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Lessons of Durban Riots

T G Ramamurthi

The Durban riots were not an expression of permanent antagonism between Indians and native Africans but an explosion of deeper frustrations in a society where rapid urbanisation and forced proletarianisation had subjected large sections of both communities to 'conscious poverty', which meant inability to pay for a home or for adequate food and clothing.

THE Durban Riots have haunted Indian-African relations ever since their occurrence in 1949. There had not been such organised rioting against Indians during the preceding 75 years of their residence in Natal, nor have any comparable incidents of anti-Indian violence occurred in the next four-and-a-half decades. They have been, and are still, cited as convincing demonstration of the existence of 'the conditions of rivalry' between the Indians and Africans, especially in Natal, and, therefore, of the 'failure of conciliation' attempted by the Indian and African Congresses since the mid-40s. Both within and outside the Indian community, critics of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) policy since 1946 to promote Indian-African goodwill and a joint front against white minority rule have invoked the Durban riots in support of their stand that the partnership envisaged in the Doctors' Pact of 1947 was an 'intellectual concept' incapable of overcoming long-standing antipathies. The question, therefore, arises whether the 1949 riots were 'a symbol of African antagonism against Indians' or 'an abnormal eruption symbolic of a frustrated and abnormal society'.² The answer may provide a clue to the contemporary dilemma of the Indian South Africans.

SINISTER HAND

That the riots were a spontaneous outburst of long-standing grievances was the impression which the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the South African government (SAG) tried to convey by carefully chosen words: "The spark which caused this tragic explosion was almost ludicrous in its insignificance". In the description of the alleged incident in which "the Natives saw an adult Indian attack a Native child" and "went berserk and attacked every Indian within sight", the insinuation that 'the Native' was still primitive and unreasoning in his reactions was combined with the suggestion that there was 'accumulated resentment' comparable to a powder-keg waiting only for a 'spark' to go into 'explosion'. But, competent contemporary observers—like Maurice Webb, then director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Margaret

Ballinger, one of the white MPs representing the Natives, Sam Kahn the communist MP, Manilal Gandhi who had by then stayed for nearly half a century in South Africa—were agreed that while the riots were unprecedented, unexpected, unusual and curious, there was nothing inherently combustible in Indian-African relations in Natal.

Webb has noted that though "responsible observers of inter-racial affairs in South Africa had for two years warned that inter-racial tensions were dangerously high throughout the country, ...no one expected the outbreak at that place and time". Webb went on to suggest that the commission deliberately ignored "the evidence given ...by competent observers (that the) relations between the Indians and Natives in Durban were ...'friendly', 'harmonious', 'cordial'".³ Manilal Gandhi noted: "Nothing of this nature has ever been heard of in the history (of) that subcontinent. Sinister hand seems to be moving behind this whole tragic affair".⁴ Ballinger was more pointed. She found that the riots were "curious" because of "widespread claim by the Africans in justification of their attack on Indians (with whom they lived in close proximity for decades with little or no friction) that when they had dealt with the Indians they would inherit the Indians' possessions". She found them "unusual" because unlike previous incidents of personal and localised nature, the January 1949 riots were spread over several areas of the city and seemed too well-organised to have been spontaneous.⁵

Ballinger was intrigued by the reports that the Africans expected to inherit Indians' possessions and found out that not only were such promises made by the Nationalist Party candidates for Natives' representatives' seats but the ANC was officially approached with this proposition. Xuma, the ANC president pertinently asked: "What do the Indians have in the (Orange) Free State?"⁶ The Nationalist Party (NP) Natal secretary and MP, Potgieter, seeking support for his party candidate for the so-called Natives' seats in the House of Representatives, reminded the 'constituency' that "the policy of the Nationalists is to repatriate Indians. If Natives

support us in this policy, they will get benefits of Indian business and trade".⁷ That such promises were made was evident from reports in the English press that African rioters cried out to the police, "Get your ships ready for the Indians". A Zulu chief (Hlengwa) told the commission in his evidence: "Let Indians return to their country where they have self-rule and bring back to us the Europeans who are in India".⁸ R T Chary, the Indian Diplomat in Johannesburg, holding the fort for the recalled high commissioner, reported that "the main cause of the riots was the anti-Indian propaganda inspired by the Nationalist Party among the Africans, fortified by the benevolent neutrality of the police on the 13th" (January 1949), the first day of the riots.⁹ Sam Kahn believed that if the riots had been dealt with a firm hand in the beginning, as it would have been were the attacks directed against Europeans, a lot of bloodshed would have been averted. He felt that "the Natives were encouraged by the attitude of approval on the part of many Europeans" and "even some policemen".¹⁰ The deaths, damage to property and wanton assaults on Indian women and children on the first day were of a frightening scale only because of police inaction.

Webb glosses over this aspect, but betrays awareness by suggesting that "the Natives were deeply stirred" by the eventual result of the riots—"numbers had *unexpectedly* been killed or wounded by the police and other forces of government"—and reporting typical European reactions: "The Coons are going for the coolies": "I am all for the Natives. Serves the coolies right"; "the Indians had it coming" (though) "they got the wrong Indians".¹¹ Corroboration of European support, connivance and even active participation came from eyewitnesses, including a group of Indian repatriates who were interviewed by Indian secret servicemen on landing in Madras. Though they were merely availing of 'assisted emigration', in particular the temporary increase in bonus (from 20 to 40 pounds per family) announced by the NP government and not fleeing from the riots, they had lived through the tragic affair and had vivid memory of 'white goondas' supplying arms and some even blackening their faces and joining the African gangs.¹² An African journalist reported in the *Inkundla ya Bantu* how a European woman driving by assured the rioters that "the government was with them by pointing out that "the police... are not shooting you".¹³

The statistics of the casualties also showed the 'benevolent neutrality' of the police on the first day when almost all the killed were Indians while on the succeeding days almost all the killed were Natives "due in large part to the bullets of police and military, in small part to retaliatory action taken by some

Indians".¹⁴ Indeed, there was little or no retaliation from the affected sections of the Indian community—the working classes who lived cheek by jowl with Africans—and the action, if any, was taken by hired gangs at the call of the well-to-do. The final toll, according to government figures, included 137 dead (one European, 53 Indians, 83 Natives), 1,883 injured (30 Europeans, 1,085 Natives and 768 Indians).¹⁵ Besides, 1,532 dwellings, 710 stores and three factories were destroyed or damaged.¹⁶ Both Indians and Africans believed that the government figures were erroneous and too low.

ECONOMIC CAUSES

However, both the African and Indian leadership were less concerned with the number of casualties than with the sinister significance of the riots. The national leaders of both the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) acted promptly, prudently and purposefully. On January 17, A B Xuma, president of the ANC and G M Naicker, president of SAIC, accompanied by R T Chary, visited the refugee camps, mostly located in Indian schools and accommodating both Africans and Indians. While Naicker was also the Natal Indian leader. Xuma represented the ANC national body. A W G Champion, the leader of the ANC-Natal was therefore co-opted. Champion had, on the previous day, told the Durban City Council that the causes of the riots were economic and if the Indian bus operators would surrender a few licences to Africans as a gesture, the latter's resentment would diminish (Champion himself was one of the aspirants for a transport licence). It was thus understandable that during the discussions that followed the visit to the camps, Champion's was the dissenting voice while the consensus was for giving priority to the restoration of quiet and friendly relations. However, even Champion agreed with the other leaders that the riots would be used by the government and the Europeans politically to show Africans as barbarians unfit for civil rights while breaking Indian morale and preparing them for repatriation.

Chary, indeed, strove hard to convince both communities of the need to work together, though he had a little less success in this effort with the Natal section of the African leadership than with the Natal Indian sections under the leadership of the NIC. He also advised the government of India (GoI) that "statements from India should stress identity of interests of African and Indian masses in South Africa" and stressed the "need for Indians in the Union to assist and co-operate in the betterment of Africans". Chary discouraged any GoI representation to the South African government (SAG), cautioning that "our intervention for Indians only might estrange African leaders". India's sympathy, he said, should take practical form of funds for relief irrespective of race. He was also convinced that

"the joint effort of African and Indian leaders" was "the sole means of securing future good relations".¹⁷

The GoI, under prime minister Nehru's leadership, was already disposed in the same direction. In a press note issued on January 19, the GoI expressed grave concern over the tragic happenings which it felt could not have started and spread in such short time without some basic causes. In a message to the prime minister of South Africa, Malan, the prime minister of India expressed his concern "at the tragic happenings in Durban and even more so at the fact that good relations which had hitherto subsisted between the Indian and African sections of the population in South Africa should have been broken in such an unfortunate manner". The SAG was also informed that "secretary to the high commissioner for India in South Africa (was being asked) to co-operate in every possible way with local agencies for relief... and ... in promoting good relations between Indians and other sections of the population in South Africa".¹⁸ In another press statement issued on January 24, 1949, the GoI stressed that the "Immediate task is restoration of relations of mutual confidence and friendship between the two communities". In this context, the GoI made it clear that the "Government's policy has been and is to promote good relations between Indians and Africans not only in South Africa but all over the continent of Africa as they do not wish any vested interests should come in the way of advancement of African people in their own homeland". This policy was restated in the Indian constituent assembly which also functioned as the legislature, where prime minister Nehru declared:

The government of India's general policy, not only in South Africa but all over the continent of Africa has been to promote close friendship and co-operation between Indians and Africans. While earnestly desiring the security and well-being of Indians abroad, the government do not look with sympathy on the establishment of any vested interests which might retard the advance of the African people in their own homeland. This view has been frequently communicated to our representatives in the continent of Africa.

The change in GoI attitude towards Indian-African relations was taken adverse note of by the Natal English press. The *Sunday Tribune* of Durban commented: "This attitude (of advising South African Indians not to have any special interests at the cost of Africans but to help the latter to gain freedom) marks a change in the foreign policy of India which coincides with the independence of that great country. In the past, the government of India wisely chose to distinguish between the interests of Natives and the interests of local Indians. Interference on behalf of the latter, acknowledged as diplomatically correct, in no way excuses interference on behalf of the former. ... Until the war intervened to give

new impetus and direction to South African Indian political bodies, no local Indian could be found to subscribe to the views Pandit Nehru now expresses. If Hindustan's foreign policy is to include the encouragement of the new leaders of the Indian community in South Africa in their bid for a non-European front, we can be certain that South Africa will react accordingly."¹⁹

The inspiration for this threatening comment was revealed in the advice to "Indian moderates to inform Pandit Nehru of the dangers his policy was likely to create for them in this country". Chary's 'information' was that the article was contributed by GH Calpin²⁰ who was then commissioned to write the biography of the late A I Kajeje and was close to the Natal Indians Organisation (NIO). Similar views had already been given expression to by the NIO leaders who deplored the move to make common cause with the Africans as inspired by communists who were alleged to be controlling the NIC. They warned that such moves would alienate the whites and induce the government to disregard the safety and security of Indians. They alleged that the GoI was being misled by Chary who was partial to NIC leadership. They, therefore, wrote directly to prime minister Nehru to keep him informed of "the real position as it obtains in Natal". However, Chary was kept informed of the missives from NIO, TIO and SAIO with which, he was told, the GoI was not impressed.²¹

CONFLICTING PRIORITIES

Commenting on the attitude of the authorities on the question of reconciliation between the Indians and Africans, Chary informed the GoI that the Durban City Council which heard Champion on the riots with eclat declined to hear Xuma, typifying the general European preference to diminish the influence of such leaders. The national executive of the ANC earned further mistrust of the government by issuing on January 20 a statement appealing to the Africans not to allow themselves to be used by others and urging Indian leaders to restrain their people from taking any steps that might provoke future clashes.²² The ANC, moreover, called for a joint conference with the Indian Congresses, to which R T Chary was also invited "in his personal capacity, as observer".

Xuma, conveying the invitation to Chary, said: "I feel that we as leaders of the respective communities should discuss some of the things lest they be exploited to the disadvantage of both communities".²³ The task was by no means easy. ANC leaders in Natal, like Champion and Msimang, had their own priorities. When Chary talked to them before the meeting formally opened, they were full of the bus and trading licence issues. While conceding the Indian contention that the law favoured established holders, they expected the Indians to make a gesture by not opposing the issue of fresh

licences to Africans. Champion went to the extent of suggesting that only African transporters should serve African locations. They presented these views in the separate meeting of the ANC which preceded the joint meeting. Though the ANC national leaders discouraged such reactionary thinking, which amounted to acceptance of apartheid, they took note of the views and brought them to the notice of the Indian leaders at the joint meeting.

The historic joint meeting, held in Durban on February 6, 1949 to explore ways and means of restoring normalcy, discussed the immediate causes of the friction under various heads. On the economic plane, it noted the frustration among the Africans by the blocking of trade and transport licences by older and established Indian businessmen. Alleged profiteering was also pointed out. On the social front, it was alleged that the Africans found Indians generally overbearing and contemptuous and cited some instances including segregation in cinema houses reserved for non-Europeans and owned by Indians. Xuma desired the Indian side to specifically react to these points by way of assessing their correctness and helping to remove them. The SAIC conceded that there were instances of pinpricks but these were not as widespread or basic to Indian society as was made out. They reiterated that the Indian community did not intend to block the economic progress of the African people. In this context, the statement of prime minister Nehru was read out and welcomed by both sides. Champion and Msimang, however, were not content with general statements and wanted the economic causes of friction dealt with satisfactorily before decision on joint action against the basic cause could be taken. It was, therefore, agreed that the discussion regarding what was described as immediate causes should be continued between the NIC and Natal ANC.

The way cleared, the joint meeting turned its attention to the important and immediate task of restoring quiet and harmonious relations between the two communities. Three resolutions were adopted unanimously. The first traced the basic causes of the riots to the Union's political, economic and social structure based on differential and discriminatory treatment of various racial groups and the preaching of racial intolerance and hatred by people in high places. It called upon "our respective peoples (a) to view the problem in this perspective; (b) to devise means for closer co-operation and mutual goodwill through their national organisations; and (c) to stand together in the fight for liberation". The second resolution urged prime minister Malan to appoint African and Indian representatives to the Commission of Inquiry being set up. The third resolution recorded the important decision to present a *joint case* to the government commission and nominated a seven-member committee to take the necessary steps.²⁴

The presentation of joint evidence was derailed by the commission's preference to listen to doctored evidence. Webb noted that "a substantial part of the evidence presented to the commission came from large numbers of individual Natives, most of them poor, ignorant, ill-clad, (whose) evidence was tendered in terms so similar as between one witness and the next that the thought that it was prompted in some way could not fail to strike the mind of the hearer... (which) showed the need of cross-examination in the interests of truth". This 'kid-glove' critique of the commission's data admits the truth of the claim by the African and Indian Congresses' common attorney, G Lowen that there was *not* "at any stage a movement afoot on the part of Africans as a whole against Indians as a whole. Any evidence which may be led by anyone to prove such movement will have to be tested... (which) can only be done by cross-examination". But, the commission ruled out cross-examination on the grounds that it was essentially a fact-finding one. Consequently, the counsel for the ANC and SAIC as well as the Representatives of the Combined Locations Advisory Boards withdrew from the proceedings. The NIO also expressed concern over the decision on cross-examination, but led its evidence lest the Indian side of the story should go by default.²⁵ The commission dismissed the joint ANC-SAIC stand that the riots were attributable to the deeper malady of racial discrimination and differential treatment of different races as "intellectual propaganda" (meaning communist-inspired), even though responsible white witnesses, including Webbs, Senator Brookes, G H Calpin, a joint delegation of principal local churches, the Indo-European Council and several other individuals tendered similar evidence describing the riots as "a serious and tragic sign of social disease".²⁶

Nevertheless, the experience during the proceedings of the SAG's commission set the pattern for future co-ordination between the two Congresses. Assessing the outcome of the joint meeting, Chary felt that it was definitely a step forward. During his repeated visits to Durban after the riots, he had found "wide-spread resentment among the common African people" against alleged "contemptuous treatment by the Indians" during normal contacts. He found that "though the greater portion of the Indian population in Durban is also working class... there was little social contact at any stratum", while the problem was compounded "by the segregation of the Africans in locations". He appreciated African misgivings and suspicion that the Indians were now trying to make political use of the Africans. However, thanks to the free and frank exchanges at the joint meeting, that "suspicion was now considerably weakened but not yet completely removed".

Two important issues contributing to tension were transport and housing. On the question of transport, there were two as-

pects: the grievances of the travelling public and the grouse of aspiring transporters. The Commission of Inquiry noted that the grievances like discourtesy, short-changing, etc, arose from overcrowding. Since the transporters were obliged to provide services at as low a tariff as possible, overcrowding was part of the service. As the commission observed: "It would be unreasonable to demand first class service at fourth class fares". On the issue of licences, as Chary pointed out to GoI, the flaw lay with the law which permitted a veto with the established licencees. GoI expressed surprise that Indian bus owners were insisting on retention of their monopoly and advised Chary to use whatever influence he had with the NIO and NIC to induce Indian bus owners to see reason. The NIC also advised the Indian Bus Owners Association to review their stand. However, the municipal authorities attempted to keep the issue alive as a source of tension by encouraging African boycott of Indian buses and providing them with its own skeleton service. The issue died out with stricter enforcement of segregation and separate but unequal amenities under apartheid. The residual mistrust and suspicion however continued. Even though Champion welcomed GoI stand on African economic advance and even quoted Nehru at public meetings in Zulu to promote inter-racial harmony, he remained unconvinced of the local Indian middle class and as long as he was its leader, Natal ANC kept its distance from the NIC. The Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign of 1952, thus did not take off in Natal until December, when chief Albert Lutuli took over and led, along with Naicker, a mixed batch of African and Indian volunteers.

Similarly on the housing issue, the Inquiry Commission had virtually exonerated Indian property owners from charges of rack-renting and other abuses of the shortage of accommodation in Durban, but made no useful recommendations for the future. Again, the Durban City Council kept the issue alive by offering alternative sites for African housing, not from vast unoccupied areas under European ownership, but from predominantly Indian owned areas like Cato Manor. Seeing through the game, the NIC supported the development of Cato Manor for African housing, though it maintained that this was far from fair or justified. The gesture was appreciated by the ANC as "exemplary statesmanship" but was attacked by Indian propertied classes. Ironically, the Cato Manor area was eventually declared a white area in 1953 under the Group Areas Act of 1950.

NEW UNDERSTANDING

That there was no inherent combustibility in the relations between the two groups was plain when within a few weeks, "the relationship between Indians and Africans in trade and transport resumed their normal pace", belying fond forecasts in the English

press that "Africans will never buy from Indian shops again" or that "Africans will never travel on Indian buses again".²⁷ The riots were not an expression of permanent antagonism between Indians and Africans but an explosion of deeper frustrations in a society where rapid urbanisation and forced proletarianisation had subjected large sections of both the communities to "conscious poverty" which meant "inability to pay for a home or for adequate food and clothing".²⁸ Since the Africans were more numerous, the poorer sections among them were larger and more visible than among the Indians who made up a small minority. Nevertheless, "70 per cent of Durban's Indians live[d] below the poverty datum line" in 1949.²⁹

Almost one in every six Indians was affected by the riots, through bereavement, destitution, loss of home or land. On the other hand, though more numbers of Africans were killed or injured, there were fewer African refugees. The manner in which the government attended to the aftermath of the riots left the sores festering. Africans who occupied houses or land were left undisturbed unless European requirements called for it. Indians were criticised for overstay in refugee camps though very little was done to rehabilitate them. Africans continued to be tacitly encouraged to take to violence against Indians, no action being taken against the miscreants until after the damage had been done. This way, the mutual distrust of the two communities was allowed to survive and grow.

Undeterred, Indians and Africans continued to live "within reasonable bounds of amicability in Durban", as reasonable as could be expected, given the cultural, linguistic, religious and occupational differences.³⁰ The "conditions of rivalry"³¹ arose from the differential discrimination to which they were subjected. As Webb noted, "while a man of one race has to carry a pass and another not; one may purchase land, another is prohibited; one may go to a cinema and another may not; there is sure to be resentment and resulting tension".³² The remedy lay in reducing, if not fully removing, discrimination. But, this was in the hands of the government and the whites who alone had the vote. Hence, the saner sections of the two affected communities took the next best action available to them, viz, to educate their people to forge bonds "in the shared misery of economic circumstances". In the circumstances of South African society, the forging of bonds took primarily in the political field.

This was a deliberate choice made by the Indians after 1946, but was confirmed by the tragic experience of 1949. It is well known that the post-Gandhi younger generations, almost wholly born in South Africa, realised that their hapless lot owed itself not to their being Indian but to their being non-white and that their protection could not come from London or New Delhi, but from within South Africa, through their own internal strength and support from similarly situated non-whites. Thus, the Africans were seen as

the natural allies of the Indians. Durban riots showed Indians that alliance with the Africans was not an ideological luxury but a practical condition of success for both communities in their common struggle. The Indians saw that keeping aloof from the African political struggle in order to win European support for their own cause was short-sighted and self-defeating. The Africans realised that keeping aloof from Indians only served European interests and side-tracked their struggle into attacks on another unprivileged section of the population. There started "a voluntary movement from both sides towards each other".³³

It was, in this sense, that "the most significant result of the Durban riots was the growth of a new understanding, a new pact, a reorientation in outlook and attitudes, in Indo-African relations in South Africa".³⁴ It was no easy task to bring together the masses who had been set upon each other. Moreover, they had to contend with continuing manoeuvre of the authorities to exacerbate tensions. Not having succeeded in turning the Africans against the traders and landlords among the Indians, the government attempted to put the working classes in confrontation. Thus, in 1950, following the stay-at-home on June 26 in protest against the police action against workers on May day, the Durban City Council dismissed 200 Indian workers but only 80 Africans. Moreover, the council announced its decision to replace all Indians leaving municipal service with Africans in "appreciation of the responsible and loyal conduct of its bantu employees, who performed their normal duties on June 26, 1950, thereby distinguishing themselves... from the Indian political agitators". Added hurdles came by the frequent arrests or incapacitation of the leaders, depriving the people of their guidance. This meant that the decisions taken to promote interracial understanding and harmony through local committees and councils could not be monitored. Even otherwise, neither the African nor the Indian Congress was organisationally adequate. Nevertheless, the partnership between the African and Indian Congresses was no mere "intellectual concept" or confined to "racial amity among a score of national leaders".³⁵ As noted earlier, the leadership did not try to sweep under the carpet the potential areas of mistrust and rivalry but frankly and freely discussed them and attempted to look at them in the perspective of the common struggle against minority rule. The underlying strength of the partnership was demonstrated during the 50s when, notwithstanding apathy and/or indifference of other victims of apartheid, the Indian and African Congresses launched a series of non-violent mass campaigns of protest and defiance. Though by the 60s, western academics talked about "the failure of resistance" in the face of the SAG's determined onslaught, the foundations for a non-racial democratic South Africa had been laid, to be built upon in the 90s.³⁶

Notes

- 1 Robert Edward Johnson, *Indians and Apartheid in South Africa: The Failure of Resistance*, University of Massachusetts, Doctoral Dissertation (mimeo UMI), 1973, pp 107 and 112.
- 2 Fatima Meer, 'African and Indian in Durban' in *Africa South*, Vol IV, No 4, July-September 1960, p 33.
- 3 Maurice Webb, 'The Riots and After', part one, in *Race Relations Journal*, Vol XVI, No 4, 1949.
- 4 Manilal was in India at that time and gave a press statement which was conveyed by *en clair* telegram to the Indian High Commission by GoI MEA (F No 19-1-49/CT, SAP NAI).
- 5 Margaret Ballinger, 1969, pp 410-11.
- 6 *Ibid.* Also, F No 15-3-49/CT—NAI SAP (containing A Note on the Report of the Durban Riots Commission by R T Chary).
- 7 'A Note on the Durban Riots' by R T Chary, secretary to the High Commissioner for India in F No 15-3-49/Cape Town (NAI holdings, South Africa Papers).
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 From a press telegram sent from Quayamans, J'burg to Foreign, (F 19-1-49/CT, Vol I, NAI SAP), New Delhi.
- 11 Webb, op cit.
- 12 Secret Report of an Officer of the Intelligence Section based on talks with passengers arriving by M V Isipingo on May 6, 1950 at Madras (F No 97-3-50/CT, NAI SAP).
- 13 Quoted by Fatima Meer, op cit.
- 14 Webb, op cit.
- 15 Statement by Malan in Union Parliament (F No 19-1-49-NAI SAP).
- 16 Webb, op cit. Webb gives the figures of dead as 142 and injured as 1,087, which include 11 Coloureds among injured and four unidentified among dead.
- 17 Cipher Telegram from Quayamans to Foreign, New Delhi, dated January 19, 1949 (F No 19-1-49/CT NAI SAP).
- 18 Telegram dated January 22, 1949 from PRIMIN, New Delhi, to PRIMUS, Cape Town, (F No 19-1-49/CT NAI SAP).
- 19 *Sunday Tribune*, Durban, March 13, 1949, 'Nehru's Bad Advice to Union Indians' (F No 17-1-49-OSI, MEA and CR, CR wing, NAI).
- 20 Author of *There Are No South Africans*, Thomas Nelson and Sons, London, 1941, and *Indians In South Africa*, Schuter and Shooter, Pietermaritzburg, 1949.
- 21 Gundevia to Chary, April 10, 1949 (F No 17-12-49-OSI, MEA and CR-CR wing-NAI).
- 22 Press Telegram from Quayamans, J'burg to Foreign, (F No 19-1-49/CT NAI SAP), New Delhi.
- 23 Letter dated January 29, 1949 from Xuma to Chary (F No 19-1-49/CT NAI SAP).
- 24 F No 19-1-49/CT, NAI SAP.
- 25 F No 19-3-49-Part III/Cape Town, NAI SAG.
- 26 Webb, op cit, p 91.
- 27 Fatima Meer, op cit.
- 28 Webb, op cit, p 95.
- 29 *Ibid.*
- 30 Meer, op cit, p 34.
- 31 Roberts, 1973, p 107.
- 32 Webb, op cit, p 95.
- 33 Meer, op cit, p 35.
- 34 B Pachai, *The International Aspects of the South African Indian Question*, C Struik, Cape Town, 1971, p 224.
- 35 Roberts, 1973, pp 116 and 105.
- 36 See T G Ramamurthi, *Non-Violence and Nationalism—A Study of Gandhian Mass Resistance in South Africa*, Amar Prakashan, Delhi, 1993.