Leadership and Conflict in Bushbuckridge:
Struggles to Define Moral Economies
Within the Context of Rapidly Transforming Political Economies
(1978 - 1990)

By : Edwin Ritchken
DECLARATION

I, EDWIN RITCHKEN, do hereby declare that this Thesis is my own unaided work. It has been submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand. It has not been submitted for a Degree at any other University.

SIGNED:  

DATE: 20/11/75
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Abstract

This thesis analyses the effects of state interventions on chiefly, ethnic, gender and generational relations in Bushbuckridge. By analysing violent conflicts, the thesis investigates how social forces attempt to impose moral economies on a "community" within the context of a rapidly transforming political economy. Leaders are analyzed in relation to their ability to represent a moral economy, and in doing so, intervene effectively on behalf of their constituency.

The first three chapters unpack the historical process through which the Bantustan state was constituted as a patrimonial state. The thesis argues that the relationship between the state and the chieftainship needs to be conceptualised as a compromise from both sides: Through Tribal Authorities the state attempted to transform the chieftainship into an agent of administrative and political control. The chieftainship, on the other hand, was trying to use its position within the state to bolster its own powers, and, establish its independence from the state. It was in this context of ambiguous dependence that politics in the Bantustans played itself out. Chapter Five and Six describe how leaders who were refused recognition by the state, tried to position themselves so as to cope with this ambiguity.

The thesis investigates how state interventions affected ethnic relations in Bushbuckridge. Chapter Four argues that the "Shangaan" chieftainships, who fled wars in Mozambique in the nineteenth century, entered into an alliance with the South African state in order to consolidate their claim to land and political authority, a claim the Pulana chiefs tried to deny them. Through investigating the career of Matsiketsane Mashile, the thesis investigates the relationship between chiefly politics, ethnic nationalism and african nationalism. Chapter Six shows how the Pulana nationalism was compatible with african nationalism because the principles underlying Pulana ethnicity clashed with those employed by the South African state.

The thesis investigates the effects of state interventions on gender and generational relations. Chapter Seven and Eight show how youth organisation tried to redefine the moral economy of gender and generational relations through the rhetoric of the "war against apartheid". Chapter eight describes how a vigilante organisation, made up of an alliance of chiefs, bureaucrats, principals and parents, tried to reimpose generational authority.
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List of Abbreviations

ANC : African National Congress
AO : Agricultural Officer
BAC : Bantu Affairs Commissioner
BAO : Archives of the Department of Bantu Affairs
BYC : Brooklyn Youth Congress
BYO : Brooklyn Youth Organisation
CAD : Central Archives Depot
CBAC : Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner
CNC : Chief Native Commissioner
DC : Disciplinary Committee
HNK : Archives of the Chief Native Commissioner, Pietersburg
LA : Legislative Assembly
LDE : Archive of the Department of Lands
LLN : Leihlo La Naga Migrant Organisation
MC : Motlamogale Cooperative
MCC : Mapulaneng Crisis Committee
MP : Member of the Legislative Assembly
NAD : Native Affairs Department
NC : Native Commissioner
NEC : Native Economic Commission
NTPC : Northern Transvaal People's Congress
NTS : Archives of the Department of Native Affairs
PC : Planning Committee
RA : Released Area
SACC : South African Council of Churches
SANAC : South African Native Affairs Commission
SANT : South African Native Trust
SCC : Sethlare Crisis Committee
SCU : Sofasonke Civic Union
SNC : Sub Native Commissioner
SRC : Student Representative Council
SYC : Shatale Youth Congress
TA : Tribal Authority
TGME : Transvaal Gold Mining Estates
UDF : United Democratic Front
URU : Archive of the Office of the State President
ZCC : Zion Christian Church
ZYO : Zoeknog Youth Organisation

Glossary

Bahlakana : A derogatory name given to refugees
Bagomane : The Chief's family's council
Bodika : First phase of male initiation
Bogoera : Second phase of male initiation
Botho : Socialised humanity
Induna : Chief's headman
Kgoro : Chief's Court
Kgoshi : Chief
Kgotla : Meeting of men
Lobola : Brideswealth
Moshate : The chief's house
Ngaka : Spirit medium and traditional healer
Nkonza : Pay allegiance to a chief
Sangoma : Spirit medium and traditional healer
INTRODUCTION

Leadership and Conflict in Bushbuckridge 1978 - 1990

Bushbuckridge is located in the North Eastern Transvaal, midway between the (white residential) cities of Nelspruit and Phalaborwa. The district begins on the edge of the escarpment and is divided into two sections: the Drakensberg and the temperate middleveld to the west and the tropical Lowveld to the east. Segments of two Bantustans fall within the area of Bushbuckridge. The Mapulaneng district of Lebowa, which consists of the Marite, Bushbuckridge and Matibide segments. And the Mhala district of Gazankulu, whose borders interlock with Mapulaneng like two pieces of a puzzle. It is the history and politics of these two districts that makes up the subject of this thesis.

Conflict

Throughout the 1980s, political violence broke out sporadically in Bushbuckridge. October 1984 was marked by ethnic conflicts over the border between Gazankulu and Lebowa. The allocation of a small triangle of land, consisting of approximately 100 hectares, situated between Buffelshoek and Cottdoale, to either Lebowa or Gazankulu was the overt reason for the dispute. Secondary school students from both Bantustans were transported in their hundreds to participate in the fighting. A number of "Sothos" resident in Gazankulu and "Shangaans" resident in Lebowa fought on the side of their ethnic "homeland" during the day and returned at night to their homes on the "wrong" side of the border. The fighting
continued for three days before it was stopped by the intervention of the South African Police. Over twenty people were killed, numerous people were injured and 45 houses were burnt. Streams of "Sotho refugees" left Gazankulu to settle in Lebowa and "Shangaan refugees" moved from Lebowa to Gazankulu.

In February 1986, the houses of six businessmen in Shatale were burnt by students on the grounds that the businessmen were part of a gang of people who were killing township residents in order to use their body parts for "muti". The leader of the gang was killed and his bottle store burnt after he fired on the students, who had come to demand that he leave the township. The police responded by arresting every student they could find on the street, and systematically assaulting them with sjamboks at the police station. Those students who were not arrested fled into the surrounding mountains. The two elected members of the Lebowa parliament, the Mashile brothers, convened a meeting in Shatale to discuss the situation. At the meeting the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee (MCC) was formed to try and persuade the students to return to school and to mediate between residents and the state.

Organisation spread throughout the district when the MCC formed sub-branches in other parts of Mapulaneng. Students in Shatale formed a youth congress modelled on equivalent urban organisations. Youths in villages throughout Mapulaneng followed the Shatale students’ lead and formed organisations (albeit, as will be shown below, with a different agenda to their Shatale counterparts). The MCC, which consisted of a bank clerk and teachers, introduced elements of national democratic struggle to the area. Stayaways were organised on May Day and June 16th. A Consumer boycott of "white, police and vigilante owned businesses" was called to voice a mixture of educational, workbased and national demands.
The Committee attended workshops of the United Democratic Front and the National Education Crisis Committee. In Shatale, the Committee combined with the Shatale Youth Congress (SYC) in a crime prevention campaign. However, between April and May, youth organisations in Mapulaneng attacked approximately a hundred and fifty people for allegedly practising witchcraft. Thirty people were "necklaced". Other "punishments" included sjambokking, expulsion from the area and the burning down of houses. Hundred of elderly people fled their homes and moved into the mountains during the anti-witchcraft movement. The movement only came to an end when the South African Defence Force moved into the area on a mass scale. In mid June 1986, the entire executive of the MCC and the two MPs were detained until they were tried a year later for terrorism.

In December 1989, the Sofasonke Civic Union (SCU) was constituted in Brooklyn. The SCU consisted of an alliance of certain chiefs, Tribal Authority Councillors, some principals and teachers, businesspeople, the police, cabinet ministers in the Lebowa Cabinet and elderly residents. The first activity of the Sofasonke (with the active support of about eight hundred women residents) was to burn down the houses of six youth leaders in Brooklyn. The violence spread eastward to Green-Valley, Acornhoek and Buffelshoek. Numerous houses were destroyed and two people were killed in the violence. The house of one of the elected MPs was destroyed by Sofasonke and an assassination attempt was made on the other MP. The violence only came to an end when the South African Council of Churches and the United Democratic Front (with the support of the African National Congress) intervened.

On the 21 July 1990, Willis Ngobe, a herbalist and prominent political figure, was stoned by about four hundred youths. Ngobe's life was saved by the timely intervention of one of
the MPs and two executive members of the MCC. It was alleged by the youths that Ngobe was protecting a teacher who the students had accused of being a police informer. On investigation the MCC discovered that the allegations were based on rumours spread by Ngobe's political adversaries. The assailants were incapable of separating these rumours from facts. As there was no structure amongst adult residents to investigate allegations, the MCC formed a Civic Association. The Civic was then held responsible by the MCC for any actions undertaken by the youth in the area.

These events pose questions about the status of witchcraft, ethnic, generational and chiefly conflicts. Was rural politics in the 1980s essentially organised around primordial identities or do the content of these identities reflect essentially "new" issues? Were organisations that used the rhetoric of national liberation concerned more with local divisions and conflicts, than with national political issues? Were the witchcraft attacks a manifestation of an intrinsically irrational or superstitious mindset or did the attacks have a rationality and a material affectivity? What was the relationship between "traditional" political centres such as the chieftainship, and the "modern" institutions imposed by the South African state? And are these oppositions between the local and the national, and the traditional and the modern, more misleading than useful?

Leadership

A number of actors emerged to take leadership roles in the above conflicts. These leaders came from within the state and civil society: Chiefs, magistrates, businessmen, MPs, principals and teachers, students, unemployed youths, cabinet ministers and herbalists all
assumed leadership positions. At different moments the same actors took on different stances in relation to the state: Chiefs defied the state by supporting the war over the Bantustan boundaries, but led the Sofasonke’s campaign against organisations and leaders linked to the national liberation moment. Different members of the same sector played leadership roles in opposing camps. For example, some teachers and principals played a leading role in the MCC, but others were executive members of Sofasonke. The role of the Matsiketsane Mashile was at first glance anomalous to frameworks that dichotomise ethnic and african nationalism: He was an unrecognised chief, who fought for recognition, who led the Pulana in the ethnic war, who was a member of the Lebowa parliament, who formed organisations linked to the national liberation movement, and who was detained and charged with terrorism in 1986. The activities of youth organisations likewise appear puzzling to approaches that rigidly divide the local and the national: youth organisations organised both May day stayaways and an anti-witchcraft movement.

This poses questions about leadership and the relationship between leadership and the Bantustan state. Politics in the district was marked by both diverse forms of rhetoric referring to the same relationship (but defining the relationship in distinct ways), and the use of the same rhetoric by diverse people (but which meant different things to their respective constituencies). Successful leaders had to create ideologies that spanned the "traditional" and the "modern". They needed to construct principles on which they could legitimately exercise political authority, and in doing so, forge constituencies from a population fragmented by forced removals, and divided by factional, class, gender and generational cleavages. A salient feature of the 1980s was the failure of leadership and organisation to build a stable following, particularly in those areas administered by tribal authorities. By the end of the decade
leadership had become a dangerous occupation: Local and regional leaders were attacked by youths, adult residents, bureaucrats or professional assassins. This highlights the incapacity of leaders or organisations to define and direct a constituency in a context of rapidly transforming and extremely fragmented political communities.

**Contemporary Rural Politics: A Literature Review**

With the (partial) exception of KwaZulu, there is a dearth of literature investigating the dynamics of contemporary rural politics in South Africa. There is, however, sufficient overlap between issues raised in the preceding section, and those present in KwaZulu, to make a brief review of the Natal literature useful. These overlapping issues include the role of the chieftainship in the Bantustan state, the status of ethnicity and ethnic organisation in the political conflict, the relationship between ethnicity and african nationalism, and the role of youth organisation in these conflicts. Studies from other regions will be introduced when this is helpful.

Mare and Hamilton argue that Buthelezi's claim to work against apartheid from within the system is largely rhetorical, and that Buthelezi's initial legitimacy derived from his ability to represent himself as part of the national liberation movement. However, having chosen to work within the "system", Buthelezi (and Inkatha) became dependent on the patronage and coercive powers from their position within Bantustan structures, and consequently their survival depended on preserving that system rather than destroying it. This approach tends to fuse Inkatha's political agenda and capacity with that of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. Gwala (implicitly) supports this position when, in analyzing the Edendale
violence, he argues that Inkatha’s political support results from their ability to control "bureaucratic entry points" in black areas of Natal. Edendale, however, does not fall under KwaZulu, hence Inkatha was left with "no other option to enter Edendale except by force."

There are two problems with this approach, namely its understanding of the genesis and dynamics of the patrimonial character of the South African state, and its handling of politicised ethnicity. Bayart warns that "different clientelisms in Africa can be understood only in relation to the historical evolution of the structure of systems of inequality and domination in the societies of that continent". At this point it is useful to distinguish between a clientelist and a patrimonial state. A clientelistic bureaucracy will be employed to refer to a personalisation of bureaucratic positions such that service provision is discriminatory, and is performed in exchange for resources or political loyalty. A Patrimonial bureaucracy, on the other hand, will be used to denote a situation where the bureaucracy is characterised by the parallell existence of "rational forms of domination" and "traditionalist forms of domination". In this context, "rational forms of domination" alludes to an impersonal bureaucracy governed by objective rules and regulations, where position is determined by technical criteria, where the salary structure is fixed, and where the link between political accumulation and political position is severed. In contrast, "traditional forms of domination" refers to a personalised (usually hereditary) bureaucratic structure, whose right to rule is legitimated with reference to divine authority, and who has the right to extract taxes and tribute in exchange for crucial resources (eg land), judicial services and military protection. A patrimonial bureaucracy is therefore a sign of a compromise between the state and a social force whose support the state needs to govern. However, having labelled a bureaucracy as clientelist or patrimonial does not, in itself, explain the specific politics of that bureaucracy.
Rather the phenomenon of clientelism or patrimonialism should be "viewed as a dependent variable which assumes different forms and degrees of significance in response to the forces at work in the wider environment". Hence, the system of patrimonialism can be "adapted to ends totally different from that of maintaining the social order from which it emanates." Although a patrimonial bureaucracy will in all likelihood enter into clientelist relationships, the agendas of (at least parts of that bureaucracy) cannot be reduced to the maintenance of a clientelist relationship. These agendas can only be understood in relation to the historical cooption of the "traditional" social force onto the bureaucracy, and the balance of power between that force, the central state and civil society.

With reference to the Natal focus, Shula Marks shows how the cooption onto state structures of the chieftainship in general, and the Zulu royal family in particular, was a compromise from both sides. The state, lacking popular legitimacy, depended (at different times) on the chieftainship to maintain its control over the rural populace. The chiefs, in turn, were dependent on the state, but, in accepting a position in the state, they risked losing popular support. Yet, the chiefs also tried to use their positions (and the resources made available by those positions) to build their chieftainships as institutions that transcended the limitations imposed by Tribal Authorities. This insight poses (at least) three tasks for contemporary political analysts: the task of periodising Tribal Authorities as a moment is the state's attempt to impose administrative control over rural settlements, the task of assessing any correspondence of interest brought about by the structure of clientelism, and the task of analyzing the relative success or failure of chief's ability to use their position within the state to bolster their chieftainships.
The point that needs to be stressed from the above discussion, is that the chieftainship, and chiefly authority, was not created by the state. The same can be said of politicised ethnicity, an area Mare and Hamilton reduce to "manipulation"14 and that Marks leaves largely unexplored. In KwaZulu, the historical link between Zuluness and political structure can be captured in the concept of the "Zulu Kingdom".15 In these terms, the King's authority to rule is legitimated and reproduced through ancestral beliefs, an ideology on which gender and generational authority within and outside of the household, is also based. This ideology pre-existed the bantustan system, and will almost certainly exist long after its demise. The fact that several commentators have noted that politicised ethnicity has powerful resonances for many people in KwaZulu,16 poses the question as to how the link between territory, ethnicity and political authority has been preserved and transformed within the context of massive state interventions and the development of capitalism.

This poses the question as to how historical experiences shape definitions of ethnicity and politicised ethnicity. Sitas17 provides one such example. He shows how Zulu workers in Howick identify themselves as "Zulu" as defined by linguistic and cultural characteristics, but politically see themselves as part of a broader dispossessed African nation. This was a result of two experiences of land dispossession, (which resulted in the severing of their relationship with the chieftainship), proletarianisation and exposure to political organisation with an african nationalist agenda. In contrast Zulu workers in Richards Bay understand themselves to be part of a separate and distinct "Zulu" people:

They are tied together by a common culture and a prior political community (state) which was destroyed by imperialism; they strongly believe that the Zulu nation needs its own territory and a government that represents them; their political unity is mediated through the chiefs and they are available to Inkatha's non-class interpellations. In fact, the majority of them are members.18
Most of these people still enjoy access to agricultural land, which remains a meaningful component of household life. The chieftainship and the system of headmen still wield significant authority in these areas, and migrancy remains the dominant form of proletarianisation. Inkatha is understood by residents as a vehicle for asserting "traditional" household relations, and the organisation has a strong membership in the area.

What is clear from the above is that different people in the same ethnic group assert competing definitions of what it means to be a member of that group. The next step in an analysis of ethnicity would thus be to assess the compatibility between definitions of ethnicity propagated by the state, with those asserted by different people within civil society. This also introduces the question of the compatibility of ethnic mobilization with African nationalist political programmes. Delius shows how migrants from Sekhukhuneland organised as Pedis to resist the imposition of Tribal Authorities. In an article on KwaNdebele, I show how youths, women and workers forged an alliance with the Ndzundza Royal family to resist the imposition of independence by KwaNdebele cabinet ministers.

Central to the debate on the Natal violence is the significance of the political struggle between Inkatha and the African National Congress (ANC). Aitchison argues that residents' allegiances to the ANC and Inkatha were crucial in determining "who should live and die". In contrast, Stavrou and Crouch argue that just over one quarter of (alleged Inkatha) "vigilantes" and less than 20% of the (United Democratic Front (UDF) affiliated) "comrades" could identify the leaders of Inkatha and the UDF respectively. Shaw and Taylor use this evidence to assert that processes of urbanisation and differentiation linked to "Apartheid" are more fundamental explanatory categories than political affiliation and conflict between
political organisations. Without wanting to get bogged down in this debate, it will suffice to suggest that rather than arguing about what affiliation to, or identification with, political organisation did not mean, it is more useful to analyze what political organisations meant to the relevant actors. Hence the question that needs to be addressed is how national and ethnic organisation are operationalised in a local context torn by chiefly, gender and generational conflicts. Hence, it becomes crucial to query to what extent was Inkatha perceived as a vehicle to bolster the chieftainship’s position both within and outside of Tribal Authorities and as a means of (re) asserting generational and gender authority. On the other side of the coin, one needs to ask to what extent was the ANC perceived as an alternative source of authority by people excluded from the bureaucracy to challenge Tribal Authorities, and by youths to redefine gender and generational relations.

To summarise the above: Patrimonialism, ethnic identification and african nationalism form crucial components of contemporary rural politics. This thesis thus has the challenge of showing how these elements, through time, articulate or conflict with, chiefly, gender and generational relationships within the context of massive state interventions and the development of capitalist relations. The first section of the thesis consists of a broad historical overview of transformations in the political economy of Bushbuckridge in the twentieth century. Having set the context, the remainder of the thesis consists of case studies which provide a detailed analysis of the above questions. Certain organising principles, or concepts, do, nevertheless, arise in all the chapters. The most central of these principles is that of the relationship between, and the specific meanings of, power and rhetoric. The next section provides an breakdown of these concepts and how they are employed in the thesis. The following sections supply a chapter outline, which is followed by a discussion on the process of collecting and reading of evidence.
Conceptual Issues

There are broadly two approaches to historical studies, a universalising approach and an individualising approach. The former attempts to formulate general social scientific laws, while the latter focuses on historical specificity. Studies of political violence are no exception to this rule. Relative deprivation, value integration and rational choice are a few of the many concepts that have been thrown up in the process of searching for a general theory of political violence. However, this thesis focuses on historical specificity and will not attempt to theorise around political violence, or place the explanations in relation to these theories. Rather than being the focus of the study, political violence is being used as a prism to give insight into the specific dynamics of conflict and leadership in Bushbuckridge as they played themselves out in each case study. In this way, it is hoped that the thesis will contribute to a Southern African "regional domain" of enquiry.

When used as a prism, the notion of political violence points to a number of conceptual issues. There are two components to an analysis of political violence, namely why the actors involved in the violence were in conflict with one another, and secondly, why violence was used to resolve the conflict. Hence, incidents of violence reflect the existence of social antagonisms and the absence of a legitimate political structure capable of mediating the antagonism. It is therefore important to question the relationship between political violence and identity formation, and secondly, to examine the implications of the violence in relation to question of what constituted legitimate systems of political authority to the people involved in the violence.

The first question looks at issues surrounding the construction of ethnic, gender and
recognizing generational identities as well as witchcraft accusations. This poses the question of the relationship between violence and the construction of identities. In other words, to what extent do violent acts impose meaning on actions, and in doing so, define the boundaries of what is legitimate behaviour for the social identities involved in the violence. In these terms, there is no intrinsic meaning surrounding political violence; rather the meaning being imposed by the violence needs to be understood in relation to the moral economy employed by the relevant actors. At a more abstract level, this points to the relationship between the construction of identity and power relations.

Power consists of the ability to repress and oppress. The assumption of any identity is only possible through the repression of alternative identities. Secondly, power also consists of the ability to control institutions, objects in space, and access to resources. The exercise of power is always already the exercise of knowledge that defines social difference and that assumes an imaginary perspective on the world, that is an identity. The exercise of knowledge is likewise the exercise of power in that systems of meaning are intrinsically selective. However, the relationship between the exercise of knowledge and that of domination is more contingent, and needs to be analyzed in relation to a political imaginary that orders the world and has the effect of defining the conditions under which knowledge and power are legitimately articulated, that is the authority of a speaker.

Following from the above, social practices, such as a speech act or the wearing of a particular style of dress, can be thought of as "acts of identification". Any "act of identification" can then be analyzed in relation to competing imaginaries and associated ideologies which define the rules associated with those identities. It can also be analyzed in
relation to the system of power relations structuring the identity. The thesis employs the
notion of political economy to capture issues relating to systems of unequal power relations,
while the notion of moral economy is used to evoke struggles over the symbolic definition
of identities, and what constitutes legitimate claims to political power.36

Political Economy and Moral Economy

A problem with using political economy is that different theorists and historians, coming
from the same or dissimilar intellectual traditions, have used the framework of political
economy in divergent ways. Nevertheless, the basic idea of a political economy of a social
relation consists of the analysis of those (unequal) power relations that determine access to
material resources that under-write the social relation. Marxist approaches tend to assume
that, firstly, a class identity is a necessary and inevitable effect of a subject’s position in the
relations of production, and that, secondly, all identities are ultimately determined by a class
identity. However, given that identities are rhetorically, or symbolically, constructed, and
that experiences are made meaningful by their insertion into a symbolic framework, these
assumptions are untenable.37

This does not mean, however, that an analysis of power relations is unimportant to the
rhetorical construction of identity.38 The concept of power forms a condition of possibility
of any identity. Furthermore, a subject’s position in power relations determines the type of
experiences that subject will be exposed to, explain, and have to cope with. However,
regardless of whether a subject position (i.e. a symbolically defined identity), is characterised
by unequal power relations, it is always articulated according to some principle, which one
way or another, must be explained to the subject:

The phenomenon of power lies at the centre of political analysis, but this is not because the power relationship is autonomous... it is because the existence of a power capable of obtaining generalised obedience and allegiance implies a certain type of social division and articulation, as well as a certain type of representation, to some extent explicit, to a larger extent implicit, concerning the legitimacy of the social order... And I say "representation" to suggest that it is of the essence of power to present and make visible a model of social organisation.39

To put it simply, the power relations that make up a subject position can be dealt with in a variety of ways: they can be conjured away as irrelevant, or they can be legitimated or opposed in relation to some principle as to what is moral. The concept of moral economy will be employed to illuminate the way power relations are rationalised.

Like the notion of political economy, moral economy has been used by different theorists to denote profoundly different objects. E.P. Thompson, who first used the term in contemporary academic discourse, intended to use the term to (literally) denote people's conceptions of what was a moral (and hence legitimate) economic system.40 Scott used the term to show how power relations (that are not necessarily accepted as legitimate) were negotiated in such a way as to assign duties and obligations on both oppressor and oppressed.41 This thesis uses neither of these definitions. Rather, I wish to draw on Lonsdale's use of the concept in the "Moral Economy of the Mau Mau".42 Lonsdale centres his article around answers to the question of what constituted a moral Kikuyu (man) working in his self interest. Implicit to the responses to this question was a symbolic system that defined society (and hence the speaker) in relation to the real (i.e. a political imaginary that limits and (partially) fixes the meaning of rhetoric), that ordered and placed limits on subject positions (rights and obligations) in relation to the imaginary, and that legitimated the allocation of authority to certain subject positions as necessary to guard the moral economy for the social good. The
precise content of a moral economy (as Lonsdale shows) is an ongoing debate. A moral economy sets the terms of the debate, but, as material conditions change, members of a shared moral community debate priorities, strategies and necessary compromises that both sustain and transform the moral economy.

Hegemony, within this perspective, will be evoked to denote a state of affairs when a moral economy both organises power relations and is accepted by subordinate subject positions as moral. A hegemonic project is then understood as an attempt to transform power relations into (implicitly legitimate) relations of political authority. The failure of a hegemonic project points to the need to search for critiques of the proposed moral economy and attempts to resist the imposition of that economy.

It follows that explanations of violence needs to include an analysis of the violence in relation to the internal logic of a moral economy evoked by the perpetrators of the violence. This operation exposes the discipline being imposed by the perpetrators of the violence. The moral economy propagated by the victims of the violence needs to be analyzed to expose the stakes underlying the struggle to impose one or the other economy. It is by contrasting the two economies that the implications of the intervention for an ongoing struggle to impose power relations on various social relationships can be understood.

The following section provides a chapter outline to demonstrate the logic of the narrative strategy adopted in the thesis.

Chapter Outline
The central question that will be investigated by this thesis is: How were pre-existing institutions, identities, beliefs and practices transformed by state interventions in the twentieth century in general, and the implementation of Apartheid policies and structures in particular in the district of Bushbuckridge? This question will be investigated in the first three chapters by describing the internal logic of state policies, as well as how these policies were implemented and how they impacted on the organisation of chiefly power and gender and generational relationships. The chapters will focus on how these policies transformed the powers of the chieftainship, and (despite drawing on a rhetoric associated with pre-existing imaginaries) imposed a new moral economy on the institution. There were four crucial moments in the creation of the Bantustan state:

1914 - 1936: the definition of a Released Area for Black settlement
1936 - 1963: the creation of Trust Land and the implementation of Betterment Policies.
1963 - 1973: the creation of Tribal authorities.
1973 - the creation of Ethnically based legislative assemblies.

Each identity, practice and belief, while being affected by the changing conditions within which they exist, retain a specific history and dynamic. Specific experiences of historical processes can only be thoroughly reconstructed by locating them in their immediate context. Hence the rest of the thesis takes the form of case studies. Each study consists of a detailed and textured analysis of struggles around a specific identity or leader.

Responses to the extension of administrative structures were not uniform. Different actors attempted to mould and use certain state interventions as a resource to bolster their position within rural society while attempting to mobilise resistance to those state policies that
undermined their positions. The lines between resistance and collaboration are blurred: Seen from the point of view of the state, key actors were coopted onto state structures to facilitate the process of administration. Seen through the eyes of key actors, temporary alliances were entered with the state in order to construct independent power bases. This poses the question: how did pre-existing struggles affect the response of residents to state policies, and how did leaders position themselves in relation to these processes? These “ambiguities of dependence” form a central focus of the following three chapters.

Chapter four consists of an investigation into the ethnic violence that broke out over the border between Lebowa and Gazankulu. In probing the relationship between ethnic identities, moral economies and power struggles, this study will ask the central question: How did ethnic struggles shape the response of different groups and actors to state policies, and how did these policies impact upon ethnic relationships?

A problem with centring a study of rural politics around incidents of political violence is a tendency to reify both the event and the conditions that made the event possible, to only see politics through the prism of antagonistic interaction. The logic of an analysis of violence can be tautologous: Because a relationship is characterised by violence, it is, essentially, an antagonistic relationship. Violence, however, is a strategy, not a relationship. In all the incidents described above, residents felt an acute ambivalence about the use of violence. The relationships involved in the conflict cannot be reduced to a structural antagonism. Similarly, a complex multifaceted identity cannot be reduced to a single moral economy. Violence is a consequence of the culmination of a number of historical processes intersecting at a particular time and place in a peculiar way. There is no necessity to the violence outside
of the coincidence of these processes. Ambivalence around the violence must be located in
the space where subjects acted violently, yet knew there was more to the relationships than
an underlying antagonism, and had access to ideologies that negated the antagonism.

In order to take the above factor into account, the remainder of the thesis acts as a critique
of the idea that the Pulana formed a single political community based on a common moral
economy (as might be inferred from aspects of Chapter four). The Pulana chiefs accepted
their position in Tribal Authorities, an act which contradicted the moral economy on which
was based the Pulana claim to own (and hence control) the district as a whole. Different
Pulanas had different experiences of, and ideas about, the relationship between ethnicity and
politics, ethnicity and gender and generational relationships. Where a moral economy was
not shared, patronage, rather than a commitment to an ideology, often structured the
relationship between leaders and their constituency. The following chapters explore these
issues.

Chapter five investigates the career of a leader, Willis Ngobe, who did not have a position
in the state, and who operated in the context of a Betterment scheme. Ngobe was an outsider,
he was not a Pulana and he had no historical relationship with the settlement. This chapter
asks questions about how the state worked at a local level by examining administrative
processes and alliances between different sectors of the bureaucracy, and between the
bureaucracy and residents. The central question will be how, in the context of a patrimonial
state, a leader, with no historical claim to authority, attempted to build political alliances, and
in the process challenge the bureaucracy by defining new moral economies.
The following chapter returns more explicitly to the question of Pulana ethnicity. The case study examines the career of an unrecognised Pulana chief who reconstituted his chieftainship through aligning himself with national political organisation, becoming a broker between residents and different departments in the state through his position as an elected member of parliament, and through the creation of burial societies and ethnically based migrant organisations. In particular, the chapter will scrutinise moral economies associated with chiefly politics, pulana nationalism, and african nationalism, and how alliances, based on these economies, were built.

The next two chapters explore how youth organisations defined a moral economy based on their position as "vanguard of the struggle" and "guardian of the nation". Chapter seven examines the significance of youth organisation labelling, and attacking, witches, abortionists and poisoners by relating these attacks to an ongoing struggle to define chiefly, gender and generational relationships. In the process, the chapter contrasts the moral economy of youth organisation with that of chiefly and generational authority. Chapter eight will continue the analyses of the moral economy of youth organisation by examining how the Brooklyn Youth Congress organised campaigns that challenged the authority of chiefs, principals, priests, bureaucrats and parents. In response to these actions, the Sofasonke Civic Union (SCU) was formed which attempted to reconstitute chiefly and generational authority. The chapter will investigate the institutional, historical and ideological underpinnings of the SCU.

The conclusion attempts to draw together those conceptual and empirical themes that were common to the case studies.
Archival Evidence, Oral history and Participant Observation

In practice, the availability of evidence ultimately dictates which aspects of events and relationships can be unpacked and explained. This section will discuss the collecting, sifting and reading of evidence.

Each of the three sources of evidence exposes different aspects of the phenomena that were being studied. No single source predominated in the compilation of evidence. Each issue threw up unique problems which were tackled through a specific combination of the three sources. The combination of the three had the effect of reinforcing certain arguments, throwing doubt on other arguments, filling in gaps implicit to each source and generally creating a pool of anomalous data in relation to the hypothesis being tested. In other words, a constant dialogue was maintained between hypotheses and the evidence thrown up by the three sources. The thesis itself is an artificial but necessary freezing of this on-going dialogue.

The tensions and contradictions between different sources of evidence were crucial in both exposing personal bias and providing a broader context for reading the evidence. An example of this dynamic can be taken from the chapter on ethnic relationships where different ethnic groups offered competing versions of history. Accusations by informants that a Native Commissioner (NC) had formed an alliance with one side of the ethnic conflict, lead to an investigation of the NC’s personal history and a new conception of the relationship between the Department of Native Affairs, Missionary Churches and the construction of ethnic policies. The NC’s seemingly neutral ethnic observations in correspondence to the Native
Affair's Department (NAD) were actually loaded with an ethnic bias as a consequence of the Commissioner's history in the Swiss Mission Church.46

There are broadly two approaches to the use of oral history as evidence: a "more history" and a "symptomatic reading" approach. The "more history" approach "functions as a source of historical information and insights, to be used, in traditional ways, in the formulation of historical generalizations and narratives."47 In this approach the interview is used to gather material about events and experiences. This material is then plugged into the framework of the analyst. Hence, the interviewer actively tried to focus the discussion around empirically verifiable information that would confirm or deny a hypothesis. Interviews are then checked with other sources, both oral and written, for convergent and divergent lines of evidence.

In the "symptomatic reading" approach the form and content of the interviews becomes a central object of enquiry. This involves asking questions about the rhetorical stance that interviewees adopt towards the diverse subject matter that emerges in the course of an interview. This approach attempts to gain insight into the ideologies, myths and cultural practices which structures the consciousness of individuals and shapes the way the individual picks out significant events and experiences from the past.48 The concept of the political imaginary as constituent of a moral economy was employed to capture insights gained through a symptomatic analysis. Questions also need to be asked as to how the social setting and structure of the interview determine the content of the replies of the interviewee.49

The two approaches were applied to both archival and oral evidence. "Historical documents, whether oral or written, not only contain facts to be mined, but they also organise
perceptions in ways that require interpretation. Whether written or oral, documents both contain information and embody cultural conceptions.\textsuperscript{50} Hence, like oral sources, written documents need to be read symptomatically: What rhetorical position is being adopted by the writer? Who is writing to whom? What is the relationship between author and intended reader? What is the relationship between the author and the subject that is being represented?

Written documents have the advantage of representing facts in terms of the concerns prevalent at the time of writing. In oral interviews history tends to be reconstructed in terms of the present concerns of the speaker. Information that used to be neutral at the time of an event, subsequently often becomes highly loaded. This does not mean that assertions of fact that appear neutral in relation to the political concerns at the time of writing can be read uncritically: Before any "facts can be mined" from a written document, questions have to be asked about the reliability of the methodology used to gather those facts. This is particularly applicable to statistical information as demonstrated by the following example: The NCs (drawing on their understanding of tribalism) assumed that residents who did not move from an area after it was allocated to a recognised chief, paid allegiance to that chieftainship. Tax cards of people who did not move were changed to reflect this assumption. Statistics based on tax cards were then gathered to prove the support of recognised chiefs. While this episode shows that the statistics were patently misleading, it also demonstrates the creation of a self fulfilling "bureaucratic reality". This insight is crucial in understanding why NCs took various policy positions.

The archival experience is an important balance to the fieldwork experience. Fieldwork tends to be very locally specific and tends to give an impression of contemporariness to social
practices and struggles. The archives give a sense of the regional and national processes which structured the local context. One constantly discovers that issues and struggles that are highly significant in the contemporary scenario had their roots in processes that began at the turn of the century.

The state archives in Pretoria have a wealth of material on Bushbuckridge. The bulk of the material came from the Department of Native Affairs which later became the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. The most useful files were on issues surrounding the recognition of Chiefs, ethnic relationships and surveys around Betterment policies. The minutes of quarterly meetings between Native Commissioners and communities as well as the Uys Commission of Enquiry into border disputes provided invaluable (although obviously distorted) oral testimony.

From the mid 1960s, the archival material relating to correspondence within the state became very thin. An effect of this was a sudden change in the nature of evidence. Between 1910 and 1965, archival material provided a birds eye-view of the internal workings of the state. After 1965, this evidence was almost entirely inaccessible. As a rule, state officials refused to speak to me, and viewed my presence as a threat. The strategy that was employed to get around this problem was to focus on case studies that emphasised resistance to the state.

A second important difference between archival material and structured oral interviews is the question of the intention behind making a statement. Archival material exists for purposes independent of the researcher. An interview is a communication between the researcher and a subject. What is stated, is stated for the purpose of the interview. However, like the
archival material, the interview is a process that occurs "in history". The interviewer has a social position which evokes a number of power relations. The interview setting is an arena where interpretations are contested and ideologies affirmed or resisted.\textsuperscript{51} Representations of history and identity change depending on the relationship between speaker and audience. In the context of isolated rural communities, the researcher acts as a broker, a person that learns to access and translate historical experiences into a form that a broader, more literate, society will find comprehensible. My fieldwork material was mediated by my position within the historical and political context of the Bushbuckridge district. It is thus necessary to detail my fieldwork experience in Bushbuckridge between 1985 and 1991.

I was a white, male, English-speaking, South African student interviewing people to whom both white and male represented symbols of power and authority. It was the rare informant whose experience of white people was not from a position of subordination. Second, there was a state of emergency for most of the period when I was doing this research. This created a climate of fear and anxiety, particularly as the vast majority of whites who entered the district were soldiers, police or bureaucrats. Third, many of the events that were investigated were still points of acute contention between residents and the state and amongst residents. Around the issue of witchcraft, many informants were awaiting trial when I interviewed them. Furthermore, as will be argued, the anti-witchcraft attacks produced a generalised climate of anxiety which meant that informants were very guarded in criticising the anti-witchcraft movement (for fear of being seen to ally themselves with the alleged witches). Fourth, may of the issues that this thesis covers, such as witchcraft, ethnicity and the chieftainship, have been used to depict black society as intrinsically primitive, static and superstitious. This depiction has been used by the state to legitimate the policy of separate
development, a cornerstone of the Apartheid system. Fifth, the settlements under investigation were profoundly fragmented into opposing factions. This invariably meant being associated with a faction. What follows gives an indication of how I attempted to position myself in relation to these issues and the advantages and disadvantages of taking the stances I took.

Extended periods of fieldwork were undertaken in the area since December 1985. My two main bases in the area were at the houses of Willis Ngobe in Dingleydale (Chapter 5) and Lawrence Mogakane in Shatale (Chapter 6) both of whom were political leaders. Less extended periods of fieldwork were spent in Brooklyn, Buffelshoek and Cotondale. The experience of living in these settlements was crucial in forcing me to confront (some) of my preconceptions about how residents perceive, experience and act in their environment. These observations then shaped the questions that were asked in more formal interviews.

In Apartheid South Africa, an urban based academic living in a rural community is perceived in a different light by different residents. Some people resented having an outsider (particularly a "white" person) intruding into local affairs. The most negative response were from those who saw me as a political threat. The continued isolation of the area creates the conditions under which corruption amongst the bureaucracy thrives. During the course of the six years that I was present in the area, Chiefs, Agricultural Officers, Security Police, magistrates and (what I consider to be) a corrupt faction within the African National Congress all tried to oppose my presence in the area. Other residents welcomed my presence, seeing it as a sign of the beginnings of the disintegration of racial segregation and the isolation of the area. These people welcomed the chance to tell me their stories and to
establish meaningful relationships.

It is impossible to establish any meaningful relationships within these settlements without being associated with a faction. Within a day of my arrival in Dingleydale in December 1985, I was already strongly associated with a particular faction. This association came about as an effect of being introduced to residents by a particular person and staying at his house. The ability to introduce, enter into dialogue with and play host to outsiders is a display of enormous political significance. Both the introduction and accommodation were practical necessities beyond of my control.

I established a close working relationship with three political figures that are discussed in the thesis, namely Willis Ngobe, Matsiketsane Mashile and Lawrence Mogakane. My role was essentially to put local organisations in touch with resources and service organisations in the urban areas. In engaging with the nitty gritty of politics in the area, one is forced to come to terms with events and observations that do not correspond with one's preconceptions. An example of this process was a failed water-supply project. I assisted in introducing a water-supply advisory organisation to the area. The organisation was put in contact with a village which had a particularly poor water supply and elections were held for a committee. The Chair of the Committee, a Mr N, was a business person, a Zion Christian Church priest and an office bearer on a number of village level committees. His election was contentious; he had the support of the women present at the meeting, while the young men strongly opposed him. Mr N proceeded to use his position as Chair to sabotage the project. Workshops to train committee members in administration never took place as Committee members would mysteriously leave prearranged meeting points. It was later established that
committee members were never informed of the meetings. Mr N used his position to tell different actors different reports about what had been arranged. In short, Mr N was only going to allow the water supply project to be implemented if he had complete control of the project. The entrenchment of personal power came before the supply of water. This experience hammered home to me how misleading the concept of community can be. A common interest at the level of need does not automatically translate into a unity at the level of practice.54

By working towards a common goal outside of the academic process, the relationship between oneself and certain residents changes. Meetings are held whose priorities are determined by practical demands. In this context one is able to observe which problems are practically prioritised, how they are perceived, and how people set about solving those problems. This is the strength of participant observation: one has the ability to observe the difference between what people say in formal interviews and what they do in practice.

My experience of herbal treatments from Ngobe (who is a traditional healer) proved to be a vital entry point to discussion with residents of such issues as witchcraft and ancestor beliefs. The fact that I had experienced the herbal treatments for myself was particularly significant in a context where "traditional" beliefs are not recognised as rational by the dominant white culture.

Whenever possible I tried to enter into dialogue with residents about my research. Interviews often became debates as I would test the arguments in the thesis with informants. Copies of papers I had written were circulated amongst selected informants and often lead to lengthy
discussion. Responses would assist in removing (the more overt) bias in the paper as I would know if one side of the conflict (for example the ethnic conflict) believed the paper to be unfair or too fair. This process also helped disaggregate perceptions of the legitimacy about the anti-witchcraft movement.

In the earlier stages of the research formal interviews were recorded with pen and paper because the issues I was investigating were still highly sensitive. The presence of a tape recorder would not have been conducive to communication. However, the use of pen and paper has a number of disadvantages. Much of what is communicated is lost in the process of writing it down. As a result there is no objective record of the interaction for future historians to check for misinterpretations. This is particularly so when the interview was conducted through an interpreter. In the latter stages of the research, when the content of interviews were not politically contentious, life histories were recorded on a tape and given to an oral history project. Whenever possible a reference is made to a source where the evidence can be found in a more original and objective form. The process of collecting the data through interviews should be seen as a project of knowledge production valid in itself. A single piece of work usually just scratches the surface of the evidence gathered in oral interviews.
Notes

1. The name Bushbuckridge refers to a small town and a district. The town is situated on the edge of the North Eastern ridge of the Drakensburg mountains. These mountains form the escarpment, the boundary between the middleveld and the Lowveld. The district of Bushbuckridge refers to an area covering both the Middleveld and the Lowveld and runs from around Hazyview in the South to Hoedspruit in the North. The Magisterial district of Pilgrims Rest more closely approximates what residents mean when they refer to Bushbuckridge as a district.


4. Ibid, pg 519.


9. Ibid Chapter Seven.


12. Craig Charney in "Vigilantes, Clientelism, and the South African State", Transformation, No 16, 1991, seems to equate the notions of patrimonialism and clientelism. Consequently he blankly describes the South African state as clientelist (without periodising that claim), and he is unable to (conceptually) distinguish between the dynamics of administration by Tribal Authorities (in the Bantustans) and Black Local Authorities (in the townships). His argument in the above article rests on a previous functionalist and blanket assertion that "clientelism" is the dominant basis of hegemony in the neo-colonial state. See Charney, C., "Political Power and Social Class in the Neo-Colonial State", Review of African Political Economy, No 38, 1987.


14. See in particular, Mare and Hamilton, An Appetite for..., p58 - 60. See also Mare, G., Politics and Ethnicity in South Africa, ZED books, London, 1993, p42. Mare in the latter book seems to suggest that while the "acceptance" of an ethnicity is not a political act, which seems to suggest that there is some intrinsic link between cultural practices and an ethnicity, any attempt to link ethnicity to political or class interests is "manipulation".


16. See for example, Webster and Kuzwayo’s 1976 survey of unionised worker attitudes in Natal found that 87% of the sample named Buthelezi as the only legitimate leader alive. See Webster and Kuzwayo’s contribution in Schlemmer, L., and Webster. E., (eds) Economic Growth and Change in South Africa, Johannesburg, 1976.


23. Taylor, R., and Shaw, M., "Interpreting the Conflict in Natal", Africa Perspective, Vol 2, No 1, 1993. Kentridge provides what I consider a definitive response to this approach to the Natal violence, when he asserts that "Poverty, unemployment and alienated youth [to this can be added process of rapid urbanisation, patronialism etc etc] are not specific to Natal, whereas the political rivalry between Inkatha and the UDF is." see Kentridge, M., An Unofficial War: Inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg, David Philips, Cape Town, 1990.


25. For an example of the way in which urban based youths understood youth organisation, and how that understanding gave these youths the authority to act, see Marks, M., "Organisation, Identity and Violence Amongst Activist Diepkloof Youth, 1984 - 1993", Unpublished Masters Thesis, Wits University, Johannesburg, 1993.


27. For a succint and critical overview of these theories see Rule J, Theories of Civil Violence, University of California Press, 1988.

28. Rule conclusion that "the search for general theories of civil violence, then, may simply be the wrong search" was instrumental in focusing the thesis on rural politics rather than political violence. see Rule, Theories of Civil Violence, p264.


30. The Chapters on ethnicity and witchcraft will provide a more detailed discussion on the conceptual approaches used in tackling these specific issues.

31. This hypothesis implicitly draws on Foucault's description and analyses of the spectacle of public punishment in Discipline and Punish, Peregrine, London. Foucault, however, assumes that technologies (or strategies) of power have a history independent of any ideological agenda that calls them into being. Foucault loses the specificity of different social relations by subsuming them to their common use of the same technique of power. For a critique of Foucault's use of power see Dews P, Logics of Disintegration, Verso, 1988.

33. The notion of the political (or social) imaginary is drawn from Claude Lefort. Lefort uses the idea of the imaginary to delineate a certain logic through which human beings represent themselves and their collective modes of co-existence to themselves. The imaginary is not deducible from the real, but orders that which we take to be real. This imaginary conception of society renders intelligible what is legitimate and what is not, what can be changed and what cannot. The imaginary thus has two dimensions, an epistemological dimension through which human beings comprehend and order their existence, and built on the former, a more ideological dimension, i.e. that which explains away social division. See Lefort C, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy and Totalitarianism; edited and introduced by Thompson, J.B; Polity Press; Cambridge; 1986. For commentary see Howard D, "Bureaucratic Society and Traditional Rationality; Claude Lefort", in The Marxist Legacy, Virgin Books, New York, 1977 and Thompson J B, "Ideology and the Social Imaginary: An Appraisal of Castoriadis and Lefort", in Studies in the Theory of Ideology, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1984.

34. This distinction between the dynamics of the exercise of knowledge and that of the exercise of power is important. Deacon totally ignores this distinction when he (absurdly) suggests that Delius and Bozolli are guilty of "violently suppressing debate" through the act of writing a history of radical Southern African historiography. See Deacon, R., "Hegemony, Essentialism and Radical History in South Africa", South African Historical Journal, No 24, 1991, p167. Deacon was reviewing Bozolli and Delius, "Radical History and South African Society" in Radical History Review, Vol 46/7, 1990. In the (much more subtle and interesting) "Xhosa Cattle Killing and the Politics of Memory" published in Sociological Forum, Vol 6 No 3 1991, Adam Ashforth argues that anthropological writing "about domination in a context where the power to encode the past in writing is itself both a product of domination and form of domination" (pg 590). Hence, he argues, that the text needs to be centred "around the subjectivity of the author and the dialogue with the people who are being written of" (ibid). Apart from the fact that Ashforth makes the populist assumption that Peires' book "refutes a whole people's understanding of their past", and in doing so forgets that: (a) a written (or oral) history invariably empowers the political project of some (in this case) Xhosas at the expense of others, and (b) the political significance of Peires' contribution in the 1990s cannot be compared to that of anthropologists in the 1940s, who made a direct contribution to state policy. Ashforth makes no explicit reference to the notion of a political imaginary (although aspects of the concept are implicit to his critique of Peires). It was the absence of this concept that allowed Peires to (incorrectly) assume that the actions of 19th-century Xhosas could be interpreted and judged in the same terms that we use to understand our own actions. By explicitly introducing the notion of political imaginary, I am arguing against the possibility of some transcendental, or intrinsically superior, or fully transportable rationality.


36. Conceptual discussions around the issues of ethnicity, witchcraft and clientelism can be found in the body of the thesis under the relevant section.

38. It is not being suggested that power relations exist independently of an ideology that organises them. This is precisely the problem with the status of the relation of production in Marxism. The point I am making is that power relations have an autonomy from any definitive meaning. In other words, the meaning of power relations are always open to redefinition. The following quote from Lefort makes the point very crisply:

"If, however, I use the term "political" to describe the "form" in which the symbolic dimension of the social is revealed, it is not in order to give priority to relations of power at the expense of others; rather, it is in order to make it clear that power is not "a thing", empirically determined, but is inseparable from its representation, and that the exercise of it - being simultaneously the exercise of knowledge, the mode of articulation of social discourse - is constitutive of social identity."


43. This use of hegemony approximates Bob Jessop's reworking of the concept in *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, Chapter seven.


45. The notion of ambivalence lies at the heart of the conceptualisation of identity. Ambivalence can be thought of as existing at a number of levels:

1) There is no necessary relationship between a subject and a symbolically defined subject position. Any relationship is created through a process of identification which is imaginary.

2) That there are competing definitions over what is meant by belonging to a particular subject position. This points to a power struggle over the definition of what it means to adopt a particular subject position. See Laclau, E., and Mouffe, C., *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Verso, London, 1985.

3) That there are competing priorities between subject positions adopted by any single social agent. This implies a trade-off of identities in adopting a position on an issue. See Laclau and Mouffe *Hegemony and...* Chapter three.

46. This is not to say that the NC had no integrity. Rather, what is being exposed is the forces involved in the construction of that integrity.


52. Over the period of my fieldwork, I have put residents in touch with Trade Unions, Operation Hunger, various Newspapers, National Liberation Organisations, consulting engineers and numerous specifically rural service organisations.

53. The extent to which one’s preconceptions determine what will be observed as significant should not be under-estimated. Behind a preconception is a politically motivated belief of the way things are supposed to be. For example, in the case of a (crude) left-wing view of the Apartheid system, the state is assumed to be universally "evil" and controlling, while the oppressed "community" is supposed to be universally "good" and resistant. It is on the basis of these assumptions that theories and actors become attractive or repulsive. This kind of (unconscious) political bias prevented me from seeing the "Shangaan" "collaboration" with the state as resistance. For a discussion of the link between rhetoric, politics and choice of theories see Rule J, *Theories of Civil Violence*, University of California Press, 1988. For a discussion on the way personal experiences shape fieldwork observations see Fabian J, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983.

54. Lonsdale succinctly points out: "A joint interest in redressing a specific issue or securing a material resource never solves the problems of authority, discipline or method in the requisite action; it creates them." See Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley*, p 293. This points to the importance of the concept of moral economy in discussing organisation and action.
55. These interviews are recorded in the bibliography using the informant's initials.
During the nineteenth century, Bushbuckridge lay on the fringes of the Boer Republic and the Pedi, Swazi and Shangaan polities. This vulnerable location ensured that, by the end of the century, no stable centralised political authority emerged in the district. Throughout the nineteenth century, settlers in the district (most of whom were refugees from conflicts between and within the above polities) faced repeated raids from all directions. The 1904 population statistics record the presence of twenty four chiefs in the district, each with independent followings. The population of the district was ethnically diverse; Pulana, Khutswe, Pai, Pedi, Roka, Koni, Shangaan (Nguni) and Tsonga speaking people had settled in the region. The numerous chiefdoms neither had clear domains of authority nor ethnically homogeneous followings. Some households appeared to live under no form of local government at all. There was no reserve land in the district or land privately owned by Africans. By 1910, residents lived on Crown land, which fell under the Departments of Lands, Forestry and Mining, or on Company owned land. Administrators from the Native Affairs Department (NAD), posted to Pilgrims Rest between 1910 and 1936 were faced with the task of regulating settlement and bureaucratising the chieftainship in this anarchic setting.

This chapter provides a broad description of nineteenth century processes of settlement and conflict that spawned the bureaucratic headaches of the twentieth century. The chapter then
outlines the changing nature of the NAD as well as the strategies employed by bureaucrats as they tried to assert new forms of administrative control over the district. The chapter ends with a description of employment opportunities and their effects on gender and generational relationships within African settlements.

Settlement and Conflict in the Nineteenth Century

In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the Ndwandwe, led by Zwide, invaded Swaziland four times from Northern Natal. In the process the Ndwandwe almost obliterated the Ngwane (Swazi) state. However, in 1819, Zwide's armies were decisively defeated by Shaka, which gave Sobhuza, the exiled Swazi King, some breathing space to reestablish the Ngwane state. During his years in exile from southern Swaziland, Sobhuza had been impressed by the natural fortresses of central and northern Swaziland. In 1820 he embarked on a campaign to conquer these areas and make them the site of an expanded kingdom.2

Various "Nguni", "Sotho" and "Tonga" chiefdoms were settled haphazardly across northern Swaziland. Over the next twenty years, these chiefdoms were incorporated into Sobhuza's rapidly expanding Swazi state or defeated in battle and forced to flee north. Segments of these chiefdoms settled on the mountains between the Crocodile River in the South and the Olifants River in the North. Amongst them were groups that were to become known as the Pulana, Khutswe and Pai.3

In the 1830s, the chiefdoms that had fled northern Swaziland were joined by a significant migration of refugees from Mozambique to the Transvaal. The refugees were fleeing the
invasion of the lower Limpopo valley by Shoshangane, a Zulu general. Although the term Shangaan was initially applied only to the Nguni paramountcy, over time the groups subjected by Shoshangane and his successors were also known by that name. Initially the invaders called the conquered groups Tongas, meaning "slaves" in Zulu. Peculiar cultural practices related to gender emerged as the Nguni invaders were predominantly male and married the local "Tsonga" speaking women. The language of the household and hence of youth socialisation remained a dialect of "Tsonga", whilst the language of the chief's court and the public sphere (which was almost exclusively male) was Zulu.

Henri Junod, a Swiss Missionary and the author of the first significant ethnographic account on these refugees, divided the emigrants from Mozambique into several clans, the Ronga, Hlanganu, Djonga, Hlabi, Nwalungu, the Bilas and the Hlengwe. The Swiss Mission turned one of the numerous dialects spoken by the refugees into a written language and called both the language and the people who spoke it Tsonga. Native Commissioners stationed at Pilgrims Rest in this period refer only to the migration of the Hlanganu who, at the time of Shoshangana's invasion, were settled on the Western edges of Mozambique. It is more probable that households from all these groups trekked into the Lowveld around Bushbuckridge.

The mid nineteenth century was a particularly traumatic period for people settled between the Crocodile and Olifants River. The land on the edge of the Drakensburg was both ideal winter grazing land and an ideal spot to act as a launching pad for Mswati, Sobhuza's successor, to take control of the eastern Lowveld as a whole. Furthermore, the invading Swazi armies were also attracted by opportunities to accumulate ivory, cattle and captives.
The Swazi King used these resources to cement political alliances with the Boers, and for the
distribution of patronage to his military regiments and officers. By the middle of the century,
divisions in the Zulu state and effective diplomatic overtures to the British authorities in Natal
gave Mswati the opportunity to concentrate his energies towards the north and the east. By
the late 1850s and early 1860s the Pulana and Pai chiefdoms living in the area were either
"obliterated" or "expelled" to be replaced by military villages under Mswati's close
lieutenants.7

Swazi raids were compounded by political turmoil in Mozambique. The death of Shoshangane
in 1858 sparked off a succession dispute between the King's sons. Mawewe, the lawful
successor according to genealogical principles, defeated his rivals with the support of the
Nguni aristocracy. His principal opponent, Mzila, whose support base consisted of the
subjugated "Tsonga" groups, was forced to flee to the Zoutpansberg where he found shelter
with Joao Albasini, the Boer Republic's maverick Native Commissioner. In 1860, Mzila
returned to Mozambique. He entered into an alliance with the Portuguese at Lourenco
Marques and, with the support of local tributaries, inflicted a shattering defeat on Mawewe
who fled to his brother-in-law, the Swazi King Mswati.8

Mswati saw participation in the dispute as a means of gaining access to "Tsonga" cattle and
children as well as gaining control over the strategic trade route to Lourenco Marques. In
1862, he sent a three pronged force to attack Mzila. One of the Swazi divisions marched
along the Drakensberg foothills, destroying Pulana settlements on the edge of the mountains
and "hunting like wild beasts" any of the Hlanganu refugees who had settled on the
Lowveld.9 Mawewe's army was defeated after Mzila had made a strategic withdrawal to the
North before counter-attacking. A section of the defeated army returned to Swaziland via the Lowveld, again destroying any settlement they found. The following year, the same section again ravaged the Lowveld as the Swazi King continued to support Mawewe's attempts to wrest the chieftainship from Mzila. Grandjean, writing in 1899, recalled these wars:

Ten years of battles and of "razzias" from which the country has still not recovered. Initially there were five years of continual wars when one could not even think of working in the fields. People survived on roots and branches of palms. Women and children followed armies to get their part of the meagre booty. For the next five years there was less fighting but people were ceaselessly on the lookout. Each year Mawewe's people came back to ravage fields and burn villages.\(^{10}\)

**Pulana, Khutswe and Pai Between 1825 and 1860**

Living on the fringes of an expansionist Swazi state to the south, an explosive Shangaan succession dispute to the east and the Pedi paramountcy to the west was not conducive to the establishment of a powerful, centralised and secure form of political authority. Settlements between the Crocodile and Olifants river were comparatively poor, fragmented and scattered well into the 1860s. Many lived in sheltered sites - often fortified caves - in almost constant fear of raids, having been stripped of, or abandoned attempts to keep, stock.\(^{11}\) The maintenance of a royal herd, a crucial source of chiefly patronage and power, was impossible. Hoes replaced cattle as the unit of exchange in marital transactions.\(^{12}\)

After fleeing Northern Swaziland in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the Pulana and Pai dispersed and split into numerous chieftainships. Exposed as they were to Swazi raids, these chieftainships were compelled to ally themselves with broader political forces. These forces consisted of the Pedi paramountcy, agents of the South African Republic (particularly Abel Erasmus, the Native Commissioner stationed in Lydenburg) and dissidents from the Swazi state.
These alliances were organised around the politics of survival and expediency. At both a household and chiefly level, people chose to settle around, and align themselves with, those forces that could offer them effective security. After fleeing Swaziland the Pulana sought refuge with the Pedi paramount before gradually moving east. The Pedi practices of initiation and age regiments were adopted. In exchange for land and protection, the Pulana chiefs had to send their age-regiments on demand to the Pedi paramount. The paramount used the regiments for hunting, irrigation construction and military activities. The Pedi paramount also constituted the ultimate court of appeal for contentious cases amongst the subordinate Pulana chiefdoms. There was no uniform relationship between the Pedi paramount and the various subject chiefdoms that lived within the ambit of the Pedi domain. The terms of these relationships were forged out of a dynamic power struggle between the paramount and the subordinate chiefdoms. These processes were in turn shaped by struggles within the Pedi polity, alliances between chiefs and members of the Maroteng royal family and the presence of external threats to the security of the chiefdoms. Even when the Pulana chieftainships began to split, competing chiefs remained members of age regiments named after Pedi chiefs. The Pulana retained a distinct language, which combined Pedi with Swazi, although elements of Pedi predominated.

Settled on the eastern edges of the escarpment, the Pulana fell under a fluctuating "dual hegemony" of the Pedi paramountcy and the Boer Republic. Different factions in secession disputes allied themselves with different forces in attempting to consolidate their claim to the chieftainship or establish their own independent following. The Mogane lineage formed an alliance with one Native Commissioner Abel Erasmus from around the mid nineteenth century in an attempt to establish their independence from the Mashegos, a previously dominant
Pulana lineage. Erasmus saw to Kobeng Mogane’s education and ensured his succession to the chieftainship on the request of Kobeng’s father, Moronwe.\textsuperscript{18} In return, the Mogane's probably provided Erasmus with labour and military support. Another Pulana lineage, the Chiloanes, aligned themselves with the Pedi paramount.

Somcuba, a dissident member of the Swazi royal family, was a further force under whose shelter groups of Pulana and Pai sought protection. Somcuba was forced to flee Swaziland in 1849 having challenged the authority of Mswati by appropriating cattle and certain political and ritual powers reserved for the king. He sought sanctuary with the Boers, who were always keen to exploit divisions within African polities. Eventually Somcuba settled in the Eastern Transvaal, some forty miles from Swaziland. However, Somcuba’s security ultimately depended on his alliance with the Boers. Hence, when relations between Mswati and the Boers improved in the mid 1850s, Somcuba’s usefulness to the Boers decreased. Around 1855, Somcuba’s settlement was attacked and destroyed by a Swazi army and he was killed.\textsuperscript{19}

The wars between Mzila and Mawewe produced a new migration of refugees from Mozambique. Amongst the new settlers were two chiefs, Bondzini and Magwagwaza. The refugees were in the unfortunate position of being preyed upon by Swazi and Mawewe’s armies, some Pulana chieftains and the Khutswe and they lived in small dispersed settlements on the Lowveld or sought protection with settled chiefdoms or from the Boer Republic.\textsuperscript{20}

The Khutswe spent the greater part of the nineteenth century traversing the Eastern Transvaal from Pretoriuskop (in what is now the southern end of the Kruger National Park) to the
Zoutpansberg in the North. During this period, they fought raiding parties from the Swazis and entered into a war with the Chiloane section of the Pulana. The Khutswe also attacked Bondzini, a Hlanganu chief who fled to Erasmus for protection. Fearing retaliation from Erasmus, the Khutswe sought the protection of Albasini. On moving south again, the Khutswe chief, still unsure of Abel Erasmus’ intentions, established an alliance with the Pedi paramountcy. Like the Pulana, the Khutswe spoke a mixture of Pedi and Swazi and adopted the practice of initiation and age regiments.21

The End of Swazi Expansionism: 1860 -1870

The mid 1860s were a turning point in the struggle for control of the Lowveld. In 1864 a Swazi raiding party was decisively defeated by Pulanas led by Maripe Chiloane at Moholoholo (Maripeskop). Maripe's victory gave him an effective claim to the chieftainship within the Chiloane lineage. Before the battle it was questionable whether Maripe was the hereditary chief. However, prior to the battle, Maripe's two brothers, Molotele and Makuke, had fled to Sekhkukhune for shelter. On their return, the two brothers discovered that Maripe had taken effective control of the chieftainship. Molotele left the Chiloane heartland with a small following and settled on the foothills of the Drakensburg to the North of Moholoholo. Makuke settled on the highveld to the west of Moholoholo.22

In 1866, the Swazis mounted a successful foray into the Lowveld as far north as Phalaborwa. However, the jubilation following their success was short lived; A Swazi army sent to replace Sekhkukhune, the Pedi paramount, with Mampuru, Sekhkukhune's brother, was decimated at the Lulu mountains.23 In 1869 the Swazi were again comprehensively defeated
when a combined Pedi, Bokgaga, Bolobedu, Pulana and Phalaborwa force ambushed and destroyed a returning Swazi raiding party. Although the threat of Swazi raids diminished, Erasmus continued to raid cattle in Maripe's chiefdom well into the seventies.

The British annexation of the Transvaal and the defeat of the Pedi paramountcy by a combined British, Boer and Swazi force in 1879 changed the balance of power in the Eastern Transvaal. The Pedi paramount had been both a persistent stumbling block to Boer attempts to assert control over land and labour and a major military power threatening the viability of Boer settlement in the Eastern Transvaal. The British also went about revamping the disorganised administration that they inherited from the Boer Republic.

Like the Pedi chiefs, Pulana chiefs had different attitudes towards the British Government in the 1880s. The relationship with the British was determined by the preexisting alliances with the Boers or Sekhukhune prior to annexation. Kolwyn Mogane, who was resident on the Middleveld just east of Bushbuckridge, was "inciting the natives to join with the Boers" against the British. Maripe, on the other hand, despite having assisted Sekhukhune in the 1879 war, sent a message to the British Native Commissioner in Lydenburg from his base at Moholoholo that "they [Maripe] considered themselves children of the English Government" and that "they would never submit again to the bad treatment they underwent at the hands of the Boers." Maripe, went on to allege that Erasmus had personally threatened his safety in the event of a British withdrawal. The Khutswe chief was resident in Sekhukhune's kraal and "carried the white feathers" for the paramount. A refugee chief Wintervogel gave the British administration military assistance in their conflicts with the Boers.
The British left the Boer Republic in an immeasurably more powerful position in 1881 than they had found it in 1878. The Pedi paramountcy, formed a working relationship with the reinstated Native Commissioner of Lydenburg, Abel Erasmus in an attempt to salvage their position following their defeat in 1879.31

Bushbuckridge and the Lowveld lay at the fringes of Erasmus' jurisdiction, and his administration of the district was personalised and haphazard. Each winter Erasmus, accompanied by a "native police force", undertook both a tax collecting tour and hunting expedition in the district. The "native police force" who assisted Erasmus in these "tax raids" was headed by Tobys Malambo, a Pai chief, who was given "considerable freedom of action by his patron in the Lowveld reaches of the district."32 Maripe and other Pulana chiefs probably had no choice but to accommodate the demands for taxation. The Hlanganu, who had settled on the Lowveld, responded to these raids by migrating to Mozambiquan side of the border during the winter months. Thoughtfully, the Portuguese authorities collected tax in Mozambique during the summer months, allowing the Hlanganu to avoid paying tax altogether.33

By 1894, a number of Pulana chiefdoms had established themselves on the slopes and foothills of the Drakensburg mountains that form the drop into the escarpment. These included Chiefs Molotele Chiloane, Sethlare (Maripe's son), Tabankulu Mashego, and the Matlushe Mashego chieftainships. The middleveld just west of the escarpment was settled by Kolwyn Mogane and Makuke Chiloane who had given shelter to a couple of Pedi chiefs who had antagonised Sekhkukhune. The Pulana population numbered about 3,500 families. In 1894, the Boer Republic's Location Commission awarded Kolwyn for his loyalty by
appointing him the paramount chief of the Pulanas. The Pulanas were "given" a few farms in the Lowveld as a "location" by the Commission. However, the location was never surveyed as the Volksraad disapproved of it. The Khutswe chief had settled just to the South of Bushbuckridge on the farm Sandford. The Mpais, numbering some 2,700 families were settled in the "broken country" south of Bushbuckridge under several petty chiefs. The 1894 Location Commission made Tobys Malombo the paramount of the Mpais. Like the Pulanas, the Mpais were "given" a "location" by the Commission that was also never surveyed.

In 1897 a third flow of refugees began to enter the Transvaal from Mozambique, following the defeat of the Shangaan paramountcy by the Portuguese. During this wave, the Shangaan paramountcy, along with several other small chieftainships, entered the Lowveld. These groups scattered and settled under virtually every chief living on the escarpment and the Eastern Highveld. "They were attached to homesteads as individuals, or, as small groups under their own headmen, were scattered throughout the veld, colonising those areas where human and animal diseases, poor soils or lack of water had previously restricted settlement." Sections of the refugees settled in the relatively depopulated, dry and malarial Lowveld.

Differences in political alliances between the Pulana chiefs reemerged during the second Anglo-Boer war. Maripe assisted the British forces (and attacked local shopkeepers), whilst Kolwyn gave the Boer guerrillas considerable assistance.

The above processes produced settlements that had social organisations described by van
Warmelo in his 1934 survey as unique in the whole Republic. However, before describing the dynamics of the relationships within these settlement, it is necessary to delineate the political imaginary underlying the organisation of the constituent social relationships within these communities.

**The Imaginary ordering of the "Socialised World"**

There is a broad consensus in historical and anthropological literature that pre-colonial African settlements in the Transvaal shared a common ontology within which the social, spiritual and natural worlds existed side by side on a continuum, or as different qualities of an object, and effected one another. The supernatural shaped the nature of lived "reality" within this imaginary through two forces, namely: ancestors and witches.

The will of the ancestors represented the social order in its purest form. Within this context, people were placed on earth to carry out that will; to reproduce relations passed down by their predecessors. Ancestors enforced their will by rewarding people for socially legitimate behaviour, and punishing them for transgressing established norms. Lived reality, in these terms, consisted of a constant dialogue between a person and their ancestors, between the past and present. No hard and fast distinction could be drawn between the past and present, as the past was always active and present.

Boundaries between the three spheres were overlapping and vague. A grown man, for example, formed a unity consisting of a active social subject that made decisions, a representative of an ancestral lineage (with certain qualities attached to that linage), and a
natural body. Certain people were gifted with an innate power, or taught techniques, to
harness the power of the different spheres that constituted an object. These people had the
ability to "activate" a quality in an animal, object or natural force to cause someone harm.
Some people had the power to transform their bodies into those of animals in order to achieve
their goals. The ability to harness the power of an object, or to change its nature, was called
witchcraft. This power could be used for productive or evil purposes; to cause drought, to
make an army invincible, to cure illness or to provide entertainment. Those people who used
the power for social good were thought of as powerful, that is gifted with "power", those
who used their abilities to cause social harm were stigmatised as witches.40

The "natural" attributes of certain objects did not require witchcraft to activate "intrinsic"
qualities. Menstrual blood, for example, represented "sterile soil", an association with which
contaminated the object with this quality. A man, animal or crop could waste away after
contact with menstrual blood.41

This ontology provided the skeleton to the central ideological underpinnings of chiefly,
generational and gendered authority. The powers of each social position was divinely
sanctioned by the proximity or distance of that position from a (hierarchical) ancestral order.
People occupying senior social positions were, in theory at least, gifted with greater spiritual
powers than their junior counterparts. Generational authority, therefore, was legitimated by
(and bolstered by) the privileged access of the aged (because of their proximity) to the will
of the ancestors.42

A chief was chief by blood. That is, the chief represented, and hence had privileged access

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to the power of, the most powerful lineage within the chiefdom. Chiefly ancestors proved
their superior powers by claiming ownership of the land by sacrificing their blood in
conquering the previous "owners". "The land", in the words of a Pulana leader,

"belongs to our forefathers. They shed their blood so that we can live on it [the land].
We must respect them as we are living on it on their behalf, according to their
rules."43

As the living representative of the most powerful ancestors, the chief was the "ultimate
[living] owner of the land". The will of these ancestors, expressed through the chief, secured
the reproduction of the chiefdom, and the fertility of the natural world. For example, it was
the sanction of the royal ancestors that ensured the success of rain-making rituals and
agricultural endeavours, and accorded the chief the authority to control the distribution of seed,
the timing of the planting and harvesting, and ridding the society of pestilence.44 As
representative of a social position sanctioned by the ancestors, the words of a Senior
expressed both ideas and the will (and the powers associated with that will) of the ancestors.
The authority with which a subject spoke was therefore determined by the position of that
subject within the hierarchy of the chiefdom and the household.45

Within the above imaginary, women were conceptualised as living on the boundaries of the
social. As bearers of children, women held within their being (i.e their womb), the potentially
chaotic and uncontainable forces of nature.46 As such, a socialised woman could always be
subverted by her reproductive forces, or her sexuality. Hence, to allow women into the
chief's court would be to allow the "wild" into the "ordered" agnatic world. Furthermore,
the womb was the soil in which a man planted the seed.47 As the womb represented nature,
what happened in the womb could affect, by association, other natural forces or bodies. The
fisa (heat) of a menstruating women could cause cattle, men or crops to shrivel up and die.48
Elaborate rituals cleansed a chiefdom after a miscarriage as a barren womb produced a barren season: the heat of an "untreated" foetus "sucked" water from the sky. When a woman reached menopause, she was allowed to participate in marital negotiations around the exchange of cattle and had a pivotal role in kinship rituals. The role of socialised humanity, that being a married man, was thus to maintain the boundaries between the social and the natural, which meant in practice, the confinement of post-pubescent women to her father's or husband's household, or the fields. 49

The Imaginary in Practice

Although chiefly authority was ostensibly determined by "blood", and the above imaginary provided the rhetoric within which the moral economy of a chieftainship was negotiated, the powers exercised by a chief at a particular time and place were a more complex issue. Although a social hierarchy was fixed, no specific rights and obligations between chief and subject were determined by the above imaginary. A second moral principle, namely "a chief is a chief because of his subjects", that is, because the chief represents the will of his followers, provided the counterpoint to the absolute position implied by determination by blood. Although the office of the chieftainship was sacred, the appropriateness of the person bearing that office was a subject of constant debate. When the will of the chief and that of (some or all of) his followers parted, subjects could look for another (ostensible) member of the royal family who could claim the chieftainship as the legitimate heir to the throne, or they could leave the chiefdom. Jean and John Comaroff argue that there was a dynamic tension between the exercise of chiefly powers and the autonomy of the household. Chiefly power could be measured by the ability of chiefs to allocate land, provide military security,
effectively settling disputes by enforcing judgments made at the chief's court, control the
 timing of planting and harvesting, and control the labour of unmarried but uninitiated men.
 Households, on the other hand, had an interest in limiting chiefly extractions and controls.
 As chiefly powers were dependent on the continued centralisation of the chieftainship, and
 the existence of relatively permanent habitations, resistance to chiefly control was effected by
 moving.\textsuperscript{50}

In Bushbuckridge, for the first quarter of the twentieth century, settlement was scattered
 thoroughly the region and there remained an abundance of depopulated land on which
disenchanted subjects could settle. Residents took advantage of the situation: Subjects who
 were dissatisfied with the judgements of one chief, moved and changed their allegiances to
 a neighbouring chief.\textsuperscript{51} Families also upped and left a locality when the fertility of the soil
 was exhausted and, in doing so, changed their loyalties from one chief to another.\textsuperscript{52} In the
 absence of any circumstance enforcing centralised settlement, Commissioner's noted that
 chiefly authority in the district was relatively circumscribed:

"Families [are] settled singly in the bush under numerous petty chiefs, none of whom
 have the social standing and authority of other Transvaal Native chiefs."\textsuperscript{53}

This impression is confirmed by the following description of a Mapulana chief written by
 a Native Commissioner:

"His following is small and he had very little influence during his lifetime and
 practically no control."\textsuperscript{54}

It is not surprising to discover that within this context there were many "chiefs". The
 population statistics in 1910 recorded the presence of twenty four different chiefs in the
By 1936, this number had grown to thirty three. No chief had any clear sphere of influence. Rather there was, according to a Native Commissioner:

"a confused tangle of tribes and sections and scattered units, very often no larger than just a family, speaking several languages and following different customs."

Chiefly power, rather than being an absolute, was a process determined by localised struggles. The various chieftainships did not conform to an ideal model; the assorted chiefs wielded qualitatively and quantitatively different combinations of political, military and ritual powers. Although Native Commissioner and anthropologists might have made hard and fast distinctions between headmen and chiefs, residents took such labels less seriously:

"Indunas appointed by General Erasmus...now call themselves chief. When one asks a native who his chief is, he gives the name, as often as not, of his local Induna."

Lineages without formal chiefly status assumed chiefly powers (and then chiefly authority) over time as they were able to demonstrate their (political, military and spiritual) powers and build followings. Men built their chiefly authority by demonstrating their privileged access to the supernatural, as the following quote suggests:

"Matibela is not considered a suitable man for appointment as chief. He came with his father, a member of the Bakhatla tribe to these parts from Pretoria about 50 years ago. As a rainmaker this man attracted a certain following which today include some 600 tax paying adults of various tribes scattered over 29 farms in this district and who, since the death of the old man, have become adherents of Matibela...Matibela is not able to control his scattered followers and has little influence except such as he is able to inspire as a reputed rainmaker."

A further distinctive aspect of the area was the degree of ethnic mixing within chiefdons. The ability to provide protection, rather than ethnic affiliation, determined residents' loyalty to a chief. A significant number of Shangaans and Mhlangana paid allegiance to Pulana chiefs.
despite the nearby presence of Shangaan and Hlanganu chiefs. An Assistant Native Commissioner noted in 1916:

"I have the honour to inform you that Chief Tabakhulu of a section of the Besutu, Baroka and Mhlangana tribes died on the above date." 61

Van Warmelo's survey, conducted in 1934, confirmed the ethnic heterogeneity of different chiefs' followings. 62

Like the exercise of chiefly power, the application of generational and gender power could not be deduced from the political imaginary that underwrote it. As control over unmarried men's labour was a historical site of struggle between chiefs and fathers, the rights and organisation of unmarried men varied considerably across chiefdoms and through time. For example, at the turn of the century, Pulana chiefdoms retained koma (initiation school) which marked a turning point in the transition from boy to manhood and the right to marry. 63 The Shangaan chieftainship had abolished circumcision in Mozambique, resulting in a more ambiguous transition from boyhood. 64 This gave the chief or father greater discretion over the timing of the young man's marriage, and hence extended the period of the young man's subordination. Some chiefdoms oscillated between adopting and rejecting the institution. 65

Marriage and the establishment of a household marked the point when a man became a fully socialised being, when he had the responsibility of reproducing gender and generational relations, passed down from the ancestors, within his own household.

In all African settlements at Bushbuckridge, women were given the legal status of minors, and as such were excluded from the chief's court. 66 Women had the responsibility of tending to crops in the fields, cooking and maintaining the household. Nevertheless, customs defining gender relations differed considerably within chiefdoms and between ethnic groups. Like male
initiation, some chiefdoms retained the institution of female initiation, while others had dropped it. Degrees and practices of subservience demanded of women varied between groups. Some groups accepted sexual intercourse before marriage, but (formally at least) insisted on fidelity after marriage, while others accepted demanded sexual abstinence before marriage, but tolerated (discretely conducted) extra-marital affairs.

Household customs were defined at the nexus of both gender and generational relations. There was no uniform household structure or cycle of household formation and dissolution in Bushbuckridge in the early twentieth century. The process of dislocation from Mozambique resulted in the shattering of extended homesteads. Many people arrived without their immediate families and settled with relatives. Different ethnic groups had different and changing models of appropriate household relationships. Groups from Mozambique living on the sandy areas of the Lowveld appeared to follow a pattern of living under an agnatically extended homestead until the death of the (male) household head. The ability to allocate land and control cattle formed the material basis of the power of the homestead head. On the death of the homestead head, the homestead was burnt and the households splintered off in different directions to establish independent homesteads. The more settled groupings, living on the foothills of the Drakensburg, also had agnatically extended homesteads, but these were apparently more permanently settled along lineage lines. On the death of the homestead head, the eldest son inherited the household head's cattle, kraal and lands. The deceased homestead head was buried alongside his predecessors in the cattle kraal. There was no specific point in time when a household would or could leave the homestead to establish itself as an independent unit. This usually only occurred when there was an acute conflict within the homestead, or if there was a shortage of land.
Over the next seventy years the state intervened in this fluid context with the aim of administering access to residential and agricultural land, incorporating "chiefs" into bureaucratic structures and creating ethnically homogeneous areas corresponding to the ethnic affiliation of the chief. These interventions had effects on the following: relationships between chiefs and subjects; relationships between the different ethnic groups; and gender and generational relationships. However, to understand why the state intervened as it did, it is necessary to provide a sense of the character of, and dynamics within, the NAD.

The Milner Administration as Paramount Chief

The report of the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1905 sought to produce a framework which legitimated a racially divided and labour-repressive state. This was achieved (discursively at least) through defining the "Natives" as (homogeneously) "tribal" and hence in need of a different kind of citizenship and representation. This citizenship was based on granting the "Natives" reserved lands which (theoretically at least) consisted of the "ancestral lands", fought for, and held by their "forefathers". These lands were "traditionally" occupied under conditions of communal tenure, and administered in trust by the chief. When the Crown peacefully annexed the land, the Report argued, the chiefs transferred their sovereign rights to the Crown. Hence, the Crown assumed the authority of a chief with corresponding rights and obligations previously held by the chief. Provided that the chiefs recognised the ultimate "paramountcy" of the Crown, they would be given the right to administer their "tribes" under "Native law" (except when that law was "repugnant to the general principles of humanity and civilization"71). In terms of the scheme the "Crown"
would have the status of the guiding father:

As father exercises authority within his family, as headman of a krall or collection of kraals rules them and exercises authority over them, so the chief rules the tribes and guides its destinies.72

Adopting the Tribal system had the added advantage of solving the problem of black political representation. Rather than accord individual rights to the "native" populace, annexation meant that the state need only recognise the tribe as a monolithic entity, represented by the chief and his council. Knowledge of the "tribal system" became the qualification for speaking on behalf of the "native". Hence, missionaries, administrators and other "Europeans" with immediate experience of "tribal" law could speak on behalf of the "natives", while educated africans could not.

The policy of "tribal rule" was however, moderated (if not compromised) by a paternalist ideology of a different order, namely that of the imperial civilizing mission. It was the states role to accelerate the "natural advancement" from barbarism to civilization. This was to be achieved through missionary activities (both church and school) which would include education in the "rules of hygiene". The ambivalence between the "civilizing mission" and the policy of "tribal rule" was summed up when the Commission suggested that:

In a few words, the abolition of the tribal system and chieftainship is being left to time and evolution towards civilization, assisted by legislation where necessary and administrative methods.73

It was along the lines laid down by the Commission that the post-Milner state constituted itself after 1910.

Native Administration after 1910

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The NAD in the early years of Union consisted of the (partial at best) merging of the Transkei, Natal and Transvaal Departments. Despite the ostensible merger, the three Departments retained differences in organisation and followed different statutes. The Transkei administration was the most extensive of the three regions and had an associated administrative ethic organised around the idea of "sympathetic paternalism". As a recognised representative of the "Native", this ethic saw the role of the Commissioner (and that of the NAD as a Department) as the arbiter between black and white, the Natives and the state. The ultimate function of the administrator was to govern in such a way as to preserve peace and discipline despite pressures acting to the contrary from above and below. Not surprisingly, maintaining a "just balance" between black and white was a role of specialists: the Transkei ethic dictated that Native administration was a vocation reserved for those with a "detailed and precise knowledge of local customs, languages and traditions". The vast majority of administrators were English speaking, and were the sons of administrators or missionaries.

The ethic of "sympathetic paternalism" in practice emphasised the notion of "personal rule" whereby an administrator was stationed in a district for a lengthy period and had significant personal discretion in implementing Departmental policies. The position of the administrator as "personal ruler" was enhanced by his status as the representative of the supreme father (or paramount) in the form of the state. Administrators had to balance a implicitly transformative "civilising mission" with pragmatic political accommodation and an innate and cautious conservatism. In the Transvaal, the Milner administration had established a network of English speaking sub-native commissioners who were attached to the NAD but fell under the nominal authority of the Justice magistrates. Like its Transkein counterpart, the Transvaal administration was ordered around the ideas of "sympathetic paternalism" and "personal

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Despite the grandiose task that the NAD had assigned itself, for the first seventeen years after Union, the NAD was relatively impotent. Only one to two per cent of the government's total budget was spent on the NAD between 1912 and 1936. Outside of the Transkei, the prospects of promotion for its officers were small, and officers were ultimately subordinate to the Justice Department. Members of the Department also had to jockey for administrative authority with the Department of Lands and Labour. It was from within this context that administrators from the NAD attempted to control settlement and recognise chiefs as, at least partial, members of the bureaucracy.

Attempts by the State to Bureaucratise the Chieftainship

Little consensus existed in the NAD regarding the role of the chieftainship in the administration. As the ethic of the "civilising mission" held powerful resonances within the NAD, members of the administration attitudes towards the future role of the chieftainship, were, at best, ambivalent. A hardliner modernising faction within the NAD, keen to see the "natives" "progress" towards "civilisation", explicitly aimed to abolish the chieftainship, albeit in an evolutionary manner.

Nevertheless, members of the Administration also realised that the chieftainship "enabled efficient control over large bodies of natives over extended tracts of country". As young men and women began to leave rural areas for the cities, the need to bolster "traditional" structures of authority who had an interest in preventing urbanisation (and in maintaining
"native" morality) became more urgent. In addition, Native Commissioners increasingly began to recommend to the NAD that customary law be recognised and institutionalised both as an administrative necessity and as a principle of just rule. However, the role of chiefs in administering customary law remained an unresolved debate in the NAD until 1927.79

Despite the fact that the NAD did not have a coherent policy in relation to recognising the chieftainship, in Bushbuckridge, the NAD was ultimately unable to give the chiefs significant jurisdiction over areas of land where the NAD itself only had limited control. In Bushbuckridge, there were no "reserve lands" or "locations" which were owned by "communities" or the state in which the NAD could delegate specific administrative powers to the chieftainship. The district was a mixture of Company owned land with a few individual owners and Crown land. In this context, the powers that recognition by the state gave to chiefs were of questionable significance. The following section will briefly outline the changing criteria for recognition and what that recognition meant in practice in the Pilgrims Rest district between 1910 and 1924.

The Meaning of Recognition

There were two forms of recognition of chiefs in this period: recognition of chiefs under Section 4 of Law 4 of 1885, and recognition for "administrative purposes".

In 1919 the secretary of the NAD requested the sub Native Commissioner (NC), A Hook, to send a list of recognised chiefs in Pilgrims Rest. Hook, unable to find any documentation in the office regarding previous accreditation of chiefs, referred to the 1909 ethnological blue
book. He suggested that the four chiefs with the biggest followings be recognised as full
chiefs, while a further twenty chiefs be recognised as sub-chiefs with "similar powers" so as
to not "disturb the conditions" as they existed. Over a year later, the secretary of the NAD
rejected Hook's recommendations. Rather than "multiply the number of formal recognitions",
the Secretary instructed that a

"clear distinction must be drawn between chiefs appointed as judicial officers and
administrative headmen."81

Hook was instructed to submit a list of those chiefs he believed it necessary to recognise.
Those excluded would still be recognised for "administrative purposes". Hook obediently
forwarded the names of eleven chiefs whom he considered worthy of recognition.

Despite the apparently fastidious thought which went into the recognition of chiefs under
Section 4, it is doubtful that such recognition made any practical difference to the ability of
the chosen chiefs to rule. Although recognition gave chiefs limited judicial powers in terms
of "Native Law and Custom", in practice these powers were so "vague and indefinite" as to
be meaningless. What is more, it is questionable whether recognised chiefs understood the
principles of Section 4, or how to use the Act to bolster their powers.83 Moreover, when
chiefs did try to use the powers accorded to them by "native law and custom", residents did
not hesitate to appeal the judgements when they contradicted the national state's common
law.84

Recognition for administrative purposes, on the other hand, gave the chief the right to settle
disputes amongst his followers, although the outcome of the cases was not recognised by the
state. Residents were also able to appeal against the judgements of the chiefs at the
Magistrate's court. Administrative recognition also meant that the chief would function as a
channel of communication between the state and residents. Chiefs given recognition for administrative purposes were never recognised in the government gazette. Recognition for "administrative purposes" was extremely flexible and suited the singularly fluid conditions in the district.

The following example demonstrates how administrative recognition was implemented in practice: After the Boer war a "petty Shangana chief" named Masipali arrived in the district with a "handful" of followers from Mozambique. They were settled under an Mbayi chief, Mangulube. On the death of Masipali, his family sent a delegation to the Sub Native Commissioner (SNC) at Graskop requesting recognition for Shugela Ndlovu, Masipali's son. The basis for the request was that they had "nothing in common with the Mbayi people" whose customs were "totally different" from theirs. The Commissioner gave the following recommendations:

"Since I have been here, there has been little ill feeling between these two sections and I think it would be advisable to have Shugela appointed chief of the Shanganas, this would avoid further trouble." The Commissioner checked that Shugela did have majority support from the refugees, Shugela was recognised for administrative purposes. A small section of 11 families, involved in a succession dispute with the recently recognised chief, requested and were given permission to leave the district for Mozambique following the appointment of Shugela.

There were limits to the extension of recognition to would-be chiefs and headmen. Recognition was refused when it entailed undermining a chief already recognised under Law 4 of 1885. For example, when Charles Monisi [sic] approached the NAD through a legal firm
for recognition, the NAD responded that:

"He [Monisi] is reported by local officers of the Department to exercise an adverse influence in the Tribe and his primary aim is apparently to secure recognition as an independent headman. Such recognition the government is not prepared to extend to him." 89

In many ways the policy of "administrative" recognition was ideally suited to prevailing conditions in the area. It was flexible enough to prevent the emergence of violent chiefly or ethnic conflicts caused by the imposition of a single chief in an ethnically heterogeneous area. 90 Residents retained a large degree of choice regarding their affiliations to a chieftainship. Ultimately, recognition gave the chiefs very little practical bureaucratic power beyond what respect they were able to command from their followings.

Controlling Settlement: The Creation of a Released Area

The NAD had to balance african chief's claims to "ancestral" land with the claims to land of white farmers and mining companies. This task was performed by the Beaumont Commission in 1916 and reassessed by the Stubbs Commission in 1917 who defined a "Released Area" in Bushbuckridge. The RA consisted of land set aside for purchase or settlement under rent tenancy conditions by black individuals or communities in terms of the 1913 Land Act. Ultimately the RA consisted of 85 farms covering 283,000 morgan. Thirty thousand morgan were reserved for Forestry purposes. 91

Initially at least, the Native Commissioners at Graskop were not able to implement the Act effectively. By 1919 the Assistant Native Commissioner (ANC) at Graskop noted that:

"very little regard has in the past been paid by the Native population to the provisions
of the Act, with the result that the movements of Native families have taken place indiscriminately from and to Government and private farms.92

This situation was exacerbated by the absence of a clear policy within the state regarding the use of Crown lands for settlement purposes. Initially, the Minister of Lands refused to allow African settlement on a number of Crown Lands in the district on the grounds that it carried "valuable timber".93 Applications for settlement outside the reserved area recommended by the Beaumont Commission but within the area recommended by the ETLC were also refused.94 However, by 1922, both these problems were resolved.95

Two strategies were articulated within the NAD around the problem of organising the settlement of black families. The first was to demand access to more Crown Land for settlement and to demand an extension of the Released Area. The second approach was based on the assumption that the constant movement of families from farm to farm was caused by the infertility of the soil, combined with the use of "outdated" farming techniques. This approach, more interventionist and overtly part of a "civilising mission", advocated the increased use of fertilisers and improved methods of cultivation and irrigation.96 Until the 1940s, only the first approach was adopted.

Reorganising the NAD and Fostering "Tribal Discipline"

In the early twenties the NAD under went a thorough restructuring. Initially emasculated by the Public Service Commission in 1923, the NAD began to reconstitute its authority under the leadership of Major J.F. Herbst, the new Departmental secretary. The governing principles behind the new NAD were efficiency, bureaucratic centralisation and administrative uniformity, all of which tended to undermine the autonomy and discretion of Native
Central to the new administrative strategy was the policy of retribalisation. The recognition of chiefs and the bolstering of chiefly powers would achieve two goals: Firstly, the NAD would have greater control over an influential section of the "native" community; and secondly, "tribal discipline" and with it control over an increasingly fragmented black world, would reemerge as a logical consequence of a revamped chieftainship.

With administrative centralisation, came scientific policy making. Scientific procedures managed by "experts", rather than lengthy commissions, would increasingly be called upon to make policy. This "applied science" was "unapologetically empiricist and positivist... [science] was about exact measurement and precise standards in the interest of maintaining a predictable and orderly world. In this version of science, observation and prediction were directly tied to control." The NAD was not unaffected by these processes and began to search for objective and scientific criteria to apply to questions of chiefly recognition. To this end, an ethnological section was formed in 1925 with the aim of accumulating "pure scientific knowledge" as well as serving the "more practical ends of native administration". Knowledge of the "native" was no longer the esoteric domain of those with lengthy personal experience; rather, all a bureaucrat needed to know about the native was available in "scientific" ethnography. NAD officers were encouraged to take vacation courses in ethnology and social anthropology. A special diploma course was created in Bantu studies for Commissioners. Schapera's study of Tswana law and custom became the text-book for Commissioners. Basing their policies on scientific anthropology, the NAD’s definition of "tribe" began to harden into an administrative unit consisting of a chief, a homogenous ethnic group and a piece of land.
The Native Administration Act of 1927 effectively augmented the powers of the NAD and centralised its administration. The NAD was given wide powers to curb sedition and dissent and to control the free movement of Africans. The need for flexibility was supposedly met by the Departments right to legislate by proclamation. Commissioners were given criminal jurisdiction over Africans, a right lost to the Justice Department in the 1922 restructuring.

Most importantly for our purposes, the Act gave chiefs civil jurisdiction over their followers meaning that the state would recognise the decisions reached at the chief’s court as legally binding on the parties concerned, unless they lodged an appeal with the Commissioner's court. In 1929 four chiefs from the Bushbuckridge district were proposed for recognition in terms of the Act. The aim of the Commissioner was to recognise one chief per ethnic group. The followers of unrecognised chiefs would, according to the logic of the Commissioner, voluntarily over time attach themselves to the recognised chiefs. As there were no "tribal lands" or "tribal locations" in the district, the four chiefs were given jurisdiction over any member of their "tribe" domiciled anywhere in the district. There was no specific area of land over which a recognised chief had a monopoly because the area was so ethnically heterogenous.

However, although four chiefs were submitted in 1929 for recognition in terms of the Act, the submission was not included in the government gazette, for no apparent reason. It was only in 1936 that the recognition of four chiefs was gazetted.102

Recognition had limited effects on relations between chiefs and subjects. Residents were still
able to choose which chief they wanted to try their cases, even if that chief was only granted the status of mediator by the state. An assertive unrecognised leader remained a more effective force than a weak recognised "chief". The Commissioner, who was supposed to only take appeals from the courts of recognised chiefs with written records from those chiefs, continued to take appeals in the absence of any records. In fact the demand for written records created more confusion than administrative order in the case of Sethlare, a recognised Pulana chief, who ignored orders from the Commissioner to submit his court records in the event of an appeal. In 1942 the Commissioner withdrew Sethlare's recognition.

Although the recognition of the four chiefs was practically an "administrative necessity", the Commissioner was under the impression that the recognition of all the other chiefs was thereby withdrawn. The announcement that other chiefs were no longer recognised was not well received by a number of "ex-chiefs" at the quarterly meetings. For example, when it was announced that Sethlare would take over jurisdiction of all the Pulana in the district at a meeting at Klaserie, there was the following response:

Ex-chief [sic] Narishe speaking on behalf of his followers said that they regarded Chief Sekukuni as hereditary chief.
Ex-chief Stephen Makhatlishe said the appointment of these chiefs ought to upset the government of other petty chiefs over their tribe.
Ex-chief Matlushe supported Setlari.

The response of the NC to these protests was to emphasise the continuities of the arrangement. No chieftainship would practically be deprived of their followers in any immediate way:

NC: Other small ex-chiefs would carry on with their following as heretofore, until such time as units of such followings desired to attach themselves to Setlari. With exception of ex-chief Narishe no one opposed Setlari.
Prior to the creation of Trust land in 1936 the major state curtailment of the powers of the chieftainship was by restricting hunting and instituting the Native Commissioner's court as a source of appeals against chiefly judgements.

Hunting was not only an essential part of the subsistence base, but the control of hunting was a crucial area of chiefly authority. A conflict ensued between the state and Mathibela, a chief living on Calcutta, a farm on the edge of the Kruger National Park.

Mathibela resisted control of hunting by posting sentries to watch out for game rangers, refusing to cooperate in the search for alleged poachers, using his influence as a chief and rain-maker to protect "poachers" from rangers and, of course, by organising hunting parties led by members of his family. After complaints from the Kruger National Park, the surrounding farmers and the Wildlife Society, the Commissioner got permission for the removal of Mathibela from the border of the National Park to the farm Xanthia. Because of his age, he was not deported. His four sons were banished to Sekhukhuneland.

At the enquiry preceding their removals, the heir to the throne, Philip Malangeza, refused to give any evidence, under oath or otherwise. Mathibela's sons were convicted four times for failing to comply with the order to move. Eventually, in late 1940, they were settled in Mooihoek, Sekukuneland, some 300 km away. However, after his father died in 1942,
members of the chiefdom unanimously elected Philip Malangeza Mokoena, one of the banished sons, to the position of chief. He was allowed to return and was granted civil jurisdiction, i.e., the ability to try civil cases for his followers.

**Chiefs and the Native Commissioner's Court**

The second major violation of chiefly authority was the appearance of the Native Commissioner's Court as a source of appeal against the decisions of the chief's Court. Initially, complaints at quarterly meetings regarding the Commissioner's Court were only brought forward by chiefs in the vicinity of Graskop. The chief's Court was being ignored by residents in favour of the Commissioner's Court. For example:

Chiefs complained that litigants ignored the chief's Court frequently and took their cases direct to the Court of the ANC at Graskop. This was a slight on the chief concerned.¹⁰⁸

The judgements given by the chief's court were "disregarded" when appeals by residents to the Commissioner's court resulted in the chief's judgement being overruled. When the Commissioner moved offices to Bushbuckridge in 1943, complaints of this nature from all the chiefs arose at quarterly meetings. The Commissioner, however, was unmoved, and blamed declining respect for the chieftainship on corruption amongst the chiefs themselves.

This is graphically illustrated in the following extract from a meeting between chiefs and headmen in 1944:

Headman Moses Mnisi: The fact that natives can appeal against the judgements of chiefs tends to undermine the whole of Native tribal discipline. More and more natives are ignoring the chiefs.

NC: The point is that appeals are not as such undermining the powers and the status
of chiefs; What is undermining them is the necessity for appeals. It is unfortunate but it must be said: The lowveld chiefs are not fair in the matter of dealing with cases. One cannot but conclude that in most cases judgement is given to the party which brings the biggest present. It is no wonder that the people cease to have trust in the chiefs. If the appeal court did not have to uphold the great majority of these appeals, then the natives would not be appealing. They come to their chiefs for justice but they do not get justice. The remedy for the speaker's complaint lies with the chiefs alone.109

The Commissioner's sentiments received the support from a number of residents:

"The speaker also objects to the practice of chiefs charging for taking up their grievances...[the speaker] complains that chiefs make charges without rendering the service asked for and then they refuse to refund the fee."110

The chieftainship was not only being subverted by the authority of the Commissioner, but it was also losing popular legitimacy.

The Development of Labour Tenancy and the NAD

As the mediator between the "natives" and white power, the NAD played a tricky balancing act between attempting to meet the labour needs of white farmers and protecting the "natives" from forced labour. Members of the NAD took the latter role very seriously as the following extract suggests.

"It is clearly our duty to provide accommodation for Natives, who have been wrongfully evicted from farms, or where the conditions of tenure have become such that Natives cannot make provision for his (sic) dependents."111

The "natives" however, needed little protection during this period. The presence of large tracts of company and Crown land which were available for African settlement ensured that labour tenancy, a system whereby tenants pay rent for land by providing labour services, grew very slowly in the first half of the century. As one frustrated farmer commented in
1924:

"I think the NAD is fully aware that Natives refuse to reside on the farms and to give three months free labour, for their lands, etc, I can give numerous instances where the free labour system was introduced and that every native left immediately...as soon as we suggested free labour every boy [sic] left although we are paying our boys very well..."\textsuperscript{112}

Three farmers attempted to implement labour tenancy relationships on the Lowveld in 1920. All the residents of one farm moved to neighbouring farms when the farmer insisted upon a labour tenancy relationship. One of the farmers, Travers, was more successful as he persuaded the Molotele chieftainship, who had historical connections with that piece of land and feared the dispersal of their following, to remain on the farm. Tenants, in return for rendering three months labour service annually, would be allowed to plough unlimited areas and keep stock.\textsuperscript{113} The main concern of tenant families seems to have been to ensure that the tenancy agreement did not jeopardise their ability to engage in migrant employment. Household heads tolerated labour tenancy when it involved their wives and children. However, when their own or their sons' access to broader employment opportunities was threatened, tenant families often decided to leave.\textsuperscript{114}

Tensions arose between the Native Commissioner's attempts to meet white farmers' labour requirements and the space opened up by the RA for rent tenancy settlement. In 1926 the NC tried to prevent a labour tenant "who had organised an exodus of Natives" from a farm practising labour tenancy, from settling in the RA.\textsuperscript{115} The labour tenant appealed directly to the NAD who warned the NC that "the residence of Natives on rent paying terms in potential Native areas accords with the declared policy of the Government."\textsuperscript{116} Furthermore, there was no attempt to stop rent tenancy on the land and mining company owned land.
outside the RA. By the mid thirties there were over two thousand rent tenancy families on these farms.¹¹⁷

Those farmers who had implemented labour tenancy struggled to get the tenants who stayed on their farms to fulfil their "contractual" obligations as this comment by the Commissioner to the 1932 Native Economic Commission demonstrates:

"Many farmers assert that they never see 50% of their labour tenants who remain away for indefinite periods at various labour centres. They return to their kraals but hide and are away again without any endeavour or intention to commence their obligations to landlords in respect of the tenure of their families on those farms."¹¹⁸

In 1932 the revamped NAD attempted to intervene more forcefully to meet the labour requirements of white farmers. A circular sent to all districts in the Transvaal in 1932 prevented Commissioners from settling black families under rent tenancy conditions both within and outside of the Released Area.¹¹⁹ The aim of the circular was to force black families into farm labour by refusing them access to the RA. However, in effect the circular made the administration of the area untenable. The demand for labour tenants was low in the Pilgrims Rest district as whole.¹²⁰ The Forestry Department was evicting large numbers of tenants in preparation for afforestation. The result was that it was almost impossible for the Commissioner to find available land for the settlement of evicted labour and rent tenants. These families, in the words of the Commissioner, became "driftwood". The nearest available place for settlement was in a recognised location in Sekhukhuneland, over two hundred kilometres away, which was already overcrowded. An offer by the TGME to take one thousand families onto their land on a rent tenancy basis, on the understanding that a member of each family would work for wages in the mines was refused by the NAD as it was illegal. By 1934, the circular was revoked in the district. By 1939, there were only about one
thousand labour tenants in the entire district.  

Apart from sporadic evictions of labour tenants, the only significant removals occurred in 1929. About a hundred families were removed by the Forestry Department from Maripeskop, the heart of the Sethlare chiefdom, to Crown lands on the Lowveld about forty kilometres to the east.

Unlike the labour tenant farmers (with the possible exception of Travers) the Transvaal Gold Mining Estates (TGME) entered into various local alliances to achieve their labour requirements. In the first quarter of the century, the TGME entered into a symbiotic alliance with the Pulana chief Kobeng. In return for helping with the provision of labour, Kobeng could allocate land, appoint headmen on TGME farms, hear judicial cases and organise initiation school. In 1911, the TGME held a meeting with 35 "chiefs" from "below the Berg" who were living on Company farms. The TGME records that "very satisfactory arrangements... for the control and organisation of our unskilled labour force" were made at the meeting. However, by the 1920s, declining yields called the profitability of the mines into question which lead to the implementation of a harsher labour regime. The relationship between TGME and Kobeng's successor, Chaane, had deteriorated to such an extent that Chaane was evicted from TGME land in 1932, probably because of the chief's relationship with the Industrial and Commercial Union (ICU). However, the chiefs living on land "below the Berg" purchased by the African and European Investment Company for speculative purposes, retained their autonomy from TGME demands.

State interventions had few effects on the material conditions that underwrote gender and
generational relations. Access to migrant labour markets, however, effected the material bases of gender and generational power, which set in motion a number of transformations to these relationships during this period. These processes of transformation continued (albeit unevenly) into the eighties, and hence provide insight into the stakes involved in contemporary struggles. The next section describes the nature of these transformations.

Employment and its Effects on Black Residents: 1910 to 1936

Between 1910 and 1936 the population of Pilgrims Rest increased from around forty thousand to eighty thousand people. Apart from natural increases, a steady stream of people settled in the district from Mozambique to work on the local mines, farms and the railways. These settled on either Crown land, Company farms or private farms.

Pilgrims Rest mining operations were dominated by two major concerns, the Transvaal Gold Mining Estates (TGME) and Glynns Lydenburg. The TGME operated the bulk of the mines and owned freehold title to 32 farms. The mines employed about three thousand four hundred people in 1910. From the late nineteenth century the mines had exemption from the Squatters Act which allowed the mining companies to settle the families of workers on Company farms on a rent tenancy basis. Half of the mine's labour requirements was met by families settled on Company owned farms located "Below the Berg". Workers from Mozambique would marry local women as a means of settling permanently on the Company farms. Mozambiquans also brought in their families from Mozambique and settled them on Company owned land, often in the established households of relatives and with a chief's approval. This made it extremely difficult for the state to control the migration.
Over this period a significant number of men migrated to the Witwatersrand for employment. By 1910, over two thousand men were recorded as having passes to work outside of the district of Pilgrims Rest but inside the Transvaal. The number of men migrating to destinations outside the district had grown to approximately nine thousand by the early 1930s. The Commissioner and the Native Recruiting Corporation were willing to guarantee employment on Witwatersrand mines, provided the applicant was physically fit. In 1936, the Native Recruiting Corporation established an office in Bushbuckridge, which by 1942 the office was recruiting over four thousand workers for employment on the mines. In the same year, the NC's office received over twenty thousand pounds as deferred pay and migrant remittances.

The growth of wage employment opportunities had a number of effects on relationships between the black residents of Bushbuckridge. Wages were not generally used to purchase food except in times of severe drought. Agricultural land was plentiful; households would cultivate a portion of land according to their individual needs and the amount of labour that was available. Given the population, the district was agriculturally self-sufficient: In 1910, for example, approximately 55,000 acres were cultivated which produced in the region of 100,000 bags of mealies, 2,500 bags of millet and 6,250 bags each of beans, ground nuts and sweet potatoes. 20,000 bags of mealies at 8s per bag and 400 bags of ground nuts at 5s per bag and beans at 4s per bag were sold to local traders or used as barter for merchandise. Game was plentiful.

Migrancy affected the balance of power in generational relationships. Forty to fifty percent of the TGME's labour force was under 18 years of age. This was made possible by the
relative proximity of the mine to family homesteads which enabled youths to return home on a daily or weekly basis. Salaries from the mine were mainly used to buy clothes and cattle. Western clothes were an important marker of generational status. Young men's ability to buy cattle gave them access to brideswealth independently of their fathers, giving them greater leverage in the choice of a wife and the timing of their marriage. In response to these conditions, young men began to attend initiation schools at a younger age, and often married before leaving on a migrant contract or after a few years of employment. Migrant remittance were consequently sent to the migrant's father in exchange for the brideswealth put forward by the family.  

There were few controls preventing women from having access to Company compounds. Wives stayed with their husbands in huts and other women were smuggled in at will. "Mapulanas, Pedis, Shangaans... women who didn't have money" thronged into the compounds. Many brewed beer which they hid in adjacent forests; others engaged in "quasi- or open prostitution". Among the "hundreds of women who [left] their families [in the Pilgrims Rest district] preferring a loose life in the compounds" many seem to have ventured no further than the TGME mines.  

The mine compounds and then the industrial centres of the Witwatersrand gave women an alternative to their role in the homestead; a theme taken up in more detail in the next Chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter argued that the post union NAD was both under-resourced and relatively benign. The NAD had to jostle for administrative authority with other departments and was under-
Guided by an ethic of "sympathetic paternalism", the NAD saw itself as a buffer between white power and African social structure. As such, the NAD implemented policies cautiously and conservatively, both to protect the "natives" and to prevent the outbreak of an insurrection. In Bushbuckridge, however, the NAD was particularly ineffective. The presence of four different types of land tenure, as well as competition for control by other Departments, meant that the NAD could only partially control black settlement.

All attempts to integrate the chieftainship into the state floundered on the fact that all the recognised chiefs lived on privately owned land and, as such, were at the mercy of individual farmers. On some labour tenant farms, the chiefs received no special privileges. On other labour tenant farms, only the immediate members of the chief’s family were exempted from performing labour services, and the chief was allowed to hold court and conduct initiation school. However, farmers drastically subverted the powers of the chiefs who were resident on their farms. Farmers allocated land and evicted tenants who did not perform their labour service. Travers, for example, made the chief kneel before he gave the chief permission to address him. The authority of the chief’s court was weakened when tenants took cases to the farmer on appeal. Chiefs who moved to avoid labour tenancy had their followings dispersed and were settled in so far as their tenure was not disturbed by the arrival of a new labour tenant farmer. The Mnisi chieftainship, for example, moved three times to avoid labour tenancy between 1920 and 1936. Without unambiguous control of land the NAD was neither able to effectively allocate powers to chiefs or control the settlement of households.

Although state interventions during this period did not have significant effects on gender and generational relationships, access to migrant labour markets gave young unmarried men a
means of obtaining brideswealth independently of their parents. Neglected women also had the option of leaving homesteads for the cities.

Within the NAD a new administrative logic based on ecological and agricultural viability began to be asserted by recently appointed Agricultural Officers. Officers posted to Bushbuckridge argued that if optimal use was to be made of Crown land for settlement purposes, then a system of demarcated agricultural lands and grazing lands needed to be implemented. This was the context in Bushbuckridge when the South African Native Trust (SANT) was created in 1936.


13. See Delius P, "The Land...", Chapter two. Delius characterises the Pedi domain as being a "place of refuge" from the Swazi raids and Boer exactions; p59.


22. See Ziervogel, "The Eastern Sotho...", p188; and Van Warmelo N.J, "Preliminary Survey ..., p112.


25. CAD SS 559/77 V229 Maripi to State President 6/12/1876.

26. Bonner, P., Kings, Commoners... p221.

27. CAD SN 4A No 45, Letter Native Commissioner Lulu Mountains to SNA 22/4/81.

28. CAD SS R432/78 v266 NC Lydenburg to State Secretary 14/1/78.

29. CAD SN 4A 131/81, Letter Native Commissioner Lydenburg to SNA, 26/6/81.

30. CAD SN 4A, No 46, NC Lulu Mountains to SNA 8/4/81, and No 71, NC Lulu Mountains to SNA 22/4/81.

1986, p186.


34. CPSA, A1655 B51, *The Hunt Papers, Translation of the Boer Republic’s Location Commission*.

35. ibid.


46. Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Reason and..., p160.

47. Interview Ngobe, W., Dingleydale, 01/08/1993.


51. See for example, CAD BAO F54/1074/13, SNC Graskop to C Jansen Weilbach (Attorneys), 30/12/21.

52. CAD NHS 62/323 V7090, Letter SubNC to NC Lydenburg, 14/9/1918.

53. CAD NTS 62/323 V7090, Letter SubNC Graskop to NC Lydenburg, 14/9/1918.

54. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Note by ANC, 9/1/1930.

55. CAD SNA 235, Letter Magistrate Lydenburg to NAD, 10/9/1904.

56. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Location Reclamation Committee Report, 19/2/1940.

57. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, van Warmelo quoted in the Location Reclamation Committee Report, 19/2/1940.
58. See Bonner P., *Kings, Commoners,...* for a description of how the Swazi Kings expanded their powers into these different spheres through extended conflict.

59. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Location Reclamation Report, 19/2/1940.

60. CAD NTS 189/55 V349, NC Pilgrims Rest to NAD, 10/3/28. Thirteen years later Matibela was afforded full recognition as a chief.

61. CAD NTS 191/55 V349, Letter ANC Graskop to NAD, 24/10/1916.


64. Interview Nxumalo, K., Orinoco, 09/07/1992.


67. For evidence on the adoption and then rejection of initiation school see Junod *The Life of...*, pg94; Also interview Mnisi, E., Germiston, 12/06/1992.

68. Compare for example Junod’s description of the consequences of adultery amongst the "Tsonga" in *The Life of a...* pg 196 -198 with that of Krige and Krige *The Realm of...* pl58-60 who wrote about the Lovedu.

69. Interview Nachate, F., Brooklyn, 13/12/1992. See also Monnig, *The Pedi...*, Pg 139.


74. This discussion is based on Dubow S, "Holding a just balance between white and black": The Native Affairs Department in South Africa c. 1920-33", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 12, No. 2, 1986 and Dubow, S., *Racial Segregation and the Origins of*

75. Dubow S, Racial Segregation..., pg 102.


77. From Dubow S, Holding a Just Balance..., p219.


80. CAD NTS 55/44 V327 Sub NC Graskop to Sec NAD 28/6/1919, 27/10/19.

81. CAD NTS 44/55 V327 Sec NAD to SNC Graskop 4/1/21.

82. CAD NTS 45/276/3/5, Letter Detached Clerk Hammondskraal to NAD, 9/2/25.

83. ibid.

84. See for example, CAD BAO, SNC Graskop to C Jansen Weilbach (attorneys), 30/12/21.

85. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, SNC Pilgrims Rest to NAD, 4/6/1918.

86. ibid.

87. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, NAD to SNC Pilgrims Rest, 13/9/1918.

88. CAD NTS 44/55 v327, SNC Graskop to NAD, 31/7/1919.

89. CAD NTS 44/55 V327 NAD to Findlay and Niemeyer (Attorneys) 19/9/1928.

90. See Chapter Four where this is discussed in greater depth.


92. CAD NTS 62/323 V7090, Report by ANC Graskop to NAD, 14/9/1918.

93. CAD NTS 62/323 V7090, Report by SNC Graskop to NAD, 14/9/1918.

95. CAD NTS 68/323 V7090, Secretary of Lands to NAD, 21/3/24; Telegram from NAD to SNC Graskop, 18/9/1920.


97. See Dubow S, Holding "a just balance between white and black": The Native Affairs Department in South Africa c.1920-33, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 12, No.2, April 1986. Much of the following discussion is based on Dubow’s article.

98. For a strikingly similar policy of retribalisation in (what was then) Tanganyika during the same period see Ayliffe, J., *A Modern History of Tanganyke*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.


102. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Memo Chief Clerk Bushbuckridge, 28/6/45.

103. CAD NTS 187/55 V349, ANC Bushbuckridge to NAD, 19/9/41.

104. CAD NTS 187/55 V349, ANC Bushbuckridge to NAD, 5/8/41.

105. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meeting with Chiefs and Headmen, 14/2/1934.

106. CAD NTS 189/55 V349 NC Pilgrims Rest to NAD, 27/6/33.

107. CAD NTS 189/55 V349, Internal NAD Memo, 26/10/33.

108. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of Meeting Chiefs and Head Elandsfontein, March 1931.

109. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of meetings with Chiefs and Headmen, Islington, 27/4/44.

110. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of Meetings with Chiefs and Headmen, Dwarsloop, 27/3/43.

111. CAD NTS 68/323 V7090, NC Lydenburg to Secretary NAD, 18/2/1919.

112. CAD NTS 66/323 V7090, Acornhoek Cotton Syndicate to NAD, 10/12/24.

114. CAD NTS 61/323 V2876, SNC Graskop to NAD, 17/8/26.

115. CAD NTS 61/323 V2876 SNC Graskop to NAD, 17/8/26.


117. CAD NTS 97/362/21 V8840, ANC Bushbuckridge to NAD, 10/1039.

118. Report of the Native Economic Commission 1932; Evidence of Assistant Native Commissioner, Bushbuckridge, p199.

119. CAD LDE 217/64 V1067, General Report, Director of Native Agriculture, 1934.

120. CAD NTS 828/308 V3586, ANC Pilgrims Rest to NAD 18/8/35.

121. CAD NTS 97/362/21, Magistrate Pilgrims Rest to NAD, 8/7/39.


123. BRA, TGME Annual Reports, 1911, 3,6, 1912, 37, quoted in Bonner and Shapiro, "Company Estate...", p24.

124. See Bonner and Shapiro, "Company Estate...", p31.

125. See NAD annual Report 1910 p68; CAD NTS 17/423 V10226 Letter CNC Northern Areas to NC Bushbuckridge, 18/2/38; NTS 127/276 1805 Statistical Report ANC Graskop to NAD; and N02-02-01 Urban and Rural Population of SA 1904 to 1960 Central Statistical Services.

126. Information on the TGME is drawn from Bonner and Shapiro, "Company Estate...".


128. See CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of Meeting with Chiefs, Bushbuckridge, 8/3/32.

129. CAD NTS 301/278 V1959, NC Bushbuckridge to NAD, 21/1/42.


131. CAD Government Native Labour Bureau '402/18/98 V303, Dyke Poynter to Secretary Mines and Industries 29/4/1919.

132. See interviews F Machate, Brooklyn, 20/11/91; and E Manzini, Buffelshoek, 6/7/92. Also Delius P, The Land..., Chapter Three; and Delius and Beinart, "The Family and Early Migrancy in Southern Africa" Unpub Seminar Paper, African History Seminar,
University of London, May 1979. These issues will be examined in more detail in Chapter Seven.

133. Former mine worker quoted in Bonner and Shapiro, "Company Estate..." pg20.


135. ibid pg20.


137. CAD LDE 217/64 V1067 Report Engineer to Department of Agriculture 3/8/34.
CHAPTER TWO

The Establishment of the South African Native Trust (1936 - 1963)

The establishment of the South African Native Trust (SANT) marked the start of a process that resulted in massive state intervention in Released Areas. Crown Land within the Released Area now fell under the direct control of the NAD who had the task of managing the land on behalf of the "natives". The departmental jostling over the control of land which characterised the earlier period was resolved at least as far as land owned by the state within the Released Area was concerned. This did not mean, however, that the NAD had a coherent policy relating to the administration of the Trust land. The Department was caught between two broad approaches: On the one hand, in order to maintain the ecological and agricultural viability of the Trust lands, the NAD imposed a series of "Betterment" policies that involved the demarcation of the area into residential, agricultural and grazing areas. On the other hand, the NAD was trying to bolster the chieftainship in order to foster "tribal discipline". The problem was that the implementation of "Betterment" involved transferring control over the allocation and organisation of land from the chief's kgoro to Agricultural Officers and the Native Commissioners. This, not surprisingly, both undermined and alienated chiefs, councillors and household heads. Secondly, the policy of making the reserve areas economically viable, although well intentioned, was also untenable: As evictions from white-owned farms escalated, the amount of agricultural and grazing land became increasingly incapable of securing household subsistence needs. What is more, by the end of the period
under scrutiny, the Department was faced with the prospect of massive removals, making the ideals of Betterment even more impracticable.

This chapter begins by detailing changes in the composition and character of the NAD. It then describes how the NAD attempted to both bolster the chieftainship and implement Betterment policies in Bushbuckridge, as well as the contradictory effects of these processes. The chapter then concludes with a discussion on the effects of the above interventions on gender and generational relations within the Trust land.

Traditionalists and Modernisers in the NAD

The restructuring of the NAD in the twenties spawned a new class of bureaucrat. Although progeny from administrator and missionary families continued to join the NAD as a "secular mission", the increasingly centralised and technocratic character of the Department opened up employment opportunities for the "average clerk" to become Native Commissioners. These men, most of whom were English speaking and United Party supporters, received their qualifications to administer from a course on Civil Service Law run through the University of South Africa. In contrast to the "big men" of the past whose knowledge of the "native" rested on personal experience, these bureaucrats' understanding of black society was abstract and largely derived from Schapera's survey of Bantu Tribes. The new bureaucrats were more rigid, more prone to follow text-book models, and had greater faith in "scientific procedures" than their predecessors.1

As a counterweight to text-book solutions, the new bureaucratic Native Commissioners'
promotion was linked to a trouble free tour of duty in the field. This translated into a form of local administrative autonomy as Commissioners retained a relatively cautious and piecemeal approach to administration when they believed this was practicable. Commissioners maintained an ideology of sympathetic paternalism to the extent that they used what autonomy they had to minimise the disruptive effects of any policy, and, in return, expected loyalty from their "native" constituency. Relationships were personalised to the extent that Commissioners went out of their way to protect and promote chiefs they could work with effectively.²

Although ostensibly committed to strengthening the chieftainship, the NAD as a whole retained an ambivalent attitude towards the institution. Even the "liberal traditionalists",³ who argued that the policy of "retribalisation" was a crucial administrative strategy, did not consider the reconstruction of the tribe to be a principled end-goal. These people acknowledged the effects of industrialisation and migrancy as being irreversible, and believed that black society could be developed through education and appropriate "progressive" measures.

One of these "progressive measures" was the policy of restructuring the reserve economy so as to retain the agricultural viability of the Trust land. To achieve this goal, the Department opened up an agricultural office in 1929, and employed agricultural officers. The 1930 Native Economic Commission, couched in the scientific rhetoric of the day, swung the balance in favour of a policy of "developing" or "modernising" reserve areas. The Commission blamed the "tribal system" for the "primitive mentality" of the reserve population which, the Commission argued, was the root cause of the ecological problems in the reserves. The
Commission asserted that the first developmental priority was to change that "mentality" through agricultural education. Rather than basing political exclusion on the "tribal system", the report legitimatised the divided state on the basis of the underdeveloped state of the native mind. Segregation was thus necessary while the native mind was being "developed". At a less abstract level the Commission argued that unless the reserves could be salvaged, the state could not legitimately maintain that the "native" population had a viable alternative space in which they could exercise citizenship. The report went on to define a new conception of segregation based on a class of "specialised land workers", "casual" migrant workers and permanent town-dwellers.

The Economic Commission ultimately spawned the legislation of Betterment policies in 1936, and the growth of a faction of modernisers in the NAD. Betterment policies included soil conservation measures and the demarcation of land into residential, agricultural and grazing areas. The modernisers, the driving force behind "Betterment" policies, wanted to transform pre-colonial households into economically efficient and productive units. Modernisers, who emphasised the adoption of technical solutions to settlement problems, were doubtful that the chieftainship could be transformed into an effective administrative structure. The first modernisers were British Agricultural Officers, who had received their professional training in British Universities. These officials drew on scientific forestry, botany, agronomy and conservationist theories from Europe and the United States.

The administration of Bushbuckridge oscillated between liberal traditionalists and modernisers over the next twenty five years as Commissioners from each faction were appointed. By 1960, (compromised) elements of both approaches were implemented. The following sections
of this chapter describe both how different administrators tried to reconstruct the chieftainship and transform household production within the district, as well as the (often contradictory) effects of these policies.

The situation inherited by the SANT in Bushbuckridge

In the latter half of the nineteen thirties, there were about fifty thousand rent paying "squatters" in the Released Area of whom about fifteen thousand were settled on Trust Land and thirty five thousand on privately owned farms. A further ten thousand rent paying families were living on private farms outside the RA, most of whom had at least one member working full time for the mines. Commissioners were wary of trying to enforce labour tenancy relations, arguing that any attempt to transform rent tenancy conditions would result in a mass exodus. There were about one thousand labour tenant families in the district.7 Labour tenants outside of the Released Area, and residents within the Released Area threatened with the implementation of labour tenancy made repeated requests to the NAD to purchase the farms or provide them with accommodation on Trust Land.8

In 1936, only sixteen farms in the Released Area were owned by the SANT, which limited the possibilities of a systematic restructuring of the district by the Trust. The purchase of farms was understood by bureaucrats as both a means of establishing control and building legitimacy amongst their "constituency":

"The non-provision of adequate land is reacting unfavourably on the administration of the area. There is a spirit of dissatisfaction and discontent abroad among the Natives. Meetings of the NC and others are marked by turbulence and distrust. No effort is being made to cooperate in schemes for development. There has never been the same contact between the administration and the Natives in this area, as has grown up in other districts because no land has ever been made available for Native
Although the above sentiments were well intentioned, they were also naive. It was true that, publically at least, the "natives" supported the idea of Trust land (particularly when the alternative was private white-owned farms). However, the difference between the Native Commissioner's perception of Trust land, and those of the "Natives", was that the vast majority of the latter saw the Trust as a haven from the Native Commissioner's idea of "development". The following extract is taken from a letter signed by nine chiefs in Bushbuckridge:

"We beg also to remind you that the Government has set aside a place for wild animals, known as the game reserve, where these animals live unmolested. We pray you that we too may be granted such an area where we may live likewise, in peace."10

The chiefs' prayers were, alas, in vain. Although farms were only purchased sporadically over the next twenty five years, this did not prevent bureaucrats from enthusiastically designing elaborate "development" plans that embraced the district as a whole, and then implementing the plans on a piece meal basis as the Trust purchased more farms. The first of these plans involved the creation of "tribal areas".

Building the Chieftainship: The Creation of "Tribal" Areas

In the words of a former colleague, Native Commissioner T.D. Ramsay had "style"; he spoke with an impeccable British accent, was an immaculate dresser and, was a uncompromising intellectual. An amateur anthropologist with a keen interest in "Tsonga" culture, Ramsay published a book and journal article on "Tsonga" law in the Transvaal in the early 1940s.11 In 1940 Ramsay led a committee that produced the first comprehensive Location Reclamation
Survey in Bushbuckridge. The report was written a year after 10 000 head of cattle in the
district and 7,800 head of cattle on Trust land were lost to foot and mouth disease.
Consequently, over the following years, ploughing had to be performed by hand.12

Drawing on the anthropology of the day, Ramsay understood a "tribal unit" as being a chief
who ruled over a specific geographical area, and had a ethnically homogeneous following.
The report was based on a systematic and comprehensive survey of the distribution of ethnic
groups and the different chief's followings on farms throughout the Released Area. In the
report, Ramsay set about outlining a strategy of retribalisation as a prelude to effectively
bureaucratising the chieftainship. By 1940, according to the survey, "tribalism [as
understood by the committee] had absolutely broken down and nothing had been
substituted."13 The committee noted that there were thirty three chiefs and sub chiefs, the
distinction between the two levels of leadership being very vague. Residents, according to the
report, recognised the leader nearest to their place of residence, regardless of the ethnic
identity of that leader. Should one leader move, then residents would take their cases to the
next most proximate leader. The Committee argued that "the people would welcome tribal
cohesion" and "tribal areas", a situation the Committee hoped to bring about.14

This cohesion was to be achieved through the creation of eight tribal areas, one for each
ethnic group resident in the district. One chief would be recognised per group and all
"independent entities" of each "tribe" would be absorbed into the single chieftainship.
"Minor" chiefs and indunas would be given areas of jurisdiction as indunas under the
(recognised) "tribal chief". Future settlers would be settled into their relevant "tribal" area.
This plan, according to the report, was in accordance with "tribal custom".15
Despite an extraordinary quantity of evidence to the contrary, the committee remained convinced that the degree of ethnic mixing was not significant, due to the presence of Malaria on the Lowveld. The "Sothos", the report argued, were "accustomed" to living on the middleveld and would invariably die of malaria if they were resettled in the Lowveld. Hence, the foothills of the Drakensberg was the natural "Sotho sphere of influence" while the Lowveld was allocated to the "Shangaan sphere of influence".

The report limited infrastructural changes to the provision of roads and water. The report was emphatic that there was "no erosion, no overpopulation and no overstocking" in the district. Three years later, this assessment would be thrown into question by the next survey.

Ramsay's plans sparked off an intense debate with the Chief Native Commissioner in Pietersburg, which reflected different approaches within the Department towards chiefly recognition and ethnicity. The Chief Native Commissioner was more experienced and pragmatic than Ramsay, and tended to be less abstract in his definition of tribe. The Chief Commissioner pointed to the contradictions in the report between a reality of ethnic mixing and a theory of primordial ethnic exclusiveness. He argued that it was doubtful that unrecognised chiefs with a history of independence would be agreeable to relinquishing or subordinating their chieftainships in the name of tribal cohesion. Rather, he argued the present households of chiefs should be used as "the nucleus of the location to be allotted to the following".

Ramsay responded by arguing, with characteristic aplomb, that recognition of existing chiefs
would entail the "establishment of approximately 33 tribal areas under petty chiefs and the eventual loss of the identity of the tribes." He reiterated that unrecognised chiefs could become headmen placed in charge of areas under the jurisdiction of "tribal" chiefs. Ethnic mixing, Ramsay continued, was due to the enforced removal of Pulanas to the Lowveld, most of whom, he believed, had already died from malaria.

Ramsay got his way. In December 1940 Ramsay's report was approved by the Department as the blueprint for future settlement. However, only four chiefs who had a history of recognition by the state, and who were resident on Trust land, were recognised and given a "tribal area" in terms of the scheme. They were Mathibela of the Khutswe, Tulamahashe of the Shangaan chieftainship and Koza and Mnisi of the Nhlanganu. The civil jurisdiction of Mnisi and Tulamahashe was changed from "personnel jurisdiction" over all of their followers in the district to anyone falling in their "tribal" areas. No Pulana chiefs were resident on Trust land and hence were not given recognition.

The definition of a specific area as belonging to a particular "tribal chief" did not result in the mass movement of residents towards their respective "tribal areas". As far as the Commissioner was concerned most residents accepted the control of the chiefs placed over the areas in which they already lived. Those who did not accept the chief, who, the Commissioner noted, were few in number, moved to the areas designated for their "own particular tribes". There was, according to the NC "a general concurrence with the idea of unravelling the past mixture of tribal members." State records, specifically tax cards, were automatically altered to reflect residents' allegiance to the chief under whose area of jurisdiction they fell. This was later to become crucial in establishing a bureaucratic reality
where a chief had majority support on the basis of allegiance reflected in tax cards. There
was, of course, a third option open to residents. That was to remain where they were, and
not to recognise the chiefs who had been given formal recognition by the government, which
was the preferred option of a significant number of residents.21

The Logic of Tribe gives way to the Logic of Betterment

In 1934, the NC attempted to use recognised chiefs to control settlement on Crown land.
Chiefs resident on Crown lands were supposed to take charge of the distribution of arable
land in order to prevent indiscriminate ploughing.22 After the creation of the SANT, the
Commissioner gave certain chiefs the responsibility of preventing settlement on newly
acquired ground until demarcation could take place. These attempts to use the chiefs as
administrators were a failure. One chief, despite agreeing to prevent settlement, "imported
his followers until the farm [in the eyes of the Commissioner] was heavily over-populated and
overstocked."23

In 1943, Ramsay was transferred, and the new Commissioner, an avid moderniser, was keen
to start implementing Betterment policies. He selected two farms, Islington and Clare, which
had been purchased by the Trust in 1938, on which to implement the policy of demarcation.
According to the Commissioner's plan, families would be allocated three morgan plots and
could own a maximum of twelve head of cattle. The scheme met with immediate resistance
from all the chiefs, who wrote a combined letter to the NAD, requesting for more land, (as
residents were "growers and producers of 10 different crops") and for the removal of
limitations on cattle ownership. A comparison was made with the wild game that was able
to roam freely eating precious grass, while a limitation was imposed on cattle "whereas the District is proclaimed a Native Area."  

After a rowdy meeting between the chiefs, indunas and Douglas Smit, the secretary for Native Affairs, the demarcation scheme was suspended by Smit until after the war when, Smit believed, the Department would have resources to purchase more farms. These farms would enable the Department to allocate bigger plots and so meet the aspirations put forward by residents at the meeting. A die-hard paternalist, Smit made the following addendum in a letter to the NC at Bushbuckridge:

"The point is that from a scientific point of view the decision to proceed with the reallocation of land was correct - but the time is not opportune and we want to proceed by way of propaganda for some time first - and then take action when we have acquired more land."  

The only farm where demarcation took place immediately was Cork, which was uninhabited, a state in which it remained as residents boycotted the farm.  

Resistance to demarcation was not confined to the size of the plots: This is clearly illustrated in an exchange between the NC and the chiefs at a special meeting to discuss the issue:

Chief John Koza: Our soil is not favourable for crops and the allotments are too small. We also resist being stopped from ploughing near the river. The scheme is not in conformity with native custom.

Asked what extent the speaker would advocate: I don't talk in terms of morgen, but from what you say I would suggest 18 morgen.

Asked whether the people would be satisfied with 18 morgen allotments: No! The people do not wish to be given lands at all. They want to plough as they like.  

The logic of Betterment and demarcation did not receive universal condemnation by residents. A small mission educated elite were able to use Betterment to their own advantage as modernisers, on principle, did what they could to assist "progressive" farmers. However, for
the vast majority of people, an entire lifestyle based on chiefly and the homestead head's control over the allocation of land and stock was being undermined.

Resistance to demarcation was an attempt to retain economic and political autonomy from bureaucratic controls. Betterment meant that the control over the right to settle and over the allocation of land was transferred from the chiefs and the homestead heads to the agricultural officers. Furthermore, bureaucrats were not only concerned with establishing an environmentally viable productive system, but aimed to create bureaucratically manageable household units. This ultimately meant that households would all be allowed access to the same quantity of resources. The problem was that levels of wealth varied considerably between homesteads, particularly in relation to stock holdings. Betterment meant that the existing strategies of accumulating wealth through stock, marital transactions, and agriculture were nullified.

Prior to Betterment, homestead income was determined by a combination of migrant remittances and agricultural production. The use of land by homesteads was determined by the amount of labour available, access to migrancy networks, and the relative dependence on agricultural production. Access to land was a subject of negotiation between sons, homestead heads, lineage heads, headmen and chiefs. In the last instance, households could move to have access to more, or better land. Demarcation removed the flexibility that characterised previous settlement patterns and placed the control of resources beyond the negotiating power of residents.

Residents were challenging the logic of a system that divided space in such a way that
individual preferences were ignored and the control of the homestead head and chief was bypassed. In place of a political imaginary within which the chief and homestead head had the role of preserving rights to land passed down to them by their ancestors (to whom the land ultimately belonged), the imaginary of Betterment destroyed history. Demarcation constituted the imposition of a rigid written culture on a fluid oral culture. Residents did not have access to the grammar of the system of demarcation which determined their access to space.30

The construction of fences and beacons were part of a process of constructing a new hegemony and was perceived as such. Fences and demarcated plots were symbols of the power of the state to define households as bureaucratic units both on paper and in real space and time. Demarcation meant being constrained, controlled and monitored, as the following quote taken from an Induna suggests:

"The farm Cork is like a gaol. It is demarcated. We will have nothing to do with Cork until the demarcation lines have been rubbed out."31

The agents of Betterment, the Agricultural Officers, faced an almost uniform resentment, as demonstrated by the following account of an attempt to introduce a "malaria spotter" to a public meeting. "Induna Matumane...also complained about the agricultural officer. He stated that the Government would formulate new regulations and then have the Natives prosecuted for breach of same."32 Furthermore, the imposition of Agricultural Officers subverted the logic of generational authority, whereby age, as opposed to technocratic qualification, determined the weight with which a person spoke:

"Induna Hokwe states that the AO is a young man and that he is an old man and therefore unable to teach him."33

Not a single vote was cast in favour of the Malaria Spotter working in the district.
Agricultural Officers were perceived as a direct threat to chiefly authority. The dipping supervisors controlled stock ownership records and could only change those records on instruction from the Native Commissioner or the owner of the stock. However, when approached by a successful litigant at the chief’s court to transfer stock ownership following a chief’s judgement, the inspector refused to do so without the consent of the owner. In this way, according to an indignant headman, the Officer "constituted himself as a court of appeal over chief’s judgements ... [and] ... annuls the chief’s decision." The Commissioner, in response, commented that he could not understand how the headman could have had such a "ridiculous conception of the position".

In 1943, a systematic survey of Trust farms in the area, conducted by the recently posted moderniser, argued that eighteen of the twenty four Trust farms were overcrowded and overstocked in terms of the Betterment criteria. The Director of Agriculture, after a visit to Islington reported on the "pitiful" state of the farm. All fencing had been demolished. Agricultural lands had been extended beyond the area of the previous year and, as a result of the drought, no crops had been harvested. The farm was overstocked by 500 head of cattle, resulting in the rapid destruction of the grass and soil. In a nutshell, as far as the NC was concerned, an ecological catastrophe loomed on the horizon.

The Native Commissioner used the report to argue that the issue was "simply a question of control, full control or no control", and control to the Commissioner meant demarcation. He argued that he had insufficient field staff to effectively prevent new settlers from taking up residence on newly purchased farms, and he demanded increased powers and resources to implement demarcation. Despite the Commissioner’s passionate appeals, these resources
were denied him until the end of the war.

During the war, the Commissioner did try to intervene on the question of overstocking by preventing new cattle from being moved onto Trust farms. This resulted in an outcry as it hindered the transfer of cattle in marital transactions. Ever mindful of his role as benevolent peace-keeper, the NC responded by introducing stock sales to white farmers in order to bring down the number of surplus stock. The sales started slowly, but picked up to the extent that the NC was able, with the exception of four farms, to remove any restrictions on the movement of stock into Trust farms for the following three years.  

By the end of the war the Commissioner was anxious to bring the matter of demarcation to a head. In 1946 another attempt was made to demarcate Islington along with an adjacent farm Clare. However, despite a warning that ignoring or damaging the allotments would result in prosecution, the response of many residents was to destroy "the beacons and plough up the commonage on Islington and Clare." The benevolent father brought out the iron fist: The Commissioner immediately instituted prosecutions against alleged offenders. Agricultural Officers ploughed up any crops that had been planted on undemarcated land. Overt resistance soon ceased, and in 1947, Islington was successfully demarcated.

In 1946, new stock limitations were published and the idea of culling was suggested by the Agricultural Officer. The new limitations "were compared to a declaration of war" by numerous, "bitter" speakers at quarterly meetings between Commissioners and chiefs. In a letter of protest to the Department, signed by all the chiefs living on the Trust land, the chiefs argued that stock limitation would affect the entire "economic and social system."
Stock was used as a store of wealth, the medium through which marriage transactions took place, security for drought and old age and, most especially, a central support for generational power through control of the marriage process. The chiefs queried the presence of large quantities of game in the RA which they asserted were responsible for the destruction of crops and the over-grazing. The Department, fearing another confrontation, did not force the issue of culling because of the presence of wild game, but maintained the stock sales.45

The Bushbuckridge Local Council

In 1944, the Native Commissioner formed the Bushbuckridge Local Council (BLC). The aim in establishing the Council was to give recognised chiefs and "progressive sectors" an active role in the administration of the area, or more accurately, a role in the implementation of Betterment. The BLC consisted of government recognised chiefs and four elected members. These four members of the Council were two preachers, a multi-talented teacher / preacher / farmer / businessman and an "ordinary illiterate native peasant".46 Both chiefs who sat on the Council were "young" and educated by the teacher. The Council was boycotted by Chief Mathibela, who resisted all forms of state intervention (except when it bolstered his powers).

The Commissioner had a second agenda when he formed the Council. Disturbed by the "complaints" against "administrative measures" (i.e. demarcation) and against his person (which would be to the detriment of his prospects for promotion), the Commissioner formed the Council system so that:

"all these complaints would first be sifted by a representative body and modified, and when they eventually emerge they would have shape and an organised body."47
With the Council's consent, if not approval, the Commissioner attempted to restrict the ploughing of river beds and the cutting of trees. These restrictions were deemed necessary to prevent soil erosion and maintain water supplies. Six new "rangers" were employed to police the restrictions. A year after the restriction on ploughing was imposed, 130 people had been arrested and convicted, the majority being women. The restriction on the cutting of trees resulted in a shortage of hut building material and an inability to build fences to protect crops from game.

The Commissioner requested the Council to comment on the possibility of destroying crops planted on river beds. The response of the Shangaan regent, Kheto Nxumalo, demonstrates a logic that identified the authority of the chieftainship with the authority of the state.

"The disobedience of the people is the cause of most of our troubles and the weakening of our Chief's powers, our people must be taught to obey and respect law and authority..."

However, in colluding with the state the Councillors faced the risk of isolating themselves and losing any legitimacy. Identifying with the state cut both ways:

"If the crops are destroyed there will be real resentment of the NC, the AOs and the Council...They will say that the NC not only arrests us and fines us but also takes our food away from us."

For once, the Commissioner put pragmatism before principle: The crops were not destroyed.

The Council attempted to halt the implementation of certain Betterment policies or ease the hardships that these policies would create. These interventions included requests that restrictions on cattle movements in the Trust be lifted, and that the Trust provide wood for hut building as the cutting of trees was illegal. These requests were granted provided they did not contradict the basic assumptions underlying Betterment policies. When the Council
requested the lifting of the restrictions on the cutting of trees in order to build fences to protect arable lands from game the NC refused to cooperate until the area had been demarcated. The "sympathetic" father had reached his limits:

"Had you accepted the demarcation scheme two years ago, I would have been able to make provision for the protection of your lands...You may be cultivating a patch which the Department really does not wish you to cultivate at all; so why should the Department worry about game damage?" 54

Thus, while the Commissioner could not understand why the vast majority of residents refused to cooperate with the implementation of Betterment policies, he could not conceive of approving suggestions which did not conform to his terms of reference.

Ultimately, the Council was reduced to granting business licences and allocating its limited funds to the building of schools, hospitals and other "development" projects, albeit under the watchful eye of the Commissioner.

The Effects of Betterment on Recognised and Unrecognised Chiefs

The policy of recognising only four chiefs in the area was becoming increasingly impracticable. Unrecognised chiefs did not accept their loss of status. Reports reached the NC about the unrecognised chiefs challenging the authority of the recognised chiefs. 55 These disputes centred around the right to hold court, the reversal of judgements made in unrecognised chiefly courts, and the right to hold initiation school. In response, the Commissioner tried to enforce the distinctions between a headman and chief and a recognised and unrecognised chief. This was demonstrated in the case of a "self styled headman" Sineas Mnisi, "who tries cases among people on adjoining private farms and who levies execution against the judgement debtors without any authority, even exercises force against them." 56
The NC pointed out that there are many of these "self-styled dignitaries up to the same mischief". After the NC intervened in the case, Sineas Mnisi and his "henchmen" were punished, their "gang liquidated" and they left the area.

However, by 1945, the Commissioner acknowledged that the position was untenable. "There seems to be little difference between most of these unrecognised chiefs and those who have from time to time been accorded recognition." The Commissioner argued that there was confusion within the NAD as regards the existing laws regulating the recognition of chiefs. He argued that those chiefs who had become "ex-chiefs" with the passing of the Native Administration Act should not have lost their recognition under Law 4 of 1885. He argued for the immediate granting of civil jurisdiction to those chiefs previously recognised, with the exception of Matches Kumalo, who the NC believed was not significant enough.

The Commissioner found a staunch ally in head office in the person of van Warmelo, the government ethnologist. Van Warmelo argued that there was no coherent policy as to why some chiefs are recognised and others are not. Recognising the chieftainships in question would only be a "belated recognition of the facts." To undermine the chieftainship would be playing with fire:

"I can only urge the Department to make use of the only authority in existence amongst the natives. It is easy to destroy it, but what do we put in its place? To hope that our few officials, "birds of passage" as they have been called, cut off from the people by barriers of language and social status, can take the place of the native aristocracy, is to me the complete utopia. Once natives become an amorphic mass, who will control them? It is hard enough in towns, but in miles and miles of country it is impossible unless through some force amongst themselves."60

Numerous reports about the deleterious effects of Betterment on the chieftainship in a
number of areas of the Transvaal reached the NAD in Pretoria. A powerful lobby of "traditionalists" emerged within the NAD emphasising the need to coopt the chieftainship if cooperation with communities in the implementation of policies was to be achieved. The thrust of this argument was presented by van Warmelo, the state ethnologist, to the Chief Native Commissioner's Conference in 1945.

The one thing they [the chiefs of the Transvaal] have seen very clearly is that on Trust Land, chiefs and all they stand for, have been relegated to a position of minor importance. The inference obviously is that, for them, the Trust and all its works are not a good thing……How are we ever going to make headway in the reserves whilst the chiefs and headmen feel that Trust control would be the end for them? How can they agree willingly to control? No man will saw off the branch he is sitting on.61

Van Warmelo emphasised the need for the NAD to give chiefs material advantages to win their cooperation. He argued that it should be made as clear as possible "that we favour the good boys and frown on the bad boys."62 The philosophy underlying his approach was that "a drop of honey attracts more flies than a barrel of vinegar."63 Despite these arguments, which must have had an effect on the attitudes of Native Commissioners on the ground, the Head Office of the NAD failed to take decisive action on redefining the powers associated with chiefly recognition.

Back in Bushbuckridge, in 1946, Commissioner Bourquin, a traditionalist from a Swiss Mission family, drew up a detailed report on the issue or the recognition of chiefs. The report gave the chief who had the largest following on a particular farm jurisdiction over that farm. In this way it was hoped that all significant chiefs would be recognised. The logic of allocating chiefs a specific area of jurisdiction was retained as an administrative necessity.64 The report argued that chiefs should be paid a salary so that the administration could demand a stronger sense of accountability from the traditional rulers. Furthermore, the report retained the assumption that residents would move to live under a specific chief or pay allegiance,
nkonza, to the chief in whose area they were allocated. The report referred to the previously altered state records to demonstrate that this argument was correct:

"The outstanding fact to be noted is the large increase in the number of their [previously recognised chiefs'] followers which clearly indicate the readiness of members of other tribes to nkonza to the chiefs placed in power over them."

It was impossible for the NAD to give all the chiefs recognised in the report definite areas of jurisdiction as the Trust only owned small fragmented sections of the Released Area and a number of chiefs were based outside the Released Area. The contradiction remained between an indigenous political culture that denied chiefs definite areas of jurisdiction, and asserted flexibility in the recognition of chiefs, and a rigid policy of chiefly recognition dictated by administrative centralisation. Although the report was finally not adopted by head-office, the acting Commissioners did give the chiefs recognised in the report the right to hold court and continued to consult them through quarterly meetings.

Despite the debates around recognising more chiefs, the powers that recognition gave chiefs were extremely circumscribed. Government recognition limited chiefly authority to the right to judge civil cases. Residents dissatisfied with chiefly judgements could appeal to the Commissioner's Court. Furthermore, even though specific chiefs were given recognition over privately owned land that fell in the Released Area, in practice this recognition was unenforceable, giving residents the ability to choose the chief of their preference to adjudicate their cases.

Being recognised also had drawbacks in so far as Commissioner made recognition conditional upon the chiefs shunning witchcraft related cases. Although Native Commissioners allowed chiefs considerable leeway on cases relating to "native law and custom", and often affirmed
chiefly judgements even when they clashed with a strict reading of state law, their flexibility reached its limits on matters relating to witchcraft. According to indigenous ideology, chiefs, as the living representative of the most powerful lineage, had the role of using their spiritual powers to protect their subjects from witchcraft. Demonstrations of such powers were crucial in earning the respect of subjects. Recognised chiefs were caught in a double bind on the issue: On the one hand, if they did not adjudicate on cases involving witchcraft accusations, they risked losing legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects and being politically sidelined by competing chiefs. On the other hand, Commissioners threatened to withdraw recognition if chiefs were caught involving themselves in such cases. Ultimately, however, despite Commissioners consistently threatening to "deprive" chiefs of their powers to try civil cases, these threats were never carried out and most chiefs continued to adjudicate on witchcraft related cases. Councillors, for their part, responded to the restrictions by interpreting the policy as a deliberate attempt to undermine the fabric of rural society: the "Government" was accused of "suppressing witchcraft so that rainmakers can't be employed when the rains stay away."

The only other power recognition gave chiefs was the right to assist the government in administering the area when called upon to do so. In practice, this meant assisting the government with the implementation of Betterment. The problem was that Betterment destroyed the political and economic autonomy of settlements on Trust land, and in doing so, subverted chiefly power.

Contradictions between Betterment Policies and Land Shortages
By the late forties a contradiction surfaced between the principle of agricultural and ecological viability (which required a limitation on the numbers of "settlers" and stock on Trust Land) and the role of the Trust as a shelter for evicted tenants. Trust farms were filled to their capacity (as defined by the Betterment plan). Evicted tenants were no longer given access to Trust land and were forced to find accommodation elsewhere. Farms outside the Trust were getting progressively more crowded as people left the Trust farms to avoid Betterment, as there was increased forestation, and as labour tenancy became more entrenched.

The population on the TGME estates, as well as other company owned land outside the Released Area, more than doubled between 1936 and 1960. The increase in population was a result of the permanent settlement on TGME farms by workers from Mozambique, an inflow of people escaping Betterment controls on Trust land, and an influx of farm "evicted" farm labour tenants. The amount of ploughing land available to each family was progressively reduced and greater limitations were placed on stock ownership. By 1960, conditions on the TGME estates were similar to those on the Trust land; each tenant only had access to one morgan of agricultural land.

In 1945, the Forestry Department began to establish the Welgevonden Forestry Reserve. This entailed the eviction of some 900 rent tenants, including a Pulana Chief. The Forestry Department tried to evict 182 of the "worst" rent defaulters (who were also "guilty of ploughing and grazing in prohibited areas"). However, because there was no land on which the evicted people could be settled, the trekpasses were "completely ignored" by tenants. During the next year, thirty families were settled on private farms in the Released Area under
terms of rent tenancy, while the chief and a number of followers were settled on Ramanas, a neighbouring labour tenancy farm. In 1946 the Forestry Department established a location where the rent tenants were settled with one acre of ploughing land and the rights to graze three stock.71

By the late fifties the number of registered labour tenants in the district had increased to 1500, an increase of 50% from 1939.72 However, in the same period, many families were forced off the farms. Between 1947 and 1960 the rate of mechanisation in Pilgrims Rest and surrounding districts increased dramatically.73 This changed the balance of power between farmers and labour and rent tenants which made many tenant families redundant. Labour tenant contracts were changing. Household heads were finding it progressively more difficult to control their sons, particularly as more employment opportunities opened up in the cities. Household heads began to serve the three month and then four month period of labour tenancy and migrate on contract for the remainder of the year. As access to Trust Land and Company farms decreased, conditions of labour tenancy became harsher. The period of labour requirements increased to four (and sometimes six) months and labour was demanded of more members of the household. Greater limitations were placed on stock and the amount of agricultural land available to these tenants decreased.74

The Commissioner initially tried to solve the problem of evicted tenants by referring them to Company owned land as there was little demand for labour tenants in the district.75 However, despite controls on movement, families often moved onto the Trust land to settle with relatives without the immediate knowledge of the NC. Furthermore, as the Trust purchased more land, the NC discovered that evicted tenants had often settled on farms with
neither his or the owner’s permission. Although the Commissioner chose to evict "illegal" tenants, they just settled without permission elsewhere, thus exacerbating the problem of administrative control. In 1948, when the Trust purchased eight company farms on the foothills of the Drakensberg which had been described in 1937 as "eroded, overpopulated and overstocked", the Commissioner had no choice but to find a way of settling more people onto less land.

A New Approach to the Problem of Overcrowding

In 1948, the modernisers produced the second major Location Reclamation Report which attempted to break the impasse. The crux of the report was that if the Trust lands were to be at all viable for future settlement, this could only be achieved through scientific development. Settlement would now be organised along both tribal lines and in terms of the natural resources on the land, such as soil types, grazing capacity, and rainfall. The bottom line was that every settler in agriculturally viable zones should be entitled to one morgan of arable land.

The logic of households as uniform bureaucratic units was, however, tempered by an ideology of "progressiveness". The modernisers, concerned to see an optimum utilisation of land, were keen to make access to land conditional upon efficient use, rather than an unconditional right: If a settler proved to be a successful farmer then this allotment could be increased. Likewise, agricultural land which was not productively employed should be taken away and reallocated. Records should be maintained of the crop grown, the fertiliser and manure applied, whether the land was properly cultivated and the crop yield.
The report marked a decisive break with the strategy of purchasing more land to respond to increased settlement. The only solution a previous traditionalist committee could offer was to "transfer" some 3,000 "Shangaan" families from Bushbuckridge to neighbouring Letaba. The modernisers argued that the need for removals was based on an assumption of "extremely low productivity" and rejected the removal as unnecessary as it was possible for all "to make a decent living from the land" provided production was reorganised.80

The chieftainship was not mentioned in the report. The tension between the incorporation of the chieftainship as a reliable administrative entity and the desire by the modernising Native Commissioners to maintain direct and technocratic control over the reserves sharpened.

The recommendation of the report were accepted and implemented. Between 1951 and 1953, according to Deparmental records, all of the existing Trust lands had been demarcated into half morgan residential sites, one morgan agricultural plots and cattle wards of various sizes.81

However, by the early fifties the Trust land was again filled to capacity, and any farms purchased by the Trust were already so overpopulated and overstocked that, rather than providing new accommodation for evicted tenants, they aggravated the overall position of the Trust.82 When a portion of Cottondale was bought in 1953, accommodation had to be found for 205 surplus families, and 687 surplus stock needed to be sold. The only way to solve this problem was to allocate even smaller plots of arable land to each household. This was achieved through the introduction of village settlements. The first settlement to be
planned and established was at Zoeknog. Residents were allocated one sixteenth of a morgan of irrigated land "for the cultivation of vegetables". Residents were not be allowed to keep stock.\textsuperscript{83} Further rural villages were established at Champagne and Ludlow.

By the early fifties, the Commissioner was forced to take a harder line on the culling of stock. Residents were given the chance to sell their stock at sales. If this channel failed, then the Trust went ahead with the culling with or without the cooperation of the owner.\textsuperscript{84} Evicted labour tenants were forbidden to bring their stock onto the Trust land. By mid 1953 there were 3 330 families without any stock on the Trust, although all households still had access to some agricultural land.

**Opposition to Labour Tenancy in the Released Area**

As conditions became harsher outside the Released Area, residents on private farms within the Released Area fought bitter struggles against the implementation of labour tenancy. On six farms owned by a private farming company based in Nelspruit, Hall and Sons, residents had been opposing the conditions of rent tenancy since the mid forties. Tenants opposed the Company's attempts to restrict the sale of their cattle to the Company, to confiscate manure from cattle kraals and to force young boys to work at the Company's citrus estates in Nelspruit.\textsuperscript{85} In 1957 Hall and Sons attempted to impose labour tenancy conditions whereby "all farm tenants have to give four months free labour together with their wives and children."\textsuperscript{86} Residents fought to maintain their ability to migrate to urban employment and refused to accept conditions "which bound men together with their wives and children."\textsuperscript{87} Hall and Sons burnt down the houses of the Induna and six leaders during the course of the struggle. The tenants found an unlikely ally in their struggle in the person of Nic Roberts,
a member of the labour tenancy control board and a neighbouring farmer who received
seasonal labour from the affected farms. Roberts assisted by writing letters in his official
capacity to the NAD, and by employing lawyers. A young "headman", Matsiketsane Mashile,
rose to prominence in these struggles and contacted the African National Congress, who
assisted with lawyers. Hall and Sons were clear as to the root cause of the resistance:

"The main reason we feel for the uncooperative spirit of the Company's Selati Natives
is that they realise that the farms are in the Native Released Area. They want to do
exactly as they please."88

After requests to have four of the farms placed outside of the Released Area were refused by
the NAD, Hall and Sons gave up their attempts to impose labour tenant relationships on the
farms.89 Similar, but less bitter and intense, disputes occurred on Dwarsloop and
Orinoco.90 Residents were determined to maintain the distinct status of the Released Area
and prevent the entrenchment of white farming interests.

These "islands" of privately owned farms prevented a uniform application of state policies in
the district. These farms were havens from state controls and attracted a diverse group of
households. The farms were ethnically mixed, the residents on the farms paid allegiance to
the chief of their choice, more agricultural land was available for use and there were fewer
restrictions on cattle. However, over time, the number of these farms steadily decreased as
the Trust purchased more land in the Released Area.

Changes in Head Office and the End of the Moderniser's Dream

In 1948 the National Party came to power. Hendrick Verwoerd took control of the NAD, and
immediately purged the head office of its relatively liberal, United party supporting, English
speaking leadership and replacing them with Apartheid ideologues. These ideologues came from diverse backgrounds ranging from academic posts in Afrikaner universities to the prison services. Verwoerd created posts for hand picked research officers, who reported directly to him and were responsible for providing the scientific input of relevance to the implementation of Apartheid. Although the National Party accepted the reality of "detribalisation" in the first half of the fifties, by the latter part of the decade, the overall vision of Apartheid was to separate the different races and cultures into discrete socio-economic communities. The pragmatic piece-meal, often tentative, approach to administration that characterised the NAD prior to 1948 was replaced by an unapologetically interventionist state. The Apartheid ideologues drew on a notion of scientific administration that went beyond the strategy of employing expert policy makers. Scientific management theories were displaced from the realm of economic production and adopted as the guiding principles governing the role and functioning of the state. The state became the scientific (and highly interventionist) manager of social process.

The ideologues of Apartheid, or "conservative traditionalists", had a particular understanding of the constitution of society in general, and black society in particular. Drawing on christian nationalist theology, the ideologues believed that differences in culture and nation were divinely ordained and insurmountable. Although an individual was capable of transcending cultural boundaries, this phenomenon would go against the individuals "divinely ordained place in the bosom of 'their' people". The role of the state was to recognise these differences and create the conditions under which each discrete culture could advance as a whole to statehood, without losing its (intrinsic) identity. Although cloaked in cultural and religious rhetoric, conservative traditionalists were racist: assimilation was an impossibility.
as black people were biologically incapable of adapting to white culture.  

African society was understood to be composed of discrete "tribes", consisting of a chief, a homogenous ethnic group and a area of land. The chieftainship was understood to be an absolute monarchy, representing the fusion of political structure and culture. In the conservative traditionalist's scheme it was the principled role of the state to recognise these cultures and reconstruct the "tribe" in all its manifestations. In 1951, legislation covering the establishment of Tribal Authorities was passed. Under the ambit of Tribal Authorities, chiefs would be both administrators and political representatives of their subjects.

The new regime had two priorities; The first was the massive settlement of african families on trust land. The economic viability of the rural african household was no longer a major Departmental consideration. The second priority was the establishment of "tribal rule", as both a strategy of control and a principle of political representation, through the institution of Tribal Authorities.

Back in Bushbuckridge, Modernisers were frantically looking for ways of placing a rapidly increasing Trust population so as to provide each household with a viable subsistence base. By 1957, there were 3 081 families on the Trust with land and stock, 204 families with stock but no land, 3 072 families with land but no stock and 2518 families with neither land nor stock. In early 1957, the Modernisers, drawing on policies advocated by the Tomlinson Commission in 1954, produced a report that organised settlement on an "economic unit" basis. An "economic unit" was supposed to provide households with enough resources to remain economically self-sufficient and attached to the land. To achieve this goal, the
The modernisers divided the district into zones according to technocratic criteria such as soil type, rainfall level, type of vegetation etc. Residents of zone one, the most westerly area of the district, were to become full time tomato farmers. Each "settler" was to be allocated 1,5 morgan on which to build a home and cultivate fruit crops. For the scheme to succeed, the report advocated that it was "essential that a family should live on their fruit farm in order that all members of the family" could "share at all times in tending the crops." Ownership of stock was to be abolished as grazing lands would take up too much land, the movement of stock would damage the fruit crops and it would mean residential areas would be located away from agricultural plots so the "people would then be living too far away from their plots to devote the necessary regular attention to the fruit crops." 

The report fitted chief's areas into the "scientifically" defined zones. The core of a chief's area was determined by the area most densely populated by the chief's followers. The "stragglers", or people resident outside of the newly defined chief's areas, were supposed to either be prepared to move or change their allegiance to the chief in whose area they had "elected to remain." 

The report effectively marginalised the chieftainship. According to the report, the allocation of land was to remain firmly in the hands of the Commissioners "in consultation with the chief of the area concerned." The only duty the report gave the chieftainship (in the form of the not yet constituted Tribal Authorities) was the particularly unpopular job of managing stock reduction. After the agricultural staff had decided how much stock need to
be disposed of, the Tribal Authority would be informed of the required number, and would
have the responsibility of ensuring that the stock were removed.

Verwoerd rejected the 1957 report. The organisation of the area into grazing wards,
agricultural and residential areas was to remain. The available economic units were to be
divided into full economic units, half and third units. These were to be allocated to residents
who already had land. The Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme, designed to provide resources to
a class of full-time farmers, was given the go-ahead. The remaining families were to be
settled in village settlements without access to agricultural land. Two townships, one in the
Sotho sphere of influence and one in the Shangaan sphere of influence, were to be established
for professionals. For the first time in Bushbuckridge, state policy accepted that there would
be a permanent class of landless and stockless residents on the Trust land.

Even modernisers realised that the need to effectively coopt the chieftainship onto state
structures was becoming more acute as unrecognised chiefs on private farms in and outside
of the RA were building a constituency by opposing the implementation of Betterment.105
Some of the chiefs that were recognised in the 1946 report, were either resisting
Departmental or Company authority, or losing credibility as they were marginalised by the
Forestry Department and the T.G.M.E.106 The head office of the NAD also demanded that
a revised report include more substantial duties for the soon-to-be-implemented Tribal
Authorities.

In 1957, the NAD attempted to reimplement Chapter 4 with the hope of abolishing rent
tenancy and controlling the distribution of labour tenants between rich and poor farmers.107
In Bushbuckridge this meant the removal of some 5 000 families living under a mixture of rent and labour tenancy conditions on Company owned ground outside the Released Area. This figure excludes labour tenants on private farms. Before these removals could take place, the state needed to establish Bantu Authorities (which entailed giving the chiefs definite areas of jurisdiction), purchase more farms within the Released Area, plan these farms and then remove the families. The implementation of these policies will be described in the following chapter.

State intervention in this period had significant effects on patterns of migrancy and household relationships. The following section investigates these dynamics.

**Migrancy, Betterment and Household Relationships**

Migrant labour became more entrenched between 1936 and 1962. By 1947, mines and industries in the district employed a total of 7 668 people. The Native Recruiting Corporation recruited 5 700 people who worked in the mines on the PWV. These workers returned about 27,000 pounds in remittances and deferred pay in 1947. Settled households on Company land, which managed to retain a significant resource base, continued to migrate as a means of paying brideswealth, improving their residences and building a capital base. However, less fortunate households were seeking migrant employment for different reasons. Those households facing continuous tenant and Betterment removals, whose lands were decreased in size and who were unable to retain their stock, depended on migrant remittances for their survival.
As they lost the resources required for an adequate livelihood, residents left the area to live permanently in the cities. Between 1946 and 1951 the number of people in the district as a whole decreased from one hundred thousand to eighty seven thousand people, pointing to a permanent migration of people from the district to the Witwatersrand. Compounds, squatter camps, hostels, and the increase in formal housing created accommodation possibilities for both men and women in the PWV during the forties and fifties. Job opportunities for both genders also increased. There were broadly three categories of people who left the area: migrants who deserted their households, migrants who brought their wives and other family members to the cities, and neglected women who left the area to take their chances in the cities.

There were a number of reasons for women leaving the area, most of which centred around struggles within the household. Some women "ran away" when they were forced into marriages to which they did not consent, particularly when the husband was an "older man" with many wives. However, it was more common for women to leave the area because of neglect by their husbands, or their husbands' families.

Control over marriage was crucial to the elders' ability to control both young men and women. Women did not have any legal status and were considered minors who were not allowed to own property. Men had the right to beat their wives should their authority be questioned. Marriage, during this period, can best be conceptualised as a transaction between families. Lobola (brideswealth) was an exchange, between families, of cattle for control over a woman's labour and reproductive capacity. Control over women's economic opportunities was linked to control over their sexuality and vice versa. A married woman
would live within the extended homestead of her husband's father. The husband, father-in-law and mother in law had effective supervisory control over the daughter-in-law's labour. Although Lebola was supposed to guarantee the wife certain rights, in practice the lot of a daughter-in-law was an unenviable one. For example, the daughter-in-law did not have the right to speak to her parents-in-law without their permission. This permission was only granted on presentation of a gift.  

An effect of the further entrenchment of migrancy was, in the absence of the migrant father, the transfer of control of household resources from men to women. In the case of an extended household this meant that the wife (partly) assumed the authority of her absent husband. In the case of desertions, women had complete authority over households. By 1959, approximately sixteen percent of the households in the area were headed by women.  

The maintenance of the extended family homestead depended on the elders' ability to control migrant remittances, access to lebola and land, as well control over the labour of women who had married into the family. During this period, struggles raged over these issues.  

Tensions between migrants' wives and parents were particularly acute over the issue of migrant remittances. Migrants would send their wages to their fathers, or in the absence of a father, to their mothers. However, there was no clear rule concerning the access of a migrant's wife to this money, particularly when the wife was living in an extended household. While remittances were not necessary for survival while there was excess land and good rains, they were crucial for survival when land became scarce and during times of drought. When a migrant deserted the area, or the migrant's parents were on bad terms with the wife,
the wife would often suffer severe neglect. She could then return to her parents and face the stigma of divorce, or she could leave for the cities.\textsuperscript{119}

Opportunities for women in the cities, and the resulting departure of some women for the urban areas, stimulated a tendency towards a splitting of the extended homestead. Generational authority was subverted by Betterment and labour tenancy, because chiefs and elders lost control over the allocation of land. This gave young men the ability to establish households wherever they liked on Trust land, independently of their parents. Many migrants set up their households as independent economic units under the unambiguous control of their wives. A new convention emerged during this period. When a son got married, after his wife gave birth, he would leave his parents' household to establish his own household; "he would move a distance away to avoid disputes with in-laws".\textsuperscript{120} The distance the son moved away would be determined by relations within the household. The next son would only get married after his elder brother had moved out. The last son would build his house on the same stand as his parents. When the father died, the youngest son would inherit his property, although the eldest son retained greater authority within the broader family structure.

Although this cycle of household formation was common, it was by no means universal. The timing of the establishment of an independent household depended on having acquired a sufficient resource base. There were also cultural differences in this pattern. Shangaan-speaking households retained an extended family for a much longer period than their Pulana counterparts. Shangaan parents-in-law were more likely to take responsibility for their daughters-in-law welfare in the event of their husband's desertion, in the hope that the husband would one day return to the household.\textsuperscript{121}
Declining generational authority, migrancy and desertions resulted in marriages becoming increasingly unstable. Women moved in with men without lebola being paid or any formal procedures being followed. These "marriages" could prove to be unhappy experiences for the women as the following life history suggests:

"F was born in the forties at Glen Lyden, a labour tenancy farm. After initiation school, she moved to Eden on her own initiative to live with L. L did not pay Lebola, although his parents showed her family a cow but did not deliver it. Her husband worked in Sabie but soon began to neglect her. "He was a drunkard and spent all his money on alcohol and women." Her husband's father was "just like his son" and did not assist her. Her mother-in-law had died before she got married. She had four children but three died. In the late sixties, she "divorced" her husband and moved back to Glen Lyden."

Removals were often the catalyst, rather than the cause of, extended households separating:

"As young people our fathers were all dead, so we separated by choice [when the removals took place]. As you get married trouble starts with the wives, that's when the trouble starts. When the father dies there is no understanding between the brothers. When we got married [at Maripeskop] we would all stay at one home, build our houses in the same yard, all the brothers. Just as brothers got married they get their own plots from our father. But after the father dies the wives and brothers quarrel. The people who start trouble are wives. The mother-in-law favours that one, she does not do hard work in the fields. The only way to solve that problem is to separate. When this Trust started, then we decided, I am going to settle there with my wife and we separated."

Chiefs and elders tried to use the state to prevent women from leaving the area throughout the thirties and forties. The opportunities opened up by domestic service were targeted in the following exchange between an Induna and the Commissioner at a quarterly meeting:

He [Induna] complained that the Government should prevent women from proceeding to JHB and taking the place of native "kitchen boys". He stated that women had too many liberties. As an alternative he suggested that working woman [sic] should be made to pay taxes and that would ease the position and let the women realise that their place was in the fields and in their Kraals.

The Chiefs demanded that the state prevent women from visiting compounds:

We - all the tribes - have a complaint. We object to the low morals of our wives and children. Our women are always hanging around in the compounds. This is because
the Blantyres and P.E. African Natives live single lives in the union. We want the Government to send our women back to us. They should not be allowed in the compounds. There were women here who have listened to what the Assistant Commissioner said about our women. They should not have been listening. Why did the ANC not say he will have loose women arrested. Why did he not say he will report the matter to the Government? The difference between our treatment of women and that of white men is based on an economic factor. The women go away because their husbands do not support them. That is true. But NC should help people to get their women back. 127

Despite continued protests by chiefs and headmen during the thirties and forties, the Commissioners, acting on NAD policy, were receptive to at least some of the women’s grievances. They refused to register marriages without the consent of wives, particularly in cases of polygamy. No divorces were granted unless the wife was present as a defendant, which meant that lebola did not have to be returned. The NC also “always listened to the women who report their absent relatives for failure to provide for them, thus causing the relatives to return home.” 128

In 1949, numerous chiefs throughout the Transvaal, called on the government to extend influx control to women. At the quarterly meetings and a meeting of the Local Council, the chiefs and headmen voted unanimously for the extension of the pass laws to women. 129 However, it took ten years before the exodus of women to the cities was reversed. 130

Conclusion

This chapter argued that the post 1936 NAD was ambivalent about the future of the chieftainship. The Department was torn between a modernising mission, which was implicitly transformative, and a segregationalist ideal of conserving the chieftainship. This ambivalence
was reflected in two contradictory policies: On the one hand, the policy of "retribalisation" and "tribal areas" attempted to reconstruct and centralise the chieftainship. On the other hand, the policy of Betterment effectively transferred power over the allocation of land from the chief to the Native Commissioner and the Agricultural Officers. The implementation of demarcation resulted in widespread resistance as chiefs, councillors and homestead heads tried to withstand the state's attempts to transform the homestead into bureaucratically monitored productive units. The judicial powers of recognised chiefs, though nominally strengthened through being accorded civil jurisdiction, were also undermined by the Native Commissioner's court as a means of appeal. However, the moderniser's dream of economically self-sufficient and ecologically sustainable reserve areas collapsed in the late forties. First the quantity of agricultural land allocated to each household decreased to below subsistence levels, then, by the late fifties, households were not allocated agricultural land. These households depended almost entirely on migrant remittances and local wage employment for their income.

Access to a migrant labour markets as well as the implementation of Betterment had a significant impact on generational and gender relations. Betterment meant that young men could have access to land without having to consult their fathers or a chief. Access to the cities meant that women had the option of leaving the area if they faced severe neglect. Both these factors hastened the tendency of the extended household to split, which gave married women greater control over migrant incomes and their labour.

In 1948, the National Party came to power and a new regime took control of the head office of the NAD. Under the ideology of Apartheid, propogated by the new regime, the
reconstruction of the tribe was both a strategy and a principled ideal. The new regime theoretically retained, but (as the following section will show) practically dropped, the moderniser's vision of economically sufficient reserve areas. The following chapter investigates how the NAD expedited both the establishment of Tribal Authorities as well as the massive removal of labour and rent tenants into the reserves.
Notes

1. Interview D Hammond-Tooke (Former Member of the Ethnology Department of the NAD 1954-59), Wits University, 15/4/93.

2. Interview D Hammond-Tooke, Johannesburg, 15/4/93.

3. Liberal traditionalist is my own term.


7. CAD NTS 97/362/21, Magistrate Pilgrims Rest to NAD, 8/7/39.

8. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meeting between Chiefs and Headmen, Islington, 27/7/44 and NTS 971/323/8/1 V7153, NC Bushbuckridge to CNC Pietersburg, December 1954.

9. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, CNC to NAD, 18/2/38.

10. CAD NTS 1252/308, Letter from nine chiefs to ANC Bushbuckridge, 14/5/1938.


12. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Memo Director of Native Agriculture, 17/8/39.

13. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226 Location Reclamation Committee Report, 19/2/1940.

14. ibid.

15. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Report of Reclamation Committee, 19/2/1940.

16. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Location Reclamation Report, 19/2/1940.

17. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Memorandum by CNC Pietersburg in response to Location Reclamation Report, 22/5/40.

18. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, LRC response to CNC Memo, 17/6/1940.


21. A survey conducted in 1962 into chiefly followings on each farm revealed this latter point. See statistical survey attached to CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report of Special Departmental Committee, 19/5/61.

22. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meeting between Chiefs and Headmen, Cunningmoore, 26/3/35.

23. CAD NTS 8/426 V10314, Letter CNC Pietersburg to NC Bushbuckridge, 10/10/47.

24. CAD NTS 8/426 V10314, Letter to NAD from "The Chief, his Induna and his People, 14/8/42.

25. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Meeting Chiefs and Headmen and DL Smit, 22/9/42.

26. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Letter Smit to NC Bushbuckridge, 22/9/42.

27. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meetings with Chief and Headmen, Cunningmoore, 27/1/43.

28. CAD NTS 8/426 V10314, Meeting with Chiefs and Headmen, Bushbuckridge, 18/7/42.

29. See CAD NTS 902/327 V7571, Survey of Stock Ownership, 1946. The significance of stock restrictions is discussed further below.


31. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meetings between Chiefs and Headmen, Cunningmoore, 27/1/43. Kheto Nxumalo specifically used the term monitored when describing why people opposed Betterment. See K Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/92.

32. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of meeting Chiefs and Headmen, Dwarsloop, 9/11/37.

33. ibid

34. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of Meeting between Chiefs and Headmen, Rolle 18/1/43.
35. ibid.

36. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Report of Assistant Director of Agriculture, 13/7/43.

37. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Letter ANC Bushbuckridge to Director of Agriculture, 16/7/43.

38. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meeting of Chiefs and Headmen, Klaserie, 13/1/43; Dwarsloop, 14/1/43, 24/1/43 and NTS 17/423 V10226 ANC Bushbuckridge to NAD, 1/5/43 and NAD to ANC Bushbuckridge 5/6/43.

39. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meeting between Chief and Headmen, Islington 7/9/45.

40. CAD NTS 8/426 V10314, Letter CNC Pietersburg to NAD, 4/3/47.

41. CAD NTS 8/426 V10314, NC Bushbuckridge to CNC Pietersburg, 1/3/47.

42. Interview Kheto Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/1992.

43. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meeting Chiefs and Head, Cunningmoore, 19/2/46; Arthurstone 21/2/46.

44. CAD NTS 902/323 V7571 NC Bushbuckridge to CNC Pietersburg 15/4/46;

45. CAD NAD to CNC Pietersburg, 25/8/46; CNC Pietersburg to senior Agricultural Officer Bushbuckridge, 23/6/47.

46. CAD NTS 87/360/c V8571, Letter NC Bushbuckridge to NAD, 31/7/44.

47. CAD NTS 87/360 V8570, ANC to Sec NAD, 18/9/42.

48. CAD NTS 87/360/c V8571, Meeting of BLC, 13/12/45.

49. CAD NTS 87/360/c V8571, BLC meeting, 18/1/45.

50. CAD NTS 87/360/C V8571, Minutes of BLC, 2/11/44.

51. ibid.

52. CAD NTS 87/360/C V8571, BLC Meeting, 21/9/44.

53. ibid.

54. CAD NTS 87/360/c V8571, Meeting BLC, 2/11/44.

55. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meeting between NC, Chiefs and Headmen, Cunningmoore, 25/3/42. Also NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of Meeting between Chiefs and Headmen, Vaalhoek, 12/8/43 and 25/10/43.
56. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meeting between Chiefs and Headmen, Islington, 26/10/44.

57. ibid.

58. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meeting between Chiefs and Headmen, Islington, 7/6/45.

59. CAD NTS 44/55 V327 NC Bushbuckridge to NAD 25/5/45.

60. CAD NTS 44/55 Memo van Warmelo 3/8/45.

61. CAD NTS 13/392 V9459, Memo van Warmelo to CNC Conference, 30/8/45.

62. ibid

63. ibid.

64. The need to give chiefs a specific area of jurisdiction as well as a standardised salary if the chiefs were to be effectively incorporated into the bureaucracy was emphasised in an internal NAD memo signed by J.M.B. dated 7/8/45. CAD NTS 44/55 V327.

65. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report into Conferment of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction to Native Chiefs, 31/7/46.

66. See CAD BAO F54/1074/13, ANC Bushbuckridge to Tulamahashe Nxumayo, 23/2/43 and ANC Bushbuckridge to NAD 10/5/43; also NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of Meetings between chiefs and headmen, 25/3/43, 10/7/47.

67. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814 Minutes of meetings between chiefs and headmen, 18/1/43, 25/3/43.

68. CAD CNC F/4/70 Land Act Applications of J Mashigo (5/7/46), H Mashele (18/7/47) and F Mabilane (28/4/50). Also CNC N2/7/2 Circular No 7 of 1947.


71. see CAD NTS 489/323 District Forestry Officer, Graskop to ANC Bushbuckridge, 3/4/45; NC Bushbuckridge to NAD 24/4/45 and 30/7/45 and 28/11/45; and Director of Forestry to NAD 15/1/45

73. Between 1947 and 1960 the number of tractors increased from 184 to 743 in Letaba, 102 to 593 in Lydenburg, 100 to 760 in Nelspruit and 29 to 297 in Pilgrims Rest. See Central Statistical Services Agricultural Census no 24 (1947) and 34 (1960).


75. CAD NTS 828/308 V3586, ANC Pilgrims Rest to NAD, 18/8/35.

76. CAD NTS 2580/308 V3801, NC Bushbuckridge to NAD, 7/2/45 and 6/3/45.

77. CAD BAO H128/1080 V5734, Director of Native Agriculture to C.N.C, 29/1/48 and LDE V2328 115/30, Valuation Lands Department, 25/10/1937.

78. CAD NTS 17/423/B V10227, Location Reclamation Report, 1948.

79. ibid.


81. CAD NTS 8/426 V10314, Certificates of work performed by the Agricultural Office, 1951 - 1953.

82. see CAD HNK 42/4/6, Senior AO to NC Bushbuckridge, 26/11/53.

83. CAD HNK 2/4/5, CNC Pietersburg to NAD, 14/8/52.

84. CAD HNK 37/0/20, NC Bushbuckridge to Departmental Committee on Culling and Livestock, 3/11/51.

85. see CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of Meeting Chiefs and Headmen, Islington, 24/7/44; and 971/323/8/1 V7153 South African Institute of Race Relations to NAD 12/11/54, NC Bushbuckridge to CNC Pietersburg; and Hall and Sons Rent Tenancy contract.

86. CAD NTS 971/323/8 V7153, Labour tenant control Board to NAD, 20/8/57.

87. See CAD NTS 971/323/8 V7153, Statement given by A Mashile and Others to NAD 6/9/57.

88. CAD NTS 971/323/8, Hall and Sons to NC Bushbuckridge, 19/2/58.
89. See CAD NTS 971/323/8 V7153, Labour tenant control Board to NAD, 20/8/57, N J Roberts to NAD 29/8/57, Ejectments of Mapulane Tribe of Leamington and Andover, unsigned and undated memo, statement given by A Mashile and Others to NAD 6/9/57, Labour Tenancy Control Board to NAD, 9/9/57, Hall and Sons to NC Bushbuckridge 19/2/58; NTS 289/280/3/53, BAC Bushbuckridge to BAC, 15/1/60, Hall and Sons to BAC Bushbuckridge, 1/8/59.

90. CAD NTS 971/323/8/1 V7153, NAD to Jack Levitan, Rich and Burland, 13/9/55.

91. See Interview D Hammond-Tooke, Johannesburg, 15/4/93.


95. See Ashforth A, The Politics of Official Discourse..., p 158. Chapter Five of the above provides a detailed analysis of the legitimating principles underlying the Apartheid policy. See also Dubow, S., "Ethnic Euphemisms and Radical Echoes", Paper Presented to the Conference on "Ethnicity, Identity and Nationalism in South Africa: Comparative Perspectives", Grahamstown, 1993, p6-8, for a discussion around the role of anthropological theories of culture in the formulation of Apartheid.

96. See Dubow S, Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of "Race", Journal of African history, 33, 1992, for a detailed discussion around the (biological) racial theories underpinning Apartheid.


98. CAD NTS 17/423/1 V10226, Report on Ad Hoc Committee on Reclamation and Resettlement, March 1957.
99. CAD NTS 17/423/1 v10226, Report into implementing economic Units, March 1957.


101. CAD NTS 17/423/1 V10226, Report into Settlement, March 1957.

102. ibid.

103. ibid.

104. ibid.

105. NTS 44/55 V327, Report into Recognition of Chieftainships, 19/5/61.

106. See CAD NTS 2352/308 V3779 NC Bushbuckridge to NAD 3/4/45; NTS 489/323, NC Bushbuckridge to NAD, 30/7/45 and 28/11/45; NTS 44/55 V327, Report into Conferment of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction, 31/7/46.


108. CAD BAO B24/1080, Secretary BAO to CBAC Pietersburg, 29/1/65.

109. CAD HNK 30/4/2, Natives employed by Rural Mines and Industries, 30/9/47.


114. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meetings between Chiefs and Headmen, Cunningmoore 18/12/44.

115. See CAD NTS 32/318, Minutes of meetings between Chiefs and headmen, Cunninmoore, 29/3/43.


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118. See CAD HNK 34/0/17, Besonderhede vir Beplanning van Zone 2 - Bosbokrand Dist, 31/5/59.


121. Interview Mgiba, F., Cottondale, 12/07/1992; Baloyi, P.C., Thulamahashe, 09/07/1992. These ethnic differences are probably (partially) attributable to the "Shangaan" situation as relatively recent refugees, resulting in a greater sense of mutual dependence.

122. See for example, Interview R Mkhabela, Buffelshoek, 11/7/92; Lofina Mashile, Cottondale, 11/7/92.


124. Interview, FM, Buffelshoek, 8/7/92. See also interview Lofina Mashile, Buffelshoek, 11/7/92.


126. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of meeting of Chiefs and Headmen, Cunningmoore, 12/11/37.

127. ibid.

128. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Meeting between Chiefs and headmen, Cunningmoore 29/3/43, 23/7/43, 18/12/44 and Islington 26/10/44.

129. CAD BAO 87/360/c V8571, BLC meeting, 12/3/49.

The Creation of Mapulaneng and Mhala: 1963 - 1990

Native Commissioner Charles Bourquin was a "plump and approachable" man. He was, according to a former colleague, "a christian in the good sense of the word", a man who, in relation to his african constituency was "outstanding in terms of sympathy".1 A fluent Tsonga speaker, Bourquin, the son of a Swiss Missionary, joined the civil service as his secular mission. Bourquin "believed in what he was doing" and as a man who considered himself answerable to an authority greater than the state, Bourquin specialised in the role of mediator and conciliator.2 Yet, despite these characteristics, when Bourquin was stationed at Bushbuckridge in the early 1960s, he was in an unenviable position. The newly established Department of Bantu Affairs was centralised, autocratic, and intent on destroying what was left of Native Commissioners' autonomy and discretion. Furthermore, his conservative traditionalist superiors in the head office wanted results, and they did not appreciate elegant plans, or humanitarian concerns. These processes were (sometimes) cushioned in Bourquin's case as he went to school with, and fought in the school's boxing team alongside, the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for the Northern Transvaal (Liebenburg) and one of Verwoerd's secretaries (Dobbs). Although Bourquin's promotional prospects were negligible, and his integrity as a humanitarian was at stake, after much soul searching (during a trip to Switzerland), he stuck to his post.

The administrative tasks facing Bourquin were indeed considerable. The philosophy behind
the establishment of Tribal Authorities demanded that each recognised chief have a definite area of jurisdiction and a homogeneous ethnic following. However, the local reality was more complex. Despite the fact that settlement had been organised over the previous twenty years along "tribal lines", there were no clear ethnic divisions in the district. Recognised chiefs still had no sharply defined spheres of influence. Followers of different chiefs were scattered all over the Released Area. Some significant chiefs and their followers remained outside of the Released Area; planners had to cater for their eventual removal to the Released Area and for their recognition. Unrecognised chiefs within and outside the Released Area were doing what they could to build their own following and to snipe at the authority of recognised chiefs who were cooperating with the state. Three thousand families living on the Highveld portion of the district under rent tenancy conditions in the 1960s had to be resettled on Trust Land in terms of the implementation of Chapter 4, which was designed to abolish rent tenancy and redistribute labour tenants. The Trust Land that was on the Highveld was very mountainous and was ill-suited for accommodating a large population. Furthermore, as wage labour relationships began to be introduced, farmers in the Lowveld began to evict their labour tenants.

This chapter describes these, and further state interventions, and their effects on the organisation of African society in Bushbuckridge, between 1963 and 1985. These interventions had the effect of almost completely destroying the agricultural base of the reserves, and with the creation of Tribal Authorities in 1963, integrating the chieftainship into the bureaucracy. The chapter also argues that the formation of the ethnically based Bantustan states in the early seventies had the effect of creating a patrimonial and predatory bureaucracy. The chapter analyses the internal structure (or lack thereof) of the Bantustan state.
The Formation of Tribal Authorities

In April 1961, a Committee consisting of the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, the Chief Agricultural Officer of the Northern Areas, the Bantu Affairs Commissioner stationed at Bushbuckridge (Charles Bourquin), Senior and Local Agricultural Officers, and Drs van Warmelo and Bothma (the state ethnologists), was constituted to define Tribal Authorities for the area as well as give recommendations concerning the purchase of more Trust Land both within and outside the Released Area. The formation of the Committee followed the failure of earlier attempts by Commissioners to arrive at a satisfactory demarcation of ethnic and Tribal Authority areas.³

The Dingleydale irrigation scheme, which was still under construction, was divided up between two Pulana chieftainships, a Shangaan chieftainship and a Hlanganu (Mnisi) chieftainship. The Committee allocated the remaining farms to Tribal Authorities by determining which chief had the most followers on a farm. The chiefs were given exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which included criminal and civil jurisdiction, over those farms that fell under their Tribal Authority. However, the system of allocation resulted in the creation of a "Sotho island" within the area allocated to the Mnisi chieftainship and the "Shangaan area of influence". The only farms where the "Sothos" could be settled, namely Buffelshoek and Acornhoek, would create a "Shangaan island" in the "Sotho sphere of influence" at Rooiboklaagte. A temporary compromise was reached: Since most of the farms that constituted the "Sotho island" were still owned by Hall and Sons, all recognised chiefs, both "Sotho" and "Shangaan" were given personal jurisdiction over their followers on these farms. The problem of chiefs who were residing outside of the Released Area was postponed until
more land could be acquired by the Trust, which would then be allocated to these chiefs. After the Committee's recommendations were accepted, Bourquin established seven Tribal authorities in Bushbuckridge in 1963. The Amashangana, Jongilanga, Mnisi and Mathibela Tribal Authorities combined to form the Mathibela-Hlangana-Amashangana Regional Authority (Mhala Regional Authority). Although Mathibela was classified as a Northern Sotho, his Tribal Authority was allocated to the Shangaan Regional Authority because most of his followers were from Mozambique and his area of jurisdiction fell under the Shangaan area of influence. The Sethlare, Moreipuso and Thabakgolo Tribal Authorities combined to form the Mapulana Regional Authority. In 1963 the Shangaan Regional Authority affiliated to the Amashangana Territorial Authority, and in 1967 the Mapulana Regional Authority affiliated to the Lebowa Territorial Authority.

In 1963, an unrecognised Pulana "chief", Matsiketsane Mashile, living on the "Sotho island" in Ludlow which fell under the Mnisi Tribal Authority, demanded to be recognised and given an area of jurisdiction. Even Bourquin's placatory approach was not able to make Mashile see reason (from the state's point of view) and compromise on his demands. After a number of mass meetings where Mashile allegedly warned that "blood would flow" if he was not recognised, Bourquin had Mashile banished, with his brother, for fifteen and eleven years respectively. This effectively ended overt resistance from unrecognised chiefs living on the Trust Land.

Removals, Planning and the Recognition of More Chiefs
The population on the Trust Land doubled between 1960 and 1970 as evicted labour and rent tenants were forced onto the Trust. Most people settled in the Trust during this period were provided with sufficient land for residential purposes only, and were not allowed to bring stock with them. This process saw an end to the planners' vision of providing a viable subsistence base for the majority of Trust residents. The only exception was the construction of the Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme which provided about six hundred households with both irrigated land and grazing for stock.

Between 1960 and 1965 the South African Native Trust purchased at least 24 farms for black settlement in the Released Area. During this period there was a massive influx onto certain Trust farms as a result of the implementation of Chapter Four of the 1936 Land Act in surrounding districts. Farmers who had maintained a combination of rent and labour tenants were forced to evict all rent tenants. Farmers in Pilgrims Rest and surrounding districts continued to mechanise throughout the sixties. The farmers with more capital around Hoedspruit and Hazyview, had begun to replace labour tenants with wage labourers. By the late sixties, new labour tenant contracts were banned in the Transvaal and labour tenancy was outlawed in 25 districts of the province. Although the Pilgrims Rest district was excluded from the proclamation, surrounding districts were affected, which resulted in an increase in the flow of people onto the Trust.

These movements into the Released Area and onto Trust land were often either illegal or undertaken without the formal permission of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner (BAC). Evicted families would move into their relatives' households whilst male "kraal heads" remained working in the urban areas. This required the planning and then replanning of Trust farms.
For example, between 1960 and 1965 the population in Marite increased from 303 families to nearly 1000 families. By 1965, most of Marite was divided into stands or "smallholdings" ranging in size from 1/4 to 1/2 morgan. A small number of agricultural allotments were distributed to a minority of "full-time" male farmers. The Commissioner observed in a report to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner that "many residential areas in this district are more villages and towns than what is known as Agricultural residential areas." With the exception of the Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme, access to any agricultural land became a privilege.

Two townships, Shatale and Thulamahashe, and three "closer settlements" were formed in the district to accommodate evicted tenants and "surplus" people settled on Trust farms. The townships provided pre-built houses, tapped water and sanitation facilities. Schools were built in close proximity to the townships to attract residents. Residents of the townships were prohibited from keeping stock. Initially Shatale was boycotted, as residents demanded the right to build their own houses. When this right was granted the townships slowly began to fill up. "Closer settlements" were townships with minimal infrastructure: A "few boreholes" were provided and no agricultural land was made available.

The steady, more or less uncontrolled, inflow of people into the Trust necessitated a constant replanning of the settlement policy of the district. When a "stabilisation" plan was introduced in the district in the late fifties, residential settlement was organised along main roads. In the sixties, this organising principle was abandoned and new residential areas were demarcated. Residents who had built their houses on the previously demarcated stands along the main roads were forced to move. In the words of a Councillor at a meeting of the Mapulana
Regional Authority:

"Some spend all the money they have to put up decent buildings. What happens is that after a few years the people are told to break down the houses and build at new sites, this kind of thing goes on and on and the people begin to feel that there is no place they can really call their own."  

In 1964 the Trust purchased the farm Dwarsloop. The settled residents of the farm were split in their allegiance between Nxumalo, the Shangaan chief, and Barney Mashego, a Pulana chief. However, at the time of the purchase, Skukuza Malele, an unrecognised Pulana chief, and his followers, were threatened with removal from the neighbouring farms of Versailles and Ramanas. Two thirds of Dwarsloop was set aside for Malele and a Tribal Authority was constituted in 1967, after which residents of Versailles and Ramanas were removed without their stock. They were settled on a "closer settlement basis", without any agricultural land.

From the mid sixties the Department began to place increasing pressure on Bourquin to remove some eight to ten thousand rent tenant families from Company lands on the Highveld, as demanded by Chapter Four. Bourquin, retained the image of himself as a cushion between the state and the "native", refused to remove tenants onto Trust land until adequate land had been purchased and "sanitary conveniences and water" had been provided. The only land available for settlement on the Highveld was a closer settlement, Dientjie, which was established in 1960 to accommodate about a hundred evicted tenants from the farm Frankfort. The amount of land was patently inadequate. The tenants also "refused point blank" to consider being removed to the Lowveld Trust land. As the T.G.M.E gold mines closed down, and the company switched to "intensive agriculture", the Company demanded that tenants become farm labourers or move. The ex-rent tenants refused to become farm labourers as this would mean sacrificing their urban labour opportunities. Both the T.G.M.E.
and the head-office of the NAD were indifferent to Bourquin's "human concern", and reiterated the demand that Bourquin remove the tenants expeditiously. The farm Elandsfontein was purchased by the Trust. Three Tribal Authorities were established on the Highveld farms owned by the Trust. In 1969, the majority of the tenants were removed to Elandsfontein and Dientjie on the Highveld, while a small proportion of those moved settled in Shatale. Between Christmas and New year of 1972, after an unsuccessful court application, Chief Pitas Mogane, some 3000 followers, and about seven hundred cattle, were finally removed from the T.G.M.E farm Hermansberg to Dientjie.

In 1969, the unrecognised Pulana Molotele chieftainship, and some one hundred and twenty families, were threatened with removal from the farm Glen Lyden. The Commissioner allocated one of the last two unallocated farms, Buffelshoek, for the settlement of the chieftainship and the establishment of a Tribal Authority. In mid 1971, the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner in Pietersburg recognised the Molotele chieftainship.

The allocation of definite areas of jurisdiction did not mean that recognised chiefs withdrew their headmen from areas allocated to other Tribal Authorities. Followers of chiefs living in the "wrong" areas continued to approach these headmen to settle disputes. Where possible these followers continued to pay taxes and have administrative processes performed through the Tribal Authority of their choice.

Tribal Authorities and the Implementation of Betterment

Tribal Authorities were created to assist in the process of controlling settlement and
implementing policies that most chieftainships had, for some time, been resisting. By carrying out their administrative duties, the Tribal Authorities were supposed to make the chiefs effective agents for the implementation of Betterment. Authorities would now have the responsibility of issuing "economic units" of land to settlers, controlling dipping operations, selecting stock for sale or slaughter, erecting and maintaining fences, controlling crop and grazing systems, as well as other administrative responsibilities.23

The Regional Authorities started to play an active role in the Betterment planning of Bushbuckridge. They formed a Planning Committee, which began coordinating the settlement process and the demarcation of residential stands in 1965.24 A "dry land farming committee" was also formed with responsibility for improving agriculture through the assistance of an extension officer. However, instead of maintaining communal rights to agricultural land, the committee took the view that:

"the ownership of the ploughing land (morgan) is a privilege and not a right; unless cultivation is done on scientific lines, the chief and his councillors reserve the right to terminate such ownership."25

Chiefs, through the Authorities, began to become distributors of patronage rather than protectors of the "traditional" right to communal tenure.

The recognised chiefs attempted to consolidate their position within the state and increase their administrative and legal powers, albeit on terms defined by the Department. In doing so, chiefs began to identify themselves with Betterment policies as the following quote from a meeting of the Shangaan Regional Authority demonstrates:

"The Regional Authority finds that owing to the fact the chiefs have no criminal jurisdiction over their subjects as regards to damage done to Trust property such as fences, water supply, the burning of veld etc etc, these evils cannot be controlled...it is absolutely essential that some of these powers be also given to the chiefs."26
Chiefs who had resisted Betterment began to fall into line with Departmental policy in order to retain their recognition and their position on a Tribal Authority. In 1965, Jongilanga Koza moved his household from a grazing area to a residential area. His resistance had been a "severe handicap" in planning "his" area. The Commissioner subsequently wrote in an enthusiastic letter to the Department:

"Since his bandla [homestead] was removed his subjects are following his example and the resettlement of the area is about complete."27

The creation of the Tribal Authorities effectively marginalised "uncooperative" chiefs, as administrative portfolios were taken up by a TA secretary or other councillors. The chiefs, many of whom were illiterate or poorly educated, were often unable to participate in planning. This created a vacuum within the Authorities which was rapidly filled by other more "qualified" members. An example of this process was the Mathibela TA. Mathibela was a long-standing opponent of Betterment and refused to cooperate in its implementation. Regardless of instructions to the contrary, Mathibela allowed residents to build in undemarcated areas. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner (BAC) noted in 1966:

"The main reason [for the absence of progress in implementing planning despite funding at the Tribal Authorities disposal] is the negative, sitting on the fence attitude of Chief Mathibela Mokwena and the incapability of the Secretary and the Councillors to carry on more or less on their own. The Chief’s attitude is "I have no objection to Tribal Authorities - Let the Councillors get on with the work - improvements etc. and I shall sit, look and watch and in the end shall pass judgement - hoping that he will have good grounds to criticise."28

However by mid 1967 the BAC sent the following letter:

In teenstelling met die vorige begroting kan met meer optimisme met werksaamhede voortgegaan word aangesien die Sekretaris / Terourier van die Stamowerbied in sou mate in 'n vertouensposisie by Kaptein Mathibela verkeer, dat hy toegelaat word om met die werksaamhede aan te gaan. Binne die eerste drie maande van die huidige boekjaar is fantastiese vordering gemaak.29

A similar process occurred in the Mnisi Tribal Authority.
Conflict between Agricultural Officers and Tribal Authorities

The working relationship between the Commissioners, Agricultural Officers and the Tribal Authorities remained strained during the process of implementing settlement and Betterment programmes. A significant overlap existed in the responsibilities of the Tribal Authorities and the Agricultural Officers, as the modernisers in the bureaucracy had built in a number of checks preventing the chiefs from acting unilaterally in allocating land. The chiefs were supposed to allocate residential sites and agricultural land in consultation with both the Commissioner and the Agricultural Office.30 The Commissioner, following Departmental policy, attempted to incorporate the Authorities more systematically into the administration of the area. Part of this process was a proposal to transfer junior agricultural officers known as Trust Rangers to the staff of the Authorities. The Commissioner hoped that this would have the benefit of giving the Rangers the authority of the chieftainship:

"The people will look upon the rangers as the chiefs or headmen's messengers and thus it will ensure better cooperation from the people for the proper administration of the Bantu area."31

The scheme would also result, the Commissioner argued, in greater coordination of the "chiefs and headmen's administrative machinery with no doubt more efficient control."32 However, before the scheme could be implemented senior Agricultural Officers objected that the Authorities were incapable of organising planning on a systematic basis:

"Sogenaamde herwinningswerke deur Bantoe-owerhede gedoen, word nie beplan nie en word orals aangebring, n plaas van die hele taak aan te pak en klaar te maak met 'n opvangsgebied of bepaalde grondeenheid."33

Ultimately, it became apparent that the Tribal Authorities could not be trusted to organise settlement according to Departmental specifications. The chiefs aimed to settle as many
potential followers as possible in their area, as the Commissioner noted in a letter to the Department:

"I am afraid that the position, especially as regards illegal squatters will become completely out of hand."

The result of the whole experience was that Agricultural Officers were instructed to work in "close cooperation" with the Tribal Authorities.

The tense relationship between the Tribal Authorities and the Agricultural Officers remained unresolved. Officers acted without consulting the Authorities. A chief complained to the Commissioner at a Regional Authority meeting: "In my area we have stands demarcated and issued without the knowledge of the chief."

Furthermore, Officers called public meetings without informing the Tribal Authorities, an encroachment on chiefly power. The Officers built public profiles as powerful personalities and exaggerated their influence by making promises to build schools, again an area within the jurisdiction of the Tribal Authority.

Agricultural Officers were beginning to use their administrative positions and the confusion surrounding their powers to develop their personal economic accumulative strategies. For example, one Officer was allocating residential sites to newly arrived settled only at one area at the expense of other planned residential areas. The Authority had little doubt that it was not a coincidence that there was a shop adjacent to the area where the stands were being allocated:

"The general opinion of the people is that the shop does not belong to Charles Mabaso but that it belongs to the Agricultural Officer."

Clearly there was a great deal of confusion as to the relationship between Agricultural Officers and the Tribal Authorities and the areas of administrative jurisdiction of each party. The consequences of this confusion were that residents could not identify one institution

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where the delivery of administrative services was guaranteed.

The Creation of Lebowa and Gazankulu: 1972 - 1990

In 1972, the Legislative Assemblies (LA) of Lebowa and Gazankulu were established. Over the next twenty years the population increased from 66 583 to 174 391 in Mapulaneng and from 61 057 to 181,704 in Mhala. These increases were the result of the following processes. Firstly, residents of townships around Sabie, Graskop and Pilgrims Rest were removed in the early seventies in accordance with the Group Areas Act. Many of these people settled in Shatale. Secondly, Game farms were established in the Eastern portions of the district and the tenants on these farms were moved into Mhala. Thirdly, labour tenant removals continued to take place in the early seventies. Fourthly, on the more capitalised farms, wage relations were formalised, compounds built to house full time male workers and the families of farm workers removed to the Bantustans while women were seasonally employed on the farms. Women employed by the farmers were required to return to the Bantustan every week. Finally, from the mid eighties, thousands of refugees fleeing the civil war in Mozambique were settled in refugee camps in Mhala.

With the exception of the Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme, no attempt was made by planners to provide households with a viable agricultural base during the seventies and eighties. By the end of the eighties, the vast majority of residents were settled on a closer settlement basis, without agricultural land or cattle. Out of about thirty thousand households in Mapulaneng, less than four hundred "economic units" were allocated. Excluding the Dingleydale Irrigation scheme, which provided about four hundred irrigated plots of one
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Migrancy became the principal means of survival for the vast majority of households, even for those who had been settled for generations in the area that became Trust Land. A retired migrant recollected in a recent interview how migrant remittances were spent before Betterment removals destroyed his household's access to agricultural and grazing land:

"From the 1960s that's when the trouble started. Before then money was useful. Civilisation was coming up... People were working for a better life. Money was spent on clothing, buying cattle to pay for your wife or improving your house with window frames and corrugated irons. Now ploughing is scarce."

Administration After the Creation of Legislative Assembly

The Legislative Assemblies of Lebowa and Gazankulu each contained 100 members: 60 chiefs and 40 elected members. The cabinets consisted of a Chief Minister and nine other ministers. Each Legislative Assembly had ten Government Departments and one public
The chieftainship was the cornerstone of the Bantustan state. The constitution of the Bantustan state recognised chiefs as both administrators and as the sole legitimate political representative of their "subjects", that is the chief (soley) represented civil society, and, as part of the bureaucracy, administered civil society. This dual status of the chieftainship resulted in a labyrinthine and clumsy structure that oversaw the provision of administrative services. Although the chieftainship was incorporated into the bureaucracy, it was not effectively bureaucratised in that there was no clear definition of channels of administrative accountability or of administrative duties and powers.

The confusion between Tribal Authorities, Agricultural Officers and Commissioners (who were now Magistrates) that had characterised the previous period was exacerbated. The Development Bank describes the allocation of administrative responsibilities as follows:

Rural (with agricultural land) and Close (without agricultural land) settlement are administered by the Tribal and Community Authorities in conjunction with the [Bantustan] Department of Home Affairs and Agriculture and Environmental Affairs through the Magistrates' offices. Towns are administered by the Department of Home Affairs and the RSA Department of Development Aid.

In practice, the Tribal Authorities played no practical role in the provision of services. Drawing on the "traditional" image of chiefs as the ultimate owners of the land, the Bantustan state gave chiefs the ability to veto any development within the Authorities recognised areas. Any application for the provision of a service had to pass from the Tribal Authority to the
Magistrate's office which would then instruct the relevant Department to provide the service. If an application was not accompanied by a letter of permission from the Authority, it was refused by the Magistrate. Hence, access to Government Departments which provided electricity, water supplies, residential and agricultural land and pensions depended on the written approval of the chief.

Tribal Authorities consisted of an alliance between chiefs and their councillors. Weingrod defines the Patron-client pattern as "a situation of structured inequality in which a client is able to obtain political rights only through the intervention of his patron." Positions on the Tribal Authority council gave members privileged access to administrative processes and thus to state resources. This access was used to restrict competition (in the case of the allocation of business licenses) or to accumulate wealth by facilitating administrative procedures only in exchange for a bribe. The pivotal position of certain councillors allowed them to establish significant patronage networks. These benefits give councillors a strong material interest in maintaining the recognition of a particular chief and in conserving the system of Tribal Authorities. Moreover, where "material, bureaucratic and political vulnerabilities are maximised" patron-client networks flourish. The maintenance of these vulnerabilities gave people in positions of power an interest in opposing organisations that had the aim of securing people's rights.

The lack of clarity surrounding proper bureaucratic procedures gave rise to a context within which patronage and corruption thrived. Bureaucrats often deflected administrative responsibilities by claiming that the responsibility lay with another department. Residents frequently had to offer a bribe or a promise of political loyalty in exchange for the delivery
of a service. The following description, by an ex-secretary of a Tribal Authority’s Development Committee, of the processes involved in starting a business illustrates the above points:

If you need a business you must first approach a headman, who will listen to your problem after you have given him a “present”. Then you go to the chief’s clerk who will ask for “more” in order to make representations to the chief. Then after you have a letter from the chief, you must go to the clerks at the magistrate’s office who will need something to send the licence to Chuneespoort. When the license returns you will need more to have it sent to the Tribal Authority. Then you must assist the Agricultural Officer in order to be given a site. Then the health inspectors to allow you to open. It is a complicated and long network of manipulating people. This is how these headmen and Councillors get their living. They even go to the extent of opening their own businesses because their positions are boosting them. Of course, if you are a friend of Mr I [the Chair of the Development Committee], you will get a license without any problems.

The relationship between the Tribal Authorities and the different Departments was not always a cooperative one. Chiefs, in return for a payment, often gave people permission to settle on undemarcated residential and agricultural sites, without consulting Agricultural Officers. Many Agricultural Officers, in turn, used the ambiguities surrounding their portfolios to establish exclusive areas of jurisdiction within which they could accumulate wealth.

The Tribal Authorities were responsible for the collection of taxes. These taxes included a tribal levy, a water supply tax, school building funds, bicycle tax, grazing and dipping tax, dog and goat tax, agricultural and residential site rentals and taxes for the purchase of a chief’s car. Many of the taxes that were collected were illegal as legislated procedures were not followed. Tribal Authorities differed significantly in the amount of tax they collected per resident. For example, in the late eighties, the Authority that collected the most
tax collected five times more tax per capita than the Authority which collected the least tax. 59

School principals played both an administrative and a political role in the Tribal Authorities. Politically, principals (as relatively well-educated residents) often assumed the role of brokers for the uneducated chiefs by interpreting government policy to the Authorities and representing the Authority to outsiders. However, principals were also dependent on the chief in that the chief's approval was necessary for continued employment at the school, and hence for the possibility of future promotion. Expulsion from a chief's area made reemployment in the area of another Authority very difficult.

The alliance between school principals and chiefs also had an economic component. In Authority areas, residents were responsible for building schools. In the seventies and early eighties the funds designated for this purpose were banked with the Authority. After numerous complaints that these funds were being embezzled, the principals were granted the right to open special accounts for the purpose of constructing school buildings. Principals rarely submitted written accounts of funds to residents at year-end meetings. It was the responsibility of the chief or school inspector to enforce this requirement. An alliance with the chief, would enable the principal to embezzle school building funds and/or (illegally imposed) examination fees. A close working relationship between principals and the Authority also gave the principal privileged access to the bureaucracy, particularly for the purposes of establishing a business.

Power Relations within the Administrative Structures of the Legislative Assemblies
The chief's "traditional" status as sole owner of the land was used to interpret any challenge to the state as a challenge to the chieftainship. In this sense, only the chieftainship was endowed with the authority to represent local problems to the state. An attempt by any organisation to challenge the bureaucracy was interpreted as an attempt by the leader of the organisation to challenge the chief's position as sole political representative of the "community", or at best, to subvert chiefly authority. This created an extremely oppressive political climate in which it became impossible for independent organisations to function.

The chiefs and Departments were administratively and politically accountable to the Legislative Assembly. Residents, with the exception of elected members of parliament, had to take complaints through the chiefs to the Magistrates or Departmental Ministers and Secretaries. However, the chiefs, who were supposed to be administratively responsible for an area, were often the root cause of the complaints. As a result, residents were prevented from attempting any administrative or political measures which could effectively address their grievances. Furthermore, the chiefs, as a block, had effective control of the Legislative Assembly. The Chief Minister needed to maintain a support base amongst the chiefs or risk losing his position. This gave the chiefs further indemnity from effective administrative accountability.

However, the chiefs were also dependent on the approval of the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister had the power to literally create and destroy "tribes" and in doing so, chieftainships. The following extract from the schedule that defined the powers of Chief Ministers summarises this position:

The division of existing Black tribes, the amalgamation of black tribes, the constitution of new black tribes, and the recognition, appointment, conditions of service,
discipline, retirement, deposition, dismissal and pensioning of paramount chiefs, chiefs
and headmen.\textsuperscript{60} The Chief Minister held the power to appoint Ministers and other political office holders, who
received high salaries and had the ability to establish both political and economic patronage
networks. If a chief lost the support of the Chief Minister, the Tribal Authority was
discriminated against in the provision of infrastructural grants. The Chief Minister could also
refuse to provide police protection in cases of urgent need. Hence, conformity to the demands
of the dominant political alliance in the Legislative Assembly became a condition for chiefs
retention of the chieftainship, access to political and physical protection, and the delivery of
state resources to their constituencies.

The Magistrate continued to play a pivotal role at a local political level. As the conduit
through which administrative applications were processed, the Magistrate was able to channel
Departmental personnel and resources to particular areas. The Magistrate was also the means
through which chiefs who were not Legislative Assembly members had access to Lebowa
Government resources, such as police protection.

There was one channel of communication to Ministerial authority which bypassed the chiefs
and Magistrate, i.e. the elected Member of Parliament. At a regional and local level, elected
Members of Parliament had the potential to play a crucial role in the delivery of rights and
services to their constituents. An MP had direct access to a Government Minister or the
Secretary of a Department. Hence, an MP had the ability to side-step any alliances between
the Authorities, Magistrates and local Government Departments. They could achieve this goal
by facilitating meetings between relevant ministers and residents, either at the Ministerial
offices or at local (mass) meetings.
Although the chieftainship was effectively coopted onto Tribal Authorities, this did not mean that the chieftainship was reducible to the Tribal Authority. Chiefly families were trying to use the Tribal Authorities to build a stable following for the institution of the chieftainship. This was obviously a difficult task given that the administrative functions and constitution of the Tribal Authorities threatened the political and economic autonomy that residents had in the past expected the chieftainship to defend. However, some chiefs were more successful than others in using the state as a resource to build a personal and chiefly power base. The next chapter, which investigates transformation of ethnic relationships in the district, deals with this issue in greater detail.

Conclusion

The foregoing chapters have described the processes associated with the state’s attempts to control the movement and settlement of the African population in Bushbuckridge in the twentieth century. These controls resulted in a massive transformation of african settlements and politics. Scattered populations with almost unlimited access to agricultural land in the 1920s, were settled in high density village settlements with negligible access to land and stock by the 1980s. A situation where residents had a significant degree of choice from, and control over, numerous competing chiefs gave way to one where nine chiefs had a state imposed monopoly over specific areas of land. The ability to wield chiefly power, and the nature of that power, was, with the establishment of Tribal Authorities in the 1960s, determined by recognition from the state, rather than from popular support. Land that had previously been administered by the chieftainship together with lineage and homestead heads, was, by the 1970s, controlled by a patrimonial state.
There have been, however, substantial gaps in the above discussion. For example, was there a uniform response from all chiefs and ethnic groups to state interventions, and if not why not? Were ethnic relations as harmonious or antagonistic as Commissioner's and Anthropologist's perceived them to be? How did pre-existing moral economies change or reproduce themselves in the light of the ideology propagated by Apartheid ideologues?

The following chapter will begin to answer these questions by investigating the nature of ethnic relations in Bushbuckridge and the struggle to define and attach competing moral economies to different ethnic identities.
Notes

1. Interview D Hammond-Tooke, Johannesburg, 15/4/93.

2. Interview A Mamiane, Acornhoek, 16/12/93.


4. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report of Special Departmental Committee, 19/5/61 and Bac Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg, 19/5/61.

5. CAD NTS 302/362/1 V9059, Proclamation of areas of certain tribes and establishment of tribal authorities Bushbuckridge area, 23/3/62.

6. See CAD URU 1076 V4535, Minute no 1076, 27/6/1963. Chapter Four looks at Bourquin's and Mashile's role in the ethnic conflict that racked the area in 1984. Chapter six offers a detailed description of Matsiketsane Mashile's career as a leader and the ideology that legitimated his actions.

7. This theme of the activities of unrecognised chiefs is an important focus of the rest of the thesis.

8. The population increased from 27 908 to 61 057 in Mhala and 27 016 to 66 583 in Mapulaneng. Central Statistical Services, 1985 Census.


10. Between 1960 and 1970 the number of tractors increased from 743 to 1390 in Letaba, 593 to 735 in Lydenburg and 297 to 316 in Pilgrims Rest. See Agricultural Census no 34 and Report No 06-01-08.

11. CAD BAO B24/1080, Arbeidskakelbeampte Barbeton to BAC Bushbuckridge 28/1/65, 2/2/65, 19/3/65, 30/7/65; BAC Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg, 14/7/65.


17. CAD BAO B24/1080, BAC Bushbuckridge to Chief BAC Pietersburg, 14/7/65 and BA F55/4/12/4, Mapulaneng Regional Authority Meeting, 7/3/67.

18. CAD BAO BAC B24/1080, Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg, 7/4/65.

19. See CAD BAO B24/1080 BAC Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg, 14/7/65.


22. See CAD K335, Evidence to Uys Commission, Moeniseng Mashego, Exson Chiloane, Bushbuckridge 14/5/77 and S Nogbeni, Mhala, 16/5/77.

23. CAD NTS 17/423/1 V10226, Revised report on Reclamation and Resettlement, 9/8/58.

24. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4 Meeting of MRA, 7/9/65.

25. CAD BAO F55/2/12/4, Meeting MRA, 5/7/66.

26. CAD BAO F55/4/15/4, SRA Meeting, 11/7/64.

27. CAD BAO 54/1080/13, Letter BAC Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg 16/6/65.

28. CAD BAO F53/1080/7/1, BAC Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg, 19/4/66 and 24/1/67.

29. CAD BAO F53/1080/7/1, BAC Bushbuckridge to Assit CBAC Sibasa, 19/6/67. Loosely translated the above quote means: In contrast to the previous report, I can talk with more optimism about progress in administration since the new secretary treasurer of the Tribal Authority, who has a privileged relation with Chief Mathibela, that he has been allowed to continue with administration. During the first three months of the previous book year fantastic progress was made.
30. CAD NTS 17/423/1 V10226, Revised report into Reclamation and Resettlement Bushbuckridge, 9/8/58.

31. CAD BAO F53/1080/7/1, BAC Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg, 30/12/64.

32. ibid.

33. CAD BAO F53/1080/2/1, CBAC Pietersburg to BAO, 2/8/66.

34. CAD BAO F53/1080/1/1, BAC Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg, 5/8/66.

35. CAD BAO F53/1080/1/1, BAC Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg, 5/8/66.

36. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4, Meeting MRA, 7/9/65. See also 6/12/66 and 3/9/68.

37. ibid

38. ibid.

39. ibid.


41. Interview Elisa Moshaba, Buffelshoek, 23/11/91.

42. Over time the available agricultural land at Dingleydale became very unevenly distributed amongst settlers at the scheme. See Chapter 4 for details of this process.

43. Information from statistics for 1989 and 1990 provided by the Agricultural Office at Bushbuckridge.

44. For employment conditions and struggles around the granting of land to agri-business see Chapter 4.

45. Using the age statistics for the two districts, I calculated the male absenteeism rate by determining the difference between the male and female populations between the age of 15 and 64. In 1970 around 50% of working age men in Mapulaneng and 53,5% in Mhala were absent from the area. In 1980, the figure dropped in around 46% in both districts, probably because of the growth in Secondary schooling. In 1985, the male absentee rate was around 45%. See Central Statistical Services, Population Census, 1970, Report No 02-05-03; 1980, Report No 02-8-01 and 1985, Report No 02-85-01. In 1989, 36% of "rural" household income in Lebowa came from migrancy. See Geerdts, Hall and Strijdom, Information for Development planning in Lebowa: income and expenditure patterns, Human Sciences Research Council, 1990. Chapter seven investigates household survival strategies in greater detail.
46. Interview S Machate, Brooklyn, 20/11/91.

47. See Development Information for Lebowa, and Development Information for Gazankulu, published by The Development Bank, 1986.

48. Lefort in *Democracy and Political Theory*, trans. Macey, D., Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988, argues that the separation of administrative power and political authority (and hence of civil society and the state) is a condition of possibility of democracy. The separation "necessitates and legitimates the expression of a multiplicity of positions... (and) it proves to be indissociable from freedom of opinion, of association and of movement, and from the freedom to express conflict throughout society" pg 29. As will be argued in the following paragraphs, the fusion of the two realms resulted in the constitutional and practical denial of the above freedoms.


50. The responsibilities of the TAs are both sweeping and vague. They are summarised by the Development Bank as follows:
- The Authorities are responsible for the construction of schools, water supply, clinics, offices and assist in planning their area for residential, arable and grazing purposes.
- Generally administering the affairs of the tribes and the communities within its area;
- Assist and support its magoshi or headmen in the execution or performance of the powers, authorities and functions conferred upon them;
- Advise and assist the government in connection with the well being of the residents of the area and the development and improvement of the land;
- Exercise or perform the powers, authorities and functions assigned to the authority by the Minister, eg hygiene, sanitation, health services, soil conservation, land administration, fauna and flora etc.
- Taxes: All fees rates and charges are paid to the authority; Administer the funds by way of control of estimates of revenue and expenditure.


53. The Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs was supposed to settle agricultural residents as well as plan and promote agriculture. The Department of Home Affairs had the responsibility of "administering land affairs". See Development Information for Lebowa, Development Bank, 1986.

54. Interview Tandios Mashile, Buffelshoek, 21/11/91.
55. By 1989, according to statistics supplied by an Agricultural Officer based at Bushbuckridge, there were about seven and a half thousand "squatters" (people in undemarcated stands) in Mapulaneng.

56. Chapter 4 in particular examines these issues in depth.

57. In the late eighties, residents of Buffelshoek were paying the following taxes:
   - Tribal Levy: R5
   - Water: R10
   - School Building: R20
   - Grazing: R5 (per cattle)
   - Dipping: R2 (per cattle)
   - Dogs: R2
   - Chief's Car: R10
   - Goats: R5
   - Ploughing Land: R2


58. In order for TAs to charge and collect water taxes, school building funds etc it was necessary to get these taxes promulgated by the Lebowa Legislative Assembly for a specified period of time. This procedure was usually ignored resulting in the illegal collection of taxes. It is also questionable whether a proper procedure for the charging of water taxes by Tribal Authorities was ever legislated.

59. In Mapulaneng, according to returns for the year March 1989 to April 1990 provided by the Magistrate, a total of R1,205,880, excluding school fees, was collected by Tribal Authorities. The total tax divided by the number of residents gives an average of R7.41 per person or R37.05 per family (assuming five members per family). However, the per capita amount collected by each Tribal Authority varied from R4.79 to over R23.62 (in two out of nine TAs). This means that families in the most heavily taxed TA areas paid tax of R118.00 a year. The TAs had a total expenditure of R806,227 implying that an amount of R4.97 was spent per resident. This leaves a difference of R2.44 per resident of taxes paid and expenditure by the TA.

60. Schedule I of Act No 21 of 1971.
CHAPTER FOUR

Ethnic Relationships in Bushbuckridge: 1897 - 1985

Introduction: Defining Ethnicity

"Tribal" identities, as defined by "traditionalists" in the Native Affairs Department (NAD), equated the notions of ethnicity and culture. For each discrete culture, made up of a series of customs and practices, there was supposedly a corresponding ethnic group and identity. Political affiliation was ultimately and inevitably determined by ethnic identity; Ethnicity and nationhood went hand in hand. Tribes consisted of a correspondence between a political structure, namely the chieftainship, and a unique combination of cultural practices. Advocates of this approach prioritised the collection and labelling of cultural practices as a necessary and sufficient explanation for ethnic identities and political affiliation. Modernisers assumed that tribalism was a "traditional aberration in a modern world"¹, an aberration that would inevitably be overcome by western rationality. Conservatives argued that the "tribe" was innate, primordial and politically desirable.²

In response to theories of Tribe, Marxists argued that tribalism, rather than being a primordial phenomena, was a product of colonialism and the development of capitalism. Leys, for example, argues that in post-colonial Kenya, ethnic divisions were really class divisions: Because the Kikuyu had an early experience of "underdevelopment", they were the
first to be integrated into a capitalist economy, and so began to constitute a bourgeoisie. ³

Hence, ethnic conflict between the Luo and the Kikuyu was really class conflict. This approach, however, cannot explain, (except by recourse to the idea of false consciousness or, ironically, to some notion of primordialism), why the conflict took the form of an ethnic struggle, rather than a class (or any other) conflict.

In order to get beyond the notion that tribalism was purely a construct of the colonial state, other writers have tried to integrate a class analysis of an ethnic group with an analysis of indirect rule. Vail, for example, argues that, within the context of a state that divides subordinate groups along ethnic lines, a rural petite bourgeois manipulated ethnic sentiments into ethnic nationalist programmes to achieve their own ends. ⁴ The rural underclasses supposedly accept these manipulations as chiefs (who are part of, or have an alliance with, the petite bourgeois) protect the interests of absent migrants. This formulation is instrumentalist, functionalist and (as Chapter six will show) empirically wrong. Rather than depending on the chiefs to protect their interests, migrants organised to resist chiefly exactions. More importantly, this approach cannot explain why ethnic mobilisations have such powerful resonances in one context while failing dismally in other situations. By failing to both link ethnic relations to power relations that structure the experience of members of an ethnic group, and by failing to show how members of an ethnic group struggle to define a moral economy appropriate to these experiences, the approach reduces ethnicity to symbolic manipulation from above.

Barth produced the most convincing critique of the theory of tribe. Barth argued that theories of “tribe” assumed precisely what needed to be explained; namely why specific cultural
practices (such as the use of a language) gave rise to ethnic identities. Not all "objective" cultural differences between groups became markers of ethnic identity, but only those practices which the actors themselves regarded as important. Barth shifted the debate from ethnic identities as a primordial given to ethnic relationships as a situational variable. The cultural practice in and of itself is not as significant as the process of transforming that practice into a symbol that serves to both define and separate ethnic groups. It is when a cultural practice acts as a boundary, that is a label which separates one group from another, that ethnic relationships (on which ethnic identities are contingently built) emerge.5

What is specific to ethnic relationships and identities is the link between a cultural practice (which acts as a boundary) and a normative judgement about what constitutes appropriate behaviour for people who adhere to that practice. Hence the content of the ethnic relationship is the normative prescriptions about what behaviour is appropriate to an ethnic identity in various spheres of social interaction. These prescriptions may or may not have anything to do with the cultural content of the practice that acts as a boundary. The cultural practices of the two groups can change, but so long as a boundary exists, the divisions between the two groups are reproduced.6

Following Barth's intervention, the problem for analysis is the content of ethnicity, which is the contingent link between a cultural practice and normative judgements about people who adhere to that practice. There are two broad dynamics around the definition of what constitutes appropriate behaviour for a member of an ethnic group: the imposition of a judgement from outside of the group (an ethnic relationship) and struggles between members of a group over definitions of what constitutes appropriate behaviour for members of that
group (an ethnic identity). The concept of moral economy advocated in the Introduction is ideally suited to capture both the symbolic dimension of the debate within an ethnic group about appropriate behaviour for members of that group as well as the criteria used by an ethnic group to pass judgements on other ethnic groups.

Ethnic relationships are constituted when an outsider attempts to impose a link between a cultural practice and a stereotype of a person adhering to that practice. Following this logic, the relationship between ethnic groups can be conceptualised as a power relation; namely an ongoing struggle to impose and resist definitions of an ethnic identity. It is attempts to organise power relations along ethnic lines that gives ethnicity a material existence.7 From this perspective, periodising the power struggle underlying an ethnic relationship becomes the object for analysis. In other words, the analyst must periodise the conditions under which an ethnic relationship emerges, is reproduced and is transformed.

The link between ethnicity and power relations has important methodological repercussions for researchers. Because ethnic identities are represented in different ways to different people, the interpretation of any representation of an ethnic identity needs to be accompanied by an awareness of the power relations operative in the interaction. In this context the notion of "hidden transcripts"8 is useful: in situations of vulnerability there can be different versions of events for insiders and outsiders. No single version of an event or relationship should be taken as the definitive version.

An ethnic identity links a moral economy, in the form of a series of practices and normative values, to a cultural marker. If an identity, and associated moral economy, is accepted by a
group, it becomes a multidimensional positive resource that can be drawn upon and redefined in different ways in different contexts. When individuals identify with one another on the basis of a shared cultural practice linked to certain norms of behaviour, an ethnic nation is constituted. What makes an accepted ethnic identity potentially powerful is that it can be evoked as a metaphor for an entire national "way of life". It is this "way of life" that separates members of the nation from outsiders. The definition of a practice as "cultural" depoliticises the practice as natural, immutable, moral, and hence intrinsically legitimate. Members of an ethnic group struggle over the definition of the moral economy that defines the rules that govern certain relationships within that ethnic community. Hence definitions of appropriate ethnic behaviour from within a group can be a site of struggle between subgroups demarcated along gender, generational and class lines. It is the changing balance of power between these strata that (over) determines the debates within a moral economy of an ethnic nation.

The adoption of cultural practices within the context of different ethnic relationships reflect relations of power within an ethnic community and between different ethnic groups. The role of the analyst is to relate the adoption and rejection of those elements that compromise a moral economy to a changing context of power relations.

Ethnic nationalism is a definition of ethnic relationships which demands that ethnic identity and political structure be congruent. Built into an imaginary that defines an identity and an associated moral economy are criteria that determine legitimate access to political power. This imaginary might or might not link ethnicity to political power. If the imaginary is not shared by other ethnic groups, ethnic nationalist projects have the potential of destroying any
consensus that makes ethnically diverse societies possible. Furthermore, a link between formal structures of political power and an ethnic identity intrinsically discriminates against people who are not members of the group. Struggles over the adoption of an ethnic nationalist project are determined by dynamics between and within ethnic groups, particularly in the case of ethnically heterogenous societies.

This chapter investigates the transformation of relationships between "Sotho" and "Shangaan" residents of Bushbuckridge from a relation of apparent harmony to one of conflict. It demonstrates how members of the "Sotho" group attempted to equate being "Shangaan" to being a refugee, and on the basis of this definition, demand a "Sotho" monopoly of political power. It describes how the "Shangaans" had a definition of themselves as "first settlers" on land that was ultimately owned by the (white) South African state. Implicit to that definition was a redefinition of the political imaginary and associated moral economy that defined the chieftainship. Within the horizon of meaning established by this reworked imaginary, different "Shangaan" chieftains were able to enter into legitimate and sustained alliances with the Swiss Mission Church and the Native Affairs Department. These alliances secured their recognition as chiefs from the NAD and consolidated their power amongst their subjects. The chapter periodises the struggle between the two ethnic groups in relation to shifts in the balance of power between the two groups. It shows how cultural practices were adopted and rejected by residents in response to this balance.

Ethnic identities are open to subversion by other identities such as class, racial, generational or gender identities. The chapter argues that residents experienced an acute ambivalence around the ethnic conflict. Many residents refused to identify with, or engage in, the ethnic
conflict. Many of those who did participate in the conflict were left with a deep uncertainty about the wisdom of their actions. The chapter will explore the causes and nature of this ambivalence.

**Ethnic Harmony and Ethnic Conflict in Bushbuckridge**

In October 1984 a crowd of over one thousand people, armed with pangas, kieries and makeshift weapons crossed the road which, until then, had acted as the border between Cottondale in Gazankulu and Buffelshoek in Lebowa. The vast majority of people in the crowd were "Shangaans". The aim of the crowd was to extend the border of Gazankulu to a railway line, which ran a few hundred metres west of the road. The crowd was accompanied by a contingent of Gazankulu police who appeared to sanction the aims of the mob. The mob destroyed houses that lay between the road and the railway line. Within hours, hundreds of mostly "Sotho" school students in Mapulaneng were transported from schools to the border. Students in Gazankulu were similarly mobilised. A battle ensued which continued for three days. Numerous "Shangaan" men living in Lebowa would leave their homes in the morning to fight on the Gazankulu side of the battle, only to return to their houses in the evening. "Sotho" men living in Gazankulu did likewise. Forty five houses were burnt. Fifteen people were killed and hundreds were injured. The violence was accompanied by streams of "Sotho refugees" moving out of Gazankulu into Lebowa and "Shangaan refugees" moving out of Lebowa into Gazankulu. It was only the intervention of a contingent of South African Police that ended the battle. The border between the two Bantustans remained the road.
In Dingleydale, some twenty kilometres away, a truckload of Gazankulu police attempted to remove a "road-block" erected by "Sotho" residents who were preparing for an expected attack from "Shangaans" living in neighbouring New Forest. The "Shangaans" had been beating their "war drums" throughout the previous three nights. The Gazankulu police fired shots into the air to disperse a group of residents gathered round the road-block. The residents did not acknowledge that the area fell under the jurisdiction of the Gazankulu police and were provoked into battle by the shots. The police were attacked with "stones, tomahawks, pangas", everything residents could find. One policeman was killed and another was seriously wounded. The rest of the policemen "ran for their lives" leaving their shoes, guns and clothes behind. A short while later a squad of South African police arrived, and successfully calmed the situation in the village.14

On 20 November 1984, a meeting of Pulana chiefs and elected Members of Parliament for Mapulaneng unanimously resolved that Tsonga, the official language of Gazankulu, would "no longer be taught or used as a medium of instruction in their schools as from 1 January 1985. Other foreign languages were specifically exempted from this resolution".15 The ban was justified as a "reprisal" in response to the phasing out of Northern Sotho lessons in Gazankulu. The decision affected about ten thousand Tsonga speaking children living in Mapulaneng.

A Commission established to investigate the border dispute, the Hiemstra Commission, found that the justification for the ban was unfounded:

"There is on the contrary a conspicuous readiness [by Gazankulu authorities] to provide instruction in Northern Sotho wherever it can be justified by the number of pupils who cannot be accommodated elsewhere."
The Commission found that:

"the so-called reprisal is merely an excuse, it is not the real reason. The true reason is general bad feeling against Shangaans. It showed itself in other manifestations of anti-Shangaan feeling, in that there was agitation for the dismissal of Shangaan workers in the area."\textsuperscript{16}

This interpretation by the Hiemstra Commission is corroborated in an unpublished letter from a Pulana leader to a magazine. The letter, which was written five years after the event, implies that "Shangaans" identify more strongly with the "white" Apartheid state than with the black population. The letter described "Shangaans" as being:

"malicious by nature and intolerable....people of Lebowa are sick and tired of the Shangaans...[we] therefore decided a retaliation [by stopping Tsonga at the schools] to give the Shangaans a chance to think that they are blacks."\textsuperscript{17}

In late January 1985, in protest at the withdrawal of Tsonga as a medium of instruction, "Shangaan" parents resident in Mapulaneng vented their anger on four schools in the district, causing damage to furniture and breaking over two hundred window panes.

These events stand in sharp contrast to earlier descriptions of the area by Native Commissioners and state Ethnologists. Correspondence between Commissioners and the Secretary of Native Affairs Department written from the turn of the century till well into the 1950s consistently refers to the absence of ethnic conflict despite the diversity of the district. Commissioners were struck by the lack of congruence between ethnic identity and political affiliation: numerous "Shangaans" lived adjacent to, and paid allegiance to "Sotho" chiefs. Van Warmelo, the state Ethnologist, was so struck by the ethnic harmony amongst the diversity of the district, that he referred to Bushbuckridge as an "area unique in the whole of South Africa"\textsuperscript{18}

The above descriptions pose two questions:
- How were apparently harmonious ethnic relationships transformed into antagonistic relationships?
- Why was violence used as an attempt to resolve the ethnic conflict?

This chapter argues that settlement patterns and ethnic identities in Bushbuckridge had their origins in nineteenth century conflicts and processes. In the nineteenth century there was no intrinsic link between ethnic identity and political affiliation at both the level of the household and the chieftaincy.19 However, the two main ethnic groups involved in the 1984 conflict, the "Shangaan" and the "Sotho" had different historical experiences of conflict and settlement in the district. The "Sotho" chieftainships had settled in Bushbuckridge in the first quarter of the nineteenth century in order to flee Swazi raiding parties. Although most of the century was spent fighting and fleeing Swazi and Shangaan marauders, by the last decade of the century the "Sotho" chieftainships were in a position to establish themselves as settled and more or less autonomous chiefdoms. The "Sotho" chieftainships had a historical claim to the land based on battles fought in the nineteenth century and their alliance with the Pedi paramountcy against the Swazi Kingdom. From this starting point, the "Sotho" chieftains entered into alliances with the aim of maintaining the political and economic autonomy that they had established in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The "Shangaan" settlers were refugees from various wars in Mozambique which took place in the nineteenth century. The Shangaan paramount entered the area in 1897, having been decisively defeated by the Portuguese. As these chieftains were unable to take ownership of land through military means they were forced to accept their status as subjects of some broader political force while attempting to reconstruct their chieftainships. To achieve these
ends the Shangaan chieftainships entered into alliances, at different times, with the "Sotho" chiefdoms, the Swiss Mission Church and the Native Affairs Department.

Different ideologies structured these alliances. The ideologies and histories adopted by the settled "Sotho" chiefdoms, which were reproduced through a vibrant oral tradition, linked the ownership of land to conquest and the shedding of blood by a chiefdom. The chief, as symbolic head of the "community", had ultimate ownership of the conquered land. Any person, regardless of their ethnic identification, who settled on a chief's land, would then by definition be accepting their subjection to the chief. Hence a chiefdom could incorporate other chiefs and have an ethnically heterogeneous following. This ideology was built on an imaginary which defined the social, natural and supernatural as intrinsically linked. In these terms the chief was the mediator between the living and the dead, the living representative of the most powerful lineage. On the other hand, the Swiss Mission Church and the Native Affairs Department had an ahistorical and rigid understanding of relationships within black society. Ideologies employed by these institutions assumed an intrinsic link between land, language, political affiliation and the chieftainship. This unit was called a tribe. Each tribe, according to this policy, would then have an equal right to "own" land and to have its own chief. Hence, the existence of a "tribal unit" or ethnic group was sufficient grounds for the right to land. This ideology accepted the political authority of the chieftainship as the appropriate form of government over, and political representative of, the "tribe". However, it denied the image of the chief as representing sacred authority, that is, as a structure whose authority rested on its position as a mediator between the living and the dead.20

This chapter argues that from a "Sotho" perspective, being "Shangaan" meant being a
refugee, that is a settler given land by a settled chief, and in accepting the land, accepting subjection to that chief. "Shangaans" were welcome to integrate into "Sotho" society through attending initiation school which was the main cultural / political barrier to recognition as a subject in the chief's court and to intermarriage. Those "Shangaans" who did not attend initiation remained marginalised within the "Sotho" chiefdoms. "Shangaan" chiefs were welcome to hold court "in their own language" but, as refugees, were ultimately subjects of the "Sotho" chiefs.

However, the right to own and control land was not determined by the cogency of ideological claims. Ownership of land came from the ability to assert power over that area, a fact not lost on the Shangaan chieftainship. "Shangaans" did not have a vision of themselves as being refugees in perpetuity. The Shangaan chieftainship established its position as paramount over Southern Mozambique through bloody conquest. The refugee paramountcy intended reestablishing its political autonomy, as well as its hegemony, at least over the refugees from Mozambique who had previously been its subjects. However, given the impossibility of military conquest, the chieftainship had to align itself with external political forces which could facilitate it achieving its goals. After reaching an accommodation with the Pulana chiefdoms and the Boer Republic in 1897, the Shangaan chieftainship entered into an alliance with the Swiss Mission Church in 1914. The Church acted as a broker between the Union Government and the Chieftainship. Through its schools, which preached an ideology of ethnic nationalism as well as modernisation, the church equipped the chieftainship with the conceptual means of negotiating with the Native Affairs Department (NAD). This alliance, however, represented a significant shift in the moral economy of the Shangaan chieftainship: By going to church the chieftainship accepted the legitimacy of an institution which denied
the link between politics and religion, between "secular power and sacred authority"\textsuperscript{21}, and in doing so, challenged the chieftainship's divine right to rule. Over time, the alliance had the effect of secularising and transforming the chieftainship into a (secular) political broker. One of the churches most "modern" and articulate products was Kheto Nxumalo, who was inaugurated to the chieftainship in 1942. In exchange for recognition and increased powers, Nxumalo entered into an alliance with the Native Affairs Department. In 1958, the "Shangaan / Tsonga" chiefs from the Northern and Eastern Transvaal successfully fought for recognition as an ethnic group as defined by the ideology of separate development. By (formally at least) accepting the ideology of Separate Development the Shangaan chieftainship, as well as the other refugee chieftainships, were able to achieve recognition, rights to land, and (at least in relation to the state) parity with the "Sotho" chieftainships.

The loose tribalism employed by the Milner Government was compatible with the "Sotho" chiefdoms' (who were later to become directly involved in the ethnic conflict) claims to own land and, consequently, wield ultimate political authority. Although the NAD's definition of tribe changed considerably in the first half of the twentieth century, (and implicit in this change was a transformation in the criteria employed by the NAD in the allocation of land and recognition of chiefly authority), prior to the establishment of Tribal Authorities in Bushbuckridge in 1963, the situation was fluid enough for the "Sotho" chiefs to maintain the image of themselves as ultimate owners of the land. This was because the state's recognition of a chief did not give that chief a monopoly over an area of ground. The apparent Departmental flexibility allowed the "Sotho" chiefs to believe that they had (ultimate) ownership of areas settled by "Shangaan" chiefs. The "Sotho" chiefs had consistently tried (and largely failed) to maintain their autonomy, and protect the integrity of gender and
generational relations from the state. However, the constitution of Tribal Authorities and then ethnically based Legislative Assemblies gave recognised chiefs sole control over their Authority areas. This effectively challenged the "Sotho" vision of having an effective hegemony over the district.22

The war of 1984 was more than a conflict around Bantustan borders. It was a clash of the two moral economies which defined different principles on which the legitimacy of claims to land and political authority were based: The "Sotho" claim was based on nineteenth century conquests and an ideology linking the past to the present, that is the ownership of the land to the shedding of blood. The "Shangaan" claim was based on their recognition as an ethnic group with a right to land and nationhood within the context of the ideology of Separate Development.

Violence was used to resolve the antagonism after the state was perceived by both parties as inconsistent in its role as an impartial mediator. Residents on both sides of the conflict were, through the use of violence, defining the right to own and control land regardless of the state's definition of boundaries. This process can be periodised as follows:

1835 - 1902: The arrival of the refugee chieftainships and their settlement in Bushbuckridge under a dual Pulana and Boer Republic hegemony.

1902 - 1936: The arrival of the Swiss Mission and early attempts by the Colonial and Post Colonial state to recognise the chieftainship.

1936 - 1962: The creation of the South African Native Trust and "Tribal Areas" and the consolidation of an alliance between Commissioners and the Shangaan Chieftainship.
1963 - 1972: The implementation of Tribal Authorities and Territorial Authorities and the growth of overt ethnic tensions.

1973 - 1985: The establishment of Legislative Assemblies and the evolution of border disputes.

The Settlement of Refugees from Mozambique: 1835-1902

Chapter one surveyed the processes that structured the settlement and politics of Bushbuckridge in the nineteenth century. It demonstrated that there was no single Pulana claim to land over the district. Maripe based his claim to paramountcy over the district on his military victory over a Swazi raiding party and his recognition by the Pedi paramount. Kolwyn, on the other hand, based his claim to paramountcy of the Pulanas on his recognition as such by the Boer Republic. The numerous smaller Pulana chiefs vacillated in their allegiances to broader forces. The history of each chieftainship was reproduced in a vibrant oral tradition. These histories emphasised moments of relative power and prosperity. Hence, there was no single Pulana "history" on which a claim to the district could be based.

Pulana, Pai and Khutswe chiefs competed with one another for followers and political power in the latter part of the nineteenth century. There was no paramount chief amongst either the Pulana or Pais who extracted tribute and who could make effective demands for the control of age regiments which fell under the different chiefs in the event of potential military conflict. Any political alliances were limited to two or three chieftainships amongst the dozen or more who resided in the district. However, apart from forging alliances with broader political forces, chiefs could increase their support base by accommodating refugees. Given the relatively depopulated area of the Lowveld in the late nineteenth century, one resource
the district was not short of was land. Hence, the arrival of the refugees from Mozambique was welcomed by the settled chieftainships as a chance to increase their followings and consolidate their power. The refugees, many of whom arrived "practically naked" and vulnerable, were looking for a structure that could offer them physical security and access to productive resources, most especially land.

The major barrier to assimilation into the settled chieftainships was the practice of initiation school. People who had not been initiated were barred from effective participation at the chief's court. Initiates formed exclusive groups in the form of age regiments, within which each member had an esoteric name, unknown to outsiders. Initiates would mock non-initiates and call them Mashaburo, meaning boy. Marrying a non-initiate was severely discouraged. 24

There were, however, those households that discriminated against the "Shangaan" refugees because they were "Shangaan" refugees. These households, an old Pulana woman recollected:

"did not make friends with them [the "Shangaans"]. It was a disgrace if one of their children fell in love with a Shangaan. They used to call them derogatory names. They did not give them water to drink, because they said if a cup had been touched by a Shangaan, it must not be used by others; it must be buried or burnt...The Pulanas could be cruel." 25

Some households settled individually within the areas of authority of the settled chieftains. These households attempted to assimilate themselves to their adopted "communities". They became known (derogatively) as the Bahlakana, those who are mixed up (or those who have no culture of their own). An old Pulana women remembers the relationship between the Pulanas and the Bahlakana at Maripeskop in the thirties:

"At Salique...they stayed all around. They attended chief's court. After a time we just stayed like we were all Pulana. They spoke SePulana. They attended initiation
As the result of adopting these practices, ethnic intermarriage with these households became widely practised. Over time these households adopted SePulana as their home language and became Pulanas in almost everything but their surnames.

Groups of refugees were given land by Pulana chiefs on conditions similar to those enjoyed by lineage groups. Leaders of these groups were allowed to settle disputes amongst members and allocate land to individual households. Over time most of these leaders attended initiation school and became headmen and councillors in the Pulana chiefly courts. Those leaders who did not attend initiation were still allowed to appear at the Pulana chief’s court, but they faced the possibility of “not being taken seriously”. Not all households in these groups went to initiation school, despite the discrimination they suffered as “outsiders”. A Pulana describes discrimination faced by non-initiates at the chief’s court:

If you had not been to initiation school they treated you as a minor. You could bring a complaint to the Kgoro and they would listen to it but they would not listen to it. Some would even say: “By the way, have you been to initiation school?” They could be rude. They could say: “What do you want here? Are you trying to pretend you know about things that you don’t know about?” But if you were from initiation they could listen and act.

Chiefs and Land

According to a Pulana oral tradition maintained by Maripe’s successors, the settled Pulana chieftainships gave land to the immigrant chieftainships on conditions similar to those practised by the Pedi polity. The immigrant chieftainships were given an effective local autonomy. They could hold court “in their own language” on condition that the Pulana Kgoro was taken as the ultimate court of appeal. Furthermore, as the land had been given to the
refugees, that is, as it had not been won through war, the Pulana chieftainships retained their status as the "ultimate owners of the land". In exchange, there is evidence to suggest that Pulana chiefs were hoping to establish a loyal force that could be called upon during secession disputes and conflicts between chieftainships.\textsuperscript{31}

In practice, the ability to assert a hegemony depended on the balance of power between two parties. Given the fragmented nature of the Pulana chieftainships, the presence of the South African state and the relatively depopulated nature of the Lowveld, the conditions under which the different immigrant chieftainships settled were more ambiguous.

The Mathebula or Baloi chieftainship settled on the farm Dokkum in what is now the Kruger National Park. The chiefdom consisted of about three hundred followers scattered around the eastern Lowveld. This group was settled east of any effective influence of the Pulana chieftainships.\textsuperscript{32}

The Mnisi chieftainship came to the Lowveld in the 1850s following the secession dispute for the Shangaan paramountcy. The Mnisi chieftainship had fallen under the hegemony of the Nxumalo (or Shangaan) chief while residing in Mozambique. Within the ambit of Shangaan paramountcy, the Mnisi's were recognised by the Royal family as rain-makers. They spoke a dialect of "Tsonga" named by the Swiss Mission as Hlanganu. On arrival in the Transvaal, the chieftainship was keen to establish its independence from the Nxumalos and settled with its followers at Klaserie near the Pulana Molotele Chieftainship. The Mnisi chieftainship adopted the practice of initiation school and would on occasion attend the Pulana court. In 1905, the Mnisis had the largest registered following of all the immigrant chiefs.\textsuperscript{33}
However, with the purchase of farms in the district by syndicates and farmers, the chieftainship was forced to move three times over the next thirty years to avoid labour tenancy, thus dispersing its following. The chieftainship was also racked by internal divisions. Moses Mnisi, the brother of recognised chief, Shobian Mnisi, was involved in a secession dispute over the chieftainship. This tension was exacerbated by the arrival in the early twentieth century of a second section of the Mnisi clan who had been resident in Lydenburg. This section had its own chief who was doing what he could to establish his dominance over Shobian. In 1936, Shobian Mnisi and his family were settled by a Commissioner on a recently purchased Trust farm, Islington, which was situated well into the Lowveld. This gave the Mnisis effective autonomy from the Pulana chieftainships living on the foothills of the Drakensberg.

The Nxumalo (or Shangaan) Chieftainship was headed by Mpisane, Nghunghunyane's uncle, who was appointed regent by Nghunghunyane just prior to his deportation by the Portuguese in 1895. The chieftainship settled on the farm Orinoco some forty to fifty kilometres away from Maripeskop. The Nxumalos were the direct Nguni descendants of Soshangane, who had conquered large areas of Mozambique in the 1830s. Although the Shangaan chieftainship had been racked by bloody internal conflicts throughout the nineteenth century, it had retained its position as paramount over Southern Mozambique. The members of the Shangaan chieftainship retained the use of the Zulu language and important elements of Zulu culture, particularly the prohibition on eating fish, which served to separate the Ngunis from the conquered groupings in Mozambique. The Nxumalos never adopted initiation school.

The conditions under which the Shangaan chieftainship settled remains a subject of intense
debate. Both sides of the debate agree that the chieftainship had contact with Maripe, a Pulana chief, as well as with Abel Erasmus (the Native Commissioner for the Boer Republic stationed at Lydenburg). Maripe's successors claim that the land was given to the Nxumalos to settle on but not to own. These Pulana see the relationship between Maripe and Erasmus as one of a temporary political accommodation between rivals. The Nxumalos claim that the land was allocated to them by Erasmus in exchange for various gifts. They see Maripe's recognition of Erasmus as an acknowledgement by Maripe of the Boer Republic's "ownership" of the land. The truth probably lies somewhere between the two poles.36

The first forty years after the flight from Mozambique proved to be a difficult period for the Shangaan chieftainship. Mpisane abdicated the chieftainship in 1910 in favour of Thulamahashe, one of Ngunghunyane's sons. However, in 1921, Buysono, the rightful genealogical heir who was arrested by the Portuguese in 1895, sent word from South West Africa that he wanted to return to the Lowveld and take over the chieftainship. This prompted Thulamahashe to investigate the possibilities of returning to Mozambique with his following. On discovering that he would not be recognised by the Portuguese authorities, Thulamahashe stayed in the Transvaal and handed over the chieftainship to Buysono when the latter returned in 1922. However, rivalry between the two brothers effectively split the chieftainship until 1932 when Buysono died and Thulamahashe was reinstated as chief.37

The Chieftainship, Ethnicity and the Post Colonial state: 1902 - 1936

It has been shown in Chapter One that the Milner government legitimated the distinct political rights accorded to the african population by representing the "native" as essentially "tribal",
granting "tribes" their "ancestral" land, and installing the state as "paramount chief" of the "tribes". Native Commissioners within this scheme could be thought of as representatives of the Crown. This combined with the ethnics of sympathetic paternalism and personal rule, as well as an under-resourced NAD, gave Commissioners considerable autonomy in the administration of their districts.

The principle of "ancestral lands" was not good news for the Shangaan chieftainship; as recent refugees from Mozambique, they were accorded the status of "squatter" by the Milner Government's Location Committee, regardless of any agreement they might have made with Erasmus in the late nineteenth century. However, although the discourse of "ancestral lands" seemed to be compatible with the interests of the settled chiefdoms, the administrative definition of "ancestral lands" was a more complicated process. Ultimately administratively recognised "ancestral land", the Released Area, was defined by the Beaumont (and in the Eastern Transvaal) the Stubbs Commissions, who balanced the claims of farmers, the mining industry and "tribes". Regardless of any agreements reached between Kolwyn and Erasmus, the land where Kolwyn's descendants had settled had been purchased by the Transvaal Gold Mining and Estate (TGME) and fell outside of the Released Area. Additionally, despite the politics of the paramountcy practised in the nineteenth century, in terms of which loyal chiefs were granted special recognition and autonomy for rendering military services, chiefs were not accorded special privileges in exchange for military support. This Setlare, Maripe's successor, discovered after the gun he was given for fighting in the First World War was confiscated. 

These apparently contradictory phenomena are explicable with reference to the fact that as
the first quarter of the twentieth century progressed the NAD was attempting to establish bureaucratic criteria in terms of which chief's would be recognised. However, the situation in Bushbuckridge was an anathema to ideologies that reified the chieftainship or cultural practices into a single static model. Chiefly powers and ritual authority differed considerably within an ethnic group and between ethnic groups. Indeed, compared to areas where there was a history of stable centralised authority, the chiefs appeared to have almost no authority. There were no clear areas of chiefly influence: followers of different chiefs were intermingled and the followings of the different chieftainships were not ethnically homogenous. "Cultural" practices such as initiation were adopted by individuals from an ethnic group without a history of such practices, whilst other individuals rejected these practices. The link between language and a uniform culture which served as a founding principle of European nation state philosophy (on which traditionalists based their perceptions) was, in numerous cases, simply non-existent. Added to this context was the fact that the NAD was under-resourced for the first third of the twentieth century. During this period, relatively pragmatic and flexible Commissioners only made half hearted efforts to bureaucratise the chieftainship.

The state was not the only institution chiefs looked towards in order to bolster their powers. After being spurned by Milner's Location Commission, in 1914 the Nxumalo chieftainship adopted a new strategy of coping with their immigrant situation; they joined the Swiss Mission Church and went to school.

The Swiss Mission's Arrival In South Africa

In 1872, the free church of the Canton of Vaud, which was later to become the Swiss Mission
Church, began its missionary endeavour in Southern Africa. Initially the church assisted the Paris Missionary Society in Basotholand, but soon began to search for an independent base and its own "tribal" constituency. However, by the time the Swiss missionaries arrived in the Transvaal, the Berlin Mission had already laid exclusive claim to all the autochthonous chiefdoms in the northern and eastern Transvaal. After failing to make inroads around Sekhukhuneland, which was already covered by the Berlin Mission, the missionaries trekked further north to a point south west of the Zoutpansberg mountains. There, the missionaries learnt of "Bergkaffirs" or "knobneuse", who spoke an "extremely difficult language" and were refugees fleeing from wars in Mozambique. The Swiss Mission had found a constituency. Missionaries from the other churches agreed that the "knobneuse" were to be allocated to the Swiss Mission. The Missionaries gradually became aware that there were numerous other east coast immigrant settlements scattered throughout the North Eastern Transvaal.

"These lived in independent chiefdoms strung out along the Levubu river as well as to the south of the Spelonken where communities had settled under Modjadji and other Pedi chiefs....[Soon] the Swiss Missionaries laid claim to the entire diaspora of the east coast immigrants."*

Believing that it was their "God-ordained mission" to save the Gwamba (later to become the "Tsonga"), the Swiss Mission "dedicated itself uniquely to the Gwambas and had to create a literature in that language."** The missionaries drew on a theory of nationalism that asserted that a common language consciously or unconsciously bound the speakers together as a nation. This view was reinforced by the division of the mission field along linguistic lines. The missionaries embarked on a process of formalising a "common" language, Tsonga, out of the numerous dialects of their constituency. The "common" language was ultimately a formalised written version of one these dialects. The missionaries then initiated a campaign to build a sense of nationhood based on the "common" language and the "unique"
cultural practices that they associated with the language.  

The relationship between the Swiss missionaries and the Berlin Mission reflected the competitiveness between European nations that went beyond religious concerns. Each mission defined its own constituency in terms of cultural stereotypes and based it on an ostensibly common language. The missionaries were quick to look for admirable stereotypes in "their" people, and negative stereotypes in the competitive mission's constituency. These stereotypes were based on projections of what was positive to the liberal French Swiss Mission versus the relatively authoritarian and conservative German Mission. "The difference between the Gwambas (Tsonga) and Batsoetla (Vendas) was conceptualised in starkly oppositional terms, often reminiscent of Franco-German rivalries." The missionaries also inherited their stereotypes from their constituencies' depiction of one another. These stereotypes were rarely challenged, as the vast majority of missionaries learnt only the language spoken by their constituencies and, by choice, had little contact with other groupings.

Church and School in Bushbuckridge

In 1914, Bethuel Matinye, a former "herdboy" for the Shangaan Royal Family who had become a member of the Swiss Mission at Waterval Boven and had been educated by the Church between 1907 and 1912, opened up a church at Mpisane. Matinye was amongst the group of refugees who had arrived with Mpisane in 1897. In 1915, Jonas Maphophe, an educated and articulate convert of the Mission, was sent to Mpisane to open up a school as well. The school opened with more than 350 pupils.
The establishment of the Church sparked off a debate within the Nxumalo chieftainship. One side of the debate was suspicious of church and school as an alternative source of political power to the chieftainship, and stressed the disruptive possibilities of the institution to existing household relationships. The other side of the debate stressed the need to find a mediating force between the chieftainship and the "white dominated" state, despite the unwanted effects the church might have on the integrity of the chieftainship and on household cohesion. The latter side won the debate and all the members, both male and female, of the Shangaan royal family went to school. However, the elder members of the family soon dropped out as the classes were conducted in Tsonga, which the Nguni patriarchs did not understand.47

Implicit in the terms of the debate was a transformation in the principles underlying the moral economy of the chieftainship. An alliance with the Swiss Mission Church was not just an expedient alliance with a broader political force, but an alliance with an institution that was constituted within an imaginary that denied the existence of ancestors, and hence of the divine authority and powers of the chieftainship. The chieftainship swapped the principle linking the chieftainship to the ultimate ownership of land to the shedding of blood with the acceptance that they were living under a "white dominated" state and hence needed to mediate between the state and its subjects. Rather than being located at the nexus of the living and the dead, that is between the ancestors and its subjects, the chieftainship now saw itself between the state and its subjects. The Swiss Mission Church, for its part, never challenged the (secular) political authority of the chieftainship: according to the Mission's theory of tribe, the chief was the undisputed head of a tribal unit.

Over the next twenty years the Swiss Mission established numerous churches and schools in
the district, with varying degrees of success. In the 1920s the Church of the Nazarine, an American Mission Church, also began to open up branches in Bushbuckridge. It established a church at Zoegnog amongst the refugees living under the Pulana Thabakulu chieftainship. The Church found its chiefly base amongst a section of the divided Mnisi royal family. Moses Mnisi, a brother to Shobian the recognised chief, used the church to build his influence and opened a Zulu speaking church near his homestead. Shobian did not join the church.48

The Swiss Mission was not interested in converting Pulanas. Pulanas were classified as Northern Sotho and hence the domain of the Berlin Mission. All classes and church services of the Swiss Mission were held in Tsonga, the language of the refugees. The church also scorned initiation, and encouraged converts not to be circumcised in an initiation rite. Although many refugees living as groups under Pulana chieftainships joined the Church, the Pulana boycotted both church and school, including the Nazarene which offered classes in SePedi. A retired Swiss Mission Principal who worked in the area of the Thabakulu chieftainship recollected:

"The Pulana had a different culture. When they were twelve or thirteen they would go to initiation school and then straight away go to work. When they returned they got married. They were not interested in school. The "Tsongas" would stay at home during their teens and go to school."49

Church and school were viewed by the Pulana as a challenge to ancestral authority, and hence to the authority of the chieftainship and the principles on which household relationships were based. Ancestral rules and histories were reproduced through a powerful oral tradition that drew on generational authority for its power, and reproduced that authority. The disruptive capacity of school was articulated by Chief Mathibela to the 1917 Land Commission:

"Now today our chief Secocoeni [sic] is killed, and his son is our big chief...But he was caught when he was very young and taught how to read and write. We thought we had two good chiefs. They also throw us away."50
Whereas the Pulana victimised uninitiated "Shangaans" who attended the Pulana chiefs court, "Shangaan" students went out of their way to victimise those few initiated Pulanas who attended Swiss Mission schools in the thirties and forties. Pulana students also had to cope with being scorned by their peers who had gone to work, and as a consequence, had some money to spend. Sekgopela Mashile recalls his schooling experience:

I was doing Standard Two at Kokobela [Swiss Mission] school at Islington when I went to circumcision school. When I returned, we did not agree. I was the only man among the Shangaan boys. The Shangaan boys take us as people who have no culture. They undermine us. They speak funny words. Because I know that I am a man, they cannot call me a boy. They must not use my name which they call me at home.... The Shangaan boys did not take care of that... The boys from work thought themselves to be better than me. We were poor, and I did not have sufficient clothes. When other boys from work returned with clothes, you fell very sorry so you go to work also. I left school for Matafin [a citrus estate]. My brother [Matsiketsane] came back from Johannesburg and forced me to return to school. But this time I went to Lephong [state] school.\textsuperscript{51}

The Shangaan chieftainship initially allied itself with the church for strategic reasons: it aimed to use the church as a buffer between itself and the state. This strategy bore fruit when Missionaries made representations to the NAD about removals and other hardships and when a missionary represented the chieftainship to the Stubbs Commission.\textsuperscript{52} Evidence to the Commission reveals different expectations and attitudes towards the state of the various chieftainships.

Evidence to the Stubbs Commission

The evidence of Matches Khumalo, a minor immigrant "headman" reflected the vulnerability of the refugees and a willingness to accommodate the state.

We are very thankful to the authorities. We are all black here and we are the children of the Government. We first started paying our tax under Paul Kruger. To-day we
should like to settle down quietly and have an area forever. We are very pleased with
the district officers for helping us. We are your dogs.53

In complete contrast to the evidence of Khumalo, the evidence of Mathibela, the Bakhutswe
chief was militant. Mathibela consistently built his chieftainship by acting as a shield between
his followers and external intrusions from farmers and the state. In his evidence Mathibela
asserted a historical right to land and to political and economic autonomy:

I am suffering. For I am not one to go mining. I was born in this country. I have
been here always. My grandfathers in the olden days lived in this country and I grew
up here. I was frightened when I saw a whiteman building a house and afterwards I
heard him say he had bought me. I am not a woman to be bought... Then I grew
angry. My heart said to me to go into my house and get my assegai but I was afraid.
I packed up and said I would go into Portuguese Territory... I am not pleased with
what the Colonel has said. I shall be afraid to tell my wife. I am still heart sore. I
have not seen a way to freedom.54

The Nxumalo chieftainship used Maphophe, the Swiss Mission priest and teacher, to represent
them to the Land Commission. In effect Maphophe acted as a broker. He mediated between
the interests of the chieftainship and the formal requirements of the Commission. Maphophe
was extremely articulate and understood the politics of segregation. Although he accepted the
"principle of territorial separation", Maphophe made a direct and considered demand for a
massive extension to the Released Area.55

The Pulana chieftainships were split in their representations to the Land Commission. Setlare,
hoping to achieve recognition as an independent political entity from the state by providing
military services in order to demonstrate his loyalty and power, emphasised that he was on
his way to fight in the First World War. He accepted the land allocated by the Commission
as it covered the area historically controlled by his chieftainship. Kolwyn, on the other hand,
whose area was left out of the Released Area in its entirety as it was owned by gold mining.
companies, opposed the Commission's recommendations.56

There was a marked contrast between the evidence presented to the Commission at Pilgrims Rest and that presented by the representative of the Venda paramount, Sibasa. Sibasa's evidence was virulently anti "Shangaan". The presentation of evidence by "foreigners" (namely "Shangaans") at the Commission was resented by Sibasa as it implied some right to own land and to be recognised as a chief after Sibasa had been kind enough to "look after" the refugees. "Shangaans", Sibasa suggested, should be sent back to "Portuguese East Africa" or taken to a place "with no name" where "no human being can live".57 In Bushbuckridge, however, where there was no history of a centralised paramountcy to claim hegemony over the region, and where there was no immediate experience of land shortages, there was no evidence of anti-"Shangaan" sentiment at either the Beaumont or Stubbs land Commissions.

The Situation by 1936

In 1934 van Warmelo, the state ethnologist conducted his national survey of the distribution of chieftainships and ethnic groups. Van Warmelo's observations on ethnic relations in Bushbuckridge in 1934 were as follows:

"We find today immigrants from all quarters of the compass (save due north where there are no people) peaceably living side by side, and the boundaries of tribal influence intersecting and overlapping to an amazing extent.... Pilgrims Rest district in which are spoken the languages Zulu, Swazi, both the Nhlanganu and Nkuna dialects of Tsonga, sePedi, hiPai and seKoka remains an area unique in the whole of South Africa."58

Van Warmelo, expecting overt ethnic conflict, failed to observe more subtle forms of ethnic power relations and discrimination. For example, van Warmelo's chiefly and ethnic survey
quoted in Appendix C, based on tax-cards, reflect the degree of ethnic mixing and the absence of a fixed correlation between a chief and an ethnic group. Nevertheless, van Warmelo does not note the significance of the almost complete absence of any Pulana households paying allegiance to "Shangaan" or "Nhlanganu" chiefs. While the refugees were willing to pay allegiance to any chieftainship that could offer them protection, the more settled groupings, although experiencing labour tenant and forestry removals, did not akonza to the refugee chieftainships.59

Although the refugees who settled under Pulana chieftainships faced overt discrimination in the early stages of settlement, the status of those refugees who began to attend initiation school improved considerably. Initiates could attend chiefly court and (in theory at least) marry other initiates despite ethnic differences. Those refugees who did not attend initiation school had no choice but to accept a marginal position within the domain of the chieftainship. When these people settled in groups, they did hold court in Shangaan.60

By 1936 two broad strategies of consolidating chiefly power had emerged in the district. The settled chieftainships on the edges of the Drakensburg were attempting to incorporate groups of refugees under a loose hegemony. These groups could then be called upon to provide support in times of need. These chieftoms, retained an image of the chief as living representative of the dominant lineage and attempted to maintain their autonomy in relation to church and state. Following the failure of earlier attempts to establish an alliance with the state in exchange for this autonomy, these chieftainships withdrew into a passive, uncooperative stance in relation to the state.
The refugee chiefs, on the other hand, were looking to the settled chieftainships, the church, and the state as potential resources to bolster their positions and to gain secure access to land. The Shangaan chieftainship were drawing on the Swiss Mission to act as both a mediator between themselves and the state and as a resource to equip themselves to negotiate with the state on their own behalf. This, however, involved an implicit change in the principles that structured the moral economy of the Shangaan chieftainship.

With the creation of the South African Native Trust and the unprecedented restructuring of settlement that accompanied Betterment, strategies attempting to secure insularity from outside forces were becoming increasingly untenable. The following section explores this dynamic.

Chiefly Responses to the South African Native Trust: 1936 - 1962

The creation of the SANT in 1936 placed the administration of Trust lands unequivocally in the hands of Departmental officials. Administrative centralisation, following the 1927 Native Administration Act, was accompanied by a shift in the NAD towards "scientific" policy making, which included the discipline of anthropology. This resulted in Commissioners being less sensitive to the local context and in more strenuous attempts by the NAD to bureaucratise the chieftainship along lines dictated by the theory of tribes. In 1940 the first major report into the restructuring of settlement was produced by Commissioner Ramsay. Chapter Two provides a detailed summary of the report and the controversy within the bureaucracy that surrounded it. The crux of the report was an attempt to recreate "tribal cohesion" through recognising and allocating Trust land to one chief per ethnic group except when followings
were geographically or historically split. Unrecognised "ex-chiefs" were to become headmen of the recognised chiefs. Trust residents would be invited to move and settle under their own chiefs. If residents "preferred" to remain where they were, then they were supposed to "acknowledge the authority and customs of the chief" under whom they were living. 62

The district was divided into the "Shangaan sphere of influence" which was the Lowveld portion of the Released Area and the "Sotho sphere of influence" which consisted of the slopes and foothills of the Drakensburg. Drawing on Swiss Mission folk wisdom, different "tribes" had established a greater or lesser resistance to malaria. Hence, despite the presence of malaria on both the Lowveld and the Middleveld, and the settlement of members of all major ethnic groups on both altitudes, the Middleveld was allocated to the "Mapulane and Mbaye" while the malaria ridden Lowveld was allocated to the "Shangane, Hlangana and Mkhutswe". However, this division reveals a sub-text of ethnic stereotyping that had nothing to do with health considerations. The division of the area, which became an accepted bureaucratic fact, reflected the "Shangaan" stereotype of "Sothos" as "mountain people" and the "Shangaan" version of history that the refugees were the first settlers on a depopulated Lowveld in 1897, and hence had a claim to ownership of that area. 63

Following resistance by unrecognised chiefs, a second report on the allocation of chiefly areas was produced in 1946 by Charles Bourquin, the son of a Swiss Missionary. The report allocated a farm to the chief whose followers made up the majority of residents on that farm. Based on this principle six previously unrecognised Pulana chiefs, who were living outside of the Released Area, were marked down for future recognition. 64
The second report produced two problems for the social planners. Difficulties remained in allocating farms where no following of any chief predominated over the followings of other chiefs. The Commissioner "solved" the problem on one such farm by granting all chiefs with followers on the farm, jurisdiction over their supporters. Three other mixed farms were given to the Mnisi chieftainship because the "Tonga [sic] element predominated". The second problem that arose was the existence of "islands" of land that should have been allocated to a chief on the basis of the chief having the majority of followers, but were geographically separated from the chief's main "tribal area". In response to this dilemma, van Warmelo put forward an explicitly ethnically based principle for allocating these farms:

I would suggest taking the longer view, that in the long run, a Sotho island amidst Shangaans is undesirable and give the three farms concerned... to Shobian [Mnisi] also. I would give Acornhoek and Rooiboklaagte to Mabalane [Setlare's successor], despite the number of Shangaans living thereon esp on the latter.

Although van Warmelo's suggestions were adopted in theory, in practice Commissioners were not able to implement a systematic programme of settling people on "tribal" lines as most of the Released Area was privately owned well into the forties. The Trust purchased farms between 1940 and 1960 sporadically and unsystematically. Numerous farms purchased late in the fifties and early sixties had ethnically diverse populations who paid allegiance to up to eight different chiefs.

Furthermore, Commissioners could not accord chiefs resident on private farms meaningful recognition. Because of this, in 1941, only four chiefs were recognised following Ramsay's report. By the late forties, when further ground had been purchased by the Trust, Modernisers, more interested in organising settlement along agro-economic lines than bureaucratising the chieftainship, had moved into the Native Commissioner's chair. Hence despite the fact that the two reports written in the forties recommended that several more
chiefs be recognised, this recognition was not forthcoming even when farms on which these chiefs were resident were purchased by the Trust.

Although some bureaucrats saw the reconstruction of the chieftainship as a temporary phenomena, the chief as political head of "tribal unit" was the cornerstone of traditionalist ideology; the chieftainship was both the structure through which the traditionalists hoped to gain administrative control over reserve areas, as well as the recognised political representative of what was supposed to be ethnically homogeneous communities. "Tribal discipline" and "tribal pride" were both ideals to be realised for the sake of the "communities" as well as for the sake of sound administration. Within this framework, the "tribal unit" formed the institutional building block for an ethnic nationalist project.

However, the implementation of Betterment policies threatened to subvert these aims by undermining chiefly authority and legitimacy. Recognised chiefs were granted both legal and administrative powers. These chiefs had to choose whether to formally cooperate with, or resist, the implementation of Betterment. Unrecognised chiefs had to choose between building their followings by opposing Betterment or trying to achieve recognition by cooperating with bureaucrats. The strategies and choices made by chiefs differed considerably in this period. The following section gives a sense of how these processes affected the powers and followings of different chiefs.

Relationship between Chiefs, Residents and the State

The Shangaan Chieftainship
The alliance between the Shangaan chieftainship and the Swiss Mission bore fruit for the chieftainship in the form of Kheto Nxumalo, who became regent in 1942. Nxumalo was a tall, dignified man, who projected a calm and implacable authority. He was Swiss Mission educated and an active member of the Church. As such he was steeped in the ideology of "tribalism", as preached by the Church, which enabled him to present the interests of the chieftainship in a way that traditionalists in the state could understand. He was a successful "progressive" farmer who understood the logic of Betterment and could effectively negotiate the implementation thereof with Modernisers. He was also a member of the royal family and steeped in the history and practices of the chieftainship. Nxumalo was equipped to traverse the gulf between the logic of state planners and the logic of a society organised around ancestral practices.68

Nxumalo's reign saw the transformation in the moral economy of the Shangaan chieftainship that underwrote the alliance with the Swiss Mission. Kheto took over the chieftainship when his father, Thulamahashe, was on the point of losing chiefly recognition for referring witchcraft accusations to Sangomas for arbitration. In contrast to Thulamahashe, when Kheto took over the reigns of power, the chieftainship became secularised: Kheto abolished rain-making ceremonies and refused to "judge" witchcraft accusations.69 The church became the source of the chiefdom's spiritual protection and the forum where residents could pray for rain. The role of the chief as mediator between the living and the dead was superseded by the role of the chieftainship as mediator between its subjects and the state. This meant it was the (moral) role of the chief to speak the language of the state when speaking to bureaucrats, and that of "custom" when speaking to subjects.
The Shangaan chieftainship's commitment to education reaped further dividends. Other subjects of the chieftainship who were members of the Swiss Mission Church and received an education from the Church were qualified to seek jobs in the bureaucracy. These people became agricultural officers, teachers, policemen and clerks in the Commissioner's office. They were well placed to influence local agents of the state in ways that would benefit the chieftainship. By 1955 there were eight Swiss Mission churches with schools in the district which further increased the number of educated "Tsongas" who were schooled in the ideology of ethnic nationalism.

Nxumalo successfully set himself up as a broker between his subjects and the state. He trod the fine line between being associated with Betterment whilst demonstrating that he was not responsible for its implementation. Nxumalo served with an educated and articulate Swiss Mission priest, Jonas Maphophe, on the Bushbuckridge Local Council. As a member of the Council, Nxumalo used his position to soften the impact of the harsher Betterment policies. To avoid being directly implicated in the implementation of Betterment, Nxumalo gave the real proponents of Betterment a platform to communicate directly to his subjects:

"The people spoke point blank that they did not like it [Betterment]. I invited all the people to come to my home and called those who came with the plans to explain it. If I had explained it, I would have had a problem." 

Nxumalo did, however, discourage his subjects from opposing Betterment. At a meeting with his indunas, Kheto argued the following:

"This [Betterment] is happening everywhere. What is going to happen if we alone resist it. You must look to the direction where you are going."

These statements reflected the chieftain's acceptance and accommodation of the fact that they were living under a more powerful state.
Nxumalo was not opposed to using the punitive power of the state to ensure that his subjects channelled any request or complaint to the Commissioner through the chieftainship, as is demonstrated by the following extract from a local council meeting:

Our people give us a lot of trouble and just do not want to obey the law and do not listen to us. Why did they not come to us to plead for mercy from the government. Instead they just break the law. I am not in favour of the crops [planted outside of demarcated agricultural areas] being given back to the offenders. The Trust must take the crops.74

Nxumalo established a working relationship with the Agricultural Office so that he was consulted before any application for settlement was processed. Headmen, who had fled from Mozambique with Mpisane, with a proven loyalty to the chieftainship were living as a group on the farm Merry Pebble Stream. Over the next twenty years, as the Trust brought a farm and it was demarcated, Nxumalo would station one of these headmen on that farm. The chieftainship would then distribute new settlers to the recently purchased farm. Any settlers that formed a group that could challenge these headmen were dispersed to different farms. Using this strategy the chieftainship was effectively reconstructed.75

Nxumalo, the chief, was a pragmatist. Unlike his predecessors he was not an Nguni chauvinist. He was fluent in, and allowed the use of, both Nguni and Shangaan dialects in his court. He kept his court scrupulously and did not discriminate against any ethnic group in his judgements.76 He granted recognition as headman to leaders who did not have historical status as headmen, but who had significant support. When sons of headmen refused to take up the position he allowed local elections to decide who the new headman was to be. He began to forge an alliance between the Nxumalo and the Mnisi chieftainships through the marriage of his sister to the royal incumbent, Jotham Mnisi.77 Between 1934 and 1960 the following of the Shangaan chieftainship increased from about 2498 to 3908 taxpayers.78
Mathibela's Chieftainship

The Mathibela chieftainship was in the paradoxical position of being resident on Trust Land, recognised by the state and given jurisdiction over definite areas while, at the same time, doing everything in its power to resist any intrusion by the state into the workings of the chieftainship, or the lives of its subjects.

Mathibela was one of the four chiefs recognised in terms of the Location Reclamation Report. In 1941 he was given a definite area of jurisdiction in terms of the Report's settlement plan. The residents who had settled on the ground that was allocated to the chieftainship had the choice of moving or changing their allegiance to Mathibela. The result was a significant "bureaucratic increase" of his following; that is, tax cards of followers of other chiefs living in his area were automatically altered to show that they had "nkonzaed" to him. Between 1938 and 1946 his following increased from about 1,300 to 2,481 taxpayers.79

This restructuring met with resistance from two previously "independent headmen" living in the area allocated to Mathibela. In an attempt to consolidate his power, Mathibela was willing to turn to the Commissioner at a quarterly meeting with the following complaint:

"Chief Mathibela complains that Headmen Matjes [Khumalo] and Jantie Nkuna do not recognise his authority as a chief. He is willing to work with them but these men do not cooperate."80

Mathibela was able to incorporate the two headmen by giving them the status of headmen in his court. Over time significant numbers of their followers accepted his rule. By 1946, the Commissioner described Khumalo's following as insignificant.81

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Mathibela built his following by acting as a buffer between his subjects and the state. The Commissioner described Mathibela in 1946 as:

"a proper heathen chief and uneducated but he is a chief with considerable power among his followers. He is respected and obeyed and definitely controls his people. Unfortunately he is very conservative and is very suspicious of all Europeans and of the Government and at times very difficult to work with. He administers justice fairly, although at times he tends to exceed his powers."82

Mathibela was a nominated member of the Bushbuckridge Local Council but scrupulously boycotted the forum. He blamed the Council for the implementation of Betterment:

"Mathibela stated that he was against the Local Council as it was only since the introduction of the Local Council System that his people were forced to reside and plough in certain defined area. I [the Commissioner] get the impression that his whole attitude was against any form of control or interference by the Trust."83

Although Mathibela could not effectively resist the demarcation of lands, he undermined the implementation of Betterment by unilaterally giving evicted labour or rent tenant households permission to settle in his area. He refused to respect the limits of his legal jurisdiction and aggressively ensured that his judgements were carried out.84

However, although Mathibela's strategy of refusing to acknowledge the state's terms of reference was effective during this period, in the sixties this stance was to have devastating effects on the recognition of his chieftainship.

The Mnisi Chieftainship

The Mnisi chieftainship was in the unenviable position of being the first chieftainship to experience Betterment, of being located in the most ethnically heterogeneous segment of the district, and of being racked by internal divisions.
The first attempt to implement demarcation in 1942 was met with fierce resistance from residents, causing its delay until 1946. However, the Commissioner pressed ahead with banning the ploughing of river beds, which resulted in the arrest of 130 people when they ignored the restriction. The chief, Shobian, who was not educated, had no effective strategy of dealing with these developments leading to his marginalisation.

Shobian had more success in receiving assistance from the state to combat challenges to his chieftainship. In the late thirties, a group of Mnisis came to the district from Lydenburg, sparking a dispute for the chieftainship. In 1944, one of this group, a "self-styled" headman, Sineas Mnisi, who was trying cases on adjoining farms and executing his judgements "without any authority" to the point of using force, was "punished" by the Commissioner and his gang was "liquidated." The punishment was noted by other factions in the family who toned down their challenges to the chief.

The settlement of the chieftainship in Islington gave it effective autonomy from the Pulana chiefs living on the foothills of the Drakensberg. However, there was a substantial Pulana settlement surrounding Islington, as a result of the 1929 forestry removals. The Mnisi chieftainship, eager to establish an independent base, and distinguish themselves from the Pulanas, stopped holding initiation school. Discrimination against non-initiates by the Pulana Kgotla ensured that any new families who settled in the area and who had not been initiated attended the Mnisi Kgoro.

In 1953, in an attempt to reassert the authority of the chieftainship, Jotham Mnisi, took over from his father before his father's death. Mnisi, a graduate from a Swiss Mission School, was
neither a patient nor tolerant man. These characteristics, plus the timing of his take-over, were unfortunate. The first task allocated to the new chief by the Commissioner was to explain to residents on recently purchased farms how demarcation worked. The experience was not a pleasant one:

The government said do this, I must tell them, and the people don't say anything so I get harsh... Soon, I sat alone in the court. The people did not come. When we used to call meeting we would have to postpone it.... Moses and Johannes Mnisi and Frank Makinyane [who were headmen] they were calling secret meetings, the aim being to sack me from the chieftainship.87

The "headmen" openly flouted the authority of the chieftainship:

When an induna or headman settles a case, the headman is supposed to shout the name of the chief, not the headman. However the headman would stand and say he was chief. He will say it is my land.88

It was not only members of Mnisi's family who were jumping on the anti-Betterment bandwagon to build a constituency. Added to these pressures were the militant activities of Pulana chiefs, some of whom were resident within the Mnisi "sphere of influence", who were building a constituency by opposing Betterment and hence undermining Mnisi.89 In 1961, the young chief gave up the balancing act and went into voluntary exile. A relative, Willie Mnisi, replaced him as chief.

The Pulana Chieftainships

Until 1948 no recognised Pulana chiefs were resident on Trust Land. Four of the six chiefs recommended for recognition in the 1946 report lived outside the Released Area. The Pulana chiefdoms, both within and outside of the Released Area, struggled to retain the integrity of their chiefdoms and assert some autonomy from the intrusions of farmers and state.
Setiare, who was the most significant Pulana chief in the Released Area, took up a passive, uncooperative, and drunken stance in relation to state agents, following the confiscation of the rifle presented to him by the British King for his services during the First World War. The confiscation represented the death knell for any illusion that the chieftainship would be recognised as an independent political and geographical entity. In 1936, Setlare was one of the four chiefs in the district given civil recognition to try cases. By 1942, his recognition was withdrawn because Setlare refused to keep records of his court, or supply the Commissioner with reasons for his judgements. Setlare’s successor was described by the Commissioner in 1946 as quarrelsome, drunk and uneducated. "It is with misgivings," the Commissioner noted, "that I see this man come to power." 

Two Pulana chiefs living on Forestry Land were evicted during the 1940s for refusing to "cooperate" with the Department. Stefaans Mogane was evicted because he refused to abide by the tenancy "agreement", kept too many cattle and continued to hold court, which the Department complained, turned his Kraal into a "minor location." Narishe Mashego was evicted by the Forestry Department for ostensibly defaulting with his rent. However, the more probable reason for his eviction can be gleaned from the following description of Narishe from the Commissioner:

"Narishe has for many years, been a thorn in its [the Forestry Department’s] side and has made the administration and control of the Natives residing in the Forest Reserve most difficult." 

The Commissioner described Narishe as violent, hard-headed and incapable of listening to reason. However, in the next breath the Commissioner notes that Narishe was a "strong man and respected by his followers" and he "had more control over his followers than any other Mapulane chief." 

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As conditions on farms outside the Released Area tightened, and the bulk of farms in the Released Area were brought by the Trust and allocated to recognised chiefs, the unrecognised Pulana chiefs struggled to build a support base, and, in doing so, force recognition from the state. These chiefs had an advantage on recognised chiefs in that they could use the association between recognised chiefs and the implementation of unpopular Betterment policies to win support for themselves. Matsiketsane Mashile was an example of such a chief living in the Released Area who had never been accorded recognition by the state. Mashile built his support base by leading opposition to tenancy conditions laid down by Hall and Sons, by opposing the implementation of Betterment on Trust Land, and by organising the anti-pass campaign of the early sixties. Mashile introduced the African National Congress to the district in the late fifties and used the organisation to provide legal assistance. Mashile was jailed for two years in 1961 on charges of sabotage.

The Molotele Chieftainship was not recognised by the state as it was resident on a farm outside of the Released Area. Anias Chiloane took over the chieftainship in the early fifties and proceeded to aggressively reassert its authority in a context where the chieftainship was becoming progressively marginalised as many of his followers who were evicted from farms were settled under Pulana chiefs resident on Trust Land. Chiloane used his unrecognised status to oppose Betterment and undermine the authority of recognised chiefs. However, his aggressive attitude ultimately alienated Commissioners, who did not believe Chiloane to be an appropriate candidate for the chieftainship. The Molotele chieftainship was only to receive recognition in 1971 after Anias was killed and the entire labour force evicted from the farm.
The period 1936 to 1961 was characterised by labour tenant, forestry and Betterment related removals. Although some residents would only move to an area where they could be under a specific chief, others were less choosy about their chiefly allegiances. Issues such as the proximity of schools or the availability of land often took precedence over loyalty to any chief. The maintenance of a distinctive culture (including a language) within the household, ensured the reproduction of a distinct identity within the context of a alien chiefdom. The following quote captures this dynamic:

Even though I live here under [chief] Mashego, I will never believe in his ancestors. Even though he might tell me what to do, and I might do it, and follow his laws, I don't believe in his ancestors. I believe in my ancestors and I have to teach my children their culture. Mashego can't tell me how to remember my ancestors.98

Apart from the Pulana condition requiring people to have been initiated in order to be recognised in the chief's court, there is no evidence of overt ethnic discrimination by the chiefs. In areas where people with loyalty to numerous chiefs resided, pragmatism over-ruled any ethnic considerations. An example of such an area was the ethnically mixed area around Ludlow (which the Commissioners had placed under the Mnisi chieftainship). In Andover, prior to the 1940s there was a single Pulana "headman" in the area, installed by Setlare when a number of his followers were removed from Maripeskop in 1929 by the Forestry Department. The residents who were removed included families from Mozambique who had settled under Setlare and assimilated themselves to the Pulana chieftainship by attending initiation. In 1936, the Mnisi chieftainship was settled at nearby Islington. The "Tsonga" population of the area began to increase because of further immigrations from Mozambique and removals from labour tenancy farms. Conflicts emerged when the Pulana insisted that attendance at the chief's court was conditional on attending initiation school. To this end,
reluctant men were "kidnapped" to attend the school. Some "Tsongas" who historically had paid allegiance to Mnisi began to hold court under the ambit of the Mnisis. The uninitiated settlers (as well as some initiated residents loyal to Mnisi) attended Mnisi's court, while the people who were removed from Maripeskop and the more recent Pulana settlers attended Setlare's court. In the fifties, the Molotele chieftainship, under Anias Chiloane, established a "headman" who began to hold court in the area.

New settlers were free to choose their chiefly loyalties as described by a former resident of the area:

"If you are a Shangaan and want to live with Mapulana you report to Mapulana Induna. If you want to live with Shangaans you report to Shangaan Induna. The choice is yours, whoever you want to report to."

Problems between residents who had different chiefly loyalties were solved by approaching the "headman" of the person against whom a resident wished to lay a charge. For example, if a Pulana had a complaint against a follower of Mnisi, he would approach Mnisi's "headman" to lay the charge. Hence, although in theory the Pulana "did not consider a Shangaan to be a chief" in practice they would "report to them if we had a problem". It is doubtful, however, whether a person who had not been initiated received a fair hearing at the Pulana court.

Youth culture in ethnically mixed areas was organised around village solidarity, rather than ethnic solidarity. Boys from the same village challenged their counterparts at neighbouring villages to fights, and looked to one another for protection when confronted by their nearby rivals. In these contests, neighbourhood, rather than a common ethnicity, was the dominant
Although no overt conflicts arose when residents could choose their chiefly allegiances, as soon as the Commissioner tried to suggest that chief Mnisi should have sole jurisdiction over an ethnically heterogenous area, there was "an immediate strong reaction by the Sotho". The situation was defused as the farms were owned by Hall and Sons, and hence the Commissioner was able to reinform the residents that "chief Mnisi did not have jurisdiction over the Sotho of these farms... but only over his followers." 

After 1962, the establishment of Tribal Authorities changed this situation as, by definition, a Tribal Authority was given territorial, that is sole, jurisdiction over its area. Nevertheless, the "Tsonga" chiefs had to struggle to receive recognition by the state as an ethnic group, before they could benefit from the policy of Separate Development.

**The Recognition of the Amashangana Territorial Authority**

When first legislated in 1951, Tribal Authorities were grouped into regional Authorities on a mixture of ethnic and spatial lines. The Bantu Affairs Department which was dominated by conservative traditionalists from a German Mission family background did not recognise the "Tsongas" as an ethnic group. As a consequence no Tsonga Territorial Authority was envisaged and Tsonga speaking Tribal Authorities were grouped administratively in Regional Authorities alongside "Venda" and "Northern Sotho" Tribal Authorities. The planned assimilation of "Tsongas" into Venda and Lebowa was perceived by both the Swiss Mission and "Tsonga" chiefs as discrimination by a Bantu Affairs Department dominated by
bureaucrats coming from a German Mission background with associated prejudices against
the "Tsongas".\textsuperscript{108}

In the mid fifties the Tsonga speaking Tribal Authorities around Elim began to organise for
the ethnic segregation of Regional Authorities after experiencing discrimination from the
Venda speaking chiefs. The meetings saw ethnic segregation as the only means for
"Shangaans" to develop without hinderance from non-Shangaan chiefs.

Chief Mamitwa: We have always been undermined by other national units, but today
we are growing to catch up with them.\textsuperscript{109}

Although Tribal Authorities had not been formed in Bushbuckridge, the "Shangaan" chiefs
were approached by the "Tsonga" chiefs from Elim with the aim of establishing a "Tsonga"
or "Shangaan" Territorial Authority. At the first sitting of the "All Shangaan People's
Meeting" that was attended by Kheto Nxumalo, historical tensions between the Shangaan
paramount and their former "Tsonga" subjects (who were now asserting their autonomy)
sprang up over the use of the word Tsonga instead of Shangaan to designate the ethnic group:

Kheto Nxumalo said that Tsongas have nothing to do with the Shangaans. He wanted
to know if all the people in the meeting were calling themselves "Tsonga" instead of
"Shangaan" and if so that would mean a still [division] amongst them.
Chief Mhinga thereafter apologised for using the word "Tsonga" in his speech. He
said, "Let us use Shangaan from today".
I Shanelane suggested that the name "Tsonga" should die completely as we are all
Shangaans. \textsuperscript{110}

Ultimately, the Shangaan chieftainship was more concerned with the Pulana threat than the
threat of possible "Tsonga" hegemony over a new "homeland". Kheto Nxumalo remembers
this process:

When this issue of Shangaan assimilation was introduced I was present. Some
[Shangaans] were to be given to Venda, some to Lebowa. Here [in Bushbuckridge]
we should have found some problems: the question who is to be the rulers or chief.
We did not find anybody here then it is our land. These ones [the Pulana chiefs] are
going to say you are from Mozambique. That is what we suspected. This was the
time when the Tsongas and Shangaans came together, came to the conclusion that we
did not want to be divided.\textsuperscript{111}

The "Tsonga" chieftainships were well equipped for the task ahead of them. The "Tsonga"
delegation was composed of Swiss Mission graduates who were well schooled in the language
of ethnic nationalism. Hudson Ntswanwisi, who led the delegation, was a priest and
academic, who had just succeeded in changing the Swiss Missionary Church in South Africa
into the locally controlled Tsonga Presbyterian Church.\textsuperscript{112}

In contrast to their "Sotho" counterparts, the style of the "Tsonga" delegation was obsequious.
The content of their approach showed a consummate understanding of the logic and rhetoric
of Separate Development. The "Tsonga" delegation "humbly requested" that the NAD
"sympathetically consider" the "difference of the Tsonga group from other groups". The
emphasis on ethnic differences, as well as the classification of Tsonga as Nguni by the 1949
educational commission, entailed that the delegation accentuate a distinct "Tsonga" cultural
and historical experience. The delegation argued that the "Nguni group", that is the
Shangaans, had been absorbed in language, customs and material needs "like the Barbarians
who occupied Rome in the 5th century A.D.". The delegation concluded that the "Tsongas"
formed a separate cultural and linguistic group with its own history, and as it was the role
of the regional and territorial authority to "see that the purity of the race and interests of the
different groups are respected", the "Tsongas" were entitled to their own homeland.\textsuperscript{113}

Initially, the Secretary of the Department of Bantu Affairs, Eiselin (from German Missionary
stock), was not responsive to the chieftainships' advances. The Tomlinson Commission,
however, swung the balance in favour of the "Tsonga" delegation when it changed the state's
emphasis on segregation from spatial to ethnic national lines. In 1959, the Bantu Self-
Government Act asserted that:

"the Bantu people of South Africa do not constitute a homogenous people, but form separate national units on the basis of language and culture."

Ultimately, the Apartheid planners were left with little choice but to hear the delegation's request sympathetically: In 1959 the state recognised the "Shangane / Tsonga" as a "national unit".

Charles Bourquin and the Implementation of Tribal Authorities

Bushbuckridge was the last district in the Transvaal to implement Tribal Authorities because of the difficulties associated with defining chiefly and ethnic areas. Commissioner Charles Bourquin, who had been stationed in the area in the thirties and forties as a clerk, and had assisted van Warmelo in his survey, was considered an "expert" on the district and was transferred to Bushbuckridge in 1961 to supervise the establishment of the structures. Bourquin, however, was a controversial figure. Born in Mozambique, on a Swiss Mission, it comes as not surprise to learn that he was a close friend of Kheto Nxumalo:

"There was a personal relationship between myself [Kheto Nxumalo] and Bourquin because he was a Christian and we attended church services together. He used to visit me personally for discussions. We were great friends."

Pulana leaders, on the other hand, have a different recollection of Bourquin:

"He was an intelligent crook. He was intelligent because he could cool a very hot situation. He was always called when there was trouble. But, he used his skills to steal the Pulana land away from them."

Despite Bourquin's liberal leanings, he was a very influential man in the NAD. To some of his colleagues in senior positions in the NAD, Bourquin was the trusted expert on Bushbuckridge; Trusted, because he went to the same school, and boxed in the same team, as the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner in Pietersburg, and one of the senior secretaries of
the NAD. And an expert as a progeny of a Missionary, who had years of experience in the field of “native administration”.117

In reality, Bourquin was a complex man. Genuinely liberal, he was deeply ambivalent about the policy of Separate Development, and was ultimately involved in the implementation of policies he believed to be misguided.118 He explicitly rejected the notion of inherently antagonistic “tribes” and argued in a memorandem that:

"if ever the great principles of common fatherhood and brotherhood of mankind should be stressed and encouraged, it is among the Mapulana, Nhlanganu, Shangana, Kutshwe, Pedi, Swazi and ba-Pai people of the Bushbuckridge area and woe be to anyone who works for division, instead of love and co-operation amongst these people."119

Yet, the Pulana leader's perception of Bourquin was not entirely inaccurate. Bourquin was unaware that, as a consequence of his background in the Swiss Mission church, he had accepted a "Tsonga" view of history as the truth.120 Bourquin, even at his most paternalistic, was unable to understand, let alone identify with, the logic of the Pulana claim to land.121

Bourquin formed Tribal Authorities in Bushbuckridge in 1963. The Authorities were grouped to form two regional authorities, namely the Mapulana Regional Authority and the Mathibela - Hlangaan - Shangaan Regional Authority. The division of the two Regional Authorities reflected the division of the area into a “Shangaan” sphere of influence and a “Sotho” sphere of influence. Although Mathibela was classified as a Northern Sotho his Tribal Authority was allocated to the “Shangaan” sphere of influence because most of his area of jurisdiction fell in the Lowveld and the majority of his followers were Tsonga speaking refugees who had settled in his area.122
By coincidence, the chiefly membership of the Mhala Regional Authority was identical to the membership of the (now defunct) Local Council. The Mhala Regional Authority, under the leadership of Kheto Nxumalo, immediately affiliated to the Matsangana Territorial Authority. However, the affiliation of the Mapulana Regional Authority with a Territorial Authority was more complicated.

The Mapulana Regional Authority was ethnically mixed. Of the twelve councillors in 1963, seven were "Northern Sotho" and five were "Shangaan". At least two of the "Shangaan" councillors were prominent business people. Although the Pulana chiefs had finally been forced into accepting recognition by the state, and the constraints associated with this recognition, in Regional Authority meetings their rhetoric oscillated between accepting the limitations of Tribal Authorities and invoking a logic associated with the pre-colonial chieftainship. Even when working within the state's terms of reference, the attitude of the Pulana chiefs towards ethnic segregation was ambivalent. The requirement of affiliation with an ethnically based Territorial Authority threatened to split the Regional Authority. The Mapulana Regional Authority called for a Territorial Authority based on spatial, not ethnic criteria. The decision by the Mhala Regional Authority to affiliate to the Matsangana Territorial Authority was seen as an act of betrayal as was voiced by a Councillor in an Authority meeting:

Clr Malele: at first the Mapulana, Shangaans and Swazi were to have formed one Territorial Authority. That is why we felt we could not follow the Shangaans after they had left us. Now the Swazi have done the same [by joining the KaNgwane Territorial Authority].

Affiliation with Lebowa, the "Northern Sotho" Territorial Authority was viewed with suspicion at meetings of the Regional Authority. Councillors repeatedly stressed the supposed historical independence of the Pulana from the "Bapedi". A member of the Authority
interpreted affiliation with Lebowa as subordination to the BaPedi:

"Are we to join [Lebowa] as juniors or equals. I know these people well, we are going to be their boys." 125

After a year spent procrastinating over the decision, it became clear that the Authority had little choice around the question of affiliation. The Chair of the Authority announced in February 1967, much to the dismay of the "Shangaan" councillors (who were loath to see the Authority accepting the logic of ethnic areas):

"Mr Welman [the Commissioner] has explained the whole thing to us and we must join Lebowa, any further talk is a waste of time." 126

The Allocation of Land as Ethnic Discrimination

The area allocated to the Mnisi Tribal Authority had a substantial "Sotho Island" at its centre. Commissioner Bourquin, in an additional note to the report which allocated areas to Tribal Authorities, made the following caution:

"If the Sotho followers of Chief Setlare Tshilwane and Anias Tshilwane were to adopt an unreasonable attitude, and refused to "Nkonza" to Chief Mnisi and could not be provided with alternative ground, then the position could become very unpleasant" 127

The Commissioner was not able to find alternative land, as the only farms available, namely Buffelshoek and Acornhoek, would have had the effect of turning Rooiboklaagte, a predominantly "Shangaan" settled farm, into an "island" in the "Sotho area". "I am afraid that this is a most complex problem and there is no easy solution to it" 128, the Commissioner concluded.

Bourquin's premonition was correct. The problem came in the form of Matsiketsane Mashile, who was released from prison in 1963. On his release, Mashile, assisted by his younger
brother, started demanding that he be given recognition as the chief of the area comprising the "Sotho island". Mashile, who was a grandson of Maripe, also began a secession dispute for the Setlare chieftainship. Mashile organised numerous public meetings where he allegedly incited residents to "rise up" against Mnisi, and threatened to take the matter to court or "blood will flow". Not even Bourquin's considerable pacifying skills could make Mashile see "reason" and compromise: On 26 June 1963, the two Mashile brothers were banished to the Ciskei and Transkei, following which overt resistance to the implementation of Tribal Authorities ceased.

Recognised chiefs did not withdraw their headmen from areas allocated to other Tribal Authorities. The Molotele chieftainship retained its headmen in areas covered by the Mnisi Authority. Followers of Molotele in the Mnisi Authority area continued to pay their taxes to Molotele, with the exception of dipping fees. They also continued to attend the Molotele chiefly court in Buffelshoek.

The ad hoc nature of the allocation of land to the Pulana chiefs in the Released Area resulted in the Pulana chiefs having relatively fewer farms than their "Shangaan" counterparts. The relative overcrowding of the "Sotho sphere" was also a consequence of its being located in a Betterment defined "agro-economic zone" which allowed for greater population density than farms in the "Shangaan" sphere of influence. The following table gives an indication of this difference in 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of farms</th>
<th>Number of Chiefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapulaneng (Sotho)</td>
<td>62942</td>
<td>+-23</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Pulana chiefs perceived the situation as one of ethnic discrimination. A Pulana chief commented at a Regional Authority meeting:

"We are a symbol of failure. The Government should please refer to maps and study the land question and if a solution is found the problem will be settled before a big issue can be made out of it." 133

Pulana leaders believed the situation to be a result of an alliance between the "Shangaan" chieftainship and Commissioner Bourquin:

"When he arrived in Pretoria he wrote to the Shangaans to plead with Pretoria to allow him to come to Bushbuckridge. They did so. Bourquin was returned to Bushbuckridge so that he can take all the land of Mapulana and gave it to the Shangaans."134

By 1966, members of the Mapulana Regional Authority began to frame disputes over land as disputes between ethnic groups rather than as disputes between chiefs. The shift in emphasise was not lost on a prominent "Shangaan" member of the Mapulana Regional Authority:

"This matter is serious. This will bring enmity between the Tribes. We should not talk about Sothos and Shangaans. Acornhoek should just be given to one of the chiefs"135

The Development of Overt Ethnic Tensions

In August 1968, Hudson Ntswanwisi, the Chair of the Shangaan Territorial Authority, made a speech at the Dingleydale Agricultural show that was the first public pronouncement of the area as belonging to the "Shangaans". The speech drew on the metaphor that "different cattle should not be kept in one kraal" implying that ethnic segregation was an ideal to be followed. "Sothos", Ntswanwisi continued, drawing on a stereotype, should return "to the mountains"
as the Lowveld belonged to "Ngungunyane's children". He called for all "Shangaans" to settle in Gazankulu.\textsuperscript{136}

The speech evoked a powerful response from the Pulana chiefs at a Regional Authority meeting that reinvoked the status of "Shangaans" as refugees:

"Mapulana sheltered Mpisana when he was in trouble but Ngungunyana never set his foot on Mapulana soil. The Amatshangan Tribal Authority would like Ngungunyana's children to return to their land and we know that their land is Portuguese East Africa. We have no objection, let them go."\textsuperscript{137}

The episode revealed an important difference in the way Ntswanwisi represented the Shangaan claim to land to the state and the way he represented the claim to his constituency. At the meeting of the Mapulana Regional Authority where the issue was discussed, the Commissioner argued that according to the written copy of the speech he had received, the

"speech did not aim at antagonising local tribes... What the Prof said is that the Shangaans should organise themselves and in so doing they are within their rights."\textsuperscript{138}

The Chair of the Regional Authority thanked the Commissioner for the copy of the speech and his remarks and proceeded to point out that: "Mapulana attended the show and listened to the address and what they say is based on the actual speech."\textsuperscript{139} Another Councillor summed up the feelings of the Authority when he stated that:

"The damage has been done; even if the wound would heal, the scar will remain and it is bound to open up some day."\textsuperscript{140}

Tensions mounted in the district following the speech. The Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner held a meeting with the Mapulana Regional Authority in an attempt to calm the situation. The Chief Commissioner requested the Regional Authority to be patient as more land was to be purchased on which clinics, schools and water would be provided, and the "Shangaans" would be removed. There were no indications that these statements were deliberately cynical.
The promise effectively diffused the situation. However, the Regional Authority made it clear to the Chief Commissioner that they had felt a powerful sense of betrayal:

"When we heard him [Ntswanwisi] mentioning Ngunghunyane in the Sotho area, we thought he wanted to deprive us of the land that belongs to our forefathers, but after the explanation of our Chief BAC it seems there is peace once more."\(^{141}\)

The ideals of "Tsonga" ethnic nationalism, so long espoused and practised by the Swiss Mission Church, began to be more aggressively pursued in Mhala by the end of the 1960s. The Shangaan Regional Authority decided to change the name of Maripe College (named after the Pulana chief) to Orhovelani High School. Education in Northern Sotho was discontinued at the college and "Sotho" students were "transferred" to Lekete school some thirty kilometres away. The action heightened insecurity on both sides of the Bantustan border as thousands of Tsonga speaking students in Mapulaneng were faced with a similar reprisal from the Mapulana Regional Authority.

The message to the Pulanas was clear: In Gazankulu, sePulana was to be banished from the public sphere (which was previously symbolised by the chief’s court). The establishment of Tribal Authorities had the effect of severing the link between the use of Pulana as a language and access to political authority. This dynamic, and how it was perceived within the moral economy employed by some Pulanas, comes across powerfully in the following evidence given to the Uys Commission by a deposed Pulana "chief" living within the ambit of the Nxumalo Tribal Authority.

We only started seeing another tribe in 1960 when they dethroned my father, giving the throne to the Shangaans, somebody. From that time until today we have seen the Shangaans and have learnt to know their language. The Shangaans dethroned my father. Then we started understanding the Shangaan language. What is surprising today that we are not to speak about the language, the Mapulana language. We are thinking of the graves of our great grandparents.\(^{142}\)

Towards the end of 1969, competition over land resulted in the first notable use of violence.
around the allocation of Acornhoek. Acornhoek, which lay at the border of the "Sotho" and "Shangaan" spheres of influence, had not been allocated to a chieftainship or ethnic group, despite the fact that it was predominantly occupied by "Shangaans". The Commissioner desperately needed to find land to settle the Molotele chieftainship and some 120 families (most of whom were Pulana) who were threatened with removal from the farm Glen Lyden. The Department of Housing began to build thirty "temporary houses" in Acornhoek to cater for some of the removed families. However, the project had to be scrapped when the workers were attacked by "Shangaans" resident in Acornhoek fearing removal should the area be allocated to the Molotele chieftainship. The removed families and the chieftainship were subsequently settled in nearby Buffelshoek which was relatively sparsely populated.

The Establishment of Legislative Assemblies

In 1972 the Lebowa Legislative Assembly was established. The following year, the AmaShangana Territorial Authority became the Gazankulu Legislative Assembly. Gazankulu was named after a province in Mozambique. The name change reflected a significant shift in the ideology around which the "Tsonga" nation was constituted. The term Shangaan, narrowly defined, refers to the Nguni descendants of Soshangane. "Outsiders" (for example black urban residents in Johannesburg) tended to refer to anyone from Mozambique as "Shangaans". Amongst "insiders", the term "Shangaan" began to designate people from Southern Mozambique who fell under the hegemony of Soshangane while "Tsonga" referred to the people from Northern Mozambique. The ethnic nationalist project was built on Tsonga, the language codified in writing by the Swiss Mission and recognised by the state. However, it was the "Tsongas" who were conquered and subjected by the Shangaans in Mozambique.
Hence, rather than reflecting the historical dominance of the Nguni speaking Shangaan aristocracy, the name change from Amashangana to Gazankulu was employed to symbolise the common experience of diaspora. The Gazankulu government immediately embarked on a campaign to popularise Tsonga and build a myth of a common "Tsonga" origin and culture.  

Associated with the establishment of the Lebowa and Gazankulu Legislative Assemblies in 1973 was a change in the state's criteria for the allocation of land. The policy of ethnic consolidation dictated that the ethnic composition of the population of a farm become the definitive criterion for the allocation of the farm to a legislative assembly. This placed doubts over the allocation of Leamington in Mhala and five farms in Mapulaneng. However, a reallocation of these farms would have fragmented the two regions by creating "islands" of Gazankulu in Lebowa and vice versa. Ethnic leaders used these cases to point to ethnic discrimination by the state. Ultimately it became clear that neither leaders, residents nor members of the bureaucracy knew which criteria were applied in allocating land to a Legislative Assembly. 

The new criteria for allocating land created a zero sum common sense in the district: If you are a "Sotho" and you allow a "Shangaan" to live near you, more "Shangaans" will arrive and they will take the land. Or vice versa. This logic can be read off the following quote taken from a Pulana woman who lived in Dwarsloop under the Nxumalo chieftainship. 

"In 1972, the Shangaans said, "we don't need any more Sotho here." I don't know why. They started saying from Violet Bank to Beretta [Dwarsloop] was Shangaan. They used to tell me that "if you live here, if we talk something, we Shangaans, you will take it to the Pulana". The Basotho and the Shangaan were starting to fight, grouping themselves to fight and then a white man [Bourquin] intervened. He said Shangaans and Sothos must live in peace. We are one blood... We stayed in 72 but
73 was worse. Every Basotho ran away and I was alone there. The Induna would not
speak to me if I had a problem. They said they would take me to Mafemane [the
Shangaan chief] with a lorry and my children and then when my husband came back
he will fetch me. Everyday, they came and said "move, move". Every time they
wanted me to move I said my husband is not present. Eventually, we moved without
my husband."147

The establishment of the Legislative Assemblies saw the splitting of the Mathibela Tribal
Authority. Although chief Mathibela was classified as "Sotho" the Mathibela Authority fell
under the "Shangaan area of influence" as it was located on the Lowveld and most of its
residents were migrants from Mozambique who had settled under Mathibela. However,
throughout the sixties tensions grew between Mathibela, who opposed cooperation with the
state, and other members of the Shangaan Regional Authority, who were intimately involved
in the implementation of Betterment policies.148 When the Lebowa Legislative Assembly
was constituted, Mathibela chose to affiliate his Authority with Lebowa. This created a
contradiction between the ethnic criteria applied by the state in the allocation of land and the
ethnic affiliation of the chief. The state acted on the contradiction by constituting the Hoxana
Tribal Authority in Gazankulu and transferring five of the Authority's eight farms to that
Authority. The chief of the Hoxana Authority was a previously unrecognised chief living in
the area assigned to Mathibela. The Secretary of the Mathibela Tribal Authority and some of
Mathibela's councillors left Mathibela to become members of the Hoxana Authority. The
position of the Mathibela Tribal Authority remained tenuous as they retained a significant
"Shangaan" population which an unrecognised "Tsonga" chief had claimed as his subjects.
The splitting of the Mathibela Tribal Authority evoked a bitter reaction from the Pulana
chiefs, and was used as proof of the "Shangaan" tendency to renege on earlier agreements
reached with the chieftaincies who once gave them "shelter".149

The working relationship between the Shangaan chieftainship and the state was undermined
by the reallocation of the Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme from Gazankulu to Lebowa. In the 1940 and 1946 reports into the allocation of areas to chiefs, Dingleydale was allocated to the Nxumalo chieftainship on the basis that the majority of residents on the farm paid allegiance to the chieftainship. However, with the establishment of the Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme in 1962, state planners decided to allocate a portion of the scheme to "Sotho" chiefs in order to provide aspirant "Sotho" farmers with irrigated land. Initially, a portion of the farm Champagne, which lies adjacent to Dingleydale, was allocated to Pulana chief Alfred Mashego. In 1963, the Commissioner persuaded the Nxumalo chieftainship to allow the settlement of "Sotho" families in two of the six residential wards in Dingleydale proper. In 1965, many of the residents of the farm Orinoco, an historical stronghold of the Nxumalo chieftainship, were removed to Dingleydale as part of the replanning of the district. However, in 1966 "friction" arose in the scheme when "Sotho" chiefs tried to exercise jurisdiction over their adherents in Dingleydale. The Amashangana Tribal Authority "objected" to the Commissioner, and, according to the Authority, the "friction became more intense from month to month". In 1972, the central state ruled that four residential areas and their corresponding irrigation lands would be administered by Lebowa. The Lebowa Agricultural Officers made an announcement in Dingleydale that "Shangaans" were to remove to neighbouring Songeni where irrigated lands would be allocated to them or face arrest. The majority of "Shangaans" left Dingleydale. The confusion in the state was highlighted by the failure to change the constitutional allocation of Dingleydale from the Shangaan Tribal Authority to various Pulana Authorities until 1977 when the Uys Commission formally allocated the land to Lebowa.

Politics around the use of language in schools intensified. A number of schools with strong
historical associations with an ethnic group fell under areas of jurisdiction of the "other" ethnically based government. This was felt particularly acutely by the Swiss Mission schools in Mapulaneng, which had originally been built and managed by "Tsonga" congregations. In both Mapulaneng and Mhala the use of the "wrong" language began to be suspended in the primary and secondary schools. Students began to be excluded on the basis of their ethnic identity, sometimes through the application of an ethnic nationalism that accepted the legitimacy of the claim that the Bantustan states represented the interests of their ethnically defined citizens. A Pulana migrant's wife living in Dwarsloop told the following story:

I had one child, Elizabeth at Mpisana School. The principal chased her away. I asked him and he said, take your child away because if your child is big she will not work in Gazankulu but in Lebowa.

School attendance amongst Pulanas increased dramatically in the sixties and seventies. In those school where the vast majority of students were Pulana, "Shangaan" students who had not been to initiation school were isolated by their initiated peers. In these instances, uninitiated "Shangaan" students probably welcomed the language question as a means of changing schools. At predominantly "Shangaan" schools and villages, Pulana children found themselves isolated and victimised whenever a disagreement arose amongst students, because of their ethnic identity. Ethnic identities became more important than village solidarities.

The Uys Commission

Evidence to the Uys Commission, established in 1977 to investigate boundary disputes between Lebowa and Gazankulu, revealed the different points of reference used by the Pulana and the "Tsonga" delegation in their claim to land. When speaking to the Commission, the Pulana delegation completely dropped any "ambiguity of dependence": they argued from the
point of view of a moral economy of the chieftainship as mediator between the living and the
dead.

The Pulana delegation made their claim to the land as if the South African state and its
policies towards ethnic groups did not exist. The boundaries of Mapulaneng that were claimed
originated from the Pulana position between the Pedi and Swazi Polities in the nineteenth
century. Mapulaneng, it was argued, consisted of "Lepelle River (Olifants) in the North,
Mokoena River (Crocodile) in the South, Mashishing in the West and [the] Lebopo
(Lebombo) mountains in the East." The claim to the land was based on the ideology that asserted
that ownership of land came only through conquest and the shedding of blood. The
chief, as the living representative of the most powerful lineage, was the ultimate owner of the
land and symbolic protector of custom. The ideology linked ownership of land to the sacred
authority of ancestors, which was central to reproducing chiefly and generational authority.
The ideology was reproduced in each household through an oral tradition. The truth and
power of the oral tradition, in turn, rested on the link between generational authority and
sacred truth. Documentary evidence was shunned as irrelevant by the Pulana delegation. The
tension between a "literate" Commission and an "oral" tradition is demonstrated in the
following extract of evidence:

Mr Mativandela: Most of what you say is history over 200 years.
Mr Chiloane: I'm talking about what I have heard as a small boy from my father who also
learnt that as a small boy.
Mr Mativandela: Did you take that as true?
Mr Chiloane: I took that as true because that is my father and as far as I know
anything I got from my father is true.
Mr Mativandela: If somebody told a different story told by his father it will also be
true?
Mr Chiloane: I will not take information from a wrong man rather than my
father.160

The Pulana delegation argued that they had given the "Shangaan" chiefs and their followers
who were fleeing the wars in Mozambique the right to occupy land but not to own it. The
"Shangaan" chiefs had become subjects of the Pulana chiefs through accepting the land:

"She [Chiloane's Grandmother] said to me that a foreigner can never have a Kgosi in
another man's land."161

Although, the "Shangaan" chiefs had the right to hear cases "in their own language", the
ultimate court of appeal lay with the Pulana chiefs.162 The "Shangaan" chiefs, as far as the
Pulana delegation was concerned, were only chiefs because the state recognised them as such.

The Pulana delegation painted a picture of past ethnic harmony. The presence of ethnically
mixed communities under Pulana chiefs, of ethnic intermarriage and ethnically mixed chief's
Kgoro was emphasised. The ethnic conflict was blamed on the state:

I grew up in this area and we lived with the Shangaans and there were no boundaries
between us. We lived happily together. When this boundary question started this
worried us. We now turn to central government. It was the central government the
cause of all the dispute. That's what I stand for. We don't want a boundary in
Mapulaneng.163

The Pulana delegation's claim to the land was based on the assumption of the independent
existence of the "Pulana people" as a historical and political entity. There was no mention of
Lebowa in the formal memorandum given to the Commission. The state's terms of reference
re criteria for the recognition of chiefs and the allocation of land was completely ignored.

The "Shangaan" delegation's submission to the Commission stood in sharp contrast to the
above. The "Shangaan" claim to the land was based on an identification of the "Shangaan
nation" with the state of Gazankulu (as defined by Apartheid ideology). The submissions
presented by the Gazankulu government showed a comfortable familiarity with state ideology
and a consummate skill in presenting these ideologies in written form.
The "Shangaan" claim to land was based on the "Shangaan" status as a recognised ethnic group and the state's policies towards ethnic groups: the settlement of black people, according to both state policy and "Bantu" custom, the delegation argued, consisted of allocating a specific area to family units who fell under a chief. A chief held his position by virtue of the fact that he was recognised as such by his adherents and that he was appointed by the "republican" government. The majority of the family units under a chief were linked to the chief through a common language, an adherence to specific customary laws and practices, blood relations, history and tradition. "Such a group was exclusive and closely knit and regarded all others as foreigners with whom they had nothing in common and it was taboo even to inter-marry with them." Following from these principles, the state allocated Trust Land "to each ethnic or tribal group separately. Each group was a homogeneous unit. It was not mixed with the other groups and resented any intrusion by what it called foreigners." 

The history of black communities in Bushbuckridge, stated the written submission, followed the same model as described above:

"There were three distinct ethnic groups, namely Shangaan, Sotho, Swazi... Prior to 1929, the Shangaans lived in the plains between the Lebombo and the foothills of the escarpment. The Sotho occupied the Eastern slopes and the summits of the escarpment, while the Swazi occupied the eastern slopes of the escarpment South of the Sabi river." Each of these groups had its own "tribal governmental structure in the usual Bantu pattern."

The delegation argued that the "Shangaan" chiefs had been subjects of the South African state since their arrival in the Transvaal in 1897 when Abel Erasmus gave them land on which to settle. Furthermore, as the land was depopulated, the "Shangaan" chief's could claim the land as first settlers. Hence, there was no question of the "Shangaan" chiefs ever being subjugated to the Pulana chiefs.
According to the written submission, when the Trust bought land, the "Shangaan" chiefs were settled as "homogeneous communities with their own residential plots, arable lands and grazing areas. They built their houses, established schools and churches and developed their environment." These policies were represented as an intrinsic part of "Bantu" custom.

Ethnic mixing was represented as an unnatural state of affairs and was seen as a consequence of forced removals of "Sothos" into "predominantly Shangaan communities". It was argued that when ever such mixing took place there were problems:

Mr Mpahlele: I would like to know from you before the Gazankulu and the Lebowa Government, did the Sothos and the Shangaans live peacefully?
Mr Mabunda: They never did live peacefully.

The submission argued that conflict in the area had emerged when "for some inexplicable reason predominantly settled Shangaan communities were placed under the control of Sotho chiefs." The Gazankulu claim to land was based on the demand that the principles of separate development be applied consistently by the state in allocating land. The basis of the claim was that "30 000 Shangaan people on traditional Tsonga areas have been allocated to Lebowa in defiance of all principles of separate development".

Ownership and control of land was not determined by the cogency of ideological claims. The Pulana submission ignored the policies of the state, but that did not make those policies go away. The reality was that the state and not the Pulana chieftainship had effective control of the district. Although the Pulana attitude towards the state was antagonistic, the above contradiction did not lead to a struggle against the state for control of the land. The claims to the land were based on an ethnic identity and ideology forged independently of the influence of state ideology and were aimed against another ethnic groups. The Gazankulu
claim, on the other hand, was based on the definition of ethnicity as propagated by a state that ignored the status of black people as a disenfranchised majority.

The Formation of Ethnic Organisations

In 1978 a meeting for Pulana migrant workers was convened at the municipality compound located at Seventeen Shaft Crown Mines in Johannesburg. The meeting was convened by a core of railway workers who had their rural homes under the Setlare Tribal Authority. The meeting resolved to form an organisation, the Leihlo La Naga (Eye of the Nation). The aim of the organisation was to "build a spirit of Mapulaneng", to create a unity amongst Pulanas across the different chieftainships. The organisation defined the boundaries of Mapulaneng along the same lines as those presented to the Uys Commission and had a vision of the chieftainship as it existed prior to Tribal Authorities.171

At a later meeting a "top executive Committee" of eighteen members drawn from nine different townships was elected. Initially the organisation made overtures to the Molotele chieftainship whose isolation on the farms until the early seventies resulted in the maintenance of a powerful oral tradition. However, the practicalities of accepting Tribal Authorities and giving up the chieftainship's historical base outside of the Trust land soon brought the Molotele chieftainship into conflict with an organisation seeking to discipline the chieftainship and establish nineteenth century boundaries. The organisation never had any substantial support from Pulanas in the Middleveld, who were subjects of Kolwyn's grandson.

Matsiketsane Mashile, the "chief" banished in 1963 for resisting Tribal Authorities and the
ethnic demarcation of the area, represented a vision of a Mapulaneng without Gazankulu and of the chief as protector of his subjects. The migrants formed a "reception committee" and assisted in Mashile's return from the Ciskei.172

To say that Mashile's return was a threat to the Mnisi chieftainship would be understating the case. Mashile's nephew, who was resident in Ludlow which fell under the Mnisi Tribal Authority, had maintained weekly meetings of the "chief's Kgotla". He also ran a biannual initiation school. Mashile's core following was comprised of those Pulana and "Bahlakana" families who had been removed from Maripeskop in 1929.173 The Mnisi chieftainship was threatened from within by members of the royal family looking for ways of using Mashile's return to undermine the recognised chief.174 Shortly after his return to the area, Mashile's house in Ludlow was burnt down. He was given an old farm house in distant Acornhoek by the Commissioner.

Mashile began to organise for the re-establishment of his chieftainship. A local branch of Leihlo la Naga made up of Mashile's core following in Ludlow, as well as leading figures alienated from the Lebowa government, was formed in the district, specifically to organise around the "land question".175 In 1984, both Mashile brothers were elected to the Lebowa parliament, indicating an increase in their following and influence. They began to use their access to the Lebowa parliament to voice their land demands.

The Chief Minister of Gazankulu formed Ximoko xa Rixaka, a "cultural" organisation modelled on KwaZulu's Inkatha. The organisation aimed to promote "worthy customs and traditions" and unite all "Tsongas" around a common loyalty "first to Gazankulu and then to
South Africa”. Ximoko effectively bound the chiefs with other members of the bureaucracy under a single umbrella.

The Consolidation Commission and the Border War

In 1984, the uneasy calm in the region following the recommendations of the Uys Commission was shattered by proposals made by the Consolidation Commission which had the task of redefining Bantustan boundaries. The Commission allocated the whole of the farm Dingleydale to Lebowa. This would have had the effect of taking away the remaining residential and irrigation land falling under Gazankulu. Furthermore, Songeni Primary school and Orhovelani (previously Maripe) High School would also fall under Lebowa. At Buffelshoek, Lebowa would lose a hundred hectares of land which lay between the railway line and the main road.

The proposals had the effect of opening up all the old disputes. Gazankulu started demanding all the areas which had a "Shangaan" majority. Insecurity in the area heightened at the thought of a further reallocation of land. This insecurity was felt particularly acutely by the two chiefs, namely Molotele and Mnisi, whose land tenure was the most insecure. The loss of each piece of land became symbolic of a process of further encroachment. Residents began to organise themselves to define boundaries through the use of force.

In Mapulaneng a pamphlet was distributed calling for all "Shangaans" to leave Mapulaneng and go to "Mozambique because there is no place for them here". The pamphlet called for the "sacking" of any "Shangaan" in government employment, as well as "Shangaan"
Indunas and councillors. "Shangaan" businessmen were told to "carry their businesses to Maputo while you still have the chance." In predominantly "Shangaan" areas of Gazankulu, "Sothos" were told to move "back into the mountains".

The first spark came when the "Shangaan" hawkers were forcefully expelled from the Lebowa side of Acornhoek. In Buffelshoek, where a railway line had acted as the border, the construction of a new railway line squarely placed the Molotele chieftainship's household on the Gazankulu side of the border. In retaliation for the expulsion of the hawkers, residents from Gazankulu formed a mob to claim the area of Buffelshoek up to the railway line. The war described at the start of the Chapter followed.

Conclusion

The violence resolved contradictions at two levels. In the context of an inconsistent and incoherent state, residents drew boundaries regardless of state policies. The violence ensured that this was the last attempt by the state to impose boundaries autocratically.

At a second level, the "Shangaans" were taking their claim to land onto the terrain advocated by the Pulana moral economy. In showing a willingness to sacrifice blood for the land, the "Shangaans" were asserting an equality with Pulana claims for the land. "Shangaans" were no longer willing to be looked down upon as servile refugees. The "Shangaans" resident in Mapulaneng, who crossed the border to fight on the Gazankulu side of the conflict, were asserting their equality and dignity.
The exclusion of Tsonga as a subject from schools in Mapulaneng was not just a retaliatory measure. The action reinstated a history of Pulana hegemony, a history where the language of the public domain was SePulana. The message behind the action was that Tsonga was to be a language for the household or private sphere.

The most abiding feeling experienced by residents following the violence was, however, one of ambivalence. Most residents in the district did not go and fight in the war. The violence was divisive and these divisions legitimated the ideology of the Apartheid state. Furthermore, the historical experience of ethnic inter-marriage and cooperation stood in sharp contrast to the war. The irony of the war was that it occurred precisely in the area where ethnic boundaries were historically most ambiguous. The acceptance of a logic of a boundary marking spatial ethnic segregation was also the acceptance of the logic of demarcation; a logic inscribing non-negotiable rigid bureaucratic categories, on day to day practice. It was precisely this logic that residents of the area had so forcefully resisted in the forties and continued to do so in the eighties.

Staunch Pulana nationalists were particularly dubious about the legitimacy of the war. Pulana chiefs, having accepted Tribal Authorities, had accepted terms of reference that contradicted the political imaginary of the chieftainship on which the Pulana claim to land was based. Yet by fighting over a boundary between Tribal Authorities, the Pulana Nationalists were protecting these chief’s position in Tribal Authorities. The following chapters explore this ambivalence.
Notes


4. see Vail, L., "Introduction" in Vail, L., (ed), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, J. Currey, London, 1989. The article by Harries in the above volume, namely "Exclusion, Classification and Internal Colonialism: The Emergence of Ethnicity Amongst Tsonga Speakers of South Africa", argues along lines very similar to Vail in his Introduction. Also see the review of the literature analyzing politicised zulu ethnicity in the Introduction for further examples of this approach.


6. Ibid.


12. "Sotho" in this sense refers to the generic category of "Sotho" speakers. Numerous dialects fall into this category, including SePulana and SeKhutswe (classified by Zievogel as Eastern Sotho) and Pedi (classified as Northern Sotho by the state). As will be demonstrated in the chapter, no political ethnicity was built out of the common use of "Sotho". However, as individuals who were involved in the "war" spoke these different dialects, and as the chiefdoms involved in the conflict included both Pulana and Khutswe chiefs, the term "Sotho" is employed in this context.

13. Account taken from Interview P Mogale, Green Valley, 16/8/92; E Mnisi, Germiston, 12/6/92; also V.G. Hiemstra, Mediator, "Report on Trans-Border clashes between subjects of Gazankulu and Lebowa" 25/7/85.

14. Interviews W Ngobe, Dingleydale, 04/06/91; and P Mogale, Green Valley, 16/8/92.


19. See the first section of Chapter One.


21. See Commaroff and Commaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution..., Chapter seven.

22. At the same time, the "acceptance" of Tribal Authorities by the Pulana chiefs, shattered (an already battered) self-image of the chief as living protector of the integrity of past relations. This contradiction between a Pulana ethnicity that drew on a "theological" imaginary and the practical acceptance of Tribal Authorities that redefined the chieftainship as a secular institution is investigated in chapter six.


24. Interview P C Baloyi, Thulamahashe, 9/7/92; F Machate, Brooklyn, 12/13/92, and A Molimi, Dingleydale, 30/9/93.
25. Interview A Molimi, 30/9/93, Dingleydale; and K Shoakane, Green Valley, 10/9/93.


27. See for example, Interview with Mgiba, P., Buffelshoek, 10/07/1992; Mgiba, R., Buffelshoek, 08/07/1992 for an example of a household with a "Shangaan" name which over time adopted pulana culture.

28. Interview A Molimi, Dingleydale, 30/9/93. See also Interview P Baloi, Thulamahashe, 9/7/92; Machate M, 20/11/91, Brooklyn; R Mkhabela, Cottondale, 7/7/92.

29. Interview F Machate, Brooklyn, 1992/12/13. See also interviews with P.C. Baloi, Thulamahashe, 9/7/92; R Mkhabela, Cottondale, 7/7/92; and F Mgiba, Cottondale, 12/07/92.

30. See Delius P, The Land Belongs to Us, Ravan, 1983, Chapter Two.

31. See CAD, K335, Evidence to Uys Commission of Phooku Chiloane, Bushbuckridge, 12/5/1977; Sweet Mohlala, Bushbuckridge, 12/5/77; Also see interview Matsiketsane Mashile, Acornhoek, 7/7/92; For the use of refugees in internal disputes see Interview by Niehaus, S., Mrs Chilaone, Green Valley, 1/8/1990.

32. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, SNC Graskop to NC Lydenburg, 9/10/1918.

33. Interview (ex-chief) J Mnisi, Buffelshoek, 6/10/91 Erik Mnisi, Germiston, 12/6/92; CAD NTS 8/426 V10314, Letter CNC Pietersburg to NC Bushbuckridge, 10/10/47; Annual Report of the Department of Native Affairs, Ethnological Table, C.71, 1904.

34. Interview (ex-chief) J Mnisi, Buffelshoek, 6/10/91 Erik Mnisi, Germiston, 12/6/92; CAD NTS 8/426 V10314, Letter CNC Pietersburg to NC Bushbuckridge, 10/10/47.


36. For the "Shangaan" view see CAD K335 Evidence to Uys Commission of P Mnisi, H Sambo, Thulamahashe, 16/5/77. For the "Pulana" view see Evidence to Uys Commission of P Chiloane, E Chiloane 14/5/77.

37. see CAD BAO F54/1074/13, Sub NC Graskop to NAD, 27/2/1919; NC Zoutpansberg to NAD, 18/2/21; Sub NC Graskop to NAD 29/9/21 and 30/5/22, 24/1032 and Assistant NC Graskop to NC Pilgrims Rest 26/11/32 and Minutes of Meeting held at Bushbuckridge 22/11/32.


42. Harries p, "The Roots of Ethnicity...", p33.


44. Harries P, "Roots of Ethnicity... p40.

45. Interview Rev F Bill, Johannesburg, 12/7/92.


47. Interview K Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/92.

48. Sihlangu A, Ta Ka ..., p 57-69; Interview J Mnisi, Buffelshoek, 6/10/91; E Mnisi, Germiston, 12/6/92.

49. Interview P.C. Baloyi, Thulamahashe, 9/7/92; R Mkhabela, 7/7/92; Rev F Bill, Johannesburg, 12/7/92.


51. Interview S Mashile, Buffelshoek, 13/7/93.

52. For examples of where the Swiss Missionaries made representations to the State on the chieftainships behalf see: CAD NTS 828/308 Eastern Transvaal Missionary Association to NAD 25/2/34; Rev Maphophe to SNC Graskop 24/2/21. Rev Maphophe played a central role in the Bushbuckridge Local Council, formed in the early forties.


57. U.G. 32-18, Evidence to Stubbs Commission, Takilane, p70.

58. N.J. van Warmelo, A Preliminary Survey of Bantu Tribes of South Africa, Pretoria, 1935. Van Warmelo’s observations were probably influenced by Charles Bourquin, who was then a clerk at
the Native Commissioner's office. In his writing, as well as his practice, Bourquin always emphasised the ethnic harmony in the district.

59. Ibid.

60. See in particular interview Mgiba, P., Cottondale, 12/07/1992.


62. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Location Reclamation Report, 19/2/1940.

63. See CAD K335 Evidence to the Uys Commission of the Shangaan delegation, Thulamahashe, 18/5/77.

64. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report into the Conferment of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction to Native Chiefs, 31/7/46.

65. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, "Report into the Conferment of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction to Native Chiefs", 31/7/46.


68. See CAD BAO 87/360/C V8571, NC Bushbuckridge to NAD, 31/7/44 and CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report into Conferment..., 31/7/46 and Hartmann, "Die Politike en Judisiele..." p87 for view of Commissioners and Anthropologists praising Kheto Nxumalo's leadership. Also Interview, K Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/92.

69. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814 Minutes of Meeting between Chiefs and Headmen, 18/1/43; 25/3/43.

70. Interview P.C Baloyi, Thulamahashe, 9/7/92.

71. CAD NTS 17/423/1, Reclamation and Settlement Report, March 1958.

72. Interview Kheto Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/92.

73. Interview Kheto Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/92.

74. BAO 87/360/c V8571, Kheto Nxumalo quoted from a meeting of Bushbuckridge Local Council, 13/12/45.

75. Interview Kheto Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/92.


77. Interview Kheto Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/92.

79. CAD NTS 44/55 V349, Report into conferment of civil and criminal Jurisdiction, 31/7/46.

80. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of Meetings Between Chiefs and Headmen, 25/3/42.

81. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report into Conferment of civil and Criminal Jurisdiction to Native Chiefs, 31/7/46.

82. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report into the Conferment of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction to Native Chiefs, 31/7/46.

83. CAD NTS 189/55 V349, Letter NC Bushbuckridge to CNC Pietersburg, 18/9/51.

84. CAD NTS 189/55 V327, Memo to Minister of NAD, 5/11/57, 11/11/57 and 4/12/57.

85. CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of meeting Chiefs and Headmen, Islington, 26/10/44.

86. Interview E Mnisi, Germiston, 12/6/92; and Phios Theko, Buffelshoek, 23/11/91.

87. Interview Jotham Mnisi, Buffelshoek, 6/10/91.

88. Interview Jotham Mnisi (deposed chief), Buffelshoek, 5/10/91

89. See next chapter.

90. CAD NTS 187/55 V349, ANC to NAD, 5/8/41, 2/9/41, 19/9/41, 16/1/42.

91. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report into Conferment..., 31/7/46.


93. CAD NTS 489/323, NC Bushbuckridge to NAD, 28/11/45.

94. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report into Conferment of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction, 31/7/46.


96. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4 Minutes of MRA, 11/1/66.

97. CAD NTS 44/55 V327 Report into Land and Administrative matters, 19/5/61.

98. Interview W Ngobe, Dingleydale, 2/9/90.

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100. See Interview Pious Theko, Andover, 23/11/91; Also F Mgiba, Cottondale, 12/7/92 and Thabane, E., Buffelshoek, 28/11/91.


102. Interview Phios Theko, Buffelshoek, 23/11/91.

103. Interview P.C. Baloi, Thulamahashe, 9/7/92.

104. Interview L Mogakane, Johannesburg, 17/10/93.


106. ibid.

107. See Harries, "Exclusion, Classification...", p104.

108. Interview Rev F Bill, Johannesburg, 12/7/92.


110. CAD NTS 423/362 "The All Shangaan People’s Meeting", Mamitwa 23/7/61

111. Interview Kheto Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/92.

112. Interview Rev F Bill, Johannesburg, 12/7/92.

113. CAD NTS 423/362 V9103, Memorandum submitted to the NAD re the recognition of the Shangaan / Tsonga ethnic group, 1958.

114. Quoted from Harries, "Exclusion and ...", p104.

115. Interview Kheto Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/92.


117. Interview A Mamiane, (former secretary of the Mapulana Regional Authority), Acornhoek, 16/12/1993.

118. See interview A Mamiane, Acornhoek, 16/12/93. In 1965, Bourquin took leave to visit Switzerland to give himself time to consider if he was not compromising his integrity by continuing to serve in the bureaucracy under the National Party. He decided to give the policy a chance. See CAD, BAO P55/4/12/4, Minutes of Meeting of the Mapulana Regional Authority, 5/7/65.

119. Quoted in Voorlegging aan Die Rabie Kommissie van Onderzoek names Lebowa, Unpublished memorandum, 23/7/93, p83.
120. Pulana leaders believed that Bourquin's father (a Swiss Missionary) had, from his death bed, told his son to take care of the Tsongs in South Africa. See Interview, Mamiane, Acornhoek, 16/12/93. In 1973, Bourquin produced a four page history on the relationship between the Kutswe and Tsonga on the Lowveld. This history accepts the "Tsonga" history of the area and justifies their claim to land. See Voorlegging aan Die Rabie Kommissie van Ondersoek names Lebowa, Unpublished memorandum, 23/7/93, p83.

121. In a letter to the Chief Native Commissioner, Bourquin complained that "the trouble with Mathibela Mokoena is that he claims that the whole of the Pilgrims Rest district... should fall under his jurisdiction and he considers that both the Shangaans and Hlangaans to have nkonzaed to his grand father and that they should all be his subjects and should have no chief of their own." quoted in Voorlegging aan Die Rabie Kommissie van Ondersoek names Lebowa, Unpublished memorandum, 23/7/93, pg82.

122. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report of special Departmental Committee, 19/5/61.

123. A former secretary of the Authority alleged that many of the Pulana chief's claims to the district based on nineteenth century conquests, which were made in the meetings, were not minuted. See Interview Mamiane, Acornhoek, 16/12/93.

124. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4, MRA Meeting, 6/9/66.

125. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4, Minutes of MRA Meeting, 11/166.

126. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4, MRA Meeting, 7/2/67.

127. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Additional Note to Report by Special Departmental Committee, 19/5/61.

128. ibid

129. CAD UHU Minute no 1076, 26/6/63 and Hiemstra V.G., Report on Trans-Border Clashes, 1985/7/25, Mimeo.

130. ibid.

131. CAD K335, Evidence to Uys Commission, Moeniseng Mashego 12/5/77 and Chief Exson Chiloane 14/5/77, Bushbuckridge.

132. See Chapter One for the definition of Agro Economic Zones.

133. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4, Minutes of MRA Meeting, 7/9/65.


135. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4, Minutes of MRA Meeting, 6/9/66.

136. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4, Minutes of MRA Meeting, 3/9/68.
137. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4, MRA Meeting, 3/9/68.

138. ibid.

139. ibid. It should be noted that when I questioned a "neutral" informant who was present at the meeting, the informant had no recollection of any mention of Ngunghunyane.

140. ibid.

141. CAD BAO F55/4/12/4, CBAC Liebenberg at MRA Meeting, 5/11/68.

142. CAD K335 Evidence Mirosi Mashego, Bushbuckridge 14/5/77. Sociolinguistics have defined the concept of "diglossia" to capture differences in status between two languages, and how the use of a language in the public sphere reflects power relations between linguistic groups. See Fasold, R., The Sociolinguistics of Society, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993, p30-60.

143. CAD BAO 164/6/1080/1 V7944, Urban Areas Commissioner, Internal Memo, 8/3/71.

144. See Interview Kheto Nxumalo, Orinoco, 9/7/92 and Rev F Bill, Johannesburg, 12/7/92.


146. See CAD K335, Evidence to Uys Commission, Written submission by Gazankulu delegation and oral testimony of Prof H Ntswanwisi, Thulamahashe, 17/5/77.

147. Interview Bateanne Mogakane, Shatale, 27/11/91.

148. CAD BAO 54/1080/13, Letter BAC to CBAC Pietersburg, 16/6/65.

149. See Annexure B to Report of Uys Commission into Boundary Disputes which includes "Lebowa Memorandum to Uys Commission" and Minutes of "Joint Meeting of Lebowa and Machangana Executive Councils" held on 27/4/71; Also see Evidence to Uys Commission of Alex Makutu, Wilson Mahlangu, E Matsane all at Bushbuckridge on 14/5/77 and Sargant Manzini and Philemon Nkuna at Thulamahashe, 18/5/77.

150. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report of Special Departmental Committee, 19/5/61.

151. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report of Special Departmental Committee, 19/5/61.

152. CAD K335, Written Memorandum to Uys Commission by Gazankulu Government.

153. CAD BAO H128/1080 V5734, BAC Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg, 17/9/64 and 8/12/65.
154. ibid.

155. ibid and Interview W Ngobe, Dingleydale, 4/6/91.

156. CAD K335, Evidence to Uys Commission, Baadjie Twala, Freddie Sithole and Amos Shabangu, Thulamahashe, 17 and 18 May 1977.


158. See in particular interview Mogakane, L., Johannesburg, 17/10/1993; and Sakwane, S., Nelspruit, 04/07/1993.

159. CAD K335, Written submission by Pulana delegation to Uys Commission.

160. CAD K335 Evidence to Uys Commission of Phooko Chiloane, Bushbuckridge 12/5/77. See also evidence of Alex Makutu, Moeniseng Mashego and Elmon Seoke for similar exchanges between members of the Commission and witnesses. For testimony around the irrelevance or written documentation see L. S. Matlala, 14/5/77, Bushbuckridge. For evidence of the link between Zulu ethnicity and an oral tradition see Mare, G., Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, ZED Books, London, 1993, p66.

161. CAD K335, Evidence to Uys Commission, Boas Chiloane, 14/5/77, Bushbuckridge and Written evidence of the Pulana delegation.

162. The terms of these agreements were typical of the agreements reached between the Pedi paramount and refugee chieftainships in the nineteenth century. see Delius, The Land Belongs to Us, Ravan, 1983, Chapter 2.

163. CAD K335, Evidence to Uys Commission, Ben Mogakane, Bushbuckridge, 14/5/77. See also evidence of Wilson Mahlangu, Elmon Matsane, James Makutu, Elfas Malele, Alex Makutu for evidence around a past of ethnic harmony.

164. CAD K335, Written submission of Gazankulu Government to Uys Commission.

165. ibid.

166. ibid.

167. CAD K335, Written Submission by Gazankulu Government to Uys Commission.

168. CAD K335, Evidence to Uys Commission, Leonard Mabunda, Mhala, 17/5/77.

169. CAD K335, Written submission by Gazankulu Government to Uys Commission.

170. CAD K335, Written submission to Uys Commission of Gazankulu Government.


173. Interviews with Renious Mashile, Acornhoek, 7/7/92; and Matsiketsane Mashile, Acornhoek, 7/7/92.

174. Interview J Mnisi, Buffelshoek, 6/10/91.

175. Interview Patrick Mogale, Green Valley, 16/8/92.

176. See Draft Constitution of the national, cultural, liberation movement for the development and direction of the people of Gazankulu and to be known as the Ximoko xa Rixaka", Mimeo.

177. Memorandum in Reaction to Proposals by the Minister of Cooperation, Development and Education in Connection with the Consolidation of the National State Gazankulu as presented in Giyani on 13/10/1984, Mimeo.


179. Ibid.


181. Interview E Mnisi, Germiston, 12/6/92.
CHAPTER FIVE

Leadership on the Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme: W N Ngobe

We have seen in Chapter 2 that the Department of Native Affairs (NAD) had two broad approaches towards administering Trust land, namely a traditionalist approach (that involved using the chiefs as administrators) and a modernising approach (that involved transforming households into economic units and administering them as such). Initially Betterment marginalised the chiefs, then the establishment of Tribal Authorities marked a return of the traditionalist approach. However, substantial (albeit compromised) elements of a modernising approach were retained as the strategy of demarcating residential and grazing lands dominated settlement policy.

The Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme was a partial exception to this pattern. The Scheme was the only recommendation of the 1957 Betterment report that was accepted by the Head Office of the NAD. By offering one morgan of irrigated land to four hundred households, the Scheme was designed to house a group of full time, market orientated, farmers. Agricultural Officers, assisted by elected farmer's committees, were supposed to administer the Scheme. With the formation of Tribal Authorities, however, the administration of the Scheme became confused; the logic of modernisation and the logic of the traditionalists clashed.

This chapter investigates this clash, and the politics that it spawned, by examining the career of a local leader and farmer, Willis Ngobe. In the context of a predatory bureaucracy,
farmers had no choice but to take a political stance to make their enterprises viable. The strategies, tactics and ideologies employed by Ngobe in attempting to achieve this end, form the focus of this chapter.¹

**History of Dingleydale**

Dingleydale was one of the six farms earmarked by the 1894 Boer Republic’s Location Commission for a Pulana location under Kolwyn Mogane. The Commission’s recommendations were never legislated by the Volksraad and the farm remained depopulated until refugees fleeing the war in Mozambique began to settle in the area after 1897.² In 1924 the farm was purchased by Jack Rabie. Rabie, who was not resident on the farm, only farmed ten morgan. The majority of people who stayed on the farm did so under rent tenancy conditions. When the Trust purchased the farm in 1955, seventy families, were resident as rent tenants on the farm, and a further ten families were farm labourers.³

In the 1940s, tax records reflected that the majority of residents on Dingleydale paid allegiance to the Nxumalo chieftainship. Drawing on these figures, the 1940 and 1946 reports into the allocation of areas to chiefs allocated Dingleydale to the Nxumalo chieftainship.⁴ However, the 1957 Location Reclamation Report, drawn up by ardent modernisers, had ambitious plans for the transformation of the district as a whole and of Dingleydale in particular. Dingleydale was to become a model irrigation scheme catering for a class of full time tomato farmers. Each farmer was to receive one hectare of irrigated agricultural land, a residential site, and grazing for a limited number of stock. As “modern” farming schemes required “modern” management structures, the report made provision for the establishment
of farmer's committees and marketing cooperatives. Agricultural officers would provide extension services. Farming techniques would be monitored by agricultural officers, and if land utilisation by a farmer was judged to be inadequate, the farmer risked losing access to a plot. The report did not define an administrative role for the chief on the Scheme. With the single exception of the Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme, most of the recommendations of the 1957 report were over-ruled by the head-office of the Bantu Affairs Department which was dominated by conservative traditionalists. The Scheme remained as the last remnant of the Moderniser's vision of an economically independent reserve community.5

When the Scheme was established in 1962, the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, desperately short of land to settle evicted "Sotho" labour tenants, allocated a portion of the Scheme to "Sotho" chiefs in order to provide aspirant "Sotho" farmers with irrigated land.6 Initially, a portion of the farm Champagne, which lies adjacent to Dingleydale, was allotted to Pulana chief Alfred Mashego.7 In 1963, the Commissioner persuaded the Nxumalo chieftainship to allow the settlement of "Sotho" families in two of the six residential wards in Dingleydale proper.8

Attitudes amongst the African population towards the Scheme were ambivalent. Initially people only trickled onto the Scheme. An old woman recalls:

"When they demarcated plots at Dingleydale, they [Agricultural Officers] came to Rooiboklaagte and told us they did not want people who drank and smoked. They wanted those who ploughed. Most people did not take up their offer."9

Although the Scheme offered land, it also exposed residents to an unprecedented battery of state controls enforced by the consistently unpopular Agricultural Officers.10 Renting irrigated land from Agricultural Officers implied that the land would be monitored by the
Officers throughout the year. Some people preferred to leave Dingleydale, rather than remain in an area where access to land was at the discretion of the Officers.\textsuperscript{11}

The only mass removal onto the Scheme occurred in 1965 when many of the residents of the farm Orinoco, a historical stronghold of the Nxumalo chieftainship, were removed to Dingleydale as part of the replanning of the district.\textsuperscript{12} Many of the early settlers on the Scheme were evicted labour tenant or farm labourers hoping to become serious commercial farmers.\textsuperscript{13}

Although portions of the Scheme were allocated to various Tribal Authorities, the role of the Authorities in the administration of the Scheme remained vague. In 1966 "tensions" arose on the Scheme when "Sotho" chiefs tried to exercise jurisdiction over their adherents who had settled in Dingleydale. Despite objections by the Amashangana Tribal Authority, the Commissioner did not take any action to strictly enforce the definition of chiefly areas of jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{14} When the Mapulana Regional Authority affiliated to the Lebowa Territorial Authority in 1967, the Agricultural Officers became accountable to their respective Territorial Authorities creating greater confusion over the administration of the Scheme.

In 1972, in the confusion that prevailed following the establishment of Lebowa and Gazankulu, four residential areas and their corresponding irrigated lands which had previously been under the jurisdiction of the Amashangana Tribal Authority were transferred to the Lebowa administration.\textsuperscript{15} The Lebowa Agricultural Officers made an announcement in Dingleydale that "Shangaans" were to move to neighbouring Songeni, where irrigated lands would be provided, or face arrest. The majority of "Shangaans" left Dingleydale.\textsuperscript{16} Despite
the administration of the farm by Lebowa, on paper the wards remained under the Amashangana Tribal Authority until 1977 when the Uys Commission rectified the contradiction by formerly allocating the farm to various Pulana Tribal Authorities.

In practice, from 1973, three of the five residential wards were allocated to the Moreipuso Tribal Authority. The Sethlare and Molotele Authorities were each assigned a ward. After the expulsion of the "Shangaan" residents to Songeni, the Scheme remained relatively depopulated allowing the established farmers access to further agricultural land. Individual households slowly trickled onto the Scheme. Some of these households were evicted from white-owned farms, whilst others voluntarily moved from neighbouring Trust farms.

Households with land had different economic aspirations: Some aspired to be full time market orientated farmers, others wanted to combine subsistence or commercial farming with migrant labour whilst others rarely used their land. Farmers also had different models of production: some relied on wage labour, others on family labour, while others used a combination of the two. One man married seven wives and had them each work a hectare of land. Despite the bureaucratic model of one household - one plot of land, a degree of economic stratification emerged on the Scheme. By the early eighties, all available agricultural land had been allocated. In the seventies, a few rich farmers organised over five hectares of land for themselves which they worked for the market. The "landless" households were forced to rely on migrant labour or local wage labour opportunities to survive. Like the limitations on land use, restrictions on stock ownership were followed more in the breach than in observance: stock ownership reflected the growing economic differences between households on the Scheme.
The machinations of the administrative allocation of the farm had enormous ramifications for the political coherence of residents who settled on the Scheme. Most residents came to the Scheme as individual households. People settled on the Scheme with different aspirations. Residents did not know or trust one another. There was no common experience prior to settlement on Dingleydale that united residents: Residents came from Trust, forestry and mining land, white farms where labour tenant and farm labour conditions prevailed and townships near white cities. Few of the residents living on the Scheme accepted the assumptions of Betterment on which the administration of the Scheme was based. Many of the residents were not interested in making the Scheme work on its own terms. This severely hindered the possibility of establishing stable networks capable of challenging the bureaucracy. Few kinship networks extended beyond individual stands and there were even fewer neighbourly networks of reciprocity, leaving residents vulnerable in moments of economic crisis. Hence, residents were forced to turn to people who could provide them with some economic security in the short term.

The Administration of the Scheme 1964 - 1978

Three structures managed the Scheme in the sixties and seventies; the Agricultural Office, the Tribal Authority and various Committees made up of residents. The responsibilities of these structures, and the relationship between them, resembled a convoluted jigsaw puzzle, who pieces did not quite fit one another, and whose shape changed through time.

When the Scheme was established in 1964 it fell more or less unambiguously under the control of the Agricultural Office. Although the role of the Tribal Authority on the Scheme
was not clearly defined, the Agricultural Office and the Amashangana Tribal Authority had a smooth working relationship as Kheto Nxumalo, the Shangaan chief, understood the logic behind betterment and supported the aims of the Scheme. Nxumalo also had personal relationships with most of the Agricultural Officers, the majority of who were products of the Swiss Mission schools. Nxumalo’s selection of an Induna was pragmatic: he chose a local leader who, despite not having any genealogical claims to headmanship, had built a solid support base and had scrupulously attended the Nxumalo’s court.21 Apart from receiving permission from the Tribal Authority to settle on the Scheme, the day to day administration of the Scheme was unambiguously in the hands of the Agricultural Officers who remained directly accountable to a central government department. Residents appealed to both the Tribal Authority and the Commissioner (who was a Liberal Traditionalist) in the event of problems with the Officers.22

The nature of the administrative puzzle that managed the Scheme changed with the transferal of the Dingleydale Scheme to the Lebowa Legislative Assembly in 1973. Under the Bantustan, the only access that residents had to Government Departments was through the Tribal Authorities. Agricultural Officers were accountable to a Department headed by a chief with no knowledge of agricultural management. The Departments were responsible to the Legislative Assembly, which was controlled by chiefs. In practice, the Departments were dominated by (white Afrikaner) secretaries who were given the position because of political connections rather than any qualification. There were no Agricultural Officers from the district; all the Agricultural Officers were from Sekhukhuneland or Pietersburg.

The confusion in the administration of Dingleydale was exacerbated by problems within the
Moreipuso Tribal Authority, the structure given jurisdiction over four of the six wards which made up the Scheme. Rather than devote its energies towards establishing a coherent administrative niche for itself in relation to the Scheme, the Authority was more preoccupied with internal divisions. On the death of Chief Ben Matlushe in 1967, a regent had to be found as the "rightful" heir, Mishack, was too young. The first regent, Phillis Mashego was found to be inadequate and after nine months was replaced by Mustrat Mashego. In 1977, after a bitter struggle, Mustrat stood down and Mishack Mashego was inaugurated as chief. The young chief immediately purged all the regent's Indunas. However, he remained insecure of both his position and his role as chief. In his first years as a chief he ruled "in absolute fear" his greatest fears being of the removal of his recognition and of witchcraft. Apart from divisions within the royal family, he had no reliable support base as much of the population of the farms falling under his areas of jurisdiction came from outside the historical ambit of his chieftainship and supported other chiefs. Fearing the withdrawal of his recognition, the young chief took the words of the Agricultural Officers more seriously than that of his subjects. Exploiting the young chief's fears, the Agricultural Officers reported any threat to their authority as a threat to Mashego's position as chief, effectively isolating residents from access to senior officials in the bureaucracy.

Two years after the formation of the Scheme, the Senior Agricultural Officer, following the policy laid out in the 1957 Location Reclamation Report, added the final piece to the administrative puzzle by forming an extension committee. Although the aim behind the formation of the Committee was to establish a communications link between the farmers and the Agricultural Office, the Senior Agricultural Officer nominated eight people, six of whom were from the agricultural office. The Committee dissolved briefly in 1971, but was
reformed in 1973 as a Development Committee. The name was changed to Planning Committee (PC) in 1978. The broad aim of the Planning Committee was (ostensibly) to assist in all aspects of the management of the Betterment Scheme, but what the PC's exact powers were remained vague. In 1974, the Agricultural Officer formed the Motlamogale Cooperative to assist farmers in the sale of their produce.

The Tribal Authority, Agricultural Officers and the various committees at different times all had different ideas as to the role of the assorted structures in the administration of the Scheme. There was no shortage of issues to cause conflict between these people. The procedures involved in the allocation of residential and agricultural land, the regulation of the water supply to different sections of the Scheme, the hiring out of tractors, the impounding of cattle, and the control of grazing fields were all potential points of contention between the various structures. There was a constant jostling for power by various sectors of the bureaucracy. The result was bureaucratic confusion and an administrative vacuum in many areas.

The absence of any coherent administrative procedures was used to create a sense of overwhelming helplessness amongst the populace. Bureaucrats deflected administrative responsibility by referring applicant to other Departments to avoid delivering services (except on payment of a bribe). All bodies denied responsibility for particular areas of administration, making it impossible to get anything done. Residents ultimately had to depend on the affectivity of a patron, who was either in the bureaucracy or had an alliance with a member of the bureaucracy, in order to achieve the delivery of an administrative service. Such patronage was usually accompanied by a bribe: residents had to pay to get access to
residential or agricultural land, tractors, seed, water, and other administrative services.

While the Agricultural Officers were able to dominate the various committees and the chief, they were able to expand the areas under their control and use their positions for financial gain. The Agricultural Officers took effective control of the Motlamogale Cooperative by (unconstitutionally) nominating uneducated and subservient people onto the Management Committee. Credit was given illegally in the Coop to members of the Management Committee in exchange for their compliance. No financial statement was presented to the members. The situation reached drastic proportions when the Cooperative began to market crops on a communal basis, instead of rendering assistance to each individual farmer. Under the earlier system each farmer received a cheque directly from the purchaser. When the crops were sold on a communal basis, the Cooperative received the cheque in one lump sum and then distributed the proceeds to the farmers, which opened up new opportunities for embezzlement. In 1978, the Cooperative gave farmers twenty cents each for the wheat crop sold by the Coop. Few farmers had the capacity to challenge the Agricultural Officers. An illiterate old woman, who used to farm on the Scheme, recalls:

The Agricultural Officers used to give us seed. And then they used to come with trucks and take produce to the markets. I planted cotton, wheat, tomatoes and beans. They [the AOs] used to give me a cheque and I did not even know how much I had harvested.

Farmers became desperate as unsatisfactory marketing jeopardised the viability of their endeavours. In this situation, where the feasibility of farming depended on transforming the political context, Willis Ngobe, a farmer elected Chair of the Planning Committee, asserted his leadership in resisting the Agricultural Officers, and in doing so, created an administration more conducive to the success of agricultural enterprises.

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The task facing Ngobe was not an easy one. By the late seventies the Irrigation Scheme was characterised by an economically stratified population who had divergent experiences prior to their settlement on the Scheme and who had no experience of living and working with one-another in pursuit of a common goal. The Scheme was controlled by a corrupt and oppressive bureaucracy, with undefined powers, and no clear channels of accountability. The bureaucrats were quick to use their powers and access to the chief and magistrate to victimise anyone threatening their positions. While the Agricultural Officers had effective control of the chief and the various "advisory" committees, residents were effectively isolated as the policy of Tribal Authorities ensured that no-one but the chief had the authority to represent the "community" to the bureaucracy. All of which poses the question: how could resistance be organised in this context? The following sections explore Ngobe's position within the Dingleydale population and how he used that position to organise resistance to the Agricultural Officer's stranglehold on the administration of the Scheme.

A Brief Biography of Willis Ngobe

Willis Ngobe was born in 1942 on a gold-mining estate near Sabie. The Pai chieftainships were shattered first by Swazi raiding in the nineteenth century and then again in the first quarter of the twentieth century by massive forestry removals. Ngobe's family lived on company owned land outside of chiefly controls. His father worked at the Pilgrims Rest mines as a surface worker but retired from the mines in the late 1940s when he had accumulated enough capital to start a business transporting wood to saw mills. The family had approximately ten hectares of land which they farmed between 1943 and 1954. Occasionally they hired a few people to assist on the land. When they needed a larger work-force, they
Ngobe went to a Lutheran Mission school in Sabie between 1951 and 1959, passing his standard six. A shortage of resources (and a more pressing interest in women) ensured that Ngobe did not continue his formal education at a boarding school in Lydenburg. In 1957, Ngobe went to an initiation school that lasted four months.

In 1957, the family moved off the farm and into a location on the outskirts of Sabie. His father began to earn a living from metal-work. When Ngobe left school, he learnt the skill from his father and began to make a living as a metalworker. He learnt rudimentary herbal cures from his mother who was a midwife and from his aunt who was a herbalist. In 1966, Ngobe married and moved to the Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme.

Ngobe's background equipped him with a variety of cultural and intellectual resources. His experiences at the Lutheran school left him with both a formal education and a knowledge of the christian church. Within his parent's household, he learnt about the existence of ancestors and witches. He gained a working knowledge of herbalism and divination from his relatives. Initiation school exposed him to the principles surrounding chiefly rule as well as a strict model of gender and generational relationships. He acquired agricultural skills from working on his family's fields and metal work skills from his father. He inherited an entrepreneurial ethic from his father and a communal ethic from his experience in initiation school and from communal work-parties (usually called to assist in harvesting) on the mining land. On the mining ground he experienced the machinations of chiefly rule, whilst in the Sabie location he was exposed to a local government that existed without chiefly authority and
elderly control of cattle. Ngobe capitalised on these experiences over the next twenty years as he formulated different strategies of accumulation and tried to create a political context within which these strategies could succeed.

Ngobe the Farmer

Until Ngobe started farming in 1973, he made a living through metal work. He sold water containers, chimneys, gutters, and other objects made to order. His wife planted maize on one hectare of land. In 1973, having watched some farmers succeed at their ventures, he planted one hectare of tomatoes which were sold on the local market. The same year, the farmers at Dingleydale discovered a secure market for their produce in the form of a canning factory near Hoedspruit. Using his savings and profits from the sale of the previous year's crop, Ngobe hired four full time workers and planted two hectares of tomatoes in 1974. The entire crop was sold to the canning factory. The following year, Ngobe took advantage of the lands vacated by the expelled "Shangaans" and planted four hectares of tomatoes. In 1976, Ngobe purchased a two and a half ton truck and planted eight hectares of land. He employed eighteen full time workers, eleven of whom were women. The male workers were involved in marketing and irrigation. At harvest time, Ngobe employed a further twenty people from surrounding farms. By 1979, Ngobe rented a further three hectares from residents and (illegally) cut a further two hectares from the bush. He employed a total of twenty three full time workers.29

Ngobe's homestead reflected his economic success. Made from brick and corrugated iron, Ngobe's residence included a six room main house for his first wife, a two room house for
his second wife, a large kitchen and two store rooms. Ngobe built three thatched huts "for his ancestors". A luxurious German-made car was housed in a garage.

Ngobe was extremely influential during these years. His influence and powers flowed from his position as a successful farmer on a Betterment Scheme. By providing a steady competitive wage (he paid more than any other farmer on the Scheme), bonuses in the form of food, and payment in advance in the event of an emergency, he offered his full-time employees with a much sought after degree of security. This was particularly so for the women workers who were dependent upon (often unreliable) migrant remittances. His capacity to exploit contradictions in the Betterment Scheme was reflected by his ability to take over vacated lands and carve more land from the bush, despite the fact that these actions were illegal and led to protests from the Agricultural Officers. Ngobe (successfully) argued that the aim of the Scheme was not to allocate "economic units", but rather to encourage and build "progressive" farmers, and as he was using the land more productively than his counterparts, he had a right to retain use of the land. In 1973, Ngobe was elected onto the Development Committee. Ngobe tried to use the Committee to secure his (and other farmers') rights on the Scheme. Apart from challenging Agricultural Officers at public meetings, and exposing their corrupt practices to their seniors, he was able to go over the heads of the local Agricultural Officers and organise the relocation of the Dipping Tanks to more appropriate land. Residents approached him for advice and help when they had problems with the bureaucracy.

Ngobe also participated in the ousting of John Selowe, Chief Mustrat Mashego's Induna, on the grounds that he discriminated against "Sothos" in his court. Selowe also refused to build a toilet for his family which was a "bad example" and created a "health hazard" for other
residents. Ngobe's role in the purge boosted his political profile. As a credible leader, he was often asked to adjudicate in disputes between neighbours, a job supposedly reserved for the Induna. His access to transport enabled him to forge relations with regionally influential people based outside of the vicinity of Dingleydale. The most significant of these people were the two Mashile brothers who were banished from the district in 1963. Sekgopela Mashile, the younger brother of Matsiketsane Mashile, returned from the Ciskei in 1974 and was made MP in 1978. When Matsiketsane returned to the area in 1978, Ngobe was part of the welcoming committee. In 1978, he was voted Chair of the Planning Committee.

Despite these achievements, Ngobe's position was vulnerable in many respects. He had neither an extended kinship network to draw on for support, nor did he have historical ties with other residents. He had no links to the chief, and as an "outsider" was treated with suspicion by the Tribal Authority and other settlers on the Scheme. He could not mobilise ethnic networks as he was a Pai, who were an insignificant minority on the Scheme. Because his first marriage did not produce any children and he did not have any relatives in Dingleydale, he was entirely dependent on wages to attract labour, imposing a relatively high cost structure on his enterprise.

Ngobe's position was also threatened by other would be patrons. Where political power and the ability to accumulate are intrinsically linked, patrons are involved in a zero sum competitive struggle. As a matter of course, a patron jumps at the opportunity to undermine the character and position of competing patrons. When patrons compete, fact gives way to rumour, as each patron struggles to blame competitors for any misfortune. Without access to a structure to distinguish truth from rumour, clients believe those whom they trust, or those
in a position to help them. As a demonstration of loyalty, a client must also be seen to believe
his patron's version of an event, and propagate that account. Substantial political issues are
turned into personalised power struggles.  

In Dingleydale, there was no shortage of patrons and would be patrons. Mishack Mashego's
newly appointed Induna was trying to carve out a political niche for himself. Shop owners
depended on a high political profile for the success of their commercial enterprises;
shopowners were particularly vulnerable to the establishment of new stores and the loss of
their client base in a context of a population with limited cash resources. Viable customer
bases rested on providing both economic and political services. Some school principals also
struggled to forge alliances with the bureaucracy so that they could use their positions to
embezzle building and other school funds.

In early 1979, an underlying antagonism between Ngobe and the Agricultural Officers erupted
over the control of the Cooperative. Although the farmers who were members of the
Cooperative were constitutionally supposed to elect the Management Committee of the
organisation, in practice the Agricultural Officers nominated the Committee. The conflict
reached a head over the mismanagement of the marketing of the wheat crop. Initially, Ngobe
tried to assert his rights as a farmer and used his position on the Planning Committee (PC)
to challenge the Agricultural Officers.

If the PC were to effectively challenge the Agricultural Officers, they were going to need the
support of the chief. However, the Agricultural Officers used their access to the chief to
create an antagonism between the Tribal Authority and Ngobe. Ngobe's activities were
represented to the recently installed chief by the Agricultural Officers as a challenge to the chief’s authority:

“Do you know that the people of Dingleydale have a new chief now? The new chief is Ngobe”.32

The chief responded to this information by hiring a bodyguard and refusing to acknowledge the existence of the Planning Committee, which only made the situation more confused. In the face of a potentially dangerous confrontation, Ngobe resigned his position on the Planning Committee and formed an underground organisation to lead resistance to the bureaucracy. The five people who made up the organisation were to become known as the "Big Five".

The Big Five

Ngobe hoped to create a core support network through the "Big 5". Ngobe knew only one member of the "Big 5", Simon Phoku, prior to his arrival in Dingleydale. Phoku and Ngobe had attended school together in Sabie. The other members of the "Big 5" arrived in Dingleydale at different times having come from different places: Rufus Zwane moved to Dingleydale in 1964 from Dwarsloop, a recently purchased Trust farm that was in the process of being planned. He remained a migrant worker in Johannesburg until the beginning of 1978 when he started farming for the market. Reverend Malapane, an apostolic priest, arrived in Dingleydale in 1972, having been evicted off a white farm near Hoedspruit. Mashiloane moved from Merry Pebble Stream, a Trust farm, to Dingleydale in 1974 with the hope of ending his career as a migrant worker in White River.33

The "Big 5" were not in a position to mobilise an ethnic movement. The ethnic composition of the "Big 5" reflected the heterogeneity of the district. Ngobe identified himself as Mpai,
phoku and Malapane were Bakones, Mashiloane was Khutswe and Zwane was Swazi.

Despite Ngobe's efforts, to mobilise around issues of accountability, ultimately what bound most members of the "Big 5" to Ngobe was his ability to provide economic security and support. Two of the members of the "Big 5", Phoku and Mashiloane had been full time employees of Ngobe in 1977 after their previous attempts at farming had failed. Malapane's wife was also one of Ngobe's full time employees. Just prior to the formation of the "Big 5" Ngobe had helped both Phoku and Malapane with capital to start full time farming. Rufus Zwane was economically independent of Ngobe as he had two brothers living on the Scheme from whom he was able to borrow capital.34

All the members of the "Big 5" were accomplished public speakers who had supported Ngobe's opposition to Agricultural Officers in public meetings prior to 1978. Phoku was the most educated of the group, having passed his matric exams. Ngobe and Mashiloane both passed Standard Six. Zwane reached Standard Three while Malapane had little formal education.

Ngobe built a second level of support by cementing his relationship with the Mashile brothers. He became an executive member of the Mapulaneng branch of Leihlo La Naga, an organisation formed by the Mashiles to both cement their personal support network and to challenge the distribution of land to Mapulaneng and Mhala. His membership of the organisation put him in touch with numerous other local leaders who were alienated from the bureaucracy and the recognised chiefs.
There were a number of advantages to working underground. All formal structures, such as the PC, had chiefly and other government representatives, making candid discussion impossible. By lowering his profile, Ngobe tried to thwart the Agricultural Officers attempts to turn administrative issues into a contest for the chieftainship. The "Big Five" existed but did not exist formally, hence it could not be easily construed as a threat to the chieftainship.

Many residents associated membership of a committee with corruption, an association Ngobe avoided by resigning from formal positions. If Ngobe was to succeed he would have to mobilise residents around an issue, rather than any ability he might have had in delivering personalised services (in exchange for loyalty). That is, Ngobe’s legitimacy as a leader was dependent upon his ability to be seen to use a public profile to represent more than his personal interests. Ngobe saw his mission as providing an alternative model of leadership to the chieftainship and the bureaucracy. He commented:

“If you are a leader, people think that you’ll force them to give money or presents. I want to show them that this is not a leader. A bona fide leader is an ordinary person who always supplies instruction to people, advising them to live in a good way.”

Ngobe’s resignation from the Planning Committee marked the moment when he gave up trying to use his status as a farmer on a Betterment Scheme to pressurise the bureaucracy into delivering those rights due to farmers on the Scheme. At the same time, Ngobe’s position as a broker became entrenched when he retained a leadership role but quit those formal structures provided by the bureaucracy to guard farmers’ interests. Ngobe, an office bearer in the Lutheran church, saw himself as answerable to an authority above politics. Ngobe invoked a specifically Christian imaginary to legitimate his position as a leader. However, this did not legitimate the exercise of power:

“There are people who are blessed to be leaders by God, but this is not to say that they must stand in a higher rank... just because they are born leaders doesn’t mean
The "Big Five" and the Agricultural Officers

The conflict between the "Big Five" and the Agricultural Officers came to a head in February 1980 when the AOs called a meeting to discuss problems with the Coop Committee. When all the farmers turned up at the meeting, the AOs, sensing the militant mood of the gathering, called the meeting off. The AOs then laid a charge against all the members of the "Big 5" with the magistrate of Bushbuckridge. They alleged the "Big 5" were trouble makers and were holding illegal meetings. A warrant was issued for their arrest. The "Big 5" contacted Sekgopela Mashile, the Member of Lebowa's Parliament, who showed the magistrate the invitation they had received from the Agricultural Officers to attend the "illegal" meeting. The charges were dropped. Eventually, in May 1980, with the assistance of Mashile, the "Big 5" managed to call a meeting with the Planning Committee, Coop Committee, the Magistrate and the Agricultural Officers. The meeting resolved to hold elections amongst the Coop members for a new Coop committee in July 1980. Elections were also held for the PC on the same date.

After the showdown with the AOs, the relationship between the PC, Ngobe and the chief slowly improved. The PC continued to give the chief minutes of all its meetings to convince the chief that it was not a threat. The chief, on his own accord, also did research amongst his subjects and discovered that he was being misinformed by corrupt AOs. By the mid eighties, the chief showed his support for the Planning Committee by making a public statement to the effect that any farming-related problem was to go through the PC before going to him. The chief's support changed the balance of power between the Committee and the Agricultural
Officers. The chief ensured that members of the "Big 5" had easy access to the bureaucracy, and also allowed "helpful" outsiders to have entrance to the area. Animosity between the chief and the AOs increased to the point where an AO tried (unsuccessfully) to challenge the chief's right to intervene in the administration of the Irrigation Scheme, given its status as a special Betterment project. Ngobe was made a member of the chief's council in 1985. A year later, the chief (tentatively) offered Ngobe the position of induna. It is worth noting that by 1986, the Big 5 held a feast for the chief to thank him for his concern and to encourage him to be active in all areas of "community" life in Dingleydale.

The "Big 5" came to dominate political life in Dingleydale. Members of the group had key portfolios on the PC, the Coop, the induna's council, the chief's council, the grazing committee, the health committee and various school committees. The activities of the "Big 5" provided a fixed procedure for getting administrative services delivered. By dominating all the Betterment committees, they were in a position to define a fixed administrative space and procedure for these committees. Having a working relationship with the chief, meant they could use the platform of the chief's court to control the Tribal Authority. Likewise, their relationship with the MPs meant they were able to expose the activities of corrupt Lebowa government personnel to their superiors. In this way the administrative confusion described above was greatly clarified.

Ngobe refused to accept any portfolios on the PC, the Coop or any other committees related directly to farming activities. When these committees presented suggestions or decisions to public meetings, Ngobe used his autonomous position to mediate between residents and the committees. By having no formal place on the committees Ngobe ensured that he could not
be accused of using political positions to enhance his personal economic aspirations.

The "Big 5" did not rely on consensus being reached at public meetings. Before any big gathering was held, they would caucus amongst themselves to decide on a unified line. The "Big 5" went to great lengths to ensure that they were in touch with public opinion. They also devised strategies to change that opinion. If, for example, an Agricultural Officer needed to be disciplined, the "Big 5" would use informal communication channels, such as the shebeens, to spread the word about the activities of the Officer. Hence by the time a meeting was held, residents were fully briefed as to the problems that were to be discussed.

The Decline of the Big Five

The drought in first two years of the 1980s marked a turning point in Ngobe's economic fortunes. In both years Ngobe planted ten hectares of tomatoes but failed to produce a crop, resulting in a significant financial loss. In 1983, Ngobe only planted three hectares of crops. Although, the next year he had a moderately successful crop on eight hectares of land, the year was marred by the loss of his truck in an accident, undermining his ability to market his produce independently.

Apart from the vagaries of the climate, Ngobe's farming endeavour faced more fundamental problems. Without an extended kinship network to draw on, Ngobe was having difficulties finding a reliable supervisor to oversee his employees when he was away from the lands. The fertility of the soil, which was marginal at the best of times, was getting progressively used up. As new residents settled on the Scheme, Ngobe faced increasing resentment over his use
of more than one hectare of land. Lastly, the water supply began to be threatened by the arrival of new management on the neighbouring farm of Champagne. 1985 was to be the last year that Ngobe was a full time farmer.

Champagne was one of two farms purchased by John Travers in 1919. Travers was a serious commercial farmer and immediately implemented labour tenancy relations on the farm. By 1949, the farm had been transformed into the “best” citrus estate in the district with 6000 citrus trees, 2000 mango trees, 400 litchi trees, irrigation canal stretching four and a half miles and an annual income of 17 900 pounds. In 1950 the South African Native Trust purchased the farm for 50 000 pounds. The Commissioner and Chief Agricultural Officer were loath to turn a successful and expensive enterprise over to small-scale black farmers. The Trust decided to manage the farm for the benefit of the population living on the surrounding farms. Any profits from the farm went to the SANT. Although the farm was transferred to Lebowa in 1973, no changes were made in its management.

Relations between the Dingleydale farmers and Champagne changed drastically when, in 1982, the Lebowa Development Corporation handed over the management of the farm to a Johannesburg based syndicate, Measured Farming. Measured Farming impounded stray cattle, refused to allow school children to take a short cut through the land and fined residents for collecting firewood from the farm. The syndicate stole money deducted from worker’s pay packets for unemployment insurance and pension fund purposes. Measured Farming with the assistance of the Agricultural Officers began to syphon off water from the canal. Relations deteriorated further when Measured Farming began to expand their farming operations onto Dingleydale’s land. Ngobe contacted a lawyer who challenged the Syndicate. Eventually
agreement was reached that no more land would be taken, unemployment and pension deductions would cease, and a representative of the Dingleydale farmers would sit in on management meetings at Measured Farming. Simon Phoku was nominated by the chief to perform this role.

Although Ngobe came out triumphant in the initial skirmish with Measured Farming, conflict around the syndicate was to mark the beginning of the end of the "Big 5". Ngobe's influence over the other members of the Big 5 progressively declined with his economic fortunes, as his ability to act as a source of economic security decreased. The temptation always existed for members of the "Big 5" to use their political positions to accumulate wealth. The strategy of forming the "Big Five" was caught in the contradiction of depending on a group of individuals to discipline a system that functioned by personalising political processes. In a context were the accuracy of his accusations could not be verified, Mashiloane accused Phoku of using his position as the Dingleydale farmer's representative to "sell out the community" to Measured Farming. Ngobe's attempts to protect Phoku failed. Tensions reached the point where Phoku fled the Scheme fearing for his life.

Having driven Phoku from the Scheme, Mashiloane was in a position to literally take over the administration of the Cooperative. In the second half of 1986, he held the position of Chair, Secretary and Treasurer. An audit of the Cooperative's books at the end of the year could not account for forty thousand rand. At a public meeting in early 1987 to discuss problems in the cooperative, Ngobe successfully organised the removal of Mashiloane from all executive positions. The meeting marked the end of the "Big Five" and the beginning of open enmity between Ngobe and Mashiloane.
Herbalism, Cattle and School: The Start of a new Career

In 1986 Ngobe, on instructions received from his ancestors in a dream, became a full-time herbalist. That the instructions came from his ancestors was not contrived: Within an imaginary that defined the social, natural and supernatural as three interlinked spheres, there was no other source of authority or inspiration to heal that lies outside the spiritual. Within this framework personal power is an accumulation of a multitude of individual talents that are perceived to originate from outside the material body. The ability to heal, to speak persuasively, to farm productively all mark the individual as a source of both material and spiritual power.

Ngobe’s change of career marked the moment when he defined himself as an outsider to both the formal economy, and those administrative structures that existed to regulate that economy. Within the “informal” economy, accumulation could take place outside of the intrusions of a predatory bureaucracy. Ngobe could thus withdraw from formal politics. The new vocation was also accompanied by a change in Ngobe’s style of leadership. Within this context healing and politics go hand in hand. A herbalist is a cultural broker par-excellence. The practice of herbalism links physical health to culture, in that the ancestors have the ability to sanction behaviour in such a way as to cause sickness. Sickness is not limited to physical health; a herbalist must be able to treat ailments such as bad-luck and poor social relationships. Hence, a herbalist needs to be able to link mind, body, social position and the behaviour of the spiritual world.

Ngobe’s career as a herbalist was accompanied by a change from the Lutheran to the
Apostolic Church and a reworking of agnatic ideology. Prior to Ngobe’s arrival at Dingleydale, he had never lived under a chief or within an extended clan network. Ngobe’s reworking of agnatic ideology replaced the chieftainship and the lineage with the household as the centre of social reproduction. Like the chieftainship, the powers of the household head were legitimised by his proximity to the household’s ancestors. It was the sacred duty of the household head to reproduce “appropriate” gender and generational relations. If all households conformed to this requirement, social harmony would be secured. Within this reworking, the rights of household head’s to control those institutions that socialised their children were inviolate; However, the right to rule outside the household became a secular issue; the authority of the chieftainship depended on their respect for, and capacity to guarantee, the authority of the household head. Should the chieftainship abuse its position, then it should be replaced by a form of government decided by the vote, and the church be given the role of guarding a “communities” spiritual health.40

The ideological reworking embraced “modernity” (in so far as this did not interfere with the authority of the household head). “It is necessary”, Ngobe often asserted, “to stay absolutely up to date.” In the absence of the chieftainship as symbolic reproducer of all aspects of social life, the use of fertilisers and insecticides were not a challenge to the spiritual powers of the institution and the ritual reproduction of the social whole.41 Likewise, the political space for church and school was unequivocally opened (provided these institutions reproduced household relations).

The link between Ngobe’s new style of leadership, the above precepts, and his career as a herbalist was demonstrated by a feast he held to “thank his ancestors” in 1988. The feast was
attended by local dignitaries, including the Mashile brothers, executive members of the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee, teachers and some prominent businessmen. People from outside of Bushbuckridge included a lawyer, a labour relations expert, a trade unionist and a group of university students. Speakers included Matsiketsane Mashile and myself. The speeches were followed by traditional dancing. The overt content of the feast was that if a person "loved their culture" and "remembered their ancestors" they would be successful. In the vacuum created by the Bantustan state, Ngobe was attempting to define organising principles around which conflicts could be resolved, and a sense of community could be constituted. However, the form of the feast was equally, if not more, important than the content of the speech. The fact that Ngobe held a feast (ostensibly as a sacrifice for his ancestors) demonstrated his public acknowledgement that he belonged to a "community".42 Furthermore, Ngobe was demonstrating his ability to mediate between insiders and outsiders in a way that linked his prowess as a herbalist to his ability to mediate across cultures. The ancestors must have appreciated the feast: Ngobe's practice boomed in the following months.

Ngobe became Matsiketsane Mashile's personal herbalist, a position that linked him to Mashile's role as an unrecognised chief.43 He organised lawyers for the Mashile brothers when they and the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee were detained and tried for terrorism in 1987; an action that earned the trust and gratitude of the Crisis Committee. He was the treasurer on the Management Committee of a legal advice centre. He specialised in contacting and communicating with outside resource bearers. He arranged for a student organisation based in Johannesburg to assist in the building of a local school. He introduced Operation Hunger to a women's group.44
Ngobe persisted in exposing members of the bureaucracy who violated (what Ngobe considered to be) the inalienable rights of the household head, which ultimately brought him into conflict with the chief. The principal of the local primary school (where two of Ngobe's children were enrolled) failed to produce a financial statement for public scrutiny. Ngobe alleged that the principal had embezzled building funds and had illegally imposed examination fees. A local shop-owner, who was a member of the chief's council, was the chair of the Primary school committee. Having been approached by the shop-owner, and probably bribed by the principal, the chief refused to investigate Ngobe's allegations and instructed Ngobe to drop the issue. As far as Ngobe was concerned, the chief's refusal to take action removed the raison de etre of the chieftainship (in securing the rights of the household head), and he continued to pursue the matter. After the circuit inspectors failed to investigate the irregularities, Ngobe organised an appointment, via the Mashile brothers, with the Secretary of Education in Lebowa. Despite statements to the contrary, the Secretary failed to act on the allegations. The chief, seemingly concerned to assert his personal authority (and, with it his ability to protect clients), was infuriated by Ngobe's refusal to obey his instructions, and expelled Ngobe from his Council.45

In the latter part of the eighties, Ngobe assumed positions on two committees, the Grazing Committee and the Maakere Secondary School Committee. These positions ultimately led to his downfall. In 1987, Ngobe started cattle farming. In the same year he was elected chair of the Grazing Committee. One of the Committee's responsibilities was to implement rotational grazing. This meant preventing farmers from grazing their cattle in certain wards, despite the shortage of grazing in the available wards. Residents protested and ultimately Ngobe was forced to back down and allow grazing in all the wards. However, during the
conflict Ngobe became implicated in the administration of despised Betterment policies. In attempting to make the Scheme ecologically and economically viable, Ngobe was caught in the contradiction between administering a Betterment Scheme that served a population who were at best ambivalent about Betterment assumptions and controls. Ironically Ngobe had served the function of acting as a buffer between residents and the Agricultural Officers.

A diffuse but powerful alliance was being built against Ngobe. By the end of the eighties he had antagonised a wide range of patrons. These included the chief and his council, the Induna, the Agricultural Officers, Mashiloane, the principal, the shopkeeper and numerous other patrons. Ngobe had also lost support and legitimacy through the conflict around the implementation of rotational grazing. Nothing boosts a patron's prestige and power like being seen to be actively involved in the downfall of competing patrons. Ngobe's enemies were quick to embellish on these conflicts so as to further isolate Ngobe. Where there is no definitive institution to confirm or deny rumours, residents don't believe everything that they hear, but believe everything that confirms what they want to hear. Ngobe was becoming progressively isolated.

It is doubtful whether these forces would have been sufficient to cause Ngobe any lasting harm. However, during this period, school students emerged as a cohesive but anarchic force in Dingleydale. Ngobe's position as chair of the Maakere Secondary School Committee put him at the intersection of a growing institutional and generational conflict. In mid-July 1990, schooling at Maakere Secondary School came to a halt when students called for the dismissal of two teachers and the abolition of corporal punishment. One teacher was accused of being a government spy. Both teachers had recently been transferred to Maakere after student
action at their previous schools had forced them to leave. As Chair of the school committee, Ngobe took it upon himself to protect the teachers. Ngobe refused to get the teachers transferred, claiming that no evidence was presented to support the allegations against the teachers. The demand for the abolition of corporal punishment was refused. At the end of the week the circuit inspector closed the school.

Ngobe had bitten off more than he could chew. Instead of bringing the conflicting parties into contact with one another, Ngobe took sides with the school authorities. In effect, he made problems in the school his personal problems. Students began to see Ngobe as part of the problem, not the solution. Furthermore, underlying the institutional conflicts around the running of the school was a generational antagonism. Students were demanding the right to a political voice. Abolishing corporal punishment would have effectively redefined the rights of youths. As a custodian of "culture", Ngobe felt a personal responsibility to reproduce the practices of his ancestors: He refused to deal with the students as adults; his style when dealing with the students remained arrogant and brash. Students, he believed, respected firmness. Not surprisingly, the focus of student anger was displaced from the school authorities onto Ngobe.

The students discovered that they were not alone in their conflict with Ngobe. Patrons fed the students lurid stories about alliances between Ngobe and the police, formed with the aim of attacking the youth. There was no institution or person that either Ngobe or the students could turn to resolve the conflict and distinguish the truth from the rumours. Tensions mounted and the students decided to act.
On the 21 July, a group of about 400 youths arrived at Ngobe's house to ask him to attend a meeting on the soccer field. A number of the youths were armed with sjamboks. As Ngobe had been informed the previous night that he was going to be attacked, he told the group to wait while he went into his house to get his shield and spear. The crowd panicked and fled. Soon they regrouped and began to stone Ngobe who was at a neighbour's house. The stoning continued for about two hours by which stage Ngobe was badly cut on his head and face. Eventually, the stoning stopped and a mass meeting was convened at the local soccer field.

A police van arrived but did nothing to assist Ngobe who was bleeding profusely. At the meeting students alleged that the school committee had not given parents a financial statement. A member of the school committee and a parent testified that the committee had given a statement.

The students continued to insist that they wanted Ngobe to leave the area. Ngobe refused, saying that he would only leave if the youth could present evidence of his committing any crime. Ngobe was on the point of passing out due to loss of blood when Matsiketsane Mashile and two members of the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee, David Chiloane and Emon Mashego, arrived, having been summoned by Ngobe's wife. The police van quickly left. Mashile and the MCC members successfully negotiated with the students that Ngobe be taken to hospital.

The chairman of the Tribal Authority arrived. Failing to notice the presence of the MCC members or Mashile, he complimented the youth on their action. He gave his assurance that no-one would be arrested. He ordered that any police enquiries should be referred to the chief. The crowd dispersed.46
Over the following weeks, in the process of investigating the attack, the MCC held numerous meetings with the students. Allegations against Ngobe ranged from his being a member of "Inkatha" to his making preparations to "attack the youth". No evidence was presented to substantiate any allegations against Ngobe. During the meetings, the MCC managed to trace the origins of some of the rumours to the Induna, two shop-owners and a policeman.  

The MCC defined vigilantes as people who work with the police and the chief, and in doing so, are able to attack people without fear of arrest. The MCC concluded that the students acted as vigilantes and had been used by the bureaucracy. They were warned not to repeat the incident. Ngobe was advised to press charges against anyone involved in the attack.  

Ngobe resigned from public life after the attack.

Conclusion

Willis Ngobe was (and remains at the time of writing) an extraordinarily resourceful man. He moved successfully from metal work to farming, and from farming to herbalism. As a farmer, in the course of five years, and without access to external financial support, he farmed and marketed the produce from thirteen hectares of land and employed twenty three full time workers. This was achieved under a system which attempted to restrict farmers to one hectare of land. Although he was taught the rudiments of herbal healing by his mother, Ngobe's healing skills (like his farming methods) were largely self-taught. Through a process of acute observation, Ngobe developed a knowledge of physical and psychological pathologies and an accompanying battery of herbal cures.
Ngobe's achievements by no means came easily. A predatory bureaucracy threatened Ngobe's economic aspirations and his desire to live in an environment conducive to his children's education. Ngobe needed to find a way of ensuring that corrupt bureaucrats were made accountable for their actions. However, Ngobe was caught in a contradiction when he tried to achieve this goal: as a recent settler in the area he had neither a historical claim to wield political authority, nor a relationship with the chieftainship. Ngobe had to build a power base from scratch, without an indigenous ideology on which to base his claim to leadership.

He employed two strategies to reach this goal. He tried to use the various committees formed by Agricultural Officers as a platform to expose corrupt practices by the bureaucracy and he tried to unify residents around shared ideals. A gifted public speaker and rigorous thinker, Ngobe traversed indigenous and western ideologies with consummate ease. Ever mindful of the fact that indigenous systems of political thought legitimated the wielding of authority on the principles of ancestral ideology, Ngobe integrated the institutions of church and school with these starting points in a dynamic, eclectic and complex discourse. Ngobe, the leader, was attempting to create organising principles on which notions of community could be constructed, and residents mobilised around, in the context of the Bantustans. Ultimately, almost at the cost of his life, Ngobe failed.

Ngobe "failed" as a leader for a number of reasons. The experiences of removal associated with labour tenancy and Betterment have left settlements of strangers in their wake, making the organisation of resistance particularly difficult. Ngobe's position as an outsider, without a historical relationship to the area, placed further limits on his ability to mobilise support. Having no historical relationship with the chieftainship, Ngobe struggled to find a position
where he could legitimately wield political authority.

Ngobe's failure was part of the broader success of clientelist politics. No social force was able to define ideologies and implement institutions that delivered a combination of rights and services in a way that won widespread support amongst residents. In this vacuum, politics became a localised power struggle between competing social forces and individuals. It is the politics of survival, where short term expediencies, rather than shared principles, unite people. However, Ngobe was caught in processes larger than clientelist politics: In trying to create an environment where his farming enterprise could prosper, that is in trying to make the Irrigation Scheme work, Ngobe got caught between a population still trying to maintain pre-colonial rights to land and the logic of Betterment. By involving himself with the management of secondary schooling Ngobe was caught in both institutional and generational conflict.

The position of Matsiketsane Mashile stands in sharp contrast to that of Ngobe. In so far as Ngobe did not have a history to draw on, Matsiketsane had history on his side. A Pulana with a claim to the Sethlare chieftainship, whose core following was resident in an area allocated to Gazankulu, who was jailed and banished for resisting the implementation of Tribal Authorities, Mashile represented the chieftainship as defined by indigenous principles on which the Pulana claims to land were based. The next chapter outlines Matsiketsane's career as a leader.
Notes

1. Much of the information contained in this chapter is based on my personal observations during my visits to Dingleydale. Between 1985 and the time of writing I have spent a considerable amount of time at Dingleydale, living with Ngobe.

2. Church of the Province Library, A1655 B51, The Hunt Papers, Summary and Translation of the 1894 Boer Location Commission; Also Report by the Commissioner for Native Affairs, Relative to the acquisition and Tenure of land by Natives in the Transvaal, July 1904.

3. CAD LDE A115/48 V2331, Sec Lands to Central Land Board, 2/6/55; Sec NAD to Sec Lands, 29/8/55. Also CAD K335, Evidence to Uys Commission of Petrus Ubisi, Thulamahashe, 17/5/1977.

4. CAD NTS 17/423 V10226, Report of Reclamation Committee, 19/2/1940; and NTS 44/55 V327, Proposed Confitrmo of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction, 31/7/1946.

5. CAD NTS 17/423/1 V10226, Location Reclamation and Resettlement Report, March 1957; BAO to NC Bushbuckridge, 9/7/57; NC Bushbuckridge to BAO, 9/8/58; BAO to NC Bushbuckridge 25/1/59.


7. CAD NTS 44/55 V327, Report of Special Departmental Committee, 19/5/61.

8. CAD K335, Written Memorandem to Uys Commission by Gazankulu Government.

9. Interview Ania Molimi, Dingleydale, 30/9/93.


12. CAD BAO H128/1080 V5734, BAC Bushbuckridge to CBAC Pietersburg, 17/9/64 and 8/12/65.


14. ibid.

15. CAD K335, Written Memorandem to the Uys Commission by the Gazankulu Government.
16. ibid and Interview W Ngobe, Dingleydale, 4/6/91.

17. Interview Ngobe, W., Dingleydale, 02/09/1990.


20. According to a survey of some two hundred households conducted in Dingleydale in December 1985 to January 1986, approximately 28% of the potentially economically active population are self-employed, the majority being full time farmers. Only 7.4% of households with access to land received no cash income whatsoever from farming. 30% of the potentially economically active population were migrant workers. 8.6% of the PEA were formally employed. Approximately 30% of the PEA males were unemployed, while 69% of the PEA females were unemployed. At the time of the survey, 23% of the households were landless. 43.5% of the households owned livestock. Ownership ranged between 1 and 34 head of cattle. The survey was supervised by the author and Karen Miedzinski for the Transvaal Rural Aid and Development Programme.


22. Interview Ngobe, W., Dingleydale, 08/02/1991.


24. Quoted from Miedzinski, "Traditional and Alternative..." P45.


26. Interview A Molimi, Dingleydale, 30/9/93.


28. The above and the following paragraphs are based on Interview Ngobe, W., Dingleydale, 05/06/1987.


31. The above paragraph and the following paragraphs are based on personal observations from when I lived at Dingleydale and when I visited the scheme between December 1985 until the time of writing.
32. Quote taken from Miedzinski, K., "Traditional and Alternative structures..." pg46.


34. ibid.


36. ibid.

37. CAD LDE A115/23 V2328, Report Senior AO to NC Bushbuckridge 30/9/49.

38. CAD LDE A115/23 V2328, Deed of sale, 20/6/1950.


40. The above paragraph is based on numerous discussions and debates between myself and Ngobe, rather than on any particular interview.


42. See Niehaus, I.A., "Coins for Blood and Blood for Coins: Towards a Genealogy of Sacrifice in Bushbuckridge 1930 - 1990" Unpublished paper presented to the African Studies Institute, 14/3/94 for a detailed analysis of the meanings of sacrifice. The idea of sacrifice is explored in more detail in Chapter seven.

43. See the next chapter.

44. The above is based on personal observations.


46. Interview Mashego, E., (Secretary of the MCC), Shatale, 08/08/1990.

47. Ibid.
48. ibid.
Matsiketsane Mashile had scars on his back (from lashings he received as part of a sentence for incitement), a broken cheekbone (from a farmer who tried to prevent him from collecting the belongings of a deceased worker), and a voice that could make his audience "soar through the clouds" (a gift from his ancestors). Matsiketsane was an African National Congress leader and unrecognised chief banished in 1963 for fifteen years because of his opposition to Tribal Authorities. He returned to Bushbuckridge in 1978 and immediately set about rebuilding his chieftainship. He demonstrated his spiritual prowess in his position as a Bishop in the Bantu Apostolic Faith Mission Church and as a faith healer. He constituted a family council (Bagomane) and then built a core following by organising the largest burial society in Bushbuckridge. As an elected Member of Lebowa Parliament, Mashile fought corruption in the Lebowa Government, and in doing so, became a political representative of the population, a position supposedly reserved for recognised chiefs.

As an unrecognised "chief", based in a Pulana "island" allocated to Gazankulu, who forged links with the African National Congress in the fifties, Mashile personified the gap between the Pulana (oral) history of the district and the perceptions and policies of the bureaucracy. Building on his singular history, Matsiketsane was able to forge alliances with the two oppositional movements that emerged amongst the Pulana. The first movement, the Pulana nationalists, grounded their opposition to Apartheid on a moral economy of the chieftainship.
that drew on the imaginary of the chief as living representative of the dominant lineage. Building on this moral economy, that nationalists constructed a series of principles that constituted what they considered to be the appropriate relationship between ethnicity and politics. These principles clashed with those employed by the Apartheid state, especially those principles applied by the state in the allocation of land. Organisationally, this movement took the form of a migrant association, the Leihlo La Naga: the Eye of the Nation. The second oppositional movement, the secular Pulana, grounded their critique of Apartheid on their racial identity, that is their exclusion from central state power because of their racial characteristics. Although these residents acknowledged their ethnic identity, their political focus was distinctly national. They recognised the counter hegemonic potential of the Pulana identity, but did not organise politically around ethnicity. Hence, although they saw the practice of initiation school, the employment of indigenous idioms, and the use of the Pulana language as part of a process of resisting colonial intrusions, they steadfastly refused to link the wielding of political power to ethnicity. The secular Pulana drew on democratic principles which dictated that all subjects be treated as equals by the state and which separated the wielding of social authority from any spiritual dimension. These people formed the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee (MCC) and aligned themselves with national political organisations linked to the Congress tradition.

Although the two movements shared large areas of overlapping interest, the two approaches were not entirely compatible. The secular Pulana, who brought national political organisation to the district, were interested in building organisations (both adult and youth) with the capacity to challenge the bureaucracy. Mashile's role as a Member of Parliament was crucial in achieving this goal. However, Mashile's claim to traditional authority was a double edged
sword for the Crisis Committee. On the one hand, Mashile represented historical continuity, and as a consequence, drew on a multitude of cultural resources that resonated with his constituency. On the other hand, Mashile's authority was never able to transcend the confines of chiefly secession disputes and sectarian ethnic interests. This in turn drew organisations with a national agenda into localised conflicts.

This chapter explores the relationship between chiefly politics and Pulana and African nationalism as it unfolded in the career of Matsiketsane Mashile.

**Matsiketsane and the Chieftainship**

Matsiketsane Mashile was born in 1927 on Maripeskop (Moholoholo), the second son of his father's third wife. Two years after his birth, a few hundred families were removed by the forestry Department to five farms owned by the state some forty kilometres east of Maripeskop on the Lowveld. The removed households settled along the same clan lines that existed at Maripeskop. Amongst the removed households were refugees from Mozambique known by the Pulana as the *Bahlakano*, who had settled on Maripeskop under a Pulana chief. Although there seems to have been spatial segregation in that the *Bahlakano* formed a separate "clan", the refugees spoke Pulana, and attended initiation school and the Pulana Kgoro. Two years after the removal, Matsiketsane's brother, Sekgopela Mashile was born.

Matsiketsane's claim to the chieftainship was based on his relationship to Maripe. According to Mashile, his grand-father, Legole Mashile, was one of Maripe's sons, who died before
he could "take over his rightful place" on the chieftainship. Instead, Setlare took over as "acting chief" on Maripe's death. Setlare changed his surname from Mashile to Chiloane to "distance himself" from his brother. Mashile's father, Lekgwadi, entered into a secession dispute with Setlare when he was old enough to take over the chieftainship. The dispute divided the chiefdom into two areas, one controlled by Setlare, one by Lekgwadi. However, during the dispute, Lekgwadi was "murdered" by witchcraft used by his opponent. A year after the death of Lekgwadi, the forestry removals took place resulting in most of Lekgwadi's followers being removed to the Lowveld. On Setlare's death in 1946, Mabalane Chiloane became chief. Mabalane was succeeded by his eldest son, Sekganyane in 1956. On the death of Sekganyane in 1959, his brother Masinyane Chiloane ruled as regent for four years. After Masinyane's death, another of Sekganyane's brothers, German Chiloane, became regent. German ruled (officially at least) till the end of the eighties.  

Although rules of genealogical secession legitimise claims to the chieftainship, these rules, in and of themselves, do not determine secession. As can be noted from the above, genealogical claims are complex. Royal blood provides a claimant with the authority to speak, but it does not guarantee that claimant the right to rule. When the divinely sanctioned harmony between rulers and ruled is broken, that is, when the actions of the chief and the aspirations of his subjects differ, secession disputes ensured that the aspirations of the chief and that of his subjects are made congruant. Secession disputes were the rule, rather than the exception. Comaroff provides a succinct summary of what this entails:

Genealogical argument may provide the terms in which rival claims are debated, but actual outcomes depend upon the processes of competition for support and on the ability of politicians to mobilise followers. In this sense, ascription and achievement are not conflicting principles but describe two levels of one reality.  

Although the Kgoro dictated procedures which governed the exercise of chiefly power, and
the external context also placed limits on the wielding of that power, chiefly authority was also dependent on the personality of the chief. "His right to regulate the affairs of the morafe [chiefdom] was held, tautologically, to depend on his ability to demonstrate his effectiveness before his people". Or as one informant put it: "the chief chooses himself".

Bushbuckridge in the seventies and eighties, provided a paradoxical context within which a chief could exercise power: On the one hand, recognition meant that the chief was a bureaucrat, forced to implement broadly unpopular policies. On the other hand, the powers of any member of the bureaucracy were obscure; a chief with a powerful personality was able to exploit this confusion to consolidate his authority, while those with less powerful personalities were marginalised by other sections of the bureaucracy. Matsiketsane inherited a political vacuum in the gap between popular visions of the chieftainship and the reality of Tribal Authorities. The administrative confusion surrounding the bureaucracy also personalised the political process: those people with the ability to assert administrative control effectively had control. The fulfilment of Matsiketsane's political aspirations hinged on his ability to demonstrate his personal powers by exploiting these vacuums.

When Matsiketsane was a child, his grand-mother told him, that by right, he was chief. His ancestors confirmed his royal calling by appearing to him in dreams. In short, Matsiketsane knew himself to be the chief. The ball was in his court. He needed to prove that his ancestors had endowed him with the qualities worthy of the respect paid to a chief. In demonstrating these powers, Mashile hoped to build a sufficient support base to appropriate the chieftainship. The following sections show how Matsiketsane went about achieving this end.
Vrfran Experiences

A year after Matsiketsane was born his father was allegedly murdered in the course of the chieftainship dispute with Setlare. As was the custom, Matsiketsane's mother was remarried to his father's younger brother. Mashile had just completed his Standard One at a local school when his "younger father" died. His "younger father" had used most of Mashile's father's cattle to buy more wives. Those few cattle that remained were "taken" by Mashile's half brother, who moved to Leamington some forty kilometres away. Mashile's family found themselves destitute. Having achieved his Standard one, Mashile had to "cry tears of frustration" at having to leave school, and he left for the Witwatersrand to seek employment.

Mashile worked as a domestic before being employed at Amato textiles in Benoni. He moved from the Benoni hostel to the Apex squatter camp in order to live with his wife. The camp was organised along a mixture of regional and ethnic lines; Pulana and other migrants from Bushbuckridge had a section of the camp and held a kgotla every weekend. Matsiketsane became Markus Madiongoane's, the leader of the camp, secretary. At Amato textiles he became a South African Council of Trade Unions (SACTU) shop steward. In the wake of the 1955 Amato strike, Mashile lost his job at the textile company. Two years later Mashile returned to Mapulaneng.

The Ludlow Mashile returned to in 1957 was a very different place to the one he had left in 1948. The South African Native Trust (SANT) had purchased Ludlow and were in the process of moving residents from their scattered households into residential blocks, and
demarcating the haphazard agricultural plots into one morgan squares. Mashile also found himself living on a "Pulana island"; Despite the predominance of Pulanas on Ludlow, as well as surrounding farms, the farms fell under the Shangaan "sphere of influence" and had been allocated to the Mnisi chieftainship.

Mashile also discovered that the surrounding farms were involved in a bitter struggle with Hall and Sons, an agricultural company based in Nelspruit. Hall and Sons had purchased eight farms in the immediate vicinity of Ludlow in 1944. The relationship between the company and their tenants had been fraught. As rent tenants, residents had fought the companies attempts to increase rent, monopolise the sale of cattle and the use of manure, and force their children to work at the company's farm in Nelspruit. These struggles reached a climax in 1957 when the company tried to introduce compulsory labour tenancy on the farms. The tenants were given ninety days notice to leave the farm or accept labour tenant conditions. When the notice period had expired, the indunas on the farms were ordered to appear before the Native Commissioner. Whilst visiting the Commissioner, their homes were destroyed.

With the expulsion of the indunas a leadership vacuum emerged and Matsiketsane enthusiastically joined the fray. He took over the induna's court and found an unlikely ally in a neighbouring farmer, Nic Roberts, who was the head of the district's Labour Tenancy Control Board. Roberts seasonally employed the tenants on Hall and Son's property and was loath to see his supply of labour dry up with the implementation of labour tenancy on the company farms. He tried to use his position on the Control Board to influence the Commissioner to ban labour tenancy in the Released Area. His approach to the
Commissioner was untenable as Hall and Sons were acting in accordance with Chapter Four, which formally abolished rent tenancy. Mashile reported the conflict to "The World" newspaper, who wrote an article on it. Roberts and Mashile tried to employ lawyers to sue Hall and Sons for damages and to withdraw the eviction notices. Before the cases reached court, the NAD suspended the implementation of Chapter Four in the district.

After clarifying that there was no possibility of the Company's farms being excluded from the Released Area, Hall and Sons dropped their attempts to implement labour tenancy. The relationship between the company and the tenants did not improve, however. Matsiketsane continued to challenge the company's monopoly on cattle sales and their right to appropriate kraal-manure. On one of his expeditions to Johannesburg to seek assistance, Mashile contacted the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC agreed to provide the tenants with legal assistance on the condition that they joined the organisation. Mashile convened a meeting, and about four hundred people joined the organisation. Through the intervention of the lawyers, the appropriation of kraal manure ceased.

Mashile used his court to run ANC meetings. "When the police came we used to put ANC minutes under the table and take out the books of the tribal court." In 1960, a spy attended his court, and Mashile was arrested on charges of incitement for encouraging people to burn their passes. He was found guilty and sentenced to two years hard labour at Barberton Prison and five lashes. Recalling the lashes, Mashile commented: "They hit me that day until I could see stars. But I thought: "You buggers! You think I will be afraid of you and let you take my land."
On his release, Mashile discovered that the farm on which he was resident, as well as surrounding farms, were allocated to the Mnisi Tribal Authority. With the assistance of his younger brother, Sekgopela, Mashile began to organise resistance to the demarcation of Tribal Authority areas. He demanded that the area of his chieftainship be recognised or that he be given immediate recognition as the legitimate heir to the Setlare chieftainship. The meetings he organised were well attended and militant: "Blood would flow", Mashile allegedly asserted, if the courts did not rectify the situation. An exasperated Charles Bourquin, the Native Commissioner who prided himself on his ability to "justly" mediate between state and the "native" gave up the struggle of trying to "reason" with the brothers, and organised that the brothers were banished from the area to the Eastern Cape.16

**Banishment**

Matsiketsane spent fifteen years in the Transkei, while his brother was restricted to the Ciskei for eleven years. Matsiketsane was very active in exile: "My house was like a hospital", he remembers, "People were coming from all over for me to pray for them. I wasted a lot of time on church business. I used to go into the mountains and fast."17 Helen Joseph organised bursaries for the two brothers. Matsiketsane passed his Standard eight and two matric subjects. Sekgopela also passed his Standard eight exams. Lastly, Mashile worked for the Tanskei government on an experiemental farm. Church, school and work were, however, no substitute for home: the years in exile were extremely painful for both brothers who were chronically homesick.18

Although the two brother were physically absent from Bushbuckridge, they left a heritage
behind in the district which was to grow more powerful year by year as residents of the area began to experience the inequities of Apartheid. Residents began to look to their past for symbols of resistance as inspiration to guide them in their immediate struggles. The memory of the Mashile brothers served this purpose. In many quarters, (incorrect) stories circulated about the Mashiles being prisoners on Robbin Island, with other national leaders. Yet the heritage the Mashiles left behind was ambiguous: Matsiketsane's association with the African National Congress animated people looking to national liberation organisations for their emancipation. On the other hand, his association with Pulana land claims made him a symbol of (sectarian) ethnic interests. On his return to Bushbuckridge, Matsiketsane was to build on both aspects of this heritage, without, however, resolving any of the ambiguity surrounding it.

The Brothers Return to Bushbuckridge

In 1974, Sekgopela returned from the Ciskei. Perceived by the Commissioner as a threat to public order, he was immediately placed under house arrest. In 1978, while still formally under arrest, he successfully ran for the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. The same year Matsiketsane (illegally) returned from the Transkei. After fasting for sixteen days in the mountains, (and nearly dying in the process), Mashile went to go and ask the magistrate for permission to stay permanently at Bushbuckridge. He was banished to Bochum, but on appeal was allowed to return to Bushbuckridge and live under house arrest for three months, after which the restrictions were removed.19

Matsiketsane returned to find the nucleus of his chieftainship intact. Despite the area's
allocation to the Mnisi chieftainship and to Gazankulu, Matsiketsane's nephew, Benson Mashile had maintained the core institutions of the chieftainship. Benson held Kgoro at his home every second weekend. He also ensured that initiation school was held in defiance of the banning of the institution by the Gazankulu Legislative Assembly. Benson was also chair of the Primary and Secondary school committees. The Mashile's following was ethnically heterogenous and included many of the families removed from Maripeskop.20

Matsiketsane's most powerful ally was his brother, Sekgopela. The two brother's complimented one another. If Matsiketsane was the talker, Sekgopela was the listener. If Matsiketsane demanded respect because of his uncompromising pugnaciousness, Sekgopela commanded respect with his unflappable composure. Furthermore, both brothers were extraordinarily brave people. By fighting corruption as a Member of the Lebowa Parliament, Sekgopela built a substantial support base amongst grass-roots leaders (like Willis Ngobe).

When Matsiketsane returned from banishment, he was welcomed by a group of migrants representing a migrant organisation. The organisation was made up of Pulana nationalists and was to be a further source of support for Mashile.

Matsiketsane and the Land Question: The Leihlo La Naga Migrant Organisation

In 1978 a meeting of Pulana migrant workers was held at the municipal compound in Crown Mines Johannesburg. Migrants were mobilised through sending invitations to burial societies, compounds and factories. The vast majority of the migrants who attended the meeting worked for either the railways, municipality, mines or manufacturing concerns. Most of the
workers were illiterate, reflecting the relatively late arrival of schools in Mapulaneng. Urban representatives of the Tribal Authorities were also invited to the meeting. The meeting elected an interim committee for a new organisation, Leihlo la Naga, The Eye of the Nation.  

The major concerns of the The Eye of the Nation's founders were the "land question" and the position of Mapulaneng in Lebowa. On the one hand, "Pulana land" was being progressively "lost" to Gazankulu, on the other, the Pulana were being excluded from jobs and resources provided by the Lebowa Government. As a means of tackling the problem, the founders hoped to create a structure to unify the disparate Pulana chiefs under the umbrella of their common ethnicity. As a means to achieve this unity, the migrants wanted to have one Pulana representative in each township, instead of the existing system where each of the eight chiefs had an "induna". The aims of the organisation were reflected in its motto: "Mapulana first".  

The migrant's had, however, entered ethnic politics under duress. In contrast to the motto, the first aim and objective of the organisation was the:  

"elimination of discrimination on the ground of race, tribe, religion, language and sex; and instead create conditions in which equality of opportunity can be exercised."  

In short, the migrant organisation aimed to abolish Apartheid.  

This opposition to Apartheid was built on the migrant's ethnic identity. Prior to the implementation of Tribal Authorities, Pulana ethnicity had existed, but the relationship between that ethnicity and politics was diffuse. Pulana ethnicity was greater than any single chieftainship. There was no indigenous principle which linked membership of a chiefdom to
a Pulana (or any other) ethnic identity. As a consequence, and given the Pulana chiefdom's historical position on the edges of the Pedi, Swazi and Shangaan polities, the Pulana chiefdoms were characterised by ethnically heterogenous populations. On the other hand, according to indigenous principles, ownership and control of land was the exclusive and sacred right of the chief. A chieftainship "sacrificed blood for the land", that is it earned the right to own the land through conquest. However, these indigenous principles clashed with the ethnic criteria employed by the Apartheid state in the allocation of land and the recognition of chiefs. The implementation of Apartheid saw the Pulana nationalists "losing" what they believed to be land belonging to the Pulana chiefdoms. The Pulana nationalists felt confident that they were best able to assert their ethnic interests, (particularly in relation to the "land question"), when the link between ethnicity and access to state power, one of the cornerstones of Apartheid, was severed.

Yet, the Pulana nationalists had to fight on a terrain where they were at their weakest; that is they had to organise themselves as an ethnic group to stake their claim to land and government resources. A bridge needed to be built between the indigenous and Apartheid principles. Some structure had to be found to represent a Pulana nation's claim to land on the basis of conquest. Unlike the Zulu king, there was no clear Pulana paramount: there were many Pulana chiefs, none of whom had a secure historical claim to the paramountcy, but all of whom found elements in history on which to base the claim. These competing claims to the paramountcy reflected a history of intra-Pulana chiefly competition and distrust. The Pulana chiefs did not have a history of working as a coherent block under a centralised authority. Finding a representative of the organisation in the countryside was not going to be an easy task.
The migrants faced further difficulties in their search for a representative of the Pulana nation. The recognised chiefs accepted Tribal Authorities out of a political necessity. However, having accepted a position in the bureaucracy, and the strictures that went along with that position, the recognised chiefs had distanced themselves from the indigenous principles on which the Pulana claim to land was based. Furthermore, these chiefs were paid by the state to implement policies that denied those rights that the chieftainship was looked upon by its subjects to protect. The chief was no longer chief because of the "people" but because of recognition by the state. These chiefs could not symbolise what it meant to be a "moral Pulana". The migrants had a vision of the chieftainship as the Pulana chieftainships existed prior to Tribal Authorities, that is as political and ritual protector of the integrity of the Kgoro. The migrants wanted to reestablish a system where the chief did not receive a salary from government, but survived through the services he rendered to his subjects. Any problem was to be solved through "calling his people to Legkotla". In short, "it was only for a chief to make peace with his tribe".

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the migrants had urgent complaints that they hoped to voice about the functioning of the Tribal Authorities. Although the explicit aims and objectives had the potential to unite chiefs and subjects, the implicit aim of the Eye of the Nation was to provide the migrants with a "voice in the countryside". Not only were decisions being made at Tribal Authority meetings during the week in the absence of the migrants, but bribery and embezzlement were commonplace. School building funds were being embezzled by both chiefs and principals. More and more taxes were being imposed on an already over-extended populace. The majority of the councillors on the Tribal Authorities were businessmen who did "not feel pity for the poor". 
Not surprisingly, the newly formed migrant organisation was frustrated in its efforts to obtain recognition from a state reluctant to recognise any political representative apart from the chief. At an introductory meeting, the chiefs and the magistrate in Bushbuckridge refused to accept the credentials of the executive committee. The organisation found an ally in Chief Masoja Chiloane (Molotele), the last chief to be granted a Tribal Authority after being removed from white owned farms in 1972. Molotele’s insular existence on Glen Lyden under labour tenancy conditions, left the chief illiterate, steeped in an oral tradition, and out of his depth in his new circumstances.27 The chief was vulnerable and looking for allies. Hints that the migrant organisation recognised his claim to paramountcy fell on receptive ears, and Molotele allowed a mass meeting to be held in his courtyard. However, the tension between the chieftainship as defined in an oral tradition and the compromises made by chiefs in accepting Tribal Authorities surfaced. Speakers complained about the "decision" by Molotele to "sell" the chieftainships historical land on Glen Lyden by "accepting" removal and Tribal Authorities. The next (and last) meeting the migrants held at Molotele was surrounded by machine gun wielding police.

Undaunted, the migrants held a further meeting at Crown Mines to elect an "urban areas executive committee". Executive portfolio holders as well as a representative from each of the nine townships present were chosen. However, these elections were designed to maintain the appearance of trusting the recognised chiefs. A few weeks later, the "real" elections for the "Top Urban Executive Committee" were held in the absence of any representative of the recognised chiefs. The meeting was attended by Sekgopela Mashile, who had recently been elected to represent Mapulaneng in the Lebowa parliament. Approximately eighteen members were elected, all of whom were workers. The Chair, Secretary and Treasurer all worked for
the railways. There were two Apostolic Faith Mission priests on the executive. The majority of the members had their homes in the Setlare and Molotele chiefdoms.

Having been shunned by the recognised chiefs, the migrants had decided to throw in their lot with Matsiketsane. As an unrecognised "chief" banished for fifteen years for his opposition to Tribal Authorities, Mashile personified the image of the chief as protector of the "community". As Mashile's core support area was allocated to Gazankulu, his claim to the chieftainship represented the chasm between one of the Pulana oral histories of the region (and the moral economy of the chieftainship associated with that tradition) and the state's ahistorical, ethnically based, principles of land allocation. Furthermore, Matsiketsane claimed that the Setlare chieftainship was the paramount over the other Pulana chiefs on the basis of Maripe's victory over the Swazis in 1864. In a nutshell, Matsiketsane Mashile represented the vision of a chieftainship that ignored the boundaries and principles imposed by the Apartheid state. The "top executive" committee formed the "reception committee" to welcome Matsiketsane on his return from the Transkei in 1978. Mashile was presented with "gifts" and a feast was arranged at Mashile's house.

Following the feast the goal of uniting all the Pulana chiefs under the structure of the Eye of the Nation became untenable. On his return, Mashile reopened the succession dispute for the Setlare chieftainship. By welcoming Mashile home, the migrant's had taken sides in the dispute and closed off the possibility of working with Setlare. Furthermore, the recognised chiefs were threatened by Matsiketsane's claim to the paramountcy. The executive members of the organisation recalled: "The chiefs of Mapulaneng decided that LLN had chosen Matsiketsane to be the paramount chief of Mapulaneng. After this event all the chiefs ignored
A few months after Matsiketsane's return the Mapulaneng branch of the LLN was formed. The branch united grass-roots leaders who were disenchanted with the bureaucracy with supporters of Matsiketsane's chiefly aspirations. The President of the branch, a priest, was a close relative of Mashiles. The General Secretary was a school principal. The Treasurer was a recently retired migrant who was renting and managing a shop. All three officer bearers lived in the Setlare Tribal Authority.

Matsiketsane Builds His Chieftainship

To prove his personal power, a chief must prove his ability to intervene in the sphere of the supernatural. Matsiketsane returned to Bushbuckridge as a Bishop in the Bantu Apostolic Faith Mission church. He soon formed a congregation and opened up sub-branches of the church. Matsiketsane proved the "power of his words" by acting as a faith-healer in the church. In time, his brother, Sekgopela, and nephew, Benson, became priests in the church and held services at their houses. Former Pulana headmen in Gazankulu who supported Mashile's claim to the Setlare chieftainship, also started congregations.

The two brothers reconstituted structures of the chieftainship, in particular the Bagomane (the chief's family council), in the form of the Kwanang Mashile burial society. Although the society was originally only meant to service members of the Mashile family, the demand was such that the organisation expanded beyond those confines. By 1986 the society had seven branches with a total membership of over five hundred households. Matsiketsane was the
president of the society. Sekgopela was his deputy. There was a large overlap of the priests in Mashile's church and branch heads of the society. The branches were based in both Mapulaneng and Gazankulu. At the end of each year, the society held a feast at Matsiketsane's house consisting of speeches, songs, dances and food.

Implicit in the notion of a burial society was the constitution of a community based on the principle of mahloko, "sharing the pain". By taking the burden of the death off the family's shoulders, the society was making the "community a family" and the "family a community". The feast followed the burial represented a symbolic display of trust and unity. Trust because residents were willing to eat the food offered at the feast and unity because no-one was socially above eating the offered food. Apart from providing himself with a public platform to communicate relevant political messages, by placing himself at the intersection of the living and the dead, Mashile was putting himself in a position to interpret the legacy of the ancestors.

Matsiketsane and the Lebowa Parliament

The two Mashile brothers, with the support of Leihlo La Naga, won the 1983 elections to become members of the Lebowa parliament. The Mashiles' main opponent was a close friend of the Chief Minister of Lebowa, a businessman and the only Pulana resident in Mapulaneng with a university degree. Mashile's victory represented the triumph of indigenous symbols over symbols of status and power associated with western literate culture. To the Pulana nationalists, victory meant that even though the state refused to recognise Mashile's credentials, this did not mean that the "people" did not recognise his leadership.
As a Member of the Lebowa Parliament, Mashile was able to have his cake and eat it. He was able to represent the "community" to the Lebowa Government (a job otherwise monopolised by the Tribal Authorities) without (unlike the recognised chiefs) becoming implicated in the administration of unpopular policies. Mashile became an even greater threat to the recognised chiefs: Implicit in each approach made to Mashile for assistance and advice was an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of his claim to the chieftainship. Mashile became a broker: he either took residents directly to the bureaucracy or brought the bureaucracy to meet the residents without being associated with the failures of the state.

The Mashiles fought against regionalism and nepotism in the Lebowa government that had the effect of discriminating against Pulanas. An alleged Pedi stereotype of Pulanas was that they were "stupid" and "primitive" because relatively few Pulanas were educated compared to the Pedi who had a long history of mission schools. The following quote illustrates how this attitude was experienced:

At home we spoke Pulana, but at school, where most of the teachers were from Pietersburg, we had to speak Northern Sotho. People from Pietersburg were saying that we are speaking like kids... At one stage, Matsiketsane wanted to break from Lebowa, because of the way those people were behaving towards the Pulanas.  

The Mashiles fought for, and succeeded in, placing Pulanas in jobs in the bureaucracy that were previously "reserved" for "Pedis from Seshego". The instatement of the first Pulana school principal in 1984 was hailed as a victory for the Pulana against "Pedi" chauvinism. In the processes of securing jobs for professionals in the bureaucracy, Mashile won the support of numerous principals and teachers who became members of the LLN.  

The Mashiles also struggled for infrastructural resources from Lebowa. These struggles included the provision of schools, water supply and electricity. Amongst the Pulana
nationalists the construction of a teacher’s training college was both an economic and ethnic political project; a teachers training college would not only secure jobs for Pulanas in the bureaucracy, but also contradict the stereotype of Pulanas as “primitive”. Mashile organised for the Minister of Education to attend a meeting with "parents" at a school hall in Mapulaneng. The meeting was attended by over a thousand people. The Minister agreed to establish a temporary college of education at Lekete school the following year while a permanent structure was under construction.

The Mashiles' achievements in making bureaucrats accountable for their actions were impressive. In the seventies, the provision of any bureaucratic service, including the provision of water, electricity and land, lay at the discretion of the Tribal Authority. To alienate the Tribal Authority meant losing access to the entire bureaucracy. Mashile was able to bypass the Tribal Authorities in ensuring that residents' rights were respected. This gave residents the opportunity to challenge the Tribal Authorities without fearing devastating repercussions. Mashile had agricultural officers, policemen, clerks and a magistrate "transferred" for corruption. To his constituency, Mashile was able to use his position to present himself as a chief who represented the "people" to the authorities, but not vice versa.

These activities made Matsiketsane a symbol of resistance and a source of political authority that went beyond his position as MP. The two brothers did not limit their activities to disciplining the bureaucracy. They successfully challenged the implementation of certain Betterment policies, such as the banning of the use of river beds for farming purposes. They fought the Lebowa policy of arresting and fining migrants for not paying their taxes when they came home at the end of each year. Sekgopela Mashile specialised in assisting residents
with work-based problems. The Mashiles were called in by families to mediate in marital problems and disputes between neighbours. The executive of Leihlo La Naga summed up Mashile's ambiguous status: "Every time we didn't want to see a chief because we had an MP in the Lebowa Government." To the Eye of the Nation at least, Mashile had become the Paramount chief of Mapulaneng.

**Leihlo La Naga and the Ethnic Conflict**

The Pulana Nationalists' opposition to Apartheid did not mean that they were above local ethnic antagonisms. Leihlo La Naga began to explore alternative political strategies to improve the position of Pulas, specifically in relation to the state. Read through the prism of Maripe's relative subjugation to the Pedi Paramount, the Lebowa Government was perceived by the organisation as a new form of "Pedi" dominance. Lebowa tax was represented as the Pedi taking money from the Pulana. The organisation looked into the possibility of Mapulaneng becoming a separate homeland so as to fall directly under central government. Towards this end, Leihlo La Naga tried to forge an alliance with the "Khutswe" and the "Pai", based on their common understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and politics and their mutual marginalisation by the recognised "tribes", those being the "Pedis, Shanganese and Swazis".

Conflicts with the Lebowa Government were overshadowed by the release of the Consolidation Commission in mid 1984 which redefined the borders between Mapulaneng and Mhala. The application of the same indigenous principles that conflicted with Apartheid principles also lay behind the Pulana antagonism against "Shangaans". As far as the Pulana
Nationalists were concerned, the "Shangaans", fleeing the wars in Mozambique, had been given sanctuary and land by the Pulana chiefs. In accepting land, the "Shangaans" were regarded as having accepted their subjugation to the Pulana chiefs. When the "Shangaan" chiefs were given "Pulana" land and recognition from the state, the Pulana nationalists saw this as a betrayal of their historical agreement.37

The Commission proved to be the spark that resulted in the ethnic war of October 1984. Leihlo La Naga, with the Mashile brothers as Members of Parliament, organised the Pulana side of the conflict.38 Although the immediate nature of the conflict created an unprecedented degree of unity between the urban branch of Leihlo La Naga, the Mapulaneng branch, the Mashile brothers, and the Molotele chieftainship (who were the most affected by the border changes) this unity began to break down shortly after the conflict.

Funds raised for legal services were allegedly embezzled by Molotele resulting in a rift between the chief and Matsiketsane. This rift soon took the form of chiefly conflict. Molotele, Matsketsane asserted, was living on land belonging to the Setlare chieftainship and should move back to Glen Lyden to live on his "own" land.39 The Molotele chief’s insecurity regarding his recognition by the state served to make the conflict more intense.

A split emerged between the Mapulaneng branch and the urban leadership of Leihlo La Naga over the control of funds. Following the split, the Soweto branch began to approach opposition members of (the central) parliament, rural service organisations, and the Minister of Constitutional Development around the possibility of Mapulaneng withdrawing from Lebowa and falling under central government. They had little success in these endeavours.40
In 1985, two African National Congress guerillas were killed, and one guerilla was shot and captured in Mapulaneng. The general secretary of the Mapulaneng branch of Leihlo La Naga was arrested and charged with assisting a banned organisation. He was found guilty and was to become the principal of the Robben Island prisoners' school during his imprisonment. Two other members of the Leihlo La Naga executive were interrogated and tortured by the police. These events highlight an overlap between the aims of Leihlo La Naga and that of the national liberation movement. It is towards Matsiketsane's alliance with organisations with a distinctly national agenda that the chapter now turns.

Matsiketsane and the Congress Alliance

In 1986 Matsiketsane forged an alliance with the residents of Shatale that was independent of his claims to the chieftainship. Shatale, which was to become the headquarters of the secular Pulana, was an extraordinary place when compared with the surrounding trust farms. A portion of London farm was demarcated, named Shatale and declared a township in 1962. This meant that taps were provided on every street and residents were forbidden from keeping stock. No agricultural land was provided. The Native Commissioner, Charles Bourquin, modelled the township on urban townships and pressured the Department of Housing to build corrugated iron houses. The houses were built, made available for rent and, much to Bourquin's chagrin, were boycotted by the local populace. The chief state ethnologist, Van Warmelo, was called in. Van Warmelo diagnosed the boycott as having been caused by chiefly competition for followers and prescribed the construction of a township in all Tribal Authority areas. Bourquin knew better, and eventually relented by allowing residents to build their own houses without having to pay a monthly rental. A high-school was built in the
township to encourage "professionals" to settle in Shatale.41

"Surplus" residents from townships around Graskop, Pilgrims Rest and Sabie were removed to Shatale.42 Households from the surrounding trust farms with an interest in providing their children with a Secondary education moved to the township. Over time, the township became the home of teachers, other professionals and businesspeople. Relatively few households in Shatale depend on migrant labour.43 In 1984, half the High schools (which offered matric) in Mapulaneng were located in Shatale.

The township was governed by a town council. Although the powers of the council were negligible, residents had few complaints. Rentals remained relatively low, and conditions in the township were noticeably better than surrounding areas. Every household was provided with taps, electricity was installed in the mid eighties, and the main road was tarred in 1986.

In 1984, the Mashile brothers called a parliamentary report back meeting in Shatale. The meeting was attended by approximately two thousand people. Although problems around civic issues were raised, the most pressing and vocal problem was that of policing.44 Residents were enraged by the poor police performance in solving thirteen murders that had occurred in the township during the previous year. Most of the murders had involved the mutilation of the victim's bodies. The genitals, tongue and eyes had been severed from the corpses. Suspects had been arrested for the crimes, but had been released without being charged. The Mashiles raised the problem in the Lebowa parliament,45 but the situation did not improve. The following year, five more people were killed, including two children.
Evidence around the murders pointed to a group of seven people lead by a businessman (who was also the township mayor), Mr Morema. The motivation for the crimes was to make “muti” so that the gang’s businesses would thrive. Residents believed that they had not been arrested because of a close relationship between the leader of the gang and the police station commander at Bushbuckridge. In November 1985, the Mashile brothers organised a meeting between township residents and the Minister of Law and Order in Lebowa. At the meeting, the Minister agreed to have the Station Commander transferred along with his senior officers.

In December 1985, the group of seven people were arrested after various human body parts were allegedly found in Morema’s refrigerator. However, the group was released without being charged. Tension in the township heightened as a new restaurant complex owned by Morema was shortly to be opened. Residents asked themselves who was going to be "sacrificed" to "baptise" the new store.

It is impossible to describe the atmosphere of terror that pervades a neighbourhood when there is a muti-murderer on the loose. Few images evoke as much horror, anger and fear as that of a brutally murdered and mutilated corpse. No-one can feel safe as the choice of target is arbitrary. The absence of street-lights make travel by foot at night, a regular necessity for most residents, a dread-filled experience. Anxiety in Shatale reached a fever-pitch.

Apart from the fear that the muti-murder provoked, the killings also generated a moral-panic. The failure by the police to act effectively against the murderers caused residents to question the very fibre of the state itself. The gulf between residents and the bureaucracy increased. As "the sore aches the owner", that is those effected by a problem experience
the consequences of the problem, a group of residents decided to take action. A pamphlet was produced, ordering members of the alleged gang to leave or face being forced out of the township. A group of six students organised a series of secret meetings in the classrooms of five Secondary Schools in Shatale. On the evening of the 23 February the students from all the schools assembled on the local soccer ground and went on to burn the houses of two members of the gang. Three days later, a mob of students confronted the alleged leader of the gang, Morema, at his bottlestore. Morema drew a gun, an altercation ensued during which Morema was killed and his bottle-store burnt down. The students went on to burn the houses of the remaining members of the gang.48

That evening the Lebowa riot squad from Seshego arrived in the township. They arrested every student they could find, all the members of the local football club and two teachers. The police, assisted by members of Morema's family, systemically assaulted all the arrested people. Those students who had not been arrested fled into the nearby mountains. School attendance dropped to a negligible level.

The Mashile brothers obtained permission from the Minister of Law and Order in Lebowa to hold a mass meeting in Shatale with the aim of persuading the students to go back to school. The arrested students were released on March 14. Two days later, the meeting was convened. At the meeting, the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee was elected to negotiate with the police and other relevant authorities.

Mobilisation to Organisation: The Mapulaneng Crisis Committee
The social composition of the Committee reflected Shatale's specific history. All the members, except for the women's organiser, had at one time or another been teachers. The ages of the members of the Committee ranged between twenty six and thirty six. The Pulana nationalist claim to political hegemony over the district did not make sense to members of the Crisis Committee who had experienced life under "Shangaan" chiefs and whose world-view was essentially national. The following life history of the President of the Committee demonstrates these themes:

Lawrence Mogakane was born in Orinoco in 1959, the fifth of a family of eight children. His father was a migrant worker, employed as a waiter in a hotel in Germiston. The majority of the Mogakane's neighbours, and childhood friends were "Shangaans". Local boys formed gangs to protect one another from boys from the (predominantly Pulana) Shatale. Any neighbourly disputes were taken to Kheto Nxumalo, the Shangaan chief's court. Lawrence went to primary school in 1966. Six years later, he went to an ethnically mixed initiation school whose principal was Hlanganu. In 1973, after suffering constant harrassment from Nxumalo's induna following the establishment of Gazankulu, the Mogakane's moved to Shatale "because of the proximity of schools". At high school, Mogakane formed a study group with three other students who were later to become members of the Crisis Committee. Although Mogakane had been brought up with the idea that Pulanas were the "owners of the land", any resonances that the notion had were removed when, in 1979, Mogakane read for a Bachelor of Commerce degree at the University of the North, and was exposed to student political organisation and national leaders of. During one of his vacations, Mogakane got a job at Sabie paper mills and proceeded to organise the factory under the Paper, Printing and Allied Workers Union. After three years of studying, Mogakane was forced to leave the university without qualifying for financial reasons. On his return to Bushbuckridge, he began employment with a Bank.

The MCC saw itself as part of a national movement and made almost immediate contact with national organisations. These included the South African Council of Churches, the Detainees Parent's Support Committee, the National Education Crisis Committee and the United Democratic Front. Members of the Committee attended workshops and conferences called by the above organisations. The Committee adopted the liberation strategy advocated by the
UDF, which centred around the creation of mass based organisations. The Mashile brothers' role in facilitating meetings and contact with the bureaucracy was vital in achieving this goal, which created the basis of a working alliance between the Committee and the brothers.51

Soon after the Crisis Committee was formed, students in Shatale formed the Shatale Youth Congress (SYC). The Youth Congress consisted of a Central Executive Committee, a Cultural Committee, and Educational Committee and a Disciplinary Committee. Most of the leading members of the Congress had experienced political organisation whilst attending school in townships on the Rand. The President of the Congress was schooling in Shatale because he was wanted by the police in Daveyton because of his political activities. Like the MCC, the SYC made almost immediate contact with national organisations.52

The aims of the Shatale Youth Congress identified unambiguously with a national political agenda. The first aim was to "draw [up] a good guideline for a future community system in a democratic South Africa."53 The other aims and objectives included building unity amongst residents, improving education, providing entertainment and maintaining law and order. The latter aim was to dominate the activities of the Youth Congress. The families of the alleged muti-murder gang had become vigilantes, working with the consent of the police. The vigilantes harassed Shatale residents and threatened to poison the water supply. The SYC formed itself into anti-crime squads who patrolled the location throughout the night. When a bakery was robbed, residents approached the SYC who caught the thieves. The SYC also formed a "people's court" modelled on the chief's court. The court was used to discipline members of the SYC, intervene in neighbourly conflicts and try cases of youths in
neighbouring communities who abused the aims of the "struggle".54

The MCC and the SYC maintained a close working relationship. The leadership of both organisations consulted with one another before embarking on any action. The SYC provided the person power to publicise MCC campaigns. The two organisations set up Student Representative Councils in Shatale. When a woman was kidnapped by a gang based in Mhala, members of the MCC and the SYC, rescued the girl, destroyed the gang’s business, and handed the gang over to the police.

The MCC aimed to "organise the region" and went about forming sub-branches, which in the process, resulted in a working relationship with the Mashile brothers. On the 13 April, the Mashiles held a parliamentary "report back" meeting at Green-Valley. After residents had registered their complaints, the MCC organised an election for the Setlare sub-branch of the Crisis Committee. Youths from Shatale also informed youths at the meeting to form an organisation.

With the election of the Setlare Crisis Committee, the Crisis Committee as an organisation became associated with Matsiketsane's chiefly and ethnic agenda. The three active members of the SCC were the Chair, a telephone exchange operator (who had passed his matric exams); the Vice President: a shoemaker whose schooling ended at Standard One; and the Treasurer: a shopowner who had also left school after Standard One.55 The Chair was Matsiketsane's nephew, who was an executive member of Leihlo La Naga, the next in line
for Matsiketsane's "throne" and who was resident in Gazankulu. In other words, the Setlare Crisis Committee did not recognise the borders between Lebowa and Gazankulu but defined Mapulaneng along the lines advocated by Leihlo La Naga. In the areas outside of Shatale, the Crisis Committee, youth organisation, and the rhetoric of national liberation that came along with it, became drawn into one side of a secession dispute and the ethnic conflict. Assertions by the recognised chief that the Setlare Crisis Committee was another attempt by Matsiketsane to replace him, were on the face of it, consistent with the unfolding of events. Furthermore, given the association between Pulana ethnicity and the emergence of national liberation organisations in the district, no organisations with a national political agenda found a foothold in Mhala until 1990.

The MCC was caught in another contradiction. On the one hand, it had constituted itself as a crisis committee, whose main function was to calm an extremely explosive situation. On the other hand, the MCC perceived itself as being part of a national liberation movement. They organised the May 1 stayaway and attempted to implement the resolutions taken at the National Education Crisis Committee's national conference. They popularised a culture of national liberation introducing t-shirts, stickers and newspapers with an african national slant to Mapulaneng. The problem for the Crisis Committee lay, however, in the way the rhetoric of the liberation movement was understood by the youth. The African National Congress declared 1985 the year of the youth and hailed the youth as the vanguard of the struggle for national liberation. These calls fell on receptive ears in the countryside. The rural youth, historically and culturally excluded from having a political voice, were given the authority to lead the nation. Youth organisation spread like wildfire throughout the district. However, there was a huge gap in the way the MCC and the SYC understood the "struggle"
and the role of youth organisation, and the way that the youth living under the Tribal Authorities perceived problems faced by their "communities". In the months of April and May 1986, approximately one hundred and fifty people were attacked as witches. Youth organisations linked by rhetoric to the Congress Alliance became enmeshed in local struggles and divisions. These associations between the "struggle", the authority to act and local conflicts can be read off the following song sung by the Brooklyn Youth Organisation as they patrolled the location at night:

Our lives are in great danger.
We are bewitched.
We are poisoned.
Abortions are the order of the day.
Comrades, wake up, remake the world.
Our parent's hour has passed away.
This hour belongs to the youth.
We the Comrades.
Forward Comrades.
We are a generation of war.

During this period the MCC and SYC were called upon to intervene in a number of incidents to prevent the anti-witchcraft attacks from taking place. They were almost always successful on these occasions. However, in the majority of cases the MCC and SYC were unaware of, and had no control over, the attacks. It was only the invasion of the area by a large contingent of South African Defence Force soldiers that brought the situation under control. At the same time, the executive members of the MCC, the Mashile brothers and the active members of the SCC were detained and visible political organisation in the district ground to a halt. Matsiketsane spent six months in jail before being released on bail. Charged first with sedition and then with terrorism, Mashile and the Crisis Committee were acquitted at their trial in mid
1997. However, in order to understand the context Matsiketsane inherited on his release from prison, it is necessary to take a detour into the nature and significance of youth organisation. This will be achieved in the following chapter that explores the moral economy of youth organisations, particularly as it related to chiefly politics and gender and generational relationships. The final chapter takes up the story of Matsiketsane again, by analysing the Sofasonke Civic Union, an alliance that was formed in opposition to the Mashile brothers and youth organisation.

Nevertheless, it will not be out of place to conclude this section by posing the question: Was Matsiketsane primarily a Pulana nationalist, or an african nationalist. The obvious answer is that Matsiketsane was both: He found Apartheid repugnant as both a Pulana and a black South African. But Pulana nationalism was not entirely compatible with African nationalism, and, in the last instance Matsiketsane was married to his claim to the chieftainship, and the imaginary on which that claim was built:

It was through them [the "Shangaans"] that I was arrested. They wanted to rule me, whereas they are the refugees from Portuguese East Africa... When Bourquin came in 1934, he appointed Shangaan headmen as chiefs ruling their own people. But I was not affected by that as they were not ruling us. Until 1962, when they confiscated all the land and handed it over to the Shangaans. Then they said I must be an Inunda under a Shangaan chief... I said, that will be the day. When they see Pulana all over support me, they organised a deportation order... We suffered alot. My cattle, goats, house destroyed by Bourquin and the Shangaans. That is why, although the ANC pleads with me to forget all, I find it difficult not to speak.

Conclusion

This chapter has tried to tease out the relationship between Pulana ethnicity and politics as that relationship played itself out in the career of Matsiketsane Mashile. Although there were
large areas of overlap between a secular Pulana identity and the Pulana nationalists, the political agendas of the two organisations representing these approaches were not entirely compatible. The close working relationship between Matsiketsane Mashile and the MCC, and the continuities between the LLN and the SCC ensured that organisations linked to, and the rhetoric associated with the national liberation struggle, were perceived as part and parcel of chiefly disputes and particular ethnic interests. Consequently, national political organisation did not make in-roads into Gazankulu until 1990. Matsiketsane's historical association with the ANC, plus his relationship with the MCC, resulted in his reputation amongst the recognised chiefs as the ultimate leader of the youth. Youth politics was thus drawn into chiefly secession disputes. Nevertheless, youth organisations also fell at the intersection of gender and generational relations, and thus had its own specific history, and political agenda. This forms the subject of the following chapter.
Notes


7. Interview M Mashile, Acornhoek, 5/7/93.


9. CAD NTS V6814 32/318, Minutes of Meeting of Chiefs and Head, Islington 24/7/44; NTS971/323/8/1 V7153, Letter South African Institute of Race Relations To NAD, 12/11/54; NC Bushbuckridge to CNC Pietersburg 13/1/55.

10. See CAD NTS 971/323/8/1 V7153, Internal Memo on Ejectment of Mapulane Tribe of Leamington and Andover, undated and Statements made by Allen Mashile, Simon Mashego and Rice Matlhake to Senior NC Pretoria on 6/9/57.


13. CAD NTS 971/323/8/1 V7153, Letter H L Hall and Sons to NAD 2/1/58 and 19/2/58.
14. Mashile M, quoted in Koch, E., Learn and Teach, Number 6, 1988, pg34.

15. Ibid.

16. CAD UHU Minute no 1076, 26/6/63. The Minute contained the banishment order.

17. Interview Mashile, M., Acornhoek, 05/07/1993.


20. Attendance at both the court and the initiation school was ethnically mixed.


22. See the Constitution of Leihlo La Naga.

23. Ibid.

24. See Chapter Two.

25. Interview C Chiloane [secretary LLN], Soweto, 5/1/90.


27. Delius argues that the "entrapment" of Ndebele labour tenants and workers on farms was crucial in shaping a particularly conservative Ndebele ethnicity. See Delius "The Indzundza Ndebele: I Indenture and the Making of Ethnic Identity", in Bonner, P., I Hofmeyr, D James and T Lodge (eds), Holding Their Ground. Class, Locality and Culture in 19th and 20th Century South Africa, History Workshop 4, Johannesburg, 1989. I argue that the metaphor of "entrapment" was employed by Ndebeles to mobilise against the imposition of "independence" on the KwaNdebele Bantustan. See Ritchken, E., The KwaNdebel Struggle Against Independence in Moss, G., and Obery, I., (eds) South African Review 5, Raven Press, Johannesburg, 1989.

28. Interview, S Mashego, M Mashego and C Chiloane, Soweto, 14/12/89.

29. Ibid.

30. Interview Mashile, S., Buffelshoek, 08/05/1993.

32. Interview Kalli Shakoane, 20/7/93, Green Valley. Also see Minute Book of Mapulaneng Branch of Leihlo La Naha, Meeting held February 1984 in Mapulaneng.

33. Interview Kalli Shakoane, 20/7/93, Green Valley.

33. Interview Chiloane, C., and Mashego, S., Soweto, 14/12/1989. Also Matsiketsane Mashile keeps a written record of meetings he attends, as well as a record of cases that are brought for his attention. A copy of these records has been given to the Church of the Province Library. The above paragraph is based on these records.

34. Interview Chiloane, C., and Mashego, S., Soweto, 14/12/1989.

35. Minutes of Meeting of LLN, Mapulaneng branch, Acornhoek, 28/1/84.


37. See Constitution of LLN, Minutes of meeting, Mapulaneng Branch, Feb 1984; and CAD K335, Written and Oral Evidence to Uys Commission of the Pulana delegation.

38. Interview Mogale, P., (Executive Member of Mapulaneng Branch of LLN), Greenvalley, 16/08/1992.


40. Written correspondence between LLN and the Transvaal Rural Action Committee, Peter Sole [MP] and Minister of Constitutional Development [Wilkens].


42. Suburbs in Shatale are popularly named after the (white) town from where people were removed.

43. The gender ratio in Shatale remained consistently around 50% in the seventies and eighties. See Infraplan, Survey of Mapulaneng, 1991.

44. See Ritchken, "Mobilisation and Organisation...", Chapter two for more details of these issues.


47. Quote taken from mobilising pamphlet distributed in Shatale. Exhibit 2 in State versus Mashego and eleven others.

48. Interview Mashego, S. (Vice President of Shatale Youth Congress), Shatale, 20/12/1987; and Ntlatlane, J. (executive member of SYC), Shatale, 15/12/1986.

49. Mohammed Bham’s (defence attorney) personal records from the trial: Mashego, E., and eleven others versus the State, Nelspruit Regional Court, June 1987. These records will be donated to the Church of the Province Library, Wits University.


51. The wording of constitution, on the advice of lawyers, was guarded. The following is the Preamble to the constitution:
   a) Organise the society so that they could take up their demand for a relevant role in the territory without violence.
   b) Work in tandem with our MPs6) in taking up matters of common concern to the highest authorities.
   c) Organise the people so that they could play a more meaningful role in the society.

The Aims and Objectives of the Committee were:
   a) To watch and voice out the demands of the people in a closest proximity.
   b) To forge links with students and parents for a normal execution of education process as scheduled.
   c) To organise and engage the society in sporting and social welfare.


53. 14) The full Aims and Objectives of the SYC read as follows:
   Through the present crisis the congress shall contribute through solving the present community crisis by:
   a) To build unity between student and parents, teachers, workers and other members of the community.
   b) To collect the demands of residents regarding education.
   c) To limit boozing among youths and provide them with entertainment.
   d) To provide a concrete channel for community grievances to our Town Council.
   e) To assist the needy concerning education ie providing school funds and books.
   f) To encourage youths to take part in sporting activities.
   g) To see that dancing, soccer and other entertainment clubs are lodged.
   h) To draw a good guideline for a future community system in a democratic South Africa.
   i) To reach and mobilise as many sectors of the community around the issue of education and peace amongst residents.
   j) To see that the crime rate is limited by introducing anti-crime squads.

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k) To see the promotion of law and order.


55. Mohammed Bham's private records from the trial Mashego, E., and Eleven others versus the State, Nelspruit Regional Court, June 1987.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Comrades, Witches and the State:

The Anti-Witchcraft Movement of 1986

There is a terrible weeping in Brooklyn.
The Community is crying for the Comrades.
Some say, we will pass away.
Many things came and they passed away.
Haai! Haai! Haai!
Comrades will never pass away.
Suffering: Haai! Haai! Haai!
You will pass away.
Comradeship is our people's enemy against you. Haai! Haai!
Parents: Haai! Haai!
Brooklyn is our home. Haai! Haai!
Tell the police - Haai! Haai!
Tell witches - Haai! Haai!
Tell those who poison - Haai! Haai!
Tell those who commit abortions - Haai! Haai!
This is our hour - Haai! Haai!
We will die for our land.
Forward Comrades.

Between the months of March and May, youth organisations, made up of predominantly
initiated but unmarried men, sprung up rapidly and spontaneously throughout Mapulaneng.

Although the organisations participated in campaigns articulating national demands, initiated
by the Crisis Committee, the primary activity of youth organisations was the disciplining of
alleged witches. In the space of two months, approximately one hundred and fifty people
were "punished" by youth organisations for the crime of harming people by means of
witchcraft. Punishments included necklacing, whipping, expulsion and the burning of houses.

The following chronology gives a sense of the process of mobilisation.
28 February: Students in Shatale burn the homes of two alleged muti-murderers.

3 March: Students burn the homes of three alleged muti-murderers. The leader of the alleged gang of murderers is killed and his business is destroyed.

4 March: Students and two teachers arrested by the Mankweng riot squad. While in detention they are brutally assaulted. Those not arrested flee into the mountains. Schooling ceases.

15 March: Students released from jail.

16 March: Public meeting held in Shatale by the two Mashile brothers. Mapulaneng Crisis Committee elected. Call for students to return from the mountains. Schooling restarts.

31 March: Public meeting held in Shatale by the MCC. Report back from National Education Crisis Committee Meeting held in Durban.

13 April: Meeting held at Green-Valley to form the Setlare branch of the MCC (SCC). Youth organisations are formed soon after the meeting at Brooklyn, Boelang and Arthurs Seat.

16 April: Meeting held at Ben Matlushe High School in Violet Bank. The MCC called for formation of SRCs and parent’s committees. As a result, youth organisations were formed at Zoeknog and Wales.

20 April: Meeting held at Hlabakiese to make peace between chief and his subjects. A branch of the MCC was formed and a Youth Congress was also formed.

26 April: Three alleged witches were killed in London Trust.

Youth Organisation is formed at Craigs Burn.

27 April: Shatale Youth Congress organises an attack on a criminal gang operating from Gazankulu called the "Mapshanga Gang". One hundred and sixty six members of the SYC were arrested.

28 April: MCC held meeting with business-people at Acornhoek.
Meeting held in Shatale of youth from all over Mapulaneng. Although the official meeting discussed issues such as regional coordination, unofficially groups mingled and resolved to rid Mapulaneng of witchcraft and muti-murderers. After the meeting, four alleged witches were killed at Craigs Burn. One alleged witch was killed at Arthurs Seat. A blanket school boycott begins.

29 April: An alleged witch was killed at London Trust.

30 April: MCC met with the school principals association.

1 May: Two alleged witches were killed at London Trust. Two alleged witches were killed and five houses were burnt at Wales Trust.

3 May: An alleged witch is killed at Casteel Trust.

5 May: An alleged witch is killed at Zoeknog Trust. The herbs of six other people were burnt.

9 May: Trial held for alleged witches in Brooklyn. One accused dies while being sjambokked for a confession.

12 May: A pamphlet calling for the consumer boycott of "white, police and vigilante owned shops" was distributed.

13 May: The executive members of the MCC are detained. A large contingent of troops from the South African Defence Force move into the area.

14 May: Two alleged witches were killed in Brooklyn. The herbs of another ten were burnt.

15 May: The herbs of six alleged witches were burnt at Arthurs Seat.

16 May: Three alleged witches were killed at Boelang.

The previous chapter demonstrated how the emergence of youth organisation was linked to both congress aligned organisations and chiefly politics. However, youth organisation also fell
at the intersection of generational and gender relations. This chapter analyses the significance of youth organisation labelling and attacking witches, poisoners and abortionists in relation to the above four concerns. This will be achieved by analyzing the moral economy implicit in the youth organisations' activities, and how that economy impacted on the morality associated with chiefly, gender and generational authority. The following two chapters will demonstrate that by claiming the authority to attack witches (and then to lead the struggle against Apartheid), the youth redefined the social hierarchy (of what used to be the chieftainship) around access to a new "truth"; this "truth" being privileged knowledge of the workings of Apartheid. In relation to this "truth" a new social hierarchy was built whereby the youth defined a subject's political authority in relation to that subject's formal position. Tied to each of these formal position was a stereotype which contained that positions level of understanding of, acceptance of, association with, and ability to fight against the "system" (of Apartheid). This social hierarchy (like that of the chieftainship) was rigidly defined. The youth, as the (self-proclaimed) guardians of morality, stood at the apex of this hierarchy. Although the new order marked an inversion with that of the chieftainship, the political imaginary employed by youth organisation maintained the link between the natural, social and super-natural (hence the acknowledgement of the existence of witchcraft). However, youth organisation asserted that ancestrally sanctioned harmony was not possible within the context of apartheid; The chiefdom was oppressed. Consequently, normal morality had to be suspended while the war against apartheid was waged. Morality was now dependent on the extent to which an action contributed to the struggle against Apartheid.

There were two (not entirely discrete) phases in the imposition of this moral economy defined by youth organisation. The first phase consisted in the building of unity through cleansing the
"community" of "immoral" elements that undermined the ability of the "community" to confront the Apartheid state.¹ This cleansing consisted predominantly of the attacking of witches, poisoners and abortionists. By attacking targets that appeared to transcend any sectoral interest, the youth hoped both to rid society of divisive and evil elements and to establish their credentials as an impartial guardian of the nation. Implicit in this unity, however, was a redefinition of (what the youth considered to be) moral gender and generational relations. This chapter investigates this reworking. The second phase involved leading the challenge to those institutions and people seen to be part of the system of Apartheid. This will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter.

Following a methodological discussion, the second section of this chapter discusses the youth's attempt to replace the chieftainship as the legitimate "guardian of the nation". A chief under Tribal Authorities faced losing state recognition if he participated in the disciplining of an alleged witch. Yet there was an overwhelming belief amongst the majority of residents that witchcraft was a significant source of misfortune. By investigating the history of what it meant to be an initiated but unmarried youth, the chapter will demonstrate on what basis the youth, historically and culturally excluded from the centres of political power, came to constitute themselves as "guardians of the nation". The youth by attacking witches hoped to fill the political vacuum left by the bureaucratization of the chieftainship, and in doing so, established their legitimacy as a movement.

Although the youth organisations targeted symbols that appeared to transcend any sectoral interest, the youth were faced with a legitimation crisis. In departing from the "traditional" legal procedures which established the veracity of a witchcraft accusation, doubts could be,
and were, cast on the legitimacy of the movement. The allegations were that the youth, at
best, acted on rumour, or at worst, used the idiom of witchcraft to resolve their own, or their
supporters', private disputes. In all the cases investigated by the Crisis Committee and the
Shatale Youth Congress, the youth, despite their vehement denials, were found to be guilty
of the latter. The crisis of legitimacy will be investigated more thoroughly in the next chapter.

This chapter will investigate the doubts surrounding the truth of the witchcraft accusations
and attacks by unpacking the processes that structured witchcraft accusations, and in doing
so, exposing a series of conflictual relationships associated with witchcraft. These processes
centre around chiefly politics and antagonistic relationships within and between households.

In the latter case, it will be demonstrated how the anti-witchcraft movement imposed a
discipline on, and defined, what the youth considered to be moral gender and generational
relationships within the household.

The next section tries to solve some of the antinomies raised by the previous two sections by
analysing the specific conditions under which an accusation against an individual came to be
accepted as true (despite the fact that the appropriate legal procedures were not followed in
establishing that truth.) This section uses a case study of an alleged gang of witches attacked
by Brooklyn Youth Organisation to demonstrate how, in certain cases, broad agreement was
reached in a village as to who were the witches. The case study shows both how the alleged
witches were involved in private conflicts, and how the youth genuinely believed they were
attacking witches who threatened an entire "community".

The final section argues that although strong historical and logical associations existed
between witchcraft and abortions, by specifically targeting abortionists, the youth were
redefining what it meant to be a woman. Witchcraft accusations were not the only way of
stigmatising people who strayed from their "cultural" role. A man who did not act out his culturally defined role was labelled a "woman". And a woman who strayed from the straight and narrow was called a "prostitute". Although certain relationships were associated with both witchcraft accusations and "prostitution", the latter label was invoked only in relation to women transgressing cultural norms. By analyzing when the label of prostitute was invoked, this section will periodise transformations in the status of women. The youth were responding to these transformations when they threatened, and carried out, attacks on abortionists.

Imagining Power: Witchcraft Beliefs and Social Conflict

Two approaches have dominated the anthropological literature on the political significance of witchcraft accusations, those being an immanent and an instrumentalist approach. The former approach emphasises how a belief system makes the world intelligible, and how people act in accordance with that system. The instrumentalist approach highlights the extent to which the "witchcraft idiom" is employed to resolve underlying conflicts. Whereas the instrumentalist approach understands witchcraft accusations as a reflection of social divisions (a "social strain gauge"), the immanent approach sees witchcraft accusations as constitutive of those divisions.

It is apparent that either of these approaches are insufficient. The instrumentalist approach cannot explain (except in crudely functionalist or cynical terms) why the idiom of witchcraft is evoked to resolve conflicts. The immanent approach cannot explain why certain social relationships are prone to give rise to accusations at one point in time and not at another. Implicit in the instrumentalist approach is the assumption that the antagonism expressed in
witchcraft accusations are essentially expressions of private conflicts whose true nature is obscured by the witchcraft accusation. In contrast, the immanent approach assumes that successful accusations are consequences of essentially publicly accepted explanations of misfortunes, and any private content to the accusation is coincidental.

It will be argued in the following sections that both these assumptions were correct (and false) when they are applied to the 1986 anti-witchcraft movement. It was apparent that some people accepted the witchcraft accusations as true, regardless of the procedures followed in establishing the guilt, or of any private conflicts that might have involved the accused. On the other hand, it was also apparent that other people argued that the witchcraft attacks were illegitimate because of the (lack of) procedures followed in determining guilt, and allegations that the accusations obscured private conflicts. This poses the question: Given the absence of accepted "legal" procedures, under what conditions are witchcraft accusations accepted as true? That is, under what conditions is it believed people turn to the powers accessible through witchcraft, and what type of person resorts to the malicious use of magic. Answering the question opens up the possibility of understanding the relationship between power struggles, morality and witchcraft accusations.

**Witchcraft as a Belief System**

Witchcraft and ancestral beliefs have their basis in an ontology within which the social order, and the spiritual and the natural world affected each other. The social order was conceptualised as the living manifestation of the will of the ancestors. People were placed on the earth to carry out that will, that is to reproduce relations passed down by their
predecessors. The ancestors enforced their will by rewarding people for "social" behaviour and punished them for transgressions. "Reality" was thus understood as an effect of the constant process of interaction between the three spheres.\(^4\)

Although boundaries existed between the three spheres, certain people were gifted with an innate power, or taught techniques, to cross the boundaries and harness the power of the other spheres. For example: Certain speakers had the power to link words and reality; An animal, object or force of nature could be "activated" or willed and sent to cause someone harm; Particular people had the ability to transform their bodies into those of animals in order to achieve their goals; The qualities of a symbol or object could be harnessed to the benefit of the owner of that object. The ability to manipulate objects through magical means was called witchcraft. Witchcraft was either an innate power, or knowledge of a technique. This power could be used for productive or evil purposes; to cause drought, to make an army invincible, to cure illness or to entertain. Those people who used the power for social good were thought of as powerful, that is, gifted with "power", those who used the practice to cause harm, so as to further their own interests, were stigmatised with the witch. Night witches were born with an innate power that developed with age, while day witches learnt, or brought the services of those who knew, techniques of witchcraft.\(^5\)

The biological body was a register of the social health of the chiefdom. Sickness was not a consequence of a chance infection but caused by either the ancestors (for transgressing cultural norms), through being polluted (breaking taboos), or witchcraft (a sign of jealousy). Certain "specialists" had the ability to mediate between the spiritual and social realms so as to give an expert view on the social causes of "natural" problems. Like the individual's
health, natural calamities, such as drought, that effected the social body as a whole, were signs of a directed supernatural force. In such instances the chief had the role of initiating procedures for cleansing the social body.\(^6\)

As discussed previously in relation to the chief (as living representative of the most powerful lineage), there was no definitive division between the living and the dead; rather on dying, a person entered a different level of being. Like life and death, consciousness and sleep, dreams and hallucinations, were different states in this continuum; states within which a person had access to both the material and spiritual levels of being. The following two extracts from women undergoing treatment by a faith healer illustrates these points:

At first I had headache trouble. My legs were aching. I was shivering. I couldn't speak. I could take three weeks sleeping - No food or drink. I died and woke up. I died again. I saw a coffin in a hole in front of me. They said you see this hole you are inside there. When I was dead, I saw myself ascending the mountain. On the left was a witchdoctor, on the right a minister... The minister called me back and took my hand. When I woke up this Minister was praying over me. He was asking for my soul from god.\(^7\)

My first trouble, my sisters child died. The child came to call me and I could hear his voice. When he called me, my heart started to beat wildly. I was mad and they tied me up with chains. Then they brought me here and prayed, and gave me some [holy] water.\(^8\)

A powerful "mythology" surrounded witchcraft beliefs and guided people in their interpretation of their perceptions and experiences. Innate witchcraft was hereditary, that is, daughters were tainted with the reputation of their mothers. Some witches worked as a group who met at night to perform their magic. Witches worked through certain familiars, some of which were real animals (such as cats, owls, baboons) while others were magical (Tokolosh). Witches were able to turn people into zombies and force them to work their fields at night.\(^9\)

The "natural", although ultimately subordinate to the "spiritual" had a logic of its own; The
individual, while being first and foremost a social subject, was also contained in a "natural" body. Materialist explanations acted as an auxiliary to supernatural explanations of phenomena. For example, although Ngobe's authority and inspiration to heal ostensibly came from his ancestors in dreams, in practice Ngobe embarked on a systematic routine of acute observation to learn his profession. According to this logic, western medicine, although able to cure the symptom of an illness, was unable to access and treat the cause.10

Witchcraft, Culture and Power

In a world where social success or failure was ultimately and necessarily determined by a supernatural sanction, an individual could turn to ancestral forces (through sacrifice and keeping to the culture), positive magic (in the form of medicines which will transfer the power of the ingredients to the user) and malicious magic of witchcraft (where harm is caused to a second party in order for the user to achieve the desired goal). Within this setting, social power ultimately resides in the realm of the supernatural and it goes without saying that people will draw on such power to achieve their goals. This poses the question: How did an individual go about harnessing these powers? From this perspective, the assertion that an individual employs one practice rather than another, defines that individual as either moral and cultural or immoral and alien. These labels are not an idiom, but constitute the definition of who is moral, and who is not.

"Culture" in an agnatically ordered society consisted of definitions of appropriate relationships between people passed down and sanctioned by the ancestors. Questioning culture meant questioning the intrinsic harmony of the social order. The flaunting of culture was a sign of
witchcraft: those who could not depend on the sanction of the ancestors drew on the assistance of alternative supernatural powers. Hence, those who set themselves apart from the "community" to pursue a selfish desire (be it the accumulation of wealth or power, within or outside of the household) regardless of the destructive effects this pursuit has on "humanity" are likely candidate to be suspected of using witchcraft. However, the definition of morality is an ambiguous process: It does not follow that because someone wants to make money, or to control their pensions, they are immoral. However, by linking a desire (or a social relation) to witchcraft, one is defining that desire or that relation as immoral. Hence, the ability to label a person as a witch was equivalent to the power to define what was "cultural". Following this logic, a witchcraft accusation was equivalent to labelling a person a traitor to the society as a whole. The anti-witchcraft movement is then conceptualised as the public disciplining of people involved in (what the accusers understand to be) these immoral practices.

The use of witchcraft to achieve a goal was not in itself sufficient to result in the user being stigmatised as a witch. The user needed to be perceived as having particular characteristics, for example being seen as aloof, inhuman and intrinsically anti-social:

"A witch has the spirit of killing. Even if you just speak of killing, then you can be called a witch. That is, if you don't have a human spirit then you are a witch. People who go to witchdoctors are not necessarily witches. I will be a witch, if I work at it day and night."13

Witchcraft to reinforce what was cultural was legitimate, whereas, witchcraft to undermine a status quo was anti-social. However, the difference between socially acceptable witchcraft and anti-social witchcraft was a mute point. Stories of the "powers" of a person's ancestors were an intrinsic part of an individual's historical heritage. And, similar to the notion that
generational authority was enforced through increasing spiritual powers, witchcraft was also
seen as a means of maintaining social order. Ngaka Baloyi were employed to use their
power to punish those involved in anti-social behaviour:

During the days of Kgosi Sethlare there was no such thing as theft. The thieves were
scared that they’d be bewitched. The ngaka were the policemen of the people.14

The moment people with the "power" entered into a conflict they could become suspected of
using their power to achieve personal ends by causing harm to others. Again, debates could
ensue as to the legitimacy of the use of witchcraft: Should those personal ends be thought of
as enforcing the legitimate culture, then the user avoids being stigmatised as a witch. If not,
then the alleged user risked being publicly accused and isolated.

The above discussion should not be reified or accepted as capturing the multifarious
worldview of all residents in Bushbuckridge. Although the above discourse, in its hard form,
provided an explanation for everything, substantially different ways of responding to problems
were present between and within societies that subscribed to the same broad ontology.
Different strategies could be mobilised when responding to misfortunes attributable to
witchcraft. Herbs for protective purposes could be bought from Ngakas. Or a Ngaka could
be employed to bewitch the alleged source of the misfortune. Lastly, the "victims" could take
their persecutors to the chief’s court. Evidence suggests that from the forties at least,
witchcraft accusations and punishments were noticeably more prevalent amongst Pulanas than
amongst their Shangaan counterparts, pointing to ethnic differences in the way people
responded to the threat of witchcraft.15

The situation became more complicated by the last quarter of the twentieth century, when
diverse and competing ideologies structured people's perceptions of reality. For example, agricultural success could be attributed to the efficacy of fertilisers, the power of prayer or to the use of "zombies" for labour (i.e., witchcraft). A whole spectrum of worldviews came into being as existing beliefs were integrated with Christian and materialist worldviews. Individuals grappled with the relationship between ideas and their experiences.

"There is a lot of confusion, even in myself. I don't believe in all these things. But then some of the stories have truth. Witchcraft is there, it does exist. God exists, but I have problems with the ancestors. I don't believe that when someone dies he can effect one's life."

The existence of "western" institutions, such as hospitals, resulted in a range of alternative responses to problems, each reflecting subtle differences in worldview. Some residents, when sick went to a hospital, and if the symptoms are cured, accepted the treatment as final. Others went to a hospital and then visited a Ngaka in order to have "more than the symptoms" cured, those being the social or spiritual component of the illness. A further category of residents boycotted hospitals on principle.

The point that needs to be stressed for the purposes of this chapter, is that a common understanding of what it means to be a witch was a condition of possibility of the anti-witchcraft movement. This does not mean that the above description has to, or is even capable of, adequately representing the complexity of witchcraft beliefs and practices. Rather, the above discussion is providing a basic level of meaning around which the anti-witchcraft movement can be understood. Individuals might have different explanations for an event, but the factor that determines which explanation prevailed was the ability to enforce procedures that allocated responsibility for an event. Through the anti-witchcraft movement, the youth defined a level of meaning, and imposed that definition, of what it meant to be a "witch".
Mbiti distinguishes between a "scientific" verification of a witchcraft accusation and a "non-scientific environment" where "beliefs of this type cannot be clean from fear, falsehood, exaggeration, suspicion, fiction and irrationality." The ultimate living guardian of culture was the chief. Amongst the Pulana chiefdoms prior to the 1960s, the truth of an accusation was verified through a number of procedures centred around the chief's court. The chief as "chief Ngakah" had the ability to protect himself from witches and had the role of punishing people guilty of harmful witchcraft. The procedures depersonalised the verification of witchcraft accusations so as to ensure that chiefs or Ngakas did not resolve personal conflicts through witchcraft trials. These procedures differed for accusations between individuals (or households) and those involving the integrity of the chiefdom.

In the event of witchcraft accusations between two households, both parties had to place a "deposit" of a fixed number of cattle before the chief's court. A Ngaka, whose credentials were accepted by both parties, was then consulted. The Ngaka could find either the accuser or the accused guilty of witchcraft. If neither party was guilty of witchcraft then the accused received the accuser's "deposit". If the accusation was true then the accuser received the accused cattle. Both parties had the right to appeal to as many Ngakas as they could afford. If a person was found guilty of using witchcraft for malicious purposes, they would have their head shaven and their house marked.

When a ward or chiefdom was threatened by a misfortune attributed to witchcraft a different procedure was followed. A headman reported the matter to the chief. The chief convened
his court and a delegation was selected to visit a Ngaka. The Ngaka had to be resident in a distant area so as not to have any personal investment in the outcome of the case. Any persons pointed out by the Ngaka had the right to appeal to other Ngakas. When the delegation was satisfied that the truth had been discovered, the court was reconvened and the offender punished.\textsuperscript{21}

The cooption of chiefs onto Tribal Authorities drove witchcraft accusations underground.\textsuperscript{22} Rather than investigating the validity of accusations that were brought to the court, the chiefs found accusers guilty of libel and of transgressing the suppression of witchcraft act. In upholding Apartheid laws, the chiefs, headmen and police began to be seen as protectors of witches.\textsuperscript{23} Instead of being definitively resolved one way or another, witchcraft accusations were never tried publicly but existed through rumour.\textsuperscript{24} The conflict around the accusations built a momentum of its own; As the witchcraft accusations remained unresolved, conflicts between accusers and accused simmered on.

Although individuals could get "protection" from witchcraft from an Ngaka, the Apostolic and Zionist churches offered a new form of institutional protection from witchcraft. The churches provided an ordered and unified "community", as well as a series of resources, ranging from joint prayer, faith healing, baptism and confession rituals which offered their members protection from both bewitchment and accusations of witchcraft.\textsuperscript{25} Membership of a "community" presupposed a commitment to sacrifice for that "community" a quality that was, in and of itself, protection against witchcraft accusations:

A person without culture (i.e. aloofness) is a cannibal; someone who feeds off the society.\textsuperscript{26}
Businessmen, fearful of their economic prosperity being perceived as arrogance, formed their own churches which integrated them into a "community", and provided them with a forum for demonstrating their spiritual powers.27

Other people were more proactive in their response to misfortunes attributable to witchcraft. In the absence of any legal procedure to verify witchcraft accusations, residents began to take action against witches without legitimising that action through the verdict of Ngakas. The credibility and accuracy of spiritual experts began to be questioned: As the services of Ngakas were commodified, the profession became associated with money making rather than establishing the truth.28 Without a body to monitor traditional healing practices, some Ngakas questioned the authenticity of methods used by other members of their fraternity.29 Ngakas, like chiefs, faced criminal conviction for pointing out witches, giving them a material interest in "protecting" witches. Residents began to believe that a powerful witch was able to protect himself from identification by a Ngaka through using witchcraft.30 Witch accusers began to look for material evidence of witchcraft, such as the presence of herbs or unconventional relationships with animals, as proof of an accusation.31

When residents decided to take the law into their own hand, the nature of punishment also changed. Guilty witches could no longer be, and were no longer, fined, and warned, under the assumption that their future behaviour would be monitored. One way or another, witches had to be removed from the "community". Punishment became violent and ad hoc.

In the seventies and eighties, a series of high profile witch accusations and attacks rocked Mapulaneng as a district. These incidents related to competition between business rivals and
chiefly secession disputes. "Competitive magic" between business and political rivals was considered inevitable, and part of the process of establishing a "powerful" reputation, that is of proving themselves worthy of respect and capable of providing spiritual protection. The use of "competitive magic" was tolerated provided it did not affect innocent bystanders. However, when the general public became affected by rivalry, then private disputes became public problems and resulted in witchcraft accusations.

In Brooklyn, conflicts between two rival businessmen reached a head when a small bus carrying the soccer team, patronised by one of the men, crashed, killing four of the players. A witchcraft accusation followed the incident. A group of men related to the victims of the accident kidnapped the alleged witch. Although he managed to escape his kidnappers, a few months later, the alleged witch was assassinated.

By the mid eighties, the Molotele chief was willing to blatantly abuse the procedure for identifying witches to attack business and political rivals. In December 1985, a young women and child were struck by lightening and killed at Buffelshoek. The chief convened a meeting at which residents agreed to contribute money towards the hiring of a Ngaka. The chief appointed a delegation of five people for this purpose. The delegation did not consult a Ngaka but "camped" at a neighbouring settlement. The following day they returned and reported to a mass meeting that the (non-existent) Ngaka had pointed out two people as responsible for the lightening. The two people were named and immediately set upon and killed by an incensed populace. The motivation behind the attack was complex. The following explanation, given by a member of the Molotele royal family, reveals more than just the immediate motivations for the animosity between the chief and the victim; it evokes a world
The hatred started from my [great] grandfathers. My [great] grandfather was Sekwekwe who specialised in muti and was a rainmaker. Because Sekwekwe could cause rain, people honoured him as a chief. The man's popularity was enhanced by his muti. The more powerful the muti, the more protective he will be to his subjects. So Mahaklishe [the chief] did not like it. One day, during summer, Sekwekwe wanted to show his bravery. It was mid-day, but rainy. Sekwekwe visited Mahaklishe, but when he left, Mahaklishe's chair stuck to his buttocks. Sekwekwe made Mahlaklishe pay four cattle in order to remove the chair. But Sekwekwe did not know the cows were doctored. He slaughtered one cow, but they were all doctored. Soon his wife fell sick. He tried to cure his wife, but his stomach started to swell and he ended up dying. The feud continued to their children... This hatred continued like that after my uncle [the victim] built a shop. The chief built a cafe next door. The chief tried to withdraw the license, but was not successful... The two men competed over taking care of Anais' [a deceased chief] family. This conflict reached a head, and my uncle was killed.32

The chief abused the procedure for identifying witches to resolve personal conflict. The delegates were tried and sentenced to twelve years in jail. The chief rewarded the families of three of the five delegates for their loyalty by giving them small trading stores.

Prior to 1986, the political rights of initiated but unmarried men within the household and the Kgoro were ambiguous. Although youths were theoretically allowed to attend the Kgoro, their authority to speak at the institution was severely limited. As they were not household heads, youths could not speak on the problems experienced by household heads within the chiefdom. As they did not have experience of marriage, they were not qualified to speak on the subject. As a principle, the opinion of a youth was always subordinated to that of a parent. Yet, it was the youth who asserted the right to intervene in this context by identifying and punishing witches. In order to understand this transformation, and the basis upon which the youth constructed the authority to act, the next section provides a brief history of what
it meant to be an initiated, but unmarried man.

**What it meant to be an Unmarried Man: Youth Organisation and the Chieftainship**

Prior to the implementation of Betterment, which was a sporadic and uneven process, as soon as they were physically capable of the task, uninitiated Pulana boys spent their days herding cattle. The duty physically toughened the boys and encouraged them to take responsibility for one another. Groups of boys were led by leaders who "chose themselves" by defeating any challengers in fights. In relation to the rest of society, boys were conceptualised as unsocialised and intrinsically irresponsible. Unquestioned obedience was the cornerstone of generational authority and harsh corporal punishment was considered the appropriate means of disciplining boys. Every adult, at their own discretion, had the right to thrash any child.33

Boys became men in a process that began with initiation school and ended with the establishment of an independent household. Initiation school was divided into two parts, the **Bodika** and the **Bogoera**. In the thirties, the length of the Bodika varied between four and six months. The role of initiation school was to transform a boy into a responsible adult who could take up his position in the chiefdom. Initiates were taught the following values: "seniority of birth, obedience to authority, respect of elders, loyalty to the chief, obedience to the father, and disobedience to the mother."34 Initiates were taught to scorn women (including their mother) and uninitiated men. They were given esoteric names and taught a secret language. All initiates became members of an "age regiment" which fell under the leadership of a the most senior member of the royal family who was being initiated. Approximately a year after the Bodika was held, the Bogoera was convened. The Bogoera
had the role of reinforcing lessons taught at the Bodika and cementing the bonds between the initiates.\textsuperscript{35}

The status of young men during the period between initiation and marriage was ambiguous. Initiation school graduates were considered socially superior to both children and women; adults could not indiscriminately thrash initiates. However, initiates only had nominal speaking rights at the chief's Kgoro or to own cattle until they assumed the responsibility of marriage.\textsuperscript{36} Father's remained liable for any fines incurred by their unmarried sons.\textsuperscript{37} In order to get married, young men needed brideswealth, which for the first half of the twentieth century, consisted largely of cattle. As unmarried men were dependent on their fathers for brideswealth, the period between initiation and marriage was a time when both chief and father struggled for control over the young man's labour or for the products of that labour.\textsuperscript{38} After marriage, a man had the right to establish his own household. Usually, however, his wife lived in his mother's hut until she gave birth, following which a hut was then built for his wife within his father's homestead. His wife was given land to plough. Although the son was now a jural citizen of the chiefdom, he still fell under the authority of the homestead head. On the death of the father, the eldest son inherited ownership of his father's possessions and control over the father's cattle.\textsuperscript{39}

Access to income through labour migration prompted a struggle between initiated but unmarried men and their fathers over the control of the migrant remittance.\textsuperscript{40} Migrant income meant that young men could save sufficient resources to enter into a marriage of their choice, at a time of their choice. Although various strategies were employed by homestead heads to gain control over remittances, the "balance of power and locus of authority within
the settlement group gradually began to shift away from the non-migrant umzi/kgoro head and fathers". Consequently, the delay between initiation and marriage decreased.

By the 1920s it became common for young Pulana men to seek employment at the T.G.M.E mines near Pilgrims Rest or on the Witwatersrand shortly before and after graduating from initiation school. Migrancy was linked with masculinity: "A boy who does not visit will ultimately marry his own sister." That is, a man who did not migrate became so closely associated with women as to become one. Money earned from the cities was used to purchase clothes or put in trust by fathers to pay for brideswealth. Remittances were only used to purchase food in times of acute drought. After a couple of migrant contracts, the young man was married. How often he migrated after marriage depended on climatic conditions, how his household was effected by removals and Betterment and his own economic aspirations.

The above pattern remained fairly fixed over the next thirty years. Attendance at mission schools was minimal amongst the Pulana until the fifties. Most mission schools in the district taught in Tsonga, which, as far as the Pulana was concerned, was the language of refugees. Furthermore, many of the teachers at the mission schools were uninitiated. Those Pulana boys who lived near "community built schools" or the Berlin Mission School, devised various strategies to attend school. They would herd cattle for three months and then attend school for three months. Some initiates would return to school for a year after completing a migrant contract. However, pressure on initiates to earn an income and establish a household combined with the scarcity of schools and qualified teachers (many teachers in the forties had reached a Standard Two level) meant that most men either received no education or very
rudimentary literacy skills. While boys had the job of herding cattle and migrant employment was readily available, most parents and sons saw little reason in delaying migrancy for schooling.47

The existence of households with different ethnic and chiefly allegiances led to a change in the function of initiation schools by the forties. Although chiefly permission (as well as that of the Native Commissioner) was required before a school could be convened, by the forties many initiation schools no longer integrated their students into a specific chiefdom. The schools became increasingly commercialised. Instead of the chief bearing the costs of the school, initiates began to pay fees. The principals of some schools appointed their closest relatives as leader of the "age regiment". At other schools, leadership was determined on a "first come, first serve" basis: that is the first students to register with the principal became the leader. The process was uneven as those chiefs who were able to preserve their hegemony over a village were able to assert greater control over the initiation process and retain a sense of corporate identity around the chieftainship. All schools continued to hammer home "appropriate" gender and generational relations to their students.48

The sixties marked the start of a dramatic change to patterns of migrancy. The massive population removals and replanning of the district led to a drastic decrease in the number of cattle and the amount of agricultural land available. The corresponding requirement for boys to herd cattle decreased. Pulana migrants began to realise that access to better paid jobs on the labour market depended on educational qualifications. Formal schooling not only provided access to the job market, but became the means of socialising children.49
By the seventies, initiation was moulded around school terms instead of vice versa. Between the sixties and the eighties the period of initiation decreased from four months to between four to six weeks. Although, the principals of initiation schools still needed the permission of the Tribal Authority to hold a school, the schools did not integrate the initiates as a corporate group under the chieftainship except at the most symbolic level. The link between youth leaders and the chieftainship was almost completely severed. The initiation of a chief’s son, who was automatically placed in a leadership position, was almost the only exception to this trend.50

Schools created a new social hierarchy based on a persons level of education. This hierarchy was applied beyond the gates of the school to the broader settlement. Literacy and education became associated with "enlightenment", progressiveness, and the ability to understand situations outside of the local context.51 In a world that was governed by a literate bureaucracy, levels of education determined the authority with which a person spoke about politics. Principals and teachers stood at the nexus of the oral and the literate worlds and were called upon to interpret the literate world (especially state policies) to their illiterate neighbours.

The education hierarchy inverted its generational counterpart. Literate children claimed a superior understanding of the political situation to their illiterate parents. Schooling increased the period of time between initiation and marriage for many young men. This prolonged the period when they were dependent on their parents and remained politically subordinate within the chiefdom. Yet literate young men faced a disjuncture between their experience and the ideals of chiefly, gender and generational authority: Male teachers drank alcohol and sexually
molested female students both in and outside of schools.\textsuperscript{52} Rather than being confined to the household, women were taking men's jobs. Migrant fathers proved to be unreliable providers for the household.\textsuperscript{53} The chief's court and administration imposed laws that restricted access to crucial subsistence resources, charged (and embezzled) taxes that stretched already over extended households, and actively prevented any oppositional political activity. And, witches roamed free, protected by Apartheid laws and institutions. The youth's parents not only seemed powerless to intervene in the situation, but reproduced it with proverbs such as "A black is nothing without a white".\textsuperscript{54} Furthermore, any attempts by the youth to question the situation were blocked by their parents who asserted the first principle of generational authority, namely obedience to your seniors and authority in general. In short, as far as the students were concerned, their parent's accepted, without fully understanding, an intolerable situation.

The economic recession that brought in the eighties spawned a new class of initiated and unemployed youths in Mapulaneng. The following statistics of registered black migrant workers originating from Lebowa provide a picture of the effects of the recession.

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Having left school, these people were supposed to find migrant employment or face being labelled "women". Yet employment was not available. As initiated but unmarried men, they not only held marginal positions in the chiefdom, but also in the household. And the possibility of them establishing their own household seemed increasingly remote. The
following biographies of three youth leaders in Brooklyn illustrate this dynamic:

Joseph K was born in 1965. His parents were not married. Before he was five, his mother first worked at a nearby white farm but in 1970 she was a domestic at Phalabowa and he was brought up by his mother's mother. But as his grandmother was working at a white farm, he was cared for by his uncles (who also lived with his grandmother). Joe went to school in 1975. He tried to make some money by herding his 'rich' neighbour's cattle but he only received an occasional 'gift' in the form of some old clothes or food. He was forced to leave school for financial reasons in 1984 when he reached Standard Four. He worked for a white farmer for R45 a month. He left after eight months and went to Kempton Park with an uncle who had found work at a construction firm for him and two of his friends. He lived at a hostel and received R58 a week. Spare time was spent at the hostel's shebeen as he was afraid of leaving the hostel because he had been warned about city girls who would rob him. After fourteen months the firm closed down and he was forced to return to the countryside. At Mapulaneng, he would spend his time going up and down to the labour office. He would try and earn some money by washing taxis. His spare time was spent under the trees playing different board games with a group of other unemployed men or watching his friends practice or play soccer. Scholars would only join them after school. He recently built a small mud hut on his own plot. He would like to get married but does not have money to pay brideswealth or to support a wife.

Bill G was born in 1965. His father worked at Sabie and would return on the weekends. His mother worked at a local shop. He was brought up by his grandmother. He went to school in 1973 but by the time he reached Std 5 he was having continual conflicts with his teachers about his bad school attendance. When he needed money his mother would give him R2 and his grandmother would contribute R2 from her pension. In 1984 he had a psychological breakdown and left school. In 1985 he studied to become a soccer referee. On qualifying, he acted as referee in all local soccer matches and some of those played away. In 1986, he received money from his half brother and had an occasional job managing a shop. He fought with his father who wanted him to work in Sabie. He spent his spare time playing games under the tree, refereeing soccer or, when he had money, at a shebeen.

Phil H was born in 1965. His father worked in Pretoria. His mother worked at Hoedspruit (some sixty km away.) As his grandparents were deceased, he was brought up by his two elder sisters. He started school in 1973. He did not like school as teachers would thrash him (especially at high school) for no reason. He left school in 1985. He plays soccer for the Brooklyn Fast Movers which practices four days a week and plays a match twice a week. He also plays games under the trees. He got a job helping at the local butchery. In 1986, he faced accommodation problems as his two sisters got divorced and returned to his parent's home with their children, effectively displacing him. He organised a room at the butchery where he was employed.
Under the trees and on the soccer fields, unemployed initiates and their student counterparts met and discussed the issues of the day. These arenas became melting pots of all the youth's frustrations and conflicts. Private experiences were shared and made public. A solidarity was repeatedly forged amongst the youth. When the African National Congress called to the youth to lead the struggle against national oppression, the call fell on the receptive ears of male initiates. The formation of the Crisis Committee stimulated the formation of youth organisations. One youth leader commented:

"When the youth got together, there was just this wonderful co-operation, and no-one had to lecture us on this co-operation."

However, Apartheid could only be effectively fought when unity was built around (what the youth considered to be) a truly moral social order. And, not surprisingly the primary target of the youth organisation's campaign were alleged witches. In attacking witches, the youth attempted to fill the vacuum created by the gulf between popular understanding of the world (and the role of the chief within that perspective), and the limits imposed on the activities of the chieftainship by Tribal Authorities. In targeting issues that appeared to transcend any factional or generational interests, the youth hoped to attain political legitimacy as an impartial guardian of the nation. Niehaus asserts this position, when in assessing a witch-hunt in Mapulaneng in 1990, he argues that "the reality of such beliefs [in witchcraft] as an intellectual attempt to explain, manage and compensate for undeserved misfortune cannot be lightly dismissed as an "idiom" which masks ulterior motives. From this perspective it can be argued that the involvement of political actors in witch-hunting can be best understood as an attempt to eliminate misfortune, perform a valuable social service, and thereby attain political legitimacy."57

In the absence of an institutionally imposed procedure, youth organisations followed a variety
of improvised procedures in determining who to attack as witches. The Brooklyn Youth Organisation put the issue to the vote (although the franchise was limited to initiated men). In certain youth organisations, the leaders decided amongst themselves, or in consultation with selected parents, who was to be targeted. The attacks were legitimated by presenting material evidence of the accused's involvement in witchcraft. In a number of cases, confessions were extracted from the alleged witches. In Brooklyn, the “knives used to cut out the tongues of zombies” were presented for public display. In Arthur Seat, the “herbs” used by alleged witches were put on public display and burnt. The public exposure of the herbs was given as proof of the truth of the accusation.58

Legitimation Crisis

The problem for the youth organisation was that many residents did not perceive the youth’s activities from Niehaus’ perspective. At the time of the witch-hunts, hundreds of elderly people fled into the mountains out of fear of attack. Although this was taken as a sign of guilt by the youth, the elders understood the youth the witch attacks to be arbitrary and an abuse of power. Some adult leaders questioned the necessity of the attacks: Youths who argued that the Ngaka was not able to identify witches, were told to protect themselves from witchcraft through purchasing herbs. The approach of the Crisis Committee was ambivalent but pragmatic:

“Maybe two percent of the witchcraft accusations are true. People fabricate stories about others who they are having a conflict with. Many people died in 86, some of them innocent... How can we find out the true two percent... The Sangomas might have personal problems himself. We can’t depend on his truth. So we discourage the practice of confronting witches in general. People can protect themselves as best they can. Let the two percent go on.”59

In failing to follow the legal procedures for identifying witches, the youth opened themselves up to the accusation of being used to resolve private disputes through the idiom of witchcraft.
In every case investigated by the Shatale Youth Congress and the Crisis Committee, the organisations found that, as far as they were concerned the youth “were being used” to resolve personal conflicts. These conflicts either involved rivalry between “Big Men” or intra or inter household disputes. Despite the findings of the organisations, the witch-hunters asserted the legitimacy of their actions. The following case study demonstrates these conflicting interpretations:

The Zoeknog Trial

During May 1986, the sons of a shopkeeper who lived in Zoeknog approached the nearby Shatale Youth Congress (SYC) for help. The problem was that the Youth Organisation at Zoeknog had called for a consumer boycott of their father’s shop. Two weeks previously, the Zoeknog Youth Organisation (ZYO) had accused their father (who was also a deposed induna) of being a witch and had burnt all his herbs and the hut where the herbs were kept. Five other residents were also attacked on the same day. Their herbs were similarly burnt. The leader of the ZYO had told their father to close his shop as he was a witch.

Two days later, the three leaders of the ZYO likewise approached the SYC for help. They explained that they were having problems with a shopowner who was a witch. They had therefore called a consumer boycott in an effort to drive the witch from their village. They sought advice from the SYC in the implementation of the consumer boycott. The SYC told them to come the following night. The SYC also sent a message to the sons of the shopowner to appear the following night.
Thus, the following night, a type of People's Court was constituted. Both parties agreed to respect the judgement of the court or risk a confrontation with the SYC.

The court made the following findings:

On the one hand, the shopowner was accused of being a witch because he ran a circumcision school. The logic of the ZYO was as follows: Anyone who ran a circumcision school knew how to use herbs. Anyone who used herbs was a witch and should be driven from the community. It was also found that the relationship between the ZYO and the shopowner was strained because the shopowner had refused to donate money and food to the ZYO when they had requested it. The youth had then helped themselves to food from his shop.

On the other hand, the witchcraft accusation had originated from a businessman who was the uncle of one of the leaders of the ZYO. The uncle owned a circumcision school and a shop. He was involved in a conflict with the shopowner about the creation of a new shop as well as being a business competitor of the shopowner. The same uncle had told the youth to launch a consumer boycott of the shopowner's business. He had also given the ZYO food and money to cement the alliance.

The Shatale Youth Congress made the following judgement:

The accused was not guilty of being a witch. The witch accusation was made by the uncle to disguise the "real issue", which was the competition over the shop. The ZYO was being used by the uncle for his selfish goals. The ZYO was constituted to protect society, not to get involved in disputes between business rivals. In contrast to the ZYO, the Shatale Youth Congress had called a consumer boycott of the local Checkers store in an attempt to force
Checkers’s management to pressurise the state to abandon Apartheid. There was no point in calling a consumer boycott of a shop owned by a black person.

As punishment the leaders of the ZYO were lashed. Although the judgement was final and binding, the leaders of the ZYO were unconvinced. One of the leaders stubbornly told the court: "But he is still a witch." 60

As can be seen from the above, the youth involved in the anti-witchcraft movement clashed with their more politicised counterparts over the truth of the witchcraft accusations. The Zoeknog case was not exceptional: In one village, the youth leaders consulted the chief, who used the anti-witchcraft movement to attack political enemies. In another settlement, the heir to the chieftainship, led the youth organisation in similar attacks on rival factions for the chieftainship. However, the most powerful factor legitimating the anti-witchcraft movement was a widespread belief that the people who were attacked were in fact guilty of practising witchcraft. In many cases, vivid stories linked the behaviour of the alleged witches to the formal mythology of witchcraft. Hence, to the youth leader, that an accusation could be traced to a private dispute did not mean that the attack was illegitimate. However, as far as many of the accused were concerned, they were attacked because their protagonists had privileged access to the youth organisations. The following sections investigate the witch-attacks through the eyes of the sceptics (or the accused), that is, the narrative assumes that people attacked for witchcraft were not necessarily guilty of causing misfortune through witchcraft, but rather were involved in conflictual relationships with powerful people. 61

Through publicly punishing witches, the youth organisation defined and imposed a discipline
on the "community". Public punishment stands as a warning to others who could be found guilty of similar crimes. Those people involved in these private conflicts were in potential danger of being attacked as witches. Hence, the anti-witchcraft movement had the effect of threatening (and disciplining) these people. In order to understand the meaning of, and stakes underlying, the anti-witchcraft movement, this section investigates the relationships within and between households, as well as the historical processes that structured those relationships. It argues that the youth challenged and redefined the moral economy of generational authority within the household by using the anti-witchcraft movement to define legitimate "custom". The following section, in the form of a case study, traces the mechanism through which private accusations became accepted as true, and ultimately resulted in particular people becoming threats to the entire "community". In doing so, this section will illuminate the conditions under which accusations were accepted as true.

**What it meant to be a Woman: Socialised Humanity verses the Womb**

Within an agnatically ordered society, *botho* (socialised humanity) represented the triumph of social order over the "threateningly fecund, chaotic realm of nature unconfined". The attainment of *botho* was a process, a struggle of maintaining the boundaries between the "social" or "cultural" and the other (natural). *Botho* came into existence the moment when the raw fertility of women, the womb as the forces of nature, was harnessed by men and put to collective ends.

A "good" woman need not be intelligent or beautiful. First and foremost a good (or cultured) women worked within the confines of her father's or husband's household. However,
women, as producers of children, were ultimately at the mercy of the prolific and potentially uncontrollable forces of reproduction, that is her sexuality. Consequently women were placed at the margins of what it meant to be social, as a woman could never be fully socialised, her social being always being open to subversion by her (uncontrollable) sexual being. Boundaries had to be drawn to protect socialised humanity from the never fully domesticated women: Women were excluded from the chief’s kgoro because, as intrinsically wild, women were ultimately not able to conduct themselves with the required restraint and dignity required of the forum. Menstrual blood represented a hot (fisa) or barren season: Women were not allowed near cattle, lest they pollute (and in doing so, kill) the animals with the “fisa” (heat) carried in their bodies. A man had to avoid sexual contact with a woman when she was menstruating or risk being polluted and falling sick. Elaborate rituals cleansed a society after a miscarriage as a woman’s womb represented the forces of nature and a barren womb left unsealed produced a barren season. The foetus also had to be buried in a wet place, lest it “suck” the moisture from the air.

“Botho” symbolised the socialisation of women in so far as she could be socialised. A cultured woman got married to the man of her parent’s choice, unobtrusively lived with and worked for her husband’s family, bore children, and eventually established her own household. The household fused the spheres of production and reproduction, and while these spheres were fused, women were socialised and restrained. In the household, controlling women’s sexuality was intimately linked to controlling women’s labour. Women were put to work (“her hands were eaten”) during the day in the fields, while sexual contact was restricted to the evening for the purposes of social reproduction. Yet there was always a tension, a possibility, that women could escape these confines, would be free to associate with
men, which would mark the breakdown of social order, the "return of the chaotic realm of nature unconfined". Socialised man was put on this world by his ancestors with the responsibility of guarding against this possibility.

After menopause, when a woman's fertility was exhausted, she made a step up the social hierarchy. At this point, a woman had certain secular and spiritual powers associated with the aged, and with these powers came control over the younger female generation's labour and a pivotal position in ancestral rituals. Now a woman had the role of "guarding" her daughters-in-law on behalf of her sons, of ensuring that sexual reproduction was linked to social production.

These ideas were central to legitimating and maintaining male and generational power in pre (and post) colonial African settlements. The control of young women secured elderly control over young men's labour: Young men could only get married and start a household, that is become a man, when their parents agreed to give them cattle for "lebola" (bridewealth). The bride's parents chose the family they wanted their daughter to marry in order to maximise the economic or political benefits of the match. Ownership of the woman was passed from the woman's father to the woman's husband through an exchange of cattle. Should this access to women be short-circuited, the control of the elderly over the life-cycle of their children, and with it the labour power of their sons, and the brideswealth from their daughters, was threatened.

Confining a woman to the household under male control meant both restraining her sexual being and socialising a women through labour. The extraction of women's labour was
legitimated by the social need to contain women in the household. The control of women's sexuality was legitimated by the need to maintain social order. However, the culture of the household, or the rights of women within the household, was a contested terrain. The following section investigates the way women used witchcraft accusations to define what constituted legitimate household relationships.

What it meant to be a Married Woman: The Changing Status of Women in the Household

Bushbuckridge in the eighties was characterised by a variety of household structures. These structures include simple two generational households, simple three generational households (where a married son and his family remains in the household), extended three generational households (where more than one married son remains in the household) and complex extended three generational households (where, apart from the extended three generational household, more distant relatives, unmarried daughter's children and adopted children are resident in the household). It will be argued that transformations in household structure were a product of a change in the balance of power between generations and the sexes brought about by migrancy, the implementation of Betterment, the growth in female participation at schools and female access to a local labour market. This section will argue that a generalised "custom" or "culture" regulating household relationships has been unable to keep pace with the rapid and uneven transformations in household structures. Within this context, it will be shown that witchcraft accusations were an attempt to define what constituted legitimate relationships within the household and impose those relationships on the elder generation.
A marriage within the context of a pre-colonial extended homestead was a transaction between families, rather than an agreement between a man and women. An unmarried man did not have the right to own stock and depended on his father for brideswealth. His father determined when his son could marry. The choice of partner was made by both the young man's and woman's parents, who entered into marital negotiations on their children's behalf. Her husband's family was effectively buying control of her labour and reproductive powers. The bride's family had the duty of explaining to the young women her role in her parents-in-law's household. In effect, a women married a man "to take care of his parents". The parent's in law had enormous powers over their son's wife: The young women was not allowed to address her in-laws without permission. Her labour would fall under the direct supervision of her parent's in law and her husband. After the wife had given birth, she was given a hut and a field. She was, nevertheless, still expected to serve her in-laws. On the death of the homestead head, the eldest son inherited his political and ritual powers, as well control of the family's stock.

Chapter Two demonstrated how migrancy, labour tenancy and the implementation of Betterment polices effected household structures. As restrictions were placed on stock ownership, migrant income became a vital source of brideswealth. Elderly control over marriages was undermined: rather than marriages being a means through which the homestead head could maximise political or economic gains, migrant's began to choose their own wives, although the migrant's parents retained their positions as negotiators of the marital agreement. Migrant remittances were a source of acute conflict within the homestead. As more homestead heads went to the cities on extended migrant contracts, the management of the homestead was transferred to the migrant's mother. However, what remained unresolved was
whether a migrant should send his remittance to his wife or his mother. Particularly as agricultural land became scarcer, wives struggled for the right to receive the remittance. As a consequence of the conflict, a new (although by no means universally accepted) household cycle came into existence, one which gave migrants and their wives greater autonomy from parental control. After the eldest son's wife had given birth, he had the right (although the formal permission of his parent's was required) to establish a household outside of the yard of his father's household. This gave the wife effective autonomy from her parents-in-law. A migrant could then send his remittance directly to his wife. While her husband was away, the wife became effective head of her household. The second born son was then married and his wife served his parents. The last born son remained in the household and inherited the family's possessions.

The above cycle was adopted unevenly by households in the district as a whole, and not adopted at all by other households. The degree of economic independence established by son's households varied considerably. Some men continued to build their houses within their parent's yard, relying on their parent's to monitor their households while they migrated. In some households, some sons would move a "distance away" from their parents, while others would build their houses in his father's yard. Others built just beyond their parent's yard, but continued to send their remittances to their parents, under the slogan "you send money to your children, not to your wife. Your mother is your witness." Similarly, the extent to which the mother-in-law made demands on her daughters-in-law varied significantly. What is of particular pertinence to this chapter is that the threat of witchcraft between women (who were otherwise socially powerless) was evoked (by men) as an explanation for the new household cycle:
The mothers-in-law were scared of their daughters-in-law. They said to their husbands and sons, better that you leave and I lose control over your wives, than I die. 78

Mass removals, the almost complete absence of agricultural land and stock limitations and losses, further subverted parental control over the marriage process and the timing of the establishment of households. In the absence of fields and cattle, migrant income became both the dominant source of brideswealth and of household income. This gave young men greater control over whom to marry, and when and where to establish a household.

The position of women also changed in the sixties and seventies. The two decades were marked by a massive increase in female school attendance. The right for females to an education was a gradual process. In the forties, Pulana women were allowed to attend school in order to be able to correspond with their future spouses. Learning to be a "cultured women" that is, instruction in a woman's role in the household and fields, was given a greater priority than formal schooling. A former school principal commented:

"The greatest fear was they will not get married. If these girls get educated, they thought tribalism will not exist." 79

Once a woman fell pregnant, she was no longer allowed to attend school, as she "would influence the other students". 80 However, as agricultural land became scarcer in the fifties and sixties, greater space opened up for women to attend schools. The granting of the right to women to attend increasing standards at school was a gradual process. Women tended to leave school at a lower standard compared to the male counterparts. Parity between the genders at a matric level was only achieved in the mid eighties. 81

Access to higher levels of formal education qualified some women for relatively well paying jobs in the bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, in the private sector. The three most common
The relatively well paid labour market gave fathers a material interest in securing their daughters' education: High earning potential meant that, in the event of their daughter's marriage, father's could charge a high bridesprice.

The above developments have generated an ideology that Stadler has termed the "modern way".82 This ideology viewed the setting up of a household that was politically autonomous, and economically independent, of the husband's parents as the appropriate model of marital existence. In contrast to the ideology of generational authority, which emphasised the conservation of pre-existing social relations, the modern way stressed the dynamic nature of social relations, and, while still retaining a notion of respecting elders, emphasised the individual's right to choose their fate. Rather than being a transaction between families, the "modern way" viewed marriage as essentially a relationship between a man and his wife. The custom of brideswealth was given a new meaning in this context. The payment of brideswealth effectively increased the bargaining power of these women: Until the brideswealth was paid in full, the status of the marriage was ambiguous, and in the event of a marital conflict, the woman could return to their parents (who would welcome their earning potential).83 Corresponding to an economic strategy organised around the labour market, educated women shied away from agricultural work as a means of survival, and welcomed the demarcation of stands which restricted both the growth of households and access to agricultural land.84

Educated women with access to reliable wage employment, were potentially economically autonomous from men. If a marriage proved contrary to their expectations, they were able
to return to their parent's household or establish an independent household. However, only a small minority of women had the opportunity to achieve a level of education that gave them access to well paid jobs. As a student advances up the standards in school, so the costs of education increase, placing schooling at a particular level beyond the means of most households. A significant number of students drop out at each standard. By the mid eighties, just over half of the age group eligible to be in Secondary school, were enrolled at a school. A meaningful number of children never got beyond Grade Two. The matric class made up about two percent of the total school going population.

Well paid, regular employment was beyond the reach of most women. Formal employment for uneducated women paid low wages, and was limited to farm labour, domestic labour and menial jobs at local shops. Informal economic strategies available to these women included hawking, producing home crafts or selling beer. The loss of agricultural land severely undermined the economic position of uneducated and unemployed women. Once married, they were almost entirely dependent on migrant remittances to survive.

Yet, desertion by a husband, in an economically autonomous household spelt complete ruin for the wife and her children. The following is an extract from a mother of five children whose husband had neither been home or sent money since 1978:

"My biggest problem is hunger, I don't have money to buy food, my children are suffering because we have no food. I have no money for school fees, my son had to leave school because I could not afford to pay. Look at my house, it's next to nothing. It would not be long before it falls down and there is no one to help."

The result of economic insecurity was severe stress, chronic illness and even complete psychological breakdown. In the above case, a women's organiser commented:

"for a long time she fell ill, because, I think, of all the frustration, she went a little
confused, she became all mixed up and was in hospital for a long while."

Although the establishment of a household, economically and politically autonomous from her parents-in-law was an aspiration of many women (regardless of their level of education), the reality was more complex. The sword of economic autonomy cut both ways. Migrant’s wives were constantly faced with the possibility of not receiving a remittance or outright desertion. Female household heads were torn between establishing independent households and maintaining support networks with their husband’s family to be mobilised in times of acute need. The result was a myriad of intra and inter household relationships that fell between the poles of autonomy and subordination. Some wives stayed in their parents-in-laws homestead, but "cooked in a separate pot". Some gave their mothers-in-law a portion of their remittance. Some brought groceries for the extended household at their discretion. Some son’s sent money home with instructions how it was to be divided between his mother and his wife. The nuances characterising these relationships were changing and diverse.

Amidst the variety of household types, there was no accepted custom that regulated the relationship between these partly autonomous, partly dependent, households. Some migrants sent their remittance to their fathers, some to their mothers, and others to their wives. Some households maintained a communal kitchen with their neighbouring kin, while others asserted greater autonomy. Some mothers-in-law insisted on controlling their daughter-in-law’s labour before they would part with the migrant’s remittance or some of their pension. Similarly, some mothers-in-law kept part of the remittance for themselves, while others gave the entire sum to their son’s wives. The ideology of the "modern way" uncompromisingly emphasised the migrant wife’s right to political and economic autonomy. The ideology of generational authority stressed the subordination of the wife to her mother-in-law. In the absence of any
agreed upon custom, or Pulana "culture", each household asserted its own "culture":

"We do not know what other families do, but this is our custom."93

This "custom" between households was determined by a contingent balance of power, in an ongoing struggle, between migrant's parents (usually mothers) and migrant's wives. Yet, the absence of secure sources of income and clear household rights were the cause of stress related illnesses. And sickness was a sign of witchcraft. Hence, it was in the process of these struggles around the definition of household custom that actors invoked witchcraft accusations. The following narratives demonstrate this connection.

In the case of a migrant that sends his wage to his mother:

"The son is fond of his mother. When he returns he brings presents for his mother and often even sends his migrant's wage to his mother. This creates problems with his wife who complains that her mother-in-law not only wants her own pension but still takes money from her husband which she should receive. "What is the mother-in-law doing with so much money?" the wife will complain. When the wife goes down to collect water or to work at the fields she will be advised by her friends: "Your mother-in-law is giving your husband herbs so that he will love her and give her his money. Your mother-in-law is a witch." This is how the trouble starts."94

Pensions were also a vital source of household income. Yet the duty of a pensioner to contribute to the broader household remained undefined. A pensioner's children, daughters-in-law and grand-children all made demands on her income. Should the pensioner have been seen not to "cooperate" with other members of the household, he or she opened themselves up to a witchcraft accusation as the following narrative demonstrates:

In most cases the pension money is running the home. But it is not her [the mother-in-law's] duty. When a child is sick, the wife asks the mother-in-law for money for the clinic and the in-law will refuse especially if the relationship is bad. Then the wife will go to her peers or to her family and they will ask her "didn't your mother-in-law get pension, and she will talk bad things of her mother-in-law: "She wants me to get rid of me etc etc." And then where ever she goes she will complain about her mother-in-law and suggest she is a witch."95
Developments in the seventies and eighties affected men in different ways. Men who lost their jobs and were forced to return to the countryside were in an unenviable position. A man (unless he held local employment) was supposed to be a migrant or risk being labelled a woman. With migrancy, management of the household was transferred from the migrant to his wife. Yet the role of unemployed migrant "household heads" was undefined. His position of authority undermined, the balance of power within certain households, shifted from the husband to his wife. Given that women were excluded from structural positions of authority, and witchcraft was a source of power available to all, the phenomena of dominated men was explained by young men as a consequence of witchcraft:

"It is a well known fact that powerful Xhosa herbalists from the Transkei have produced a herb, which when used by a woman, makes men passive and obedient to their wives. It is a major problem. These women are very mischievous with their herbs."97

On the other extreme, men with access to a steady income became enormously powerful. Following the massive removals of the sixties and seventies, the Bantustan population became increasingly impoverished. The low wages and the recession meant that mothers often did not have the resources to meet their children's aspirations. However, the money unemployed young women were not able to get from their parents, was attainable from lovers. An ideology dictating that a man needed to give his lover "maintenance" to show he was "serious" regulated the relationship. In a context of acute poverty where relatively few people had access to a steady income, resources were redistributed via a "sexual economy".98

The "sexual economy" was a double edged sword for most women. Although sexual liaisons
gave young women access to resources, salaried married men often neglected their wives in favour of their lovers. A wife was a possession whilst a lover was a contingent contract that had to be constantly renegotiated. Many unmarried, uneducated women maintained a higher standard of living from the "maintenance" they received, than women married to wealthy men (who spent their income on lovers.) Never the less, surviving by means of the sexual economy was a precarious existence as the following example demonstrates:

"Thoroughly neglected, BM leaves her husband and returns to her father's home completely penniless. Being broke and her father unable to care for her, she engages in sexual relationships with two men upon their return from work, hoping to gain access to the wages they brought from work. She comes into conflict with another unmarried woman who also starts a relationship with one of the men, RS. BM's other lover, TS, hears the brawl and comes over to beat RS, but RS drives him off with a knife. Not wanting to lose TS as well, BM follows him home but gets beaten mercilessly."

Attempts by women to get the Tribal Authority to discipline their husbands often ended in the following discovery: if the bureaucracy acted for men in exchange for money, they acted for women in exchange for sexual services.

"Those councillors are always behind women. The councillors will propose to her. That is how the late Kgoshi (chief) got his second wife. But usually they don't maintain them, they just lead them astray to more suffering."

In this context, adultery by a neglected married women was not an indulgence, but a means of survival. Yet adultery, although supposedly tolerated when discreetly conducted, was also linked to witchcraft:

"You kill your husband with adultery. Adultery and witchcraft are one thing; they go hand in hand. This is because the husband is a stumbling block. So the wife will give him some herbs to ensure that he remains ignorant. When given such herbs, even if the husband's mother tells him about the affair, he will remain passive and continue to love his wife."

Female Survival Strategies and Poisoners
Although the technique of poisoning was intrinsically linked to day witchcraft, the accusation of poisoner conjured up specific images independent of witchcraft. These images, as the following will argue, were often linked to survival strategies adopted by female headed households.

Uneducated women, tired of physical and psychological abuse experienced at their husband's or relative's home, set up independent households and carved (often extremely tenuous) independent niches for themselves in the broader economy. These niches included traditional healing, hawking, working on "white" farms or for local businesses, domestic work, home-crafts, and selling alcohol (that is opening up a shebeen). Some of these women, through establishing a reliable source of income in one of the "niches", became head of extended and complex three generational households. Having a common experience of abuse by men, remarkable support networks were forged between some (although by no means all) of these female headed households. Support included providing food, money, labour and employment.102 The following case study provides an illustration of the above processes.

Sheila M was born in 1963 in Okkermootboom. Her father was a migrant but he died in 1972. Her mother died the following year. Her aunt looked after them from her nearby household. She had four brothers. She went to the local school until Standard two. In 1980 she married Frank. No brideswealth was paid. Frank was unemployed, but used to beat her whenever he came home and there was no food. He used to drink and spend what money he had on other women. She used to do work for her mother-in-law but the relationship became strained when her mother in law told her she was tired of buying food for her as it was Frank's responsibility to support her. Eventually she moved back to her brothers. She cleaned the household for them in exchange for food. However, her brothers got married and tensions emerged between her and her brothers' wives as she was supposed to be married. She moved out and established her own household. She had three more children, each with different men. The men were migrants who would support her until the babies arrived, then they would return to their wives and children. She survives by working at neighbours' households and cleaning at the local clinic. Her neighbour, also a divorced women but with a stable job, supports her in times of desperate need with food. She has no intention of
It was around the image of a shebeen that accusations of poisoner crystallised. The shebeen, a survival strategy pursued by single women, was the place where migrants and other wage earners spent their income on questionable alcoholic concoction and extra-marital affairs in preference to buying household essentials. If a man fell sick, or died, after visiting a shebeen, the shebeen owner, male or female, was labelled and targeted a poisoner.104

Witchcraft and Neighbourly Conflicts

The above sections discussed the link between witchcraft and intra-household gender and generational conflicts. By attacking witches, youth organisation was also imposing a discipline on relationships between households, in so far as witchcraft accusations were associated with inter household conflicts. In a context where migrants were losing their jobs, failing to send remittances, or simply not returning to the countryside, access to rural resources became a life and death issue. With Tribal Authorities, the authority and legitimacy of the chief’s court was thrown into question; Bribery, rather than justice, was perceived as the rationale behind judgements. In the absence of a definitive structure to mediate in neighbourly disputes, conflicts for scarce resources remained unresolved.

"There was a piece of land that was the family’s to use. However, we did not need it and my neighbour began to use it. When my husband lost his job we began to need the land again. We gave our neighbour time to realise she did not have rights to it. Eventually, we took the matter to the chiefs court, who decided in our favour. There was great tension between us."105

In the course of the conflict, if a neighbour experienced a misfortune a witchcraft accusation
inevitably followed.

This above sections described the historical process that gave rise to "private" witchcraft accusations. Not all these accusations were taken seriously by the youth and acted upon. The use of witchcraft to achieve a goal was not sufficient grounds for punishment; the accusation had to accompany a story of misfortune, such as death or illness, in order to demonstrate the malicious nature of the alleged use of witchcraft. Residents also had to believe the accused had an affinity for destructive witchcraft, that is, the accused needed to show signs of social aloofness, arrogance and cruelty. In each village, a powerful link was drawn between particular people and witchcraft. This link was substantiated with references to magical events (as described in witchcraft mythology) as well as misfortune. The following section, drawn from interviews with youth leaders, a civic leader, and some migrant's wives from Brooklyn, shows how alleged witches were perceived to be involved in household conflicts, and how these conflicts ultimately led to a generalised belief that the people were witches.

The Brooklyn Youth Organisation and The Big Five

On the 21 April 1986, the Brooklyn Youth Organisation (BYO) was formed at a public meeting held on the local soccer field. Two leaders and a disciplinary committee (DC) were elected. Each member paid twenty cents to buy sjamboks for the leaders and the DC.

On the 12 May 1986, the BYO convened a mass meeting on the local soccer field. The meeting was attended by about eight hundred men, most of whom were below the age of twenty five. Women were forbidden to attend. The purpose of the meeting was to identify
witches living in Brooklyn and to punish them. The judicial procedure was, according to a
youth leader "perfectly democratic". Any person attending the meeting was allowed to stand
up and put forward an accusation. The accusation included the name of a person and who
they were supposed to have witched. If the accusation was received with popular approval,
then the name was noted down on a list. The most enthusiastic accusers were the older,
unemployed men. They would refer to previous occasions when witches were identified, but
the witch would then bribe the chief or induna, and remain unpunished. Some forty three
names were placed on this list. The DC were sent to collect five old women whose names
were on the top of the list. These old women were members of a notorious gang called the
"Big Five". A trial was held for the five. Those members who were reluctant to confess there
evil deeds were sjambokked until they gave a confession. One of the members died during
the sjambokking. Two of the members confessed to making zombies of their victims, to
causing lightning to strike, and to cause children to be born lame. They handed over the
knives they had allegedly used to cut out the tongues of the victims. The two were given three
days to repair the damage they had done to various people. (ie Make the lame children walk.)
A third member of the "Big Five" was ordered to leave the community. The fourth member
was allowed to remain in the location on condition that she stopped practising witchcraft. This
was because the court decided that she had only been an apprentice.

The following day a rumour was generated that members of the "Big Five" had boasted that
they would now really 'witch' the 'comrades' (members of the BYO) as they had been
allowed to live. Three days later, three members of the "Big Five" were sjambokked and then
burnt to death by terrified and furious youths. The youths went onto attack a further eight
people (seven women and one man.) These people were either sjambokked or there herbs
were burnt.

As a result of police intervention, and the invasion of Mapulaneng by a large contingent from the SADF in mid May 1986, the activities of the BYO came to an end.

Two of the members of the "Big Five" were involved in household conflicts with their daughter-in-law:

Mrs D`s husband started out as a teacher at a local school. However, he became an alcoholic and soon lost both his job and his memory. He then got a job at the nearby army base in Hoedspruit. It was well known that Mrs D ran the household. "Mrs D made a living zombie of her husband while she runs the family. The man is a women in the household. He works, but is not managing the money" [quote taken from a youth leader]. Mrs D`s eldest son was a migrant. However, he did not marry into the family that his mother had planned for him. Mrs D and her Daughter-in-law did not get on well. Mrs D would complain about her son`s wife. "The girl is eating my son`s money. He is giving her a lot of money and she does not contribute to the rest of the household" [quote taken from woman resource manager commenting on the conflict]. The son`s wife had a nervous breakdown. Her parents took her to a Sangoma who told them that Mrs D had been witching her (the daughter-in-law) as she wants her son to get divorced and marry another woman. After recuperating, the son`s wife returned to the household. "It was the daughter-in-law and her parents who used to argue very strongly that Mrs D was a witch", commented a civic leader.

Mrs M, another member of the "Big Five" had two daughters-in-law living within her household. The senior daughter-in-law (Mrs M`s oldest son`s wife) was kind hearted and often used to give her mother-in-law money when she required it. However, the junior daughter-in-law was "miserly" and would not give her any money. In return Mrs M totally disowned her junior daughter-in-law. If her junior daughter-in-law`s husband did not send her money one month, or sent the money late, Mrs M would not assist her from her pension money. Mrs M would not fulfil any social or ritual functions with her junior daughter-in-law and would ignore her grandchildren. It was the junior daughter-in-law who would blame every misfortune on her mother-in-law.

A further member of the "Big Five" was involved in indiscreet marital affairs:

Mrs L was married to a migrant. While he was away she would have many affairs. Yet still her husband sent her money every month and returned every year end despite the strong rumours about her infidelity. It was rumoured that she used herbs to keep him ignorant. When he died in 1980 it was said that she had given him an overdose.
of herbs. She lived with her divorced daughter who worked in Acornhoek and two grandchildren. Her daughter’s husband (a migrant) accused her of witchcraft when he divorced her. It was rumoured that the mother gave her daughter herbs which the daughter gave to her husband.

It was through the reputation of the leader of the “Big 5”, Mrs B, that most residents of the village were terrified of the gang. To understand the story of Mrs B, we need to introduce a link between the concept of the “family” and that of the “community”. The residents of Brooklyn were forcibly removed in the mid sixties from three surrounding areas: Cheetah Inn, Bedford and Maripieskop. The Pulanas practised "preferential marriage into the clan of one’s mother, or the clan of one’s mother’s mother, or the clan of one’s father’s mother". The effect of the above, according to Hammond-Tooke is to "reinforce neighbourhood and agnatic ties with affinal ones, so that members of a village or ward are bound together in multiplex relationships". Within ten years, marriage between families within a village produced a common ancestor. In effect, everyone living in Brooklyn could have been considered a relative to everyone else.

Mrs B had four sons (one of whom was dumb) who lived within her household. When her eldest son got married, two babies died at a young age. A Ngaka was consulted and the blame was put on the Mother-in-law, Mrs B. The eldest son (a migrant), moved his wife to another house. The second son got married and a baby died. Again a Ngaka was consulted, and again the blame was put on Mrs B. Mrs B’s daughter-in-law divorced Mrs B’s son. Eventually, the son left the household and lived with another woman. Mrs B was left living with the dumb son, a female grandchild and a great grandchild. In 1981 the second son died and a rumour was generated that as there were no more grandchildren for Mrs B’s medium to eat, it is now eating her son. The following year, Mrs B’s senior son died. From then on, other members of the family were afraid that Mrs B was going to turn her medium on them until the entire family was "finished". Almost every death that occurred was shown to be a relative of Mrs B, and she was blamed. By 1986, the entire settlement was terrified that they would be her next victim.

Meanwhile, at the daily meeting points, in the fields, water taps, scenes of tragedies and
funerals a “propaganda machine” is at work:

"A combination of the sharpest observation of the daily recounting of the day’s events and encounters, and of life-long mutual familiarities is what constitutes so-called village gossip... Each story allows everyone to define himself. The function of these stories, which are, in fact, close, oral, daily history, is to allow the whole village to define itself. The life of a village, as distinct from its physical and geographical attributes, is the sum of all the social and personal relationships existing within it, plus the social and economic relations - usually oppressive - which link the village to the rest of the world... What distinguishes the life of a village is that it is also a living portrait of itself: a communal portrait, in that everybody is portrayed and everybody portrays; and this is only possible if everybody knows everybody."¹⁰⁸

Conflicts and frustrations suffered by migrant’s wives and young men’s mothers were shared amongst themselves and thoroughly discussed. A private conflict, when shared, became a common experience and threat to the survival of all. If the alleged persecutor in the conflict was socially aloof, and in time, no-one took the trouble to contradict the accusation, a rumour became a reality as it is repeated and garnished. As public tragedies occur, people looked for past villains in order to allocate responsibility. A selfish pensioner or uncooperative neighbour becomes a witch.

The “Big Five” also contributed to the construction of their reputation as witches. Members of the "Big Five" lived in close proximity to one another. While they maintained a central role within household conflicts, their position in broader village life was marginal. It was the daughter-in-law’s task to fetch water, wash clothes, plough the fields (if the family had fields), collect wood, prepare mud for plastering and painting houses and numerous other day-to-day activities that lead to contact with other people. To this must be added a solidarity forged amongst the younger generation of women as a result of common childhood and initiation experiences. Within this context it is not surprising to discover that it was said that the members of the "Big Five" were:
"close friends, close neighbours and they shared the same rumour; the rumour being that they were witches. It [the rumour] was a treasure to them, a treasure they could not live without, especially Mrs L. If she was insulted she would respond as follows: 'If you are not cultured, I will teach you some discipline. Maybe you have not heard of me. I am Mrs L. Go around and ask. They will tell you who I am. Then you will keep your mouth shut.' That lady was proud."

The members of the "Big Five" used their status as witches to achieve some respect from the rest of the "community". They used threats of witchcraft to maintain some power both within and outside of the household. In time, a meaning independent of any individual conflict was constructed. The close association between members of the group, and the existence of a mythology of "families of witches", ensured that an accusation against any individual member was shared by all.

This association was formalised in a song the youth sung as they patrolled the location at night:

Where will we run to  
because of these witches who are killing us.  
Mrs L and her gang.  
Mrs L, we are going to burn her.

Meanwhile, in the fields, at the watering taps, funerals, in the households, on the soccer fields and under the trees a metaphor is created and a consensus is reached. A metaphor that links witches, herbs, neighbourly conflicts, domineering wives, uncooperative parents, selfish grandparents and unemployed migrants. And a consensus that binds the metaphor to a relatively small group of marginal people. (Usually people with little access to the 'propaganda machine'.) It was this metaphor and consensus that the BYO inherited when it was formed. And, it is from this metaphor that the political significance of the anti-witchcraft movement can be understood.
An attack on a witch is a punishment for all the crimes the witch is supposed to have committed. Like all public punishment, it places a label on the accused and stands as an example for the rest of society to see and from which to learn. The witch attacks were a warning of a potential punishment to all those people involved in relationships that the youth define as anti-social. The youth had taken power and their way of showing it was by displaying, in the strongest and most public terms, that domineering wives, uncooperative neighbours, tight-fisted pensioners and a multitude of other relationships would no longer be tolerated. Adultery while not punishable under everyday law, become capital offence under the logic of witchcraft. Single women would have to think twice about establishing a shebeen. It was, in effect, an enormously powerful political intervention that redefined the core of gender and generational relationships within and between households.

Youth organisations also targeted abortionists. Like poisoners, abortionists were linked with witchcraft and the image of witches, but had a specific meaning. The following section investigates the meanings around the anti-abortion slogan.

**Abortions and Prostitution: Putting a Woman in her Place**

Informers, we will destroy you. Haai! Haai!
Witches, we will burn you. Haai! Haai!
Those who commit abortions, you will be destroyed. Haai! Haai!
Mrs Botha is barren - she gives birth to rats. Haai! Haai!
Mrs Mandela is fertile - she gives birth to comrades. Haai!
Haai! Haai! Haai! Haai! [x3]
Trample comrades. Haai! Haai! Haai! [x3]
Trample an informer. Haai! Haai!
Trample people’s enemies. Haai! Haai!
Killer comrades. Haai! Haai!
Kill our people’s enemies. Haai! Haai!
Let our people know comrades. Haai! Haai!
Our Motto is: An injury to one is an injury to all.

The above section discussed the changing status of women within households. The confinement of women to the household served two purposes: it was the site of extracting women’s labour and, it controlled women’s potentially rampant sexuality. Witches are alleged to cause harm and are stigmatised on that basis. Women who did not conform to their cultural role were stigmatised as prostitutes.109 The term prostitute fused two related metaphors defining women in relation to society. The metaphor of woman as “cultural” or “sexual” fused with the metaphor of society harnessing women’s sexuality in the household or reverting to a pre-social chaos. Prostitution represented unsocialised women at their worst: Prostitutes were women who had reverted to their sexual beings; women who had left the “culture” / male dominated household for unmediated access to men. Prostitutes were women who had diffused the sites of production and reproduction in order to fulfil their promiscuous desires. In short, women who were prostitutes signified a regression to an era prior to socialised humanity.

Despite the obvious contradictions in its use, the label of prostitute was not applied ironically. Any attempt by women to break out of the definition of women as essentially “reproducers of children” had the label “prostitute” thrown back at them. Women, deserted by their husbands and neglected by their in-laws, who went to the cities were labelled prostitutes.110 Women who wanted education beyond an unspoken social norm were refused access to schooling on the grounds that they would become prostitutes.111 Women who were too assertive, who challenged their husbands or other men, were prostitutes as instead of being confined and controlled in the household, they dominated their husbands in order to “roam
free* In a nutshell, women either conformed to the "cultural" processes defining their relationship with men or they were prostitutes. And as a semi-socialised being a "prostitute" was stigmatised, isolated and treated with disrespect.

The "sexual economy" or new form of "prostitution" marked the moment when parents both lost control of their daughter's sexuality and were consequently economically marginalised. Fathers who used to value their daughters in livestock were left entirely out of the transaction. Young women "sold themselves" for cash to be used at their own discretion. The link between reproduction and the establishment of the household was broken. Social order was being replaced with chaos.

If the "sexual economy" was a sign of social decay, the spectre of women successfully establishing their own households represented, from the point of view of male domination, complete social disintegration. Economic independence gave women living in their own households greater control over their bodies. In a society where contraception was stigmatised as a source of promiscuity, economically independent women were able to receive contraception from a clinic or hospital without having to fear the response of a husband or father. Excluded from schools and the broader economy, women were at their most dependent when pregnant. Hence, economic independence allowed control over reproductive processes which allowed further economic independence. But a woman outside of the control of a male was a prostitute. Through the prism of woman as sexual being, women formed their own households to have greater, not lesser, access to men. In an analogous paradox to the application of "prostitute" to women who wanted to further their education, the metaphor of "prostitute" was applied vigorously to female-headed households which legitimised the
victimisation of these women.113

Young unemployed men and male students were antagonised by the situation for their own reasons. Without access to income, they could not compete with employed men for women (including many of their class-mates) on the sexual economy. Furthermore, school students saw their mother's frustration as their fathers spent the household's income on alcohol and "prostitutes". With the recession, the chances of these men getting jobs and having access to women seemed increasingly remote. And women, instead of bringing up children in the household, were taking many of those few available local jobs.

Members of the youth organisation were initiated, and the institution of male initiation marked the moment when female sexuality was harnessed for "social" ends.114 In this sense, age regiments were the guardians of public morality. Although the label prostitute isolated and reduced its referent to a sexual (as opposed to social) being, prostitution (which involved male complicity) was not a punishable crime. However, given the definition of women as essentially a sexual being, a link could be constructed between prostitution and abortion. A women had abortions "in order to have uninterrupted access to men",115 that is, in order to be a prostitute.

If prostitution was morally loaded, then abortions were doubly so. Prostitution represented an uncultured women, but a woman nonetheless. A witch, on the other hand, was a dangerous being in the guise of a social being. Abortions linked the notion of "prostitution" with witchcraft and climatic upheaval. No distinction was drawn between a miscarriage and an abortion. A miscarriage was caused; a "child" had been "killed" through witchcraft for
some selfish motive. The image of a woman who did not produce children, that is, a woman who was not a woman, had long been associated with witchcraft in song.¹¹⁶ Such women "killed" out of jealousy or unmitigated evil. More than that, a womb represented the forces of nature: unless the "community" underwent ritual purification, an incomplete "union of bloods" thirstily drank the moisture in the air, causing drought.

In threatening to punish abortionists, the youth were reasserting the definition of women as bearers of children. For this goal they had elderly support and could be seen as the guardians of morality. However, to youth organisation, any action that could be rationalised as contributing to the abolition of Apartheid was moral and deserved the sanction of youth organisation. And, these women were not just bearers of children, but like "Mrs Mandela" they were bearers of comrades. Running in tandem with the anti-abortion stance, was the implementation of Operation Production. The logic of Operation Production was simple: Cadres / comrades were dying in the "struggle" so it was each women's national duty, regardless of her status, to bear a child. As the "guardians of the nation", it was the duty of the youth to ensure that this national prerogative, the harnessing of women's reproductive capacity, was carried out with military precision.

At this point the youth and the elder generation came into conflict. The elder generation was interested in making women "cultured", that is, transferring the ownership of a woman from her father's family to her husband's family, and in doing so, harnessing women's labour and reproductive powers in the household. Sexual access to women was legitimate in so far as it was part of this processes of socialising women. The youth, on the other hand, were interested in making women pregnant. They reduced social woman to biological woman.
There's was an assertion of male power, but without elderly controls.

Conclusion

Although the witch hunt might have been initially cathartic, its long term effect was more ambiguous. The anti-witchcraft movement was an implicit threat and it produced fear and anxiety. It was the imposition of a new discipline in each and every household in the context of a society riddled with potential points of conflict. And as youth organisation did not employ formal procedures to establish who was guilty of witchcraft, it was this generalised threat that formed the basis of youth organisation's legitimacy crisis. The youth's proclivity to force young school girls to attend their meetings (in the name of Operation Production) contributed to this crisis as mothers and absent migrant fathers, who were concerned to see their daughter complete their schooling, were increasingly antagonised.

With the release of the chair of the Setlare Crisis Committee, the Brooklyn Youth Organisation became the Brooklyn Youth Congress and reorganised itself with increased vigour. Campaigns targeting the Tribal Authority and school principals were launched. However, the activities of the organisation, particularly in the schools, further alienated significant elements of the parent population, as well as many school students. The simmering conflict culminated in the formation of a "vigilante" organisation. The following chapter investigates this process.


For examples of the instrumentalist approach see Marwick, M. Sorcery in its Social Setting, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1965; Marwick, M. "Witchcraft as a Social Strain Guage" in Marwick, M. Witchcraft and Sorcery...; Mitchell, J.C., The Yao Village, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1956; Steadman, L. "The Killing of Witches", Oceania, 1985. Two examples of this approach that have been applied to European Witch hunts are Harris, M. Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture, New York, Random House, 1974; and Ehrenreich B., and English, D., For Her Own Good, Pluto Press, London, 1979.


7. Interview Ella Khumalo, Violet Bank, 1/9/90.
8. Interview Phinsa Malatjie, Violet Bank, 1/9/90.
11. See Mbiti, J., _African Religions...,_ p208.
12. This argument has resonances with the argument put forward by Taussig, M.T., _The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America_, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1988. Taussig argues that the extension of capitalist relations was perceived by South American peasants as a destructive and immoral process. Hence, the accumulation of wealth, which went along with the destruction of culture and community was equated with a pact with the devil.
13. Quote from Interview J Mashile, Acornhoek, 9/7/93.
15. See Interviews Florence Mgiba, Cottondale, 12/7/92 and R Mkhabela, 11/7/92, Cottondale. Both respondents had lived in predominantly Pulana settlements and "Shangaan" settlements and were asked to compare witchcraft accusations in the two settlements.
16. Interview E Mashego, Shatale, 21/7/92.
17. A Pulana father informed his prospective (Shangaan) son-in-law: "When my daughter falls ill, don't just take her to a hospital, you must always find out the cause." See Interview, F Mgiba, Cottondale, 12/7/92. See Also Monnig, H.O., _The Pedi...,_ p94.
21. Statement M Mashile to M Bham, 12/5/87; and Niehaus "Witch Hunting and..." p10.
22. Some chiefs continued to respond to witchcraft accusations when a mob approached them to do so. See Interview Mrs Mashile, Buffelshoek, 21/11/91 and Mogakane, S., Shatale, 08/09/1990. It would appear, however, that accusations between neighbours were ignored.
by the court.

23. For example, see Interview R.M. (youth leader), Brooklyn, 15/12/1986.

24. Niehaus reports that of nine people he interviewed who believed they were bewitched between 1957 and 1986, only one person made a formal public allegation. See Niehaus "Witch-hunting and Political Legitimacy..." p14.


27. Rowlands, M. and Warnier, J. "Sorcery Power and the Modern State in Cameroon" Man no 23, 1988, argue that as success is perceived to be a result of occult powers, when villagers experience misfortune successful people are likely targets for witchcraft accusations, unless these people are seen to redistribute part of his/her wealth.

28. See in particular, interview with Emon Mashego, Shatale, 21/7/92.

29. This is based on numerous discussions with Ngobe.


32. Interview G Chiloane, Green Valley, 26/7/93.

33. See Pitje G M, "Traditional Systems...", for a detailed discussion of the socialisation of boys and the meanings and practices associated with initiation school.

34. Pitje G.M, Traditional Systems..., p119.

35. See Pitje, G., Traditional Systems..., Monnig, H.O. The Pedi pg 107-129.

36. Interview K Shokane and E Mohlala, Green Valley, 16/7/93; Interview S Mashego, Green Valley, 16/7/93; See also Delius P, The Land Belongs..., p76 and Monnig, The Pedi..., p121.

37. According to Comaroff and Comaroff (1991), Of Revelation and Revolution unmarried men were considered "incompletely socialised beings - in Setswana, Makgope... synonym for "large yellow locusts," the rapacious parasites that laid waste the productive efforts of others as they ate", Pg135.

38. In the Swazi, Zulu and Shangaan chiefdoms age regiments were formed without initiation, leaving it to the discretion of the King as to when an age regiment had the right to marry. This prolonged the period when the King had access to age regiments for labour and military purposes. See Bonner, P., Kings, Commoners and Concessionaries: The Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth Century Swazi State, Raven Press,
Johannesburg, 1983.


42. Proverb from Interview with K Shokane, Johannesburg, 29/05/1993. The meaning of the proverb is not fixed to the context of migrancy. It refers more generally to the idea that a man should explore beyond the confines of his household. However, the proverb was commonly employed to insult men who were reluctant to migrate.


47. For a more detailed and comparable exposition of the migrant experience both in the countryside and city during this period see Delius, P., "Sebatakorgomo; Migrant Organisation, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1989.


51. Interview Mogakane, L., Pretoria, 22/7/93. Thethe, T., Johannesburg, 17/07/1993; Shokane, K., Green Valley, 20/07/1993. This theme will be investigated in greater detail in Chapter Eight.


53. In a survey conducted in 1993 under the leadership of John Sender, initial results indicate that 80% of the women surveyed did not receive a monthly remittance from the father of any of their children.


56. See Marks M, Organisation, Identity and Violence Amongst Activist Diepkoof Youth 1984 - 1993, Unpublished Masters Dissertation, Wits University, 1993, Chapter seven section F, for a discussion of how an urban youth organisation affiliated to the Congress alliance, identified themselves as the guardians of morality and went about imposing that morality.


59. Interview Emon Mashego, Shatale, 21/7/92.


61. I visited five families whose close relatives were victims of the anti-witchcraft movement. All five families interpreted the attacks as resulting from private conflicts. Circumstances prevented me from interviewing three of the families. The other two interviews were Florence Mgiba, Cotondale, 12/7/1992 and Mashile, E., Shatale, 19/11/1987. For the Crisis Committee's perspective see Interview, Mashego, E., Shatale, 21/7/92.


64. The proverb: "Women are baboons: We eat her hands" captures the status of (good) women as workers, rather than intellectuals or desirable sexual objects. This proverb was hammered home in initiation school and is also taught in state schools as part of the northern Sotho syllabus. See interview Thethe, T., Johannesburg, 17/07/1993.
65. *Fisa* literally means heat or hot. A hot person or object is able to contaminate another object on contact. A person becomes hot at the boundaries of the living and the dead, and the social and the natural. For example, a corpse is hot. A pregnant woman is hot for all men except for the original source of the sperm, as the sperm (or foetus) is considered hot.


68. See Malan, J.S., "Die Patron, Tempo en Rigting van Swart Verstedeliking: 'n Gevallestudie Onder die Mathibela-Stam van die Mapulaneng-Distrik in Lebowa", Unpublished Paper, University of the North, 1985 for a survey of different household structures in the Mathibela Tribal Authority in Mapulaneng.

69. "Custom" according to Hobsbawn and Ranger, "does not preclude innovation and change up to a point, though evidently the requirement that it must appear compatible or even identical with precedent imposes limitations on it. What it does is to give any desired change (or resistance to innovation) the sanction of precedent, social continuity and natural law as expressed in history." Hobsbawn, E., and Ranger, T., *Inventing Traditions*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983 p2.


72. See in particular, Interview Market Mashile, Buffelshoek, 08/07/92; Also interview, Mashile, T., Buffelshoek, 21/11/91.

73. See also Monnig, *The Pedi*, p216, for an analogous description of the autonomy gained by a migrant's wife associated with an independent household in Sekhukhuneland.

74. Interview O Mahlakoane, Buffelshoek, 5/7/92.

75. See also James D.A. "Kinship and Land in an Inter-Ethnic Rural Community", Unpublished Masters Thesis, Wits University, 1987, Chapter Four for a discussion on changing inheritance patterns in Morotse, a village in South Eastern Lebowa.

76. See Interview B Mashile, Buffelshoek, 21/11/91; E Manzini, Buffelshoek, 6/7/92.


78. Interview K Shokane and E Mohlala, Green Valley, 16/7/93.
79. Interview P.C Baloyi, Thulamahashe, 9/7/92. Baloyi wrote a paper for me entitled "Women and Education in the Early Days" which provides a brief history of women's school attendance.

80. Interview P.C Baloyi (Former principal of Majembeni Primary School), Thulamahashe, 9/7/92. Also Interview K Masia, Thulamahashe, 8/7/92.

81. Between 1972 and 1984, the gender ratio of secondary school attendance in Lebowa changed from 42.9% to 52.1% females. In 1972, the composition of the Standard eight class was 43.1% female while the matric class was 28.8%. This points to the high relative drop out rate of females after Standard eight. By 1984, 53.5% of Standard eights were female, while 49.1% of the matric class were female. See Carstens, P.D., Du Plessis, A. and Du Plessis, M., Statistical Review of Education in Lebowa 1979 - 1985, Research Institute for education Planning, University of the Orange Free State, 1985.


84. See Stadler, "Domestic Authority..." p19; In an interview with Market Mashile, Buffelshoek, 8/7/92, Mashile provides a description of the "Modern Way" and relates the development of the ideology to "working for money".

85. For example, see Interview Mkhabela, R., Cottondale, 10/06/1991.

86. Kotze provides a breakdown of the costs of schooling in Mhala in 1985. Breaking school costs down into stationary, school fees, examination fees and the costs of uniforms, Kotze gives the following costs of the different levels of formal schooling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Cost</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub A</td>
<td>R36,80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 3</td>
<td>R45,40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 6</td>
<td>R74,00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Std 8</td>
<td>R116,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 10</td>
<td>R154,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


88. The average salary of female shop assistants (educated and uneducated), based on a survey of 34 shop assistants conducted by J Sender and A Feinstein in Mapulaneng in 1991 was R170 per month. Farm labour salaries for seasonal labour were in the region of R120 a month.

90. Ibid.


92. Interview Mashile, T., Buffelshoek, 21/11/91; Mgiba, F., Cottdale, 12/7/92; Mashaba, E., Buffelshoek, 23/11/91; Mogakane, S., Craigsburn, 18/11/1987.

93. Quoted in Stadler (unpublished paper), "Age, Space and Household in Mhlaleni, Gazankulu", p7. Another informant commented that household relations "depend on the relationships between people in the homestead. If they like one another, they share, if they don't, they do not."

94. Interview Modipane, (Mrs), Brooklyn, 09/07/1987.

95. Interview T, Mashile, Buffelshoek, 21/11/91.

96. For a detailed discussion of how migrancy changed gender roles in the household see Murray, C., Families Divided, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981, Chapter seven.


100. Interview, Tandios Mashile, Buffelshoek, 03/06/1991.

101. Quote taken in 1987 from a (male) civic leader based in Brooklyn. See also interview, J Mashile, Acornhoek, 9/7/93.

102. One of the most remarkable support networks that I uncovered was led by a clinic supervisor and entrepreneur extraordinary, Rebecca Mkhabela. Every employee at the clinic, from the professional staff to the cleaners, had left their husbands after experiencing considerable abuse. The clinic supervisor formed agricultural groups and, more recently, a creche. When a rapist was on the loose, Rebecca gave self-defence workshops on
"disarming" the rapist. When the rapist attacked one of her students, her training proved effective.

103. Interview Shiela M, Cottdonde, 8/7/92. See also Interviews G.M., Cottdonde, 8/7/92; and N Mgiba and R Mgiba, Buffelshoek, 8/7/92.

104. Interview N.M. (Youth Leader), Brooklyn, 8/7/87, Mashile, K. (Youth leader), Buffelshoek, 8/7/92. and Niehaus I, "Witchhunting and Political Legitimacy....", pg 26 for a list of witchcraft accusations where shebeeners were accused of poisoning.

105. Interview Modipane, (Mrs), Brooklyn, 09/07/1987. See also interview B.L., Craigsburn, 7/12/87.


109. Interview, Thethe, T., Johannesburg, 17/07/1993; Interview S Thabane, Buffelshoek, 23/7/93; K Shokane, Green Valley, 3/8/93; Mashile, K., Buffelshoek, 8/7/92; Masia, K., Thulamahashe, 8/7/92.

110. Interview Thethe, T., Johannesburg, 17/7/93; and CAD NTS 32/318 V6814, Minutes of Meeting between chiefs and headmen, Cunningmoore, 12/11/1937.

111. Interview Masia, K., Thulamahashe, 8/7/92; See also Stadler, J., "Domestic Authority...", p5.

112. Interview Shokane, K., Green Valley, 3/8/93.

113. This included relatively wealthy and well educated women who had established their own household. For example, despite the fact that the chief and his father, principles and other "dignitories" sought the advice of a female clinic supervisor who had established her own household during the day, at night she suffered constant harrassment from a youth gang.

114. See Commaroff, J., and Commaroff, J., Of Revelation...., pg130-140.

115. Interview Thabane, S., Buffelshoek, 23/7/93.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Preserving Peace and Civilization: The Sofasonke Civic Union

In late November 1989, the Sofasonke Civic Union was formed at a public meeting in Brooklyn. The executive portfolios of the organisation were held by principals of High Schools in Boelang and Buffelshoek. Other prominent members included the Chair of the Sethlare Tribal Authority (who was a businessman) and a Nazerine Priest. The following day, under the banner of Sofasonke, eight hundred people, most of whom were women, with tacit police support, burnt six houses owned by parents of leaders of the Brooklyn Youth Congress. Sofasonke then organised groups to patrol the location at night, with the aim of ensuring that no youths were on the streets. The organisation spread to surrounding villages including Rooiboklaagte, Green Valley and Buffelshoek. On the 25 December the houses of five more youth leaders were destroyed in Brooklyn and Green Valley. Two days later, the homes of Sekgopela Mashile and a Buffelshoek youth leader were burnt. The following day, a Green Valley youth leader was killed. Early in 1990, Sekgopela Mashile approached Frank Chikane, the General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches to intervene in the conflict. By the end of January, Chikane had successfully mediated a peace agreement between the Bushbuckridge Youth Congress and the Sofasonke. Despite the agreement, tensions continued to surface in Brooklyn, which culminated in the murder of the chair of Sofasonke. This was followed by three assassination attempts of Matsiketsane Mashile’s life.
This Chapter demonstrates the processes that gave rise to the Sofasonke. It shows how initiated and literate youths, attempted to redefine the moral economy of Brooklyn village around the rhetoric of national liberation, and in the process, redefine chiefly, generational and gender relations at both a political and ritual level. There were two major components to the moral economy imposed by youth organisation. Firstly, morality depended on the ability to rationalise an action as contributing to the war against Apartheid. Secondly, as the youth "understood" Apartheid, they allocated themselves the authority to police the morals of the "community". This meant that youth organisation had the "duty" to ensure (by force if necessary) that those residents who did not understand the struggle, participated in campaigns called by the youth. This logic clashed head on with that of generational authority. Parents responded to the rule of youth organisation by forming the Sofasonke. The chapter also examines the social base of Sofasonke's various leaders and shows how the activities of the youth organisation were threatening these positions. The Brooklyn branch of Sofasonke was lead by school principals whose main agenda in becoming involved in the organisation was to discipline the youth and reinstate generational and school-based authority. In contrast, in Buffelshoek, the organisation was lead by members of the Molotele Royal Family, who were concerned to use the organisation to both discipline the youth and to attack the Mashile brothers. The role of the Lebowa Government in the violence will also be probed.

Development Projects and the Splitting of the Crisis Committee

All the executive members of the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee, along with the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and Treasurer of the Sethlare Crisis Committee, and the two Mashile brothers were detained in mid 1986 and charged with terrorism. A year later, they were tried,
acquitted and released, just as the state of emergency was renewed. Following their release, the Crisis Committee, eager to find ways of legally challenging the bureaucracy, assisted in the establishment of a legal advice office. Although the Centre was banned after three months on a legal technicality, it continued to operate defiantly for a few months from Matsiketsane Mashile's house. The chiefs saw the Advice Office as part of Matsiketsane's attempt to rebuild his chieftainship, and in the process, challenge their authority. A former member of the Molotele Development Committee recalls:

That was a sensitive issue where chiefs tried to unite. They used to say: "Now he is a chief. Are you aware Matsiketsane is running a court in his house. This man [Matsiketsane] is challenging the decisions of our councillors, landing us in many problems...." It became the main point of friction between the chiefs and the Mashiles. People are no more reporting cases to tribal office but are going to Matsiketsane's house. The government was also sensitive re pensions and Unemployment Insurance Fund.¹

After the banning of the advice centre, the MCC executive members continued to research (cautiously) areas where they could facilitate the establishment of parent (as opposed to youth) organisations. A Zion Christian Church priest and businessman, Mr Nonyane, solicited advice from the Mashile brothers regarding water supply problems on behalf of a village in Craigsburn. The Mashiles, who had already unsuccessfully requested the Department of Works in Lebowa for assistance in the matter, approached the Crisis Committee. The Committee, in turn sought the help of the Rural Advice Centre, a service organisation based in Johannesburg, who specialised in development projects around water supply. The Rural Advice Centre's "community based" approach to water supply problems involved offering both technical advice and management training to "communities" to ensure that the "community" would be able to sustain the project.²

The Mashiles convened a "parliamentary report-back meeting" at Craigsburn where, after
informing the assembly that the Lebowa Government had failed to respond to their requests for improved infrastructure, they introduced the Crisis Committee as a structure capable of solving the water problem. The Committee called for elections of a water-committee. The elections proved to be highly contentious: An unemployed youth vigorously argued for Nonyane's exclusion from the Water Committee. Nonyane, he asserted, was a busy man; he owned a taxi and a shop, he was a priest, and he was chair of the Lekete High School committee. The youth's speech was given a rousing reception by his peers. Nevertheless, a middle aged women stood up and calmly asserted that the Committee "needed" Nonyane, who was trusted, and in whose absence "things would not be straight". Nonyane was elected as chair of the Committee.

Nonyane used his position to ensure that the water supply project, as the Rural Advice Centre had conceived it, was a non event. The Advice Centre arrived for meetings or workshops with the Committee to discover that Nonyane was the only member present. Nonyane gave different report backs to the Advice Centre, the Mashiles and the Crisis Committee. There was nevertheless a logic to Nonyane's actions: either the Rural Advice Centre was going to work through him, and him alone, that is, he was to have personal control over the process of providing water, or there would be no water supply project. Ultimately, there was no water-supply project in Craigsburn.

Like Craigsburn, Brooklyn's water supply was inadequate. Women residents collected water from several shallow holes in the ground, a process which was tedious and unhygienic. To add insult to injury, the Tribal Authority had (illegally) been charging "water taxes" of ten rand a year, for approximately ten years, ostensibly to improve the supply. The water supply
remained unchanged in this period and the taxes went unaccounted for.

Underlying tensions between the MCC and Jacques Modipane, the Chair of the SCC, surfaced over the organisation of a water project in Brooklyn. Modipane, as chair of the SCC, fell under the constitutional authority of the mother body, namely the MCC. As a means of asserting his independence from his Shatale counterparts, Modipane contacted the Northern Transvaal People's Congress (NTPC), an organisation, which, despite its grandiose name, had a negligible membership and presence in Bushbuckridge. But the NTPC was created by the United Democratic Front specifically to mobilize people in the rural areas. Rather than speak from his position as chair of the SCC, through his contact with the NTPC, Modipane began to speak with the powerful and nebulous authority of the "Congress".

Like Nonyane, Modipane set about ensuring that the Rural Advice Centre's approach to water supply had no future Brooklyn. Unlike Nonyane, Modipane employed rhetoric associated with the national liberation struggle to achieve his goals. Initially, Modipane informed the Rural Advice Centre that they were not welcome in Brooklyn as they proposed to get permission from the Lebowa Government to work in Brooklyn, and, as such, were collaborators. Those who were not pure, that is, people with any association with the system, could not be trusted in the "struggle". Then, the Advice Centre were told that their policy of providing boreholes was obscuring the real issue, which was the state's responsibility to provide taps. The Rural Advice Centre withdrew from the project.

Over the following months, the differences between the MCC's post detention approach to political organisation and that of Modipane became stark: Whereas the Crisis Committee did
not claim to have privileged knowledge of residents' interests, and consequently, saw their role as creating the conditions under which residents could control processes affecting their lives, Modipane assumed that he, (and the youth), had privileged access to residents' interests, and consequently, could make and enforce decisions on behalf of the "community". Whereas the Crisis Committee emphasised the need to set up organisations under parental control, Modipane emphasised the need to mobilize the "community" against the state, with the youth, who "understood the struggle", at the vanguard of the process. And, in Brooklyn, the dominance of youth organisation translated into the dominance of Modipane.

**The Rise of the Brooklyn Youth Congress**

Modipane, with the assistance of a revitalised Brooklyn Youth Congress, set about mobilizing the "community" around the water supply. In contrast to the MCC's policy of building organisation through water supply projects, the Brooklyn Youth Congress started a protest campaign directed firstly at the most proximate form of local government, namely the Sethlare Tribal Authority, and secondly at the Lebowa Government in general.

The Sethlare Tribal Authority, lead by chief German Chiloane who was a chronic alcoholic, was particularly ineffectual. In 1984, Bonus Chiloane, German's brother, and Chair of the Tribal Authority, staged a palace coup by installing himself as chief during one of his brother's prolonged drinking bouts. Bonus immediately extended the residential areas and accepted up to ten payments for the same residential site. When his activities were discovered by the Magistrate, Bonus fled to Johannesburg and (an almost sober) German was reinstated. Matsiketsane Mashile, who was involved in a secession dispute for the Sethlare chieftainship, was a further source of alternative political authority to the recognised chief.³
Symptomatic of the progressive decline of the chieftainship under German Chiloane was the reorganisation of a number of rituals, previously controlled by the chieftainship, around the household and church. The planting and harvesting ceremonies began to be held in each household. As the chieftainship was impotent to act around the issue of witchcraft, residents turned to Zionist and Apostolic churches to secure protection from witchcraft.4

The Sethlare Tribal Authority was also unable to forge a secure alliance with other sources of authority, such as successful businessmen, in its area of jurisdiction. The two biggest businessmen in Sethlare were both priests in independent churches, through which they had secured a stable following. Neither had any position or formal links with the Authority. Aplos Chiloane, the Chair of the Authority, and owner of a small cafe at Boelang, was the only businessman in the Authority. However, Chiloane was married to the Authority to the extent that, given the small consumer base around his shop, the viability of his business depended on his ability to control the granting of licences and the bribes he received in exchange for administrative favours.

The Youth Congress organised marches to the Tribal Authority offices and a boycott of Tribal Authority taxes. Initially, the protests found much popular support, as residents welcomed the chance to air their grievances. However, problems surfaced in the youth's understanding of their position as "guardians of the nation". As parents had access to the truth of the agnatic social order, generational authority was enforced through the elderly rights to thrash any youth, without having to justify their actions. Now that the youth believed they were the legitimate vanguard of the struggle, and that any action that contributed to the war against the "system" was moral, the sjambok changed hands: Sjambok wielding youths went from house
to house in the early hours of the morning forcing parents and elderly people to attend the protests. Some youths filled waterholes with sand under the assumption that, when thirsty, residents would be more inclined to protest against inadequacies in the water supply.5

The Youth Congress became guardians over the village at night. Youths patrolled the village, singing a mixture of national freedom songs, and songs aimed at local targets (particularly alleged witches), all of which, contributed to an atmosphere of fear and anxiety amongst elderly people. A elderly resident commented:

"I'm very scared of those who go around singing at night. We always feel threatened by the Comrades. Years ago members of our family could sleep outside when it was hot. Now we can't."6

The Congress held its meetings at night in the bush. Youths were forced to attend the meetings under the logic of, "if you are not with us, you are against us". Female school students were ordered to attend the night meetings, where many were impregnated (under the auspices of Operation Production).7 Youths of both sexes returned exhausted from the meetings, unable to concentrate at school the following day. Those parents who were trying to ensure that their daughters completed their education, so as to have a high bridesprice or a high income earner in the household, were becoming progressively alienated from the youth congress. A retired migrant compares the situation in 1989 with that of his youth:

Today everybody does what he thinks is right, which is wrong. Before no girl got pregnant before marriage. If she got pregnant she was married to an old man as second wife or someone whose wife is dead. Today a twelve or fifteen year old gets pregnant. There is no control, they do what they want. Children are starving, there is no-one to support them.8

The message was hammered home to parents: The Youth Congress, rather than parents, had
control over the movement, activities, sexuality and disciplining of children of both sexes.

The Congress took control over the political and spiritual lives of the "nation". In a context where generational authority was intrinsically linked to ancestral authority, the youth congress continued to assert its status as the guardians of the spiritual integrity of the "nation". Although the youth did not attack any alleged witches during this period, songs and speeches ensured that the threat of such attacks was ever-present. The following speech was made by Modipane after a funeral:

If five people die every week, more than 20 will die in a month. If things go on like this we'll all die. You yourself may be the next... The priests should pray to God to stop these deaths. If these deaths are man-made the ministers should pray that the witches must stop... The witches think they are safe because I told my Comrades to stop burning them. If you don't pack your bags and leave I'll be unable to restrain my Comrades.9

Witchcraft accusations, however, continued to flourish, particularly within and between households. Moreover, youths labelled elderly people, who questioned the legitimacy of the youth movement, as witches. Residents began to realise that the only thing worse than having a Tribal Authority unable to set in motion "traditional" legal procedures for the investigation of witchcraft accusations, was a Youth Congress that disregarded those procedures and still attacked witches; a witchcraft accusation from people with privileged access to youth leaders, (especially the parents of youth leaders), was a threat that could be violently acted upon at any time.

As the church propagated a moral economy based on the bible, the institution stood as a potential threat to the authority of the youth. Priests, as sources of spiritual authority, were representatives of more than just a church. Like ancestral beliefs, the christian bible legitimized generational authority. As a resource that parents turned to discipline their
children, certain priests were seen by the youth as bastions of conservatism. Youths questioned the integrity of church congregations by interrupting church services, on the basis that witches were present in the congregation, and ordered the alleged witches to confess and leave the building.

The foremost response of youth organisations to the authority of the church was to propagate the message that Nelson Mandela, rather than God or Christ, would "show people the way to freedom". Night vigils and funerals became compulsory events; those people not seen at a night vigil were summoned with a sjambok or stigmatised as being happy about the death (ie not belonging to the "community"). The serving of meat was abolished from night vigils as it "encouraged witchcraft". Night vigils and funerals became forums where residents could, indeed had to, prove their solidarity with the deceased's family, with the "community", and, of course, with the struggle. To subsume these events within the framework of the struggle, the youth further marginalised priests in the process of subsuming funerals and night vigils under the moral economy of the liberation struggle. Instead of the Priest leading the night vigil in prayer, the youth guided the mourners through an assortment of "freedom songs". A funeral was described as follows:

At my cousins night vigil, the Minister was preaching this side, they were toy-toying [dancing] that side. The youth want to transport the coffin physically, the family had paid for a car... At the graveside there was a kind of pandemonium. One side, mourners were singing religious songs, on the other side they were shouting slogans and toy-toying.

Initiation as a test of manhood was an important (although not an absolutely necessary) qualification for people to become a soldier in the "war" against Apartheid:

There you become a man. When you are from ngoma you won't reveal any secrets when the police capture and torture you because you have already experienced
Within the context of the chiefdom, however, the youth's claim to a political voice was based on their status as initiates, that is men. Elderly people questioned the status of initiates as men (and consequently warriors) with the contention that "the youth of today have not passed the test that we passed and, as such are not real men". Initiation, the elders argued, used to be a six month test of strength and endurance when it was controlled by the chieftainship; a boy when initiated was fit to become a warrior and fight to protect the nation. In the contemporary period, twelve year old boys were being initiated in a few weeks by businessmen resulting in the saying: "Koma ke tsjelete: Initiation school is money". Not wanting to abolish the institution that gave the youth the authority to act, the Congress demanded that the initiation schools be reformed: The costs of initiation were to be dramatically reduced; if a boy could not afford it, he was to go for free, as the boy was being initiated to equip him in the struggle against apartheid, that is, he was going to initiation for the good of society.

The Brooklyn Youth Congress in the Schools

Principals and teachers inherited an ambiguous political heritage. On the one hand, they wielded authority because they were part of the bureaucracy. This meant, however, that they were associated with Bantu education, corrupt practices in the schools, and the Tribal Authorities. On the other hand, they commanded respect because of their educational qualifications, which meant they understood a broader literate world (particularly the "national" context), and they consequently represented "enlightenment" and "progress". This latter quality meant that teachers could challenge Modipane's and the youth's "privileged"
understanding of the struggle. The following sections investigate how this ambiguity played itself out.

In the thirties and forties, Pulanas boycotted Swiss Mission schools because of the connection between church, school and "Tsonga" ethnicity.16 The establishment of mass-based, state controlled schooling in the sixties and seventies was, however, by no means a simple process in Mapulaneng. Pulana chiefdoms faced the challenge of integrating a social hierarchy based on educational qualification with that of the chieftainship.

As formal members of the local bureaucracy, principals and teachers fell loosely under the ambit of the Tribal Authority. This gave them the "rank" of chiefly representative both within and outside of the schools. Chiefs had the right to veto the appointment of principals, and, before rampant corruption changed the system, school funds used to be "banked" with the Authority. Chiefs, most of whom were poorly educated, in their turn, would often approach principals or prominent teachers to interpret government proclamation. Given their connection to the chieftainship, a challenge to the bureaucratic authority of principal was rhetorically expressed as a challenge to the authority of the chieftainship, which implicitly mobilised a broad alliance against the "dissident".17

State schools replaced initiation schools as the major means of socialisation outside of the household. As agents in the process of socialising children, teachers received the symbolic status associated with parents and became representatives of generational authority. "Traditionally we could not question our seniors. This was transformed into the school where teachers were regarded as seniors."18 However, rather than have the relationship between
student and teacher mediated by reasoned judgement, the principle of generational authority, that is unquestioned obedience, was demanded of students. To question the authority of a teacher meant to question the authority of parents, and as a result, the judgement of teachers was not to be questioned by either a student or a parent in the presence of students. Breaches of "discipline" from arriving late to failing a test were punished "according to the culture" that is, with a thrashing. Students could only wield political power within the schools when they acted on behalf of the school authorities.

Although the above implies that the tension between the status hierarchy in the chiefdom and that in the schools was resolved, this was by no means true. The status hierarchy within the schools, that is, the notion that the authority with which a person spoke was determined by their level of education, was literally and formerly transferred to the broader "community". Within the context of a literate bureaucracy, an uneducated person did not have the authority to challenge the judgement of a teacher or principal. Just as an unmarried initiate could not speak during cases related to marital problems, so uneducated people could not speak in relation to problems around the bureaucracy as they were "illiterate". As one informant succinctly summarised the situation: "a school principal is also principal in the community". The above idea undermined the notion that illiterate chiefs, councillors and parents were equipped to understand the contemporary political situation.

Although the formation of state schooling in the fifties severed the links between school and church, by the eighties some teachers still maintained the connection. A ex-student from Maripe High School recollects:

When I arrived in 1983, there was a teacher called L who would punish you for no valid reason. I remember Std 6. We were learning under a tree. L was not teaching
us but he came to the class and said: "Those of you who have accepted Jesus as personal saviour raise your hands." I did not as I am not a christian. We were told to go to the staff-room. We were then really punished. The strokes were countable but I can't remember how many he gave us.\textsuperscript{21}

The most significant source of tension between teachers and students that sprang from the organisation of the chieftainship was the institution of initiation. In the context of the chieftainship, on being initiated a boy was formally a man, that is, he was able to speak at the chief's court. He had the right to scorn non-initiates and all women (including his mother). He also had the power to thrash non-initiates if he found them involved in any transgression. He had the right to intervene in a situation to ensure that communal laws were being obeyed. Within the schools, however, many teachers treated initiation with scorn, and warned their students that it would make them "primitive and fail". The school hierarchy, which recognised only educational qualification as a source of authority, treated the authority of initiation with disdain: "In school we talk of a teacher child relationship, not of a teacher man relationship".\textsuperscript{22} Initiates for their part, refused to recognised the authority of teachers who had not been initiated, particularly their right to beat initiated students.

During my schooling, initiates had a problem with teachers from Pietersburg. Initiates used to think they had grown up. We used to think a non-initiate or a women did not have the right to punish an initiate or instruct him on how to take care of himself... One Mohalala, after initiation, he was doing Std 3 in 1979. He was punished for late coming. He informed teachers that they can't punish him any more for late coming. After being punished again he dropped out of school. He told me that he could not be punished by a non-initiate for late coming.\textsuperscript{23}

These tensions were not confined to student teacher relationships, but also within the principal teacher community. The contradiction between principals who had influence both in and outside of the schools because of their position in the school hierarchy but were not initiated was sometimes resolved by force. In 1985, the principal of a Secondary School, who had a
Masters Degree, was kidnapped by his fellow principals to attend initiation. A teacher recollects:

The fact was that people respected him because he was a principal, but on the other hand, he was a child because he was uninitiated. Also, he used to drink with initiates at the shebeen. Now, when initiated men meet to discuss matters, that is called Makgotla. But the principal was not initiated. So they kidnapped him.24

Initiated students were confronted with further contradictions: Male teachers (both initiated and uninitiated) were often extraordinarily reckless. They would arrive at classes drunk, they sexually molested female students and would thrash students indiscriminately. Furthermore, conditions in the schools were often appalling: students were daily confronted with overcrowded classrooms, shortages of desks and chairs, and learning materials such as textbooks. Yet, school funds and building funds remained unaccounted for and teachers did not appear to care. On being approached, parents refused to act as "teachers knew better".25

It was in this context, in 1988, that the Brooklyn Youth Congress challenged the administration of Maripe High school. Class representatives for a Student Representative Council (SRC) were elected, but the Executive Committee, of the SRC, which was dominated by members of the Brooklyn Youth Congress, "elected itself".26 The SRC chose to challenge the principal on the (alleged) embezzlement of school funds. The principal had imposed a school building fee of forty rand a year per student for the previous three years. No new classrooms were constructed in the period, and the principal refused to present a financial statement at the year's end. The SRC called boycotts to force the principal to publish a financial statement. In one confrontation, the principal, in fear for his life, hid from the students in the nearby forest.
The campaign initially received widespread support from parents, most of whom were facing economic hardship without the added burden of lining the principal's pockets. However, from challenging the principal as a (corrupt) member of the bureaucracy, the youth congress began to challenge the principal and teacher's authority in the running of the school. Modipane's younger brother, the President of the SRC, took over assemblies at Maripe High School. Student meetings were convened during classes without the permission of the principal. When SRC demands were not met, boycotts were called without consultation. The SRC alleged a teacher (who was a former soldier and who carried a gun into class) was a spy. A boycott was called for the teacher's dismissal. An uninitiated teacher from Glen Cowie was targeted for using corporal punishment on both male and female students. When teachers showed solidarity with their uninitiated colleague, the SRC demanded the total abolition of corporal punishment as "teachers were unable to govern the practice justly."27

The activities of the Congress started to spawn divisions in the student body. Matric students, frustrated by having their studies interrupted by sporadic boycotts, began to resist calls to boycott classes. The Student's Representative Council, whose positions were monopolised by members of the Youth Congress, discriminated against both students from Brooklyn who were not active members of the Brooklyn Youth Congress, and students from surrounding villages. In mid 1989, tensions within the student body reached breaking point and a fight broke out between students at Maripe and the Youth Congress.

The Brooklyn Youth Congress Marginalises Teachers

Principals and teachers, as residents who commanded respect because of their educational
qualifications, were a potential threat to Modipane's (a telephone exchange operator who had achieved a matric) and the Congress' (most of whose leaders had dropped out before high school) claim to be the foremost authorities on the "struggle".

First and foremost, teachers could not be politically trusted as they were "part and parcel of the system of Bantu education". How, the Youth Congress reasoned, could teachers be employed by the Lebowa Government and wage a struggle against their employers? Teachers were excluded from Youth Congress meetings, and hence from oppositional politics on this logic.

Furthermore, if parents did not understand the struggle because they were illiterate then, as far the Congress was concerned, teachers did not understand the struggle because they were too literate. In a war situation, there was no room for intellectuals:

"They told us, the people are illiterate, so you cannot understand the people and the people cannot understand you. If you try to criticise them [Modipane or the leaders of the Youth Congress], then they say you are intellectualising the struggle; If you challenge them further they say you are an impimpi [traitor] and threaten you with violence."²⁸

Those teachers who continued to try to question youth leaders discovered that they were not "politicised". Being politicised meant having access to secret pamphlets distributed by the ANC underground which gave the reader privileged knowledge about the aims and strategies of the "movement". The pamphlets further excluded illiterate parents from the struggle:

"The leaders of the Comrades used to give them pamphlets orientating them with developments. Because they were the only people who could read those things they said they were more informed than their parents who could not read... They were politicising each other. You are only educated when you are politicised. And you are only politicised when you can quote from the pamphlet to show me that you are better placed than I am as regards politics. Those pamphlets also served as a launching pad
Both in and outside of the schools, the Congress obliterated the notion that the authority to speak as a political citizen was grounded on educational qualifications. Being politicised (as defined by the Congress), rather than being educated, gave the speaker qualification to participate in, and affect the course of, the "struggle".

Youth Organisation in Buffelshoek

In early 1988, a youth organisation was formed in Buffelshoek. Unlike their Brooklyn counterparts, the Buffelshoek Youth Congress was facing a chieftainship that had preserved its ritual character and had built a following through its involvement in the Zion Christian Church. Using its position in the Tribal Authority, the chieftainship had also established a firm alliance with the most influential and successful businessman in the Authority area.

The first Zion Christian Church congregation in the Lowveld was established in the early forties on Glen Lyden, the farm that formed the base of the Molotele chieftainship before its removal to Buffelshoek in the early seventies. The Priest was a close relative of the chief. Most of the Royal family and a significant proportion of the residents of Glen Lyden joined the Church. In 1967, the first group of households were removed from Glen Lyden to Arthur Seat. Two ZCC priests who were members of the Royal Family from Glen Lyden maintained the churches congregation in Arthur Seat. Two years later, a further group of households were removed from Glen Lyden to Boelang where the Rev Aaron Chiloane, the chief's brother, continued to hold services. In 1971, the remaining residents on Glen Lyden,
including the Molotele chief, were removed to Buffelshoek.  

After his removal, Masoja Chiloane, the Molotele chief, was facing a potentially hostile situation. Buffelshoek, which had previously been allocated by the Commissioner to the Sethlare chiefdom, was already settled by families removed from Rooiboklaagte, including a Roka induna, appointed by Sethlare. A group of "Shangaan" households removed from Champagne, were also settled on the farm. The removals divided members of the chiefdom between those who wanted to resist removal to the last, who accused Masoja of selling the land, and those who accepted the removal as inevitable. Masoja Chiloane surrounded his household with ZCC members and settled the non ZCC members from Glen Lyden in a separate ward of Buffelshoek. Sethlare’s induna controlled another ward where predominantly Roka people lived.

A year after the removal, the ZCC priests in Arthur Seat moved with their congregations from Arthur Seat to Buffelshoek, where they were given a separate ward on which to build their houses. Three years later, Aaron Chiloane led his congregation to Buffelshoek. A ZCC member recollects:

The family moved from Arthur Seat to Buffelshoek to follow their chief...The non ZCC members were few. The pride in the church is what made us to move because the chief was a ZCC member.

In the mid eighties, three separate ZCC congregations met in Buffelshoek. Bishop Lehanyane, the head of the ZCC convened a meeting and made Aaron Chiloane, the "High-Priest" of the Lowveld as a whole. The three congregations merged into one congregation under Chiloane. In a potentially hostile environment, the ZCC offered the Molotele chieftainship a stable institutionalised following. Furthermore, within the ambit of the ZCC the
chieftainship could function as a chieftainship outside of the ideological strictures of the Tribal Authority.

The Zion Christian Church reaffirmed the link between individual health and that of the social body, a notion central to the precolonial chieftainship. Prayers were held to protect the health of the chief as well as his subjects. Sick people were treated through the use of prayer and holy water. Devices and prayers offered members of the congregation protection from witchcraft. The churches also offered a forum for the members to confess to witchcraft without severe repercussions. Prayers were held for rain and at first harvest. Feasts or celebrations were blessed by officials of the church. Church elders were called upon to solve intra and inter household disputes between church members.35

Burial societies were organised under the ambit of the church. Migrant workers formed congregations in their urban townships which provided a powerful support network for church members. Members undertook to look for jobs for one another as well as assist unemployed church goers with travel costs to return to their rural homes. Priests in these townships were often members of the royal family.36

In short, the royal family developed a following they could depend on. The difference in the way a member of the ZCC relates to fellow church members verses non members is captured in the following attitude:

"If I am driving around and I see someone hitch-hiking, if he is ZCC, I will stop and give him a lift because I know I can trust him. If he is not wearing the Star [the churches badge] then I will not stop."37
The ZCC also had effective control over the Tribal Authority (TA). The chief plus seven of the nine councillors in the Tribal Authority were ZCC members. The TA became a means of delivering patronage to members of the ZCC: Church goers were favoured in the delivery of Tribal Authority services, especially the allocation of business licenses. Residents who were not members of the church had to depend on bribing councillors and clerks in order to have an application processed. Members of the church hired out their businesses and taxis and gave preferential employment to other ZCC members.

In contrast to the Sethlare Chieftainship, the Molotele chief, Masoja Chiloane, used the Tribal Authority to forge a powerful alliance with the most influential businessman under his jurisdiction, W Inama. Inama arrived in the district in the early seventies from Elandsfontein. He had a matric, three years training at a teachers college and had previously worked as a teacher. On his arrival he built a restaurant. In the mid seventies he built a bottle store and hotel and Acornhoek that became a thriving businesses. In the early seventies, Inama entered into competition with another businessman, Reckson Mashile, to win the favours of the chief. Mashile built the chief a house in the mid seventies, which Inama countered by contributing towards the chief’s car. Ultimately, however, Reckson Mashile’s association with Matsiketsane meant that Molotele did not trust him. Furthermore, Mashile could not compete with Inama’s brokering abilities. As an ex teacher with a matric and who was a fluent English speaker, Inama was given the role of brokering between the Lebowa Government and the Tribal Authority. Inama was called upon to entertain visiting bureaucrats and to interpret government directives to the Authority. He also ensured that the chief was never financially wanting. In exchange, the chief “consulted” with Inama before allotting business licenses. In 1987, Inama’s control over the allocation of business licenses was formalised when he was
appointed the chair of the Development Committee. By the late eighties he was employing thirty nine people and supplying most shebeens in the area with beer.

The Youth organisation launched itself by protesting about problems in the water supply. The youth gathered at the Moshate (chief’s house) with 25 litre water barrels and alleged that the man responsible for the water supply was selling diesel meant for the pumps. The chief promised to investigate. The organisation continued to meet at night and sing anti-witchcraft songs.

A few weeks later, five youths sitting on the side of the road were confronted by the chief and five other men in a van. The chief after accusing the youths of holding a meeting, began shooting at them. Two youths were injured. Following the incident, the South African Defence Force began to patrol the farm, temporarily halting the youth organisation’s activities.

Matsiketsane’s 1989 Election Victory

In early 1989, the activities of youth organisations were briefly overshadowed by elections for the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. In the course of the election a formidable alliance crystallised in opposition to the reelection of the Mashile brothers. Foremost in the campaign against the brothers was the Chief Minister of Lebowa, Nelson Ramodike. A former traffic cop, Ramodike retained his Hitler-like moustache, his blustering manner, and his aversion towards nonconformists in his new political position. As the only members of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly who were not members of Ramodike’s Lebowa People’s Party, the
Mashile brothers were the major (if not the sole) voice of dissent within Parliament. While the Mashile's were MPs, Ramodike's absolute hegemony over the parliament was denied, a situation Ramodike found profoundly unsatisfactory.

In a classic political miscalculation, the campaign against the Mashile brothers was launched with the distribution of a smear pamphlet aimed at discrediting the brothers:

"They [the Mashile brothers] hold illegal meetings especially before Christmas 1988, they scold, blame the chiefs, they even blame and accuse the Ministers, and the Chief Minister for not attending their meetings. The chiefs of Mapulaneng are tired about their seats in Parliament, they accuse the police, they accuse the local Magistrate without reasons. They have disturbed peace in Shatale township where they operate their comradeship. They accuse the Chief Minister for not implementing a 50-50, fifty fifty basis of representation in Parliament for equal representation of chiefs and commoners."41

Having unerringly voiced the Mashile's popular mandate, the pamphlet backfired. If the pamphlet had any effect at all, the chances are it bolstered the Mashile's campaign.

The chiefs and Lebowa People's Party threw everything they had into ensuring that the Mashiles would not be re-elected. The chiefs held meetings in their Tribal Authorities, where they made it clear to their subjects how they wanted them to vote, and warned that they would be monitoring the voting booths. A youth caught taking minutes without permission at a meeting of the Molotele Tribal Authority was assaulted, his "minute book" confiscated, and his family fined. Ramodike, along with his entire cabinet, and all nine of the Pulana chiefs, held an election rally at Green-Valley to boost the Lebowa People's Party's campaign. To Ramodike's humiliation, the rally backfired: A massive crowd overwhelmed the speakers with songs praising the Mashile brothers.

The Mashile's were able to mobilise a broad alliance of Pulana and African nationalists
around the election campaign. Both oppositional movements realised that the bureaucracy would form an unassailable bloc without the Mashiles as Members of Parliament. The Mapulaneng Crisis Committee managed the Mashile's campaign and monitored polling booths. The Leihlo La Naga successfully mobilised migrants to vote. The Brooklyn Youth Congress, under Modipane also organised (albeit with the use of sjamboks) for Matsiketsane's re-election. Within the idiom of chiefly politics, Modipane's support for the Mashile's election reaffirmed the link between youth politics and chiefly secession dispute: Modipane was ultimately Matsiketsane's induna, seeking to ensure that Mashile assumed the chieftainship.

The Defiance Campaign and its Effects

In mid 1989, the United Democratic Front launched the Defiance Campaign. Overnight, Modipane became "coordinator" of the Bushbuckridge Youth Congress, which enthusiastically took up the Campaign. In September, Modipane led a march to the Acornhoek Police Station with the aim of presenting a memorandum to the newly appointed State President, F.W. de Klerk. The memorandum protested the lack of water and health facilities, called for the reinstatement of Tsonga from Sotho schools and vice versa, and demanded the withdrawal of troops and the lifting of the state of emergency. Although the meeting was attended by ten thousand people, the sjamboks which youths had used to "mobilise" people for the march were also manifestly visible.

As Modipane's profile waxed, the Mashile brothers found themselves under attack from both ends of the political spectrum. Because of his historical association with the ANC and with
Modipane, Matsiketsane was held responsible by the chiefs for the activities of the youth. The Mashile's lost support amongst teachers when Sekgopela, at a meeting at Tladishi High School, in the presence of students, criticised the way the teachers practised corporal punishment, thus undermining the teachers' authority. On the other side of the spectrum, Modipane began to question the Mashile's role as MPs within the "system"; in the last instance, Modipane speculated, could the Mashile's be trusted to destroy the institution that paid their salary. At a meeting in Buffelshoek, a youth leader questioned Matsiketsane's claim to the chieftainship, when the movement was trying to "destroy the institution". The Mashile brothers chose not to criticise or praise the activities of the youth, and as a consequence, haemorrhaged support to both sides.

As tensions mounted, a special meeting of the Regional Authority was convened in 1989 to discuss the "unrest situation in the area" with Brigadier Moloto, the commanding officer of the Lebowa's police force. A stark gulf materialised between the strategies put forward by the chiefs and those put forward by the Police, Magistrate and the two Members of Parliament. In response to Sekgopela Mashile's suggestion that meetings be convened to discuss the "problem" with principals, parents and students, Chief Molotele commented:

"I have heard one speaker said let us go to the school to a hold a meeting. That must never, never happen. The Comrades will tell the others to go and stone the Kgosi, And make you fools. Please Brigadier, give us Mankweng police, they are strong they can cure all this trouble with sjambok. Police and soldiers should use sjambok. And they must also go from house to house if they find children who does not go to school and hit them and force them to go to school." 44

The chiefs discovered that Brigadier Moloto refused to speak their language, at least not in public. Moloto in reply to the chief's suggestion said:

In the first place [the situation] is very bad and the Magosi admit they are powerless. The Magosi in Bushbuckridge have neglected the powers invested to them by the Government. In the past, the Magosi used to call meetings and discussed the
problems of this area. As far as the police are concerned, we will try our best. But remember that you are given power to control. We will control, but what are you going to do? .. The latest issue has told us that we must never never use any sjambok. Even the Lebowa Government is against the use of sjambok. They said that the use of sjambok they say it is dangerous... In short I agree with Mr Mashile when he said that we must speak to the children.45

The Commanding Officer of the Acornhoek police station, pointed out to the chiefs that divisions existed within the student body. The Officer argued that the chiefs should be willing to call on students disenchanted with the "comrades":

"At Acornhoek, some of the students are tired and are willing to hold meeting with you Magosi, Parents, Principals to solve these problems."

The Regional Authority meeting concluded with a discussion on the problem of unmarried pregnant women. The chiefs repeated their call that force be used to ensure that men marry women they impregnate. Again, the Magistrate responded by saying that force was impracticable. Chiefs should rather "call the father of the girl and ask him why his daughter [is] staying with a man while they are not married".46

The chiefs could not have left the Regional Authority meeting feeling reassured. The contradiction at the heart of the meeting was simple: The police were calling on the chiefs to use the power that the government had vested in them to resolve the situation. Yet the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the inability of the chiefs to deal with the situation. The chiefs were faced with a force who refused to acknowledge their [the chief's] legitimacy, and who were continuously violently asserting their power over the right of residents to move and meet in the villages. In this context, the chiefs argued, force had to be met with force.

The release of the Rivonia treason trialists in early October 1989 marked a turning point in
South African politics. The implicit acknowledgement by the National Party that the South African state was not wielding power legitimately spawned a moral vacuum: If Rivonia trialists could be released from prison, then anyone could be released. Bantustan leaders, for their part, realised that they needed to fortify their power bases or risk being sidelined. In this context, Ramodike had two axes to grind in relation to the Mashile brothers. Their opposition to his political party symbolised a repudiation of his claim to represent the Lebowa elite. And secondly, Ramodike's power base lay with the chiefs, and the Bushbuckridge chiefs did not like the Mashile brothers. If Ramodike could remove the Mashile brothers from the political field, he would not only oust a personal opponent, but in the process, he would win the support of the Bushbuckridge chiefs.

Despite the apparently liberal stance taken by Brigadier Moloto at the special meeting of the Regional Authority, the Mankweng riot squad was transferred to Bushbuckridge, and the situation became progressively more confrontational as the police went on the offensive. Two "protest" marches organised by the Bushbuckridge Youth Congress were violently dispersed by the riot squad. Jacques Modipane's house was petrol bombed and shot at, allegedly by members of the South African Defence Force. On the 24 October 1989 approximately eighty youths of both sexes from Brooklyn were arrested, detained, and severely assaulted by the Lebowa police. Two days later the girls were released, and fifty five males were charged with public violence. An executive member of the Brooklyn Youth Congress, who was arrested on the 24 October, was released a week later having been brutally assaulted.47

In early November, Chief German Chiloane of the Sethlare Tribal Authority died. Following
his death, Matsiketsane took over the Tribal Authority offices for two weeks, in a symbolic display of force. The political uncertainty in the village reached fever pitch: Were villagers going to be ruled by a chief who not only endorsed the activities of the youth, but had ultimately been controlling them? Was Modipane going to install himself as chief, or was he going to scrap the chieftainship entirely? In the vacuum, the chair of the Tribal Authority, proclaimed himself acting chief.

The Formation of Sofasonke

On the 25 November, a meeting of principals, teachers, chiefs, a priest and parents (mostly mothers) was convened in Brooklyn in the presence of the police to discuss the "problem of the students". In the absence of coherent leadership from the Tribal Authority, two school principals, who had supported Matsiketsane Mashile and had been active members of the Leihlo La Naga in the mid eighties, decided to full in the leadership vacuum. The principals had been alienated from the Mashiles by the activities of the students, Sekgopela’s critical public statements about teachers and the Mashile’s refusal to take a public stance against the activities of the Youth Congress. One of the principals was a first cousin of the heir to the chieftainship and was probably concerned with the preservation of the institution. At the meeting the Sifasonke [We are dying together] Civic Organisation was formed. All the top executive positions in Sifasonke were held by former Leihlo La Naga members: The Chair and Secretary of Sifasonke were school principals. The Deputy Chair was a teacher. The Chair of the Tribal Authority, who owned a taxi and a small general dealer, was present at the meeting, along with the induna. A local butcher, fearing the Youth Congress because of his reputation as a cattle thief, also attended the meeting.
The following morning, after a prayer by a Nazerine Priest, (who implored "God to save the village from the Comrades"), eight hundred people, most of whom were women, attacked and burnt the houses of Jacques Modipane. All the windows were smashed and all the contents of the house, including furniture and clothes were destroyed. Modipane narrowly escaped with his life. The crowd then went on to destroy the houses of six leaders of the Brooklyn Youth Congress. Following a brief conference with the police, the members of the crowd formed themselves in patrols and began to search the location for youth leaders.

The Sifasonke Civic Organisation soon changed its name to Sofasonke (we die together). The Sofasonke assumed for itself all the powers previously wielded by the Youth Congress. The sjamboks changed hands back to the elder generation as armed members of the organisation patrolled the township at night, singing threatening songs directed against the Youth Congress. The patrols brutally assaulted any youths found on the streets at night. It became apparent that the Sofasonke were acting with indemnity from the police to the extent that the police often assisted in the evening patrols. The Acornhoek police station commander refused to accept statements taken by the lawyer employed by the youth leader's parents who had lost their houses. No arrests were made in connection with the burning of the houses.

An atmosphere of acute anxiety pervaded the district as the arbitrary law of Sofasonke replaced the arbitrary law of the Youth Congress, (the difference being that Sofasonke had the protection of the police). Members of Sofasonke soon used their indemnity to violently resolve personal conflicts, such as competition over the favours of a woman. Rumours of forthcoming and past attacks, far outnumbering the reality of such events, permeated the
streets as Sofasonke grew quickly and aggressively in surrounding villages. Without police protection, most villagers could just wait helplessly for the rumoured assault to happen. When the attacks came, they were vehement and decisive: On Christmas Eve the home of Mathews Thibela, a youth leader in Tsakane location in Green Valley was destroyed. On the 28 of December, five households giving refuge to the families of youth leaders were burnt in Brooklyn. In Buffelshoek, Sofasonke found a powerful base in the Molotele Tribal Authority, who on the 28 December, attacked and destroyed Sekgopela Mashile's and a youth leader's homes. Two days later, Mathews Thibela, the Tsakane youth leader whose house had been destroyed the previous week, was found dead in Green Valley with bullet wounds. The subsequent day, Matsiketsane Mashile's nephew was discovered in nearby bushes, suffering from serious bullet wounds. The following statement captures the ambivalence of many residence about the choice between Sofasonke and the Youth Congress:

"It has been much worse since Sofasonke has been around. They said they were better than the Comrades, but they also killed people."51

National Political Organisations Intervene

The following week, Sekgopela Mashile travelled to Johannesburg where he contacted the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and informed them of (his version of) the situation. The General Secretary of the SACC contacted Ramodike (who was also Minister of Police) the same day. It was one thing for Ramodike to be seen by the chiefs as being hard on the youth, it was quite another for him to be seen by national political organisations as arming an "Inkatha" like counter revolutionary organisation. The same night the police disarmed the Sofasonke patrols and told them to stay in doors until further notice.

Responding to the changed circumstances, Sofasonke produced a memorandum giving pre-
conditions for "peace and reconciliation" in the district. Sofasonke defined itself as follows:

(a) Sofasonke Civic Union is not a political organization. It is an organization which stands for civil matters. Civil matters are not similar to political matters.  
(b) Sofasonke Civic Union is affiliated by parents, Magoshi, Civil (Public Servants); Youth who surrendered from acts of the Comrades, as well as God.  
(c) Sofasonke Civic Union stands for the preservation of law and order, peace and civilization.52

The memorandum was written in the rhetoric of chiefly politics, that is, every action was measured in relation to its effects on (actual or imagined) chiefly secession disputes. No mention was made of Pulana ethnicity. Rather the memorandum targeted Matsiketsane Mashile's secession dispute as the ultimate cause of the conflict in Mapulaneng without putting forward any evidence to substantiate the allegations:

"These two members of Parliament should avoid to mobilize school students to serve as tools and weapons which to fight or struggle for Bogoshi as well as to struggle for the separation of Mapulaneng Constituency from the Lebowa Territory."53

The memorandum asserted that a local lawyer (who had been responsible for the interdict), six families of youth leaders, Jacques Modipane and the two Mashile brothers should leave Mapulaneng as a precondition to peace.

A press statement released in the third week of January by the Southern Transvaal region of the United Democratic Front bluntly accused Ramodike of employing "the very methods applied by the Apartheid colonial masters, that of repression, harassment, murder detention and terror."54 Ramodike's hands were tied: On the 23 of January, he agreed to, alongside the SACC, facilitate a peace agreement amongst all affected parties.

Despite the preconditions to peace laid out in Sofasonke's memorandum, the following week, Chikane successfully brokered a peace agreement between the Bushbuckridge Youth Congress
and Sofasonke. The Sofasonke delegation was lead by a school principal and a teacher. The Bushbuckridge Youth Congress was represented by Modipane. The MCC attended the meeting as observers. The agreement bound both sides to resolve their differences without the use of violence. Both sides, as well as the chiefs, agreed to recognise the right for any section of the population to form organisations. The Sofasonke agreed to allow people who fled their homes to return without fear of intimidation. In return the Bushbuckridge Youth Congress agreed to inform the Tribal Authority before they held any meetings.

Nevertheless, it was one thing for the Youth Congress to agree to certain principles at a public meeting, and it was another for them to respect those principles out of the public eye, particularly when those principles conflicted with the politics of monopolising the wielding of power. A month later, Sofasonke released a memorandum claiming that the BYC had broken the peace accord. In contrast to the rhetoric of the previous memorandum, which linked the activities of the Youth Congresses to the Mashile brothers without offering any concrete proof of such links, the second memorandum only made specific allegations regarding the actions of leading members of the Brooklyn Youth Congress. The memorandum was addressed to the following "mediators": the Lebowa Government cabinet, the South African Council of Churches and the Lowveld Council of Churches, the chiefs and the MCC.

The memorandum alleged that:

- The Brooklyn Youth Congress, without informing the Tribal Authority, went on night marches where they sang insulting and threatening songs about leading members of the Sofasonke.
- The Sethlare chief elect had been threatened at his house by a crowd of about one and a half thousand youths.
- A member of Sofasonke received a letter which threatened the lives of the Sethlare chief elect, the Molotele chief, and some school principals.
- That youths, lead by Brooklyn Youth leaders, had prevented the Sofasonke from holding a meeting at Arthurseat.
The memorandum gave the mediators three weeks to rectify the situation, after which Sofasonke would take unspecified action.

The balance of power, however, had swung against Sofasonke. Ramodike was making overtures to the recently unbanned African National Congress, and probably did not want to have his national aspirations subverted by local conflicts. With the publicity surrounding the peace accord, the police were not able to intervene decisively against the Youth Congress. The Youth Congresses grew progressively more assertive, until in early April the houses of the Chair and Vice-Chair of Sofasonke were burnt down. The next day, the Chair was killed, and the vice-chair seriously wounded, after being attacked by youths in broad daylight at their schools. The principals closed all the schools in Mapulaneng for a month in protests against the murder of the Chair of Sofasonke. Three assassination attempts were made on Matsiketsane Mashile. Mashile narrowly escaped death on the third attempt, when his moving car was sprayed with bullets from an automatic weapon. Three bullets went through his headrest. His nephew was seriously injured in the incident. There was a complete stayaway for two days in the region in protest against the assassination attempt and the role of the police in the violence.

The situation then stabilised.

**Conclusion**

This chapter demonstrated the processes which resulted in the formation of the Sofasonke Civic Union. First and foremost, these processes centred around the activities of youth
organisations in general and the Brooklyn Youth Congress in particular. The moral economy of youth organisation had the effect of subverting generational authority; youth organisation challenged parent's authority to discipline their children, as well as elder's rights to control the political process. Similarly, youth organisation challenged the authority of chiefs, principles and priests. Although different factions within Sofasonke drew on, and were motivated by, different moral economies, the different groups were unified by the common aim of reasserting generational authority.

Secondly, Sofasonke represented an alliance of chiefs opposed to Matsiketsane's claim to the Sethlare chieftainship, as well an alliance amongst the bureaucracy who were threatened by the Mashile brother's activities as Members of Parliament. The association between the Mashiles and youth organisation, either as a consequence of the Mashile's status as African nationalist leaders or as a result of the perception that Matsiketsane was using the youth to claim his chieftainship, had the effect of focusing Sofasonke's anger on the two brothers.

Although Sofasonke flourished for the first few months of its existence, particularly given its support from the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, the moment national organisations began to monitor and intervene in the situation, Sofasonke disintegrated. When negotiating with national organisations, Sofasonke could not draw on the logic of chiefly rhetoric to implicate the Mashile brothers in the activities of youth organisations. These allegations had to be proved, a task Sofasonke was not able to achieve. This failure enhanced the Mashile brother's standing as African nationalist leaders deserving the protection of national organisation. These splits in Sofasonke were exacerbated when Ramodicke withdrew his overt support for the organisation, leaving the leaders isolated. Furthermore, national organisation were not able
to effectively police any peace agreements. In this context, the Youth Organisation were able
to attack the leadership of Sofasonke without severe (extra-legal) repercussions.
Notes
1. Interview Tandios Mashile, Buffelshoek, 21/11/91.

2. I assisted in the process of contacting the Rural Advice Centre in both the Craigsburn and Brooklyn cases. The following paragraphs are thus based on personal observation.

3. Interview Chiloane, G., Green Valley, 26/7/93; and Mohlala, E., and Shokane, K., Green Valley, 26/7/93.

4. Interview Chiloane, G., Green Valley, 26/7/93; and Mohlala, E., and Shokane, K., Green Valley, 26/7/93.

5. The above paragraph is based on numerous conversations during this period. No formal interviews were held as the topic was too sensitive.


7. When confronted by the parents of pregnant school-girls the youths asserted that "it was the role of women to have babies", ignoring the social processes that were supposed to take place in order to have sexual access to women.

8. Interview, Mr F Machate, Brooklyn, 20/11/91.


10. Reverend Phako, Sofasonke's priest, had consistently opposed the activities of the Youth Congress since 1986, particularly attempts to make his sons attend meetings. See Interview, R M., Brooklyn, 12/12/86. See also Stadler J, "Domestic Authority and Intergrational Conflict", Paper to Postgraduate Seminar Series, University of the Witwatersrand, 1992, p12.

11. Phrase is taken from a freedom song.

12. Interview, Teacher, July 1993; Abner Cohen in "Political Symbolism", Annual Review of Anthropology, No 8, 1979, argues that as "life crises", (such as death) are irreducible and universal aspects of the human condition, political movements struggle to load these events with meanings that function to develop and maintain the interests of that movement.


15. Interview K, Shokane., Green Valley, 20/7/93.

16. See Chapter Four.

17. This dynamic is explored in greater detail in Chapter Five when the conflict between Willis Ngobe, a principal and the chief is described.


20. This point is expanded upon in the previous chapter.

21. Interview Julius Mashile, Acornhoek, 9/7/93.


23. Interview S Thabane, Buffelshoek, 2/8/93.

24. Interview K Shokane and E Mohlala, Brooklyn, 26/7/93.


27. Interview Youth Leader, Green Valley, August, 1993.


30. Interview Chiloane, G., Green Valley, 26/7/93; Mohlala, E., (ZCC Priest), Green Valley, 26/7/93.


32. Interview Manzini, E., Buffelshoek, 6/7/92.

33. Interview Chiloane, G., Green Valley, 26/7/93.

34. Interview Mohlala, E., (ZCC Priest), Green Valley, 26/7/93.

35. Interview Mohlala, E., Green Valley, 3/8/93; and Mashile, L., Buffelshoek, 11/7/92. For a more detailed analysis of the church as a mediator between indigenous belief systems and colonial intrusion see Comaroff, Jean., *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. While Comaroff emphasises the counter-hegemonic meanings implicit in ZCC rituals and paraphenalia, she neglects to describe and analyse the political alliances that the church forges at a grass-roots and regional level.

36. Interview Mashile, L., Buffelshoek, 11/7/92. Of note is that the urban branch of Leihlo La Naga was never able to recruit a significant number of members from Molotele's following.

37. Conversation with ZCC member, Wits University, August, 1993.
38. Interview Chiloane, G., (Member of Molotele Royal Family) Green Valley, 26/7/93.

39. A snap survey conducted in 1992 revealed that 75% of trading stores in Buffelshoek were owned by ZCC members.

40. Interview Mashile, K. (Youth Leader), Buffelshoek, 21/11/91.


42. See Chapter six for background to Leihlo La Naga.

43. See unpublished "Memorandum to the Honourable State President F.W.de Klerk". Ironically, Modipane had been one of the leaders of the movement which had Tsonga removed from Mapulaneng schools in 1985.

44. Molotele Chiloane at special meeting of Regional Authority. Minutes from Matsiketsane Mashile's personal diary.

45. Moloto's response taken from Matsiketsane Mashile's personal minutes of the special meeting of the Regional Authority.

46. ibid.

47. See Memorandum to Minister of Law and Order (the Honourable Chief Minister Mr Nelson Ramodicke) presented at the Acornhoek police station.

48. The name Sofasonke probably came from migrant experiences of the organisation in Soweto and Sophiatown in the fifties. See interview Chiloane, C., Soweto, 16/08/1989.


50. See for example Statement by Strekkie Ngobeng to M Mashile on 13/01/91.


54. Undated press statement re Bushbuckridge violence released by UDF Transvaal Affiliates.
CONCLUSION

The thesis sought to explain the salient features of contemporary politics in the Mapulaneng district of Lebowa and the Mhala district of Gazankulu. These features include the patrimonial nature of the Bantustan state, the eminence of ethnic conflicts, the growth of African national movements and the formation of vigilante organisations. To understand these phenomena, I focused on the role of leadership and incidents of political violence as prisms to investigate broader political processes. The concepts of moral economy and power linked these two foci.

It was argued that political violence imposed a moral economy on a social relationship, and as such, was an attempt to transform (or conserve) a political economy. Leaders were assessed in terms of their ability to represent a moral economy, and in doing so, to intervene effectively in local and regional power struggles.

The thesis argued that the creation of a Released Area in 1916, and of Trust Land in 1936, the implementation of Betterment policies, the establishment of Tribal Authorities and the Bantustan legislative assemblies combined to produce new systems of political power in reserve settlements. The notion of patrimonialism was employed to capture the ad hoc process of incorporating the chieftainship into the bureaucracy that resulted in a double-faced state; one face organised around "traditional" leadership, the other around "modern" bureaucratic concerns. Tribal Authorities, which constituted the corner-stone of the Bantustan state, implicitly, redefined and imposed a new moral economy of the chieftainship based on the Apartheid definition of "tribe". The new moral economy drew on the "traditional" image of chief as ultimate owner of the land, transformed that image to mean that the chief was the
sole legitimate political representative of (an ethnically homogenous) chiefdom, gave the chief the ability to personally veto the provision of any service, and implicitly subordinated the chieftainship to the state. The chiefs was thus both civil society and state, political representative and administrator. The bureaucracy used this closure to obscure the reality of a state dominated by patronage and corruption: Members of the bureaucracy translated any challenge to their authority, as either a challenge to the chief’s position as the legitimate political representative of the "community", or as a claim to the chieftainship. In a context where organisations within civil society had no space to function, leaders struggled to create spaces where they could exercise political authority, and in the process, challenge corrupt bureaucratic practices. In this vacuum and confusion myriads of people asserted their right to define and regulate social relationships through the use of violence. The conspicuous failure of most leaders to retain a stable following pointed to the difficulties leaders faced in positioning themselves in relation to contradictions within the state, between the state and civil society and within civil society. The struggles that this thesis describes can therefore be thought of as a moment in an ongoing process of boundary formation between civil society and state. It was these hazy boundaries that formed the institutional space in which leaders could exercise political authority.

The implementation of forced removals, the undermining of the agricultural subsistence base through the implementation of Betterment policies, the institutionalisation of migrant labour, the generalised extension of education and the creation of Tribal Authorities and ethnically based Legislative Assemblies all had an impact on the power relations that constituted social relations in the settlements studied in this thesis. The violence was then be conceptualised as an attempt to define chieftaincy, ethnic, gender and generational relationship, in relation to
a specific moral economy, in the context of changing material conditions. The violence was an assertion of power and meaning. Its implicit effect was to discipline; to punish behaviour that was regarded as "anti-social" by the perpetrators of the violence.

The thesis highlighted three (inter-related) elements of the Bantustan state, namely the patrimonial, ethnic and racial components of the state. This conclusion will attempt to isolate these elements, periodise their evolution, and show how they articulated with, transformed, and were resisted by, chiefs, ethnic groups, genders and generations.

The Bantustan State as Patrimonial State

The first three chapters demonstrated that the patrimonial character of the Bantustan state evolved out of (at least) four broad processes: Firstly, the state's bid to define the african population as citizens of a special type, requiring a separate geographical space (in the form of reserved areas) and distinctive forms of political representation. Secondly, the Native Affairs Department's (NAD) efforts to "modernise" african agricultural production, in order to make reserve areas economically viable and ecologically sustainable and in achieving these goals, develop the "native mind". Thirdly, the NAD's attempt to assert administrative control over the settlement of "natives" in the reserved areas. Fourthly, the process of controlling urbanisation and distributing african labour between (white owned) farms, mines and manufacture. These processes can be periodised as follows:

1902 - 1927: The South African Native Affairs Commission defined the "native" as "tribal", with a legitimate claim to (some) political autonomy on their "ancestral lands". Within this
scheme, the state was defined as paramount chief of the "tribes" and administration was personalised through a network of Native Commissioners. A "Released Area" was defined for "native" settlement by the Beaumont and Stubbs Commissions, who "balanced" the claims of chiefs, white farmers and the mining industry. An ethic of "sympathetic paternalism", combined with a shortage of resources, resulted in a relatively non-interventionist NAD.

1927 - 1936: Under the leadership of Major J.F. Herbst, the NAD began to be constituted around the principles of efficiency, bureaucratic centralisation and administrative uniformity. With these principles, came the search for objective and scientific criteria on which to base policy decisions. To this end, "expert" scientists were employed to formulate policy. These principles encroached on the autonomy of Native Commissioners, as the Department insisted that policy be organised around reified definitions of "tribe" (drawn from "scientific" ethnography), rather than the "man on the spot's" personal experience and discretion.

In the 1930s, when the policy of reserved lands was broadly accepted as a fact of life, the Native Economic Commission explicitly introduced the concept of "development" as a key element in the segregationalist discourse. The Commission attributed the apparent ecological degradation of the Reserves to the "primitive mentality" of the "native mind" which was in turn a consequence of the "tribal system". It was now the state's moral responsibility to transform that mentality through education around agriculture and hygiene. Agriculturally viable reserve areas would, the Commission argued, create a class of full-time farmers in the reserves, a settled urban working class, and a class of "casual" migrant workers. The NAD employed a new brand of experts, agricultural officers, to perform the task of transforming agriculture in the reserves. Although there was an apparent incompatibility between the
principles of "tribalisation" and that of "development", the NAD was to implement both policies over the next forty years (albeit not without contradictions). In Bushbuckridge, where the Released Area was predominantly privately owned, state intervention remained limited to granting four chiefs "personal" civil jurisdiction over their followers and attempting (largely unsuccessfully) to control movements into the Released Area.

1936 - 1954: The creation of the South African Native Trust marked the moment when the NAD had (potentially at least) direct control over the settlement of households on Trust land, and could grant chiefs a statutory authority and exclusive jurisdiction over an area of land. However, the aims of ecological sustainability (and "development") and that of incorporating the chieftainship into the administration were contradictory. Betterment, combined with the ideal of "full administrative control", involved transferring control of the allocation and organisation of land away from the chief's Kgoro to the Agricultural Officers and Native Commissioners. Rather than create a class of full-time farmers, administrative uniformity demanded that each household be allocated identical access to resources. However, as evictions from forestry land and white-owned farms escalated, the amount of agricultural and grazing land became increasingly incapable of (even on paper) securing household subsistence needs. When the National Party came to power in 1948, it referred these problems to the Tomlinson Commission to investigate.

1954 - 1967: The ideologues of Apartheid, or "conservative traditionalists", had a particular understanding of the constitution of society in general, and black society in particular. Drawing on christian nationalist theology, the ideologues believed that differences in culture and nation were divinely ordained and therefore insurmountable. The role of the state was to
recognise these differences and create the conditions under which each discrete culture could advance as a whole to statehood, without losing its (intrinsic) identity. African society was understood to be composed of discrete "tribes", consisting of a chief, a homogenous ethnic group and a area of land. In 1951, legislation covering the establishment of Tribal Authorities, which gave chiefs jurisdiction over definitive areas of land, was passed. However, the administrative responsibilities of the Tribal Authorities remained vague as Commissioners and Agricultural Officers continued to allocate land.

While the principle of administrative control over settlement was retained, that of economic self-sufficiency was practically (although not formally) dropped. The implementation of Chapter Four, a policy designed to distribute labour tenants amongst rich and poor farmers, and to abolish rent tenancy, led to a flood of people into (already stretched) reserve areas. Betterment gave way to "loose-planning" as households were organised into "village settlements" without access to agricultural land. Rather than act as guardians of communal tenure, most recognised chiefs became distributors of patronage as they assisted in the distribution of the little agricultural land available.

1967 - 1990: The mid sixties saw the establishment of the first self-governing, ethnically based Bantustan. The population in the Bantustans doubled and doubled again as influx controls tightened, labour tenancy was almost eradicated, and the Urban Areas Act was enforced. Apartheid ideology refused to recognise the permanence of black people in the urban areas, hence the Bantustans were (supposed to be) the home for all blacks. Almost all attempts to make the Bantustans agriculturally viable or economically self-sufficient were dropped. Hence, the role of Tribal Authorities was essentially one of maintaining
administrative and political control, or risk having the chief minister withdraw chiefly recognition. Within these parameters chiefs had considerable leeway in the administration of their authorities. The Bantustan state accorded the chief the status of both administrator and sole legitimate political representative of their "subjects". As administrators, the Tribal Authorities had the power to give, or deny, permission for the delivery of services, resulting in a personalised and discriminatory service provision. Furthermore, given the vague definition of administrative responsibilities, bureaucrats could and did deflect administrative tasks by claiming the duty lay with another Department. Additionally, Tribal Authorities and Departments were accountable to Legislative Assemblies, a body dominated by chiefs. This gave Tribal Authorities, in particular, further indemnity from administrative accountability.

Within this context, patronage and corruption thrived. Where administration was personalised, bureaucrats struggled to forge alliances within and outside of the bureaucracy, in order to secure opportunities to accumulate wealth. Chapter Five illustrated how the Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme was initially a product of Betterment policies to be managed solely by the Agricultural Department. However, when Tribal Authorities were imposed over the administration of the scheme, administrative confusion predominated, and the space for independent organisation within civil society was closed. Within this vacuum, bureaucrats from different departments struggled to dominate the administration of the Scheme, and in doing so, sought to create opportunities to accumulate wealth through bribes and the control of marketing farmer's produce.

Tribal Authorities consisted of an alliance between chiefs and their councillors. Given the pivotal role accorded chiefs, the character of the chief, and the coherence of the royal family,
was central to determining the relevance of the Tribal Authority in the administration and in
the politics of an Authority domain. Chapter Eight demonstrated how differences between
chiefs engendered distinct forms of leadership in different Tribal Authorities. In the Sethlare
Tribal Authority where the chief was extraordinarily ineffectual, and a divided royal family
jostled for power, school principals stepped in to take a leadership role in a time of crisis,
and reassert a conservative moral order. In contrast, in the Molotele Tribal Authority, where
the chief was unusually assertive, and had been able to bolster the chieftainship by using the
Tribal Authority to forge alliances with influential businessmen and the Zion Christian
Church, the royal family lead the Sofasonke's assault on youth organisation and the Mashile
brothers.

Resistance to the Patrimonial State

Within the context of a state where administrative power and political authority were fused,
residents struggled to obtain administrative rights from the bureaucracy. Leaders also
struggled to create a space where they could represent a constituency in civil society to the
state in order to secure these rights. However, in challenging the patrimonial functioning of
the Bantustan state, these leaders found themselves in conflict with an alliance of chiefs,
councillors, principals, bureaucrats from Bantustan Departments ranging from the police force
to the Department of Agriculture, businessmen and other would be patrons.

Chapter Five outlined the career of Willis Ngobe, a successful farmer, to illustrate the politics
of local leadership within the context of a predatory bureaucracy. Resistance to arbitrary
bureaucratic control was (partially) achieved through the formation of an "underground"
network called the "Big Five" which came to dominate the various farmer's committees. Having established access to the regional bureaucracy through the Mashile brothers, the "Big Five" were able to hold agricultural officers accountable for various corrupt activities. Having shown the Agricultural Officers to be guilty of misinforming the chief, the group was then able to forge an alliance with the Tribal Authority. The leader of the "Big Five", Ngobe, did not accept any formal positions as this could have been construed as a challenge to the chief, but rather acted as a mediator between residents and the different committees and Departments. Ultimately, however, the strategy of forming the "Big Five" was caught in the contradiction of depending on a group of individuals to discipline a system that functioned by personalising political processes. A member of the "Big Five" used his position to create divisions within the group, and then to accumulate wealth. Unable to engender a political environment where his farming activities could prosper, Ngobe withdrew from the formal economy and became a herbalist.

The activities of Matsiketsane Mashile and his brother, Sekgopela, were a second source of resistance to the patrimonial functioning of the Bantustan state. The brothers used their positions as Members of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly to by-pass Tribal Authorities and the magistrate, and, in publicly exposing corrupt activities, formed a means of holding the local bureaucracy accountable for their actions. The Mashiles succeeded in getting Agricultural Officers, school principals, member of the police force and magistrates "transferred" for corruption. The brothers also facilitated the formation of organisations, such as the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee, who were also able to make representations to the Bantustan government. However, like the patrimonial state, Matsiketsane Mashile presented two faces: On the one hand, his claim to leadership was based on his resistance to a racially
oppressive state. On the other hand, his claim to leadership was based on his authority as an (unrecognised) Pulana chief struggling for his chieftainship and for sectarian Pulana nationalist objectives. Seen from within the perspective associated with the latter claim, all Matsiketsane's activities against the state were interpreted as part of a (personal) campaign to claim the chieftainship, thus personalising Matsiketsane's endeavours.

Leaders of organisations associated with the national liberation movement also did not transcend patrimonial politics. Jacques Modipane, the chair of the Sethlare Crisis Committee, isolated himself from the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee, established his position as the foremost authority on the "struggle" in Brooklyn, took effective control of the Youth Congress, and then embarked on a populist campaign against the Tribal Authority and some school principals. Modipane ensured that if any political campaign was going to be waged in Brooklyn, it was going to be done through him, and it would not challenge his personal control over the Youth Congress. In this sense, Modipane personalised organisations associated with the national liberation struggle. However, following from his historical association with Matsiketsane, Modipane's activities were also perceived by the recognised chiefs within the rhetoric of chiefly politics: Modipane was Matsiketsane's "induna", whose primary goal was to overthrow the recognised chief and place Matsiketsane (or himself) in that position.

Ngobe, Matsiketsane Mashile, and Jacques Modipane were, as a result of their leadership roles, attacked and almost killed. The three leaders were opposed by remarkably similar alliances, composed of chiefs, councillors, headmen, businessmen, members of the bureaucracy and principals. Underlying these alliances was a common interest in maintaining
the patrimonial character of the state. There were however, illuminating differences between the three assaults: Ngobe was stoned by youths, whereas Matsiketsane and Modipane were attacked by elderly people for (ostensibly) either "using" youth organisations to claim the Sethlare chieftaincy, or leading (or at least condoning) the actions of the Youth Organisation that many residents found offensive. Hence, the alliance against Mashile and Modipane was forged around an attempt to bolster generational authority, whereas the people aligned against Ngobe, were (implicitly) willing to tolerate youth organisation when it served their interest. The relationship between youth politics and factional conflicts will be explored in a later section.

The Ethnic Violence and the South African State

Theories of "tribe" assume an intrinsic link between culture, nationalism, and political structure. These primordial explanations of ethnicity assert that cultures are irreducibly different, and that a subject's political affiliation will be determined ultimately by that culture. In the "african" scenario, the chieftainship represented the synthesis of culture, nation and political structure: a chief controlled a definitive physical space on which he commanded and represented a homogeneous ethnic group. Ethnic identities in this sense would be incompatible with an african nationalist political project as the primordial identities were incompatible with the "modernity" underlying a central state.

Barth redefined the terms of the debate by arguing that theories of tribe assume precisely what they were supposed to explain; that being why specific cultural practices give rise to ethnic groups. Barth argued that ethnic relationships are constituted when a cultural practice serves
as a symbol that defines and separates ethnic groups. Furthermore, Barth argued that the content of the ethnicity is not the cultural practice, but a normative judgement about people associated with that practice. The ability to impose a normative judgement as to what constitutes appropriate behaviour for members of an ethnic group (by either insiders or outsiders) is a power struggle. Periodising the changing balance of this power struggle becomes the object of analyses.

The chapter on the ethnic conflict argued that associated with Pulana and Shangaan ethnicities were ideas as to what constituted legitimate claims to land and political authority. The Pulana asserted that ownership of land came through conquest and the shedding of blood by a chiefdom. The chief, as the living representative of the most powerful lineage, possessed (on behalf of his ancestors) ultimate ownership of the conquered land. Any person, regardless of their ethnic identity, who settled on that land, would by definition be accepting their subjection to the chief. From this perspective being "Shangaan" meant being a refugee, that is someone without a historical claim to land and political authority. Having accepted land from the settled Pulana chiefs, the "Shangaans" were supposed to have accepted their (eternal) subjection to that chief. The chapter argued that the ethnic conflict was about "Shangaan" attempts to establish political autonomy, and in doing so, claim control (albeit within the structure of the Apartheid state) of land. From this perspective, the 1984 war was analyzed as a signal by the "Shangaans" that they were willing to "sacrifice blood" to secure their permanence on the land.

Periodisation of the Ethnic Conflict
1835 - 1902: During this period groups of refugees, sometimes under the leadership of a chief, arrived in the Transvaal, having fled from wars in Mozambique. These groups (with the exception of the Shangaan paramountcy which spoke "Nguni") spoke a variety of dialects, which were later classified as falling under the generic category of "Tsonga" by the Swiss Mission. Some of these groups settled in uninhabited areas of the Lowveld, while others sought protection from, and settled under, either the Boer Republic or the Pulana chiefdoms. It is also likely that some chiefdoms entered into agreements that accommodated the demands made by both Erasmus (the Boer Native Commissioner) and the settled chiefdoms. Those refugees that settled within the domain of a Pulana chiefdom could only speak at the chief's kgoro after they had been to initiation school. There is evidence, however, of overt discrimination by some Pulanas against the refugees.

1902 - 1927: The Milner state acknowledged the right of black "tribes" to "ancestral lands", and set itself up as paramount chief of all the "tribes". Under these conditions, the Shangaan chieftainship was refused recognition by the state. Some of the Pulana chiefs fought for the "Crown", hoping (in vain) that their independence would be acknowledged. Although in theory the Pulana chiefs had a claim to the land where they were living as "ancestral lands", in practice the Beaumont and Stubbs Commission "balanced" the chiefdom's claim to land with those of white farmers and the Mining industry. The consequence was that land where some Pulana chiefs were settled fell outside of the Released Area. The Shangaan chieftainship, having been shunned by the state, forged an alliance with the Swiss Mission Church. In return for permission to set up a church and school, the Church acted a mediator between the state and the chieftainship. In 1919, historical claims to political authority were ignored in favour of bureaucratic convenience, and eleven chiefs with the biggest followings
were given personal jurisdiction over their "followers", which entitled the chiefs to try cases under "Native Law and Custom". However, given the innate conservatism of Native Commissioners during this period, and the under-resourced state of the NAD, this recognition by the Department did not significantly strengthen the chosen chiefs. Furthermore, recognition did not give chiefs power over any specific areas of land.

1927 - 1936: The restructuring of the NAD around the principle of administrative uniformity, resulted in an implicit change to the criteria under which land was allocated to "tribes". Drawing on the anthropological theory of the day, the notion of "tribe" became a rigid administrative unit consisting of a chief, a homogenous ethnic following and a piece of land. Hence, the presence of a chief with an ethnic support base was sufficient criteria for a claim to land. However, before 1936, the NAD did not have the capacity to organise settlement along "tribal lines" as the Department had almost no control over privately owned land (on which the majority of people in Bushbuckridge were settled). As a consequence, chiefly recognition gave four chiefs (one per ethnic group) "personal jurisdiction" over any of their "followers" in Bushbuckridge, but did not effectively enhance their powers.

1936 - 1951: With the invention of the South African Native Trust in 1936, the NAD was able to control settlement patterns with greater affectivity. Given this increased control, and the principles of uniformity and centralisation, Native Commissioner Ted Ramsay, drew up a settlement plan that allocated chiefs specific areas of land-along rigidly "tribal lines". Although the plan was adopted by the Department, the fact that the Trust only owned fragments of land in the Released Area, and that chiefly recognition remained centred around judicial purposes, the adoption of the plan did not immediately give chiefs a (chiefly)
administrative monopoly on the designated "tribal area". The establishment of the SANT also saw the implementation of Betterment, a policy that implicitly subverted chiefly powers over the allocation of residential and agricultural land. Chiefs responded to these developments in different ways. The Shangaan chief, an articulate and christianised product of the Swiss Mission, forged an alliance with the local bureaucracy, and assisted in the implementation of Betterment (in such a way as to reconstruct the chieftainship despite the problems inherent in "collaboration"). In contrast, the Pulana chiefs tried to actively resist intrusion into their autonomy, or passively did not cooperate with the NAD. The "Sotho" chiefdoms continued to boycott school and church. In ethnically heterogenous areas on the Lowveld, residents chose which chief they wanted to try their cases. There was not evidence of ethnic discrimination at any chief's court in these settlements.

1951 - 1972: The legislation of Tribal Authorities in 1951 granted chiefs distinct areas of land to administer. Initially, state policy did not recognise the "Shangaans / Tsongas" as an ethnic group. In response, "Tsonga" and "Shangaan" chiefs started a campaign to win recognition as an ethnic group, and with it, the right to a Territorial Authority. The campaign was successful after the Tomlinson Commission definitively changed the criteria for organising segregation from spatial to ethnic lines. Drawing on Christian National theology, the Commission's starting point was that God made different cultures, and it was the state's role to recognise these differences and create conditions within which the "cultures" could develop into "nations". Because of the ethnic heterogeneity, and the absence of any clear chief's areas, in Bushbuckridge, Tribal Authorities only began to be established in 1963. In an ethnically heterogenous area, the allocation of definitive areas to chiefs met with immediate resistance from Matsiketsane Mashile, who demanded recognition as chief in an area granted to "chief"
Mnisi, a "Shangaan". Following Mashile's deportation, overt resistance ceased. Ethnic tensions did however, surface over the allocation of land to Tribal Authorities, the provision of "Sotho" in Shangaan Tribal Authority schools and vice versa, and over a speech made by the chair of the Shangaan Territorial Authority, in which it was claimed that the Lowveld historically belonged to the "Shangaans."

1972 - 1985: The establishment of ethnically based Legislative Assemblies dictated that land be allocated to a Bantustan according to the ethnic composition of the people settled on that land, regardless of the ethnic affiliation of the historically recognised chief. This lead to Chief Mathibela "losing" three "farms" that had been under his jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the above principle was not applied consistently: Farms with a predominance of "Shangaans" were allocated to Lebowa if their allocation to Gazankulu would result in an ethnic "island" and vice versa. Wards of the Dingleydale Irrigation Scheme, which were previously allocated to the Shangaan Tribal Authority, were arbitrarily reallocated to Lebowa. "Shangaans" resident in predominantly Pulana settlements in Lebowa were victimised and told to go back to Mozambique. Pulanas living in predominantly "Shangaan" settlements in Gazankulu were told to go "back to the mountains". Schools stopped teaching in the language of the "other" Bantustan. In 1977, at the Uys Commission of enquiry, the Pulana delegation reiterated their refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of Apartheid boundaries, or of a "Shangaan" claim to land and political authority. The "Shangaan" delegation, in turn - drawing on the logic of separate development - claimed large chunks of Mapulaneng. Although a relative calm followed the decisions of the Uys Commission, any resolution achieved by that Commission in fixing boundaries was shattered by the 1984 Consolidation Commission. These adjustments culminated in the border war. In relation to the state, the violence can be understood as an
attempt to ensure that the state would no longer autocratically redraw boundaries.

Ethnic Nationalism and African Nationalism

Another approach to ethnicity assumes that ethnic identities are constructed by the state, as part of a strategy of "divide and rule" so as to maintain the dominance of a race or a class. In this scheme, ethnic histories and identities are myths propagated from "above", accepted and manipulated by some members of the subordinate group's elite when it serves their interests, and (more or less) passively accepted by the majority of the oppressed classes (who suffer from a chronic false consciousness). Within this functionalist and instrumentalist framework it is not possible for ethnic identities to be mobilised as part of an african nationalist project, (in opposition to the ethnically organised state).

The argument in Chapter Four turns this scheme on its head. In contrast to the argument that the state constructed ethnic divisions, the chapter argues that ethnic struggles determined the relationship between various ethnic groups and the state. The "Shangaan" chieftainship forged an alliance with the state, and by appropriating the principles of "separate development", were able to secure their rights to land and political authority (rights the Pulana chiefs wished to deny them). In contrast, the Pulana rejected principles of "separate development" and argued instead that the "Shangaans", with the assistance of an ethnically biased state, had robbed them of their land. The chapter argued that underlying the 1984 border-war was a struggle around what constitutes legitimate access to political authority. Yet, despite the fact that the Pulana were involved in ethnic conflict, this did not mean that Pulana ethnicity was incompatible with african nationalist struggles. The following chapter investigated this
apparent antinomy.

Chapter Five argued that the relationship between Pulana ethnicity and political affiliation was diffuse. Given their position on the edges of the Swazi, Pedi, Shangaan polities and the Boer Republic in the nineteenth century, the Pulana chiefdoms remained small and fragmented. The more significant chiefdoms entered into alliances with opposing forces: Kolwyn with the Boer Republic and Maripe with the Pedi polity. Inter chiefly competition prevented the emergence of any unified ethnic nation. Secondly, the Pulana chiefdoms were built around the principle of chiefly, rather than ethnic affiliation. Provided a subject extended his loyalty to a chief, he was entitled to settle in the chiefdom. Initiation school constituted the barrier to full citizenship. The consequence of this principle was that Pulana chiefdoms were characterised by ethnically heterogenous populations.

The Apartheid state's model of "tribe" and the policy of separate development built on that model, which assumed an intrinsic link between ethnicity and political affiliation, clashed with the above principles employed by the Pulana chiefs. As far as the Pulana chiefs were concerned, the policy denied these chiefs ownership of land that was rightfully theirs. Hence, it was in the Pulana interest to sever the link between ethnicity and access to state power. The only way they could achieve this, (particularly in the context of a state that only recognised ethnic representatives) was by mobilising as an ethnic group against the Apartheid state. However, finding a leader to represent Pulana nationalist aspirations was no simple task. There were several recognised Pulana chiefs, most of whom claimed they were the paramount. Furthermore, by accepting Tribal Authorities, the recognised chiefs had distanced themselves from the principles on which the Pulana claim to land was based. Matsiketsane
Mashile, an unrecognised chief, who had been jailed in 1960 for activities associated with the African National Congress, and banished for fifteen years in 1963 for resisting Tribal Authorities, rose to become representative of the Pulana nationalist claims to land.

Mashile's claim to the Sethlare chieftaincy, a chieftaincy Matsiketsane considered to be paramount of the Pulana chiefs, gave him the authority (as a guardian of the land on behalf of his ancestors) to represent Pulana claims to land where those claims hinged on a model of chieftainship. Mashile built his status as a chief "because of the people" by forming a burial society, an apostolic church, linking up with a migrant association and winning a seat on the Lebowa Legislative Assembly (and using that position to oppose the bureaucracy).

In the process of doing what he could to thwart the Lebowa government, Matsiketsane forged an alliance with a group of Pulanas whose opposition to apartheid was based on their exclusion from state power because of their race. These Pulana, who lead the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee, were linked to the national liberation movement, and mobilised residents around national campaigns. Mashile used his position as a member of parliament to facilitate the formation of sub-branches of the Committee. The presence of many Pulana nationalist leaders on these sub-branches was a further indicator of the compatibility between the Pulana nationalist agenda and that of the MCC.

The alliance between the Crisis Committee and Matsiketsane was not without contradictions. The Crisis Committee forged an alliance with Matsiketsane because he was a Member of Parliament. Although Mashile's claim to the chieftainship was irrelevant to his leadership status as far as the Crisis Committee was concerned, to many residents and to the recognised
chiefs, Matsiketsane was using the Crisis Committee to reconstruct his chieftainship. In this way, organisations associated with the national liberation movement became enmeshed in local politics around the chieftainship, and were perceived by many "Shangaans" as part of a programme to further Pulana interests.

Alongside the Crisis Committee, youth organisations formed rapidly throughout Mapulaneng. These youth organisations, conceptualised by the African National Congress as the "vanguard of the struggle" for national liberation, immediately went about attacking witches. The following section analyses the politics of youth organisation in relation to the idea that the youth were privileged bearers of a national consciousness.

**African Nationalism and Youth Politics**

Seekings argues that there were two stereotypes of youth organisation in the eighties.¹ The sympathetic stereotype portrayed the youth as politicised and militant, as people committed to the attainment of justice and liberation. The hostile stereotype portrayed the youth as destructive, rebellious, impulsive and intrinsically violent. Underlying the positive stereotype is an assumption that the youth were responding to a national situation, underlying the negative image is the idea that the youth were asserting their power in the local context to achieve their sectarian goals. The evidence from Bushbuckridge seems to suggest that both of these stereotypes were accurate (and wrong).

Chapter Seven and Eight argued that the youth conceptualised themselves as the "guardian of the nation" and as such, saw it as their duty to purify the "community" of divisive
elements and to lead the struggle against apartheid. It was argued that the youth, as privileged bearers of national consciousness, imposed a moral economy that defined morality in terms of the extent to which an action contributed to the struggle against apartheid. The following sections analyze this political project in relation to its effects on chiefly and factional conflicts, and on gender and generational relations. In doing so, it offers a number of prisms through which to understand, and assess the activities of, youth organisation.

The "Youth" as a Historical Category

The status of initiated but unmarried men has, for at least the last seventy years been ambiguous. Before youths had access to the migrant labour market, they were dependent on their fathers for brideswealth in order to get married, and before they were married they (legally) remained the responsibility of their father. Although they were initiated, which gave them the status of men, their right to talk at the Kgoro was severely restricted. Access to income through migrant labour meant that young men could save sufficient resources to enter into marriages of their choice, at a time of their choice. Consequently, the delay between initiation and marriage decreased.

The institution of initiation was transformed as chiefs became marginal to the administration of the district in the forties. As initiation schools became increasingly commercialised, many schools no longer integrated their students into a specific chiefdom. Youth leaders (who used to be chosen from the royal family) were now chosen at the discretion of the principal of the school.

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The implementation of loose planning and village settlements in the sixties, freed boys and young men from the requirement to herd cattle and facilitated a massive growth in school attendance. This increased the period between initiation and marriage for most young men. The significance of initiation decreased as a new social hierarchy, based on a person's level of education, was constituted. Literacy became associated with enlightenment and the national context, while illiteracy was identified with parochialism and backwardness. Given that most parents were illiterate, the education hierarchy contradicted its generational counterpart. Youths who left school in the eighties, but who failed to find employment, were marginal in the household, and had to compete with salaried migrants for women. Moreover, they were practically denied a political voice.

These youths faced a disjuncture between the ideals of chiefly, generational and gender authority, and their experience of Tribal Authorities, migrant fathers, school teachers and women. This incongruity was accepted by their parents, and as a consequence, the youth were supposed to unquestioningly accept the judgement of their elders. But, as literate men who "understood" the national situation, and as initiated men, who were prepared to protect the nation, the youth decided to act. And it was in this historical juncture that the formation of youth organisation needs to be understood.

Youth Organisation as Unifiers of the Nation

The first stage of the youth's programme against the Apartheid state consisted of building unity by "purifying the nation" of divisive and evil people, namely witches, poisoners and abortionists. Once unity had been achieved the onslaught against the Apartheid state proper
could begin. Chapter Seven analyzed what it meant for the youth to attack these people.

Two approaches to analysing witchcraft accusations have dominated anthropological literature on witchcraft accusations. These were an instrumentalist approach (where the idiom of witchcraft accusations was employed to determine broader conflicts) and an immanent approach (where beliefs in witchcraft were employed to explain experiences and people are understood to act on the basis of those beliefs). Whereas the first approach understands witchcraft accusations as a reflection of broader divisions, the latter sees witchcraft accusations as constitutive of those divisions. There is, however, a third approach which asks the question: under what conditions will a witchcraft accusation against an individual be accepted as true or rejected as false? In a world where the outcome of any event is ultimately and necessarily determined by a supernatural sanction, an individual can turn to ancestral forces (through sacrifice and keeping to the culture), positive magic (in the form of medicines which will transfer the power of the ingredients to the user), and the malicious magic of witchcraft (where harm is caused to a second party in order for the user to achieve the desired goal). In this context, where the use of one of these practices goes without saying, the question is which practice was employed. The analyst then poses the question: why is it believed (albeit by a limited group of people) that an individual employs one practice, rather than another, in achieving super-natural support for their goals? From this perspective, the assertion that an individual employs one practice rather than another, defines that individual as either moral and cultural or immoral and alien. These labels are not an idiom, but constitute the definition of who is moral and who is not. The anti-witchcraft movement is then conceptualised as the public disciplining of people involved in (what the accusers understand to be) these immoral practices.
Drawing on the first perspective, Niehaus argued that the anti-witchcraft movement could "best be understood as an attempt to eliminate misfortune, perform a valuable social service and thereby attain political legitimacy". By "protecting" residents from witches, an achievement that the chief (within the structure of the Tribal Authority) was incapable of realising, the youth both purified the "community" and verified their claim to political power. Yet although the youth organisation might have believed it was acting in the general interest, the fact that the youth did not follow established procedures for proving the guilt or innocence of a witch accusation meant that doubts could be cast on the legitimacy of the attacks. Furthermore, hundreds of elderly people fled into the mountains in fear of attack, whilst the Shatale Youth Congress, as well as families of (some of) the victims, alleged that the witchcraft accusations were used to resolve political or household disputes.

These doubts opened up the space to investigate the meaning of the anti-witchcraft movement in relation to private or personal conflicts. The chapter argued that these conflicts related to the moral economy of gender and generational relations within the household. It was argued that the diverse household structures reflected the balance of gender and generational power within a household given the transformative effects of the migrant labour market, the implementation of betterment policies, the massive extension of education to both males and females and the local labour market. At stake was the right of young married couples to establish their own households, or when this was not economically viable, for a migrant's wife to control her own labour as well as the migrant remittance.

Yet, the instrumentalist explanation does not explain the widespread belief, amongst both youths and adults, that the accused were in fact guilty of practising witchcraft. This introduces
the third approach which understands witchcraft accusations within the context of the politics of labelling. The chapter shows how, in certain conditions, certain relationships, characterised as immoral by a section of the rural population, gave rise to private witchcraft accusations, which became broadly accepted, and resulted in certain people being perceived as a threat to the entire "community". The anti-witchcraft movement thus disciplined people for practising witchcraft, and stood as a warning for other people involved in "immoral" relationships, that they too could be attacked for practising witchcraft.

On the issue of poisoners, it was argued that there is a strong association between witchcraft and poisoners. For example, a day witch is defined as a person who uses herbs / poisons to achieve their goals. Nevertheless, the accusation of poisoner did evoke a specific image, that of the shebeen. The shebeen was a place where fathers spent their money on alcohol and women (instead of in the household). Furthermore, the establishment of a shebeen was a crucial survival strategy for female headed households. Targeting poisoners thus discouraged women from establishing shebeens and acted as a threat to established shebeen owners that any misfortune associated with their enterprise would have violent repercussions.

On the question of abortionists, Chapter Seven argued that within an imaginary where the social, natural and supernatural were intrinsically linked, women were conceptualised as existing of the margins of the social. As producers of children, women were ultimately at the mercy of the prolific and potentially uncontainable forces of reproduction. Hence, by confining women to their father's or husband's household, and by socialising women to work, generational authority was reproduced and social order was retained. Women who broke out of their cultural role, by, for example, migrating to the cities, demanding "too much"
education, dominating their husbands, publicly taking on lovers, establishing their own households, were stigmatised as prostitutes, that is women who had regressed to their sexual beings. And women who indulged in sexual intercourse but did not produce children, were not only prostitutes, but abortionists. Hence by threatening to punish abortionists, the youth were reasserting the definition of women as bearers of children. To this end they had elderly support and could be accepted as the guardians of the nation. However, the struggle against Apartheid dictated that it was the moral duty of women to produce children. And it was the role of Youth Organisation to ensure that this national prerogative was performed. At this point the youth and the elder generation came into conflict. Parents believed sexual access to women was legitimate in so far as it was part of the process of socialising women and hence reproducing the household. The youth, in contrast, wanted to make women pregnant; theirs was an assertion of male power, but without elderly controls.

Youth Organisation and Chiefly / Patronage Politics

Within the context of the patrimonial state, factional politics (amongst married men) revolved around people with access to the bureaucracy (who struggled to maintain their pivotal positions) and those excluded from these networks (who either tried to discipline the bureaucracy, or become part of the bureaucratic networks). Often, but not always, these struggles took the form of secession disputes for the chieftaincy or other "traditional" leadership positions, as such disputes both gave the claimant the authority to represent his subjects (by virtue of blood) and, when the claim was successful, access to the bureaucracy. Youth organisations invariably, formally or informally, forged an alliance with one of these factions. In contrast to the notion that youth organisation had privileged access to a national
consciousness, youth organisations did not necessarily choose the faction struggling against the bureaucracy, but rather chose the faction that was willing to accede to their generational demands. For example, when Ngobe was attacked the youth were influenced by an alliance (amongst parents) that was strikingly similar to the alliance that constituted the Sofasonke Civic Union. In both cases, members of the bureaucracy did what they could to give the assailants indemnity from the law. Further evidence of the link between youth organisation and factional politics can be gleaned from the anti-witchcraft attacks. In some of these instances, youths were influenced by the recognised chiefs, by unrecognised chiefs involved in succession disputes and by "headmen" (involved in local level power struggles with deposed "headmen") to attack their political rivals.

The Youth as the Vanguard of the Struggle

Certain activities of the youth congresses were aimed at the corrupt, inefficient and oppressive performance of the Bantustan state and its bureaucracy. The Brooklyn Youth Congress targeted principals who could not account for school building funds. The Congress challenged the Tribal Authority around the collection of water supply taxes given that the water supply remained patently inadequate. Only looking at these issues, however, obscures the question of on what basis the Youth Congress constituted its authority to carry out these campaigns, and then based on that authority, how the Congress implemented its crusade.

Having privileged access to the workings of Apartheid, and leading the struggle against the system, Chapters Seven and Eight show how the youth defined a new social hierarchy based on this position. By claiming the authority to attack witches, the youth replaced the
chieftainship as political centre of the "community" and ensconced themselves as the "guardian of the nation". By defining their parents as illiterate, and hence "backward" and unable to understand the national situation, the youth organisation justified marginalising parents from the political process. By claiming that teachers and principals could not be trusted either because they were too intellectual (and hence out of touch) or because they were "part of the system" the youth justified the abolition of corporal punishment (as people who were part of the system could not administer punishment justly), and the exclusion of teachers from political meetings.

Not surprisingly, these claims to authority, and the license that the youth gave themselves, resulted in youth organisation increasingly antagonising many residents. Youth leaders (and their parents) labelled as witches any residents who questioned their activities. Sjambock wielding youths forced parents to attend political meetings and protest marches. Under the banner of Operation Production, youths impregnated school girls. Perceiving priests and the Bible as a source of moral authority that challenged their hegemony, youths sung freedom songs at night vigils and funerals. Members of the Brooklyn Youth Organisation took over the running of Maripe High School (when they were not enforcing school boycotts), rendering powerless both principals and teachers.

It was these activities that gave birth to Sofasonke, an organisation committed to the reimposition of chiefly, generational and school authority.

Epilogue
With the unbanning of the African National Congress in 1990, the political landscape in South Africa underwent a radical change. To describe the effects of these changes on the political culture of Bushbuckridge would take another chapter. So, in this concluding section, I will briefly (and suggestively) describe what has happened to some of the key figures outlined in the thesis.

Lawrence Mogakane, the President of the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee, in 1990 went on a (largely) successful campaign to establish Civic Associations in Mapulaneng and Mhala. He became President of the Bushbuckridge Civic Association. He also assisted (with two other members of the MCC) in the establishment of a Resource Centre in Shatale that, by 1993, had a legal advice section, a library and a media section. He was then transferred by his employers to Pretoria. He resigned from all political positions, but continued to monitor organisations and intervene when he believes it necessary. The former Treasurer of the MCC took over Mogakane's position as President of the Bushbuckridge Civic Association.

With the change in political climate, Ngobe returned to farming in mid 1993. However, he spread his risk: he continued to practice as a herbalist, his cattle herd was growing by the month, and he farmed a diverse range of crops. He has refused positions on any political organisation.

By 1993, Matsiketsane Mashile was struggling for his political life. The African National Congress strategically prioritised coopting recognised chiefs onto the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa. However, the "Shangaan" chiefs refused to share a platform with him because of his reputation as a Pulana chauvinist, and most of the Pulana chiefs were
threatened by him because of his claim to be paramount. A senior position on the African National Congress was closed to him for similar reasons.

On the other hand, Jacques Modipane (the former coordinator of the Bushbuckridge Youth Congress) moved from strength to strength. He is, at the time of writing, the vice-chairperson of the ANC in the Eastern Transvaal.
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—HNK Archives of the Chief Native Commissioner, Pietersburg.

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—NTS Archives of the Department of Native Affairs.

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The following table (based on tax cards) taken from van Warmelo’s *Preliminary Survey of Bantu Tribes* illustrates the ethnic composition of the followings of different chiefs in 1934.

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<th>Shangaan</th>
<th>Nhlanganu</th>
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### Shangaan Chiefs

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Appendix Two: Genealogy of the Pulaea Chiefs
Appendix Three

Geneology of the Shangaan Chieftainship

Sochangana

Muzila     Mawewe

Nghunghunyana

Buyisonto     Thulamahashe

Mafemana     Kheto
Map One
REGIONAL SETTING

Map Two

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Tribal Authorities in Mapuani

Map Four
Map Five

Mhala and the AmaShangana Tribal Authority
One - represents ten taxpayers