council. This was to facilitate the inclusion of African people at a third-tier level of parliament. To be a forum to debate and negotiate a new constitutional framework that will bring African people into parliament. Provision was made for 36 members, including 9 members elected by

Black local authorities and the Chief Minister of the self-governing homelands. (Indicator: 17).

In theory, the promotion of local governments was a welcome sign of good intention towards the democratization of the system. But international experience has shown that oppressive regimes, the world over, often use "decentralization" as the means of political control. In South Africa, the BLAs were then used as a mechanism of political control. Nonetheless, from their inception, these were under-financed in line with Riekert's wishes of promoting privatization. In an attempt to be self-sufficient and viable, "between March and September 1984, fourteen Councils on the Witwatersrand announced rent and service charge increases" (Cole: 19). This became the midwife of the urban struggles that engulfed the whole country beginning in September 1984 in the Vaal. South Africa became ungovernable and the duel over "dual power" became a reality. Led by the Vanguard political movement, the ANC, the progressive urban social movements were able to exercise "dual power" alongside the power of the State. In a highly volatile political climate, both sides attempted to stamp their perspectives indelibly on public opinion and on the future. So, the government lost its sole monopoly in policy formulation and the control over of all institutions, geographical areas and other aspects of Africans' lives in the townships. Thus, the National Party government lost its legitimacy over urban Africans. The rudimentary organs of people's power emerged to fill the vacuum in the form of street and area committees, people's courts, civic organizations, issue based structures in education, health, housing, etc. Around these, people organized to challenge the regime. They gave birth to a tradition of mass participation.

However, it has to be pointed out that this situation of "dual power" created a once

unthinkable phenomenon, the space of negotiation which was used by the urban social movements to gradually but consistently strip the apartheid government of its control over some state institutions and society generally. This is a process of gradual dis-empowering of the apartheid state. It is within this space of negotiations that today the ANC and the government are involved in the "talks about talks" concerning the adoption of a new and democratic South African constitution.

3.1.3 THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL:

As part of the 'total onslaught' strategy, the National Security Management System, at regional and local levels established 11 Joint Management Centres (JMCs), 60 sub-JMSs and over 350 mini-JMCs" (IDAF: 75) throughout the country. All were usually chaired by local or regional military commanders. Their first and foremost task was to act as the political, economic and intelligence eyes and ears of the central government.

Using the "carrot and stick" approach, the JMCs began to target specific communities for upgrading. These were those urban areas identified by the government as national 'security risks': the so-called oil spots. The first move towards the ultimate control of these areas was to cut them off from the outside world and regulate the movement of the inhabitants. For example, the New Brighton township near Port Elizabeth was first encircled with blade wire, then the house to house search for so-called 'communist' agitators began. Where government imposed local authorities existed, the upgrading of the existing housing stock or squatter settlements followed (e.g. Crossroads and Alexander Township) in the hoped of co-opting the people.

A classic case of the nature of JMC repression that still haunts the minds of the progressive activists, internally and internationally, was the 1986 destruction of the Crossroads Communities, "once the crucible of squatter resistance" (Cole: 17) in South Africa, by the "witdoeke" supported by the South African security forces. The destruction "was a critical forerunner to the State's ability to reshape Cape's urban areas according to new reformist and security initiatives" (Cole: 17). Furthermore, this action was crucial to force the 'illegal' squatters to the then politically unaccepted government identified and controlled peripheral spot of "orderly urbanization" process, i.e., Khayelitsha township.

In short, the JMCs were counter-revolutionary instruments of the NSMS. They helped to penetrate and co-opt the urban African communities, and hoped to pull the rug from under the feet of the urban social movements. Nonetheless, because the social movements were well organised from below, government endeavours became a futile exercise. The collapse of the Community Councils through ungovernability demonstrated the failure of the government's top-down approach to suppress the advance of "people's power".

3.1.4 HOUSING PRIVATIZATION AND THE ROLE OF THE URBAN FOUNDATION:

John Turner has defined Non-Governmental Organizations' (NGOs) involvement in housing as "acting as catalysts for change to enable communities and as mediators" (Drabik: X). This definition is used as a means of discussing the role played by the U.F. in the evolvement of housing policy in South Africa.

One of the striking features of NGOs is that they often emerge in times of political

crisis when a State's legitimacy is challenged. This is often associated with the failure to deliver the necessary means of "collective consumption". The NGOs operate in those areas where both the state and market are either unwilling or unable to ensure the reproduction of the labour power. This is often said to be done in the name of equity.i.e. the redistribution of a country's resources. However, it has to be emphasized that such aid is always not without strings attached, and is usually aimed to promote the ideology of private property as was the case in South Africa. NGOs, therefore, are essentially political entities aimed at ensuring the present and future survival of the system. This has endowed them with an ambiguous status. On the one hand, where they appear to be working in close liaison with oppressive regimes, they are often branded as 'imperialist tools'. On the other, where they have taken sides in opposition to the oppressive status quo, they are usually accused of interfering in domestic affairs. All this can be strongly argued as being true of the Urban Foundation which emerged in 1979.

The appalling housing conditions, manifested by inadequate urban services, housing shortages and over-crowding in African townships, led to the deepening of urban crisis, and this became more apparent from the late 1970s. The failure of the existing housing delivery approaches in South Africa, therefore, set the stage for the Urban Foundation's. intervention. Its objectives were the following: (a) to promote the quality of life of Black urban communities by promoting peaceful structural changes especially in the areas of housing, education, training and employment; (b) to be a link between these communities and the private (and public) sectors and (c) thereby to contribute to the establishment of a society founded upon justice and the explicit recognition of the dignity and freedom of the individual (cited in Walker: 18).

However, it has to be pointed out that all this had to be pursued within the existing white political hegemony. Put more directly, these objectives were to be achieved without threatening the white monopoly of political power. It thus stands to reason that the Urban Foundation, from its inception, was engaged in an enabling strategy that hoped to ensure the survival and flourishment of the capitalist system under white political control. As the Urban Foundation unashamedly admits, it is: "an extension of commerce and industry, expressing the considered opinions of the nation's leading businessmen and industrialists" (cited in Walker: 18). This is further supported by the class nature of the composition of its Board of Governors which was made up of prominent members of monopoly capital, a few liberal academics, government supporters and critics, and since 1981, a few Africans (cited in Walker: 18) who were perceived as liberal 'white' men in African skins. Concerning Urban Foundation funding, the Anglo-American Corporation, which by 1987 owned 54% of the stocks listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, contributed approximately 34% of all the funding that came from both the international and internal business communities (cited in Walker: 19).

The initial involvement of the U.F. in urban African housing was based mainly on relief and charitable efforts which can be accused of being far from confidence building. In the early 1980s, however, it found itself, perhaps unconsciously, in direct confrontation with the doctrine of apartheid. It started to get involved with both the 'insiders' and the threatened 'illegal' squatter communities. Through workshops, it helped them to develop their own locally-based projects and programmes, and in the process, empowered them with the skills of negotiation which enabled them to organize themselves to negotiate on better terms with those who controlled the resources they needed, i.e. the state.

Based on a laissez-faire policy, i.e. of not trying to solve the housing crisis by throwing money at them, the Urban Foundation attempted to redress the housing backlog by first focusing - in line with its original idea of creating a propertied class - on the burgeoning African middle class. It acquired empty land within the existing townships and built private housing which became very popular with that target group, while resented by the urban social movements as an attempt to divide the Africans into property owners and the dispossessed. This scheme initially fell under the "99 year-leasehold system, and later freehold rights and the adjustments made to influx control in 1986"(Walker: 20). So, the creation of subsidized housing schemes for the African middle classes in residential areas such as Malunga Park in Guguletu near Cape Town and Selection Park in SOWETO were a conscious attempt, by both the State and capital, to create an African propertied class which it was hoped would defend the system in times of political crisis.

Urban Foundation role was later extended to cover the upgrading of squatter settlements in line with "orderly urbanization" policy like site C in Khayelitsha near Cape Town. All in all, in essence, the U.F.'s primary task was to help towards the commercialization of the welfare. Its intervention in squatter settlements was able to facilitate the commodification process. The stage was thus set for a new actor, the market forces such as "private developers, finance institutions, individuals and employers" (cited in Smith: 46) to influence, albeit without threatening the State's hidden controlling hand, the urbanization process. African public housing stock was subsequently privatized. This was, then, the beginnings of State withdrawals and the ascendance of the market.

Although the easing of housing racial laws was welcomed as a process towards the

empowerment of urban Africans, given the economic level occupied by the majority of them , the privatization of welfare meant that the reverse would be achieved. Only the middle class would have access to housing. In essence, then, privatization was the process of denying the majority of the urban Africans access to affordable housing. This theory is supported by the timing of the process. This took place when housing poverty had reached a terminal stage. This was a time when it was estimated that South Africa would have to erect "almost 5 million homes in the next decade at a rate of 400, 000 a year if housing needs are to be met"(cited in Smith: 48), and when 84% of Africans could not pay for housing without subsidies (cited in T.Botha & S.Kaplinsky :17). It is, therefore, no wonder that this process ultimately deepened - the already deep - urban political crisis, and led to more land invasions and 'illegal' squatters. Nonetheless, in the process of Urban Foundation housing activities, a space of negotiation was created which helped the access to housing by the people. In other words, albeit unintentionally, it became a mechanism through which some people were able to receive urban facilities from the government.

3.1.5 EVALUATION:

This section has attempted to argue that the State, through the Riekert Commission, the Urban Foundation, the President's Council, and the State Security Council, endeavoured to redress the socio-political and economic problems that had torn apart South African society, on its own terms. The reforms of the 1980s had the effect of generating new contradictions. The local authorities, faced with fiscal crisis and privatization, brought to the fore volatile issues like declining real incomes and living conditions in the urban areas (M Sutcliffe: 89). They subsequently became the immediate identifiable enemies. The country's wide 1984-85 urban insurrection left

many councillors dead through 'necklacing' [14], and led to the collapse of almost all the urban local authorities (statistics). It, therefore, had the potential to turn into a seizure of state power, and necessitated a coherent counter-revolutionary strategy from the government. A new urban reform programme, 'orderly' urbanization became an integral part of this counter strategy. It is, therefore, against this urban crisis of hegemony that the "Forced Birth Delivery" of 'orderly' urbanization was realized in April 1986.

PHASE 2: 1986

3.2.0 WHITE PAPER ON "ORDERLY URBANIZATION":

In 1985, the President's Council (PC) urbanization strategy proposed the discarding of the much of government's "influx control", and recommended that the term influx control be replaced by the notion of "orderly urbanization". Most of its recommendations were incorporated into the government's White Paper on urbanization, tabled in April 1986 which defined 'orderly' urbanization as:

> "the freedom of movement of all citizens and also refers to the operation of economic and social forces and continent obligations. It means further that the process of urbanization must be ordered, planned and directed by predominantly indirect forms of control, such as incentive and restrictive measures, as well as by direct measures comprising legislation and ordinances" (cited in M. Sutcliffe: 91).

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[14] 'Necklacing' is a terrible execution where a car-tyre soaked in petrol is tied around an identified government agent's neck and is then set ablaze, and it did instil a degree of fear among the collaborators.

Thus it was a pragmatic response to deep urban crisis, and set the political framework for a new phase of urban reform. According to Cole, "The overall objective of the proposed orderly urbanization strategy was to develop a comprehensive and co-ordinated urban strategy which did not abandon all restrictions on the movement and settlement of people" (Cole: 19). At the same time, it retained control via indirect and "racially neutral" mechanisms. In other words, although the White Paper accepted the principle of freedom of movement - within and between urban areas - as well as the necessity and desirability of urbanization, it emphasized that this process should be "planned" and "ordered" (M. Sutcliffe: 91).

Unlike the Riekert Commission Report of 1979, the White Paper accepted demographic realities. It accepted the fact that African urbanization had become a reality which could not be reversed or wished away. Influx control has, therefore, since been 'abolished'. The enabling legislation came into operation in 1 July 1986, but excluded the migration of Africans from the 'independent' homelands (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei - TBVC), who lost their South African citizenship during the 'independence' of these homelands. In short, "orderly urbanization" policy involved the following two pronged strategy:

> (a) the identification by the government of 'suitable' sites for urban settlements; tough control over spontaneous informal and 'illegal' squatter settlements; and the use of the Slums Act to empower the government or the landlords to deal with 'illegal' land invasions and squatter settlements that followed;
>
> (b) the privatization of the housing market which would in turn encourage the withdrawal of the State, and the private sector and the local governments were expected to play a leading role in this process (Indicator: 95).

The mechanisms to implement the government's new urbanization strategy were provided by four main Acts passed before parliament closed in June 1986:

- The Identification Act of 1986 which aimed at repealing the Pass Laws System.

- The Abolishing of Influx Control Act No.68 of 1986: In essence this Act was two pronged. First, it provided a vehicle for the scrapping of influx control through the use of legislation that had effected such control. Second, it was designed to deal with the possible consequences of rapid urbanization that may result from such institution of freedom of movement.

- The Black Community Amendment Act No.74 of 1986: This was an enabler Act whose first and foremost task was to search for strategies that would unleash the market forces within the housing market. It hoped to privatize the housing market by attracting the private sector and encouraging the State's withdrawal.

- The Restoration of South African Citizenship Act No.73 of 1986: The granting of South African citizenship did not affect homelands'citizenship' status. Such individuals were, therefore, expected to have 'dual citizenship'. TBVC citizens to whom South African citizenship was thus restored would, therefore, enjoy the same freedom of movement then extended to other black citizens of the Republic (Indicator:).

As already acknowledged, with regards to the policy formulation, this was a significant shift from the past policies based on Verwoerdian ideology which perceived Africans as 'sojourners' in 'white' urban South Africa. This movement was "away from relocation to the Bantustans to control within urban areas" (Cole: 19). Fundamental to the new 'orderly' urbanization strategy was the abolition of the pass law, and thus, a commitment to fundamental human values and to an enhancement of the quality of life of all communities, as part of the process of dismantling apartheid. However, as Chris Heunis, the then Minister of Constitutional Planning and Development, warned, this did "not imply that the country was heading for a period of chaotic growth of cities and towns" (Cole: 19). He emphasized that direct measures would still be used to

contain illegal squatting and the development of slums. It was then the sole responsibility of the State to determine where and how development occurred - through land use planning and the allocation of land in the urban areas. This is further supported by the failure of the White Paper to question one of the pillars of the apartheid system, the creation of the TBVC 'states', and hence it talked in terms of a 'dual citizenship'. The question of the stolen South African citizenship of the majority of these TBVC 'subjects' was still to be 'negotiated' with the "toy-telephones" (i.e. the homeland leaders) whose claim to legitimacy was dependent on the survival of the apartheid system.

Moreover, the commercialization of welfare at the height of the reproduction crisis, when the State was supposed to intervene to ensure the reproduction of the labour power, was an absurd and naive political move rather than an economic one. This demonstrated the ignorance of "orderly urbanization" policy makers of how the capitalist state operates - when it is supposed to intervene and withdraw.

The South African racially based history of welfare services has been based on a "Residual Model" (Indicator) whereby the State intervenes where there is crisis of affordable housing. In 19th Century Britain, characterized by mass industrialization, the crisis of affordable housing reproduction due to the unwillingness of Capital to invest where there was no possibility of profit but great risk, State intervention was necessitated through council public housing which entered the market as use-value, i.e. object which satisfies an individual, family or collective need, thus justifying its production. This is despite being produced with high technological standards applicable to a commodity. According to R. Ramirez, this use-value is a "potential commodity". In an attempt to prevent this potential commodity from entering the

market, the British government enacted laws that placed its public housing under the control of local governments only for renting and not for the market consumption. The intervention, therefore, was to ensure the long-term survival of the Capitalist System as whole.

However, the Capitalist State, by its very nature, is not a good entrepreneur. It is created to manage the system,i.e. to ensure its replicability. This then means that, using political judgement, the state when it feels that the housing crisis has been redressed in a satisfactory way, has to withdraw. The failure to do so would need to be explained in political terms, and would be in conflict with the spirit of Capitalism. It is within this essence of the Capitalist state that the British government, during the economic boom of the 1980s under Thatcherism, encouraged the privatization of the council housing stock, some of which is still in an appalling condition due to bad management and maintenance by local government. But, in the South African situation , the timing of privatization was greatly flawed and inappropriate.

Another critical feature of the strategy was that of local government. "Orderly urbanization" could not work without the supportive infrastructure - the Regional Services Councils (RSCs) and local authorities whose key task was the management of the reform process at a local level. This point is crucial to any understanding of the strategy as a whole. The President's Council stated this clearly in its report of 1985:

> "Local government institutions should be established for all communities and effective measures should be taken to ensure the viability of these authorities in view of the fact that they, in co-operation with all other government institutions, have the particularly important responsibility of managing the urbanization process at a local level on a continuous basis" (cited in Cole: 19).

3.2.1 CRITIQUE OF THE 1986 WHITE PAPER ON 'ORDERLY' URBANIZATION:

Analyzed in the light of the ungovernability within which "orderly urbanization" was born, and both the repressive and reformist measures that followed, the policy stimulates one basic line of thought. My analysis is what might be misconstrued as the sinister explanation by the South Africa regime and its supporters: that the leopard has after all, failed to change its spots. My theory is that the dramatic events of April 1986 - the declaration of "orderly urbanization" for Africans - albeit being an important shift in housing policy formulation, represented not a change of heart on the part of Pretoria, but the adoption of a more sophisticated strategy under the new reformist leadership of President P.W. Botha.

The government thinking was that the more outrageous aspects of apartheid had become an unnecessary provocation to the outside world and were of value only to the worst far-right-wing white racists. The real struggle, therefore, was not to save some wayward son of Afrikanerdom from the hazards of sex across the colour line that might be the aftermath of massive African urbanization, but to retain power, or at least privilege, in the hands of the white ruling power elite.

So, the, the government pragmatically declared African "orderly urbanization" whose internal resistance has became such an embarrassment to the international civilized community. Once the formerly unsophisticated coercive influx control mechanisms were out of the way - without triggering outright social revolution - they went through the motions of recapturing the lost legitimacy in townships using both reformist and repressive measures. Thus, the government embarked on a counter-insurgency

strategy that would "re-impose law and order in the townships, regain and legitimate control over the urban... re-establish some control over the pace and direction of the political process" (Cole: 17). To be in control of urbanization, management was central. The word 'orderly' was crucial, and the government actions associated with "carrot and stick" tactics that followed had demonstrated that the policy was no sweet melody for the urban African.

All in all, although the political framework identified in the White Paper was a major policy shift, punitive and unrealistic measures, such as the Squatter, Slums and Black Community Acts, remained and aimed to closely control and direct African urban settlements. It seems reasonable, therefore, to argue that: the Squatting, Slums and Black Community Acts were alternative mechanisms of ensuring perpetual white political control over Africans. Nonetheless, 'orderly' urbanization laid the basis for the shape of urban struggles in the post-1986 period. Its success was dependent upon new social forces - the market and the actions of local government authorities - and a political context with which this strategy could succeed.

CHAPTER 4

4.0 THE URBAN STRATEGIES IN POST 1986:

There is no doubt that the State's urban reform strategies of the 1980s shaped the terrain of urban struggles in South Africa. The key aspects of this urban strategy - restructuring local government, the policy of privatization, greater urban management - resulted in new actors taking the stage in urban struggles (M. Sutcliffe: 93). But, before this could proceed, it was necessary for the State to make dramatic interventions. Between the publishing of the White Paper in April and the abolishing of the Influx Control Act in July, it was repression which dominated South Africa as a whole.

In the Western Cape, prior to the declaration of a national State of Emergency in June 1986, the world witnessed one of the biggest forced removals in South African history. Aimed at the squatter settlements located on the land around the old Crossroads, and led by "witdoeke" from within Crossroads and Site C in Khayelitsha, it led to the radical break-up of militant anti-apartheid squatter settlements in the Greater Cape Town areas (Cole: 19). The State of Emergency, mass detentions, and banning of community organizations which followed, paved the way for the State to implement its reform strategies. The specific struggles described below are all directly related to the above-argued state reform initiatives.

4.1 URBAN CRISIS AND CONFLICTS:

The communities focused on here are mainly those from informal settlements whose social movements had greatly shaped the evolvement of the housing policy through urban struggles. The post-1986 intensification in the privatization of land and housing brought about pressure on the urban poor Africans who traditionally live and work on the edges of the city where no formal housing existed. True to the spirit of Capitalism, only the rich have access to decent affordable housing. The poor are gradually being marginalized as an insolvent urban problem that will continue to plague the society. Private developers have, as a consequence, become a major force in both forced removals and the provision of housing beyond the reach of large numbers of African people. With the central government no longer a visible actor in the removal process, these struggles have also become much more complicated.

As a result of this "land-grab", land and housing urban struggles have become particularly acute. Faced with a housing backlog of immense proportions - the direct result of the apartheid legacy - local government officials, developers, and community organizations find themselves caught up in a bitter struggle over who will gain access to well-located land in the cities. In places like the Western Cape, where access to resources and services has been historically denied to the African population for decades, an acute crisis has arisen. Since late 1986, developers, landowners and local municipalities have been attempting to remove small pockets of squatters from land which they currently occupy. In most cases, these small communities have used court cases, publicity, and support of community and service organizations, to resist removal and cling to the land where they live (Cole: 20).

The resistance of these communities has meant that local government authorities and private developers face a de facto situation where who controls the process of urbanization is contested. Struggles on the ground, as a result, often conflict with the direction set out in the 1986 White Paper. This poses a dilemma to both central and local government officials. The management of the urban process presupposes the settlement of Africans on "approved' land. Urbanization, as articulated by the government, cannot be "orderly" or "managed" if it is planned by the people, and not by the government. It was largely because of the resistance and legal success of this group of squatter communities, everywhere in the country between 1986-88, that the government amended the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act in February 1989. Both repressive and reformist clauses exist in this Act which attempt to control where and how African people live in the cities.

In the present context, where an escalating crisis has developed around the issue of access to land and housing, the government is likely to actively intervene to ensure that 'orderly' urbanization proceeds according to plan. Some concessions will be made, particularly to those squatter communities that are strategic for the political survival of both the government and its surrogate forces like Inkatha. However, those that are perceived as a political threat, and are thus outside government control, by aligning themselves, say, with the ANC, will continue to suffer a similar fate as the June 1992 Boipatong Massacre near Vreeniging where more than 40 people were killed. It is a political game designed to force them under the 'protection' of the "orderly urbanization" policy. In the Western Cape, the 'uncontrollable' and progressive squatter communities that were destroyed around Crossroads in 1986 were forced into an "orderly urbanization" designated area, Khayelitsha.

To illustrate the tenacity of these urban struggles, I will briefly recapitulate some specific struggles that took place in some of the informal settlements.

4.2 URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: RECAPPING

This section will recapitulate what has been established so far concerning the urban social movements. The top-down urban reforms of the late 1970s and 1980s created a need, in addition to political movements and trade unions, for an urban revolutionary force to weld together and direct the urban struggles. This was realised by the emergence of organic, urban social movements. They, therefore, thrived when urban Africans underwent a deep crisis, when something great, i.e. political autonomy, was a stake. As the product of the mass struggle, they were able to provide a revolutionary leadership in the realm of thinking. They analyzed and identified the problems that faced the people, and proposed possible practical solutions. This provided the people with a revolutionary theory which helped them to unmask the false myths of the racist political culture and to raise the urban struggles to an unprecedented level that, for the first time in South African history, made the country ungovernable, and apartheid unworkable. They actualized the theory of "dual power" and fulfilled Karl Marx's 'prophecy' of the ruling power elite not being able to govern in the same old way. Moreover, they gave clarity to the class struggle and broadened the alliance.

The origins of the contemporary generation of urban social movements can be credited to the pioneering political programmes of the Committee of Ten (CoT) in 1977 after the Soweto Urban Struggles which led to the collapse of the Soweto Urban Bantu Council (Shubane: 73). In Cape Town the equivalent was the Cape Area Housing

Action Committee (CAHAC) formed in September 1980, whilst that of Port Elizabeth was the October 1980 Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO). These came into being mainly out of parent-student committees (formed to support struggles in schools), residents' associations and groups formed to oppose the regime's co-optation strategy through the Community Councils (Davies: 361) which superseded the Bantu Administration Boards (BAB), and whose primary task was to collect rents and service charges from the township communities. Since rents and service charges were the main source of income for these Community Councils, spiralling increases of these charges became the initial major rallying point of the social movements. However, the nature of apartheid ideology forced the urban struggles not to concentrate on bread and butter issues, but to use these struggles as a gate-way towards the democratization of the centre as well. It has to be re-emphasized that these social movements emerged as direct responses to specific political issues such education, housing, etc., but due to the political demands on the ground they later assumed a multi-class nature.

As earlier stated, a classic case of new strategies in the struggle for urban land and housing recorded is that of Crossroads near Cape Town which started in 1978 when the government threatened to destroy their settlement and repatriate them back to Transkei as 'illegal' squatters. In defence of their right to be in the Western Cape, the community established the Crossroad Committee as their mouth-piece which linked up with other community organizations in the region. This contributed to the achievement of a high level of political mobilization and publicity which, in turn, helped them to withstand government pressures. In the midst of political 'reforms', the government seemed reluctant to overtly destroy the shacks. During the ensuing struggles, a space of negotiation was created due to the mediation of the U.F. The

April 1979 "Koornhof's Settlement" (N. Walker: 24) that followed, albeit with its insistence on the repatriation of the 'jobless', recognized the right of Africans to work and have access to housing in urban areas. This led to the creation of the better-off New-Crossroads directly by the State. This was a partial victory for the community because Koornhof's proposals were never realised due to the resistance of the community which became a militant symbol of squatter resistance. Year after year, they weathered pass raids, deportation and demolition. However, at the end Crossroads was reduced to smouldering ruins in mid-1986 by the marauding 'Witdoeke' vigilantes with the overt help of the South African security forces.

Nonetheless, in 1983, urban social movements found their expression in the launching of the U.D.F., and assumed a mass based character which helped them to co-ordinate their struggles at street, area, regional and national levels with devastating political effects upon the racist housing policies. Each and every activist was able to monitor his or her neighbour easily during consumer and rent boycotts, and stay-aways. This bottom-up approach helped to minimize defaulting, and hence the radical transformation of the urban struggles in the 1980s. The July 1985 UDF-led historic, almost 100%, consumer boycott recorded in Port Elizabeth and the 1984-85 near seizure of political power signify the effectiveness of these structures (Shubane: 73). They made South Africa ungovernable, with almost all the state's created Black Local Authorities collapsing. The creation of street committees which took over the management of the townships and encouraged more political land invasions, and the people's courts which reorganized the judiciary, all actualized the theory of dual power, as expounded by the early work of Castells. The social movements thus set the political agenda in the townships which had became no go areas for the government, or semi-liberated zones. All in all, what started as local urban social movements

concerned with collective consumption ended up being a national political struggle that aimed to bring social change. It became clear that urban struggles were not separated from the command post - the central government. The local structures of control were the manifestations of the centre. The first and foremost task of "Orderly urbanization", albeit in vain, was an attempt to contain and ultimately crush these urban social movements.

However, the February 1990 unbanning of the ANC and other political organizations has opened a new debate on how urban social movements in post-apartheid South Africa could continue to strengthen democracy without being counter-revolutionary. There is an assumed conclusion by the progressive social movements that the ANC is the government in waiting. So, then, the present political campaigns should avoid at all costs creating a situation which would make it difficult to redress the legacies of apartheid in the future. But it has to be pointed out that the future of these 'rudimentary' structures of democracy depends on the attitude of the future South African government towards them. Whether they will be tolerated is still a hypothetical question.

5. CONCLUSION:

Housing policies are rarely the result of benign government. They are shaped by economic imperatives and political struggles. State intervention in the sphere of reproduction and consumption only occurs when external (and internal) pressures force its hand. However, politics of the state do not always correspond to the needs of the capital. In South Africa, apartheid and capitalism have coexisted in a "fluctuating" relationship (Posel, 1989: 199), mediated by struggles "on the ground".

This paper has attempted to show how government policies, in particular housing policies, were a response to, and a particular form of resolution of, the urban crisis of the 1980s. Accepting socio-economic and political realities, the State ultimately took responsibility for housing urban Africans. It devised ways and means of doing this at minimum expense to itself and to employers. Yet, the compromise failed to solve the housing problem. Contradictory measures in other parts of the state apparatus created additional problems. Poverty and resistance in the urban African areas continued as wages failed to meet the costs of labour reproduction. Popular struggle was met with state violence, when more "pragmatic" measures had failed.

All in all, the evolvement of the housing policies in the 1980s acknowledges that the cities are, were and will continue to be, the arenas where crucial class struggles for the influence and control of state power take place. In the 1960s-70s, Grand Apartheid coincided with repressive African de-urbanization. In the 1980s, the militarization of the Urban Question culminated in the dawn of "orderly urbanization" programmes that combined repression of independent social movements with the lifting of "influx control", selective upgrading and privatization. However, grassroots

social movements resisted all these policies and neither side achieved their original objectives. The legacy of these struggles has resulted in a new round of battles with major class interests at stake.

The post-1986 phenomenon saw De Klerk, in 1989, wresting power from the securocrats, and replacing militarized WHAM programme - which was the basis for the State's urban policy - with a policy framework that has been formulated largely by the "econocrats". These are the urban planners of big capital in the Urban Foundation, liberal economic reformers in the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) and State officials (Working in Progress: 66).

The new urban policy framework coincided, in the eyes of capital, with political transition to a post-apartheid Constitutional order, and will be backed financially by the major financial institutions, bi-corporations, conservative foreign governments and now the State's fiscus (Ibid: 66). The policy development is, therefore, probably the most important component of the liberation phase that will precede the democratization process that is to follow.

In retrospect, then, "total strategy" and its continuous, more sophisticated stage, "orderly urbanization", failed to overcome the deep organic crisis of the 1980s. Many reasons can be attributed to this, but some of the most important are the following. First, there was a failure to create an African middle class which could serve as a buffer zone between the oppressed and the power elite. The reason for this is not difficult to find: whilst the apartheid system hoped to a co-opt a few Africans who were expected to defend the capitalist system in times of political crisis, the same target group (middle class) was subjected to the same apartheid laws that were designed to

control the urban Africans. This was a contradiction within the system. No politically sensible African was prepared to risk his/her life and family through 'neclacing' by supporting the regime whilst still living amongst the politically angry people he/she was supposed to help control. The few that dared allow themselves to be co-opted lost their heads. Lastly, the white business community, albeit enthusiastic about the reforms, was still not yet ready to pressurize the government for African political rights. Their fear of African domination limited their agitation as far as the sharing of "collective consumption".

On the other hand, despite the political gains of the still maturing National Democratic Struggle, very few would argue that the Africans are on the verge of capturing political power. It is obvious that no one can reverse the political gains that have been achieved so far. But the South African white regime, despite its loss of monopoly of the strategic initiative, is still powerful. It has substantial resources at its disposal (i.e. the Security forces and the army) and retains powerful allies internationally with vested interests in South Africa (i.e. British, the U.S.A, Germany and Japan). Nonetheless, an important phenomenon in all this is that the urban struggles have created the once unthinkable - given the essence of the doctrine of white supremacy - space of negotiation. This has became another important field of struggle. It is hoped that through this a stage of a transitional government will be reached and that joint decision making will follow. So, negotiations are to be perceived as a gradual process of dis-empowering the apartheid system. On 30th July 1992, the South African State President, F.W.de Klerk, welcomed the United Nations monitoring of township violence by agreeing to international observers overseeing the 3-4th August 1992 general strike called by the ANC (The Guardian, 31.7.92). The government has traditionally been hostile to UN involvement in the political conflict, viewing it as an infringement of

sovereignty. Allowing UN observers has established a precedent which supports the theory of negotiations being a gradual process of dis-empowering the apartheid state. So, then, the outcome of these historical struggles is still being played out today.