An African Athens

Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa

Philippe-Joseph Salazar

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Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa

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An African Athens

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Philippe-Joseph Salazar
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ABOUT THIS BOOK

What is a “rhetorical democracy” at the dawn of the new millenium? Salazar attempts an answer by proposing to analyze post-apartheid South Africa as a signal terrain for rhetoric studies. In the course of his analysis, he addresses, for example, the impact of religious oratory on the formulation of secular deliberation. He presents the rhetorical stakes of a “performative” presidency of the black empowerment presidency of Nelson Mandela.

He further contends that exposure to reconciliation and perception of communal values across racial lines provoke a dialectic between private and public advocacy. He extends his argument by analyzing the “cosmetics” of peace and of the public landscape, the images and spaces through which political deliberation and public rhetoric cluster in a human ecology of arguments regarding the very locale of a working democracy.
This study will help to put rhetoric at the center of investigations on postmodern democracy, owing to the exemplary quality of South Africa—“an African Athens.”
Series Editor’s Foreword

Charles Bazerman
University of California, Santa Barbara

Merely a decade ago, who would have thought that apartheid would end soon, without a major revolution, and a new multi-cultural regime would remake the very idea of the South African nation? Who would have imagined Nelson Mandela, as president of the country, embracing the Springbok rugby team—the former symbol of white power? Who would have imagined the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s bold amnesties at the price of confession on both sides?

In this same decade we have seen other dramatic changes of regimes, of political systems, even of economic systems. But none of them has so quickly and so solidly reconfigured the idea, range, and commitment of citizenship. And none of them has so rapidly and firmly addressed and reversed racism in the state and culture. Rather, several new states have reinvigorated ancient hostilities with savage violence.

A decade ago, many were predicting just such a bloody future for South Africa, with hatred and revenge being the legacy of long-standing racial repression. But, amazingly, a new nation was born in ges-
tures of peace and was achieved in unifying words and symbols. The new South Africa is a remarkable rhetorical accomplishment, overcoming the deep wounds of class and race, forging a multicultural nation out of the former oppressed and oppressors.

The old South Africa, while claiming to be an educated nation with a modern economy, had acted with the cruelty of the imperialism of former centuries. Then, it changed. De Klerk released Mandela, power was soon transferred. The formerly outlawed African National Congress took hold of the opportunity. Through rhetorical statecraft the long-imprisoned Nelson Mandela and his associates brought into being a remarkable new polity.

This is the story that Philippe-Joseph Salazar recounts in an *Afri
can Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa*. For over two decades a teacher and scholar at the University of Cape Town, specializing in the role of rhetoric in nation building, Salazar viewed the unfolding events through a very special lens. He noted the roots of the new nation in Tutu’s vision of religious community to be created through the rhetoric of unity and meeting of spirits. This vision was taken up by and secularized by Mandela, who pursued the vision in political and governmental arenas. As the nation came into being the evolving vision was enacted and realized through multiple cultural sites as diverse as voting registry, corporate advertising, sporting events, glamour magazines, real estate schemes, and public parks and monuments.

The lives of nations are complex, carried out in multiple scenes of daily engagements. That is why nations and national cultures are so resistant to change, no matter what drastic events wash over them.

Yet South Africa has addressed its need to change in so many arenas, communicating new visions and new ways of being citizens, that it does stand as a guiding light for the politics of the century just being born. South Africa is still a country with a continuing legacy of problems of economy, education, disease, and dispossessed individuals inured to violence. Yet it is a country that has found a path and a vision.

Salazar is right to suggest that we take the rhetorical lessons of how new national visions can be forged to bring all people into citizenship. Most of all, Salazar reminds us that rhetoric is not just of division and overcoming, but of unity and cooperation.
Preface

This volume was written at the end of 2 decades spent observing South Africa’s struggle to shape itself into a civilized society.

The first time I set foot in South Africa was on Easter Sunday 1978. The bus from the airport dropped me in midtown Pretoria. The city seemed bleached white by the hot Transvaal sun, its large and neat avenues (wide enough, I would later be told, to allow two ox wagons to turn round simultaneously) lined with dark green patches of well-tended lawns and trees. The city was deserted. I had entered a negative space of European history, where I would be testing knowledge acquired as a novice sociologist on the Sorbonne benches.

I deposited my suitcase at the oddly named Manhattan Hotel. Across the street stood a colonial-Gothic pile of what looked like a cathedral, murmurs of chants filtering through its doors. I entered it briefly, not out of devotional fervor, but as a diver goes through a decompression chamber—so as to delay and secure my immersion into the inner world of European colonial fantasies. (Just before leaving for South Africa I had read that prescient Dante had placed the bottom of his Inferno in the austral zone.) I then took a walk around the block, attracted by a quite different chant that swelled and rose, unlike the brittlely bored responses of the faithful inside the church. In the inner courtyard of the hotel, sitting in the shade, outside the kitchens, black women were also praising the Passion of the Lord, in a language I could not fathom. The sudden juxtaposition of the two chants made me realize, more brutally than any self-reflective fieldwork,
that South Africa was a world apart: A sacrificial event like the Christian Passion, supposed to unite humankind, was celebrated in two different voices, some in the comfort and glamor of churches lit by a thousand candles and suffused with frankincense vapors, others in the smells and din of kitchen yards, amid bins overflowing with the remains of the former’s repast.

I thought I was prepared to handle such dislocation until, later that afternoon, as I was walking down Pretoriusstraat, an old man who was slowly walking ahead of me—we were the only two people on the street—cautiously stepped down from the sidewalk into the gutter and paused, to let me pass. I learned later that the majority of South Africans were expected to behave that way: let the white man pass, on the sidewalk. At that point I realized racial perceptions conditioned every move, every glance, every word. I was not to be an individual, just a metaphor of my perceived and socially engineered race.

Twenty years later, I was taking an American scholar in rhetoric to Robben Island, where Nelson Mandela and most of the new leadership had been imprisoned at one time or another. It was a brilliant Cape sunny day. On board were foreign tourists, locals, visitors from up-country. On the trip to the Island everyone stood apart, in anticipation of the tour. On the way back, though, people began to address each other, asking each other where they came from, why they came here, if they liked it, how they were related to traveling companions (“Is the lady with the red hat your girlfriend?”)—mingling private and public, personal anecdotes and impressions about the Island and what it meant. Some even swapped addresses. Most said good-bye and waved hands on the quayside. Long gone was the sidewalk of 1978, I thought. These fellow pilgrims were now individuals, yet metaphors of a country reconciled and at peace.

I too had come a long way since the mid-1970s. As a graduate student then at Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris, I had approached my philosophy tutor, Louis Althusser, for advice on how to proceed with my junior doctoral dissertation. I had wanted to do research on Eurocommunism—then an intellectual fad and seemingly the panacea to a strategically weary, economically depressed, and politically disoriented Western Europe. Those were the days when every intellectual was looking to propitiate the already much talked about “End of Politics” and “End of Ideology”—blissfully forgetting that
in South Africa these expressions meant nothing at all, that history was there very much in the making, and ideology in full force. Louis Althusser, learning that I had written my master’s thesis under Emmanuel Levinas and perhaps mistakenly believing that I had therefore grasped Levinas’ views on The Other, suggested that I look further afield. This is why I turned toward South Africa and racial conflict. I then met up with the doyen of French Africanists, Georges Balandier, who immediately urged me to go and investigate this field, so far left fallow by French social scientists. This inspired conjunction—unknown to them—of Althusser and Balandier set me on the way to Pretoria.

The intellectual baggage I carried to South Africa in 1978 is still mine today. A few words need to be said about this intellectual framework in order to facilitate the reader’s entry into my argument concerning rhetoric and the shaping of South African democracy.

I come from a tradition of French scholarship in the humane “sciences” that is markedly different, in its methods, its aims, and its world vision, from the American postwar tradition. As is well known and sometimes lamented, French Theory has filtered into the American field of Cultural Studies, so French theoretical concepts and styles and references are now part of a common transatlantic idiom. However, what does not lend itself to exportation, acclimatization, or appropriation is a certain je ne sais quoi, that intangible quality which guides scientific reason by coaxing one to tackle a question at hand in one particular manner rather than another. Pierre Bourdieu has aptly named this instinct distinction.

For instance, the reader will find woven into my narrative the thread of French 18th-century philosophes. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is at times explicitly acknowledged, because *The Social Contract* is an incontrovertible text in any sound argument on democracy. However, for the most part, he, Montesquieu, and Voltaire are transparently and silently active. Why? Any levelheaded scholar molded as I was by the French tradition will approximate the collapse of apartheid South Africa with the collapse of ancien régime France and will instinctively realize how analogous the two systems of oppression were.

But, instinct and reason do sometimes tally. For instance, Roman Dutch law, the very body of written law that (together with customary laws) was erased by the Napoleonic Codes which are now the common
base for continental Europe’s notion of the rule of law, gave apartheid its
gle legal thinking, directly rooted in ancien régime Latin law treatises. Also,
social historians know that the French aristocracy founded its claim to
governance and privileges on blood alone and proclaimed itself a
“race,” distinct from and superior to ill-shaped and ill-begotten Third
Estate, the commoners. The “One Man, One Vote” slogan of the strug-
gle against apartheid echoes French constitutional history. In 1789 rev-
olutionaries demanded that the old system of allocating one vote to
each estate (one for the clergy, one for the nobility, one for the Third Es-
tate)—which ensured domination by the privileged castes—be
dropped and replaced by a one man one vote system—which would
ensure true representation by the actual numerical majority, the Third
Estate. This change in the ballot system created a Nation. The parlia-
mentary byzantinism of apartheid, spewing forth convoluted legal
schemes to alter and skew the ballot system, and to delay the unavoi-
dable—that the black population, the Third Estate, would shape the Na-
tion—has for French scholars a familiar ring indeed.

And there is yet another set of influences, even less obvious. It is
largely forgotten today that from the 1930s to the 1970s, French phi-
losophy, as taught in the universities, was a laboratory for a reap-
praisal of German philosophy. Hegelian, Husserlian, and
Heideggerian studies were the yardstick by which French philoso-
phy measured its own innovation. I am aware that Hegel is surrepti-
tiously active in my argument on reconciliation, that The
Phenomenology of Mind’s dialectics of alienation are never too re-
mote. Nonetheless, out of respect for the material presented, I have
striven to keep these influences at bay. I may not have succeeded.

Finally, rhetoric. Rhetoric in France is a recent academic venture. It
enjoys none of the academic or curricular support found in the United
States. And, to compound this isolation, communication as an aca-
demic discipline is viewed with deep-seated skepticism. Roland
Barthes, who gently guided my incipient efforts, must be credited for
restoring the luster of rhetoric, 30 years ago, by casting it (albeit
among the props) on the stage of structuralism. The French school of
rhetoric—for there is indeed one—leads a life of its own, composed of
erudite enquiries into rhetoric as a social agent in antiquity and early
modern France (as pioneered by Marc Fumaroli) or drawing on the
metaphysics of rhetoric (as in the work of Barbara Cassin). Its au-
Authors’ productions are rich, complex, influential; they have in many instances remodeled thinking across disciplines—yet they remain largely contained in Europe. Paradoxically, the work of French-speaking Chaïm Perelman is less known in France than in the United States. Most French scholars in rhetoric studies (sometimes up to their neck in Belles-letttristic revivalism or busy waging a latter-day battle against structuralism) feel uneasy about Perelman’s oeuvre; I believe it is Perelman’s legal point of departure that accounts for this feeling. French rhetoric studies are evident in my argument, but with a sense of disquiet.

In sum, this scholarly heritage informs, shapes, and activates my argument as a scholarly gesture.

But, being European by extraction, although African by place of birth and choice of life, I have in this book another intention. My argument about rhetoric and South Africa is an argument about rhetoric and democratic nation-building. Indeed, to return to that afternoon meeting with Louis Althusser and his brushing aside of Eurocommunism as a fantasy for peace, cooperation, and improvement in Europe, I make the admission that I consider South Africa to be a blueprint for the construction of a European nation. This argument is a long shot (it will be the topic of my next book), but it already pervades my appreciation of South Africa’s unique situation. The scholar cannot help being a citizen. And the citizen in turn tries to pay attention to what the scholar has gleaned from rhetoric, how rhetoric studies should be applied to examining similar democratic shapings beyond the South African case. It is on this road that I invite the reader to accompany me.

I have divided my argument into eight chapters in an attempt to scan what I consider to be eight major areas of enquiry in assessing public deliberation with respect to an emerging postmodern democracy. This somewhat didactic approach is also an attempt to loosen the esoteric mold of “rhetoric” and render its arguments more directly approachable by scholars in other disciplines or, simply, interested readers.

This is not a history of the transition from apartheid to democracy. Instead, it is an analysis of a new political ecology of rhetoric, borne by a democracy built on a sanguine belief in human rights in the fullest extent of the expression.
For the reader unfamiliar with the sometimes puzzling details of South African political history, I have provided background information in the notes. But, again, my aim has been to arrive at a general view of issues as they have taken shape in the particular South African experience. This is one reason why many of my primary sources were found in the mass media.

In the two opening chapters I deal head-on with the question of rhetorical mastery, and the personalization of rhetoric or oratory in the formative years of a nation—resting my case on Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela. The third chapter, which flows directly from the former ones, deals with presidential rhetoric and its position in a deliberative democracy still taking shape. I move then to assess, in three chapters, how public deliberation is played out on the side of the people, highlighting three sites for democratic deliberation: the writing of the Constitution, the process of reconciliation, and the print media’s representation of popular deliberation about identity. This leads my discussion into an examination of why and how seemingly a-rhetorical modes of communication such as fashion or sport (what I call “the cosmetics of peace”) are, in fact, firmly embedded in deliberation. I envisage these as key factors in building up a sense of time, of maturation, of perspective within democratic deliberation, in contraposition to both the seemingly frozen-in-time oratory of the founders (a foundation is per se immobile) and the immediacy of purely political deliberation. I close my argument on the shaping of South Africa as the “African Athens” by surveying space as a powerful rhetorical agent for integration in a democracy—by contrast, *apart-heid* means to space people apart.

Readers familiar with the lore of rhetoric will quickly recognize that, by structuring this book this way, I run through the most basic devices of rhetorical invention (who, what, when, how, where). They will also recognize that by concluding my argument with the topic of space, I go back to the very foundation of rhetoric in ancient Athenian democracy. In ancient Athens the laudation and public interment of the valorous dead became the reason and the place and the time for praising the new city, that tremendous invention—an invention of deeds, yet also an invention of words: democracy.

Hence the thread that runs through my argument: that South Africa is an “African Athens.” South Africa can be seen as a postmodern analogy of ancient Athens, acting in postmodern Af-
rica in the same manner as Athens did in ancient Greece. Like its model, South Africa is surrounded by tyrannies with which it entertains a love—hate relationship; like its model it strives to set on a safe course democratic behaviors; like its model it is not free of self-righteousness; and like its model it heralds a turning point in the cultural and social history of its historical environment. Analogies are not proofs. They are nonetheless tools to better understand and weigh a problem at hand. I believe that, as the millennium has turned on its hinges, South Africa offers a remarkable stage for a replay of the great themes of public deliberation and the rise of a postmodern rhetorical democracy. South Africa indeed offers a unique example of a democracy that has issued from a régime which both magnified and predated European colonialism, a democracy that has broken that mold without a revolution and its usual sequels and without an anarchic disintegration—the two models known so far in analogous situations. This is why I believe South Africa fully qualifies for the adjective postmodern. It also offers the striking case of a democracy won at the negotiating table and also won every day in public deliberation. For that reason, it is, I also believe, deeply "Athenian": a polity where the contest of words is a matter of national interest and where questions arise concerning the nature, aim, efficacy, and ethics of a rhetorical democracy. By and large, South Africa sets an example. It is a laboratory for democracy, and for that very reason, much like Athens, it will long remain an oddity, not only in Africa (as the Afro pessimists’ simplistic litany would like to have us believe) but also in global politics.

South Africa is a test case for global democracy; it is a test case for rhetoric; and it is a test case for the relevance of rhetoric studies in a postmodern democracy.

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I dedicate this book to Alexander Bezuidenhout.

—Philippe-Joseph Salazar
In the early 1990s, when South Africa emerged from a culture of secrecy into democratic openness, “transparency” and “accountability” became the new tropes by which state and public officeholders began measuring their own newly acquired rhetoric. One could have believed in a pure, miraculous birth of democratic speech, borne upon the baptismal fonts by the sacrament and unction of the first general elections of 1994. The “rhetorical link” seemed to have been crystallized, in the tradition of Rousseau’s *Social Contract*, by one Legislator, Nelson Mandela.

However, the democratic and secular rhetoric that has been spun around “nation-building” in South Africa has its roots in religious oratory, specifically that of Nobel Peace laureate and Anglican prelate Desmond Tutu. For this reason, the term *oratory*, whose etymon is closely linked in the Western Christian tradition to *oration*, meaning prayer (oratory and oration then being the twin voices of the propagated Word), will be reserved here for religious rhetoric; and *rhetoric* will be used to refer to the secular domain. The expression “sermonic power” would fit the purpose, but let us reserve it for a further, perhaps inevitable, comparison between Martin Luther King Jr. and Desmond Tutu.

Through Tutu’s oratorical ministry, which evolved during the struggle, the new South African nation took shape. In regard to the French Revolution—a political upheaval similar to South Africa’s in

*Chapter Notes begin on page 187.*
terms of its social and political magnitude, however dissimilar in terms of anti-clericalism—it has been contended that in 1789, “a People were being born to Eloquence,” a process of “nation-building.” Tutu’s calling was undoubtedly served by the cohesive nature of South Africa’s religious belief, massively Christian. But his oratorial impact was felt even beyond Christianity, in the far smaller Muslim, Buddhist, and Jewish communities. Before engaging directly in the discussion of the rhetorical shaping of South Africa into a democracy, it is necessary to examine the foundation of that process—that is, religious oratory itself.

AN ORATORICAL FRAME FOR NATION-BUILDING

Desmond Tutu received the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1984, in Oslo. The peroration of his acceptance speech is illuminating:

God calls us to be fellow workers with him so that we can extend his kingdom of shalom, of justice, of goodness, of compassion, of caring, of laughter, joy and reconciliation, so that the kingdoms of this world will become the Kingdom of our God and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever. Amen. Then there will be fulfilment of the wonderful vision in the Revelation of John the Divine (Revelation 7:9ff).7

Now, to begin to understand Tutu’s fashioning of a rhetorical art about nation-building, this statement must be read in conjunction with another text, the conclusion of Christianity in South Africa, published in 1990. In Oslo, Tutu had left unstated the Johannic quotation from the Book of Revelation. In the 1990 afterword, he fulfills the promises made in Oslo by quoting, for militant purposes, the full text:

After this I looked, and there was an enormous crowd—no one could count all the people! They were from every race, tribe, nation, and language, and they stood in front of the throne ... They called out in a loud voice: “Salvation comes from our God, who sits on the throne, and from the Lamb” ... Then they threw themselves face downwards in front of the throne and worshiped God, saying, “Amen! Praise, glory, wisdom, thanksgiving, honour, power, and might belong to our God for ever and ever! Amen!”

Both quotations operate as a rhetorical framing for a stage in the development of the struggle and as a blue-print for nation-building.
In September 1984, after an all-white referendum, the South African régime imposed a new Constitution, whose main feature was the creation of a tri-cameral Parliament and a multitiered cabinet, in which a coloured and an Asian House each existed alongside a white House of Assembly. The strategy was to recruit support from groups just perceived as “natural” allies to the white minority. This had the effect of placing the black majority under an even more iniquitous care and sowing division among Coloureds and Asians. It finally impelled resisters within South Africa to consolidate a legal antiapartheid political movement. Created in mid-1983 and banned in 1988, the United Democratic Front (UDF) whose leading figure was to be Desmond Tutu, hoped to combat the naive, yet temporarily efficient “divide and rule” strategy of the apartheid régime and to reinforce the nonracial bases of the African National Congress.

The peroration of Tutu’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech (quoted earlier in this chapter) was delivered 3 months after the September referendum; it marked the contrast between the illusory nation-building fabricated by the tri-cameral system and the true bringing together of South Africans in the nonracial UDF.

In 1990 when Tutu quoted the Johannic text in full (the subtext of the UDF’s manifesto), he spoke with the authority of the holder of an archiepiscopal and primatial see. He was thus fulfilling a bishop’s first duty: to preach; and in his case, given the full extent of his primacy, to preach to the entire people. The quotation from Revelation, in its apocalyptic sense, heralded the nearing end of apartheid, shortly before the liberation of Nelson Mandela (who was then to take over as the nation’s orator, as we shall later see).

Close scrutiny of Tutu’s oratorical inventiveness reveals how the rapport between orator and subject functions. First, the rhetorical commonplaces: a crowd, a jubilant crowd that speaks with one voice and recognizes only one authority. Second, the operative link between them, as embodied and energized by the orator: “I looked,” and by implication “I speak.” From the 1984 Oslo Speech (as the “Nobel Lecture” is more appropriately known) to the aptly entitled Afterword of 1990, multiplicity has been brought into unity—be it “kingdoms” made one country; multilevel and unequal representation restored into soon-to-be-accepted universal franchise; the discordance of racial voices and votes harmonized in vox populi; or the
multiple voices of the prelate laden with quotations and prophetic antecedents now retiring behind the impact of a biblical quotation.

PUTTING THE CASE FOR THE NATION

A system of oratorical invention is clearly at work. However, as South Africa has taken shape largely under its ministrations, the reconstitution of the South African nation also responds to a will—Tutu’s will—to make an evangelical vision of humanity coincide with a political purpose. In this respect, the Johannic vision evoked by Tutu is truly that of a nation reshaped. But, however sublime, it also operates as a rebuttal to a text that embodied racialism and a nation divided. The 1950 Act of Parliament, also known as the Population Registration Act, entrenched classification by race, splitting and dismembering the nation Tutu set himself the task of remembering. The Act was justified by the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church belief in white superiority, and it was as Bible-driven as Tutu’s rhetoric. Thus arose a conflict staged between two oratories, two visions of the nation, and two options on political rectitude. The Oslo Speech is a response to the infamous, yet programmatic Population Registration Act.

The Population Registration Act, in the stultified style of imperial English, unwraps a cold rhetoric of nation un-building—or, for the Afrikaners, their own nation-building. The opening section is a careful scanning of possibilities, the formalization of a stock of rhetorical commonplaces regarding a polity based on “registering” racial differences and entrenching differences within the nation:

Be it enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty [British monarch George VI], the Senate and the House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa, as follows:

1. Definitions … (iii) “coloured person” means a person who is not a white person or a native; … (x) “native” means a person who in fact is or is generally accepted as a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa; … (xv) “white person” means a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is generally accepted as a white person, but does not include a person who, although in appearance obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a coloured person …

5. Classification of persons whose names are included in the register. (1) Every person whose name is included in the register shall be classified by
the Director [of Census] as a white person, a coloured person or a native, as the case may be, and every coloured person and every native whose name is so included shall be classified by the Director according to the ethnic or other group to which he belongs. (2) The Governor-General [of the Union of South Africa] may by proclamation in the Gazette prescribe and define the ethnic or other groups into which coloured persons and natives shall be classified in terms of sub-section (1), and may in like manner amend or withdraw any such proclamation.  

Tutu’s oratorical career was to undo this racial rhetoric and reshape the nation, step by step. South Africa has no framers of its founding law, no officially recognized founding fathers. Instead it features what I would simply call “orators,” in the sense of the rhetorical Roman tradition: those who take up a cause, embody it, give it energy, and make it persuasive.

The first important aspect of Tutu’s case for the nation being built can be found in his determination to speak on behalf of those who were denied speech in the 1950 Act, and to proclaim this right.

In 1982, when the régime was at its most brutal in containing what it called the “Total Onslaught,” (by “communist-inspired” forces against the régime), Tutu was deposed by a purportedly independent Commission of Inquiry. The Elof Commission, as it was called, was set up by the government to investigate the funding of the powerful South African Council of Churches (SACC); the funding was deemed to be from forbidden foreign sources. The SACC, an ecumenical council of Protestant Churches opposed to apartheid, represented a de facto legal opposition to the régime. Desmond Tutu, the secretary-general from 1978 to 1985, was the first of the SACC directorate to be subpoenaed by the Elof Commission. Tutu took the opportunity arising from his compulsory testimony to deliver a speech. The timing was opportune because a month earlier, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches had suspended from their membership the largely apartheid-aligned Dutch Reformed Church, elected a South African man of color as their president, and declared apartheid a heresy.

Tutu’s defense of the SACC’s probity is a masterful lesson in rhetoric. At first glance, it seems to be molded according to the banality of formal oratory: formal dispositio. The preamble puts into operation a deict captatio benevolentiae (“[The officers of the commission] could very well have hamstrung our operations by taking away our
books and records”), followed by a perfunctory delineation of the argumentative basis (“My purpose is to demonstrate from the scriptures and from hallowed Christian tradition and teaching”), to which Tutu tags, with perfect logic, a remarkable preliminary refutation (“The Government appointed this commission for a reason that is perfectly obvious and totally unsubtle … I don’t impugn the integrity of this commission and its members in any way but I want the Government to know now and always that I do not fear them”). The main thrust of the demonstration resides in a defense of the SACC’s mission and purpose. The speech closes in a two-part peroration, hinged on two citations from the Gospel: the first from John (“If the world hates you, it hated me first,” John 15:18–21) and the second from Matthew (“All will hate you for your allegiance to me; but the man who holds out to the end will be saved”).

Now, this is not the real persuasive strategy at work in the speech. Beneath the decorum of the deposition, the aptum of words and styles chosen to establish a common ground between two men of reason—Tutu and Judge Eloff—who share the same biblical culture (albeit with different interpretations thereof), Desmond Tutu enfoils another argument that reaches beyond the confines of the Inquiry chambers, toward the nation that is in the process of being built. In rhetorical terminology, he manages to turn an apologia into a kategoria—a defense into an accusation. And, having turned the tables of oratory around—having redefined his own voice and place of address, which he aptly names “the divine imperative”—he now affirms the imperative need to tell the truth. By so doing, Tutu fully assumes his role as orator—persona—conferring by implication that very truth upon the SACC.

Why? Because the nation being built needs models. And until another model (such as the UDF) emerges, the ecumenical and nonracial congregation of the SACC can serve as a step toward or an approximation of the future South African nation. Tutu’s plea therefore becomes a laudation of the SACC; in strict rhetorical terms, it is an epainos, or the praise of virtues. Desmond Tutu squarely places the SACC in the perspective of nation-building. For the sake of an argument that must remain couched in doctrinal terms, in order to sustain a common language between orator and audience (Tutu and Eloff) and never seem to veer toward politics (which would explode this oratorical understanding), Tutu relies on two basic theological
commonplaces; shalom and koinonia. The SACC embodies shalom (peace) and koinonia (unity): It is a model for a nation still torn by civil war and fragmentation. In Aristotelian terms, shalom and koinonia are the “topics” of Tutu’s oratorical inventiveness.

Shalom, the first commonplace, responds to the need (in Tutu’s surreptitious argumentation concerning nation-building) to attribute to the SACC a twofold mission. Firstly the SACC should act as a reminder of civil harmony, analogous to Edenic peace and harmony (“conveyed by the virtually untranslatable Hebrew word shalom”). Secondly the SACC should perform a Pauline ministry of reconciliation (Tutu refers to 2 Corinthians 5:19; “God was in Christ reconciling the world with himself”). The SACC is a projection toward an ideal past and toward a desired future. It rests within the crucible of the times, as is the case of any nation faced with a choice. By implication, apartheid is associated with that sin which obliterated the original shalom and created national fragmentation. This fragmentation had the secondary effect of silencing those excluded and transferring, in turn, the duty to speak up and express the lost civil harmony onto orators such as Desmond Tutu. The Commission is carved within a space of controlled and censored speech; paradoxically, it allows Tutu to impersonate the nation-to-be.

What then is koinonia if not that very propagation of a national united voice? Too little attention has been paid to the fact that the word united in the United Democratic Front (the next incarnation, as it were, of nation-building) is lifted from Philippians 1:5, a call by Paul to unity. Tutu says to Eloff and beyond to South Africa:

He came to say that God had intended us for fellowship, for koinonia, for togetherness, without destroying our distinctiveness, our cultural otherness. Apartheid quite deliberately denies and repudiates this central act of Jesus.

In short, apartheid repeats, in political guise, the original sin. It may be unusual theology; it is powerful religious oratory.

THE ORATOR AS HISTORIAN OF THE NATION

Indeed, Tutu’s oratorical strategy aims at redefining the place of the nation’s orator (at a time when the leaders of the liberation forces were banned, never heard, never quoted, never even seen). As Tutu
delivers his accusation of apartheid, face to face with Judge Eloff, another judicial figure slowly emerges: the man of God as Prophetic Judge.\textsuperscript{23} In order to impress on his larger audience this very shift, Tutu proposes an example, as good rhetoric should when an argument may fall into unconvincing abstraction. He chooses an example that Eloff, a Protestant himself, would have in mind: God’s judgment as exemplified by the prophets Isaiah and Amos in their defense of the “poor and the powerless.”\textsuperscript{24} The recourse to these examples has two functions. Internally, it draws a parallel between the Inquiry judgment about to take place and the real, political national day of reckoning. Externally, Tutu aims at compelling Judge Eloff to leave the elaborate ceremony of constrained justice and to examine his own conscience; in brief, to practice \textit{shalom} and \textit{koinonia}. Unsurprisingly the maneuver failed; but it succeeded insofar as Tutu managed to transform—in the strongest sense of this word—a court of political justice into a court of proclamation of true justice. Deliberative rhetoric attains that sort of potency when it is inscribed in ritual. Here the ritual at work was that of nation-building.

Tutu’s oratory of nation-building was indeed ritualistic, and one could even contend that he helped give democratic South Africa a sense of ritual.

Even though Tutu’s engagement in political action was measured according to the Pauline injunction of making \textit{koinonia} work in practical, public terms,\textsuperscript{25} as a cleric Tutu was nonetheless operating within certain constraints, the sum of which amounted to a ritualistic practice of public life. Indeed, as apartheid imposed limits on public appearances of its opponents and censored public expression in an increasingly coded manner,\textsuperscript{26} political and public dissent had to contend with proscriptions (banned dissidents were referred to as “certain persons”) and prescriptions (censorship in the media, banning of public meetings, banning of media broadcasts). By a strange turn of events, reminiscent of public oratory in premodern Europe, dissident rhetoric found itself contained within the three traditional sites for codified and public expression: the universities (often at formal occasions, such as graduation ceremonies); the judicial commissions or the high courts (at the trials of so-called terrorists),\textsuperscript{27} and the churches (sermons in churches and, even more prominently, homilies delivered at funerals of those who died resisting apartheid). The apartheid restriction on public space led ironically to the
concentration of dissident oratory in highly charged sites, whereby speeches acquired in fact a more far-reaching potency—what in rhetoric is simply called *enargeia*, the “speech-energy” by which orators represent the absent or silent subject of their speech. For these reasons Tutu’s oratory, in his process of nation-building, was in essence ritualistic.

Anthropological studies of ritual have shown how ritual practices function as a social *paideia*—“education” in the broadest sense of the term—by inciting imitation and emulation and by arousing in individuals the consciousness of belonging to a community. Mary Collins called this “the implicit cognitive, emotional model or idea every culture has for itself.”28 Taken as a series of ritualistic events, or performances, Tutu’s speeches weave together a sense of community.

One example from such ritualistic events should provide a vivid illustration: Steve Biko’s funeral oration, on September 25, 1977, and Chris Hani’s, 16 years later.29 These two orations in praise of two assassinated leaders of the struggle frame the history of apartheid in its final and most brutal phase: Biko’s death was a prelude to the intensification of the armed insurgency, and Hani’s death was a tragic absurdity that occurred as the enforcers of apartheid were beginning to surrender.

Funeral orations are powerful ritualistic moments. The biblical quotation used by Tutu to launch his funeral praise of Steve Biko was taken from Isaiah (61:1–4):

> The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek; he hath sent me to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound ... And they shall build the old wastes ... and they shall repair the waste cities, the desolations of many generations.

This quotation offers a commentary on a current political devastation and projects the mourning community toward its own “re-membering,” the putting together, as in the biblical text, of its scattered and humiliated members into a cohesive polity. The funeral is no longer the commemoration of the dead, of his virtues and actions (a distinction which, in traditional rhetoric, frames any such speech), but one of many acts within a ritual concerning the nation, dismembered in the Population Registration Act of 1950. As with
any ritual, it aims at both past and future. The funeral oration is an integral part of celebrating the nation-to-be (a task, in any event, familiar to rhetorical scholars, ever since Pericles’ funeral oration on those who died to defend Greek democracy):

The darkest hour, they say, is before the dawn. We are experiencing the birth pangs of a new South Africa, a free South Africa, where ... all of us, black and white together, will hold hands as we stride forth on the Freedom March to usher in the new South Africa where people will matter because they are human beings made in the image of God.31

By placing the mourning community within the more general mourning called for by repression, the orator transcends the particular moment and declares, in 1977, 1 year after the Soweto riots, that a new birth is at hand—and goes as far as proposing, more than 10 years ahead of the actual change, a new semantics. The funeral oration for a singular leader turns into the praise of a community, adumbrating the cohesion of a future nation. The efficacy of epideictic rhetoric lies indeed in stimulating a sense of shared values by praising the audience.

According to this perspective, the funeral oration delivered in praise of the assassinated secretary-general of the South African Communist Party, Chris Hani (April 19, 1993), brought to its conclusion the ritual of nation-building. However, this time, instead of basing his speech on the Old Testament prophets, Tutu quotes from Paul: “If God be for us, who can be against us?”32 Many in Tutu’s audience would know this is the prelude to Paul’s hymn on divine love, which, in Pauline theology, is closely related to building the community of believers—love and communal spirit as one.33

**AN ORATORICAL TRANSFORMATION**

The overarching effect of the two funeral orations is to shift the audience from the Old to the New Testament. These two momentous orations are only the termini of an abundant career; those who followed the struggle over the years and heard Tutu speak were gradually moved from prophecy (in Isaiah) to the fulfillment of prophecy: Chris Hani was murdered on Holy Saturday, 1 year before the first general elections, and as the apartheid government was about to be replaced by a Transitional Executive Council. The national commu-
nity is cast as the Pauline *ekklesia*—the “community” of believers. In Pauline terms, what Tutu intended to achieve, and did achieve, was a political *metanoia* (Romans 12:2)—a “transformation” of the community. In fact, that very term, *transformation* (now part of South African political lexicon), originates in the concept of *metanoia* found in Karl Barth’s *Ethics*, which South African theologians who were opposed to apartheid refined and placed in its wider context.

The funeral oration for Chris Hani deserves closer scrutiny. Following standard rhetorical procedure (or “disposition”), Desmond Tutu quickly introduces the speech (in five languages); After a short biography of Hani, he launches suddenly into a series of halted-breath, anaphoric clauses (“We demand” repeated six times and framed by an introductory and concluding “We want”), which lead to a full amplification on the key commonplace of his speech, “marching to victory.” Response-style, the hundred thousand people crammed into Soweto soccer stadium answer his call at regular intervals by shouting “Now!” This exclamation forms the rhetorical core of his speech: In terms of audience response, it brings the people’s voices in coalescence with the orator’s voice.

The oration is powerful because it elicits the crowd’s participation in responses (copied from religious responses), and by doing so it makes the *metanoia* (transformation) appear to accomplish itself as the oration unfolds. The oration is, strictly speaking, a “performance”: Tutu and the crowd are, through words, “performing” the nation, that is making it appear. As French philosopher Barbara Cassin has argued, epideictic rhetoric forges a “rhetorical link” between members of the audience, a link that can then be translated into political terms, by making a fiction become reality, as it is “performed.” In Austin’s terminology, epideictic rhetoric is akin to a “performative” speech, a “speech-act” whereby words create a reality.

At this point, two strains of public oratory converge: the epideictic and the didactic. Desmond Tutu practices what is aptly named in the Pauline tradition the charismata. The much-abused expression “charismatic leader” must be recast in this tradition in order to clarify what is truly at stake in such oratory. To preach (the first duty of a minister) is to teach—a “charism.” This is sound traditional doctrine, often affirmed by Tutu, a self-identified “traditionalist.” Yet behind this affirmation is yet another concept, that of the preacher/teacher as *Theou oikonomos*, the “economist/manager
of God” (that is, of the Word) envisaged by Paul (Titus 1:7);\textsuperscript{41} or, what William Temple (1881–1944), the archbishop of Canterbury known for his social vision, called in his Christianity and Social Order (1942) “stewardship” of the community linked with the duty of “interference.”\textsuperscript{42} In the course of his Eloff Commission deposition, Tutu explicitly referred to Temple.\textsuperscript{43}

Tutu takes measure of his “charism” and “duty to interfere” in a graduation address, delivered at the University of Cape Town in December 1993, 4 months before the first general elections (Appendix I). He reflects on the Chris Hani oration:

At his funeral I asked the crowd to repeat after me, “We will be free, all of us, black and white together.” … They roared back, “We will be free, all of us, black and white together,” and I said, “We are the rainbow people of God” … I was vilified for my so-called performance at that funeral, and yet we had a remarkable demonstration of our people’s commitment to a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic dispensation.\textsuperscript{44}

In this short passage Tutu evaluates the efficacy of his “stewardship” of the nation by pondering on the expression he coined, “the rainbow people of God”—a now overused expression, divested of its divine reference. In rhetorical terms, however, this expression, as it was “performed” and appeared to his audience, constitutes a rhetorical “fiction”—a word that denotes something that is not an event (a reality), yet as if it is so.\textsuperscript{45}

The Rainbow Nation (whether “of God” or not) was to remain a “fiction” until the first general elections took place and transformed “fiction” into “history.”\textsuperscript{46} Yet Tutu points out that proffering this “fiction” in the Soweto stadium and having the crowd’s response to his “stewardship” of words—their assent to his “economy” or management of “fiction”—ensured that this fiction was about to pass into event, into reality (“history”), at a time of heightened crisis. He thus provides the Cape Town graduates with an extempore lesson in rhetoric. Tutu also tells the graduates that he chose the right time to perform this operation on the nation. In rhetoric, he seizes a kairos—the right moment.\textsuperscript{47}

The lesson of the resolved krisis—the seizing of the kairos—is an affirmation of Tutu’s rhetorical “stewardship,” encapsulated now in a commonplace of South African public rhetoric: the “rainbow people [of God].” The biblical sources are Genesis 9:13 (the rainbow as
an arching sign of alliance between God and Noah) and Ezekiel 1:28 (the rainbow signals the epiphany of God and triggers the prophecy regarding the restoration of the devastated community and its refounding). This expression is the outcome of a rhetorical transformation. A reality—the Rainbow Nation—is obfuscated by a pseudoreality—the nation created by the Population Registration Act. This real nation is born in the *krisis* provoked by Chris Hani’s assassination and through the act of *kairos* performed by Tutu. He “manages” the “economy” of the *krisis* by, first, uttering a “fiction” (he tells the crowd “You are a nation,” an utterance that is still, at that moment, a political fiction), then, in a second instance, by having the crowd assenting to his statement. The third phase in Tutu’s speech-act has the nation, reconciled in word and deed with itself yet still poised between fiction and reality, seeing itself “restored” as prophesied in the words of Ezekiel announced as early as 1986 by Tutu when he was enthroned as archbishop of Cape Town (“I have recently been reading the book of the prophet Ezekiel!”).

The following sermon mediated between the funeral orations of Biko and Hani in terms of refining a vocabulary and an agenda for nation-building. Here Tutu refers to transformation as “transfiguration”:

The principle of transfiguration is at work when something so unlikely as the grey grass that covers our veld in winter, or the tree with gnarled leafless branches, bursts forth with the sap flowing, so that the grass is green again, and the birds sit chirping in the leafy branches, and the once-dry streams gurgle with swift-flowing water—when winter gives way to spring and nature seems to have experienced its own resurrection.

The rhetorical structure of this allegory deserves some detailed comment because it introduces images that entered the stock of rhetorical commonplaces on nation-building after 1994.

The allegory, or parable, used here by Desmond Tutu is rhetorically adapted to his ends, which are to impress on the audience’s mind the necessary passage from fiction to reality, from dream of nation to realized nation. The speech itself is part of the process, as previously discussed. In fact, technically, according to Perelman’s definition, the allegory or parable allows the audience to “transfer itself” into the reality suggested and “to apply” to itself that reality. Indeed, the veld, the desolation of the wasteland, is very much part of the daily experience of many South Africans. The rhetorical im-
age thus enters the domain of personal experience. But it also acts as a logical induction, by which the audience is led to adduce from that concrete reality an abstract notion: that the nation in desolation is craving for a renaissance. An abstract notion may well fulfill the guiding end of a specific speech (and Tutu is a skillful orator who knows the resources of his art). Yet to reach its given end, to convince, a speech—which is always a live act of persuasion, located in time, place, and audience—must make the audience “live” the reality advocated (that is, called forth) by the orator; in short, the audience must “believe” it.

However, this powerful inductive argument rebounds on an assertion in the fourth point of Tutu’s sermon: “I am sad to say that I believe that the fundamental attitude that ‘Blacks are human, but …’ has not changed.” Tutu furnishes three brief examples to back up his claim and two short narratives. His point? That “transfiguration” has-and-has-not taken place. The crux of the matter is in this very ambit: It has and it has not, the emphasis being on the conjunction and. The orator himself holds a position of power and “charisma” (the Anglican Primacy of Southern Africa) previously held only by white clerics. Still he asks “Have things changed?” His reply is “Yes and No.” The kairotic function of his “Sermon on Transfiguration” is to pose the political question—the krisis, the moment of choice—of Yes and No, of the concurrency of acceptance and rejection. To formulate that crucial question is to explode the implicit myth that reconciliation is impossible and transformation doomed.

The peroration of the sermon provides a solution to the seemingly insoluble coalescence of Yes-and-No. Tutu frames his retort between two statements:

1. Friends, like you I abhor all violence. I condemn the violence of an unjust system such as apartheid and that of those who want to overthrow it.
2. In the beginning God … in the end, God.

In other words, the cleric’s oratory consists of establishing a mediation between two extremes: “We want one united South Africa where everyone matters, because each of us is created in God’s image.” The “unlikely” has become “likelihood,” the fictitious, real.
In addition, it is well known in rhetoric studies how Plato’s *Menexenus*, a funeral oration for the fallen Athenians, aims at celebrating the “community” by contrasting the Athenians with the barbarians: democracy against tyranny. Tutu’s funeral orations can also be read using the matrix of *Menexenus*, in which the “new” South Africans are the Athenians and the “old” South Africans (or at least the supporters of apartheid) are the barbarians. In this spirit, Biko and Hani are assimilated to “new” South Africans; their gruesome deaths are the signature of the “old” South Africans’ barbarity. The funeral oration for the fallen serves as a powerful signal that death, violent death, is part of the advance toward democracy. Tutu stops short of evoking martyrdom, although he does refer to the fact that Hani was assassinated on Holy Saturday. Once more, secular Athenian democracy and religious oratory find a meeting point.  

**THEOLOGY AND THE ORATORY OF LIBERATION**

To fully understand how Tutu chose critical moments to help shape the South African rhetoric of nation-building (shaping the nation itself in the process), it is worth noting that the term *kairos*—the right time, the time at which a *krisis* provokes a radical change or choice—was already part of the vocabulary of the struggle, hailing from the discipline of liberation theology. The founding manifesto of liberation theology is in part South African and dates back to 1985, a period when the apartheid system harnessed all the repressive resources of the state to combat the “Total Onslaught” and was suddenly faced with wide-ranging international sanctions (arms sales had been embargoed since 1977, under a United Nations resolution).

In the New Testament *kairos* denotes the moment most conducive to conversion (2 Corinthians 6:2, for instance). Applied to South Africa, the word *kairos* meant that the Churches had a duty to seize the circumstances (or moment of *krisis*) to effectively translate into action the World Alliance of Reformed Churches’ declaration on apartheid (declared a heresy in 1982); in other words, to proceed to a *status confessionis*, a “mission statement,” and to move into the realm of public policy in order to effect a “conversion” of the dismembered South African nation into unified nationhood. This was the true work of liberation and its prophetic dimension. The Churches rebuked apartheid supporters, as Jesus did the Pharisees and Saddu-
cess, warning that they needed to learn to interpret the signs of the times (Matthew 16:3): “All the signs indicate that this drive towards liberation and peace through justice is now unstoppable.” Tutu’s rhetoric of nation-building can be seen as a series of crucial moments, as many building blocks that must be set in place so that a “conversion” can come about.

Rarely indeed in modern history has the emergence of a democratic nation been guided by such strict religious oratory. The national conversion consisted of rupturing the balance or stalemate between Yes and No and moving the nation toward “Now!” The logic is so compelling that in 1994, on the Sunday after the first general elections on April 27 and 28, when the conversion to democracy had taken place (a conversion that affected everyone, not only Whites, because everyone now had to convert to new social relations), Tutu included in his sermon a comment on the expression “fullness of time” (Galatians 4:4 and Ephesians 1:10)—pleroma ton kairon. The prayer read by Tutu at the Swearing-In Ceremony on May 10, 1994, at the Union Buildings in Pretoria sums up what is intended by fullness of time: the accomplishment of the kairos, the nation’s conversion to democracy. More than the rhetorical projection of the orator, what is at work here is a communal spectacle or social communion by which the audience internalizes the orator’s rhetoric and makes a poetic vision a locale for public deliberation: “Thank you [O God] for the miraculous way in which you transformed the election into a corporate act of nation-building.”

In the Pauline tradition this odd expression, “corporate,” which seems to be borrowed from the “corporate world,” is actually a throwback to oikodome, the “upbuilding” of the Christian community, here translated into “nation-building.”

The oratorical link created by Desmond Tutu has helped give shape to a unique situation: that of a postmodern democracy shaping its public deliberative world view in close alliance with a set of religious arguments regarding the nation. In traditional European democracies, rooted in 18th-century freethinking, the exercise of the public mind and the achievement of reasonable participation in the exercise of power are carefully separated from religion; religion is often perceived as the fossilized remnant of a predemocratic system of deliberation. South Africa stands alone as an example of a Western-style democracy taking shape in the aftermath of the Cold War.
under the auspices of religious oratory (although perhaps there are similarities to Poland, where the alliance of the Roman Catholic Church and popular forces was a decisive catalyst). The new democracy is undoubtedly secular (as witnessed by the erasure of references to any divinity from the Constitution), yet initially religious, as an outcome of “conversion.” This signal rhetorical conjunction of sacred and secular will long remain a fundamental feature of the South African democratic deliberative modes.
“So to Speak”: The Rhetoric of Mandela

Desmond Tutu’s construction of the “Rainbow Nation,” interpreted as the political transference of the Pauline tradition of oikodome in the creation of a democracy, the harnessing of rhetoric to a rational and deliberative nationhood, is considered by South African novelist John Coetzee to be a travesty of reason, the manipulation of a commonplace without ethical purpose. This is how Coetzee deftly disentangles ethics and rhetoric:

The master-image behind the two ceremonies [the opening and closing ceremonies of the World Cup of Rugby] was clearly Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s “Rainbow People,” modified for the occasion into “Rainbow Nation.” The rainbow metaphor does not originate with Tutu, of course: he brought it back from his travels in America, where it had most recently served Jesse Jackson (for whom a “rainbow coalition” of interest groups was intended to secure the 1988 Democratic nomination) … “Rainbow” thus enters South African discourse in a self-aware fashion as an ideological term, a substitute for a long series of discredited synonyms: “plural,” “veelvolkig,” and the like. It absolves itself of the taint of mere synonymy by the instrumental intention behind it: it is to be set to work to reverse the mind-set of a population locked by its former masters into ethnic-political compartments. Specifically, it predicates the nation as a mental construct and nationhood as a collective state of mind.

Patently Coetzee, who is a novelist and a literary critic, has a particular opinion on rhetoric. He comes from the structuralist tradition
that has denied rhetoric the capacity to build and argue ideas, and he entrusts to the Writer—which makes his satirical essay the more poignant—the task of redressing the errors of public speech.

It must be contended that Tutu’s careful building of the concept of a “rainbow nation”—at the edge of the graves of assassinated leaders as well as in the closed rooms of apartheid commissions of inquiry—evinces, in the Pauline tradition, a sure sense of what rhetoric can achieve in terms of social critique. In particular, to follow the Rousseauian thread mentioned earlier, a special role must be given to the Legislator. To cite *The Social Contract*, a connection noted long ago by Jacques Derrida in his two seminal essays on Nelson Mandela:2

He who dares to undertake the making of a people’s institutions ought to feel himself capable, so to speak, of changing human nature, of transforming each individual, who is by himself a complete and solitary whole, into part of a greater whole from which he in a manner receives his life and being; of altering man’s constitution for the purpose of strengthening it.3

The incidental clause *so to speak* is not a casual turn of phrase: It is a cunning figure of speech that propels the extraordinary statement (“changing human nature”) which it pretends to attenuate. *So to speak* is in fact the formula of a rhetorical foundation. By “so speaking,” a Legislator does alter human nature and performs (from “an extraordinary position,” says Rousseau; “neither magistracy, nor Sovereign”4) the foundation of a democratic society. In South Africa, this very function has been performed by Nelson Mandela.

**A SPEECH NEVER COMES ALONE**

Nelson Mandela’s rhetoric at first glance seems to have been shaped by his training as a lawyer (a legacy that shows in his adroit handling of questions and debates, and in his unshakable confidence, at the time of his trials, in the rationality of the rule of law6). During the Cuban Revolution, when he sported a Che Guevara beard and battle fatigues, Mandela’s rhetoric also seemed to be influenced by the Leader Massimo’s eloquence. Nevertheless, Mandela’s rhetoric remains “implicit.” It does not aspire to present itself as an exercise in the mastery of public speaking, because any such proclaimed com-
mand of rhetoric might seem redolent of the old régime, with its strict monopoly of public speaking.\textsuperscript{7} (Public and private spheres are porous and blur easily in this emerging democracy, which insists on privacy on the one hand, and transparency and civic communality on the other).

A single yet momentous speech by President Mandela, the epoch-making oration he delivered in the newly constituted South African Parliament on May 24, 1994, will serve as a test case for the analysis of his oratory and the role that it played in shaping South African public rhetoric.

This particular speech by Mandela followed on the heels of two others. The first one was delivered on Cape Town’s Grand Parade, addressed “to the People,” shortly after his election as President (May 9, 1994).\textsuperscript{8} The second was made before world dignitaries as Mandela took the Oath of Office at the Union Buildings in Pretoria (May 10). These speeches, or “performances” (in the rhetorical sense of the word), were highly contrasted displays of rhetoric and of audience response. It is worth noting that newspaper and other media reports of the Grand Parade speech (“orchestrated” by Desmond Tutu) signaled that speech’s popular and fete-like atmosphere (with the presence of banners of all kinds, marijuana smokers, acrobats, and so forth) as opposed to the pomp and circumstance and the more formally coded nature of the Union Building address and of its audience.\textsuperscript{9}

Then, 2 weeks later (May 24, 1994), Mandela gave his first official speech as President to the new Parliament in a solemn sitting. This speech, delivered and printed in the media, was eagerly received by the new citizens, who rushed from their jobs to buy the quickly sold out “late final” print of the \textit{Cape Argus} (Cape Town’s afternoon newspaper). To those who hastened to read the speech, it was as fresh as it was to those who had just attended the solemn convocation. All citizens, directly or indirectly, partook in a rhetorical performance—a rare occurrence nowadays when a nation is born.

In the Grand Parade address, the nation was still “a sea of faces … a crowd … a rally,” and in the Union Building speech, the nation was a formal gathering of “a huge throng of South Africans and a panoply of princes.”\textsuperscript{10} Different rhetorical modes were activated in Mandela’s address to the Parliament, which as an elected body now represented the nation. In the speech to Parliament, the audience is
altogether of a different nature: It is, to follow the etymology of the word *Parliament*, that which “speaks for” the nation. An orator was face to face with orators, and all could, and did, contend to be the *persona*, as Quintilian would have it, of the nation.

In Parliament, Mandela was faced with the task of speaking on behalf of the nation to those who also spoke on behalf of it. Therefore, in the backdrop to his first speech to those who, by election, represented the speaking voices of the nation, lies the conflict between two orders of representation, or the tension inherent in the existence of two levels of rhetoric in a democracy. Barbara Cassin calls this the tension between *homonoia* and *homologia*; in other words, the tension between the “concord of minds,” which is respectful of plurality and difference,¹¹ and the concord of words—what those who do not know what the discipline of rhetoric entails often refer to it—the concord of words—as “rhetoric,” that is, the showcase of political verbiage in which politicians use words to achieve a semblance of agreement, or, even, an appearance of disagreement.¹²

**A SPEECH ON THE BIRTH OF A NATION**

Within this framework, Mandela’s first parliamentary address was an exercise in keeping alive this tension, on behalf of the newly born nation. Mandela was attempting the nation’s “delivery” in his speech—“delivery” as labor or travail of the South African nation and of the orator himself (Appendix II).

It is tempting to consider Mandela’s address as a eulogy of democracy, similar in this instance to Ælius Aristides’s *Panathenaic*, Athens’ praise.¹³ Mandela indeed delivers the eulogy of South Africa at the very moment that consensus, national reconciliation—the new nation as conciliation of differences—is born. Consensus is also a good translation of *homonoia*, and with that translation the parallel between Athens’ poise and South Africa’s praise—Ælius Aristides and Mandela create *homonía* through praise of values, *epideictic* rhetoric—gels. Mandela thus eulogizes the powers of his own *phonè*, of his own voice, as any good Sophist would. Eulogizing the object cannot be separated, as Cassin has argued, from eulogizing the subject. The speech would then become, at once, an indirect celebration of what presidential rhetoric can achieve.¹⁴ It would be self-referential.
Yet none of this can be assumed without examining the speech itself. The May 24 speech occupies an odd place within the genre of “presidential rhetoric.” It is indeed multi-layered: It collapses a State of the Nation address with a prime ministerial programmatic speech (which is usually coupled with a motion of confidence); it also employs the sort of ceremonial ventriloquy performed by powerless Heads of State, such as the British monarch or the German president. The latter rhetorical form, if one ponders its tradition for a moment, is directly inherited from the bygone British rule, when South Africa had the British monarch as its head of state, together with his pale reflection, the Governor General. However, the superimposition of this triple rhetorical function onto a single speaker radically alters the nature of Mandela’s rhetorical performance. The triune function places the orator at the center of elaborating (on) the national consensus. In one gesture, in one voice, the nation finds itself being “stated”; mutual confidence is affirmed, and ceremony is performed.

This is indeed the first time a South African President could speak of a state of the nation, because previously there was neither a nation nor a state that could claim legitimate existence; nor was there, for that matter, any coinciding of a South African state with a South African nation. Constitutionally, there is no provision for such a speech, nor for the President or anyone else to give any speech at all at the opening of Parliament. The speech took place nonetheless and has since become a regular and uncontested feature in the rituals of parliamentary rhetoric. The May 24 speech is in essence about the birth of a nation. To indicate this, Mandela has recourse to a remarkable phrasing, by which he projects this new condition into the future, in order to assign a sense of history to the nation:

The time will come when our nation will honour the memory of all the sons, the daughters, the mothers, the fathers, the youth and the children who, by their thoughts and deeds, gave us the right to assert with pride that we are South Africans, that we are Africans, and that we are citizens of the world.15

This opening statement is truly remarkable in that it summons pathos—emotions—through a careful phrasing that is framed by the commonplace of posterity (offspring/genitors: male–female/female–male) and anticipates a time when the moment of the speech
will be celebrated as a foundation. By descending chronologically (“the fathers, the youth, and the children”), the orator replaces ordinary time with a “pathetic” order and places himself at the cardinal point where posterity converges: those to come and those who have been, all in the metaphorical order of generation. According to Mandela’s oration, all the people are children; they are all being born into a nation whose past they therefore have already become.

The second part of his opening statement proceeds similarly, duplicating the commonplace of time (the generations of citizens) onto that of place (the nations of citizens, world-wide), and situating this nation being born into the “concert of nations” via an amplification (South Africa, Africa, the World).

Through time and place, the orator gives a clear indication of what his argumentation will revolve around (a nation is being born, to itself and to the world), while he places himself in the unique position of being its only and true orator, or advocate—its persona. This is an excellent example of the politics of homologia/homonoia, that tension between words and realities that aims at bringing, in public speech, plurality to unity, while remaining respectful of the differences that the nation-as-polity entails.

In fact, Mandela seizes this concept, the notion that his discourse transcends partisanship. Partisanship is inherent to the nature of a Parliament: a divided and divisive re-presentation of the people’s voices, of a nation’s expression (although its sum total—the Parliament or the Congress or the Assembly—is still “homologic,” which the three nouns cited clearly indicate). In the next segment of his speech, Mandela proceeds to explain how he posits himself (and his rhetoric) in relation to transcendence. In order to do so, he resorts to quoting from a poem by Afrikaans poet Ingrid Jonker. The quotation is paradoxical or, at best, a perfect rhetorical “example.” He sternly states that Jonker is “an Afrikaner woman who transcended a particular experience and became a South African, an African and a citizen of the world.”

Rhetorically, this move is a complex one. On the one hand, Mandela exemplifies the idea of consensus by quoting from the one Afrikaans woman poet who, having committed suicide in the face of iniquity (her father was one of the engineers of censorship), had removed herself from apartheid and joined, as it were, both the “memory” that Mandela has just been summoning up and the
ideal nation. Self-removal from the false nation of the apartheid régime allowed her to enter the proleptic or projected nation-to-be-born, the one Mandela is now summoning into being, and before whom and on whose behalf he is speaking. Yet by using this example, Mandela equates the power of poetic fiction, with that of political speech.

Secondly, the long reference to Jonker is a speech within a speech; it includes an opening statement, a short biography, a concluding statement, and then the quotation itself. This elaborate construction is nothing but a rhetorical hypotyposis (a vivid representation), that allows Mandela’s audience to see what has happened to youth itself, both in Jonkers’ suicide and in the poem, which describes children in the throes of repression. Having reflected on posterity, Mandela places “under the audience’s eyes” a vivid image of a seemingly doomed posteritas, now redeemed by rhetoric itself. He calls Jonkers’ poem a “vision,” a word that will filter through the whole address—its thread of gold or (to stick to rhetorical terminology) its most stable commonplace. Such an hypotyposis anchors his speech within the evidential presence of reality; even better than real images, it offers an internal vision of nation-building. In this respect the whole political speech constitutes a point-by-point illustration of the pathetic embedding provided by the hypotyposis.

THE LOGIC OF NATIONAL IMAGERY

However, what is also at work in this long hypotyposis is Mandela’s recourse to a logical strategy, that of rhetorical induction. The quotation and its apparatus function as the concealed part of a rhetorical induction. (To be effective, a rhetorical induction needs three elements: an example, an illustration, a process of identification).

The “example” is that of Ingrid Jonker, the child-poet who committed suicide (an act that exemplifies the frustration of nationhood in apartheid); the “illustration” is the poem itself, one that would strike any non-Nationalist member of Parliament as a personal recollection. Mandela combines a personal example that adheres to the logic of his first statement (let us imagine what our nation will become, and here is an example) with a vivid illustration borrowed from a fiction that is immediately real to the audience (most MPs would have witnessed scenes similar to those described in the poem
during the struggle for liberation). Mandela thus operates within the realm of inductive rhetoric, moving from the particular to the general in order to demonstrate the validity of the general.

Nevertheless, he felt it necessary to resort to a literary fiction, what he terms a “vision.” This move is what I call his “restrained rhetoric.” Few politicians will use storytelling in a momentous speech of this nature. They will use and abuse the metaphors that are the stock-in-trade of ghostwriters and spin doctors, but never fiction. This is the crunch regarding the nature of his rhetoric. The recourse to a poetic fiction, or “vision,” signals Mandela’s massive recourse to ethos, that category of subjective proofs on which Aristotle puts such store, especially when the veracity of a cause is open to challenge. An adjective often used to characterize Mandela’s style is gentlemanly. It is clear that under other circumstances his ethos would not have been so readily accepted, nor allowed him enough credibility to quote, in English, an Afrikaans poet on the sufferings of African children. In other circumstances, he might have alienated everyone at once. However, on this occasion, he offered a “vision” that was also a fiction. And such a move, if we consider it, was even bolder.

As said before, until the concluding paragraphs this speech can be seen as the actualization of the initial fiction. Mandela resorts to the well-trodden semantic paths of “integration, capacity-building, intervention, partnership, and cooperation.” He also uses terminology that is marked by its reversibility (the same terms were used by the apartheid régime); this signals the distance between homologia and homonoia. Words that may mean something quite different here mean what they are intended to mean, because they are subsumed into a fiction. In other words, the language of political planning, used by Mandela and hailed by political analysts as “realistic, pragmatic and challenging,” is merely a rhetorical ploy to draw people in, and to make the “vision” acceptable, given that it is one that not everyone shares (and also given that “visions” tend to be viewed as impractical and therefore unattractive to foreign investors).

This reversibility of terminology had already been abundantly illustrated by apartheid’s propagandists and communicators, who deployed discourses that were, as events prodded them along, “consociative,” “pluralistic,” and then finally “democratic.” The reversibility of political commonplaces is where fiction really resides. Re-
versibility is fiction. Yet while aware of the protean nature of semantics, of their utter fictionality, Mandela chooses to encase the fictionality of political commonplaces within another fiction—one that is not fictitious—with a view to making homologia coincide with homonoia.

The argument regarding fiction, as triggered here by the recourse to a poem as semen dicendi—a “kernel of speech” on the new South African nation—can be summed up as follows: Three rhetorical positions are involved—pseudos, plasma, and historia. The reversibility of political elocution underlies its ability to lie about the body politic; it is essentially a pseudos, a fiction that deceitfully tells of what does not exist (for example, talking about “consociation” when sending troops into the townships, or speaking about “reconciliation” while dilly dallying over reparations for victims). There is nothing to distinguish between pseudos and literary fiction except for this one difference: The former deliberately articulates falsehood, whereas the latter merely gives expression to a creative image, with no pretense of verifiable truth. If “poetry is the first point of friction or junction between pseudos and plasma,” Jonker’s poem is an exact example of a plasma: the kind of fiction that gives both audience and orator a sense of communality, of awareness of the world (or aisthesis). Poetry as plasma—fiction (or argumentum, as in Quintilian)—stands somewhere between reality and falsehood. In other words, it is able to present a scenario for reality.

In using a poem that feeds his whole speech and frames the speech in terms of its actual rhetorical disposition, Mandela the orator declares the birth of an entity that, while still a scenario (a plasma), is no longer a pseudos (the false South African nation of separateness—one of the most arresting oxymorons ever produced). This declaration moves it toward its historia. This is both a bold and a rhetorical move, one that nullifies the apartheid myth of South Africa and proffers the historical event of the new South Africa instead. The fact that Mandela never utters the adjective new enables us to measure the distance between the pseudos of de Klerk’s rhetoric and the historia of Mandela’s eloquence. The former can only speak of the “new South Africa” because he assumes that there existed in the “old South Africa” a “nation” and that it has simply undergone a process of rejuvenation. The lies, the pseudos of apartheid rhetoric of social engineering, are now all the more obvious: affirming a myth as truth, in order to retain a share of power.
Mandela, however, does not speak of the “new” South Africa. He projects his audience (via a poetic fiction, a plasma) into historia itself, affirming that the nation is now born. The phrase he uses to qualify this rhetorical move is “reconstruction and development” (or RDP, as this program was called during the first legislative period of the new government; the phrase is now a commonplace of South African political rhetoric).  

From a rhetorical viewpoint, Mandela's speech is itself the first event that lifts South Africa from plasma into historia. His eloquence is the first act of reconstruction and development. In words—and in words alone—his speech reconstitutes the nation.

The novelist Coetzee’s dismay at the triviality of the plasma of the “rainbow nation” becomes more intriguing when, in his conclusion, he says the following:

Today’s image-makers and image-marketers have no interest in complex realities, or indeed in anything that cannot be expounded in fifteen seconds. The truth is, their trade is not in reality at all: it is in what they call perceptions.

Perhaps one explanation is that between novelist and poet there is an unspoken acknowledgment that some fictions are good and some are not; that Ingrid Jonker’s poem is good fiction (and rhetorically correct) and that Desmond Tutu’s biblical metaphor is bad fiction (and rhetorically incorrect). Mandela’s May 24 speech to the South African Parliament is, in fine, the eulogy of democracy, similar in this instance to Ælius Aristides’ Panathenaic, Athens’ praise. Mandela delivered the praise of South Africa at the very moment that consensus, national reconciliation (the new nation as conciliation of differences), was born, performed and delivered in words—and by words.

**RHETORICAL VALEDICTION**

Valedictory speeches by Nelson Mandela form, as it were, the terminus ad quem of his performative presidency. How can the Legislator say farewell? How can performance achieve itself or, to use an Aristotelian conceit, “fulfill its motion”? If there is “virtue” in politics, it lies (as Aristotle puts it in the Politica) in fulfilling the deepest extent of one’s nature as a citizen involved in public affairs; in Mandela’s case, the “performativity” of the presidency can best be
gauged by his valedictory speeches, which help show how Mandela’s career “fulfills” itself and in doing so finds a state of plenitude.\(^{30}\)

During the opening and closing sittings of the session of the first democratic Parliament, Mandela delivered two valedictory speeches (February 5 and March 26, 1999), which are framed in turn by his New Year Message (December 31, 1998) and the speech he made at the installation of his successor (June 16, 1999). In addition, it is worth considering the partisan farewell he delivered to the 50th National Conference of the ANC (African National Congress) on December 20, 1997. This was his final leave-taking as President of the African National Congress.\(^{31}\)

Indeed, valediction as a rhetorical ritual of statehood was first tested as early as December 1997, in Mafiking, when Mandela stepped down as President of the African National Congress to make room for his successor, who would eventually also succeed him as the second President of the country. Mandela’s valedictory address to the African National Congress was markedly militant; in the way that it was adapted to the audience (a huge partisan crowd in a stiflingly hot auditorium), in its outward style (Mandela put on a yellow T-shirt), its fiery delivery, and its “rhetoric” (meaning its elocutionary devices), the valedictory speech was a précis of the 4-hour President’s Report, which was delivered with Fidel Castro overtones 4 days earlier (December 16).\(^{32}\) Both were a throwback to the early militancy of Mandela and his friends, when the Cuban Revolution loomed large in prestige. Mandela’s farewell held past and future tightly together by paying tribute to founders and calling the next generation to act “like true revolutionaries” in pursuing the struggle, which, Mandela said, had taken shape “more than 85 years ago.” In the latter statement, Mandela “retrodicts” the founding of the African National Congress.\(^{33}\) He establishes a time frame for Liberation within which apartheid is ensconced, once again, as an aberration: Aptly, if obscurely (for most of the audience that day in Mafiking), Mandela labels the period an “interregnum of defeat and humiliation,” a time frame that stretches to encompass almost the entire Union and first Republic of South Africa; with this label Mandela asserts the government’s illegitimacy during that time. In keeping with the “performativity” of his May 1994 speech, Mandela rhetorically performs a historical explanation of South Africa’s
emergence into democracy, knotting together the nation’s history with that of the African National Congress—like body and soul.

The poetic images he employs in the peroration of the speech (“I look forward to that period when I will be able to wake up with the sun; to walk the hills and valleys of Qunu in peace and tranquility”) form, in their immediately empathetic triteness, the logical conclusion to a rhetorical argument on the value of the African National Congress as the maker of peace. This is why the speech is, and ought to be, “partisan.”

By contrast, the New Year Message—23 brief sentences—is the public version of that partisan speech, its exoteric side. The roll call of “revolutionaries” has been erased and replaced by a catalog of the nation’s working components—a well-tested technique of community identification that goes back to Homer’s *Iliad*, with its Catalogue of Ships (in fact, a rhetorical listing of Greek nations). Even the key word *partnership* surfaces, albeit in the context of the fight against AIDS, and is retooled by the repetition of the *Masakhane* slogan—which entails the same idea of togetherness; the adverb *together* is used repeatedly in the address. Aimed at two different audiences, the New Year Message and the farewell to the African National Congress resort to contrasting means. The problem, however, is to analyze how valediction performs the Presidency when, as President, the orator is faced with a real and composite audience.

In fact, the speeches delivered at the opening of Parliament (February 5, 1999) and at the last sitting of this first democratically elected Parliament (March 26, 1999) were delivered in both a militant and conciliatory spirit. They responded to the challenge that composite audiences offer orators. They also fulfilled the movement, the gesture, and the dynamic initiated on May 24, 1994. These specific state rituals of valediction were surrounded, supported, and prepared by an ensemble of farewell rituals, both official and popular (the September 1998 Non-Aligned Movement conference in Durban; the September 21, 1998, farewell address to the United Nations; Mandela’s 80th “birthday bash” and his wedding; the *Farewell Madiba* supplement issued by the English-speaking medias. Nonetheless, unnoticed by commentators who viewed the Presidency as a solitary function, it was fitting that the actual farewells to the nation were made within the chambers of Parliament, and not on national television. Valediction thus took place where in-
stallation did; Valediction was performed by a President-in-Parlia-
ment, orator of the nation within the rhetorical forum of its represen-
tatives, and not by a President addressing citizens above the voices of their delegates.\(^38\)

The February 5, 1999, address purported to be, as in the case of previous first sittings of Parliament, a State of the Nation speech; the obvious difference was that, in this particular instance, it would be the last time Nelson Mandela would open Parliament. Interestingly, he chose to begin his rather long speech (11 pages) by stating the less obvious: “The time is yet to come for farewells,” and by quoting a letter he wrote “ten years ago … to the Head of the Apartheid State, in an attempt to launch negotiations.” He extracted and quoted from his letter to President P. W. Botha two passages,\(^39\) the first on majority rule (“[It] will not mean domination of the white minority by Blacks”), and the second on reconciliation being premised on “the dismantling of apartheid.”

The main body of the address lists socioeconomic transformation in concrete terms, to show that dismantling the heritage of apartheid has been undertaken in order to render reconciliation both viable and perceptible. The rhetorical move is two-sided: On one level, the long list of effective legislation translated into effective public action serves as praise for the first democratic government; yet it also serves the purpose of impressing an important point on the ex-apartheid parties who resist or deride change: that the best way to prevent “domination of the white minority by Blacks” is to transform the country socioeconomically. Without composing his speech in such a way as to sequentially address problems that are central to dissenting parties in Parliament (in the hope that every party will find something to be pleased with), Mandela prefers to go back to the foundation of the second republic and explain why democracy is a strategy for coexistence.

The speech given at the final sitting of Parliament, on March 26, 1999, addresses Mandela’s composite audience with the same rhetorical tool, recalling the means for the “foundation for a better life”: reconciliation and negotiation. Embedded in the first part of the speech is a catalog of “giants” lifted (with appropriate changes) from the Mafiking address. Significantly, the main argument of Mandela’s speech (which occurs just before the peroration and a call to his successor to “exemplify this approach”) finishes with “issues
affecting Afrikaners and other communities.” Emphasis is laid on the fact that “out of any debate we must emerge stronger and more united, and that there should be no winners and no losers.”

The speeches are neither consensual nor “bipartisan”; they simply reiterate the “foundation” with remarkable insistence. It can be said that, for better or for worse, Mandela has held tightly to his preferred rhetorical role, to perform the nation in a way that makes her appear to herself united yet diverse. In this respect, the sequence of valedictory speeches, including the address to the African National Congress, illustrates his intent.

A fundamental question arises regarding rhetoric and the Presidency: If Mandela did “hand over the baton” (as he stated metaphorically in the Mafikeng address) to his successor, Thabo Mbeki, did he hand Mbeki Polyhymnia’s rhetorical scepter in the same gesture? In less emblematic terms: How does one President succeed another in terms of rhetorical performance, and how does it affect the shaping of South Africa’s democracy? Can a “performative presidency” sustain itself? The next chapter attempts to provide an answer to this question.
In theory (as discussed in the previous chapter), presidential rhetoric should not have any place in a democracy, or should be restricted to formal ventriloquy—ceremonial rhetoric extolling the virtue of the abstract republic. Under the French Third Republic, this kind of Barthesian zero-degree presidential rhetoric was mockingly referred to as *inaugurer les chrysanthèmes*—to lay wreaths, verbal wreaths. Nineteenth-century democratic deliberation deliberately placed a “mute” command on the voice of the President, with its potential for garnering power; the President’s was after all the only unmistakably solo voice speaking from the seat of executive power—while the two correlated powers, the legislative and the judicial, were multi-personed, dislocated, dissonant, even cacophonous. To allow true presidential rhetoric would have been too close for comfort, redolent of Napoleonic proclamations, of multiple public voices entrusted to a singular voice (neatly encapsulated in the Gallic oxymoron of a “Republic entrusted to an Emperor”).¹ “Rhetorical caesarism,” as it might be termed, has nonetheless shone, in perilous times, through the voices of Lincoln, F. D. Roosevelt, Churchill, Kennedy, and de Gaulle. (Whether rhetorical democracy was actually better served by these incursions of rhetorical caesarism is open to debate.) In contrast, postmodern democracies are routinely subjected to rhetorical caesarism, with spindoctors and publicists playing a role similar to that of the Sophists of imperial Rome.
Indeed, from Rousseau to Habermas, the distribution of power between the three arms of government has at stake the distribution of roles regarding their respective claims to preside over democratic deliberation. In theory, presidential rhetoric is dangerous to deliberation and dangerous to democracy, once (would argue Rousseau) the founding moment has passed. The singular voice must then retreat before the sovereign’s diverse polyphony, democratic deliberation at its best. Constitutions such as the American and the South African ones rank the legislative power ahead of the executive one. Yet in practical terms, and in recent times, modern democracies have witnessed the rise of presidential rhetoric—a development that would have seemed improbable in earlier forms of democracy, with the exceptions (sometimes seen as too “presidential”) of Lincoln, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte and Disraeli.

The legacy of Mandela’s Presidency—which, as we have seen, is a founding act, operating at a different rhetorical level—is problematic, posing an open question: What are the rhetorical conditions under which successive South African Presidencies may function?

**PRESIDENCY, PRAISE, AND PRUDENCE**

The first question that arises pertains to the rhetorical relationship between the presidency and the public. Deliberation in a nondemocratic public sphere tends to mold itself (as rhetorical studies on imperial Rome and early modern Europe have shown) into a concerted praise of the Prince. In such circumstances, public deliberation regarding the nation, whether in municipal, provincial, or national debating sites, always has as its object the person of the monarch. The most comprehensive system for the political ecology of praise was developed in ancien régime France. In this rhetorical ecology of public deliberation, praise, while it reflects on and constructs the rhetorical link between ruled and ruler, accentuates nevertheless a set of characteristics for good governance, supposedly inherent in a good Prince who “cares” (that is, is possessed of caritas, charity).

In such a system of monopoly of power, there exist three virtues of good governance: moderation in exercising judgment (to rule); a sense of and a duty toward one’s calling (to have to rule); the provision of exemplary behavior (to be the rule). These can best be summed up as the virtue of prudence. Democratic deliberation, while evidently propelled by a different understanding of power, is
still impregnated by these encomiastic parameters and the personalization of power they evince. Even the popular eloquence of the 1789 Revolution, for all its insistence on restoring the voice of the people, could not tear itself away from this rhetorical legacy.

Praise, censure, and the attributing of specific exemplary virtues or defects to the holder of executive power is in itself neither particularly interesting nor novel. However, an interesting example of the internalization of prudential values, exemplified by Nelson Mandela, is provided in the farewell issue of *The Big Issue*—titled “So long, Madiba.”

*The Big Issue* (on the model of its eponymous London counterpart) is sold by homeless people and people with long-term unemployment who buy the magazine from the publishers for a small amount of money and resell it to the public at twice that price, keeping the difference for themselves. *The Big Issue* is an income-earning campaign to help people who otherwise would simply be vagrants to regain dignity and find employment. It is also a venue for vendors to voice their views (in a section titled “Streets ahead”). On the occasion of Mandela’s retirement, the magazine ran an interview with him that stressed his “humility,” his love for children, his ability to reach out to people, his sense of caring; it painted a picture of prudence, supported by interviews of *The Big Issue*’s vendors. Although expressing conflicting views, these interviews all stressed how Mandela’s Presidency had been that of a “good man.” The interviews offer a scenario for popular deliberation on how prudence can be an object for national consensus, at grassroots level:

After Mandela’s release, life is better on the streets. In the past when I was a child on the streets the police used to pick me up and throw me in a pool - then throw in a coin and make me look for it … Mandela stands for good because all people are one for him. When he retires, we mustn’t think of the things that happened before; it’s gone and you can’t cry over that [the interviewee is male, coloured, aged 41].

I actually went to fight Mandela in the war against Swapo [insurgents in Namibia, formerly South-West Africa, erstwhile controlled by South Africa]. We did a lot of military stuff against him because the National Party lied to us … Mandela is a good, honest man … He has stuck to his truthful attitude and I value that [the interviewee is male, white, aged 45].

To tell you the truth, there don’t seem to be many changes since Mandela came out of jail … I can say that Mandela has done a lot for the people, and
the children too: He loves children [the interviewee is female, coloured, aged 37].

I am a refugee from the East Coast of Africa and came here last year because now there is freedom in South Africa … I saw Mandela in Dar Es Salaam, in 1993, and he spoke of human rights, and I think he is a good man [the interviewee is male, black, aged 23].

Personal lives are traversed by an assessment of the fundamental quality necessary to be a good President—which is to be a “good man,” that is, to exercise power with “care.” The lives of the “poorest of the poor” (an expression often used by Nelson Mandela) serve as a standard by which power-as-care is evaluated. The statement that “he is a good man”—regardless of the actual policies involved, of which the interviewees have only a basic understanding, limited to their daily life on the streets—formulates the essence of prudential praise.

Yet the nagging question is how the sovereign (in this case, the people) can indeed praise the one who is supposedly “executing” its will or, to use an expression from The Big Issue, is its “humble servant.” No democracy has found a solution to this conundrum, except by reelecting the holder of executive power. A system quickly falls in place by which the executive pays lip service to the sovereign on an ascending scale of rhetorical complexity, which runs from the standard recourse to commonplaces (for instance, extolling the virtues of “my fellow Americans, mes chers compatriotes”) to the subversive practice of irony, whereby the executive persona pretends to be one of the sovereign. A “turnstile rhetoric,” as I call it, then operates, in which the executive persona seeks praise by praising the source of the praise itself. However, in regard to the shaping of public deliberation on the nature of power (in contrast to public deliberation on policy choices), what matters is how the resilience of praise directed at the executive (in itself undemocratic) can instill a sense of communal values and affect the function of the South African Presidency by transferring a prudential value from the private to the public sphere.

Let us begin with an anecdote. As a mild case of Y2K information technology hysteria hit South Africa, the press ran a full-page ad sponsored by the National Year 2000 Decision Support Centre.
“your friends” and one “for yourself”—arranged by pairs on the left and right columns. Between these, over a three-column space was a picture of an anxious-looking Mandela, above a signed declaration. Imprinted over the bottom part of the portrait was this statement: “Prepare yourself and three of your friends for what threatens to be the scourge of our achievements, the millennium bug.”

Mandela’s image has been used in so many ways that, at first glance, there is nothing new in having the magical presidential touch affixed to yet another social issue. In fact, it is the very banality of this rhetorical device (a hidden enthymeme, or faulty syllogistic reasoning: the President is Prudence; the President’s image appears; then take notice of prudence) that matters and that is indeed “magical” (given that the presidential image is a fiat that makes something evident). The banal recourse by media offices and government information services to presidential evidential presence—in this case the portrait together with the citation—further entrenches the presence of praise in public deliberation on the nature of power.

Presidential evidential presence clearly energizes issues. The turnstile rhetoric noted earlier is perfectly encapsulated in the superimposed declaration, a careful collocation that never says “I” but moves deftly from addressee (“yourself and … your friends”) to communality (“our achievements”) and relies on hyperbole—a millennium “bug” that could be “the scourge of our achievements”—that might even be amusing in another context. The net result is the reiteration of good governance: The President is shown to be prudent, dutiful, and exemplary.

The President’s personal virtues vouchsafe such rhetoric and justify, beyond election to the executive seat, the exercise of power as a citizen (that is, a member of the sovereign). Examples of Mandela’s virtues were amply provided during his Presidency.

For example, the celebrations accompanying Mandela’s 80th birthday (usually only monarchies or autocracies celebrate their leaders’ birthdays as national events) assumed the dimension of public festivity on July 18, 1998, spawning numerous public involvements. Massive media interest was brought to bear on Mandela’s marriage to the widow of Mozambique’s president Samora Machel which took place on Mandela’s birthday. (Like national birthday celebrations, such marriages are the stuff of monarchies, particularly if one considers the hint that this was really a republican version of a royal morganatic union:}
The widow of one President, now the bride of another, retained after her remarriage the name of her first husband.) The public dimension of the wedding was made clear by the fact that, apart from the civil and Christian ceremonies (the latter a Methodist and Anglican concelebration), the couple was blessed by ministers representing the Hindu, Muslim, and Jewish faiths. The wedding was also a wedding between the secular and the religious spheres and, within the religious sector, between different and even traditionally adversarial faiths. It therefore acted as yet another metaphor for reconciliation. So did Mandela’s farewell tour to North America and the United Nations in September 1998.

In all instances, media rhetoric emphasized the virtues listed earlier as those which justify not only the exercise of power, but the exercise of praise itself. In the public arena, reactions to such laudation included general consent and approval and a sense of pride. The turnstile effect did not need to be called into play here, because, by implication, the acts and deeds of the President were personal ones that were presented as revelatory of his public virtues; they were, in other words, personal virtues with which most citizens could identify, or at least find no fault.

A quaint indicator of this was provided by newspaper horoscopes that appeared on July 18. Horoscopes are rhetorically short moral hortatory pieces (highlighting virtues to use and vices to combat, in order to get through the day); so it is striking to read how the entry for Cancer was encapsulated by a moral portrait on the exemplary qualities of the Cancerian of the day, Mandela himself. This technique was unwittingly inherited—as many rhetorical public traditions are—from the saint’s day celebration of the Christian Church. This is one reason why no one found it improper that such attention was lavished on a personal event.

The run-up to the 1999 second general elections provides a counterexample, showing the narrow limits within which the exercise of praise may be conducted in the democratic public sphere. The Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) issued a glossy four-page loose sheet, inserted into the daily newspapers. The GCIS presented a slickly designed summary of the government’s achievements from 1994 to 1998, carefully skirting the issues of non-delivery of services; downplaying diplomatic fiascoes (such as the untimely courting of the “Asian Tigers” a few months
before the currency crash, the Lesotho incursion, and the war in Congo-ex-Zaïre); sidestepping continued urban and rural terrorism; and disregarding judicial indictments of top officials for corruption. That the GCIS confused government with the ruling party and misdirected public money in giving a party-aligned assessment of the State of the Nation is not the main concern here. The President was enlisted, both in words and in images, to add credibility, authority, and “virtue” to this propagandist document. The recourse to the President’s personal virtues—essentially prudential—to endorse partisan claims was far too overt in presentation to be perceived as anything other than a manipulation; the President’s speech at the opening of the 1999 session of Parliament—a public record—was used. Reactions to the GCIS’s operation were generally negative, if not hostile. The project was a failure.

This event indeed acts as proof a contrario of the way in which the transfer from personal to public virtues is always closely observed (and sanctioned when necessary) by the sovereign in democratic deliberation. The rhetorical mistake made by the GCIS (which was engaging with the sphere of public deliberation for the first time at this level since its reorganization) was not to have reconciled its guiding end with its given end. Its given end was to persuade non-African National Congress voters to cast their ballots for the African National Congress (at stake was the control of the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal Legislatures, as well as the possibility of achieving a decisive two-thirds majority in the National Assembly; none of this was to be achieved). The GCI’s guiding end was to resort to all available means to argue its case (one being independent from the other).

The GCIS overshot the mark by calling on the President’s evidential presence. The GCIS failed to realize that for the reading public, the orchestration of personal virtues in public deliberation remains valid only as long as it adheres to the system I described earlier. The GCIS should have tried to make the turnstile work on behalf of the President’s evidential presence, by integrating into its document praise for the sovereign—the people. Instead, the document read like a top-down distribution of favors. Readers who, by virtue of their situation in the ecology of public deliberation, were literate deliberators felt excluded and disqualified as citizens—as sovereign. By the same token, the GCIS usurped the President’s voice. It failed to achieve its given end, and it failed to understand that once it
had chosen to use the President’s evidential presence, the guiding end was premised on the turnstile effect. This is a striking case of communication services lacking an understanding of rhetoric.

The GCIS squandered what one corporate sponsor’s caption in the newspapers’ 20-page birthday supplement *Farewell Madiba* aptly identified as “our greatest asset,” the President: both a rhetorical asset and a prudential asset.

However, in a democratic public sphere, any prudential transfer of personal virtues onto public ones is slightly more complex. It calls to mind a time-honored scholastic *chria* exercise (a standard “discuss and develop” exercise in ancient rhetorical schools): The question to be discussed and developed is whether praise of virtuous deeds is the same as praise of virtue; or, to put it another way, whether from virtuous actions one can deduce that the person who performed these actions is virtuous. Discussion of this question elicits further questions on the perdurability of presidential rhetoric within the ecology of public deliberation. However, the fundamental argument (shown elsewhere in this book) concerns a distinction drawn by Aristotle between *enkômion* and *epainos*; that is the difference between praising actions and praising what was then termed *aretê* (character) and what might be called today “integrity.”

There are two ways to look at this argument. Firstly, what is at stake here is the tendency of public deliberation, particularly with regard to the executive, to draw from deeds a judgment on a person and, often, to obfuscate the fact that a politician’s deeds, however virtuous (in terms of whatever criteria are publicly accepted), give little indication of the politician’s character as a whole. For better or for worse, this is how private ethos and public ethos can become confused. Secondly, if one reflects on the cultural sources of *enkômion*, its origins in village fetes and street parties in celebration of games or war heroes in Doric Greece (the *kômos* was the Greek form of New York parades), it becomes apparent why the attention fixated on the private lives of executive public officeholders has, in recent times, taken on the features of a continuous *kômos* or, to use a fitting and more contemporary translation, a “rave.” (This has been the case whether the officeholders hold power or, as in Britain, are so-called symbolic figures—those who are symbolic of shaping public deliberation.)
The intervention of Mandela in public festive events, often sports matches in which the South African side is going for the big prize (such as the Rugby World Cup in 1995), his mere appearance or donning of sports paraphernalia are celebrated as a magic touch that will help the home team to win (which may or may not happen; a cynical tally would show that the “magic” does not work wonders, but this is obviously not what matters). Such appearances, although reminiscent of the powers of medieval kings (like the French and Anglo-Norman kings who healed scrofula by touch at their anointment ceremonies), are in keeping with enkômion: At sporting events—each one a kômos of sorts—the national hero is helping the heroes of the game; both are symbolic derivations of war heroes.

Mandela’s appearances at sporting events are “magical” in that they reassure people, in the form of popular concelebratory and diverse events, that “we all stand together”: the great miracle of South Africa. These appearances, his wedding parties, his 80th birthday are all public celebrations of private virtues, elevated to the rank of public deeds in order to affirm the “integrity” of the President: his integral ethos, his aretê—the epitome of prudence in Mandela’s case. Here lies the true rhetorical conundrum of praise and prudence. What is called “charisma” is quite simply the sum total of this operation.

This raises a compelling question: The President who founded or “performed” the nation is, as we have seen, in the unique position of being a founding authority, who remains in place after the nation’s founding. Mandela’s withdrawal from public office after only one term and his constant deference to collective leadership are signal feats that, regardless of motivation, place his Presidency outside the manipulation of prudence by praise—the conundrum in question. Yet, by one of those bittersweet ironies of dialectics, this renders his successors’ rhetorical treatment of private and public virtues even more problematic. The conundrum can be rephrased another way: Removed from the praise-laden function of the founder of the nation, yet in contact with the praise manipulation of the virtuous acts that ensued, how can a presidential successor’s rhetorical intervention in public deliberation escape authoritarianism or timidity? In any event, how can the prudential quality now attached to the Presidency play itself out?
NARRATIVES OF EMPOWERMENT

One way to rephrase the question, and to engage with the substance of the argument in regard to this particular area of deliberation in the public sphere, is to cast the net wider and see whether a similar prudential phenomenon is taking place outside the rhetorical shaping of the Presidency; that is, a phenomenon that infers public virtues from personal ones and adopts, in the formulation of policies, a celebratory strain that is laden with communal values.

Such a phenomenon has come into existence. It lies in the rhetoric of black (mainly economic) empowerment. Black empowerment has its own Black Business Council and newsprint media organ, a publication called Enterprise. Assessing black empowerment, it was able to publish in April 1999 a Directory of Black Professionals, Enterprise 200, listing an impressive roster of black corporate achievers. A year earlier, and only 2 years after the installation of the new government, unbundling and black economic empowerment had taken shape, with deals (45 in 1996) on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange representing a total value of just over $10 billion in 1996. This figure translates into an increase of 43% over 1995, while the value of transactions in 1996 was nearly eight times greater than in 1993, at the start of the economic upturn.

The pace of black empowerment activity picked up in 1996, creating a new and diversified body of black shareholders whose chief successes, as the millennium approached, were Johannesburg Consolidated Investments and Johnnic. Important players appeared on the scene, such as New Africa Investments Limited and the National Empowerment Consortium, the latter comprising some 40 business, trade union, and community groups, which established a new model for black empowerment. Trade unions and community organizations (such as the South African National Civics Organisation) had by 1996 entered the arena, together with partnership schemes and alliances to facilitate the transfer of skills. The National Economic Trust, created by a senior economic adviser to the African National Congress, has on its board of trustees representatives of political parties, black chambers of commerce, churches, and consumer consortiums. All these new groupings support and extend the government-established Black Economic Empowerment Commission.

What matters here, however, is how this translates into the sphere of public deliberation, in terms of the deliberative values attached to
the exercise of power.\textsuperscript{26} This is best described in its effect, beyond the mythologizing of stock-exchange deals, on the rise of a black middle class and the exemplary life stories disseminated by the print media—such as the life and times of one black entrepreneur, Sisa Bikitsha.\textsuperscript{27} His story was reported in a weekly newspaper that enjoys an educated, cross-racial readership, generally strongly supportive of the new dispensation. Sisa Bikitsha’s life story reads as a template for narratives on the rise of the black middle class. It functions by making use of a series of clearly identifiable commonplaces that may be reused and reproduced by other public sphere deliberators.

The operative commonplace is “millionaire”—an indicator of general uplift more than an accurate reflection of what constitutes a \textit{Fortune} millionaire.\textsuperscript{28} Terms such as \textit{millionaire} and \textit{tycoon} are widely used to characterize black achievement in areas that were simply forbidden to Blacks under apartheid. More than a commonplace of quantitative wealth, “millionaire” is a commonplace of a qualitative shift in the public sphere. A second commonplace marks another key shift: from a rural to an urban mode of living, illustrated by the even more radical shift from pastoral and underdeveloped Transkei to the country’s economic center, Johannesburg. In the narrative, a third commonplace further emphasizes how this shift is underscored by an act of political defiance: Bikitsha burns his passbook, erasing the sign that marked, for all black people under apartheid, assignment to black areas of residence.\textsuperscript{29}

Bikitsha literally “passes”\textsuperscript{30} into what would in the 1990s be called “the informal sector” of economic activities, here a social sphere as well. In this case “passing” is shown to be more than, for instance, a light-colored man “passing” for white, but a black man discarding his passbook in order to “pass” through the system of racial exclusions. Receiving the 1997 South African Entrepreneur of the Year Award, in anticipation of his representing South Africa at the Best Entrepreneur Under the Sun annual awards, Bikitsha spoke of his “mission” and “dedication” and affirmed that lessons in hardship have instilled in black South Africans “a natural skill” to defy circumstances.

A further commonplace of communal values surfaced when Bikitsha emphasized the role played by his family and “community.” The personal life story is squarely embedded into an exemplum—the report ends fittingly with the catchword “empowerment.” Empowerment is not here merely the effective rise of
Blacks into middle management or the corporate world or entrepreneurship; it is fundamentally a process of public deliberation and the creation of a set of commonplaces.

Less than 2 years later the same weekend newspaper, echoing many other such reports, articles, and general perceptions, ran a two-page feature on “The meteoric rise of South Africa’s black middle class.” Taking stock after 4 years of democracy, shortly before the second democratic elections, the reporter notes that “it took Afrikaner capital ten times longer to achieve the level of listed corporate ownership” realized by black entrepreneurs. The reporter quotes a boutique retailer in fashionable Sandton as saying: “They’ve got bucks, they’ve got cars. There is no umming and ahning. They want quality and there is no schlepping.” The reporter goes on to trace a sort of upmarket shopping landscape in which black consumers buy more, faster, and better quality than their white counterparts; from Diesel fashionware to Land Rovers, “a red carpet” has been “rolled out” for black consumers of luxury goods to tread on. Conspicuous consumption, which signals empowerment within social space, also indexes a less obvious system securing empowerment: from an organization of black business-people called The Network to the work of empowerment spindoctors such as BusinessMap, which affirms in its empowerment report that “some at least would fit the description of an elite.”

Empowerment actors are often called “shakers.” This term also summarizes the social ethos of the group: People who are seen to “shake” the public sphere, who can “argue” it, are not silent partners. The rise of the black middle class and of an African elite is not merely an economic empowerment; it also involves a redefinition of deliberation in the public sphere and installs in it the process seen at work in the prudential Presidency. Private virtues are reworked into public ones: Exemplary behaviors hold sway. Empowerment is the public sphere derivative of what has been called an “African Renaissance.” It probably is to the African Renaissance what the new power of mercantile urban elites was to the Italian Renaissance.

**THE RHETORIC OF THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE**

Empowerment and the Presidency have something in common: They both are prudential. They both bear a weighty eulogistic con-
tent, and both work on the values used in public deliberation. But what kind of Presidency is referred to here?

Once the founding act of a democracy has been played out and its Legislator has withdrawn (having been “an authority that is no authority,” as Rousseau once again so aptly puts it), the daunting task facing the first presidential successor is to begin a new stage in the rhetorical shaping of public debate, where authority has to be demonstrated, argued, and made persuasive so that democratic or deliberative citizenship can in turn evolve and grow. Rousseau, quoting Montesquieu’s *Greatness and Decadence of the Romans*, affirms two correlative notions that shed light on this process. As Montesquieu has it: “At the birth of societies, the rulers of Republics establish institutions, and afterwards the institutions mold them”; and as Rousseau glosses it: “The legislator is the engineer who invents the machine, the prince merely the mechanic who sets it up and makes it go.”33

Taking a lead from this pithy reflection, it is worth examining whether the African Renaissance rhetoric, whose “orator” is Nelson Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, does function as a mechanical setup that “molds” or shapes democratic debate. With Tutu and Mandela, respectively the religious “instrument of politics” (“in the first age of nations,” according to Rousseau)34 and the political “engineer,” off the deliberative scene, the function of the presidential office should also be scrutinized. The African Renaissance rhetoric (one of the clearest examples of a well-constructed rhetoric) is probably the only available entry into understanding the process of transforming the Presidency within the ecology of public deliberation.

The African Renaissance rhetoric (here taken to mean a set of arguments proposed in the public sphere with a view to persuading deliberators and support policies) has been relentlessly spun out in preparation for the second phase of the Presidency, that of Mandela’s successor. The regularity of events marking the integration of the African Renaissance rhetoric is such that it does indeed do justice to Rousseau’s image of a mechanical production of executive power.

Semantically, the phrase *African Renaissance* echoes a liberation slogan (also the title of the African National Congress’s newsletter)—*Mayibuye iAfrika: Return to Africa.*35 There is no indication that the expression is inspired by F. O. Matthiessen’s *American Renaissance.*36 The rare textual references appended to Thabo Mbeki’s collec-
tion of speeches do not provide any clues, beyond being indicative of Mbeki’s university education in the early 1960s, which was heavily influenced by basic Marxist literature. In terms of content, what are the tenets of this mechanical rhetoric? On the occasion of the formal adoption of the new Constitution (May 8, 1996), Thabo Mbeki delivered a speech, on behalf of the African National Congress, that set the framework in place. From an initial affirmation (“I am an African”—a statement that all party orators would repeat) the speech extends to a second statement that concludes the main body of the argument (“I am born of the people of the continent of Africa”). This opens the way to the peroration, in which reborn South Africa claims for herself, through the voice of an orator, the task of rebirthing Africa (“Africa will prosper”). The interesting point lies not so much in the claim of a “South African” Renaissance as in the claim of an “African” Renaissance, shaped from South Africa and heralded by the adoption of the Constitution. This claim—that Africa begins in Cape Town—is widely accepted in South Africa.

Popular instances of such claims are numerous. For example, visitors landing at Cape Town International or Johannesburg International Airport are greeted by “Welcome to Africa” signs, even though many of these visitors arrive from Africa. An upmarket travel magazine, launched in 1998 in Cape Town, carries the title Discover Africa and celebrates in an editorial its contribution to “the prosperity of our continent,” citing the Afrikatourism project and the Open Africa foundation (the latter sponsored by the petroleum company Engen, a “huge idea” and a “transcontinental project,” placed under the sole patronage of Nelson Mandela): In short, tourism is used as a means to furthering the South African “miracle.”

There are many more examples: The South African Broadcasting Corporation calls itself “the power of Africa’s creative spirit.” South African universities routinely claim that they are the best in Africa; seemingly unconcerned about the accuracy of such statements, they imply that they are the only African universities that have true research capacity (brushing aside the still lingering prestige of Makerere in Uganda or Ibadan in Nigeria). In April 1999, the Three Tenors gave a Bravo! Africa performance in Pretoria.

The isolation that is the legacy of apartheid is now compounded by a new disdain for what is not (South) African. This pervasive perception, similar to Western Europeans’ habit of claiming Europe as
theirs or the aloofness of Argentinians in South America, has led to an endemic xenophobia that targets immigrants from Mozambique, Angola, and French-speaking African nations. It is sometimes expressed in violent fashion and sometimes in self-righteous justifications in the black press.

South Africa’s takeover of Africa, in terms of representativity, does not fall within the ambit of this book, but it is likely to be a growing political theme and a source of diplomatic tensions, such as those experienced with Zimbabwe and Congo-ex-Zaïre. Examples of the takeover mentality continue to appear: South Africa is maneuvering to obtain a “continental” seat at the United Nations Security Council, should the latter change its composition. South Africa claimed that hosting the 2004 Olympics in Cape Town (“the Mother City” of South Africa and, by rhetorical implication, all of Africa) would constitute not only a South African bid, but an African one (an illusion dispelled by the ballot). The same claim was seen in the “African” bid made by South Africa to host the 2006 Fédération Internationale du Football Amateur (FIFA) World Cup, probably the single most important sporting event in the world; much publicity is given to the unique partnership between international leading club Ajax Amsterdam and three local Cape Town clubs (“Ajax Cape Town is a joint venture … the first example of a major football brand … It’s a whole new Ball Game” celebrates the launch advertising leaflet).

As the African Renaissance commonplaces take root in popular medias, they are reiterated by Thabo Mbeki in speeches to international audiences, sometimes in comparison with the Meiji Restoration, sometimes by asserting the exemplary qualities of South Africa. The commonplaces are also repeated for local audiences, either in speeches or in specific actions, such as the much publicized restitution of traditional land to the first nation of the =Khomani San in the Kalahari Desert. This rhetorical strategy was supplemented by the publication of a collection of speeches in 1998 and a biography issued before the second democratic elections of June 2, 1999. Both were occasions for reiterating African Renaissance commonplaces.

The African Renaissance rhetoric has sparked much public debate. A radio talk show in 1998 yielded a good crop of commonplaces for public deliberation on this set theme.
followed a conference in Johannesburg;\(^4^9\) the agreed meaning of the phrase (listeners who called in and the panel present in the studio were at pains to give a definition of the slogan) was simply that it referred to the liberation struggle pursued by different means and that it was not “exclusive” (as long as one could claim identification with “Africa”). As another commentator had put it earlier, it was the “rainbow nation” slogan rewritten in the context of globalization. The same commentator, while he ridiculed the “catchy phrase,” uttered the same commonplaces: inclusivity and pursuance of the first phase of South African democracy.\(^5^0\)

Attempts are being made to amplify these commonplaces; there is, for example, the contemplated creation of an academic Center for the African Renaissance.\(^5^1\) What emerges once again is the claim made by South Africa to speak on behalf of Africa, by way of the “Renaissance” rhetoric. This claim carried a stern rebuke from the 1986 Nobel laureate for literature, Wole Soyinka, for whom “there can be no liberation [of Africa] without Nigeria,” henceforth no “African Renaissance” commandeered by and controlled solely from Africa’s most eccentric region.\(^5^2\)

The shared term Renaissance conflates European culture with current political developments in Africa; this can be seen elegantly as a case for “hybridity.”\(^5^3\) However, it is rhetorically a claim not only to representativity (South Africa as Orator of Africa) but to inclusivity as a continental policy. The African Renaissance aims at creating inclusivity both internally and externally. It is therefore a call to “consensus.”\(^5^4\) What is at work is prudence; this is not necessarily in contradiction with reading the rhetoric also as a “front” to “plaster over socio-economics cracks [and] a way of bolstering the interests of a patriotic bourgeoisie, a new ruling elite.”\(^5^5\) Black empowerment is only one element of the rhetorical system here at work. *Homologia*, once more, can be helpful in creating the conditions for *homonoia* to set.

The renewal of Parliament in 1999—a Parliament no longer shackled by transitional arrangements, with a President no longer saddled with the legacy of the negotiated revolution—was a major test for black empowerment. Of many instances, I provide here two examples of public deliberation with regard to prudence.

A booklet distributed to all voters for the June 2, 1999, second democratic elections illustrates how empowerment and the African
Renaissance are interlocked. *The Power of Your Vote* neatly ties a local event (one would argue that the South African elections are no more momentous in fact than the Nigerian democratic elections) to a global concern.\(^56\) It makes recurrent use of one iconic device, a cross on a blank square, symbolizing a personal vote (see Fig. 3.1). On the back page a cross is made near the caption “African Renaissance and the 1999 General Elections.” By implication, it means that the summation of all rights (illustrated and explained in the 21-page colorful booklet) is the “African Renaissance.” To vote on June 2, 1999, in South Africa is to surreptitiously cast a ballot for Africa’s Republic. The text operates as an argument: First comes a bombastic opening statement (“South Africa has the potential to be a driving force in the African Renaissance’’); this is followed by two “factual” statements (describing Africa as the second largest continent and the cradle of humanity). Then comes the claim that Africa needs to be “reawakened” as model Europe was in her own Renaissance; finally the text insists that South Africa, whose freedom “marks the final liberation of the continent,” will “serve as an inspiration to all nations of Africa.” This deduction is “pure rhetoric” in that all of the statements listed are based on opinion.

The inauguration speech delivered by Thabo Mbeki on June 16, 1999,\(^57\) is the summation of this argument, a rhetorical exercise of amplification on the theme “I am an African,” set in 1996. However, there is a crucial shift; this time the President is uttering metaphors and images that effectively express presidential prudence (however “muddled” the images might seem to a listener\(^58\) estranged from the pathos that was commandeered at the time of their utterance). This shift might go unnoticed unless one considers the context of the delivery (as one ought always to do when assessing the power of rhetoric over an audience).\(^59\)

How does the device *African Renaissance* work in terms of the argument regarding prudence outlined above; and how does it work in terms of a deliberate strategy to retain prudential shaping of public deliberation? In the collected speeches of Mbeki, the final paragraph of the foreword is telling; in it the editors stress that Mandela’s successor “is not a populist and consequently his speeches do not contain rhetorical flourishes. They are firmly constructed and well argued. They are meant to be taken seriously and deserve close scrutiny.”\(^60\)
This statement belies what a commentator rightly describes as “rhetorical flourishes,” devices frequently used by the orator of the African Renaissance and employed at full throttle, to remarkable effect, in his inaugural speech—extensive use of the first person singular and the plural disguise we, emotive quotes, unusual words, similes, hyperboles, allegories, repetitions of certain words and clauses, and rhythmic collocation (Appendix III). If one uses time-honored stylistic categories in rhetoric, Mbeki has an Asianist style, which contrasts vividly with Mandela’s Atticism. The comment quoted above is aimed at cool-headed readers, not at listeners, and is in fact made to bolster the idea that the successor is, as said earlier, a “mechanic” of politics whose constructions are well turned and well fitted and deserve “scrutiny.” If the editors who wrote the comment try to avoid the reality of the “mechanic’s” style (which is intricate and highly “rhetorical”), they do so out of an astonishingly naive belief that political efficiency is diminished by public rhetoric (exactly the opposite occurs) and an even more naive belief that speeches are made to be read after they have cooled down, rather than heard in the heat and passion of a specific moment, by a specific audience, and assessed accordingly.

The terms Asianist and Atticist can be rephrased into a rhetorical framework if one reflects on the tension between the Sophists and the Platonicians concerning democracy in Athens. Their opposite views regarding the deliberative functioning of the polis—of any democratically constituted body politic—can be articulated in four points.

Firstly, Plato elaborated his concept of truthful politics as philosophy, against the opinion-based political life defended by the Sophists and later by Aristotle. Embedded within this tension are the Sophists’ distinctions between public and private, law and usage, and the consequent Sophist defense of political life as that which necessarily leaves private life private, outside the law.

Secondly, “truth in politics” for the Sophists does not exist outside the “diversity of opinions;” privately, individually held truths. Political truth is but the sum (and transient) total of particular opinions at a given time on a given issue. “Diversity” as a tool for public deliberation is just that. But to affirm doxic diversity reinforces the necessity of developing public argumentation, rhetoric as a public and agonistic practice. Diversity entails competition as part of the persuasive process.
Thirdly, appearance and being may be philosophical notions, but they are simply inoperative in politics. The polity sets the stage for make-believe; it is in fact the space where make-believe—“appearances”—takes place and appears.

Fourth and finally, “to speak” is the fundamental condition for political life—the Gordian knot Plato wants to sever, the fulcrum where private and public life, beliefs and the belief in truth, and appearances that claim Being status are all tied together. Only “to speak” can serve politics, because there are as many “speeches” as there are citizens in a single city. In brief, in politics “to speak” is always an action. It aims at “making sense” of political debates (rather than falling into the trap of believing in “truth”). Having made sense of political debates for oneself and for others (as Protagoras advises), one’s duty is then to act on that sense.

This is the essence of public rhetoric. “Mere rhetoric” is the fundamental condition for a balance between law and usage, private and public, diverse and contending beliefs, ideology and practice. Politics must always be “mere rhetoric.” In a democracy, “mere rhetoric” makes every citizen a homo faber—a fabricator—one included in the fabrication of laws and policies. The democratic deliberator is in essence the Protagorean measure of oneself—free from any extraneous ideology bent upon imposing law over usage, public over private, truth over belief, and one mode of speaking over another; or, to put it simply, leaving no alternatives and enforcing law, the public sphere, truth, and ideology as political deliberation. Democratic deliberation has to be based on plurality, appearances, persuasion, and the ability to appreciate viewpoints; in short, it has to be democratic.

Turning back to the problem at hand, let us examine the unfolding of an official rhetoric of prudential virtues that bears all the marks of a Platonic ideology.

The African Renaissance is a concerted effort to introduce a wide-ranging ideological coherence into public deliberation, to anchor empowerment within an ideological terrain. Behind this effort is a belief and fear that once the first and founding phase of the democracy is removed, citizens may lose their direction and waste their efforts; the goal then is to induce citizens to speak a common idiom—the language of the African Renaissance—in spite of their differences in political beliefs. A striking illustration of the consensual power of such rhetoric can be seen in the handling of the cele-
brations marking the centenary of the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902): On October 8, 1999, at the launch of what might have been a highly controversial public event—celebrating a war between two oppressors—Mbeki appropriated the war, so dear to the old apartheid establishment, to the ends of the African Renaissance. He did so by stressing the prudential values of a war that was not only the bloodiest fought by the British in securing their empire but also a war fought in avoidance of the rights of Africans. Mbeki used the war as a rhetorical example—a commonplace, truly—of a fight for freedom and dignity.

Originally proposed to channel deliberation in order to keep alive the energies at work in the transitional and founding phases of the South African nation, the African Renaissance remains remarkably Platonic as South Africa enters the next phase of nation-building. The executive wishes, in a philosophical gesture of sorts, to impart “truth” to public deliberation. The Presidency would retain its prudential value—as clearly indicated in the earlier quote about the second President’s supposed lack of rhetoric. Yet by wishing to impose a “truth” instead of allowing citizens to argue and debate and differ and “make sense” of their civil activity, the claim to absence of rhetoric is in itself a typical Platonic claim. It is profoundly germane to the belief that public deliberation ought to operate within limits set in advance—here the African Renaissance commonplaces, which can act as an entrapment for dissent or even the exercise of “speaking” (as defined earlier), because from a Platonic viewpoint these imply criticism of either “Africa” or the idea of a “Renaissance.”

Prudential rectitude sought by the Presidency in its second phase has to be Platonic. The Presidency therefore sets the stage for a confrontation with the nature, exercise, and function of democratic deliberation, unless it relocates its belief within the range of all beliefs and envisages prudential action as helping democratic deliberators—the citizens—to “make sense” of issues. There should be no privileged means of “measuring” deliberation. This should be a result of what Rousseau termed, in the language of the Enlightenment, a mechanical function; the Presidency should help the machine to work—as any other citizen should and in fact what South African citizens have done during the first phase of South African democracy.

There are indeed two presidential rhetorics—those of the founder and the successors. As a result, presidential rhetoric and democratic
deliberation currently exist in a tension that resembles the tension between Sophists and Plato in ancient Athens. However, due to its high profile in South Africa, this radical tension of the “African Athens” shows in a harsh light how contention concerning rhetorical prudence is a fundamental feature of a postmodern democracy as it underlines how presidential rhetoric, past the founding moment, adheres to methods of “appearance” which philosopher Louis Althusser characterized as being the “first ideological apparatus.”
Democratic deliberation and rhetorical democracy have been for some time the subject of intense and fundamental debates among rhetoricians.\(^1\) South Africa may offer an added dimension to the debate between the liberal position—which distrusts mass public deliberation as either plebiscitarian or irrational (whether one looks at the impact of presidential oratory or at diverse deliberation)\(^2\)—and postmodern rhetorical relativism, whereby the public argues over provisional meanings and appearances.\(^3\) It may offer an added example and a powerful illustration of the shortcomings of the belief in a “middle democracy,” in which “legitimation ritual” supersedes “an exercise in participatory democracy.”\(^4\) A need therefore exists to engage in an analysis and a questioning of democratic deliberation in South Africa.\(^5\)

The first step is to describe and address one rhetorical question raised by the public writing of the fundamental law—the democratic Constitution of South Africa—as it took shape during the course of 1996. There are at least two obvious reasons why consideration must be given to the shaping of this Constitution. Firstly, the legal and legislative processes that presided over the drafting of the text were accompanied by popular intervention, called the Public Participation Programme. The Constitution was thus written by two authorial presences: the legislators and the people. Secondly, this double process was a public one, of a magnitude not previously seen in contemporary politics: The Constitutional Assembly harnessed the resources of the electronic media not only to source infor-
mation from the public (synonymous with the People) but also to publicly reveal its own deliberations and resolutions. It was the first time that a Constitution had an electronic simulation of the agora, or forum, or the chambers of a congress or convention—in this case, a home page on the World Wide Web.

This dual transparency raises a series of theoretical issues regarding the rhetoric of constitution-writing as it shaped post-apartheid South Africa. The first point to bear in mind is that constitution-writing had been preceded by the deliberations of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), the crucial negotiations between the Nationalist regime and 22 organizations that took place (in two phases) from December 1991 to November 1993. The CODESA deliberations themselves were framed by the National Peace Accord of September 1991 and the installation of a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in charge of overseeing the organization of the first general elections. On November 17, 1993, at the final multiparty forum (now comprising 26 organizations), CODESA formulated a consensus, in six separate agreements, on the future shape of South Africa—the 34 Constitutional Principles.

The Interim Constitution Act No. 200 of 1993: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, assented to on January 25, 1994 was therefore agreed upon on November 17, 1993. Its introduction in January 1998 effectively ended 45 years of apartheid rule and 341 years of white oligarchic rule. It guided the TEC and remained in effect until the introduction of the new Constitution. The Interim Constitution was in many respects the real break with the past. Integral to the Interim Constitution were the all-important 34 Constitutional Principles, which were binding on the work of the Constitutional Assembly.

On April 27, 1994, there were the first general elections by universal suffrage for the National Assembly, which elected the President, and Senate (renamed National Council of Provinces in 1997); both Houses convened as the Constitutional Assembly to draft the new Constitution within a two-year time frame (see Fig. 4.1). From February to June 1995, the Public Participation Programme kicked in, by which popular submissions to the Constitutional Assembly were actively promoted and sought out.

From July to October 1995, the Constitutional Committee of the Constitutional Assembly prepared a document entitled Working
Draft of the New Constitution. On November 22, 1995, this draft was made public. From November 1995 to February 1996 (excluding the summer recess of the Constitutional Assembly), oral and written public hearings on the draft were held. On April 22, 1996, the Constitutional Assembly tabled the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 1996. This bill was then amended by a resolution on May 7, adopted on May 8 as the new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and then forwarded to the Constitutional Court (whose judges are appointed for a 12-year period) for certification.

Regarding certification, the Constitution had to comply with the 34 Constitutional Principles established in 1993; this was one cornerstone of the CODESA negotiations. The second cornerstone was the so-called sunset clause, which provided for the retention of civil servants of the old régime (including military and police forces), counterbalanced by fair retrenchment procedures. The overt aim was to give the new administration essential expertise at all levels, to integrate the old guard with new intakes of bureaucrats, and to incrementally train a new class of civil servants (befitting the new régime’s aspirations and needs) and protect the now obsolete cadres from victimization. By 1998, the process was deemed complete, especially in the army, the police, the diplomatic services, and some ministries (accusations of old guard obstructionism are sometimes leveled at officials in the finance and education departments and at provincial administrators). Further, the Government of National Unity, provided for by the Interim Constitution (a direct result of the November accord), was also enshrined in the Constitutional principles and was in essence a third sunset clause for it assured the ex-apartheid ruling party of an executive Deputy-Presidency (the Government of National Unity, in spite of this party’s subsequent withdrawal, was to remain in place until the close of the first Parliament).

Certification was denied in August 1996, and the Constitutional Assembly reworked the bill’s text and adopted it on October 11, 1996. It was certified by the Constitutional Court and signed by the President, Nelson Mandela. Implementation of the Constitution began on January 1, 1997. It was widely publicized from March 17, 1997, to March 21, 1997. Human Rights Day. The Constitutional Assembly dissolved itself (but the two assemblies remain as elected bodies) on that symbolic day.
The implementation of the Constitution has been gradual, as dictated by minor legislative provisions inherited from the interim agreements (for example, the President could not dissolve the Assembly, and MPs were not permitted to “cross the floor”—that is, to leave their parties—without forfeiting their seats), and by financial provisions (in essence, devolution to local authorities, established incrementally). Implementation was nearly fully achieved by April 30, 1999, on which date all terms of office ended, leading to the second general elections (on June 2, 1999) and to effective dissolution of the Government of National Unity (which has existed only in name since the withdrawal of the National Party in 1996). Before the beginning of the 2000 parliamentary session, three bills intended to give effect to enshrined rights still remained to be passed. Only with their passage would constitutional transition to democracy be fully effectuated.13

Popular deliberation on the shape of the Constitution thus was inserted within a complex process of partisan deliberation and legal processes that unfolded over nearly 8 years. Popular deliberation was pivotal because it acted as a relay between the initial CODESA negotiations and the constitutional debates that took place before and during the first legislature. The people were given, for a short period indeed (from September 1995 to January 1996), the opportunity to have their say—seemingly unfettered.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION AND SIMULACRA

This analysis begins with the paratexts of the Constitution: by and large, the texts that surround the basic text and function as simulacra of actual exchanges between the people and the legislators. There are two main paratexts: the documents put out by the communication office of the Constitutional Assembly in order to stimulate the Public Participation Programme; and the explanatory memoranda and prefaces. The style of publication of the various bills and acts also merits scrutiny.

As a member of the public—identified in these transitional times with the people—I myself contacted the Constitutional Assembly, not to make a submission (although a foreigner, I was allowed to vote in April 1994, a privilege no longer extended), but to receive, as
a dean at a local university, the official newspaper produced by the Constitutional Assembly, *Constitutional Talk*. I duly received a copy of the *Working Draft*, dated November 22, 1995, and signed by the executive director of the Constitutional Assembly. The covering letter read as follows:

Thank you for your submission made to the Constitutional Assembly during the first phase of the constitution-making process. Your input is highly valued. Please find a copy of the working draft prepared on the basis of submissions received. We also attach a guidelines document should you wish to make further submissions … Thank you for your interest in the constitution-making process.\(^{14}\)

From a rhetorical perspective, this text is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, it attempts to entrench the belief that the Constitution is the product of a direct exchange between the Constitutional Assembly and the people—a “process,” a “making,” a “working” together in a sort of pedagogic act by which the legislators are being guided by the people’s wisdom. Secondly, it reinforces a disparity between two styles of elocution: the “input” style, as I call it; and the legislative style contained in the *Working Draft*. Thirdly, it trivializes the legislative act by using formulae borrowed from marketing surveys and inserts the “process” into the world of modern communications, assumed to be transparent, fast, and reliable.

The didactic or pedagogic strand is firmly enunciated on the following page, “Invitation to comment on the working draft.” There, the people will find a set of instructions on how to comment on the *Working Draft*, both in terms of content and style. The “process” is, at this stage, rhetorically framed by a request (called “guidelines”), which takes the form of a short manual of composition:

If you so wish, and if at all possible, indicate if your comment is on: an area of contention; an area which you feel has been omitted; an area in which agreement has not yet been reached; an area in which agreement had been reached, but you feel that the issue has to be looked at again.\(^{15}\)

Two tropes lie at the core of these guidelines: consensus (with the whole gamut of in- and exclusion) and “feeling.” The Constitutional Assembly’s work is presented as the end result of a process whereby reason or thought is underplayed, to the benefit of “feeling,” in order to achieve consensus and a sense of inclusivity.
The work of the Constitutional Assembly is thus to rationalize and legislate on popular “feeling.” In fact, the letter goes on to say, “should your comment be lengthy, please supply us with an executive summary, highlighting the key points (and if possible provide us with the computer disk, for which you will be reimbursed on request.”

In other words, should the people offer more than “feeling,” key points will help “execute” their thoughts, in a pure coincidence between reality and words. The narrative of thoughts—what sustains the key points—is reserved for the educational workshops held by the Constitutional Assembly teams and forms part of the archives of constitutional writing. Key points are, rhetorically speaking, commonplaces.

On the Constitutional Assembly’s side, a rhetoric of commonplaces is therefore at work and is imposed onto the “natural” voice of the people. Two rhetorical positions are set in place by the Constitutional Assembly: that of the submissions, which give expression to the people’s voice; and that of the Constitutional Assembly itself, formalized and codified (as well as epitomized and made public by its public relations office). However, a deliberative continuum is postulated between these; key points are presented as rhetorical “meeting places” (or commonplaces), where the “natural” voice of the people and the “refined” voice of the people’s representatives can come together for public deliberation. This strategy helps the people to go beyond “feeling” toward “reason,” that is democratic deliberation as instrumental to public policy formulation. The Constitutional Assembly is presented as the “voice of reason”: It gives shape, coherence, and sound expression to the diverse, emotional, and free-style voice of the people. In rhetorical terms, two elocutions are face to face.

**HOW TO WRITE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS**

The second textual layer of constitution-writing is ensconced in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, as amended by the Constitutional Committee, introduced in Parliament on April 22, 1996 by the chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly. There exist at least two public (or widely publicized) versions of it.

The first one (hereafter Bill 1) is a bound photocopy of the bill issued on May 8, 1996 (after amendments adopted on May 7). The sec-
ond one (hereafter Bill 2) is a glossy publication. Both carry an “Explanatory memorandum” (itself preceded in Bill 1 by a short note entitled “Consolidated Text”) which, with minor differences that reflect procedural amendments, emphasizes the points made earlier and sets out the dual elocution delineated earlier in this chapter.

Firstly, let us examine the commonplace of “credibility.” The bill, beyond its legislative nature, has to be credible; in other words, its audience must accept it as theirs: “The objective in drafting this Bill was to ensure that the final Constitution is legitimate, credible and accepted by all South Africans” (Bill 1 and Bill 2). This is achieved by suggesting that the people actually wrote the text, with the political parties (no mention is made of the legislators) playing the role of ghostwriters:

To this extent, the process of drafting the Bill involved many South Africans in the largest public participation programme ever carried out in South Africa … the political parties represented in the Constitutional Assembly negotiated the formulations contained in this Bill which are an integration of ideas from ordinary citizens, civil society and political parties represented in and outside of the Constitutional Assembly.”

The rhetoric of “inventing” a constitutional text is presented as the result and the representation in speech of a “collective wisdom of the South African people.”

The “Explanatory Memorandum” operates on two levels. It casts in stone the rhetorical trope of a continuum between public voice and the legislators, seen as integrated and collective, and reaffirms the public nature of the process by blurring the distinction between represented and representatives. Its persuasive yet surreptitious effect is to legitimize in retrospect the general elections, given that the Constitution would not be put to popular vote. Democratic values thus belong to a closed circle of discourse, outside time, in a suspended rhetorical space.

This rhetoric of retro-legitimization is fully deployed in the folder in which the photocopied Bill 1 was bound. (This folder is in itself a remarkable piece of reified eloquence.) The cover page bears a motto that recurs on constitutional publications, “One law for one nation” (See Fig. 4.2; as of Bill 2 onward, law and nation are italicized and One bears a capital letter). It also has a cartoon showing people bringing submissions to an ethnically ambiguous male legislator (in
FIG. 4.2. One Law for One Nation. Cover of draft of the democratic constitution, 1996. Source: Constitutional Assembly, South Africa.
a country sharply aware of racial or ethnic features, he would be identified as Coloured). Adults, children, men, and women engage in conversations; the landscape is pastoral (with the neat touch of township housed depicted in the left foreground). The blurb on the back cover signed by the chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, appears under the heading “Birth certificate of a nation”—a formula much quoted by the media. An extract from the chairperson’s introductory speech, this phrase introduces a new line of argument: The Constitution puts an end to the immoral abuse of power.

The legislative text now enshrined in the folder is a moral text, representing the ethos of the people and that of the Constitutional Assembly. This is in every way an epideictic construction—a celebration of shared values, a laudation of virtues and deeds. The people, in the idyllic picture of a rejuvenated country, are praised for taking power in their own hands and putting it to proper use. Ethos and ethics are collapsed into a single energetic picture and a “certificate” That are twin images of one another (because by implication the male figure described above is the chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly).

However, the inside cover of the folder binding Bill 1 offers a different approach. Text is superimposed onto a large gray-tone illustration that depicts people carrying petitions. A dry “executive summary,” to use the expression of the Working Draft, it is the fundamental text that lies behind the Explanatory Memorandum and the process I have described earlier. Unlike the back cover, it bears no author’s name, no quotation marks; and unlike the front cover, its typography and layout present a dull or sober image. This “inside” text operates in fact as a praise of constitution-writing, a praise of the instrument that created the nation whose birth certificate is enclosed.

I quote the most striking parts of this pro domo panegyric:

One of the first tasks given to the 490 representatives elected in South Africa’s first free and democratic elections in April 1994 was to draft a new Constitution. Today, two years later, the Constitutional Assembly fulfills its historic mandate …. This Constitution does not belong to the politicians who negotiated it, the experts who helped draft it or the judges who, over the years, will interpret it, but to the people of South Africa whose views and ideas helped shape it. 

The line of encomiastic argumentation is easy to trace: The text—delivered by the Constitutional Assembly itself, but without disclos-
ing its authorial voice—presents the bill as a celebration of shared values. It distributes roles—political negotiation, legal advice, judicial interpretation—and subsumes them into a single voice: that of the people, to whom “views and ideas” are attributed.

A further trope is set in place according to which the people do not think or even speak as such; they merely express “views and ideas.” The delivery of the text—its actual proffering and birth—belongs to the Constitutional Assembly, as the expression “birth certificate” plainly says. The oratorical roles are discretely distributed: The people stand, as it were, on the site of what the Greek rhetorical tradition called *logos endiathetos*—mute speech being recited inside one’s head and rolled inside the mouth before being uttered as *logos prophorikos*—proffered speech. The Constitutional Assembly gives that internal speech presence by shaping its argumentation, its style, and its delivery, thus fulfilling the whole rhetorical compass of deliberation.

The second part of the text describes, in point form, the “unprecedented public participation program.” It claims that 2 million submissions were received; views from “120,000 individual and 500 organizations at more than 1,287 public meetings, workshops, seminars and national hearings” were gathered; outreach programs to 73% of the adult population, “18.5 million people”; there was a “concerted effort to communicate with the public in all 11 official languages”; the Assembly “undertook to write the Constitution in plain language”; it “made all documents … available … including on the Constitutional Assembly’s Internet site.”

The list closes with a peroration on the “challenge to make the culture of human rights and respect for the Constitution a reality.” The status of this list of claims concerns authorial status; the Constitutional Assembly addresses itself directly to the nation emblemized in the motto quoted earlier, as the natural intermediary between the law and the people. The gesture is largely epideictic; the Constitutional Assembly celebrates itself as the collective spokesperson of the nation—its Parliament—and celebrates an entity that is both abstract (“the people”) and real (“120,000 individuals”). The function of the central passage of the text (which is, one notices, well balanced in terms of speech construction) is to perform the assembly of the people into a nation and to entrench within the apparatus and the appearance of values the “culture of human rights.” The Constitutional As-
sembly is the performative voice of the people. Noticeably, only one person—Nelson Mandela—is named: not the function of the President, but the person holding this office.

**TROPING THE PEOPLE**

The Constitutional Assembly delivers a panegyric of the powers of legislative speech and of the process by which, besides the legitimacy of the general elections, it has gained “credibility”—in the same gesture persuading the people that Parliament will now indeed begin implementing in law the principles of the Constitution. In brief, the text is a scenario for political representation. It is rhetorically autonomous, separate from the bill itself.

In fact, in the version of this text (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996) dated May 8, 1996, the “Explanatory Memorandum,” while generally keeping the same phraseology, does away with the term *Bill* and replaces it with *Text*. It is only in the definitive version, Act No. 108 of 1996, that the “Memorandum” disappears completely. At this stage, the prefatory function is restored to the preamble; which was previously masked or preceded by the rhetorical pieces I have described. The preamble starts with these words: “We, the People of South Africa, Recognise the injustices of our past ....”

Only when the Constitution becomes the fundamental law does the panegyrical drift disappear. And what then appears is that very same *we* that had been deployed and yet displaced in so many commonplaces and tropes.

The question is, how was that “we” enacted in the Public Participation Programme of which the constitutional text is ostensibly the popular summation? Throughout the Public Participation Programme, and till May 1996, the Constitutional Assembly produced an official newsletter, *Constitutional Talk* (after initial teething problems, it was regularly and widely distributed). Constitutional Talk informed the public about the progress made by the six Theme Committees in charge of deliberating on the major areas of the Constitution. The newsletter also helped the running of “educational programmes,” by which the Constitutional Assembly was endeavoring to meet the communities, explain its work, and gather as many “ideas” as possible from direct “input.” The tone of *Constitutional Talk* is somewhat self-congratulatory.
What is truly significant is the pictographic rhetoric the Constitutional Talk media team offered their readers (who were supposed to be “every South African,” according to the inside cover of Bill 2): a picture of themselves at work on the Constitution. The format follows that of a comic strip. These strips always appeared on the back page of Constitutional Talk, so as to summarize, illustrate, or develop problems or questions raised in each issue. This pictographic style recurs in two brief summary-style documents: You and building the new Constitution, published during the Public Participation Programme phase; and You and the Constitution, a booklet released together with a pocket-size text of the Constitution, in a package available in all 11 official languages and widely distributed to the public from March 17, 1997, until the close of the Constitutional Assembly 5 days later, on Human Rights Day, March 21, 1997. (See Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4).

Clearly, a communication strategy was devised. This strategy is worth analyzing in rhetorical terms, because it opens up the other side of the process and allows it to be scrutinized. The pictographs placed on the cover of both booklets are interesting: The first one uses building iconography—ladders, scaffolding, brick and mortar, crowned by a billboard being erected and covered with a poster that carries the title of the booklet itself. The metaphor is obvious: To read the booklet (which helps each citizen to build the Public Participation Programme) is to read and to write the Constitution. The second pictograph shows two parliamentary columns transformed into a pastoral or ethnic style of architecture. Between the columns appears a vista of a valley and a green hill topped by a tree under the sun. The columns are crowned by a thatched roof and a hovering dove, and people stream from the valley through this archway, clutching the Constitution. From hard work to leisure, from material to spiritual, from process to product—the sequence of pictographs is clear; and it is in fact its clarity that is disconcerting.

Indeed, the “we” described earlier was constructed by the comic strips. Two examples illustrate the workings of such depictive rhetoric—the representation of the nation at work on its own fundamental discourse. In strict rhetorical terms, the Public Participation Programme can be termed a plasma: a narration of “things that have not taken place but are told like things that have taken place.” The cartoons suggest an imaginary speech, whereby the people give
FIG. 4.3. *You and Building the New Constitution*. Cover of an educational booklet highlighting popular involvement in writing the new constitution, 1995. Source: Constitutional Assembly, South Africa.
expression to the nation-to-be—the nation cannot speak for itself until its “birth certificate” is issued.

The cartoons thus constitute a plasma—scenario for reality. In brief, before the Constitution is at work, it already is “in the works” and “in the words.” By this process alone does the plasma gain validity and pass onto the side of reality, or event—historia. The process is expressed by two sets of metaphors—the “flow” and the “scaffolding”—and it leads to the extolling of two rhetorical situations: dia-

logue between citizens; and the iconic figure of the President as communicator.

Until the launch of the Public Participation Programme (with a mass meeting in Paarl, near Cape Town) in mid-February 1995, the key metaphor of constitution-building was “the road to a new constitution”), as the Constitutional Assembly actually took to the road as part of its “educational programme.” Comic strips show how a submission flows through the system, from posting to sorting to having six characters (emblems of the six theme committees) remit collated proposals to the Constitutional Assembly. The Assembly in turn hands out the “draft Constitution” to a female figure; this embodiment of the republic addresses the reader (who is in theory one of the people mailing the submissions and starting the flowing process) by saying “If you are not satisfied with the Draft Constitution, you’ll have another chance to say what you want.” The road metaphor takes on an even less arbitrary meaning when, in another strip, two female characters, one of them in search of a job, go on an errand that takes them through “People’s park, all welcome.” There they encounter a character carrying a placard claiming parental rights for gays and lesbians. They go on to an employment office, where gender job discrimination is exemplified; their journey ends on the steps of the Constitutional Court. The point the comic strip underscores is the enjoyment of the new freedoms entrenched in the 34 Constitutional Principles.

These texts stand on the margins of text and image. *Constitutional Talk* offered readers a protocol for expressing themselves. The “flow” metaphor is an invitation to enter the process of participation and is one of the means by which the rhetoric does become embodied in real acts: *plasma* propelling *historia*.

Let us turn now to the trope of the “scaffolding.” From March to June, until the winding down of the Public Participation Programme, the iconography of the “scaffolding” replaces that of the “flow.” The point is to illustrate the 34 Constitutional Principles against which the Constitution will be tested. The scaffolding supports the construction of a communal house—the Constitution. Here, everyone is at work. Commonplaces are created; for instance, washing new windows is tagged “transparency.”

A house of commonplaces is being built, a house of values shared in the construction of the Constitution itself; its worklike ambience is
obliquely contrasted with the neoclassical buildings housing the Constitutional Assembly (which are just that—buildings—not “construction” or “constitution”; the “constitution” is etymologically and symbolically an act of building). One could also suggest that the verticality of the second trope supersedes the horizontality of the first trope, enhancing the building process as the Public Participation Programme unfolded.

As the Public Participation Programme closed down and the Constitutional Assembly was about to meet to draft the text, a new trope emerged: dialogue. Dialogue is inherent in the tropes previously described, as characters (whether walking or laying bricks) are engaged in question-and-answer conversations. However, once the Constitutional Assembly became the only dialogic site of debate, the newsletter’s comic strip tried to keep alive the rapport between the Constitutional Assembly’s prerogative of dialogue and the people’s participation. The new trope aims to maintain the reality of the plasma. Despite this aim, the key issue the “dialogue” trope raises is the absence of the Public Participation Programme at this stage. The Constitutional Talk team resolved this difficulty by resorting to presidential ethos. The final image of the comic strip in Constitutional Talk 11 of 1995 shows the President’s hand affixing his signature to the draft; moreover, he is not signing “Nelson Mandela,” but using his affectionate nickname, “Madiba” (Fig. 4.5). Constitutional Talk 12 goes one step further: It does away with comic strips and replaces them, on the back page, with a full-page picture of Mandela, making a call on his cellular telephone to the Constitutional Assembly talk-line (Fig. 4.6).

The rhetorical move effected by these newsletter illustrations is a clever one. From the “ethical” signature to the “ethical” portrait, the former finding an amplification in the latter; from the hand that signs to the hand that holds a portable phone; from assenting voice to common voice, this single-image icon sums up the strategy behind Constitutional Talk: to assert the presence of the President in everyone; the President is the hidden persona of the process. In other words, the “rainbow nation,” the “constitution” of the nation, and the very means to communicate these notions inscribe in the ethos of the President the “friendship that binds citizens—the politike philia—of Aristotelian democratic theory. At work in these images is the creation of a “rhetorical link” between the people, the Constitutional Assembly, and the President.
FIG. 4.6. Constitutional Assembly advertising, 1996. A Mandela look-alike gives the good example on the Constitutional Assembly talk-line to have his input in the new Constitution. Source: Constitutional Assembly, South Africa.
Mandela’s statement is in fact both example and proof of that “plain language” sought by the Constitutional Assembly (certainly not represented in the final text of the Constitution, which remains largely couched in legislative idiom and semantic niceties):

People have a right to understand what government is doing in their name. And government has an obligation to speak and write in a way that enables people to know and use their rights .... If the right to information enshrined in our constitution is to have real meaning, that information must be clear, understandable and empower ordinary South Africans to use their rights to improve their lives.

The Constitutional Court will have the task of disentangling the fundamental text when old apartheid laws are tested and restoring the “plain feeling” of the people. The Mandela icon is thus an act of “magic” that conceals a deeper rhetorical turn: He speaks simply, like the people.

What was indeed at stake in the process analyzed here? Quite simply, it was a rhetorical process of legitimacy on the part of the Constitutional Assembly. The Assembly is, legally, the founding legislative body of the nation, yet it owes its existence to the general elections. As an assemblage of parliamentarians, the two chambers of the Constitutional Assembly are the result of universal suffrage, itself the result of lengthy negotiations—horse-trading. The Assembly and the Senate derive their legality from a series of concessions and compromises—horse-trading—and, more importantly, from the people’s votes. The Assembly and the Senate represent a balance of power and a political balancing act between past and present. In this respect, their legitimacy is the direct result of a political stalemate between apartheid and liberation forces; they are inscribed in a specific time frame.

Yet, at the same time, as a constitutional convention, the Assembly and the Senate perform a task that extends beyond representing universal suffrage: a logical task as opposed to a chronological task. In the constitution-writing process, they affirm the foundation of the nation, its very “constitution”: The universality they embody extends, beyond electoral representation. They represent the new universality of the “constituted” South African nation.

The question then arises, couched in rhetorical—and not political—terms: How does the Constitutional Assembly entrench this
twofold legitimacy? The procedures delineated earlier offer an answer to this question: The Assembly establishes its own legitimacy by simulating the existence of a popular “collective wisdom” and by projecting the fiction that the Constitutional Assembly, beyond its legislative frame, realizes—makes real—the voices of that collective will. The operation is neither fully credible nor fully completed nor entirely successful. (For example, the tension between legality and legitimacy is finding its way into the “popular” demand for the reinstatement of the death penalty.)

However, this fiction is so firmly part of current official rhetoric that it is used as a weapon against the freedom of the press, on the premise that the media have to be “constructive” in the same way that the Public Participation Programme was. The fiction has become a political commonplace.  

The only link between the Constitutional Assembly and the people is the President himself, because although he is technically a product of Parliament, he is ethically both the product of the newly emerged nation and the process by which the nation emerged. This elicits in turn an interrogation of the reconciliatory process by which “collective wisdom” was summoned to flesh out the legitimacy of public deliberation in representing the nation—not the abstract nation or the nation performed by constitutional mechanisms in the ecology of political speech, but the nation as a body at peace with herself. The splintered identity of the South African nation under apartheid had to reconstruct itself, not merely through universal suffrage or via the iconic charisma of Nelson Mandela, but through a storytelling process, the narrative of peace. Universal suffrage does not guarantee communal reconciliation; nor does the presence of a charismatic leader. For a nation such as South Africa to find peace within itself, another rhetorical process is needed. It was the purpose of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to begin that process.
Reconciliation and Rhetoric

One of the striking elements of the negotiated collapse of apartheid is the agreement reached between the various parties that the Constitution ought to be complemented and supported by a public process of national reconciliation. There would be no general amnesty for the security-forces assassins, but there would be no witch-hunt either. Instead, it was agreed—and this remains today a singular feat—that national unity was to be achieved by exposing the crimes of apartheid through the work of an independent commission; perpetrators and victims would be allowed to come forward and to narrate, in their own words, why they committed exactions and how they suffered.

The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (July 1995) was agreed on by the warring parties in the Interim Constitution (following the CODESA settlement on November 17, 1993). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in November 1995. An independent and statutory body accountable to Parliament, the commission, under the chairmanship of Desmond Tutu, conducted its work from April 1996 to the end of July 1998. The commissioners received 31,000 submissions and 7,000 amnesty requests (and granted 150 only). Step by step, dossier by dossier, emotional interview by emotional interview, with constant reporting by the medias, emerged “as complete a picture as possible of gross human rights violations that happened as a result of conflicts of the past within a 34-year period—1960 to 1994.” A nation was listening to its own multiple voices—voices of perpetra-
tors, voices of victims, voices of political parties, voices of corporations—30 years of hidden history.

On Thursday, October 29, 1998, Desmond Tutu presented the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Nelson Mandela. To everyone’s astonishment, the two elderly statesmen started to dance—in exultation and celebration. Closure of a society’s ills had seemingly taken place. (See Fig. 5.1).

The delivery of the Report marked a change in tempo in the unfolding of South African democratic rhetoric. It was no mere remitting of a written document, but a way for the TRC to administer proof of its claim that it had achieved its aim: to tell the truth, and to promote reconciliation. Because rhetorical proof also resides in that moment when delivery actually takes place, and not merely in the logical and elocutive construction of an argument, public policy delivery must always be looked at from the standpoint of its acts of delivery. This particular delivery was a liberating public act, a

rhetorical gesture of deliverance, observed by the general public, commented on during talk shows and in letters to newspaper editors: a social ceremony. The publication of the TRC Report can be viewed as a crucial moment in the assertion of democratic deliberation, which completes and buttresses the process of deliberative shaping that took place during the writing of the Constitution.\footnote{4}

**RITUALS OF DELIVERY**

This said, the five gilt-edged volumes delivered to President Mandela by Archbishop Tutu are not intended for public consumption. They are ostensibly, as illustrated by the presentation ceremony, an act of good government; however, they are just as illegible to citizens as most bills or laws are—and just as incontrovertible. The material nature of the TRC Report is an indication of one rhetorical facet of the presentation itself. It is a laudation of the ability of the commission to encapsulate its work and to fulfill its mandate. More than 4 years after the general elections and nearly 9 years after Nelson Mandela’s release from prison (such is the time-scale), Desmond Tutu presented the Report.

The presentation ceremony assumed all the trappings of a ritual. Rhetorical events are essentially ritualistic. They recur because, in public policy argumentation, they tend to entrench values that do not exist in civil society without the evidence borne by reiteration. This presentation ceremony enters such a chain of iterative sharing of values. It was preceded by a Morals Summit; it was followed by a special sitting of the second house of Parliament, at which the Deputy-President addressed the councillors on the topic of national reconciliation; and it was to be followed by a Reconciliation Summit (a specific recommendation of the Report) sometime in 1999 or 2000. In other words, the Report enters into a chain of events that help anchor the meaning of the reconciliatory process in popular conscience.

However, if one were to try to approximate the presentation ceremony and similar practices, it might be best likened to an plenipotentiary’s presentation of ambassadorial credentials. Why? The submission of letters of credence is based on two principles: the recognition of an equality between powers, even though one is by proxy; and the symbolizing by gesture of a trust in good relationships. In the case of the Report, Desmond Tutu indeed acted as a
plenipotentiary proxy, with the full powers delegated to him by law, to speak on behalf of the constituent parts of the nation, which until then were divided and estranged, foreign to one another, torn between past and present, or (to use a Christian simile that Archbishop Tutu might approve) between the suffering citizenry and the citizenry triumphant.

The presentation ceremony purported to be the delivery of a nation on the way to reconciliation, now transparently true to herself—a nation quite different from that born of the first general elections, when franchise was the key issue. The medias gave extensive as well as critical coverage to the event. While the TRC audiences were taking place, SAfm, a national radio, broadcast excerpts of audiences with commentaries every morning after its 8 a.m. news bulletin. National newspapers had a regular column dedicated to the most salient public hearings (such as the 10-day hearing about the activities of the Mandela United Football Club; the numerous hearings of star security operative and convicted murderer Eugene De Kock; the self-exonerating submission by former president F. W. de Klerk on behalf of the National Party; the granting of a collective amnesty—which was subsequently withdrawn as contrary to the Act—to 37 top members of the African National Congress; the highly emotional hearings of Pan Africanist Congress soldiers who sought amnesty for the December 30, 1993, Heidelberg Tavern killings in Cape Town).

As the TRC wrapped up its work, the national television SABC ran a special program under the editorship of antiapartheid activist and journalist Max Du Preez. The African National Congress published a special issue of its newsletter, Mayibuye, dedicated to the Report, in which it restated the organization’s “apologies without qualification” for “abuses” it had committed, drawing the conclusion that democracy is “the best way to repay victims,” and “the goal of reconciliation … a just society.”

Just one day after the release of the Report, a large banking group called Absa (erstwhile a pillar of apartheid) used the TRC’s emotional impact to publicize its own restructuring: A full-page advertisement depicted children of various ethnic origins at play in the veld, with the caption “Now we are one”—an astute reinterpretation of the Report’s social effect. Art exhibitions, either community-based or of gallery-format, also disseminate the social
teachings of the TRC: A Black Perspectives exhibition was held in September 1999 at the Sanlam Art Gallery in Bellville (near Cape Town). The interest of it lies in the fact that Sanlam insurance group was (like the Absa banking group) part of the old régime establishment, with an active policy of supporting high-culture arts, albeit up to now not “township” art forms; furthermore, Bellville is a traditional white Afrikaans-speaking city in the larger Cape metropolitan area, and it resisted the incorporation of neighboring townships. The exhibition is coyly sold to the public by Sanlam’s “employment equity consultant” (a black South African) and “human resources benefit” officer (a coloured man) as “transforming the company in compliance with recent employment equity legislation.” In spite of all these qualifications, such social events must be read in light of the TRC—social acts of deliberation, people-oriented, and argued along the line of “reconciliation.”

Emerging postmodern democracies such as South Africa have a natural need to ritualize rhetorically the celebration of civil values. Such rituals have not disappeared from Western democracies but have become less obvious to the common people or far more enmeshed with other social rituals (with the exception of State of the Nation addresses, which are, however, a limited phenomenon).

DEMONSTRATING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

However, the presentation of the Report must equally be seen as a demonstration of the nature of the new social contract. The very existence of the Report, regardless of its authorship, process, content, findings, and delivery, constitutes proof that the founding act of post-apartheid South Africa (Act No. 108 of 1996, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, October 11, 1996) and, before it, the agreement to a negotiated settlement were valid in their claim of promoting truth and reconciliation.

The preamble to the Constitution makes it explicit that reconciliation between past and present is the very basis for constitutional agreement. In this respect, the preamble functions as a rhetorical syllogism. In it, in two neat qualifications, lies the premise of a demonstration regarding the components of the nation-to-be: “those who suffered for justice and freedom” (that is, those who opposed the racist régime) and, in a subtle turn of phrase that can be read posi-
tively even by those who supported apartheid, “those who have worked to build and develop our country.” Such communal notions, marked by the repetitive but opaque use of the first-person plural pronoun our, lead to a self-evident formula in the conclusion finally drawn: “That South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in diversity.” The definition of nationhood and of citizenhood is simply the act of living together, here, now. But how is this brought to fruition?

To examine it from another rhetorical angle and to reinsert it into genres of public argumentation, the Report of the TRC is the fundamental model for any “speech on the State of the Nation.” It enunciates the state of a nation, as the nation reveals herself to herself—without the mediation of a spokesperson (usually the head of the executive). The Report thus purports to be an un-mediated speech, uttered by the nation in her diverse voices. Interestingly enough, as noted earlier, there is great constitutional uncertainty concerning the nature of the speech given by the President (as head of the government) at the opening of Parliament each year in February, because there are no constitutional provisions for it. Is it or is it not a State of the Nation address? The criticism leveled by the Deputy-President at “His Grace Archbishop Tutu”—who had sternly repeated his warning that he would suffer no “tyrants-in-waiting,” whoever they might be—should be comprehended in light of this issue. At issue is who the true spokesperson for the nation is; and, more radically, whether anyone, beyond the TRC and its subsequent rituals, has the right to assert what the state of that nation is. Obviously, this poses a problem.

However, let us take note of a statement regarding the “State of the Nation” that appears in the concluding section of the Report:

Reconciliation requires that all South Africans accept moral and political responsibility for nurturing a culture of human rights and democracy within which political and socio-economic conflicts are addressed both seriously and in a non-violent manner.

The issue at stake in this quotation—which already establishes the rhetorical conditions for the nation to behave in relation to her diverse parts—is homonoia, consensus.

This belongs to the sophistic tradition, as reworked by Aristotle. According to this perspective, cohesion of citizens, “sameness,” “cul-
ture of democracy”—in short, homonoia—is not, as Plato would have it, oneness (taken from the organic model of a household, the oikos) but togetherness. The city is a mixture of diverse elements, rather than the subordination or engineering of parts made to fit into a preordained totality. In order to achieve the sameness of these elements (what is today called consensus), the stress should be on the plurality, or diversity, of “virtues” (as in the carefully worded preamble to the South African Constitution), and not on the imposition of a preestablished order. One of Aristotle’s many metaphors to illustrate this idea is the image of a picnic (ta sumphoreta, Politics, 1286 a29): To the banquet of democracy, everyone brings something different, homemade, that together makes a good meal—but not of all the same food.

Political rhetoric, public argumentation, what the Report aptly qualifies as “to address” become the togetherness of diverse and contradictory voices. Stasis, dissent—to “stand up” for your ideas—is paradoxically the means to togetherness: By affirming difference on issues and accepting that to listen to each other’s arguments is part of this process of affirmation, citizens of a rhetorical democracy celebrate both the power of dissent and the power of acceptance; in sum, they celebrate their community as a rhetorical community. This Aristotelian concept sums up the “live rhetoric” in the proceedings of the TRC—testimonies, audiences’ response, commissioners’ extemporizations.

By resorting to a model that was theological in inspiration and drew its functionality from the Pauline ideal of building the ekklesia by way of predication and profession of faith (“public address”), the TRC cast itself in an Aristotelian mold. In this light, the Report is both an exposure and a weighing of South African diversity, dissent, and disagreement: in short, a recapitulation of particular virtues and specific vices that make up the nation. The narratives and the findings demonstrate a careful allocation of responsibility for human rights abuses among various social agents. The digest of the Report, widely circulated by the press, bears witness to this.12

The rhetorical advance of the Report is therefore not of the forensic type—although the narratives and the findings themselves do aim at establishing “facts.” It is essentially a deliberative text, an argument concerning the opposite components of the nation.

Yet the resolution of the Report—and this points to its unusual status—is epideictic; it praises values that led opposing parties to all
testify in the same manner. This Aristotelian model for public argumentation explains why, rhetorically, there can be no blanket amnesty and no blanket condemnation. (Such action might better fit a Platonic model.) What the Report demonstrates, in sum, is how the agents of disruption and destruction have reclaimed the right to attend the democratic banquet. For instance, the damning finding on an ex-Minister of Law and Order is rhetorically mitigated by a clause that praises the depth of his contrition and the force of his apology. In other words, the nation reconciled with its constituent parts is not an organic whole, in which the parts must be adapted to the whole, but rather the acknowledgment of the virtue of diversity (where each part has its own qualities), as expressed by the narratives and reformulated by the findings.

In this respect, the three reasons given by the TRC in its foreword (signed by Desmond Tutu)\(^\text{13}\) for not choosing proceedings reminiscent of Nuremberg are enlightening: firstly, the existence of a “military stalemate” between the warring parties; secondly, the prospect of an amnesty (not of the judicial type—the TRC simply required “full disclosure”) for the security establishment, who, without this prospect, which otherwise might have “scuppered the negotiated settlement”; thirdly, trials would have “rocked the boat” and put immense material pressure on the judicial system.

How should this explanation be read in rhetorical terms—and specifically, in Aristotelian terms? In purely practical terms, when there is stasis—dissent—one must look for a common language. Homonoia is based on homologia. The TRC also created a new vocabulary, one that is now pervasive in the political lexicon, both in South Africa and in other fractured democracies.

**RHETORIC, RECONCILIATION, AND TRUTH-TELLING**

In the foreword, the TRC gives a fourth reason for avoiding a Nuremberg-style scenario, and it concerns “truth” (or at least its first tier):

Because such legal proceedings rely on proof beyond reasonable doubt, the criminal justice system is not the best way to arrive at the truth. There is no incentive for perpetrators to tell the truth and often the court must decide between the word of one victim against the evidence of many perpetrators.\(^\text{14}\)
This is a fundamental statement regarding, in argumentative terms, the forensic nature of the TRC’s work. The mistake often made by commentators is to claim that truth should generate reconciliation—but then finding that people still disagree, to conclude that truth-telling does not work (as if in a democracy there should be no disagreement, *stasis*). This is a Platonic attitude, usually more complacent than an Aristotelian one in terms of social responsibility because it relies on government or agencies endowed with authority (the churches, for instance) to formulate and decree policies from above. By contrast, an Aristotelian approach to reconciliation is to entrust ordinary citizens with the task of internalizing events and formulating for themselves the meaning of those events. In an Aristotelian democracy, reconciling diverse views is a process that does not need verification by abstract agents, superimposed actors; in short, an Aristotelian democracy makes truth and reconciliation a private view onto public things.

To resolve this tension, one must turn to the key issue of the verbal representation of truth. Truth means, in part, the truth(s) proffered by victims and perpetrators, either in search of the answer to “what really happened?” or in search of amnesty (“this is really what happened”); in short, and in the TRC’s definition, truth is “full individual disclosure” of facts. Truth also means the truth about the TRC as perceived by the new citizens of South Africa and, by implication, the disclosure of their own past.

Again, ancient rhetoric may be useful in explaining this point, in particular Antiphon’s fragmentary treatise *On Truth*. Firstly, consider the basic situation with which the TRC found itself confronted: Someone comes forward and gives an account, whether to seek redress or clarity or to seek amnesty. The account (the “truth”) is a judicial process, a piece of forensic rhetoric, in which facts (in some cases, unknown till that moment) are reported. Here the account stops. Establishing the facts is at the core of forensic rhetoric. Yet the task of the TRC is also to ensure, in the case of amnesty-seekers, that “full individual disclosure” of the facts is provided.

Secondly, one must consider the purpose; what is “justice” if not, to quote Antiphon’s *On Truth*, “not to transgress the prescriptions of that city of which you are citizen?” Now, a recitation of atrocities may be seen as a catalog of transgressions, of “injustices” to which citizens have to be reconciled. The paradox of amnesty-seekers is
that they come forward as witnesses. At this point, the forensic nature of the TRC’s work on truth comes to a halt. Now, as Antiphon explains, “justice” (that is, the redress of civic transgressions that disrupt the social contract) is a matter of persuasion. There is a crime; there is a potentially identifiable criminal; there is a witness, argumentation, and judgment of the degree of guilt. The TRC was keenly aware of this pitfall.

In the TRC’s case, the criminal was the witness, and often the only witness. This is why perpetrators’ testimonies usually ended with a request for forgiveness and an act of contrition (except for those who denied the Constitution its legitimacy), as well as personal testimony on how their crimes were preventing them from “sleeping at night.” The perpetrators are indeed looking for “peace.” In short, the criminal, as the witness, suggests that sentence has already been passed—an operative of the Vlakplaas security unit utters, in a “soft, accommodating voice,” that he has lost his peace of mind, which he hopes to recover through his confession and, possibly, the forgiveness extended to him by the victim or the victim’s family.20

The TRC operates like a deliberative catalyst for internalizing reconciliation and conceiving the nation as a space for peace—individual and collective. Further evidence of this exists in the way in which psychological and social work discourses intersect with the TRC’s work—from counseling of victims and perpetrators to expert witnesses to “decompressing” parties for the staff. For instance, in the case of interpreters who had “to lend their voices to both victims and perpetrators,” interpretation and translation can also be seen as a gesture of reconciliation, by which interpreters internalize the voices of the witnesses—victims and perpetrators:

When you are interpreting them, it is not hard to accept that they were raised to hate blacks. I blame their parents, not them. I feel sorry for them … I have to visualize things that he is saying … That kind of evidence has given me an understanding of the extent to which people can go, human’s nature capacity for brutality, but also the capacity for compassion and forgiveness.21

The point is that narratives of truth-telling are always singular: Each account is a private act of story-telling, a private view of events; there is no room for the weighing of evidence, one witness against the other. The TRC did not work on the premise that judicial rhetoric
can ever produce a moral gain, because victim and assassin are, for the purpose of arguing the fact, *on a par*. In the reconciliation process, truth lies in the telling, on the premise that perpetrators, who come forward voluntarily, acknowledge not that they are guilty of a crime, but that they committed an act of abuse. Personal peace and national peace are two sides of the same coin as the nation—and the forums it opens for declaring reconciliation and acknowledging past abuses—becomes the very space that brings people into a harmonious relationship with others and with their inner selves, that adjudicates troubles rather than exacerbating tensions.

The public reconciliation between victim and perpetrator is a private gain, marked by public emotional gestures of forgiveness: heads bent in contrition, tears shed, embraces, handshakes. Victim and perpetrator might not agree on what *reconciliation* means, on what “to eliminate” meant, on what “South Africa” now refers to; they will probably vote for parties that are the successors of the warring parties of the predemocratic era; yet they accept the validity of the TRC process of public deliberation. By comparison, the Nazi leadership did not accept the legitimacy of the court at Nuremberg.

**THE RHETORICAL CONUNDRUM OF PRIVACY**

There is good reason to insist that this private dimension of reconciliation is crucial. Let us look at an example, taken from the presentation ceremony itself, that illustrates how the TRC functions at the level of the individual. After remitting the *Report*, Tutu and Mandela began to dance, a gesture that seemed out of place, out of beat with the dignity of the occasion. Can anyone imagine the founders of the United Nations charter, or those present at the signature of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 dancing like Tutu and Mandela? No. Why not? To dance would have been the rendition of an abstract Platonic Idea. The music of the United Nations is indeed a Platonic monody, as most of the United Nations vocabulary reminds us: “concert of nations,” “august Assembly”—these expressions suggest Plato’s own definition of society as *xumpônia tis kai harmonia*; he compares it to a consonance or a harmony, that ability to “sing together” (*Republic*, 430e, 432a), on condition that all sing the same tune. The Universal Declaration, which purports to create an international society of nations is Eurocentric in its definition of
what human rights are; it does not allow for non-Western interpretations. Dancing together to the tune of the Universal Declaration would have reminded all present of the fact that nations were invited to a Platonic _xumphônia tis kai harmonia_, a “common standard.” The Rome Convention (the only one so far to apply the Universal Declaration at a regional level) performed the same role for the nations now assembled in the European Union, by reinforcing the notion of a “common heritage” as the only standard.

The Universal declaration and the Rome Convention both truly reflect Plato’s injunction to citizens: Let’s all sing the same tune. Eastern rhythms, Iranian music, African beats—in sum, alternative conceptions of society and human rights—have no place in the “concert of nations.” And the result is, as Aristotle puts it, “an inferior sort of a city, just like a symphony that is reduced to a homophony or a rhythm to a single beat” (Politics, II, 1263b 31–35). In Aristotle’s vision of the democratic polity, citizens add their own tunes to the “public voice” and their own steps to the common dance; the democratic polity is not homophonic but polyphonic.

My question is, What is the symbolic significance of the two South African leaders’ dance? Is this “jive” a _xumphônia_ along the Platonic or the Aristotelian mode?

Here, at the closure of one of the most extraordinary processes of nationhood in modern times, the protagonists dance. Why? This particular dance is the reversal and the rebuttal of the sometimes deadly _toyi toyi_ dance, often performed at mass killings and at kangaroo courts and denounced by the TRC as a tool for gross human rights abuses on the part of the liberation movements themselves. Tutu and Mandela’s dance is a public recognition that the _toyi toyi_ they themselves once danced was, like all rallying cries, uniform and monodic, the death of individual responsibility—the responsibility that was restored by the TRC. This sort of public argumentation strategy was neatly encapsulated in a poster put out by the African National Congress, during the run-up to the general elections in 1999. On a vibrant yellow background it showed Madiba—Nelson Mandela—dancing. The caption read: “The first step in the Madiba jive is to register.”

Yet, as pointed out by Jacques Derrida (in his analysis of the “scène du pardon”), the process of public confession is highly problematic. From a rhetorical standpoint this form of public rheto-
ric eliminates the private from politics, defined here as the exercise of citizenship and nationhood (one must never lose sight of the TRC’s brief—homonoia). According to the TRC, “no one” in South Africa was left untouched by repression and oppression given that, all private acts must become public, be fully disclosed: “All South Africa ... had been caught up in oppression and resistance that left no one with clean hands.” The rhetorical move is clear: If no one is clean, everyone has something to disclose.

Now, Antiphon denounced the Athenians’ belief that only Athenians, because they spoke good Greek, could have access to “politics,” could be citizens (Antiphon’s coinage politeuetai tis does not mean to be a citizen, but “to citizen,” as in “to believe.”) Antiphon’s powerful argument is based on the necessity of retaining within politics a sense of privacy. For Antiphon the rationale for common public deliberation does not lie in the common beliefs shared by a given interpretive community concerning the exceptionality, originality, or singularity of their political compact, their common language (reflected in the Athenian motto that—“We speak good Greek; they don’t. Their society can’t be democratic!”). For Antiphon the rationale for being a citizen revolves around the distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere, that which escapes public scrutiny.

In politics, there is scrutiny each time there is transgression—a breaking of the law. A crime needs witnesses to be declared a crime—a rhetorical system of proofs and persuasion. My argument is that the TRC, because of its brief, saw itself as the means of eliminating the privacy of individual citizens as they were before the demise of apartheid in 1990.

Not enough attention is being paid to the inescapable truth that an account of facts induces an account of oneself, thus removing oneself from privacy altogether. Apartheid was the ultimate transgression against “democracy” (the common standard); it excluded Blacks from the social compact and perverted, for the Whites, the social link. The resolution of such transgression can only be effected through speech, as a persuasive tool. Little attention is paid, rhetorically, to the fact that as a “crime against humanity,” apartheid needed to be argued against, that as with all crimes, witnesses against it were required. It was the TRC’s mission to bring such witnesses to the stand.
The argument is often heard—and is explicitly formulated in the Report’s chapter on responsibilities—that everyone in the white minority conspired with apartheid (a statement that, in relation to Nazism, would still sound outrageous in Germany). It is also argued that, conversely, everyone in the liberation forces knew about the abuses committed by those forces (by contrast, the question of crimes against humanity by Allied forces was never raised). Both arguments are founded on the premise that privacy does not exist.

For instance, when an amnesty-seeker stated that he acted blindly or simply obeyed orders or had completely blocked out his crime—in other words, stated that his actions were beyond his will or control—social workers would often explain that he was a victim of the Afrikaans culture of machismo; therefore, he was not responsible. The perverse effect of such arguments (which show that proofs are simply options about facts) is not to exonerate murderers but to reaffirm the nonexistence of the private sphere.

But, as Antiphon might retort, what if the killer enjoyed killing? How would anyone prove this? In this case, all killers told the same tale about “justice”: They transgressed on command (either direct or indirect); they now bare their souls and want to be “reborn” as new citizens (sometimes they mention being “reborn” to their faith—as a proof). They never took any pleasure in their crimes. Is this true? This may be the only part of privacy that escapes scrutiny, because the alternative would be too ghastly to contemplate and because no one ever asks them whether by implication, they now take pleasure in voting in this reborn democracy.

Be that as it may, what the public in South Africa—the nation expunged of her secrets, the nation diverse yet reconciled—will ever see of the TRC Report is not likely to be the five volumes mentioned earlier, but a set of extracts published by the English-speaking press group, Independent Newspapers (which issued five supplements during the week after the release of the Report). Until an awaited abbreviated version of the Report, significantly titled Out of the Shadows, is released, these extracts are likely to remain the only popular dissemination of the TRC’s findings, alongside the harrowing reportage by writer and journalist Antjie Krog, Country of my skull, a de facto digest with commentaries of the TRC’s “best” narratives, an invaluable document unlikely to be replaced and the volume of essays by Desmond Tutu, titled No future without forgiveness.
However, the point has been made that readers have to “relive” the process so as, one assumes, to be better prepared to read the Report. Thus, in the days leading to the release of the Report, four articles appeared in the newspapers, offering an interesting framework for reading the TRC’s work since April 1996.33

**BOWDLERIZING THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION**

The four articles represent an act of advocacy by which the newspapers tried to formulate the personal deliberative modes of readers as citizens of a nation supposedly faced with her truth and now reconciled with herself. The set is neatly structured in terms of rhetorical disposition. The first two articles turn on a sharp distinction between the public voice (marked at the first hearing by emotional adjournments, prayers, collective wailing that “threatened to lift the roof off the old wood-panelled hall”) and the abstract voice of the political parties (epitomized by their efforts to silence the TRC). Whereas the people address themselves directly to “justice,” in a dialogue in which the TRC plays the role of an oratorical persona (it is the voice of justice), the parties dialogue abstractly with “the process.” In the last two articles, the writer posits the reader as a third person, able to decide independently who was indeed a criminal and where to apportion responsibility, in order to leave the past behind and move ahead as democratic subjects.

The articles also retrace the momentum of the TRC’s work. Monday’s article focuses on the first day of public hearings (April 16, 1996) as the epitome of all subsequent hearings, “the most intense and emotional in the history of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission”:

> It was an historic and dignified day in spite of the bomb threats which interrupted it—a day in which South Africans were introduced to the concepts of a witness table with microphones, water jug and box of tissues, and to the sight of witnesses being comforted by social workers as they gave evidence. It was a day in which South Africans first heard grief-stricken survivors plead for information that would lead them to the remains of disappeared loved ones (“even a small piece of bone so we can give him a decent burial”).34

The second article deals with submissions by political parties, which took place 4 months after the beginning of the TRC’s work.
Shifting from the first victim’s account of atrocity (in the first article) to policy accounts, the second article moves from the particular to the general:

These two parties (the ANC and the National Party) were, after all, the major combatants in the conflict. The commission, as a means of dealing with the past, was neither party’s first choice. The ANC would have been happier prosecuting key individuals in Nuremberg-type trials, while the NP favoured the granting of a blanket amnesty.\textsuperscript{35}

The third article, beginning with the words “Mirror, mirror on the wall, who was the biggest rogue of all,” offers a cast of criminal “heroes,” across the political spectrum—thus moving from policy to policy-implementers. It concludes on a battery of questions addressed directly to readers:

So, how do you judge the perpetrators when it comes to apportioning blame? Do you forgive those who have applied for amnesty and condemn those who have not? Do you forgive transgressions committed in the name of the ANC because you supported its struggle? Were police and soldiers justified to kill, maim and torture in defence of the system? Who is more culpable: De Klerk’s rotten apples or De Klerk himself, Jerry Richardson or Winnie Madikizela—Mandela, Almond Nofomela or Dirk Coetzee?\textsuperscript{36}

The final article focuses on “the healing process”—moving to the people’s typical and therefore three canonical reactions to the TRC: the “blanket amnesty brigade,” those who support the TRC, and those who see it as a sellout, neither victims nor perpetrators, just “the nation” as it now is, a deliberative picture offered to readers as citizens. In a series of blunt statements the final article formulates the basic commonplaces for any popular deliberation on the reconciliation process:

Apartheid was a brutal and shameful disease. It has been in remission for a few years, but scars will take generations to heal [introductory paragraph] ... However fair and impartial the commission has tried to be, there is no getting away from the fact that apartheid was wrong, that it created hatred and bitterness, that it destroyed the foundations on which democracy and respect for human dignity can flourish [central paragraph] ... The pain is not over ... However, as Tutu has pointed out: “Maybe the worst is already past” [conclusion].\textsuperscript{37}
All in all, the series provides a good overview of the questions most people were asking themselves as subjects and citizens possibly engaged in private or public debates concerning the TRC and, beyond it, nationhood. Indeed, by now, the reader is already the new citizen, one who is beyond the process of reconciliation.

The articles thus rhetorically create a fiction in which readers have already moved beyond the TRC. In short, the readers are no longer directly (as witnesses or relatives of the witnesses) or indirectly (by empathy, out of personal interest, for a whole gamut of reasons) the subjects of the TRC’s narratives; they are no longer divided and suffering, but new citizens, reconciled and hopeful. The articles achieved a twofold aim: For one, they offered a compendium about the TRC—basic dates, major events, key issues, main figures—allowing readers to understand better the TRC process as it unfolded and concluded. Readers are not academicians or scholars; as citizens they rely on news to help them to go about their business of being citizens (to recall Antiphon’s verb coinage, “to citizen”). They deliberate in the present tense, which explains why reclaiming South Africa’s past for the next generation’s benefit and education is proving so difficult and intractable a task. The second effect of these articles was to direct the attention of the readers-as-citizen toward the future: The articles posit readers as new citizens, able to look at their old selves from the outside, to take a distanced view of how they behaved under apartheid in their public and personal lives (the Report makes it clear—everyone was involved), as if they no longer are what they were. As democratic subjects, the new South African citizens have entered into a contract that precludes them from thinking from the standpoint of the TRC. The irony of the TRC process is that nation-building requires a measure of amnesia. New citizens engaged in democratic deliberation cannot afford to continue thinking of themselves as victims or perpetrators. Politics and ethics have to be placed apart.

This is the issue that brings the Report and the Constitution into a tension in terms of public deliberation on nation-building and democracy. The dance performed by the President and the Archbishop illustrates indeed how the Report rhetorically posits itself in relation to the Constitution (if one looks at the statesmen as metaphors of their functions): The Report gives life and shape to the Constitution. It imparts rhythm and imagery to the abstract text of
the fundamental law. The dance makes political music—for all to see, to hear, to visualize. The intention was for citizens to find the will to enunciate, to voice (this term is often used in the *Report*), and to materialize the boundaries of the polis and of the social contract, boundaries which were abstractly presented in the fundamental law. Yet for all its voices—voices of perpetrators, voices of victims—the *Report* remains a textual production *about* the old social contract and the new social contract. It looks toward the past. What remains unsolved is the question of popular perceptions of what it is to be a new citizen—regardless of the process of remembrance, lustration, forgiveness.

The next question therefore is, How does a nation utter a contract? Can this be uttered at all? If so, by which public rhetorical means?
The “True Colours”
Of Popular Deliberation

Shaping a nation requires, in rhetorical terms, a process of popular argumentation, together with and beyond the process of public argumentation. The latter rests largely on single “orators,” whose function is (as discussed earlier) to deliberate and to perform, to argue and to show the way, to give a nation a stock of tropes that policy can be said to reflect or detract from, in the process of national upbuilding. In contrast to this, and also beyond the largely ritualistic and controlled “mild voice of reason”\(^1\) at work in both constitutional and reconciliation rhetoric, popular argumentation, in order not to be a fiction, needs to be disseminated, multiauthored, “mediatic,” insofar as the media plays the role of relay between “people’s voice” (as the commonplace goes) and the initial *inventio* brought into action by “orators.” The process can be termed epideictic. The people are led not so much to reflect, ponder, and deliberate as to “demonstrate”—to “show off”—their phrasing of communal values; and by the same token, to perform these values, to give them rhetorical substance, to “own the process.” This epideictic coil ensures in turn a sense of legitimacy for those who control the medium by which it is channeled, whether this control is exercised by the print or audiovisual medias, or the politicians themselves.

This is the reason why, in this chapter, I will turn to two seemingly disjointed documents: *True Colours*, a nationwide reportage in the major English-language group of newspapers;\(^2\) and the first
post-apartheid population census, *Census 1996*. In each document personal narratives with statistical representations, voices with numbers, help explain how South Africans see themselves after the demise of apartheid—as citizens belonging to a single nation that can utter a collective yet differentiated “we” in a “rainbow” of citizens. (See Figs. 6.1 and 6.2.)

**THE CORPORATE BODY POLITIC**

Given that *True Colours* was sponsored by Shell, a preliminary comment must be made on how corporate interests have financed various campaigns of public awareness, conscientization, and dissemination of information regarding a wide range of questions, all pertaining to the “new South Africa” (this has been the case ever since the transitional phase that led up to the 1994 democratic instauration). Such campaigns, invariably conducted in the print medias by way of occasional dossiers, regular supplements, or full-page advertisements, may certainly be seen as an attempt by corporate interests to invest in the new national ethos, to dispel their past association with apartheid and gain a new social credibility, or to signal their steady involvement with charitable and developmental trusts. When initiated by corporations, these campaigns weave an *apologia*, a sustained rhetoric of justification developed by their public relations departments in the face of stern indictments and recurrent criticisms from both the TRC and African National Congress politicians in particular. Members of these groups assert that corporations have not atoned sufficiently for their role in supporting the apartheid economy and, sometimes quite directly, operating as agents of the fallen régime. However, these campaigns do help shape popular argumentation, regardless of the debate about their intent.

In April 1997, Shell sponsored a nationwide reportage on what it meant to be South African, a journey to the heartland of the “rainbow nation.” Two reporters traveled 8,000 kilometers, met with a thousand South Africans, and visited a hundred towns and cities. They set about discovering the new terra incognita of South Africa: Everyman. They took photos; they recorded interviews.

The corporate and public argumentation agendas were closely associated in the series of slogans that framed the report itself: “Go
FIG. 6.2. *We The People*. As the Transitional Executive Council was about to be installed, effectively marking the end of Whites' minority rule, in November 1993, South Africans were learning to become a single People, as in this special educational insert devised by *The Cape Argus* newspaper (Friday, October 1, 1993, courtesy of the editor).
well. Go Shell” was followed by “Empowering South Africans into the future." Even a moderately trained rhetorical eye can quickly read a hidden syllogism in the combination of slogans: Shell empowers cars well; South Africans need empowering; therefore, Shell can empower the slogan-reader—both as an automobile buyer and a South African citizen.

This argumentative structure also frames the title of the report, *True Colours*. Here again, a hidden argument rests on a dubious pun; beyond “political rhetoric,” here are the “real people,” the “true colours” of the “rainbow nation,” speaking and showing (as the well-worn metaphor goes) their “true colours”—what they really are.

This strategy epitomizes many such campaigns, a careful collocation of corporate and civic ethos that relies on word manipulation (injecting new meaning into clichés by cross-pollinating them) to seemingly make the readers (as a metonymic part of the whole nation) identify themselves with interviewees. Because of its detailed brief and careful composition, *True Colours* can be seen as an exemplum or blueprint of similar campaigns. Alongside *Reality Check*, it is, by all accounts, the most extensive one to date.

**RHETORICAL REPORTAGE**

The 8-page *True Colours* supplement contains an average of 25 interview excerpts per page, with visuals (photographs of the interviewees); roughly one page is devoted to each of South Africa’s nine provinces, presented in the order of the itinerary followed by the reporters (Western Cape, Northern Cape, Free State, North West, Northern Province, Mpumalanga, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape). The front page and the back page have a different layout. All pages carry a caption at the bottom, with the Shell corporate logo.

To begin with, the front page is a complex piece of iconic rhetoric (Fig. 6.3). Below the supplement title, the reader first reads a quotation from Nelson Mandela (“We must regularly take stock, critically and honestly of the progress we are making”). The quotation lends the supplement authority and places it squarely within nation-building. In relation to the supplement, the quotation functions in the same way as a biblical text does before a sermon: Each sets the audience’s mind on track, focuses attention, and by implication, places the orator (here the supplement itself) in the place of the quotation’s author, a
FIG. 6.3. True Colours. Cover of the special report commissioned by The Cape Times (Friday, April 25, 1997, courtesy of the editor).
pole of authority. The page carries a footer, inscribed with both the name and the logo of the company (the emblem of Shell and the motto described earlier, “Go well. Go Shell”), as well as a caption, “Empowering South Africans into the future.”

On the front page four photographs appear under the quotation by Mandela, four faces—three men and a woman—all middle-aged, working-class people. At the top left, the photograph is of a balding white male, an Afrikaans farmer, with slightly protruding ears and an anxious look on his face; top right, an elderly black male, with sunglasses and a tweed cap, smiling; bottom left, a coloured male, grinning and wearing a fisherman’s cap; bottom right, a woman in a scarf, with the quizzical and restrained look of many rural people of aboriginal descent. All are head-and-shoulders portraits. Unnamed, in contrast with the photographs of interviewees, they tend once more toward the abstract.

Below these portraits, readers find a map (“the route”) of the reporters’ travels, a list of “places visited,” the brief given the reporters, and photographs of them: two males—one White (of Jewish descent) and one Asian. The “map” shows that the reporters set forth from Cape Town (the “Mother City”) and traveled around the edges of the country, along the west coast of the Cape, up to the northern borders; then from the Kimberley diamond fields, they cut inland eastward across the Free State, then backtracked to the Johannesburg-Pretoria region (Gauteng) before crossing to the Indian Ocean coast (KwaZulu-Natal) and ending their journey in the Eastern Cape. The map gives the impression that the country has been circumnavigated—neatly circumscribed, “framed.” For South Africans familiar with the maps of discovery (such Renaissance maps, illustrating the rounding of the Cape of Storms by Portuguese ships are common national lore), this is a clever retort to the colonial circumnavigation of the Cape. This time, the country discovers itself: The “rounding” is national, not colonial; terrestrial and African, not maritime and European.

The brief is intended to guide the readers; or as its conclusion puts it (in bold type), “Listen carefully; maybe you will hear yourself.” It is intended to make readers identify themselves as interviewees (in the persuasive simulacrum of a printed text that “speaks”). The brief is a neat example of historical retrodiction: It offers current tropes on the democratic instauration, while making a concerted effort to
erase anything that might seem divisive—given that “diversity” must be resorbed into “one”:

Three years ago millions of South Africans voted for the first time [retrodiction: previous racial disenfranchisement is erased from this statement], ending more than 300 years of white government [retrodiction: apartheid is diluted within a complex colonial history that goes back further than “300 years”; the immediate cause is once more erased] and decades of conflict between the state and its citizens [retrodiction: the dividing line was within the nation itself rather than between “state” and “citizens”; the “state” was not the abstract entity readers are led to believe it was]. The peaceful political transition [retrodiction: the transition was not peaceful and was itself the result of sometimes brutal negotiations] was termed a miracle [note the passive voice—authority is called on] and the new South Africa christened [note the value-laden term] The Rainbow Nation [note the definite article and capitalization].

This series of apparently formal, impartial, objective statements, un-debatable unless readers start unpicking them, leads to a series of questions addressed to the interviewees and now to readers, who will find the answers in the interviews themselves. The process is dialogic:

Are you satisfied with the country’s progress? How do you rate President Nelson Mandela’s performance? How do you define yourself? Have relationships between black and white South Africans changed? Is apartheid really gone? Are we one nation?

These questions address readers on four levels: as persons and as citizens, as diverse yet “one.” They do not go back to the initial statements that function as hidden premises; for instance, the notion of the “state” is not questioned, because this “state” has been disqualified as the sole cause of conflict in the past. As a result, the only question regarding power is made personal; and concerns Nelson Mandela himself—not his administration or for that matter, the African National Congress itself or its tripartite alliance with the Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. At work here is a rhetoric of consensus, based on the loci of “virtue”—either of readers or of politicians—reduced to one singular expression. In other words, the brief begs the very question it purports to pose. It is, in its own rhetoric, pure “rainbow-ism.”
Further, the footer layout (at the bottom of the cover page) is repeated on every page except the last, with a different caption each time, as follows: “Many rights, one constitution”; “Many voices, one parliament”; “Many cultures, one nation”; “Many parties, one democracy”; “Many paths, one direction”; “Many ideals, one freedom.” The captions, placed below interviews and photographs, are rhetorically a proof by induction (as analyzed by Perelman). They infer from dispersed illustrations an abstract and general conclusion, moving the readers to first identify with concrete persons and values and then shift to a cognitive level. The inductive proof is visually vertical, as the eye moves from the page to the caption, from concrete to abstract, and (given that top and bottom are psychological markers) from surface to depth, from building to foundations.

These captions also work horizontally, as the eye moves from page to page, and shape an argument that is, by contrast, wholly abstract. Serialized, these captions offer yet another type of proof, a series of aphorisms which, once reassembled, constitute an argumentation. This, while summoning the most important tropes of the new nation, once again moves from concrete to abstract along two parallel lines. One line stresses “diversity”; the other, “unity”; or, to rephrase it in terms of the rhetorical invention commonplaces, one line argues for quantity and the other for quality, on a curve that becomes increasingly abstract (moving from “voices” to “ideals,” from “parliament” to “freedom”). The anaphoric presentation is itself an argumentative device, inducing readers to interpret the aphorisms as a collocation of predications: “Many voices is one parliament is many cultures is one nation … is one freedom—or simply “freedom.”

Interestingly, the last page does not carry a caption but instead features a large reproduction of a painting by a painter returned from exile, entitled “Freedom through Education.” The painting (in the socialist realist manner redolent of official Eastern European art of the communist era) provides an iconic summation of the captions, a lesson heavily underlined by the painting’s explanatory notes, which pick up where the last caption ended—on “freedom”: “This vibrant and compelling oil painting … reflects humanity’s quest for freedom.” The painting is also self-referential; it extols Shell’s Education Service (funds for teachers’ development) and, by implication, the educational nature of True Colours, an epideictic turn
already seen at work in the publications put out by the Constitutional Assembly. The layout of Reality Check uses the same iconic and narrative devices, including a final artwork (by a fine-art student at the Natal Technikon; the painting shows scientists in a laboratory, above the caption “Turning Darkness into Light,” with “Go well. Go Shell” signing off the supplement).11

True Colours offers a complex narrative structure that helps bind together the multivocality of the report.

The first narrative feature of True Colours is the spontaneous unfolding of personal stories concerning identity. The question “How do you define yourself?” elicits various replies suggesting that the nomenclature of racial classification adumbrated in the Population Registration Act of 1950 has been adroitly reappropriated by South Africans and given fresh twists. Self-identifications thus range from “Cape Coloured” to “Tswana,” but also from “quite white” to “African” (in one instance, the informant is an Afrikaner), from “Boer” to “Child of God,” from “English” to “Afrikaner,” and often simply “South African.”12 A remarkable feature of this untoward list of community identifications is its fluidity. The 1950 classification not only recognized “white,” “coloured” and “native” categories, thereafter refined by government ethnographers to include subcategories such as “Cape Coloured,” “Griqua,” “Asian,” “Zulu,” and “Xhosa.” To decline one’s identity as a “Boer” (Afrikaans farmer) is an act of defiance, whereas to simply affirm “Child of God” does away with classification altogether. For the reader, what the narrative of identity commonplace states is the possibility of having a “voice,” however singular it may be. The underlying argument at work in the suite of identities is that all are equated, without discrimination.

Another feature of the reportage lies in the iconic and rhetorical juxtaposition of exemplary individuals. For instance, as readers open the newspaper, pages 2 and 3 place side-by-side the photograph of an elderly man and that of a young black boy. The man is tending his rose garden; he declares that he is “quite white” (“For me it makes no difference. They [coloured farmers] can call me coloured or white.”) The boy shows the camera an ugly scar on his leg and explains that “white women’s dogs do bite [only Blacks].” The persuasive effect is to show, as the eye scans the double page, the effect of racial prejudice while also showing how it can be surmounted (by admitting to the operative “quite”). A similar diptych
argues to a similar end on pages 6 and 7. To the left, a picture shows a white family (father, mother, and little girl) hitchhiking, poor white farm laborers who tell a tale of abuse and exploitation at the hands of AWB (white supremacist) farmers; they declare that the little help they have received came from black people, in whom they now place their hopes. To the right, there are photos of three middle-class KwaZulu-Natal inhabitants: two women—one “Asian” and one “white”—and a “South African Indian” man. Their testimonies offer a counterweight to the optimistic trust that poor Whites have in their black compatriots. The “Indian” shopkeeper admits to being racist by education, the “South African Indian” berates the decline in standards of hygiene (due to the black population influx), and the “white” woman pegs all her hopes on Nelson Mandela, whom she “has met twice.” The logical effect of the diptych is to show readers how racial clichés can be challenged once white people are presumably confronted with reality. It also subtly turns upside down perceptions of wealth and, more radically, perceptions of social solidarity.

The rhetoric of the reportage can be best summed up as the creation of a fiction: a scenario for public deliberation regarding identity. This scenario is facilitated by the format of the reportage itself. Readers who do not want to read all narratives can simply scan through captions (themselves quotations from answers to the questions outlined in the brief) and photographs of informants. The captions range from the comical (“And then the paw-paw hit the fan”) to the downright offensive (“Mandela … was born a kaffir and will die a kaffir”), and there is also a fair showing of sensible remarks (“It is getting better but it will take a long time”). Altogether they offer readers fundamental commonplaces about themselves. Indeed, the report intimates, “The nation has talked, in your very terms; now think about it.” The “miracle” is that citizens can all say these things to each other, without having to murder each other or resort to oppression.

In this respect, the True Colours deliberation is a rhetorical expatriation on a specific national “poetics,” the new component of the national anthem, *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrica*. The melody and lyrics of the liberation movement—as stirring for many new-style South Africans as it once was for insurgents, and as the old national anthem, *Die Stem*, was for many white South Africans—may be seen indeed as a poetics of national identity. *Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrica* carries the se-
mantics of “union,” “betterment,” “patience,” “education,” and “good health” that formulated, long before the Reconstruction and Development policy, Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrica’ very stock of common-places. Conjugating the spiritual glossary of Nkosi with Die Stem (which dwells on the beauty of the landscapes and the clarity of the skies), the new anthem does advocate the “true colours” of South Africa—it becomes the poetic shape of a policy and the poetic figure of a national identity. The orators of True Colours are the singers of the new national anthem. However, this poetic and rhetorical internalization of nationhood was tested against the so-called hard facts of statistics and population quantification in Census 1996.

**RHETORICAL STATISTICS**

A nation is not a population. Under apartheid, the South African people were counted in discrete units whose sum total made up a population, but not a nation. Giving a new twist to a well-established notion, it can be said that South Africa was not only an “imagined community,” but an imagined set of imagined communities.

In 1996, the new government attempted to show the nation’s “true colours” by launching a population census. The rationale for this was obvious: to count the nation as a whole, and to provide vital statistics necessary for planning by government and foreign agencies, especially for the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Census 1996 had for explicit function to reconstitute the demography of a nation out of the tainted accounting of racism. The incremental release of Census 1996 took place at the same time as True Colours. They must be read in conjunction.

Census 1996 as an event of public deliberation offers interesting insights into national self-perception and shifts in that “imagined” community. In mid-October of that year, Census 1996 was a very public affair, with calls to public participation, teams of volunteers, highly visible advertising—all encapsulated by field-workers wearing bright orange-yellow mailman-style jackets and carrying pouch-bags emblazoned with a Keith Haring-like design, showing people with outstretched arms clamoring “Count us in.”

To begin with, Census 1980 had delivered apparently sound statistics, according to the system of racial classification then in place: a total population of 28 million, with 20 million Blacks, 4 million Whites,
2.5 million Coloureds, and close to 1 million Asians. The black population was further divided into sub-categories. Census 1985 saw the population swell by nearly 5 million. Ten years later, in 1991, the census administration projected a total population of 42 million in 1996. However, the 1996 census delivered only 37.9 million.  

This discrepancy in numbers set in motion a polemic between the chief director of the Central Statistics Services (in charge of demography) and the statistician from an Afrikaans university who had devised the demographic model of Census 1991. The government demographer accused his predecessor of having based the 1991 model on an assumed fertility rate for black women that was much higher than in reality; he asserted that in the highly troubled 1990s, when many rural and urban areas were “no-go” zones for Whites, his predecessor had relied on assumptions rather than conducting door-to-door checks.

The apartheid demographer thus used Census 1970 data to estimate the birthrate of Blacks, whereas for Whites, Coloureds, and Asians, he based his model on Census 1980. He blamed the apparent “loss” of 4 million people on inadequate fieldwork. His successor countered that a post-enumeration survey revealed an acceptable undercount of some 7% (which was adjusted for), and he accused his apartheid predecessor of failing to take into account the impact of urbanization. The latter retorted (this entire debate received wide media coverage) that if indeed he was wrong, then this could be partly because “the population development programme must have been more effective than we thought.” “Population development” is both an oxymoron and a euphemism; it is used to describe the family planning campaign falteringly introduced by the apartheid régime in order to curb black fertility—a campaign the black population always recognized for what it was social eugenics. In the heated and tense mid-1980s, it might also have been part of a political strategy to frighten Whites (as well as coloured and Asian groups) by revealing an alarming surge in black population growth.

However, the game was finally given away, in an absurd figure of speech, when the apartheid statistician declared that he was never blinded by the belief that Blacks “bred like rabbits.” The point is that he uttered this offensive expression and in the same breath blamed “the ideology of the 90s”—democracy—for the attack on his cherished model.
This short spate of anger on both sides operates as a microcosm of prejudices, and it underscores the difficulty of quantifying a population that does not yet see itself as a single population. It shows both manipulations and imaginings. It also shows the limitations of defining “we-ness”\textsuperscript{20} in terms of objective factors.

By putting both documents, \textit{True Colours} and \textit{Census 1996}, together—face to face—one realizes how abstract and unsatisfactory \textit{Census 1996} is, in terms of civil deliberation (although it does offer yet another example of how statistics fabricate an a priori community by proposing illusions of common traits\textsuperscript{21}). \textit{Census 1996} fails to go beyond quantification and to reach out to the rich narrative of reports like \textit{True Colours}; it fails to flesh out statistics with life. This political and rhetorical failure was acknowledged by government when, in 1999, the Interim Statistics Council, as an advisory board to the finance minister, requested from external sources (by way of a public call for papers) expert advice on \textit{Census 1996} (although this was officially accepted) with a view to preparing better for Census 2001.

By contrast, \textit{True Colours} is the actualization of the Constitution itself, an indirect praise of what can be achieved when a rhetorical community is at liberty; the report is thus largely epideictic in substance. Indeed, by voicing who they are, what they believe in, and how they see the nation, without any hindrance of speech, in a sort of naïve eloquence from the heart, the informants are in fact praising this very possibility—that they can now speak freely. \textit{True Colours} (and similar ventures aimed at representing deliberation as a process framed by individual citizens, such as two further projects initiated by newspapers in the run-up to the 1999 elections, \textit{People’s Panel}\textsuperscript{22} and \textit{Reality Check}\textsuperscript{23}) therefore offers a matrix for evaluating “the \textit{polis} as a specifically rhetorical community … because it is most centrally a site of contention.”\textsuperscript{24} It sheds light on and provides insight into what Perelman calls “an effective community of minds” that is realized “at a certain moment,” and not simply the assumed audience that those who hold power or shape public policy have in their own minds.

Ventures such as \textit{True Colours}, or the \textit{People’s Panel} and \textit{Reality Check}, are an essential tool to analyze rhetorical democracy in that they realize access to that “certain moment,” specific in time and place, working with its own perceptions of deliberation and its own mythologies regarding communal contention.\textsuperscript{25} They echo the strat-
egy of the TRC in advocating the meeting of differences under shared values. They resonate with capitalist corporate efforts to regain ethical credibility within the new nation. Finally, they illustrate the necessity for government to develop deliberative methods by which the statistical quantification of the nation is accompanied, seconded, and internalized by people’s narratives, by a display of personal testimonies regarding differences and communality.
The Rhetorical Cosmetics Of Peace

Since Roland Barthes’ pioneering work on the semiotics of fashion and the persuasive effect of “mythologies” in advertising,¹ it is no longer possible to relegate “glamour” to the outskirts of social deliberation. Fashion magazines exert a powerful influence on community values; in more ways than one, fashion magazines do fashion perceptions of being together, of appearing to each other, and of reading others in society. Fashion magazines are immensely persuasive not only in selling goods and commodities, but in relaying perceptions and teaching readers at large how to behave. Like the “silent instructor” that the book became with the advent of the printing press during the Renaissance, these magazines behave like social teachers, intimating deliberative behaviors. In fragmented societies that can afford to support fashion print medias (examples of such societies are rare), these silent instructors operate toward social cohesion. Glossy magazines do tend to gloss over differences and to impart persuasively to their readership the sense that social divisions based on race, color, or ethnic background (which are by nature visually bound and therefore the very stuff of such medias) do not matter.

THE COSMETIC SHAPE OF DEMOCRACY

South Africa presents by first-world standards a small and fragmented market, marked by huge discrepancies between social
strata (60% of the population is still illiterate, for example). Yet this uncertain market is now served by a wide range of glamour magazines (on fashion, lifestyles, leisure, and home decor), many unique to the African continent—either South African editions of Elle, Marie-Claire, Gentlemen Quarterly, FHM, Men’s Health, Conde Nast Garden & Home, and so on, or local products. Newsstands carry some 30 titles, a large number for a small market. None have gone under yet, although Vogue (which initially intended to launch its very first African edition in the early 1960s, not a very propitious time) has yet to move in. Moreover, because local newsmagazines are scarce to nonexistent, the glamour magazines tend to fill that gap by broaching social issues in a more direct and investigative way than their American or European counterparts. Political and social deliberation therefore transit by media channels whose first function is to engender escapism from the very conditions on which deliberation is planted. Glamour magazines are, in such context, powerful rhetorical agents in the public sphere. This may explain why in so contained a market they have achieved sustainability. Yet precisely how do they function in terms of social deliberation? How does being beautiful relate to being a citizen?

In the history of rhetoric, this question has already been codified. Before launching into an analysis of glamour as rhetoric in the shaping of the new South Africa, it would be helpful to outline the theoretical issue of “beauty.” The fundamental text is found at the very beginning of Gorgias’ Praise of Helen:

Order [kosmos] for a city is the excellence of its men, for a body beauty, for a soul wisdom, for an act virtue, for a speech truth. Their opposite is disorder [akosmia]. Man, woman, speech, act, product, if worthy of praise must be honored with praise, if unworthy, treated with blame; for to blame the praiseworthy or to praise the blameworthy, it is equal error and equal ignorance.²

As pointed out by its most recent commentator,³ all the “master words” for understanding democracy are present in this quotation, the statements flowing directly from two systems, positive and negative, kosmos and akosmia. Gorgias sets out, as is well known, to deny the Greek consensus that Helen is to blame for having introduced disorder (akosmia). The Praise reads like a matrix to interpret political life in a democracy, where disorder is not always where it seems
to be (following the example of Helen, seemingly “disorderly”—helenas the “destructress”). In other words, public deliberative agents of “order” are not necessarily the most obvious political ones. Some may appear to be of no consequence at all or even disruptive in their apparent detachment from public deliberation as defined by agents who wish to make the ecology of civil speech their exclusive domain.

In this light, glamour magazines are in essence Gorgianic. They perform within popular beliefs that are often contradictory, conflicting, antagonistic to one another. They are sites of deliberation, “cosmetic” indeed inasmuch as they engage the public kosmos—the system of public deliberation (while advocating glamour—cosmetics—in all shapes). By the same token, glamour print medias often reverse consensus, play against prejudices, and try to see order where disruption exists, in order to secure their market share. Unless they operate in a market that can accommodate deep divides, glamour magazines are by nature paradoxical. They gloss over differences. This is the reason why, in Barthes’ terms, they create powerful “myths,” and why, in rhetorical terms, they form a large sector of public deliberation and help shape “order.”

**DELIBERATING ON BLACK IN **_**ELLE**_

One case in point is the editorial trajectory of _Elle South Africa_. Elle’s appearance in South Africa signaled the reentry of glamour, of the realm of imaging on a scale only _Elle_ or _Vogue_ could lend to social perceptions of beauty on a global level. The argument that follows (concerning the black female persona) can also be replicated by scrutinizing the depictive rhetoric of the black male body found in _Men’s Health_, the first African version of this American magazine, or the young body deliberated on in _Directions_.

In April 1996, Issue 1/1 of _Elle South Africa_ came out, featuring on its cover the South African top model Georgina Grenville (one in a long lineage of South African beauties). Images of glamour as elements in the building of “South-African-ness” are part of popular deliberation on the nature of South African identity. Although the social history of these images remains to be fully researched, many pointers already demonstrate the role of _Elle_ as an agent for deliberation and nation-building. (See Fig. 7.1.)
FIG. 7.1. The cover of the first issue of Elle South Africa. Elle magazine launched its first African issue in April, 1996 with a paradox: a blond, blue-eyed model. (Elle South Africa, 1/1, April, 1996, courtesy of the editor).
As most South Africans are indeed aware, South Africa holds a special place in the social history of female beauty as canonized by consumer society. The conservative Afrikaner town of Krugersdorp produced Kathy Keeton (1939–1997), who rose from a scholarship at the Royal Ballet in London to become South Africa’s first “exotic” dancer in 1965. During her “Parisian Pigalle” time, she enjoyed a fame of sorts after appearing in the film _The Spy Who Came In From the Cold_, before going on to create a glamour media empire centered on _Penthouse_. In 1994, she received the Ellis Island award for the greatest community contribution by a nonnative American, having collected in the course of her mink-and-glossy-lipstick career the New York City Community Award for her efforts with black children in Harlem. Another platteland (the South African equivalent of the Midwest) beauty with brains, Charlize Theron, adorned the January 1999 cover of _Vanity Fair_, which unashamedly proclaimed her (in 1999!) the “White Hot Venus.” Former Miss South Africa Peggy Sue Khumalo remains one of the rare black South African beauty queens to have maintained a profile, albeit not on the international stage (Namibia fares better in this respect).

Beauty pageants, including a variety of male pageants of “pretty boys” pumped up by fitness exercises, are very much part of depictive rhetoric in South Africa. The London- and Miami-based Boss Models Worldwide opened its third agency in Cape Town at the end of 1996 and released in 1997 a glossy one-off magazine devoted to body glamour, significantly (if sycophantically) entitled _Society Africa_. Its pitch is, in the words of its international media director, that “South Africans have a different look.” In 1998, the South African Fashion Designers Association celebrated the “awakening” of local design by launching the first Vukani! Awards. Since 1998 South African corporation M-NET (a private television network), now supported by premier gold company AngloGold, organizes a fashion extravaganza, the “Face of Africa” beauty contest, which purports to showcase how “Once again African will inspire the world.” In the same spirit, the prestigious Nederburg Wine Auction (usually held in March) is the occasion for South African designers to send their winter collections down the catwalk, in a display of “African chic.” Meanwhile, the Durban Designer Emporium showcases African fashion as art at the National South African Gallery. Focused interest on social images has
also produced some stunning results on the international scene of advertising.\(^7\)

Nevertheless, the choice by Elle of a white “icon” for its first African venture was an odd marketing strategy.\(^8\) A year later, Issue 1/12 (March 1997) carried the face of a coloured model (as opposed to “black” in terms of South African perceptions), Meg Petersen, before returning to Georgina Grenville for Issue 2/1. For the second birthday Issue (3/1, April 1998) Elle featured no less than three black models on its cover. (See Fig. 7.2.) Over 1 year (not taking into account the launch issue), Elle’s editorial trajectory shows the development of an argumentation regarding black (meaning here non-white) women in society; the shift in cover models is a potent marker of this. A survey of South African women has become a regular feature of Elle. In Issue 1/1, this piece was entitled “We are family,” in Issue 1/12 “Gifted, Black, Female,” and in Issue 2/1 “Women Who’ve Changed Their Lives.” The three titles in themselves indicate an overarching concern with dynamic vision, empowerment, progress, moving from the static first statement to accomplishment—and therefore to change and command. These titles underscore the tenor of an argumentation concerning South African women in society.

In a syndicated magazine that remains strongly marked by French influence (massive presence of French luxury wares, stories translated from French editions), the South-African-ness of women did nevertheless take shape as the result of Elle’s editorial effort to capture a specific market of middle-class women income earners, white or black, independent and self-reflective, largely typical of Western European secular culture. Elle, contrary to established women magazines like Sarie, Fair Lady, or even Femina, does not punt for traditional family values; its first issue carried a celebratory survey of gay parenting. The graft has taken. In 1998 Elle was able to expand its decor section into a new magazine, Elle Decoration South Africa. It also now includes a regular Elle Man fashion supplement, like its counterparts elsewhere in the world in the Elle stable. In other words, the target market has responded to Elle.

Issue 1/1 carried an important feature about South African women, “We are Family.”\(^9\) Four grandmother–mother–granddaughter groupings are presented in an effort to mirror the evolution of South Africa in the personal lives of three generations of women,
FIG. 7.2. The cover of the second birthday issue of Elle South Africa. Two years after its launch, Elle "Celebrates Africa" (3/1, 1998). (Elle South Africa courtesy of the editor).
from pre-apartheid to post-apartheid. Interestingly enough, the racial ratio partly reflects Elle’s choice or prejudice, already noted with the choice of a white, blue-eyed cover girl for the first African edition: Included are two white groupings, one black, and one Indian. The prejudice is not without self-critique, for the two white groupings are culturally different, Afrikaans and South-African English (truly a mix of origins). There is no Coloured grouping.

With this qualification taken into consideration, it remains that by and large, readers will respond well to the feature. The four matrilineal groupings act like rhetorical commonplaces. They help readers to take stock. At the same time, because some of the interviewees, particularly the grandmothers, have lived eventful lives (two of them as activists), such commonplace for identification are also charged with exemplary energy. They function at two rhetorical levels, as reference and as model. In short, they are value-laden, which is the purpose of the feature “We are family.” Nevertheless, the rhetorical strategy of the feature does not lead readers beyond identification and stocktaking. The granddaughters’ narratives are marked by semantic traits that point to the future without actually describing it (“dreaming of,” “ambition to”), as if the trajectory remains open-ended. The response will only be provided in the shaping of perceptions elaborated by Elle’s editorial strategy.

One such response, on a dynamic curve, is provided in Issue 1/12. The feature is entitled “Gifted, Black, Female …”10 The suspended title is completed on the first page of the article by “& tired of dressing the corporate window”; the word black is printed in oversize characters.11 The feature tackles head-on the labor question of affirmative action (both black and female), but because this is a glamour magazine, it locates this thorny issue in the mythical “corporate world,” where the process of empowerment and affirmative action appointments has been riddled with accusations of tokenism and reverse racism, while remaining singularly male-oriented.

In rhetorical terms, the option chosen is a fiction or plasma—a narrative that carries all the qualifications of reality but is not a historia, an event, a real life-story. Unlike the women presented in Issue 1/1, Thandi, the heroine of Issue 1/12, is a fabricated character with whom an young urban black female graduates can identify, because all the exemplary features of that social group are activated in the article. The text is all the more convincing in that it is narrated by a certain
“Dr Adele Thomas” (from a leading business school), a female voice of authority who mixes factual statements with value statements, the narration evolving in the present tense. The narrative is about a thwarted career—the granddaughter’s shattered dream—and includes, by way of a large insert in the concluding section, a carefully worded explanation of what constitutes a sound policy for “managing diversity” (to quote one such policy of “training and development” at a large parastatal company). The strange thing is that a glamour magazine warns “granddaughters” (who embody the future South African woman) about the dangers of glamour in career decisions and the imperative need for nonglamorous “training and development.” The argument is effective precisely because the magazine is not touting its own voice. The outcome is to have presented one possible scenario for women’s development.

The “real” scenario (it is just that, a “scenario,” in any event a fiction), which is the true trajectory according to Elle, is proposed in the “First Birthday Issue” 2/1, under the title “Women Who’ve Changed Their Lives.” From despondency to independence, daughters now speak, narrating in the first person how they have overcome the (fictitious) pitfall of affirmative action and changed their lives—in short, empowered themselves. The feature consists of a series of short narratives, each roughly 400 words long, by women between the ages of 24 through 38, representative insofar as “racial” perceptions are concerned. The argumentation is in appearance the simple storytelling of young women, well-educated or well-connected, who have moved from a chartered future to a self-determined change. As a result, they are “empowered” and live happy lives. This fiction relies on the elimination of two series of factors that were determinant in the two previous features: the familial example set by “mothers” and two the expectations set by government-driven affirmative action.

The reportage discards indeed two factors that can rhetorically be assigned to a single category: the commonplace of authority—here the authority vested in “mothers” and affirmative action. It argues therefore for personal independence, private autonomy, and individual choice. The hidden argument is all the more powerful because most of the women’s jobs are not at all glamorous (Aids worker, Laundromat owner, and electrical engineer are balanced against a career in the infant South African film industry). The fea-
ture is forward-looking and argues against hearkening back to the past. It formulates a social argumentation about South Africa and the need to not be encumbered any longer by history.

The argument developed in Elle’s earlier issues finds (temporary) editorial closure in the remarkable “Special Second Birthday Issue” 3/1. The cover carries the faces of three black models—Nompumelela, Lenah, and Pumla—above the caption “Celebrate Africa!” The movement is complete, being the fulfillment of a rhetorical brief to convince readers of the shaping of South African women into Africans. To follow Eugene Garver’s analysis of rhetoric’s ends, it is clear that Elle’s strategy is “kinetic”; it aims, over a trajectory (kinesis), to fulfill a brief and to persuade its market by influencing it, thus achieving its given end—to turn profits. And by doing so, Elle helps shape perceptions, perhaps more persuasively than social policies do.

RHETORICS OF NATIONAL PRIDE

Yet glamour points toward another powerful social rhetoric—national pride. The formation of a rhetoric of national pride can be best observed in the vexed context of military or diplomatic operations. Since Theodore Roosevelt’s “World Cruise,” the complex formation of a rhetoric of national pride when a country is presumably ensconced in peace and prosperity remains a puzzle for rhetoricians.

“Operation Boleas,” as the 1998 Lesotho military intervention was known, stands in this respect as a benchmark for the shaping of one particular aspect of public argumentation in South Africa: that is, the shaping of national pride in a context of military intervention, a context that was previously the exclusive domain of the apartheid régime.

The Lesotho military intervention was the first of its kind performed by the newly integrated defense force, recently renamed the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). It followed (after a hiatus in the early 1990s) some 20 years of active military involvement by the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the African subcontinent (from covert operations during the decolonization of Angola and Mozambique, from 1974 to 1975, to full-fledged military expeditions under the P.W. Botha administration in the 1980s). These operations were never fully acknowl-
edged by the régime as having “war status.” They failed to muster the pride of the white minority, and the unpopular, forced, and lengthy conscription they entailed often led to passive resistance by those eligible for military service (“a waste of time” was an often-heard response) or legal challenges (mainly by the End Conscription Campaign, whose contribution to the fall of apartheid remains to be fully investigated and appraised). Furthermore, except for a few select and sometimes highly valorous units, Blacks were not enlisted (whereas Coloureds were, often in traditional units, such as the Cape Corps). The SADF was apartheid’s army—in terms of its composition, ethos, and use (both in military interventions abroad and in the black townships).

With this history, the short-lived and sudden intervention in Lesotho took place on September 22, 1998. This intervention took South Africans by surprise for many reasons. For one, even after years of strained relations between Pretoria and Maseru (marked by attempts by the South African apartheid régime to control Basotho politics in the Mountain Kingdom, an enclave within South Africa); cross-border hit-and-run missions (especially the infamous 1982 raid on the African National Congress); and remarkable economic cooperation (such as the construction of a massive dam system essential to South Africa), the latter had never invaded the stubbornly independent ex-British protectorate. Secondly, the open flow of population between Lesotho and South Africa, from mine workers to professionals, makes citizens of Lesotho often indistinguishable from other South Africans (50% of Lesotho’s male workforce is employed in South Africa). Thirdly, following the installation of Nelson Mandela and the end of military interventions in neighboring countries (now no longer enemies; and if not allies, at least friendly), a military intervention simply seemed a thing of the past.

The belief that military interventions were over—a part of history—was reinforced by a proclaimed non-militaristic diplomacy, which marked by a sharp decline in budget appropriations for the military and a refusal to involve South Africa (who has possibly the most modern and best trained army on the continent) in peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, South Africa moved into Lesotho on September 22, 1998, as part of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) peacekeeping operation, with the aim of quelling nearly 2 months of angry antigovernment riots.
and securing a deal between the three parties involved: the government, the opposition parties, and the royal palace.\textsuperscript{16}

What matters here is the way in which the intervention created a locus for public rhetoric, which is likely to have set patterns for debate with regard to any such future interventions. The Lesotho affair generated a stock of rhetorical commonplaces and argumentation styles, giving shape to a specific public deliberation.

Over the 5 days of the intervention, after which the situation in Lesotho lost both political urgency and public appeal (with the return of Nelson Mandela from his Canadian visit), the print medias\textsuperscript{17} treated the intervention as newsworthy enough to make the front page of their editions, but not so important as to monopolize the entire front-page.

In fact, only the top half of the newspaper front pages referred to here carried the story, with more information and commentaries inside (the same is true for the rest of the daily and weekly newspapers). The headlines announce dramatic events ("SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS DIE IN LESOTHO," "Everything South African is burning," "Tensions ease as SADC takes control," "We stood no chance") that are not fully substantiated by front page stories.\textsuperscript{18} In terms of layout, the first headline cited spreads across the page, in large, bold capital characters; the second headline, although laid out across the page, is in smaller characters (as befits the Cape Times, which aimed at the A income group market) with a smaller caption above it, "Lesotho invasion backfires"; the third headline, in an even slightly smaller typeface, has moved further down the front page, making room for news regarding the South African currency’s recovery against the dollar; the fourth headline, laid out like some of its predecessors across the top of the page, is not as large as the first title and is in keeping with any top-story style in weekend newspapers.

The obvious conclusion to draw from this rhetorical gap between dramatic headlines about the “war” and actual reportage on it is that over 5 days the story evolved from a series of strong nationalistic statements (the iterative use of the adjective South African; appeals to pathos by describing death and destruction, with no regard for what the residents of Maseru were enduring) to a retreat—not so much into a critique of government action as into a “privatization” of the intervention. Indeed, as the third headline shifted the focus onto failure and the SADC and the fourth headline cited soldiers themselves, who complained to the press that they were “sitting
ducks,” that *folle semaine* closed with press reports on the problem of Basotho refugees streaming into Ladybrand in South Africa.

Reports on the intervention thus evolved in 5 short days from public and nationalistic pathos to private pathos—either the plight of soldiers or of refugees. At its close, the intervention was overshadowed by other diplomatic affairs requiring South Africa’s attention, such as the unresolved instability in Congo-ex-Zaïre (where for reasons more financial than ideological, South Africa a major player), the rekindling of war in Angola, and the increasingly stressed relations between Pretoria and Harare due to Zimbabwe’s bellicose response to the situation in Congo-ex-Zaïre (Zimbabwe’s intervention was sternly condemned by South Africa).

In that short week, the print media threw up a stock of commonplaces regarding how South Africans reacted to national pride, confronted as they were by their first military mission, the very first ordered by a democratically elected government and carried out by a racially integrated army that no longer relies on conscription, but voluntary enlistment.¹⁹

The overriding commonplace, fed by stories of looting and pronouncements by the Lesotho opposition parties’ highly articulate spokesperson, was the sudden realization that the new South Africans could be “hated.”²⁰ From this commonplace flowed two other commonplaces. One was that, as “ridden with dissent”²¹ as Lesotho was and therefore in need of stability along a model provided by South Africa itself, the intervention was ultimately redolent of “old South African style.”²² From this contradiction, around which most debates in Parliament revolved, the media chose to stress the private side of it all. It carried stories about looted shops, insurance claims, refugees’ problems, the disturbance of tourism, and, most prominently, stories of the pain endured by the families of the five dead South African soldiers.²³ The media also featured interviews with soldiers whose friends had died or been injured; rebuttals of the claim that the soldiers were unprepared were mixed with remarks on the cowardice of Lesotho sharpshooters.²⁴

By the end of the week, an argument had emerged, not so much about the validity of the intervention, but the fact that South African prowess did not need to be proven, and certainly not by this sort of action. The final result, in terms of the fashioning of public deliberation, is that the military is inscribed as a private affair that entails a
private dimension of citizenship (including soldiers commenting freely). The national dimension (so much the stock-in-trade of apartheid war actions) is simply absent.

An external proof of the parenthetical nature of the rhetoric about Operation Boleas is that it was neatly framed by the absence of Nelson Mandela, who was out of the country. The day before the intervention, he gave a farewell address to the United Nations (with “good humor and soaring soul”), and on Friday, he took ill in Canada. When he returned, the routine of public affairs resumed, and the Lesotho intervention was placed between parentheses. Yet constructed during that odd week was a quiet withdrawal from the military into the civilian sphere in terms of South African public deliberation. In other words, away from hard politics, the emphasis was placed on a new and forceful style for public argumentation, advocating a rephrasing of hard issues in “civil” terms, and public matters in terms of private affairs.

In fact, the same sort of advocacy for withdrawing from hard issues into “civil” issues was already pervasive in the press rendering of two diplomatic events, the Twelfth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) convened in Durban 2 weeks before Operation Boleas (August 30–September 3, 1998) and the first State visit by Fidel Castro on September 4, 1998.

The NAM summit did not capture the public imagination, not even in Durban; a great many people had little awareness of it and, even if they did know about the Summit, could hardly have said what “NAM” stood for. However, the print media gave the summit extensive coverage in terms of the way in which both Nelson Mandela and his deputy, Thabo Mbeki, were seen to approach diplomatic conundrums. First of all, in his opening address, Mandela himself referred to Kashmir as a trouble spot—a surprise mention that shocked the Indian delegation. Secondly, a dispute arose between Mbeki and the Zimbabwean ruler (the background of which was the Zimbabwean misuse of the SADC under the pretext of the Congo-ex-Zaïre crisis), which resulted in convoluted mutual accusations of lack of courtesy. In both cases, the print media lacked the will or the insight to go beyond bombastic declarations such as “SA shapes new world order,” and instead played up minor incidents that all underlined a diplomatic style marked by private moves and incidental but firm declarations; a public style that can be best de-
scribed as “civil.” This message, regardless of its truth, became all the more prominent during the Cuban President’s visit to Cape Town. Castro himself, rather shrewdly, used it to characterize his own way of talking to South Africans. According to the press, he compared his address to “a love letter sent to a sweetheart thousands of miles away” and stressed that “a speech is like an open and intimate conversation.” This style of rapport in fact overshadowed the purpose of the visit and, in its “civility,” turned the Democratic Party’s decision not to attend this sitting of Parliament into a departure from the liberal ethos in politics; meanwhile Friends of Cuba and foreign affairs officials publicly waxed lyrical on Cuba’s achievements (in health care, for instance).

As in Operation Boleas, a restyling of public debates into “intimate” ones has imposed itself as self-evident to the point that it forms an ethos of public debate regarding the handling of foreign policy. It echoes the way in which glamour magazines have retooled large public issues, like affirmative action, into private matters. Public “order,” national pride, is therefore achieved by making private citizens’ aspirations seem to fit in a scheme of things political that does not exclude them, by making citizens feel that public events and public figures can be molded by “an intimate conversation” along privacy lines.

SPORT AS RHETORIC OF PEACE

There is, further, a locus where the rhetoric of glamour and of national prowess conjugate, a social place for deliberation that “civilizes” competition—whether of beauty or of force—where the gentility of glamour (with its accompaniments of leisure and pleasure) and the civility noticed in Operation Boleas are brought together. In South Africa, sport has been so closely linked to the legitimacy of the apartheid State and to white perceptions of physical supremacy that it remains one of the strongest sites for popular deliberation regarding national identity and for individual internalizing of civil “order.” In addition, the cultivation in the medias of direct rapports between glamour, politics, diplomacy, and sport is a forceful argument about civility and nation-building, privacy and public sphere.

When South Africa backed Cape Town for the 2004 Olympic bid, the political spectrum aligned itself behind Nelson Mandela and his
cabinet, who spared no effort in trying to convince the Comité International Olympique in Lausanne, that the 2004 Summer Games should be South Africa’s—and in other words, Africa’s. However, the South African bid was deftly placed within the rhetorical commonplace of “civility,” rather than competition or business. Significantly, shortly before the announcement in Lausanne (in September 1997), Nelson Mandela accepted the Pierre de Coubertin Fair Play Award. The award is in keeping with the spirit of the games, and Mandela glossed it over not as an encouragement to the South African bid but as an acknowledgment (or yet another sign or metaphor) of the South African democratic shaping.

“Fair play” is indeed the key commonplace. If Cape Town failed in her bid, it did not matter; what really mattered was “to compete fairly.” The video presentation summed up the main themes of South African “fairness”: a rainbow, a diverse and happy crowd, with Table Mountain promoted to some sort of Mount Sinai of Africa, where the Tables of the Law—democracy—were being handed down while the African continent itself, transformed into a multi-colored Olympic torch, gyrated down toward the focal point of its southernmost city. For the rhetorically minded observer, the competition was not between the five contending cities, but between Athens and Cape Town (neither of them particularly well equipped to host the grand spectacle of the Olympic Games). The strife of symbols was between two cradles of democracy, the European and the African—the Old and the New Athens. It was obvious even to the common observer and reveler: History was balanced in this remarkable allegorical diptych.

Since the first democratic elections (in fact, shortly before them) and the return of South African athletes to international competition, South Africa has won the Rugby World Cup (1995) and has not yet relinquished the title. South Africa has also been victorious in soccer in the African Cup of Nations (1996), and has fielded a superb national cricket team (which is considered to be the best one-day-cricket side in the world). These events have not been unanimously experienced in South Africa. When the national soccer team was knocked out of the 1998 World Cup, a major rugby match was taking place, at which rugby supporters waved the old apartheid flag as a sign of the new South Africa’s humiliation on the soccer field, soccer being traditionally a township game. In contrast,
black South Africans are generally enthusiastic supporters of the national rugby and cricket sides.\textsuperscript{27}

South African life is marked, like its American and (increasingly) European counterparts, by the calendar of sporting events in which big matches or tournaments are important locales in which social representations can be embodied. As sport at the school level is being more forcefully integrated and “developed” (a euphemism for training black children in various sports and installing sporting facilities), it is interesting to notice the reappearance, in a different guise, of the debate about athleticism that agitated Oxford and Cambridge in the second half of the 19th century.\textsuperscript{28} In Victorian and Edwardian Oxbridge society, sport was accused of entrenching the elitism of public schools at college level and imperiling academic advancement at the same time. Defenders responded by pointing out the egalitarian mold of sporting activities. The same debate, along “development” lines, seems to be at work on South African playing fields, where the slow but steady pace of transformation may bring elitist (for which, read apartheid) rugby to an end within a few years; meanwhile cricketers and soccer players, in “sports clinics,” tend to the supposedly egalitarian ethos of their sports.

The remarkable rhetorical feature of the debate is the insistence, by all parties concerned, on the “civilizing process” (to borrow Norbert Elias’ famous expression) at work in sport. For instance, fairness and gentility and glamour (most sport stars, even the most unlikely, are turned into glamour boys on magazine covers) have become the characteristics featured in sport reporting, rather than competitiveness, raw force, and gung-ho machismo.

To understand this shift in emphasis, one must consider society’s notions of what the warring force and its sublimation, sport, are all about. Medievalist Georges Duby is helpful in this respect.\textsuperscript{29} Duby outlines a fundamental shift that affected feudal conceptions of fighting in the 12th century. Tournaments then were sometimes staged for technical reasons, for example to test the new and difficult practice of lance-fencing. Tournaments or tourneys were also developed as a means to redirect chivalry’s demand for military action in principalities where political structures were adopting a more modern and peaceful shape, as a central power and popular communes consolidated at the two ends of the political spectrum.
Two elements must be borne in mind before the discussion of sport and glamour in South Africa proceeds. Firstly, in medieval times war was a means of economic production for the knightly class; War produced goods. War, and not peace, was the standard of social interaction. Secondly, warfare was not imbued with a killing mentality. In military actions, skirmishes, and raids, knights rarely killed each other. Prisoners had an exchange value of the highest kind. Killing cost goods or precious money and led to untoward vendettas. The development of lance-fencing was seen as an improvement because lances unseated riders, with less risk of mortal (and costly) injury. In turn, the appearance, especially in England and Flanders, of knife-wielding foot soldiers who had no chivalric ethics introduced a savage go-for-the-kill dimension into battles (which were themselves rare occurrences, solemn public rituals of adjudicating Right and Evil, based on the formula of private judicial ordeal).

In sum, tourneys achieved the treble effect of keeping the warring class from plundering each other’s estates (thus helping secure peace); keeping warriors contented and wealthy (tourneying teams of knights became businesslike ventures, with a recorded system of accounting and redistribution of profits); and providing training for the unmarried knights who made up the bulk of tournament contestants (these same knights were often deprived of land and fortune by primogeniture).

In addition (and unnoticed by Duby), the flowering of tourneys marked the beginning of public entertainment on a scale unseen since Roman times. Tourneys gave new meaning to old epic oral literature; they helped create new oral and written literary forms (that initially were means of social communication and deliberation, not just literary genes). Tourneys advanced the quick development of the arts of adornment (heraldic designs with their novel colors and inventive shapes, hair and clothing fashions for champions and spectators alike, the refining of the arts of the smith and the saddler, and, in the erection of pavilions, the art of public-space design); they made metallic money an object of desire; and by bringing men and women together, they were conducive to the rise of social manners and love rituals. Literature, sculptures, and miniatures bear witness to the glamour that surrounded the tourneying culture of entertainment, with its heartthrobs, its champions, and its ladies of beauty. Tourneys were both the fashion catwalks and the World Series of the
12th century; and like our own social entertainment modes, they emerged after great destruction, a surge in population growth, and the rise of conspicuous and material consumption.

For these reasons, tourneys were a crucial locus for public deliberation, where various elements of feudal culture cohered, parleyed, exchanged views, measured differences and similarities, developed communication modes—in short, rhetorized themselves. Because they developed in the 12th century, tourneys offer a clear matrix for understanding later phenomena in Western European culture and its derivatives and for appreciating the structurally interrelationship between glamour, war, and sport, as those three realms solidify in a culture no longer immersed in warring activities.

In South Africa people deliberately and enthusiastically marked the end of a warring culture by adopting new symbols of public glamour, peaceful contest, and “derealized” competition—a rhetoric of peace whose sites were often sporting venues. The 1994 first general elections were rightly hailed by all South Africans as the instauration of peace—real peace—at long last. This may have been, as discussed earlier, a theologically and politically engineered peace yet it was perceived as an event of greater magnitude than any such negotiations could ever have promised. South Africans perceived that a qualitative leap had taken place. Everyone spoke of a “miracle”—from war to peace, at a stroke of a pen, as it were. That the pen had been filled and held by many hands and that the stroke had been a calculated gesture were quickly forgotten by the people in the street. What mattered was life, everyday life. And life, as in Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony, was suddenly calm, good, and enjoyable after the protracted storm.

Civil symbols rose all over the pacified land, like a multitude of standards and banners, all of them, in one way or another, variations of the theme of the rainbow, the symbol that heralded the nation at peace with herself. The new flag, an adroit dovetailing of the old Dutch colonial colors with those of the liberation movements, marked the development of a new depictive paradigm in heraldry—the multicolorism of national pride, flaunted on armbands; decorating lapel pins; painted on the faces of rugby and soccer fans; swinging gently on the West African boubous of the South African choir invited to extol diversity at the Mass held in the ancient basilica of French Merovingian kings, a stone’s throw from the
Saint-Denis Stadium, where soccer’s 1998 World Cup was to array its jousting teams.

Cities’ and state agencies’ coats of arms, still laden with unseasonable griffins and inexplicable quarterings, began to adopt user-friendly and hip designs, a semiotics of social renewal and civil quietude. The new national coat of arms has shed colonial heraldry while the choice for a motto, in a near extinct San dialect, proclaims Diverse People Unite. New parliamentary maces (a quaint remnant of the judicial power of medieval parliaments) were fashioned for the new provincial legislatures, and Parliament’s press conference room was refurbished with a mural that is African in inspiration, featuring a glorious peacock spreading its tail—the bird of medieval Burgundian chivalry translated and tamed to Africa. Television channels, experiencing deregulation and privatization, invented mottoes and logos aimed simultaneously at spreading the icons of peace and creating a community bond with their specific viewership (Channel One settled for a multicultural pun: Simunye, We Are One). Universities began a sometimes contorted process of renaming their seats of learning. The national police force acknowledged its demilitarization by adding services to its official name; the armed forces inserted the adjective national in their nomenclature. If one considers rugby as part of the old South Africa’s macho culture, alongside the army and the police, it is notable that all provincial rugby teams have shed their old names (strongly rooted in white parochial rivalries, for instance, between the Western Cape and the ex-Transvaal or between the teams of the universities of Pretoria and Potchefstroom) and adopted American terminology—Cats, Bulls, Sharks, and Hurricanes are nonracial markers.

Signs of apartheid discrimination have been converted into cosmeticized rhetorical markers of diversity. This is epitomized by the striking display that accompanies the opening of Parliament. Members enter the Houses dressed in real (or fictional) traditional garb, displaying—in the arena in which verbal tourneys have superseded civil war—the cosmetics of their allegiance.

At the final opening of the first Parliament, in February 1999, a reporter—presumably at his wits’ end—summed up the sartorial displays in three captions: “Judicial pair” accompanies a photograph of the minister of justice and his wife—he wears the Islamic shawl popularized by Palestinians; “Ethnic flair” captures the picture of four
Members of Parliament from the North West Province, swathed in bright cloth and beadwork, faces adorned with elaborate ethnic paint; and “Trekking in” describes an odd couple in Boer Republic cotillion garb. The Afrikaans daily newspaper, Die Burger— which seems to regret the days of funeral-parlor grandeur, in which the State President’s limousine drove along streets lined with guards in uniforms straight out of The Prisoner of Zenda, to a Parliament teeming with black suits, pink dresses, homburgs, and vegetable follies—declared that the new parliamentary fashions placed “individuality over fashion,” which is indeed the point. The “fashion show” put on by public figures on the steps of Parliament focuses public attention on the transformation of warring symbols or markers of erstwhile political aggression into a visual display of peaceful signs that are readily interpreted as the “beautification” of democracy.

So-called cultural tourism, which is slowly developing in South Africa and tries to tap the novelty of South Africa for first-world markets, contributes to the propagation of this semiotics of glamorous peace, which supports social deliberation. Many more examples of this semiotics of peace could be added to the preceding list; all these rhetorical devices say the same thing: Peace is now upon the land.

These devices have promptly acted as what Frances A. Yates calls, in rhetoric, an “art of memory.” South Africans were storing up depictive and verbal signs of peace, thereby introducing into public deliberation a new stock of commonplaces, of potent images, speech reactions, and formulaic arguments concerning peace in the land. In inventing for themselves a new social memory, they began to perform these signs in public spaces and public circumstances, transforming public locales in so many “theatres of memory.” However, examining how such signs are performed is crucial in understanding a social deliberation on peace.

Projecting the tourney matrix just described onto the material at hand helps one gain an understanding the rhetorical cosmetics of peace in South Africa. Glamour magazines, diplomatic and military actions, sporting activities are indicative of a shift, similar to the one marked by the Medieval tourneying system, from utter public violence to social peace. If one bears in mind that “war” (in the medieval sense of werra) was originally an economic activity, later to be
sublimated into a social internalizing of values and civil interaction, it must be noted that violent forms of governance have followed a analogous pattern in South Africa.

During the struggle, apartheid and liberation military forces vied for the piecemeal control of areas. The avowed aim of the African National Congress was to render the black townships ungovernable and, de facto, to transfer power step-by-step on the ground—as it actually happened. The “stalemate” invoked by the TRC concerned, first and foremost, the inability of the apartheid state to regain control over urban and rural areas that, for all intents and purposes, had slipped its grip. Control gave rise to economic power—with the quick development, for instance, of “black taxi associations” (actually cartels in which political alignments and mafia interests are superimposed) and, in general, a parallel informal economy that now constitutes the bulk of the revenue generated in the townships. (The warring origin of the taxi business, which controls virtually all mass transit, is not forgotten: “Taxi wars” over the control of routes remain an untoward South African problem.) Yet the social behaviors, the signs and the words, that went along with this civil “war” have been cosmetized, have passed into the exercise and the rhetoric of peace.

A good example is the *toyi toyi* dance. This dance (which can be traced back to mine workers’ gum boots or traditional Zulu dances, although it arose in the urban context of the black townships) gained popular approval at the time of the United Democratic Front (from 1983 onward). It was performed at mass demonstrations either as a harmless provocation to the police (still, a demonstration of potential force) or as a prelude or accompaniment to kangaroo-court killings (like the infamous necklace torture). The TRC itself condemned the dance as a spectacular display of menacing violence, conducive to abusive acts:

Further, in its (i.e. the United Democratic Front’s) endorsement of and promotion of the *toyi toyi*, slogans and songs that encouraged and/or eulogized violent actions, the UDF created a climate in which such actions were considered legitimate.35

By “actions,” the TRC specifically refers to “necklacing,” the violent enforcement of boycotts, and political intolerance toward other antiapartheid forces.
Translated into peace terms, the *toyi toyi* is now good-humoredly performed by officials when demonstration of public joy is required (as in the presentation ceremony, noted earlier, of the TRC Report). It has lost its warring meaning, just as the *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrica*, now collaged with the old bilingual apartheid hymn *Die Stem van Suid-Afrika*, no longer makes white lips bleed red. The national rugby team may mouth with ill grace, but the sting has gone. Balletics and ventriloquy are sure signs of the peaceful acceptance of once dangerous moves and dangerous words. This translation is profoundly rhetorical; each peaceful *toyi toyi* and every sing-along further persuades the citizens that peace is upon the land.

Significantly, national pride no longer hinges on military prowess (as the case of Operation Boleas demonstrated) but on “jousting.” Cricket, soccer, rugby, the famous Comrades Marathon (in Natal) and the Two Oceans Marathon or the Big Walk (in the Cape), the popular support for track and field athletics—these have become, in a time of peace, the replacements for warring activities that once earned apartheid and liberation military cadres and foot-soldiers pride and glory and economic sustenance.

During the demilitarization of the police and the integration of the armed forces, individuals on both sides had a common gripe (that sometimes led to court-martial actions); namely that they had lost consideration, that the pay was poor, that, in short, the good life of the warrior was over. In public perceptions and expressions of warring qualities, glory and lucre are now firmly in the postmodern tourneying fields of sport. Stadiums and sport cafés, hung with giant television screens, have become the new spaces to perform a *toyi toyi* when the home team wins or to mumble or bellow the potluck anthem before the referee blows his whistle.

As a result, glamour—which seems to pertain only to the field of social leisure, to bodily and spatial cosmetics—evolves hand in hand with the pacification of sporting, warlike values. There are numerous indicators of this peace-time, peace-space evolution that, while it harnesses once-violent behaviors and transforms them into gentler ones, introduces a rare synergy between the verbalization of glamour and political deliberation. In short, sport and glamour have tamed violence.

One example lies in the glamorous pacification of politics: Nelson Mandela was quick to invent for himself a sartorial style
(brightly patterned “Mandela shirts”) that conveyed a sense of elegant comfort. The opening of Parliament each year receives as much media attention for the design of dresses and hats (across genders and origins) as for the actual political event itself. Newspapers carry blown-up pictures and pithy commentaries on “who wore what.” The steps of Parliament are an ideal catwalk for the peaceful display of a democracy at ease with itself and taking pleasure in the jousting of fashions and gentle behaviors. The people hang around, gawk, and wave, seeing themselves in their representatives.

The opening of Parliament as a “fashion statement” is rivaled only by the fashion extravaganza that surrounds two famous horse races, the Cape Town Met and the Durban July. It is truly the “statement” of a peaceful land. It is also a sign that “theatres of memory,” from stadiums to legislatures, from fashion shows (including the show Versace for Africa, organized by Naomi Campbell for the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund, in February 1998) to the massive and cross-racial development of the health and leisure industry are storing up key words and ready arguments for a peaceful democracy, word and arguments that already have the power of evidence. Evidence, in rhetorical terms, is indeed the direct product of “energetic” images (enargeia is evidential presence), ensconced in words and phrases that need no explanation, no justification, but merely the act of using them—performance.36
8

Space As Democratic Deliberation

Quintilian, in Book 3 of his *Institutio Oratoria*, has a passage on the genre sometimes called *laus civitatis*, the lauding of a city. This passage sheds light on how a civic discourse regarding space and place can take shape within a democracy: “Cities, like human beings can be praised … on account of their distinction (*honor*), functionality (*utilitas*), beauty (*pulchritudo*) and of those that conceived them (*auctor).*”

To praise a “city”—be it in modern terms a country as a total political entity, part of a country, a city, or any sort of built environment—rests on an act of persuasion aimed at political exercise itself; so Quintilian argues against Aristotle, accusing Aristotle of having “sidelined” epideictic rhetoric.

But by contrasting Roman practice with Greek canon, Quintilian argues that praise and blame (but the latter to a lesser extent) are part of deliberative or forensic rhetoric, of political and judicial practice. Epideictic rhetoric deals with celebrating values in public performances of oratory. Quintilian claims that beyond the pleasure of epideictic demonstrations of oratorical prowess (if one agrees with his rendering of *epideictic* as a show, a recital, a performance), there is, in the working of values “demonstrated” by the recital itself, a “pragmatic” force that operates on public affairs. “I like my town” is a type of public argumentation that itself shapes community within a democracy.
HUMAN SPACE AS DELIBERATION

In the past, the South African state regulated the usage, function, and allocation of space within the “population groups.” The word apartheid is itself semantically space-bound: It suggests the act of literally setting people apart. Human Rights Day, on March 21, commemorates the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960, when police opened fire on demonstrators who were protesting against the pass laws that required black South Africans to carry an identity document (the *dompas*) with them whenever they wished to travel outside their racially demarcated areas and, more specifically, to enter the white cities. This first major event of the antiapartheid struggle, one that captured international attention and led in 1966 the United Nations to declare March 21 International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination was about space. Human Rights Day is directly germane to space rights. Space was indeed codified, in the apartheid era, by the 1950 Group Areas Act; following on the Native (Urban Areas) Acts of 1923 and 1945 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, the Group Areas Act determined the location of people in accordance with their racial classification. The Group Areas Act codified space in much the same way as the Population Registration Act codified race.

The Group Areas Act provided a formidable vocabulary for public deliberation about the built environment and human ecology in general. Here is, excerpted, the stunning stock of commonplaces of apartheid rhetoric about space:

Be it enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate and House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa, as follows: 1. (Definitions) In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates … (v) “controlled area” means any area which is not a group area or a scheduled native area, location, native village, coloured persons settlement, mission station or communal reserve … (ix) “group” means either the white group, the coloured group or the native group … and includes … any group of persons who have … been declared to be a group … (xv) “marriage” includes a union, recognized as a marriage (whether or not of monogamous nature) in native law or custom or under the tenets of the religion of either of the parties of the union … 2. [restates the racial classification under Act No. 30 of 1950] 3. (1) (Establishment of group areas) The Governor-General may, whenever it is deemed expedient, by proclamation in the *Gazette* … (b) declare that … the area defined in the proclamation shall be an area for
ownership by members of the group specified therein ... 4. (Occupation in group areas) (1) As from the date specified ... no disqualified person shall occupy and no person shall allow any disqualified person to occupy any land or premises in any group area to which the proclamation relates, except under the authority of a permit ... 6. (Governing body for certain group areas) (1) The Minister may by notice in the *Gazette*, establish for any group area (other than an area for the white group), a certain governing body to be constituted in accordance with regulation.

For 40 years deliberations on space were fed by such a store of commonplaces, one that fixed definitions of space, property, the transmission of rights, the right to sojourn and the right to travel. The commonplaces set “the white group” apart as a spatial entity, autonomous, detached, removed, untouched—the “mainframe” of human ecology dismemberment. The main medium for these commonplaces was the law; the required permits acted as operatives.

In democratic South Africa the rhetoric of space has indeed been radically displaced. It is obvious that spatial apartheid is no longer extant. As far as its public deliberation purport is concerned, it is now largely played out in the media, and, with the exception of the claims put to the Commission for the Restitution of Land Rights, it is no longer argued within a legal framework. New cultural and deliberative practices are recasting space as “practiced place.”

In post-apartheid South Africa, public deliberation on space and the human ecology of space (strategies of “demonstration,” as shown earlier) is traversed by dynamics that, in echoing the anger caused both by spatial apartheid and by its dismantling, are altogether different. Public argumentation operates within a redefinition of the symbolic ownership of civic space. Remarkably, public attention is not focused on the methods and effects of the Land redistribution programme. With the exception of some symbolic cases, politicians, the government, and various sectors of the public are not nurturing a debate on land reappropriation and land redistribution. Yet the rhetorical retort the Group Areas Act was nevertheless expressed in the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994:

Chapter I. (Introductory Provisions) ... 3. (Claims against nominees) Subject to the provisions of this Act a person shall be entitled to claim title in land if such claimant or his, her or its antecedent [“its” refers to “community” as a “person”] (a) was prevented from obtaining or retaining title to
the claimed land because of a law which would have been inconsistent with the prohibition of racial discrimination contained in section 8(2) of the Constitution had that subsection been in operation at the relevant time.

The policy of restitution rights is the response to the policy of Group Areas. Restitution of land amounts to remixing spaces and erasing, step-by-step, the discrete cartography of apartheid. The new constitution is fittingly paired with a process of restitution.

Public deliberation regarding claims for restitution is generally restricted to the Land Claims Court. Occasionally, dramatic restitution of land, such as that of the ancestral part of the Kalahari to the =Khomani San, captures the public imagination. In such instances, restitution is utilized as a vote of praise for politicians. However, most cases are complex judicial matters that involve individuals and communities. Two examples illustrate how this closed and complex process of deliberation lessened the deleterious effect of apartheid on the human ecology of space. Space is powerfully argued in a rhetorical tension between forensic and popular deliberation.

One exemplary case pertains to an agreement reached between municipal agencies and private citizens. The latter had been forcibly removed, in the early 1960s, from the well-known African and Indian suburb of Cato Manor in Durban, after the suburb was declared a white area; Cato Manor was “deproclaimed” a white area and proclaimed an Indian area in 1980. The judgment offers an excellent insight into how forensic rhetoric and public deliberation intersect—albeit in the words of the judge who made the agreement an order of the court.

The municipal agencies applied for Cato Manor not to be restored to possible claimants (a preemptive action). Of the 511 respondents who opposed this action, 510 were represented by lawyers; the remaining one the judge declared to have made “a good impression on the Court.” In other words, before the judgment could enter into the details of the agreement (and just before the recounting of the history of the forced removal), the judge had to establish that the 511 citizens could, by proxy or directly, show their respect for forms and procedures; in other words, that the citizens’ deliberations were forensically credible. This would later impact on the Court granting an order.

The judge moved on, after the historical account of the forced removal, to affirm the ethos of the respondents, stating that to “return
to their roots” is their “dream”—contrasting it, in the same section, with “the establishment [by the municipality] of a virtual city in the area with a complete infrastructure.” The judge proceeded by adding and amplifying details, using both quantitative and qualitative commonplaces (“schools, hospitals, libraries”; “overseas” funding; “Reconstruction and Development”; “substantial employment opportunities”; “significant boost”; “upgrade” of “informal” settlements), as if the accumulation of details constituted an ethical proof of the good faith of the municipal agencies and somehow counterbalanced “the dream.”

In other words, the judge summarized two equal but contrasted positions, carefully balancing with his choice of words two “virtualities”—that of a lost past (“roots,” “dream”) and that of a future filled with the promise of “development” (a “virtual city”). The judge then recorded that the parties accepted oral evidence “to amplify the papers” and that they therefore heard only two of the three municipal witnesses before negotiating the agreement placed before the Court. The judge described and recast the act of reaching an agreement as “no mean feat.” In sum, public deliberation was validated by judicial evaluation—as a rhetorical exercise between two equal parties, of equal strength, with equal claims. Yet now the remit of the Court is to measure this agreement against legal procedures and the Act. Does the settlement meet the requirements of the Act? It cannot be merely a rhetorical agreement. The problem becomes one of how to validate public deliberation. The judge has to recast, for the second time, the process of public deliberation. This time, he has to step outside the debate between parties to measure the outcome of the agreement against the people’s interest. He has to imagine a hidden debate between the parties in agreement and the people. This must take place in order to test whether the agreement is a false agreement, that is, an agreement that entrenches the status quo instead of addressing the question of what happens after a forced removal. It could be that the parties pretended to settle in order to share the spoils of the new investments in Cato Manor. In that case, the agreement would not be the outcome of democratic public deliberation, but rather a deal; rhetorically, an agreement in words, words that pacify, obfuscate, and deviate.

The judge therefore has to test whether the agreement is in the “public interest.” Public interest is, in short, the rhetorical ethos of
the people, which the parties must show proofs of having evinced in their negotiations. The agreement ought not to be an agreement in words and in form only; it must be the result of the imaginary debate between the two parties and their symbolic inner self, the People, the judge has a duty to perform. Worrisomely, he finds that “no argument was placed before the Court on the concept of public interest because the matter was settled.” He therefore sets about defining “public interest” because the Land Rights Act does not define it and because the two parties in the case do not argue for it.

The judge thus has to invent arguments that should have been proposed during the negotiations in order to demonstrate that the two parties were indeed acting in the “public interest,” while eschewing himself a needed elaboration on precisely what “public interest” entails. A concrete test is needed. References are sought (“gleaned”) from a dictionary, cases (notably for liquor licenses!), legal literature, and (at length) two Australian cases concerning aboriginal land rights. The judge then summarizes his review by affirming, tautologically, that a balance between private and public interest has been struck—“public interest” having never been defined as such, by himself but considered rather as a result of random references.

The inability of forensic rhetoric to extend beyond an extensive definition and to reach an intensive one is matched by the illogical conclusion that the agreement is in the “public interest.” This failure to flesh out the Land Rights Act occurs because the judge is seeking guidance from records of public deliberation that are mute on this crucial aspect. The failure is also a sign that public deliberation was sought as a source for interpreting the Land Rights Act. Had the negotiators addressed subsection 6 of section 34 of the act, the judge would not have had to imagine and summon piecemeal interlocutors so odd that they were described as “gleaned.” In saying “against the advantages to the public interest of restoration … had to be weighed and balanced the advantages to the public interest of the development” the judge does not realize that he has defined neither and is merely reiterating the positions of both parties. In the end, the test was no test at all, and the weighing of public deliberation by judicial review was a fiction that, in fact, left the last word to the public deliberators. The judge literally rubber-stamped the agreement.
This entire case is exemplary of how popular deliberation, when it casts itself in terms of negotiations, agreement, balance, and “good impressions” in court—in short, when it appears to embody the spirit of democracy and to respect legal decorum—can argue for space and literally say what is the right thing in terms of space ecology.

Another exemplary case concerns the claim lodged in 1995 by the Makulele Community and the authority controlling the world-famous Kruger National Park, and the ensuing judgment. The Makulele settled in the area some 200 years ago but were removed in 1969 and forcibly settled on a farm; their land was mostly incorporated into Kruger National Park. The judge sums up this brief history by stating that “it is common cause that their removal was a result of racially discriminatory legislation and practices.”

Reviewing the claim and reflecting on the deliberative process that had been conducted before the Court entered the proceedings, the judge begins by setting the spatial conditions within which the claim itself is located. The land in question is deemed of importance for “conservation ... and the promotion of biodiversity”; it is important “strategically” (it borders on Zimbabwe and Mozambique); it is also important for “mineral deposits,” and “access” by the “broader public” (because it is now in a national park). The argument underlining the importance of this specific space runs from Nature to Public, in ascending order. This space is thus public space throughout. The judge then notes that the claimants are asking for a right (ownership) that they did not enjoy prior to their removal; he further notes the complexity of having eight parties involved (six ministries, one provincial government, and the Makulele Community). This forms the epideictic backdrop to the written settlement that was finally entered into.

Given a complex space, with a complex claim, between a complex of parties, agreement was reached with the help of two mediators. The judge merely praises the processes so far engaged by public deliberation, noting that they “presumably” followed this route as a result of the act’s stipulation that “mediation and negotiation” must be attempted. The qualifying adverb presumably is already a critique (from the domain of forensic rhetoric) addressed to public deliberation. At stake is whether, having received the referral, the settlement must be made an order of the Court.

In the previous case, the judge did not question the validity of the referral but applied legal reasoning to establish whether the settle-
ment was, in substance, respectful of the Land Rights Act. In this case, the judge asks in his review whether a court order is at all necessary. Two rhetorics of agreement are at stake. The judge asserts the Court’s role in careful terms:

The above represents the background to this matter. What is the Court’s function when a matter is referred to it in terms of section 14(3) of the Restitution Act? Section 14(3) does not expressly or by implication oblige the Court to make any agreement referred to it an order of court, notwithstanding that the parties may request it to do so. Obviously the Court must treat such a request seriously and only refuse it for good reason. The Restitution Act is clearly geared to promote the resolution of restitution claims by negotiation, mediation, agreement. Where the parties succeed in achieving this, the Court should as far as possible give effect to the intention of the parties.

The basic argument is that there must be good reason for the settlement to receive court validation, because public deliberation is then validated by a forensic (imaginary) debate (as in the Cato Manor case) and the public admitted, as it were, to having acted as if in a courtroom.

The court order—the text that contains the judgment, its collocation of sentences and paragraphs—then represents the absent “oratory,” the arguments and exchanges of which the Court has been deprived by public deliberation itself. The judgment is there to restore the dignity of legal rhetoric; or, as it is stated, to “give effect to the intention of the parties.” The Court will achieve the ends of negotiation, just as an orator achieves the speech’s aim both in terms of persuasion and in exploiting all the resources of the art. If the Court gives “effect” to the parties’ intentions, it means that the Court has been persuaded, just as the parties have been; and that, from settlement to court order, all rhetorical means (of which the oratory of the written judgment is a signal instance) have been exhausted.

The judge then proceeds to make two “enquiries.” The judge “enquires” into the validity of public deliberation. Firstly, is the Court persuaded that the agreement entitles the claimant to a restitution? With amendments the Court agrees that, on the first ground, public deliberation has been forensically correct, inclusive of “public interest” being served. But as regards the second “enquiry,” the judge hands down that the agreement itself cannot be made an order
of the Court.\textsuperscript{30} Instead, the Court has prepared, in consultation with the parties, another court order.\textsuperscript{31} This new court order avoids legal confusion that may arise in the future.\textsuperscript{32} Yet rhetorically it can also be read as the only manner in which the judge could assert the primacy of legal oratory and, fictitiously, reintroduce the parties into the courtroom and make them argue their case (albeit not on the substance of the claim but on incidentals of the case).

The Land Claims Court judgments may indeed be read as locales for conflict, tension, and resolution between two sorts of persuasion: public deliberation and forensic review, the latter positing itself as fulfilling the unfulfilled, ill-formed, misshapen words and thoughts of the former. The argument regarding “intention” is not at all new in rhetoric studies. It is ultimately Aristotelian in tradition; it rephrases Augustine’s distinction (expressed in \textit{De Doctrina Christiana}) between \textit{scriptum} and \textit{voluntas}—the text and the intention (will) that the text might not “realize,” bring to “reality,” fulfill, or achieve. The judge seeks the \textit{voluntas} of the parties and tries to “realize” it. This option, although couched in legal terms, is a philosophical act that questions (recall the word “presumably”) the veracity of the people’s text; that is whether popular deliberation alone can fulfill its own “will.”\textsuperscript{33} Space is argued in terms of desire, wish, and the means to achieve it—such is the more general portent of the dialogue between public deliberation and forensic rhetoric.

\section*{A RHETORICAL MATRIX FOR SPACE}

How is space argued in the public sphere? For one thing, community news medias in South Africa have flourished in the past 10 years, spanning the entire range from roneotyped leaflets to full-fledged newspapers. Community printed news medias in fact perform on a regular basis an exercise in \textit{laus civitatis} within the limits of a “feel-good” exercise and public agency; following the deregulation of air-waves, community-based radio stations, such as Radio 702 in Gauteng or Cape Talk in the Western Cape, do the same. The medias perform, in rhetorical terms, one of the “most difficult” functions\textsuperscript{34} of deliberation in the public sphere: that moment when an orator, impersonating someone, “characterizes” someone else (usually clients) and speaks like them (hence the root meaning of the cognate words \textit{orator} and \textit{advocate}—the one who speaks for).
Community news medias perform an impersonation—a rhetorical *prosopopeia*. They “impersonate” the many voices of the community they serve by resorting to an array of “advocacy” tools. These tools—summed up by Quintilian—have four key commonplaces befitting the epideictic genre: distinction, functionality, beauty, and those who conceive the community. Yet as Quintilian stresses it, praise and blame are inseparable from political or public argumentation in real life, because both praise and blame give shape to argumentation. Space as an object of civic rhetoric has moved to a different plane, that of impersonation—*prosopopeia*. There is a pervasive interest from the public in its own immediate space and in the development of media intervention to advocate, defend, praise, and blame space as a civic agent. In the terms defined by Quintilian, and which serve here as a matrix, space in South Africa shapes democratic deliberation.

The information utilized to fill out this matrix pertains to five main areas of “spatial impersonation,” or persuasions about spaces. The first area concerns the reversal in status of townships and informal housing settlements—from spaces of denigration into spaces of pride. The second area relates to comparisons between the cities as they were and as they are now. The third area pertains to the glamorizing of cities as vibrant built environments. The fourth area concerns the growing advocacy for special zones for the young and the aged or for the racially inclined. The last area of space persuasion pertains to the land as cultural identity itself. Examining these areas, following the criteria offered by the rhetorical tradition, will reveal how persuasion about the placement of citizens in space functions.

**SPACE AS DISTINCTION**

As the space of apartheid “disappeared” in terms of legal segregation (a vanishing symbolized during the first general elections of 1994 by long lines of voters in single file—“maids and madams” side by side—and during the advent of the second general elections in 1999 by the metonymic placing of all voters on a single bar-coded identity system of registration; in other words, a single locus), spaces created by apartheid remained: black townships and white suburbs, sometimes blurred by population mobility and the rapid emergence of a black middle class. But, more importantly, a rhetoric
of "distinction" developed in order to mark, in the voices of inhabitants, the "honor" of living where they did. The difference between apartheid rhetoric and democratic rhetoric on civil space is not so much their ideological contrast, but the latter’s insistence on deliberative agency. "Distinction" is not a given (as it was during apartheid), but an act of civil deliberation.

"Distinction" is visually marked. "What’s happening in Linga Street, Khayelitsha?" is a montage of photographs taken in a black settlement, part of a series by a Sunday newspaper that ran for some weeks during 1998. The word township is carefully avoided in the longer-than-average captions, although it is the common term used to refer to black urban areas. The captions are descriptive (“Mothers Meisi Ngqame and Madida Ncokasi, with the help of Aunt Francis, have spent the day at home [in the shack behind A514] doing the washing . . .”) and tend to speak on behalf of the subjects, illustrating the life of ordinary South Africans.

The whole compass of the two-page spread, with its 10 photographs, is to describe to its Sunday readership, in the middle of the South African summer when the beaches are crowded and gardens smell of braais (barbecues), a working day—"A Tuesday evening, 6–8pm"—among poor South Africans who are either unemployed or earning wages as unskilled workers. Yet the combination of abbreviated real-life stories with camera angles that enhance the quiet ordinariness of rest after a day’s work functions as a praise—an epideixis—of precisely why Sundays are well earned. The montage casts "distinction" as the "honor" of working, resting, and being with friends. (See Fig. 8.1.)

By extension (because the montage is technically a metonymy, a part that is symbolic of the whole) and by inference (if one takes a Perelmanian view that concrete illustrations are conducive to abstract generalizations), the reportage speaks of the whole settlement, and, in more civil terms, of the "distinction" of living in a township. The avoidance of the term township reflects the reporter’s wish to summarize her “oratorical” intent. Something similar appears in "Home Sweet Home," which juxtaposes a story about the Johannesburg suburb of Yeoville, long urbanized and until recently a white middle-income area, with a look at an informal settlement at Zevenfontein in order to point out, both visually and transitively, the way the vector of betterment functions.
Neighbours should take care of each other

FIG. 8.1. Neighbours Should Take Care of each Other. View of a middle class Black home in Yeoville, Johannesburg (Reconstruct, April 4, 1999, courtesy of the editor).
FIG. 8.2. *Our Growing City.* An unusual vista of Cape Town, The Mother City, seen from the sprawling Black and Coloured townships on the Cape Flats. It reverses the touristic glamour of the traditional frontal sea-view of Cape Town, crowned by colonial icon Table Mountain (*Saturday Argus*, March 20, 21, 1999, courtesy of the editor).
The same drift is at work, in a far more concise manner, in “Our growing city.”44 A half-page aerial photograph of Khayelitsha’s “informal housing” sites gives the impression that the city of Cape Town (see Fig. 8.2.) naturally rolls over the Cape Flats toward Khayelitsha, merging in perspectival arrangement areas of civil interaction—as lived out every day by tens of thousands of black commuters who go to “town” to work. The focal point of the perspective is a black visual angle; the traditional white visual angle onto Cape Town is the view from the shores of the Cape West Coast—a view famous since the time of the Portuguese explorers. The key word used is housing, any other term being placed under erasure. Yet the oratorical “distinction” is only achieved when the reader moves from the photograph to a story on the lower part of the page about an exchange student from Germany who lives in the Durban township (the word township is used) of Umlazi; the story is titled “Township girl.” Now the angle has been completely reversed. “Distinction” has been established by resorting to yet another angle, that of a foreigner who performs a prosopopeia function, for she truly does give voice to the alleviation of white fears (the commonplace that “KwaZulu is war-torn” or that “townships are not for Whites”).

This system of advocacy can be brought to light in different circumstances, as can be seen with regard to “Oudekraal: Battle lines drawn.”45 Oudekraal is a planned development on the foothills of the Twelve Apostles, the Atlantic face of Table Mountain, along an unspoiled coastline that boasts superb beaches and prime real estate. The “battle” for Oudekraal lines up various interested parties: the owner, whose rights were secured in the time of apartheid; the Muslim community, which has a shrine on the slopes; New Age followers who claim that Table Mountain is an energy center; and the Western Cape government and its opposition, the African National Congress, both of whom want to make political mileage out of the controversy.

The debate, which quickly sidelined the New Age viewpoint, centered on whether it would be feasible to let the building of high-density prestige estate go ahead (thus tampering with Table Mountain) in exchange for funneling part of the income derived from the scheme into low-cost housing in the townships. All parties concerned argued for the “distinction” of Table Mountain—whether as a prime piece of real estate or as a cultural or environ-
mental asset. The civic outcome, in terms of Capetonians’ enhanced awareness of their built environment, was not the decision itself (an issue that remains unresolved), but the parties’ agreement that the “general public” should agree on what ought to be done. The consensual thread that ran through print media articles and radio talk shows simply enhanced the civic value of symbols, including the symbol of Table Mountain.

Space shapes the awareness of the value of consensus. To a lesser degree, the purchasing by the State of a piece of private land at Cape Agulhas, the southernmost tip of Africa, evoked similar media coverage and public reactions.46

**THE ELOQUENCE OF FUNCTIONALITY**

The manner in which people speak about their built environment and lend their voices to matters concerning how it is “built,” planned, and structured, and how it functions, adds yet another dimension to the notion of space as deliberation.

Squatters, rural people who move to the towns and cities in search of work, are part of the urban landscape in South Africa. In the apartheid era, “squatter camps” sprang up in official townships. Since then they have become part of what is euphemistically called “informal housing.” The African National Congress government policy has been to provide “the poorest of the poor”47 with decent housing.48 The result in terms of popular deliberation has been a change of register. The perceptions are that new developments, partnerships between levels of government, the private sector, international funders, and the people themselves (both residents of established areas where squatters are present and the squatters themselves) are increasing the functionality of urban space. Reviews such as “High quality homes for squatters at Westlake,”49 “City squatters set to become home-owners,”50 and the much publicized Children’s Villages (safe havens for some 230,000 children),51 as well as the fast-growing real estate industry of retirement villages,52 all sustain a new persuasion regarding the living environment of the cities.

By resorting to emotions (*pathos*) that articulate the plight of the deprived (the homeless, the lonely, the frail), and reinforced by a recourse to the democratic commonplace that community participa-
tion (rhetorically, the ethos, the inner authority) in any form gives sense and fulfillment to intervention by government agencies, such press releases and reviews foster a new persuasion concerning the value of community life. They correspond and respond to the actual involvement of people in changing the face of the South African built environment. It is interesting to note that when people who have been waiting for a long time (sometimes a decade or more) to move into formal settlements “invade” space, notably school sites or houses being built for other occupants according to a priority scheme, illegal occupation is presented as illegal, yet also as part of a process of negotiation. This process is more often than not marred by violence. Yet all parties agree that the process adds to the functionality of the settlements. This leads to a growing epideictic drift, a praise of the functionality—people’s utilitas—of black suburbs. Lookout Hill, a giant sand dune (66 meters above sea level) in Khayelitsha near Cape Town, overlooks wetlands abundant with birds, and it is earmarked as a tourist attraction—part of a plan for “attractive approaches.” A Vaal triangle home-owner, who recently moved into a house in Evanton West, sums up the emergence of the functionality of the built environment as space of political deliberation by saying (conflating ethos and pathos), “I will vote for this government again. It has given us life.”

Functionality can also be asserted differently, by conducting a praise of utopian spaces. Two cases in point reveal the recurrence of the white fiction of separate space.

Here lies a paradox: that separate space is argued either as a gain arising from the democratic devolution of power when argued as such, or as a perversion (as in the case of ill-treatment of workers, discussed later). Both have arresting implications for understanding functionality and rhetoric of space.

As in other first-world countries, gated estates are much in demand. Whether triggered by a wish for exclusiveness, safety, or real estate optimization, in South Africa such developments bear the imprint of the old apartheid dispensation, yet in different terms. On the part of the affluent sector of the upper middle class (white, coloured, or black), there is indeed a desire to mark, by real estate, their difference from the rest of the populace. Money and the symbolic capital provided by education and social habitus replace the color bar. The built environment is praised or blamed on a new scale of functional-
ity that extends beyond replacing squatter camps with cheap yet formal housing. It is in fact the same vector that starts at zero (the shack) and scales the infinitum of social betterment. On this deliberative vector the separate, gated, safety-featured estate occupies a pivotal place.

There are still traces, reviled by almost everyone, of apartheid separateness, placed, as it were, in the negative side of the vector, and acting as imprints of the past. One striking example is the situation of farm estates, owned by Whites in remote areas, which would not enter the span of public attention if it were not for the aberrant violations of human rights—the ill-treatment of workers and the denial of labor laws—that take place there. “Farms of shame” operate as markers for indictment, negative epideictic speech. They remind the public of the nondemocratic functionality of the old régime, which treated (black) human beings like cattle. In one of many reports, the story was printed on the same page as a large advert placed by the National Youth Commission, which read “You Must Register to Vote.” The juxtaposition works like a rhetorical deduction: to avoid a (the farm of shame), do b (register and vote).

Yet once the vector of functionality moves on, beyond or together with the praise of formal housing (resettlement), another side of separateness enters the picture. It concerns another sort of resettlement, or formalization of space: the Afrikaner-only space for living. For example, consider Orania, a new settlement next to the Orange River, 150 kilometers south of the capital of the Northern Cape, Kimberley—the historical city of diamonds. Some 600 Afrikaners have settled in Orania since 1991 (Fig. 8.3). It is a private estate development aimed at preserving the ethos, culture, and language of those Afrikaners (all white) who wish to live there. There are no Blacks, even as domestic workers, and no Catholics. It is “technologically adapted.”

The rhetorical interest of resettlements, such as Orania no different from the resettlement of squatters lies in the effort toward praising the process that leads to the resettlement rather than the space itself. (This praise is echoed in the formalization of housing in black areas.) Like ex-squatter areas, white resettlements have been transformed from “dilapidated, weather-beaten and dusty” places into zones of “entrepreneurship.” As with the process of betterment for black people, in white resettlements it is “people’s labor” that erects
the houses. They mirror black resettlements. Such discourse, however aberrant it may sound in a nonracial democracy, must be read as one of many signs regarding the way in which South Africans take charge of their spaces and persuade themselves that they actually fashion them.

Gated luxury estates; massive walled-in shopping centers (malls), which sometimes feature indoor cascades and even a Mississippi-style steamer, in addition to a deluge of consumer simulacra; “waterfront” estates in cities miles away from any ocean; beach estates with custom-designed homes and services centers; conference centers—all of these point, further along the vector, to the emergence of a rhetoric of space that creates a sense of pulchritude. Golf courses, whether inland or coastal, sometimes financed by black empowerment interests, find wide publicity not so much as havens for golf but as utopias of South Africa. There is a growing trade in “signature golf,” which is to golfers what designer clothes are to trendsetters—a sign of “distinction.” A running theme of golf
“design” (as the word goes) is to offer a comprehensive package of retirement villages, shopping malls, housing estates, medical services—all aspiring to evoke (in a choice of architectural styles; typically, Cape Dutch, Victorian, and a third, ad-lib) a genteel South Africa that never existed except in popular mythologies. Golf estates are powerful loci for an unfolding public deliberation on safety, gentility, affordable luxury, and, by capitalization of symbols, cross-racial integration. In many respects, the golf estate is the cross-racial upper middle class rhetorical retort to the massive black lower-income settlement in formal housing.\(^{59}\) One cannot be appreciated without the other, because both are complementary in terms of functionality. Without laboring the point, it is nonetheless interesting to note the regularity of commercial advertisement features in the press that celebrate conference centers of “international” standing. An article in the *Star* (Johannesburg) offers a true set of *laus civitatis* of the transient and international “cities” of conference venues, from the uniquely appointed bush lodges of the Pilanesberg to the luxurious Convention Center in upmarket Sandton, Johannesburg, to entirely new urban zones such as Midrand, where the once politically oriented venue, Gallagher Estate (“versatile, bustling and prestigious”), stands; in addition the article hails the International Convention Center in Durban as “Africa’s finest meeting place.” The feature mentioned here carries a full-page advertisement by “the largest corporate interior design and space planning company in the southern hemisphere”; it declares “Whatever you want to do in your space, we’ll create it.” This is indeed a celebration of space imaging.\(^{60}\)

A recent proposal for a city-like estate, inspired by “Mont St Michel” (!), purports to set up a perfect town, protected by walls and security guards, where one can conduct the business of daily living (including even on-site employment) possibly without ever leaving (Fig. 8.4). The scheme, Heritage Park, is dubbed “medieval” (meaning “community-centered”) by the realtors.\(^{61}\) Yet, some kilometers away, in a traditional wine-farming area (aptly named Paradyskloof—Heaven’s Valley), traditional (white) residents are opposing the development of a luxury housing and golf estate, whether secure or not, in order to preserve an environment deemed “historical.”\(^{62}\) Their opposition to a brash golf estate; the sales pitch of most golf developments and of Heritage Park itself;
Killers, robbers and rapists – keep out
Developer to build medieval fortress town in bid to keep crime at bay

FIG. 8.4. Robbers and Rapists—Keep Out! Report on a gated estate on the Cape, seen as a safe haven against the evils allegedly bred by democracy (Saturday Argus, September 12/13, 1998, courtesy of the Editor).
even the rationale for Orania—all exemplify the South African concern for “close-knit community.” They propound a powerful rhetoric of *utilitas*, marked by crudity and naïveté (Heritage Park has a church but no mosque; therefore, it is a safe place—thus goes the hidden syllogism) and by moronic recycling of high culture (architectural styles are more often than not facile facades). In rhetorical terms, as persuasive effects they are similar to Khayelitsha’s Lookout Hill, unfolding a rhetoric of the social function and the celebration of values that are perceived by the community as space-bound.

**PRAISING BEAUTIFUL SPACES**

There is in South African social mythology a great liking for glamour. Space is no exception. People have to celebrate, beyond distinction and functionality, the pleasure of being where they live. Pulchritude can be best rendered as the rhetorical measure people use to quantify a sense of aesthetic enjoyment in living where they live and the joy they take in formulating this. To take a simple example, letters to local newspapers are daily replete with complaints about how dirty South African cities are; and this is not limited to areas previously reserved for Whites. There is even some sort of emulation in blame directed at cities, along the lines of “This must be the dirtiest place on earth.” Such vituperation in fact serves to highlight, in the way of a photographic negative, the constant search for beauty and aesthetics. Cape Town’s central business district is often censured as filthy, the claim being made that if this is “allowed to continue, [it] would mean the end of the city as we know it.”63 The same claims are made about the Johannesburg central business district. Yet such negative epideictic serves as a foil to concurrent celebration of the pulchritude of urban and rural spaces. A new entertainment newsmagazine entirely devoted to urban pleasures, *City Life* lauded in its launch issue a “tale of three cities”—Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban—that “have come of age” as spaces of aesthetic living.64 The magazine has found a market and is prospering.

Trite statements such as “Cape Town is officially the capital of beautiful buildings”65 nonetheless function as printed proofs of what inhabitants want to believe about each of the major South African cities (a satirical magazine carried an article comparing Cape Town unfavorably with Port Elizabeth). But the key feature of such
celebration remains an incessant to-and-fro between spaces. The inhabitants are trained to compare spaces and formulate an integrated vision of what constitutes pulchritude in urban areas.

A common theme—one that is anchored in the huge burgeoning of home design and beautification schemes—is expressed in newspaper headlines: “Humble sheds’ designs put mansions to shame” and “Shacks put city’s sham, imported facades to shame.” (These concern Gauteng—South Africa’s most urbanized province—and its capital, Johannesburg.) Shame is a powerful “ethical” proof in rhetoric: Summoning it in a speech is equivalent to forcing one’s opponent to recant and move toward adopting one’s own view. If fake revivalism of grandiose aspirations is a “sham” that induces “shame,” the underlying argument is that whether or not the “mansions” are objects of pleasure, they enter into a tension with township-derived design, a careful derivation of shedlike structures. Built-environment beauty becomes an object of contention and stimulation. It creates a space that mimics in many respects the public tension of an emerging democracy, in which institutions and rituals are sometimes a fake inheritance and sometimes shedlike derivations. The public argument about what constitutes pulchritude in the built environment is a powerful agent of social awareness. As such, it acts as a cosmetic celebration of democratic space itself, essentially urban.

Social space is entertaining. Social space is conducive to self-celebration. Social space is an occasion for social conversation. In contrast with space under apartheid, social space in present-day South Africa has a festive dimension. At face value, public entertainment under apartheid was strictly codified (by legislation restricting public amenities), and public display of festive spirit was severely restricted (for instance, by the prohibition of alcohol sales on weekends and after 5 p.m. on weekdays, similar bans on cinema showings on Sunday, and bans on gas sales over weekends—which limited leisure traveling). A South African joke, about the wastelands of joy in those fallow days, ran like this: What do you do on Sundays in Bloemfontein [capital of the then “Orange” Free State]? You park your motorcar on the highway bridge and watch vehicles pass below.

In the democratic republic, social conversation has found new places of unfolding that carry with them a social, public rhetoric about the aesthetics of living together. Entertainment develop-
ments—such as Cape Town’s Victoria and Alfred Waterfront or the Sun City enclave in the Northern Province, which emulate similar projects in the United States—and theme parks modeled on American and European ventures are going up at a regular pace. They testify to the strength of the entertainment and leisure industry in a country where, at the end of 1998, only 21% of the population had access to a telephone. The effect of these entertainment spaces goes beyond the immediate market of those who can afford them, because the publicity that surrounds them is widely disseminated. Theme parks and entertainment developments like Sun City are new utopias of social conversation, and they have relegated the celebrated game reserves to a clientele of foreigners. Once the epicenter of space-as-leisure under apartheid, organized and ideologized, game reserves, like Kruger National Park (one of the very best in the world) have now moved to the periphery. They are now, within South Africa, odd export products.

South Africans find leisure and exoticism in the postmodern spaces of Sun City, which has launched an incongruous African order of architecture (adding to the five canonical ones of architectural classicism), a blend of everything “African” that has filtered with remarkable celerity into home design, furnishings, and “fashion statements.” This style is often dubbed “African chic.” In Barthesian terms, a modern mythology is cultivating its stock of commonplaces from the fountainhead (the place of inventio), Sun City; and this mythology affects daily life. The same can be said about Cape Town’s Victoria and Alfred Waterfront, which has spawned not only an industry of leisure and entertainment (from the first African Planet Hollywood establishment to an IMAX cinema) but, more radically, perceptions and beliefs about what it means to live beside two oceans, in a setting of “privilege,” a belief embodied in Cape Town’s bid for the 2004 Olympic Games. Social celebration of pulchritude flows easily from such premises. It finds its locale in celebratory events such as the Cape Town One City Festival which includes a Township Crawling Festival.

One new case is the development of Ratanga Junction and Century City in the Western Cape. Opened in December 1998, Ratanga Junction is “the first full-scale theme park in Africa.” At a cost of $55 million, Ratanga Junction (named after an imaginary mining concession on the site) was built in a desolate, windswept zone,
hemmed in between two lower-to lower-middle class white and coloured suburbs. It has canals, a plethora of food outlets, and the largest commercial cinema screen in Africa (the Mega Vu—thus not déjà vu). A project is under way to open a canal from Ratanga to a coastal lagoon, not far from yet another development—prestige seaside condominiums—on the northern boundary of Cape Town itself. Behind the grandiosity of the undertaking lies a simple rhetoric of make-believe. This advertising rhetoric, ensconced in the promotional Ratanga Telegraph,⁷⁰ is powerful insofar as it retools public argumentation issues into public entertainment and leisure.

For instance, one entertainment area, with automated fantasy puppets, offers the struggle between “the forces of light and the forces of darkness”—a struggle that must echo the one recently resolved in civil society. The Ratanga Telegraph offers a tongue-in-cheek history of the fantastic mining concession upon which the park is supposedly built, qualified “a State of Mind” (read, a state of leisure) that realigns and rewrites South African public deliberation regarding the democratic endeavor. The Ratanga Telegraph stresses that “all outstanding claims have been settled amicably” (a direct reference to land redistribution) and that “efforts to restore Ratanga Air Transport Services (RATS) have been ineffective” (an amusing jab at the painful commercialization of South African Airways). It also announces that “all proceeds must be ploughed back into the preservation of Ratanga Crossing,” parodying a pledge often heard.

The summation of such fantastic narrative, combined with the success of the theme park, shows how a space of entertainment, leisure, and aesthetic pleasure can both feed from civil discourse and feed back into it. The comical strain is neither reductive nor distorting. It simply illustrates how celebration of space works. With the largest shopping mall ever in Africa under way (eclipsing the massive Johannesburg Eastgate), it is likely that such social persuasion of well-being will only increase, “ploughing” into social rhetoric similes, images, and clichés that originally belonged to hard politics and that might once have seemed impervious to such aesthetic treatment.⁷¹ Contrary to what an overrational reporter noted, this is not “unreality” but an occasion for aesthetic values to cohere and to be voiced—even in the shouts of joyriders fastened to the Cobra that twists and hurtles at 60 miles per hour.⁷² Epideictic rhetoric is about the celebration of values that ensure group cohesion. The beauty of a
space, its aesthetics—etymologically, how a space is “felt”—is one important ingredient.

The addition of distinction, functionality, and pulchritude does not guarantee that the celebration of space and, in particular, the built environment is rooted in time. To be adhered to values must carry at least a semblance of durability. They anchor the narratives spun by the new places and validate the “re-landscaping” of South Africa. This is where the recourse to “foundation” becomes a binding element for rhetorical and democratic deliberation in the shaping of post-apartheid South Africa, a search by the African Athens for its own Acropolis.
Conclusion

Robben Island as Foundation Rhetoric

In Pretoria in the early 1980s, the apartheid régime erected a giant bronze head of Prime Minister “Hans” Strijdom, immediate predecessor to Hendrik Verwoerd (1958) and—together with Verwoerd and the first Nationalist Prime Minister, D. F. Malan (1948)—one of the three founders of the apartheid republic. The giant head, next to the Brasilia-style opera house and a Manhattanesque banking tower—the first skyscraper of the executive capital—faced a fountain surmounted by a flight of bronze horses, the Horses of the Sun. This grand mise-en-scène, somewhat out of place next to a then derelict district of shops and dusty arcades, flanked by a cheap department store, and sited at the crossing of two avenues of no particular character, was meant to honor a father, a founding figure. In the days of apartheid, downtown Pretoria, deserted at night by her vast population of white civil servants and her even vaster population of transient black workers, could never identify with the gloomy head, left to gaze sourly onto an expanse of granite. The staging was grandiose but otiose. This was not a place of foundation or of public deliberation. It was Spartan, closed in on itself and deaf to the world, decidedly not Athenian.

At first sight, the new democratic republic lacks such public–space stagings. In fact, true to the spirit of postmodern relativism, it has been extraordinarily modest in refraining from dotting the reclaimed and enfranchised land with monuments and stone me-
mentos. Yet in more subtle ways a rhetoric of foundation, inscribed in space as required, has made inroads. Foundation rhetoric as laudation of a society’s values always begins with the praise of the dead (who represent these values to the extreme of sacrifice) and the consequent redoubling of funeral oratory at celebratory shrines and interments.1 Space has a lot to do with praise: It is its visible face.

Indeed, in the early days of the new régime, some (nostalgic for an Oscar Niemeyer-like era of architectural or sculptural statements) proposed the erection of monuments to the glory of Nelson Mandela. The proposals—such as a huge clenched fist on a hill—were incongruous and untimely in their Stalinist proportions. Had apartheid fallen in the 1960s or even the 1970s, it is likely that, drawing inspiration from Cuba, Albania, or Soviet Russia, the country would have seen a proliferation of such rhetorical monumentality, together with an accompanying personality cult. However, because the emergence of democracy took place after the end of the Cold War, in a postmodern world uncomfortable with stolidity, official space regarding foundations has to be rhetoricized differently. Yet as a rhetoric of foundation, disseminated and dispersed, has taken root, directly linked to how people relate to their own space, it appears that personality cult has been superseded by community cult, and monumentality by spatiality.

Behind deliberation on communal spaces, in their massive diversity, there is indeed at work a direct rearguing of spaces that are considered to be emblematic and therefore “founding” places; or, to invoke the etymology of this word, foundations; or, to return to Quintilian’s typology of the laus civitatis, auctor. Auctor carries two meanings in Latin that are directly pertinent to this argument: An auctor is first and foremost a guarantor and secondly, by implication, what in English is called an “author.” Creation is that which guarantees existence. By way of conclusion, let us now search, in the shaping of democratic deliberation in South Africa, for “foundations” that act as guarantees of democracy—symbolic guarantees rooted in space, of which the diverse spaces observed so far are all derivations, musical variations on a theme.

Such “fundamental” space—matrix for all spaces, imaging fountainhead of democratic space, and rhetorical node in public deliberation—is found in Robben Island.2
It is a space guaranteed by a founder, yet without personality cult or monumentality, as well as a space that embodies the values of the new nation, the same values that are being retooled by golf courses and shopping malls into a series of postmodern rhetorical displacements.

Contrary to what happened in Eastern Europe, there has been little if any defacing of buildings or felling of statues in South Africa (not that apartheid spent much time and money erecting statues). With minor exceptions, everything stands as it was. Even the Taal Monument that celebrates, on a Cape hilltop, the ascendancy of European languages—Afrikaans in particular—over the indigenous languages (a truly Oscar Niemeyer-like conception) has not been dynamited. It stands, preposterous, an almost forgotten memento to idiocy, dumb sentinel over the rolling vineyards and luxury lodges.

In Parliament, a kitsch gallery of State portraiture was taken down when the first democratic Parliament was installed; it was loaded into vans before the amused smiles of the passing public. But the equestrian statue of Louis Botha (“General, Boer, and Statesman”) stills rides forth at the impressive eastern gates of Parliament, while Queen Victoria, in the shady groves of the northern side, orb and scepter in her hands, casts her marmoreal glance toward a Rodinesque brooding statue of Jan Smuts, right outside the Slave Lodge—itself restored to its original appellation, canceling out any attempt at euphemism.

Although none of the three statues just described ought to incur any vendetta, especially not Botha and Smuts, they still are icons of South Africa’s colonial past; one might have expected that, as such, these statues—or at least one of them—would make room for a statue representing the new democracy. This retention of symbols, including the shrine of Afrikanerdom, the Mussolinianesque Voortrekker Monument (inaugurated in 1949) on a hill above Pretoria, can be seen as a hidden sunset clause—the sunset clause of symbols.

Besides being declared a World Heritage site by the UNESCO in 1999, Robben Island has been since January 1997 a national monument and a national museum, administered by the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology. The whole 474-hectare island—with its village and villagers, its decommissioned batteries, harbor, Muslim shrine, light-tower, and landing strip, together with the house where Pan African Congress founder Robert Sobukwe
was detained and the large prison complex—is a monument (Fig. 9.1). This is a rare case of space appropriation, displacement, and re-dedication. It is not the construction of a memorial (which involves a different set of issues regarding design, site, and access), nor is it the mummifying of a space (like the concentration camps of Europe), arrested in time and suspended in space in order to create a better memorial (which raises yet another set of questions regarding ownership of memory and restoration itself). Robben Island Museum has real people living on it, with quick and easy access to the quarry where Nelson Mandela labored (along with other historic leaders) and the cell where he was imprisoned; ex-prisoners lead the tours and mix private recollections with their guiding duties. This is an altogether different site of public deliberation.\footnote{The first entry into this space entails looking at the official literature spawned by curators and associates of Robben Island Museum. Visitors have two written sources of information (plus the video that is played on board the boat that takes them to the Island): a leaflet and a booklet. The cover of the leaflet shows the inside of the jail; superimposed is a quotation from a speech delivered by Nelson Mandela on Heritage Day 1997, hailing the Island as a place of “reconciliation over enforced division,” so as to “recognize above all its pre-eminent character as a symbol of the victory of the human spirit over political oppression.”}

The casual sacredness of the Island is reinforced by good-natured notices, mixing museum warnings (“Don’t remove or deface any object. Even stones and shells must not be removed from the island. Photographs must not be taken inside the prison”) with friendly advice (“You need comfortable walking shoes, sun-glasses, a full water bottle and sun protection”). This is partly what Mandela has called the “many dimensions of the island”: not only the political element, but also the simple reality of sun, wind, and stony paths, the very soil he and his fellow prisoners walked on and toiled with.

The other part, the political multidimensionality of the Island, has been carefully couched in the booklet, produced under the imprint of the Mayibuye Centre, whose chief task is to archive the annals of the struggle.\footnote{In this booklet, the Island’s history over 333 years—from the imprisonment of Khoikhoi leader Autshumato (1658) to the decommissioning of the prison in 1991—reads as a litany of misery. The narrative itself is prefaced by a short chapter enti-}
tled “Symbolism of the Island,” which contains three Dantesque paragraphs: “The Image of Hell,” “The Image of Purgatory,” and “The Image of Heaven.” Then comes this coda: “But now the Island is not so much a health (it housed a leper colony at some stage) resort as a place for moral and spiritual regeneration—for individuals as well as the nation as a whole.”

The obvious source for this rhetoric of social constructivism, which explains how Robben Island is made sacred (that is, turned into a personality cult, whereby the person is a space, Robben Island itself as persona of the nation), can be found in a ritual performed by Desmond Tutu.

On March 2, 1997, clergymen made a pilgrimage of “reconciliation” and “faith” to the Island, led by Cape Town’s Anglican archbishop (an ex-prisoner himself). The procession visited various sites: Sobukwe’s house, the lepers’ church, and the Muslim shrine or kramat. The pilgrims intoned Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika’ (originally a hymn), celebrating the island as a place of “inspiration” and an “Island of Faith.” This ritual has to be envisaged as a pilgrimage, a stylized model that encompasses the sea route followed by visitors who take the Robben Island Museum’s boats, sailing, as it were, in the wake of the ferry that took prisoners to the Island, their subsequent walks within the jail, and in the quarry, stepping where prisoners once trod.

Understanding what constitutes a pilgrimage is important here, given that the literature and oratory about the Island is laden with religious rhetoric (the commonplaces of “faith” and “inspiration”—inventio; the Dantesque metaphors—elocutio; the singing of the hymn and the service—actio). The anthropology of pilgrimages, following Paul Ricoeur, has elucidated some key characteristics that have a bearing on this argument concerning Robben Island. Firstly, pilgrimages partake of a “hierophany”—a manifestation of sacredness that leads to an experience of human renewal. Secondly, the hierophany needs its own space, in which a passage from transience to perdurability is effectuated. Thirdly, hierophanic time is not chronological; instead, it folds itself back onto illud tempus, a moment held as fundamental. Lastly, pilgrimages require a specific language, one that is ritualistic and experiential. Pilgrimages, in other words, deploy a system of deliberation that is communal and individual, spatial and temporal.
Turning back to Robben Island, it is patent, from Mandela’s quotation, that visiting Robben Island is presented as a rejuvenation, a sort of democratic ritual, secular but sacral, that all citizens ought to undergo (and not only South Africans, but all democratic subjects). The boats to the Island are similar to Egyptian mystery barques that took voyagers down the Nile to sites of self-invention. In the international symbolic imagination of ordinary people, Robben Island has acquired the high value attributed to Liberia by Black Americans, and for Europeans it is the occasion to make amends for colonization and post-colonial supremacy; meanwhile, heads of state journey to Robben Island to receive, like medieval kings, some of the sacred unction attached to the place. That Yehudi Menuhin proposed to hold his Millennium Concert in the quarry—as a symbol of atonement through music—emphasizes the hierophanic purpose of the Island.

From Robben Island, other places have sprung, monumental spaces, that pick up the common thread of a communal rhetoric based on the foundation of democracy. In Cape Town, the District Six Museum reproduces, on a giant map, the very streets and houses that were bulldozed by apartheid in 1964—possibly the most devastating eradication of a “non-white” district. Previous inhabitants have brought memorabilia and placed them on this map—in celebration of *illud tempus*. Recollection of oppression is accompanied by rites of retelling at a site which, in the absence of a proper shrine, is in fact a necropolis—not for people, but for a public space disappeared.

In 1998 in the Sterkfontein caves, paleoanthropologists discovered the near complete skeleton of a 3.5-million-year-old *Australopithecus*. Politicians made official pronouncements (including the 1999 presidential inaugural address) on how the discovery confirms that humankind has its cradle in South Africa. This is part of the same rhetorical line: The praise of the African Athens reaches back from postmodern Robben Island (and the invention of the first truly democratic human being in Africa) to prehistoric Sterkfontein’s “first human being.” All over South Africa a map of deliberative spaces, dedicated to the African Athens, is emerging, whereas traditional “theatres of memory,” monuments, and museums are indeed falling into neglect.

By implication, Robben Island is indeed pursued as a place where one can reflect on apartheid and gather one’s thoughts. The guided
visit follows the pattern of a recital of sorts; its historical elements are, in substance and details, those provided by the booklet. The guide recites these details, interpolating his own recollections, before asking whether there are any questions (often there are none except for “How long were you a prisoner?” as if visitors seek to be reassured of the guide’s veracity). But the recital itself is a praise of the Island; it helps to mark places with names and words; it gives democratic space a vocabulary.

Rhetorically speaking, this guided visit recasts, for the African Athens, Athenian epideixis as a recital of praise of the communal values that founded the polity. The quarry of Robben Island is South Africa’s symbolic agora.

The guided visit, nearly 4 hours long, transfers the pilgrims of democracy into the time of oppression, a time beyond physical recollection, because photographs are forbidden inside the inner sanctum. Photographs, in Roland Barthes’ terms, fix time and always suggest death. Here is no clichéd time, but instead the pure moment of entering the jail, beyond the deleterious fixed time of photographic recollections. The guide’s affirmation, “I was there,” serves to comfort the visitors during the hierophanic return to illud tempus, the moment of foundation recaptured by the visit and uncaptured by photographic images.

What remains is public and private deliberation, the retelling of the pilgrimage, the exchange of impressions with fellow walkers, the smiles and the sudden release of communal sentiment between the new initiates. On the way back, sprayed by strong waves—as if by purifying waters—with the salty and heady scent of the ocean, these pilgrims of postmodern democracy ask each other where they come from. Centered on the individual’s connectedness to the community rather than grand schemes of social engineering, postmodern democracy has an expressed need for fellowship. This sense of fellowship—the stuff of ancient myths—has been rhetorically engendered in the visit to Robben Island.

The human dislocation I evoked at the beginning of this book, the social space dismembered by prejudices and traversed by the taboos of racism that functioned like a white and monotonous rhetoric of praise for itself and denegation of the Other, has been erased. The best proof of this can be seen in the way visitors to Robben Island react to the symbolism carried by the place. Foreigners are inclined to
look at Nelson Mandela’s cell as a proof of evil, and they tend to transfer onto the Island penitentiary their own visions of social oppression—concentration camps for Western Europeans, modern ghettos and Old South plantations for African Americans, the gulag for Eastern Europeans—blocking out the possibility of dialogue and debate with evil. In contrast, South Africans of all shades and shapes envision Robben Island as the living sign that the exercise of deliberation is fundamental.

Oddly enough, whereas many foreign visitors conjure in Robben Island the image of a political Golgotha where like the Just they are transfigured and return home with such vision, South Africans see Robben Island as proof that dialogue, debate, deliberation can bring together the Just and the Oppressor and transfigure both. In terms of social deliberation and of society as an argumentative process, the epideictic monophony of apartheid has been replaced by polyphonic rhetoric. The key voices are the people themselves, brought to reconciliation (meaning the reconciliation of differences into a public narrative that adopts variegated forms—from voting to talking about themselves as citizens) and born to arguing their differences not on the basis of discrimination but on the basis of what makes democracy workable: the search for a common denominator.

In the United States and, to a growing extent, in the European Union, civil rights debates tend to repudiate the existence of a common denominator to define the exercise of these rights; the freedom of voicing one’s power to deliberate is used to deny that deliberation is indeed the very proof of such commonality. In contrast again, South African society is nurturing a political model for integrating differences within social deliberation. This has a name in the tradition of democratic thought: It is called the common good. This is the reason why South Africa presents itself as a democracy whose members, across a wide spectrum of agency, are imbued with a sense of the inner dignity—the ethos—of deliberation as a human right, or deliberation as the fundamental human right that gives shape to other rights.

This fundamental belief in the right to argue—correlated with the experiential belief that argument and deliberation are eventually resorbed into a common language that exhibits the commonality of democracy—is truly Athenian. It evinces a fundamental creed: that a popular democracy born in a particular moment of history that affirms human rights as the touchstone for all democratic endeavors
must—to preserve the search for common good—celebrate the power of social deliberation as an agent for commonality. As an object of rhetoric studies, South Africa offers, at the beginning of the Third Millennium, a singular and momentous case yet to be imitated or emulated.
DREAMING DREAMS

Thank you for the great honour you have bestowed on me. I have usually said I know it is a corporate award, recognising the contribution of so many stalwarts in the struggle who must in the nature of things be largely anonymous. Someone, a bit annoyed with the Archbishop of Cape Town, remarked once acidly, ‘Where would Tutu be without apartheid?’ Where indeed? What I am saying is that when you are in a crowd and you stand out it is really because you are being carried on the shoulders of others. And don’t go away with the impression, ‘Oh, isn’t he nice—he is so modest!’ I can assure you I’m not conventionally modest. I can sometimes, apparently nonchalantly, say, ‘The other day when I was in the Oval Office, I said to President Clinton...’

We are prone on occasion in our country to feel quite despondent because of the ongoing violence. But we really are being unreasonable. Of course we are right to be distressed by the violence and the carnage, because any death is one death too many and is to be deplored and condemned unequivocally. But let us remember that we are in a time of transition and such periods, almost by definition, are unstable, as we can see is the case in Eastern Europe. We forget too soon and too easily. Are you aware where we come from? Just a few years ago, in 1989, we were running the gauntlet of teargas, police dogs and whips as we defied the awful apartheid laws. Do you remember that people demonstrating peacefully were soaked with
purple dye from police water-cannons and typically, Cape Town graffiti humour surfaced: The purple shall govern appeared on T-shirts and walls.

Many of us couldn’t walk on God’s beaches because these were segregated, and the police were ready to use even live ammunition to disperse those defying these immoral laws which did not oblige obedience. Incredible—but they were ready to kill for apartheid. And now—hey, are you aware that some of us will be voting for the very first time in the land of their birth at age 62? We are too blasé. Here we are; the jailor and the jailed are about to stand together—the head of a regime that perpetrated gross injustice and the leader of the noble struggle to overthrow the system—they stood together to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, the highest accolade the world can bestow, and they will be serving in a Government of National Unity after April 27, 1994—and almost certainly with the erstwhile boss as the junior partner. The changes are qualitative, indeed, they are a quantum leap. They are mind boggling; and we have taken all in our stride as to the manor born.

We have had an Interim Constitution drafted which has stood apartheid completely on its head and we have, it seems, not really taken it all in and so we are made despondent by the violence which we roundly condemn. And yet, even with this phenomenon, shouldn’t we be saying, ‘Thank you God that it is not occurring on a vast, a national, scale?’ It is confined mainly to two parts of our country, and one is worried that the security forces have not seemed able to control it, limited though it is. And we can’t tell the good news often enough. Violence has been stopped in a number of places, because people have said ‘enough is enough.’ Political violence has almost disappeared in Alexandra Township, in Soweto and in the Vaal Triangle, in Hamarsdale in Natal. Those are success stories that should be told as we ponder the awful things happening on the East Rand and in parts of Natal. On the East Rand another success story is that a peace accord has been signed between the Thokoza Civic Association and the Hostel Residents’ Association. We pray that it will deliver the goods.

Extraordinarily, the violence is not racial. That is remarkable considering where we come from. We were on the brink of a bloody catastrophe after the assassination of Chris Hani. God be praised that we were not overwhelmed by racial blood letting. At his funeral I
asked the crowd to repeat after me, ‘We will be free, all of us, black and white together.’ Now you would have thought the young, angry, radical blacks would have said, ‘To hell with all white people.’ But they didn’t. They roared back, ‘We will be free, all of us, black and white together,’ and I said, ‘We are the rainbow people of God. We are unstoppable on the march to freedom.’ I was vilified for my so-called performance at the funeral, and yet we had a remarkable demonstration of our people’s commitment to a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic dispensation. The awful murder of an Amy Biehl is an aberration as demonstrated by those who turned out to go on a pilgrimage to the spot where she was killed and also by the moving memorial service at the University of the Western Cape. I want to express my deep shock and, indeed, disgust at the disgraceful behaviour of certain young people at the Supreme Court trial of those accused of killing Amy. It is totally unacceptable conduct and we call to behave with proper decorum in our African way. The violence is not even ethnic or tribal as can be seen in Natal where it is Zulu against Zulu. Much of the violence is political and largely stoked by sinister agents taking advantage of the tragic lack of tolerance among people belonging to different political organisations. We too have a lot to answer for in our black communities, for allowing ourselves to be manipulated into being pawns of unscrupulous men and women. As Africans we believe that the death of anyone diminishes us all.

People Count

Very briefly—when I was in Australia I was told of some beautiful graffiti, Free Mandela and 50% off Tutu, and I heard a story that scientists were not using lawyers in their experiments because there were some things which even mice refused to do. In a way both stories refer to a characteristic of our contemporary culture—cut-throat competition with bargain sales an important feature of commerce. Capitalism and communism very oddly share at least one disturbing attribute: in both systems the individual person is not considered to have an intrinsic worth. You matter because you are either a producer or consumer, or because you are a cog in the state machine. And all kinds of things go horribly wrong once we don’t reverence the human person as having a worth that is intrinsic, that does not
depend on extraneous things such as wealth or status, or race, religion, gender or sexual orientation.

We are on the threshold of a new dispensation and we should dream dreams and see visions about the new society we want to create together. It must not just be that a few blacks get coopted into the affluent elite, enjoying all sorts of gravy trains. It must not be that all that might have changed for the so-called ordinary people is the complexion of the top dogs. No, we must evolve a society that demonstrates the people matter with an infinite value that is intrinsic to who they are, which comes with the package of being human.

Our society must be characterised by ubuntu when we recognise our fundamental interdependence and interconnectedness. God teaches us that lesson, often painfully. Those who suffer from typhoid in the black community cannot easily be quarantined, as we have seen in Delmas. So-called black on black violence, which should perhaps affect only the black community, affects us all for it is our whole society that becomes unstable and deters foreign investors from coming. We belong to one another. People must matter more than profits. You could increase the latter by computerised technology, but you are likely to throw many out of work. Success must not happen through untold human suffering. Ours should be a society that cares for those who are weak and easily driven to the wall. Our health care systems, our ecological and housing policies and what we do in education—all should be ‘people-friendly.’ The people should feel that they are consulted about decisions that have important implications for them in a truly participatory style of operation. They should not be pawns in the power game.

Ours should be a caring and compassionate and a sharing society, hospitable for the people, where they count because they have been created in the image of God and consequently are of infinite worth, with a worth that is intrinsic. Let us dream. Don’t be got down by cynics who say, ‘That’s too idealistic, that’s too utopian.’ The scriptures say, where there is no vision the people perish. And all these things are far too important to be left only to politicians.

Source: University of Cape Town Media Services. By permission of the Registrar of the University of Cape Town.
Madame Speaker and Deputy Speaker, President of the Senate and Deputy President, Deputy Presidents, Chief Justice, distinguished members of the National Assembly and the Senate, provincial premiers, commanders of the Security Forces, members of the diplomatic corps, esteemed guests, comrades, ladies and gentlemen:

The time will come when our nation will honour the memory of all the sons, the daughters, the mothers, the fathers, the youth and the children who, by their thoughts and deeds, gave us the right to assert with pride that we are South Africans, that we are Africans and that we are citizens of the world.

The certainties that come with age tell me that among these we shall find an Afrikaner woman who transcended a particular experience and became a South African, an African and a citizen of the world.

Her name is Ingrid Jonker. She was both a poet and a South African. She was both an Afrikaner and an African. She was both an artist and a human being. In the midst of despair, she celebrated hope; confronted by death, she asserted the beauty of life. In the dark days when all seemed hopeless in our country, when many refused to hear her resonant voice, she took her own life. To her and others like her, we owe a debt to life itself. To her and others like her, we owe a commitment to the poor, the oppressed, the wretched and the despised.
In the aftermath of the massacre at the anti-pass demonstration in Sharpeville she wrote that:

The child is not dead
the child lifts his fists
against his mother
who shouts Afrika! ...
The child is not dead
Not at Langa nor at Nyanga
nor at Orlando nor at Sharpville
nor at the police post at Philippi
where he lies with a bullet through his brain ...
the child is present at all assemblies and law-giving
the child peers through the windows of houses
and into the hearts of mothers
this child who only wanted to play in the sun of Nyanga
is everywhere
the child grown to a man treks on through all Afrika
the child grown to a giant journeys
over the whole world
without a pass!

And in this glorious vision, she instructs that our endeavours must be about the liberation of the woman, the emancipation of the man and the liberty of the child. It is these things that we must achieve to give meaning to our presence in this chamber and to give purpose to our occupancy of the seat of government. And so we must, constrained by and yet regardless of the accumulated effect of our historical burdens, seize the time to define for ourselves what we want to make of our shared destiny.

The government I have the honour to lead and I dare say the masses who elected us to serve in this role, are inspired by the single vision of creating a people-centred society. Accordingly, the purpose that will drive this government shall be the expansion of the frontiers of human fulfilment, the continuous extension of the frontiers of the freedom.

The acid test of the legitimacy of the programmes we elaborate, the government institutions we create, the legislation we adopt must be whether they serve these objectives. Our single most impor-
tant challenge is therefore to help establish a social order in which the freedom of the individual will truly mean the freedom of the individual. We must construct that people-centred society of freedom in such a manner that it guarantees the political liberties and the human rights of all our citizens. The provisions expressive of these noble goals already exist in the transitional constitution. It will the task of the Constitutional Assembly to revisit this issue to ensure that we have all the necessary constitutional instruments that will guarantee that none can take away or in any way restrict the freedoms and rights of any of our people.

As an affirmation of our government’s commitment to an entrenched human rights culture, we shall immediately take steps to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations that we will subscribe to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In addition, we shall take steps to ensure that we accede to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights and other human rights instruments of the United Nations.

Our definition of the freedom of the individual must be instructed by the fundamental objective to restore the human dignity of each and every South African. This requires that we speak not only of political freedoms. My government’s commitment to create a people-centred society of liberty binds us to the pursuit of the goals of freedom from want, freedom from hunger, freedom from deprivation, freedom from ignorance, freedom from suppression and freedom from fear.

These freedoms are fundamental to the guarantee of human dignity. They will therefore constitute part of the centrepiece of what this government will seek to achieve, the focal point on which our attention will be continuously focused.

The things we have said constitute the true meaning, the justification and the purpose of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, without which it would lose all legitimacy.

When we elaborated this programme we were inspired by the hope that all South Africans of goodwill could join together to provide a better life for all. We were pleased that other political organisations announced similar aims.

Today, I am happy to announce that the Cabinet of the Government of National Unity has reached consensus not only on the broad
objective of the creation of the people-centred society of which I have spoken, but also on many elements of a plan broadly based on that Programme for Reconstruction and Development.

Let me indicate some of the more important agreements. Annually, in the combined budgets of central government and the provinces, we will provide for an increasing amount of funding for the plan.

This plan will start with an appropriation of R2.5 billion in the 1994/95 budget that will be presented next month. (Exchange rate was roughly R3 = U$1) This should rise to more than R10 billion by the fifth year of the life of this government.

Government will also use its own allocation of funds to the Reconstruction and Development Plan to exert maximum leverage in marshalling funds from within South Africa and abroad.

In this regard, I am pleased to report that we have been holding consultations with some of the principal business leaders of our country. Consequently, we are assured that the business sector can and will make a significant contribution towards the structuring and management of such reconstruction and development funds, towards the effective identification and implementation of projects and by supporting the financing of the socio-economic development effort.

I am also pleased to report that many of our friends abroad have already made commitments to assist us to generate the reconstruction and development funds we need. We thank them most sincerely for their positive attitude which arises not from objectives of charity but from the desire to express solidarity with the new society we seek to build.

We accept the duty of coordinating the management of the total resources that will be generated, without seeking to prescribe to other contributors or undermining the continued role of non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations.

The initial R2.5 billion will be found from savings and the redirection of spending, as included in the preliminary 1994/95 budget proposals presented to Cabinet.

I would like to thank all the departments of state for their cooperation in carrying out this adjustment to their planning, at short notice.

As we allocate larger amounts in future, we shall require further adjustments by departments, partly to correct the bias in the spending patterns which are a legacy of the past. The longer period should allow such changes to be properly planned. But they will still make
great demands on the managerial capacity and spirit of cooperation of the Cabinet and the whole civil service.

We are confident that, motivated by the desire to serve the people, the public service will discharge its responsibilities with diligence, sensitivity and enthusiasm, among other things paying attention to the important goal of increasing efficiency and productivity.

My government is equally committed to ensure that we use this longer period properly fully to bring into the decision-making processes organs of civil society. This will include the trade union movement and civic organisations, so that at no time should the government become isolated from the people. At the same time, steps will be taken to build the capacity of communities to manage their own affairs.

Precisely because we are committed to ensuring sustainable growth and development leading to a better life for all, we will continue existing programmes of fiscal rehabilitation.

We are therefore determined to make every effort to contain real general government consumption at present levels and to manage the budget deficit with a view to its continuous reduction.

Similarly, we are agreed that a permanently higher general level of taxation is to be avoided.

To achieve these important objectives will require consistent discipline on the part of both the central and the provincial governments.

Furthermore, this disciplined approach will ensure that we integrate the objectives of our Reconstruction and Development Plan within government expenditure and not treat them as incidental to the tasks of government, marginalised to the status of mere additions to the level of expenditure.

There are major areas of desperate need in our society. As a signal of its seriousness to address these, the government will, within the next 100 days, implement various projects under the direct supervision of the President. Let me briefly mention these.

Children under the age of six and pregnant mothers will receive free medical care in every state hospital and clinic where such need exists.

Similarly, a nutritional feeding scheme will be implemented in every primary school were such need is established. A concrete process of consultation between the major stakeholders in this area will be organised immediately.

A programme is already being implemented to electrify 350,000 homes during the current financial year.
The campaign will be launched at every level of government, a public works programme designed and all efforts made to involve the private sector, organised labour, the civics and other community organisations to rebuild our townships, restore services in rural and urban areas, while addressing the issue of job creation and training, especially for our unemployed youth.

Many details of the overall reconstruction and development plan remain to be discussed, agreed and put in place. But I believe that the broad outline I have given and the immediate initiatives I have mentioned, will allow you to share my joy at the progress already made by the Government of National Unity with regard to this important matter.

We shall carry out this plan within the context of a policy aimed at building a strong and growing economy which will benefit all our people.

I would like to deal with a few matters in this regard. In support of sustainable economic growth and the macro-economic objectives of government, it will remain the primary objective of monetary policy to promote and maintain overall financial stability.

The Reserve Bank has the important function of protecting the value of our currency and striving for relative price stability at all times.

We are pleased that Dr. Chris Stals will continue to serve as governor of the Reserve Bank.

The battle to reduce the rate of inflation will continue. The realisation of many of our objectives for a fair and equal treatment of all our people will not be possible unless we succeed in avoiding high inflation in the economy.

We also face a major challenge in re-entering the global economy, while stable prices are vital to the restructuring of our industries and dealing with the critical issue of job creation.

We are blessed with a heritage of a sophisticated financial sector. Our financial markets are well placed to play an important part in the allocation of scarce funds to give effect to our economic development programme. It is however also necessary that we think in new ways, to meet the challenges of reconstructing and development.

We therefore welcome recent developments that provide for the creation of community banks. We would also like to encourage the greater participation of established financial institutions in the im-
portant area of black economic empowerment and support for the
development of small and medium business.

The latter two areas of economic activity will receive the greatest
attention of the government because of their importance in
deracialising and democratising the economy and creating the jobs
which our people need.

So will we pay attention to the important matter of consumer pro-
tection to shield the ordinary people of our country from unscrupu-
lous business practices.

It is also clear that we must pay increased attention to tourism. The
jobs and foreign currency which tourism generates will strongly
influence our economy.

The active and imaginative intervention of all stake holders in
this area must take advantage of the excellent atmosphere created
by our peaceful transition to democracy to make tourism a major
positive force in the future.

We look forward to the private sector as a whole playing a central
role in achieving the significantly high and sustainable rates of eco-
nomic growth to which we have referred.

We are convinced that the growth prospects of this sector will be
enhanced by the measures of fiscal discipline contained in our ap-
proach to the Reconstruction and Development Programme and by
the continued steady course of monetary policy.

Furthermore, as growth proceeds, more domestic savings will
progressively become available to finance increased investment at
reasonable rates of interest.

The government is also acutely conscious of the fact that we
should firstly return the capital account of the balance of payments
to equilibrium and, in due course, to ensure a net inflow of re-
sources, consistent with the experience of other countries that enjoy
more rapid growth rates.

The present situation of a dual currency and the existence of an
exchange control apparatus is a direct result of the conflict in which
our country was embroiled in the past.

As the situation returns to normal, these arrangements will be
subjected to critical scrutiny. It should be possible to match the
steady growth of confidence at home and abroad with other confi-
dence-enhancing modifications to everybody’s benefit.
The government will also address all other matters that relate to the creation of an attractive investment climate for both domestic and foreign investors, conscious of the fact that we have to compete with the rest of the world in terms of attracting, in particular, foreign direct investment.

I am pleased that we have already started to address the important question of our trade policy, guided by our Gatt commitments and the determination systematically to open the economy to global competition in a carefully managed process.

Soon we will also begin trade negotiations with, among others, the European Union, the United States, our partners in the Southern African Customs Union and our neighbours in the Southern African Development Community to provide a stable and mutually beneficial framework for our international economic relations.

We will also be looking very closely at the question of enhancing south-south cooperation in general as part of the effort to expand our economic links with the rest of the world.

Consistent with our objective of creating a people-centred society and effectively to address the critical questions of growth, reconstruction and development, we will, with organised labour and the private sector, pay special attention to the issue of human resource development.

Both the public and the private sectors will be encouraged to regard labour as a resource and not a cost. Education and training must therefore be looked at very closely to ensure that we empower the workers, raise productivity levels and meet the skills needs of a modern economy.

Important work will have to be done in and significant resources devoted to the areas of science and technology, including research and development.

Government is also convinced that organised labour is an important partner whose cooperation is crucial for the reconstruction and development of our country.

That partnership requires, among other things, that our labour law be reformed so that it is in line with international standards, apartheid vestiges are removed and a more harmonious labour relations dispensation is created, on the basis of tripartite cooperation between government, labour and capital.

The government is determined forcefully to confront the scourge of unemployment, not by way of handouts but by the creation of work opportunities.
The government will also deal sensitively with the issue of population movements into the country, to protect our workers, to guard against the exploitation of vulnerable workers and to ensure friendly relations with all countries and peoples.

The government is also taking urgent measures to deal firmly with drug trafficking some of which is carried out by foreign nationals who are resident in the country.

We must end racism in the workplace as part of our common offensive against racism in general. No more should words like kaffirs, hottentots, coolies, boy, girl, and baas be part of our vocabulary.

I also trust that the matter of paying the workers for the public holidays proclaimed in order to ensure their participation in the elections and the inauguration ceremonies will now be resolved as a result of recent consultations.

This would be a welcome demonstration by the private sector of its involvement in the beautiful future we are all trying to build.

We have devoted time to a discussion of economic questions because they are fundamental to the realisation of the fundamental objectives of the Reconstruction and Development Programme.

Below I mention some of the work in which the relevant governments are already involved to translate these objectives into reality.

The government will take steps to ensure the provision of clean water on the basis of the principle of water security for all and the introduction of property sanitation sensitive to the protection of the environment.

We are determined to address the dire housing shortage in a vigorous manner, acting with the private sector and the communities in need of shelter.

Health also remains a fundamental building block of the humane society we are determined to create through the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme.

We must address the needs of the aged and disabled, uplift disadvantaged sectors such as the women and the youth, and improve the lives of our people in the rural communities and the informal settlements.

We must invest substantial amounts in education and training and meet our commitment to introduce free and compulsory education for a period of at least nine years. Everywhere we must reinculcate the culture of learning and of teaching and make it possible for this culture to thrive.
We must combat such social pathologies as widespread poverty, the breakdown of family life, crime, alcohol and drug abuse, the abuse of children, women and the elderly and the painful reality of street children. We are giving urgent attention to the long waiting lists for the payment of social grants which have developed in some areas, owing to lack of funds.

I am especially pleased that we have a ministry dedicated to the issue of the environment. Its work must impact on many aspects of national activity and address the question of the well-being of society as a whole and the preservation of a healthy environmental future even for generations not yet born.

As we began this address, we borrowed the words of Ingrid Jonker to focus on the plight of the children of our country.

I would now like to say that the government will, as matter of urgency, attend to the tragic and complex question of children and juveniles in detention and prison.

The basic principle from which we will proceed from now onwards is that we must rescue the children of the nation and ensure that the system of criminal justice must be the very last resort in the case of juvenile offenders.

I have therefore issued instructions to the departments concerned, as a matter of urgency, to work out the necessary guidelines which will enable us to empty our prisons of children and to place them in suitable alternative care.

This is in addition to an amnesty for various categories of serving prisoners as will be affected in terms of what I said in my Inauguration Address two weeks ago.

In this context, I also need to make the point that the government will also not delay unduly with regard to attending to the vexed and unresolved issue of an amnesty for criminal activities carried out in furtherance of political objectives.

We will attend to this matter in a balanced and dignified way. The nation must come to terms with its past in a spirit of openness and forgiveness and proceed to build the future on the basis of repairing and healing.

The burden of the past lies heavily on all of us, including those responsible for inflicting injury and those who suffered.

President Thabo Mbeki:
Speech delivered at his inauguration,
Pretoria, June 16, 1999

Your majesties, your royal highnesses, your excellencies, president of the Constitutional Court, chief justice, Isithwalandwe Nelson Mandela, distinguished guests, fellow South Africans, I am honoured to welcome you to our seat of government as we carry out the solemn act of inauguration of the president.

I feel greatly privileged that so many of you could travel from all corners of the globe, from everywhere in Africa and from all parts of our country to lend importance and dignity to this occasion.

That sense of privilege, which will stay with us for all time, is intensified by our recognition of the fact that never before have we, as a people, hosted this large a number of high-level delegations representing the peoples of the world.

We thank you most sincerely, for your presence which itself constitutes a tribute to the millions of our people and a profound statement of hope that all of us will, together, continue to expand the frontiers of human dignity.

For us, as South Africans, this day is as much a day for the inauguration of the new government as it is a day of salute for a generation that pulled our country out of the abyss and placed it on the pedestal of hope on which it rests today.

I speak of the generation represented pre-eminently by our outgoing president, Nelson Mandela—the generation of Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Albertina Sisulu, Ray Alexander and others. Fortunately some of these titans are present today, as they should be.
None of us can peer into their hearts to learn what they feel as this infant democracy they brought into the world begins its sixth year of existence.

But this I can say: that we who are their offspring know that we owe to them much of what is humane, noble and beautiful in the thoughts and actions of our people, as they strive to build a better world for themselves. For throughout their lives they struggled against everything that was ugly, mean, brutish and degrading of the dignity of all human beings.

And because they did, being prepared to pay the supreme price to uphold good over evil, they planted a legacy among our people which drives all of us constantly to return to the starting point and say: I am my brother’s keeper! I am my sister’s keeper! And because we are one another’s keepers, we surely must be haunted by the humiliating suffering which continues to afflict millions of our people.

Our nights cannot but be nights of nightmares while millions of our people live in conditions of degrading poverty. Sleep cannot come easily when children get permanently disabled, physically and mentally, because of lack of food.

No night can be restful when millions have no jobs, and some are forced to beg, rob and murder to ensure they and their own do not perish from hunger.

Our minds will continue the restless inquiry to find out how it is possible to have a surfeit of productive wealth in one part of our common globe and intolerable poverty levels elsewhere on that common globe.

There can be no moment of relaxation while the number of those affected by HIV—AIDS continues to expand at an alarming pace.

Our days will remain forever haunted when frightening numbers of women and children of our country fall victim to rape and other crimes of violence.

Nor can there be peace of mind when the citizens of our country feel they have neither safety nor security because of the terrible deeds of criminals and their gangs.

Our days and our nights will remain forever blemished as long as our people are torn apart and fractured into contending factions by reason of the racial and gender inequalities, which continue to characterise our society.
Neither can peace attend our souls as long as corruption continues to rob the poor of what is theirs and to corrode the value system, which sets humanity apart from the rest of the animal world.

The full meaning of liberation will not be realised until our people are freed from oppression and the dehumanising legacy of deprivation we inherited from our past.

What we did in 1994 was to begin the long journey towards the realisation of this goal. When the millions of our people went to the polls 12 days ago, they mandated us to pursue this outcome.

Our country is in that period of time which the seTswana-speaking people of southern Africa graphically describe as “mahube a naka tsa kgomo”—the dawning of the dawn, when only the tips of the horns of the cattle can be seen etched against the morning sky.

As the sun continues to rise to banish the darkness of the long years of colonialism and apartheid, what the new light over our land must show is a nation diligently at work to create a better life for itself. What it must show is a palpable process of the comprehensive renewal of our country—its rebirth—driven by the enormous talents of all our people, black and white, and made possible by the knowledge and realisation that we share a common destiny, regardless of the shapes of our noses.

What we will have to see in the rising light is a government that is fully conscious of the fact that it has entered into a contract with the people, to work in partnership with them to build together a winning nation. In practical and measurable ways, we have to keep pace with the rising sun, progressing from despair to hope, away from a brutal past that forever seeks to drag us backwards, towards a new tomorrow that speaks of change in a forward direction.

History and circumstance have given us the rare possibility to achieve these objectives. To ensure that we transform the possibility to reality, we will have to nurture the spirit among our people which made it possible for many to describe the transition of 1994 as a miracle—the same spirit which, in many respects, turned this year’s election campaign into a festival in celebration of democracy.

As Africans, we are the children of the abyss, who have sustained a backward march for half a millennium. We have been a source for human slaves. Our countries were turned into the patrimony of colonial powers. We have been victim to our own African predators.
If this is not merely the wish being father to the thought, something in the air seems to suggest that we are emerging out of the dreadful centuries which in the practice, and in the ideology and consciousness of some, defined us as subhuman.

As South Africans, whatever the difficulties, we are moving forward in the effort to combine ourselves into one nation of many colours, many cultures and diverse origins.

No longer capable of being falsely defined as a European outpost in Africa, we are an African nation in the complex process simultaneously of formation and renewal. And in that process, we will seek to educate the young and ourselves about everything all our forebears did to uphold the torch of freedom. It is in this spirit that we are, this year, observing the centenary of the commencement of the Anglo-Boer War and the 120th anniversary of the battle of Isandhlwana.

We will work also to rediscover and claim the African heritage, for the benefit especially of our young generations.

From SA to Ethiopia lie strewn ancient fossils which, in their stillness, speak of the African origins of all humanity. Recorded history and the material things that time left behind speak also of Africa’s historic contribution to the universe of philosophy, the natural sciences, human settlement and organisation and the creative arts.

Being certain that not always were we the children of the abyss, we will do what we have to do to achieve our own renaissance.

We trust that what we will do will better not only our own condition as a people, but will make a contribution also, however small, to the success of Africa’s renaissance, towards the identification of the century ahead of us as the African Century.

Twenty-three years ago this day, children died in Soweto, Johannesburg, in a youth uprising which democratic SA honours as our National Youth Day.

As we speak, our own as well as international athletes are competing in our annual Comrades Marathon which this year is dedicated to Nelson Mandela. Our best wishes go to all these, the runners of the marathon. Those who complete the course will do so only because they do not, as fatigue sets in, convince themselves that the road ahead is still too long, the inclines too steep, the loneliness impossible to bear and the prize itself of doubtful value.

We, too, as the peoples of SA and Africa, must together run our Comrades Marathon, as comrades who are ready to take to the road
together, refusing to be discouraged by the recognition that the road is very long, the inclines very steep and that, at times, what we see as the end is but a mirage.

When the race is run, all humanity and ourselves will acknowledge the fact that we succeeded only because we succeeded in believing in our own dreams.

Every year the rains will fall to bless our efforts. That too is a dream. But because it is our dream, we are able still to demand of our ancestors—pula! nala! (rain! prosperity!)

Source: *Business Day*, June 17, 1999. The speech is in the public domain.
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Notes

CHAPTER 1

4. The expression “the struggle” (without a capital letter) is commonly used in South Africa to describe the fight against apartheid.
6. It is assumed that some 70% of those who state a religious affiliation are Christians; Muslims and Buddhists represent 1% each, and thus of the Jewish faith 0.5%. However, the main source of information, the *South Africa Yearbook*, uses statistics sometimes two decades old. A precise survey is badly needed.
9. Tutu, “Afterword,” 249. Biblical citations given by Tutu are ground for a separate study in the pragmatics of discourse. Depending on audiences and circumstances, Tutu quotes either from the Good News Bible (referred
to as GNB), a 1977 translation more in keeping with modern standard English; or from the solemn King James Version (KJ); or sometimes, with slight alterations (is he quoting from memory?), from the Revised Standard Version. Here the quote is taken from the GNB.

10. In keeping with common usage in South African English, I use the term coloured to mean people of mixed origins, mainly located, since the 18th century, in the Cape. I maintain the South African spelling. Asian refers chiefly to the population of Indian descent, relocated in the mid-19th century to Natal from British India—hence its common permutation as Indian. I capitalize the words Asian, Black, Coloured, Indian, and White, again in keeping with South African usage—whenever I use these terms as nouns referring to a segment of the South African population. Because Asian is drawn from a place name, it is always capitalized.


13. John De Gruchy and Charles Villa-Vicencio, eds., Apartheid Is a Heresy, Cape Town: David Phillip; Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans, 1983. The Dutch Reformed Church, in spite of dissidents within it, gave its full doctrinal support to apartheid (see, for example, the nuanced analysis by Johann Klinghorn, “The Theology of Separate Equality: A Critical Outline of the DRC’s Position on Apartheid,” in Prozesky, 57–80). The DRC, together with the Roman Catholic Church, but obviously for different reasons, therefore joined the SACC only in July 1995.


17. The word “understanding” translates here the rhetorical concept of accommodatio.


23. Kennedy, 178 n. 85.
26. See Merrett.
30. Ibid., 17–18 (KJ).
31. Ibid., 21.
32. Romans 8:31 (KJ).
33. Ridderbos, 328–332.
35. Appendix I.
37. Cassin, 192 ff.
41. Ridderbos, 458.


45. Cassin, 473–484: in rhetorical theory, “fiction” translates the Latin word *fictio*, itself a translation of the Greek word *plasma*.

46. Which translates the Greek *historia*.


48. More references appear in Revelation (4:3; 10:1) and Ecclesiasticus (43:11–12; 50:7), but these are less to the point.

49. Rhetorical theory contrasts *pseudos* (a lie, a deceit; translated here as “pseudo reality”) with *plasma* (something that is told as if it is an actual event, but without the intention to deceive the audience) and *historia* (the telling of a true event, of a reality).

50. Ibid., *The Rainbow People of God*, 110.

51. Ibid., 118.

52. Eugene Garver discusses the crucial distinction between “given end” (to persuade an audience) and “guiding end” (to use all appropriate rhetorical means) in his *Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994.


55. This analysis bears the mark of Augustine’s presentation of the defilement of martyrs’ bodies, in the *De Mendacio*.

56. See Bazerman’s interpretation of kairotics in *Constructing Experience*.


58. Ibid., 123.


61. Ibid., 2–9.

62. Ibid., 49; instead of the traditional translation (“to interpret”), this document renders the concept as “to read” (i.e., to read the signs of the times).


64. Ridderbos, 44–49.
There was considerable debate about whether this deletion constituted a betrayal of what some irate callers on radio talk shows called “South Africa, a God-fearing country.” The issue ignited rallies and demonstrations while the Constitution was being drafted and crafted. To “concerned Christians,” Desmond Tutu simply retorted that God did not need a Constitution to exert his “grace.” It is widely accepted that protests were led by a combination of hard-line apartheid supporters and evangelical churches that were extremely conservative in outlook. Their agenda was multilayered, because to include “God” (however the word was defined) would have then served as a lever for attacking other provisions, either those already discussed in Parliament or those destined to come up in the lawmaking process (because at that time Parliament had a duty to flesh out and to implement a still abstract Bill of Rights—and has indeed done so). Provisions that might have come under attack could have included any legislation deemed irreligious by conservative factions, such as laws that prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, laws that decriminalized abortion, and laws that abolished the death penalty, all of these are now statute law. “God” is nevertheless included in the preamble to the Constitution, by way of an awkward paraphrase of a verse from the dual national anthem, Nkosi Sikelele iAfrica—“May God protect our people.” When executive, legislative, and judicial officers (national and provincial alike) are sworn in, a choice is given between an “oath” (which will then end “So help me God”) and a “solemn affirmation” (in fact, the words “to swear” are reserved for an oath and equated to “to affirm”). Both are placed squarely under the aegis of the Constitution as supreme law (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996, Preamble and Schedule 2). By contrast, the preamble to the interim Constitution (Act No. 200 of 1993) opened with: “In humble submission to Almighty God, We the People of South Africa declare.” It would be worth comparing this debate with the discussion of the framing of the American Constitution with regard to its theistic background. (See the insightful review essay by James Arnt Aune, “Tales of the Text: Originalism, Theism, and the History of the U.S. Constitution,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 1/2 (1998): 256–279.)

CHAPTER 2

marks and lectures during his 1998 visit to South Africa have not yet been
published in book form. Nonetheless, see the interview published in the
quarterly issue of the Institut français d’Afrique du Sud, Johannesburg, “Il
faut toujours parler de l’Afrique du Sud au futur antérieur” (text both in
French and in English), Newton Zebra, 11 (1998): 22–27. I have also con-
sulted a tape recording of his Paris seminar session of January 7, 1999 (my
thanks to Anna Guédy for this).
4. Ibid., 401.
5. The March 1961 treason trial, which led to an acquittal, must not be con-
fused with the November 1962 trial (in which Mandela was convicted on
two charges of incitement to crime, the 1961 strike, and of traveling abroad
without valid documents) or its immediate sequel, the October 1963–June
1964 Rivonia trial which led to a sentence of life imprisonment (for conspir-
acy, the State pressed charges under the Sabotage Act rather than treason,
although the later would have led to a conviction that would probably
have resulted in the death sentence being imposed). Martin Meredith, Nel-
“admiration” (to admire is also to “mirror” oneself) for the legacy of the
Magna Carta, as in his Rivonia trial statement–May 1964), goes against
Marxist or Liberal readings of liberty. According to Derrida, Mandela of-
fered his judges the example of a Democrat; he is the one “who respects the
logic of legacy to the extent that he resorts to it against those who claim to
be its depositories; to the extent that he shows, against the usurpers, that
which, in the legacy, has never been seen before; to the extent that he deliv-
ers, in the performance of his reflection, that which had not yet been deliv-
ered” (456, my translation). Derrida delineates the signs of this “reflexion”
or “mirroring” (the process by which Mandela reflects on the British demo-
cratic tradition in which he mirrors his thoughts, “admiring” democracy at
work in his reflection): the 1955 Freedom Charter which enacts for South
Africa the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in response to the
founding of apartheid (1948–50). The Charter is a founding speech act that
“records what will have been always here, the unity of a nation and the
foundation of a State, as they both are being performed now” (457). This is
an “a-legal act.” The Charter (460) “reflects” on it by mirroring for the
white minority the very principles they are claiming to embody. Derrida
uses the expression “futur anterieur” (future perfect tense, meaning that
the future of democracy is already here; it is a future that predates the iniqu-
ity of the present régime) to characterize Mandela’s “vocation,” his “call”
or “recall”; Mandela summons the principles of democracy to the stand, in
an act of recall, thus affirming what “liberty” is, in contrast to a Marxist
analysis of balance of power or a liberal will to work within the system. In
other words, the Charter is the future of South Africa, but a future already
enacted by the stubborn refusal of the African National Congress to accept
a system based on class struggle or racialism; the nation to be born in 1994
was already alive in 1964.
7. See Merrett.

8. According to the Constitution, “At its first sitting after its election, and whenever necessary to fill a vacancy, the National Assembly must elect a woman or a man from among its members to be President” (subsection 86(1), chapter 5, Act No. 108 of 1996). The National Council of Provinces (whose members are styled “Delegates”) has no electoral power with regard to the Presidency. The Deputy-President is appointed by the President from within the Assembly. During the transitional phase leading up to the dissolution of the first Parliament on April 30, 1999, provision was made for Executive Deputy-Presidents; the two posts were immediately filled by F. W. de Klerk and Mangosuthu Buthelezi, members of the original Government of National Unity (Schedule 6, “Transitional Arrangements,” Annexure B, paragraph 4).

14. I have elsewhere shown how in public deliberation in ancien régime France, whenever addressing Parliament, the monarch purposely tried to show how “regality” could be achieved in the art of rhetoric, how there is at work in rhetoric a set of practices that can lift a speech above the technicalities of the profession to the sublimity of persuasion—a “regal” art. If public orators would then follow their monarch, “the golden-mouthed king” as panegyrists put it, they would not only achieve their aims, but presumably also submit to the monarch as the very embodiment of rhetoric. (Amyot, Projet d’Eloquence Royale, nouvelle édition, précédée d’un essai critique, Le monarque orateur, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1992). In a democracy, the strenuous tension often observed between presidential rhetoric and “political” rhetoric is perhaps a retooling of that debate—an odd remnant, within democratic deliberation, of the claim to primacy. In a sound democracy, there should be no presidential speeches at all and certainly no State of the Nation address; except for the broadcasting of parliamentary debates where, in deed, the “State of the Nation” is explicated.
16. Ibid.
18. The expression used by Quintilian is sub oculos subjectio (Institutio Oratoria, 9.2.17).
19. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 481.
22. See note 45 above.
23. As above, 474 (my translation).
25. Cassin, 483–484.
26. The word *muthos* is nearly synonymous with *pseudos*.
27. The Reconstruction and Development policy, a kind of Marshall Plan for post-apartheid South Africa, was first tabled in Parliament on November 11, 1994, as a white paper—one of the first major bills of the new government (Government Gazette, notice 1954 of 1994).
31. Address to the Closing Session of the 50th National Conference of the ANC, Mafikeng, 20 December, 1997; New Year Message, 31 December, 1998; Address to Parliament, 5 February, 1999; Speech by President Nelson Mandela at the Final Sitting of the First Democratically Elected Parliament, 26 March, 1999. (See: www.anc.org.za.)
32. The international press (via The Associated Press news agency) often confused the Report (December 16) and the closing Address (December 20) under the same heading of “farewell speech.”
33. “Retrodiction”—or “reading history backwards”—was a concept introduced in the theory of history by Paul Veyne. It signifies the assumption of a cause by a statement concerning what an historian believes a cause to be, cause and effect having being established not as cause and effect, but simply as extensively documented facts (*Comment on écrit l’histoire*, Paris: Le Seuil, 1971).
37. See below, chapter 3.
38. This feature may well be a lasting heritage of the Westminster style of the British parliamentary tradition.
CHAPTER 3

1. In the words of the Senatus-Consultus of May 18, 1804, which established the Napoleonic First Empire.


5. On the subject prudence, I draw on Eugene Garver (1987). Machiavelli and the History of Prudence, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Here I am proposing an extension to, or a variation on, a concept that has generated an ample literature among rhetorical scholars.

6. See the study by Jean-Claude Bonnet, “La sainte masure, sanctuaire de la parole fondatrice,” mentioned earlier.

7. The Big Issue, 23, June 1999. Available: www.bigissue.co.za. Circulation figure is 17,000. This particular issue received international coverage when Nelson Mandela’s interview was reprinted in the London Big Issue.

8. There are also British, Scottish and Irish Big Issue editions as well as one in San Francisco.

9. Ibid., 16.

10. By contrast, in regard to ceremonial rhetoric, it is worth noting that South Africa has a national praise poet (in Xhosa, imbongi yesiwe) Zolani Mkiva, who performs praise songs (a traditional form well known to specialists of orality) at official functions. He first appeared at Mandela’s inauguration in 1994.

11. Ibid., 14.


14. One analyst, writing in the most widely read Sunday newspaper, stated that “a conflict within Nelson Mandela between the pressure to defer to collective leadership and an instinctual desire to take matters into his own hands, for better or for worse.” The acuteness of this full page analysis was somewhat blunted by two collateral contributions by struggle comrades of
the President, the titles of which are self-explanatory: *The poetic justice of Madiba’s rule* and *The meticulous genius* (*Sunday Times*, July 19, 1998).

15. Graça Machel (1945) lost her husband in 1986. Until Nelson Mandela and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela had divorced (1996), the latter referred to her as “the concubine.”


20. The supplement was the equivalent of the official books published in Britain on the occasion of the monarch’s jubilee (*The President’s 80th birthday celebration, July 17, 1998*). Each newspaper ran special tributes. A full-scale study of these ought to be undertaken.


22. The expression *Mandela Magic* is part of the South African public vocabulary.

23. *Directory of Black Professionals, Enterprise 200*. Enterprise is a wholly black South African undertaking (as its editor stressed in a personal communication), with an audited circulation which is 30,000 strong.


26. A sign of this shift is the lament expressed in the 1997 survey by the Board of Directors, a grouping of corporate directors that exist in several Commonwealth countries (65,000 members worldwide) that, “with regard to black people, there is a degree of reluctance to join.” The dated tone of the expression may account for this reluctance (in current South African idiom, one would simply say “Blacks”). The shift in the ecology of economic deliberation is a more direct factor. (Institute of Directors, Business Day Corporate Survey, April, 1997.)


28. However, Bikitsha’s fortune amounts to just over $3 million.

29. On the system of “group areas” see chapter 8 below. Black residents needed a passbook to go through demarcated White areas.


32. “Schlep” is South African slang; as a verb, “to schlep” means “to make an effort”; as a noun “schlep” is a chore, a bore, or a strain.


34. Ibid., 402.
“Mayibuye” was the codename of the planned Cuban–inspired “general insurrection … sparked off by … well–prepared guerilla operations” de-
vised in 1963, which led to the 1964 Rivonia trial (Meredith, 238–9)


In fact, except for two well-worn quotations from Yates and W. E. B. du Bois (not referenced), the few references of substance are to Marx, Engels, Fanon and several South African Marxist social scientists of note.

has come, Cape Town/Johannesburg, Tafelberg/Mafube, pp. 31–36.


As in “Statement at the conference on Partnership Africa, Stockholm, Swe-

As in the speech delivered on the occasion of the ANC’s 87th birthday, January 8, 1999.

“=Khomani” is the correct spelling.

This took place on Human Rights Day, March 21, 1999: “This land claim, I
am sure, will stand out among all land claims … It stands out because this
land claim is about the rebirth of a people” (Cape Times, March 22, 1). The
“rebirth” simile is part of the “Renaissance” commonplace. The audience
included the last living speakers of the aboriginal N/u language. (The term
aboriginal is hardly used in this context in South African English.)

Mbeki, Africa. The time has come.

Adrian Hadland & Jovial Rantao (1999). The Life and Times of Thabo
Mbeki. Foreword by Shaun Johnson, Cape Town, Zebra/Struik.

For this assessment I drew on material from the Web site of the Mail &
Guardian and selected items. The “African Renaissance” is indexed for ease
of search. The fact there is an index on the site is telling.

I drew on extracts and commentary on SAfm talk show “Talk at Will” by
David Beresford, “Are non-Blacks invited to the banquet,” Mail & Guardian
Web site, October 9, 1998.

Also commented on by Ferial Haffajee, “Renaissance Incorporated,” Mail &
Guardian Web site, October 2, 1998. See the proceedings of the conference (Sep-
Prologue by Thabo Mbeki, Mafube/Tafelberg, Sandton/Cape Town, 1999.
There is also a “think tank,” the African Renaissance Interim Committee.

“Renaissance isn’t the right word,” in Robert Kirby’s column, Mail &
Guardian Web site, May 15, 1998. He proposes the terms revival or estab-
ishment instead—one wonders why.

At the University of the Western Cape; see Swapna Prabhakaran, “Lighting

Interview, Mail & Guardian Web site, March 6, 1998.

A tentative interpretation, following Homi Bhaba’s The Location of Culture
(London, Routledge, 1994), by David Chisdester, “Embracing South Af-

54. Xolela Mangcu, a visiting scholar from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, reporting in the Mail & Guardian Web site (June 5, 1998), sees in the African Renaissance as a tension between end values and democratic means, which suggest the need “to create a deliberative process of public purpose-building that is pluralistic,” using as a model a National Endowment for the Humanities sponsored National Conversation on American Pluralism and Identity.


57. I refer to the live broadcast put out by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (my thanks to John Maytham, Cape Talk Radio, for supplying me with a copy of the tape). The strategies of excerpts carried by the print media are worth brief investigation, a striking example being the report “What the new president said today” (Cape Argus, June 16, 1999), which excised the last part of the speech.


59. Radio and television broadcasts and media reports are always necessary to correct textual assessments of the power of public rhetoric. Textual assessments will naturally veer toward logic and dialectics, forgetting that rhetoric is neither—or is both only within the effects of belief, not truth.

60. Mbeki, Africa. The time has come, p. xxii.


63. Or théoria.

64. Or bios politikos.

65. Or aítheia.

66. Or doxai.

67. Or the use of logos.

68. Or logoi.

69. Another way, I submit, to translate théoria.


CHAPTER 4


5. The expression “rhetorical republic” would be out of place as republic is still marked, in South Africa, on the side of apartheid. It was commonly used as a synonym for “South Africa” (“The Republic/Die Republiek”), after the country left the Commonwealth and replaced its royal titular Head with a State President. Interestingly enough the expression “State President” has been dropped in favor of “President,” whereas “Republic,” alongside “the President of the Republic,” are idiomatic in legislation issued by Parliament, albeit not in popular usage. “Democracy” and its paradigmatic vocabulary, are, in contrast, widely used.

6. In February 1996, as the second phase of public participation was about to end, *Constitutional Talk, 1*, February 9–29 reported that, from September 1995 to January 1996, “7,238 people have made 56,798 requests for information.” And added that “[the] highest number (17,724) come from within South Africa, but that’s closely followed by over 10,000 from the U.S. commercial sector and nearly 6,000 from American educational institutions.” This made for “53 people a day” accessing the home page. A detailed breakdown of searches is also provided at constitution.org.za.

7. Hassen Ebrahim (who had previously served as Executive Director of the Constitutional Assembly) has meticulously documented the political, legal and constitutional negotiations that took place between 1991 and 1996—paying little, if no attention to popular deliberation (*The Soul of a Nation: Constitution-making in South Africa* (1998). Cape Town, Oxford University Press).


10. Ibid., Appendix I, schedule 4.

11. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. This version was the 6th draft, but not all drafts, except for the Working Draft and the bill as amended on May 7, were available to the public, they were working documents. Four million copies of the Working Draft were distributed between December 1995 and February 1996 (*Constitutional Talk, 1*, February 9–29).

12. As above, Schedule 6, Section 24.

13. These bills (called Acts once passed by Parliament) are the Equality Bill (which provides practical measures to prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation—a constitutional premiere, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, age, disability,
religion, language, social status, nationality or any other grounds), the Open Democracy Bill, and the Administrative Justice Bill. In the interim, courts actively protect these rights by case-by-case rulings.

15. Ibid., p. 2.
16. Ibid.
18. Inside cover 2 of Bill 1.
20. Constitutional Talk, 7, May 19–June 9, 1995 states that of 150,000 copies of Issue 7,100,000 were distributed to taxi commuters, 45,000 by mail, 4,000 at public meetings, 1,000 to the Constitutional Assembly members, staff, and visitors, which apparently “means that an average of 750,000 people will read about the Constitution.”
21. Constitutional Talk, 8, June 9–June 29, 1995, quoted a survey done by the Community Agency for Social Inquiry that showed that 65% of adult South Africans were aware of the existence of the Constitutional Assembly.
23. In May 1996, a large mural, “Four Steps to Democracy,” was unveiled outside Parliament in Cape Town. It depicts, from night to dawn to morning and noon, the rise of the new nation, culminating in a rainbow-topped utopian landscape (one of the four panels is similar to a picture on the folder mentioned above, Bill 1). The mural itself deserves analysis.

CHAPTER 5

2. The TRC was constituted by 17 commissioners appointed by the President in December 1995, from a short list of 25 nominees who had been publicly interviewed by an independent panel and selected from a nominations roster of 299 nominees (proposed by various sectors of civil society). It was divided into two committees: the Human Rights Violations Committee, which considered accounts of victims and survivors through public hearings (this committee became the public face of the TRC, its visible presence); the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee, which formulated a policy to assist victims (by far the least successful, largely due to govern-
ment’s reluctance to provide funding). The Amnesty Committee’s three commissioners and two judges, which had to evaluate amnesty applications, were appointed by the President on January 24, 1996 and functioned independently from the TRC until the end of 1999 (that is, one year after the TRC had closed down), with appeals being routed through the Courts.

3. The summary of amnesty decisions given on the TRC Website (www.truth.org.za) as at November 1, 2000 lists 7,112 requests, 849 amnesties granted, 5,392 amnesties referred by comparison, in July 1998, there had been only 150 amnesties granted out of the final 7,112 requests.


5. The TRC *Report*, interestingly enough, was published not by the Government Printer, but by a private publisher, Juta, while the tender for a shorter version of the Report was awarded to Nolwazi Educational Publishers. Juta was a mainstay of the educational publishing establishment under apartheid, whereas Nolwazi represents black empowerment. The distribution of contracts thus gives material form to the spirit of reconciliation.


10. During the National Assembly debate on reconciliation, November 10, 1998.


15. Ibid.

16. By contrast, the 1985 Argentinian process which brought to book the junta that had organized the repression from 1976 to 1983, was two-fold. On the one hand, trials were held in which criminal responsibilities were established—a forensic procedure in which the State and the accused argued on evidence produced. On the other, there was the report of the Comision Nacional sobre la Disparicion de Personas (CONADEP), whose brief was to collect information on disappeared persons—being at once forensic, deliberative and demonstrative. Neither the trials nor CONADEP’s Nunca Mas report were intended to produce reconciliation. Moreover, the link between telling the whole truth and obtaining amnesty, or being deprived of civil rights (“lustration”), was thought “inappropriate to the South African context” (Report, recommendation 17). On Argentina, refer to Sergio Ciancaglini and Martin Granovsky, *Nada Mas que la Verdad. El juico a las jun-*

17. The Amnesty Committee’s decisions are legally binding, whereas the TRC submits recommendations that are both specific and societal—a blueprint intended for the new nation (which would merit a separate analysis). Amnesty may be granted to those who, having voluntarily approached the TRC, and given full disclosure of gross abuses of human rights they have committed, can show that such acts were politically motivated. Amnesty granted in these circumstances indemnifies the perpetrators from criminal prosecution, but not civil action. Jacques Derrida has shared his thoughts on the TRC at public lectures given in South Africa in July 1998 (and also in his Parisian seminar in January 1999, as mentioned earlier). They were summed up in “Il faut toujours parler de l’Afrique du Sud au futur antérieur” (“One must always talk about South Africa in the future perfect tense”).

18. See the proceedings of the conference held in Cape Town (September 20–21, 1999), Truth in politics, Rhetorical Approaches, Philippe-Joseph Salazar (Ed.), Johannesburg: Protea Books, in press.

19. I am setting aside the debate as to whether Antiphon the Sophist is the same character as Antiphon the politician.


23. Interestingly, the Argentinian military argued that, given the order by a democratically elected government to “annihilate” (aniquilar) subversion, they did so, applying the military code’s definition of “annihilate”“to destroy... by way of military action.” South African agents of the apartheid régime did not need to resort to codes to exculpate themselves, as they were not on trial. Yet a Minister of Law and Order affirmed that the words “to eliminate” or “to remove permanently from society” did not mean, for him, “to kill.” The conundrum that has made impossible the appearance of former President P. W. Botha before TRC impossible (besides the political significance of the negotiated settlement) stems from the TRC’s insistence on establishing a definitive meaning for the phrase “to eliminate,” and to get it from the source himself. Had Botha appeared, he might well have tripped himself up, as did the Argentinian junta, which, by playing semantic games, simply drew the State’s attention to military code definitions—that expressly excluded from “military action” most of the offences with which the junta was being charged (further proof that the Argentinian trials were forensic in essence). I thank Carlos de Santos, director of Ediciones Manantial, in Buenos Aires, for drawing my attention to the aniquilar debate.

24. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was ostensibly “proclaimed” as “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society... shall
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights; see: www.un.org).

25. The Rome Convention of 1950 reads: “Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration” (European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Preamble, paragraph 5, (see: www.coe.fr).


27. Jacques Derrida argues that “Tutu’s generous confusion” between a “logic of pardon” and a “logic of justice” makes reconciliation difficult to apprehend. He proposes that once pardon (as he calls forgiveness granted by a victim, of a victim’s family, to a “perpetrator”) follows a pattern of “staging”—either provoked by a perpetrator asking publicly for forgiveness or simply because the TRC itself wishes to have such confessional “scène du pardon,” the logic at work is that of justice, publicly administered, no longer that of pardon privately consented. This publicity, compounded with the implicit, yet often explicit, demand put onto a victim or the victim’s family to grant a pardon (in which Derrida sees a renewed violence), ultimately hampers reconciliation as it deprives pardoners from their free will and right not to have their moral conscience be measured by a public standard, itself politically legitimised by the puzzling conjoining of the TRC’s legal powers with perpetrators’ demands for pardon (Derrida, Foi et Savoir, Paris:Le Seuil, 2000, 116–118). The Report of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.(1998). Extract 5, November 6, p. 2.

28. The dance commonplace was used by the ANC in the 1999 general elections campaign. One poster, urging voters to register, read: “The first step in the Madiba jive is to register”—and showed Nelson Mandela “jiving.”

29. Ibid., p. 162.


31. Psychoanalyst Clint Van Der Walt has proposed a Lacanian reading of the practice of testimony at the TRC: the telling of a testimony retraumatizes the victim or the perpetrator by imposing on them a new master narrative (to tell the “truth” in order to help “reconciliation”). To appear in Truth in politics, Philippe-Joseph Salazar, (Ed.).


37. *Cape Times*, October 28, 1998, 7. The journalist refers to the conviction of Winnie Mandela (accessory to kidnapping and violence) in the murder case of a young activist. His last example refers to two operatives.


39. History workshops have been held to try to design a new history curriculum for the secondary school system. They have encountered numerous stumbling blocks, the main one being the ideological belief (shared by most educators) that citizens need, in order to be citizens, to have control over a coherent collective past (see the research paper by Lydia Samarbaksh-Liberge, to appear in *Truth in politics*, Philippe-Joseph Salazar, (Ed.).

40. This is a cause of much concern for Antjie Krog.

41. This point—regarding the necessity to build onto the TRC’s work a forward-looking project of “justice”—is forcefully made by Charles Villa-Vicencio, Head of the TRC’s Research Department (who oversaw the cataloguing of millions of pages—300 meters of box-files, now deposited in the National Archives in Pretoria) in his keynote address, “Living well with bad memories.” in *Truth in politics*. Philippe-Joseph Salazar, (Ed.).

CHAPTER 6

1. As in Joseph Bessette.


3. Apart from the campaign analyzed here, two further examples worth mentioning are the “Reconstruct” supplement to *The Sunday Independent* and the “One City, Many Cultures” special reports in the *Cape Times*. “Reconstruct,” “the development paper,” features social and economic reconstruction, and is a joint venture by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the European Union and the Communication Assistance Foundation. “One City, Many Cultures” is aimed at bettering community relations, and is sponsored by the ubiquitous Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the Comparative Human Relations Initiative. The project led in September 1999 to a full-scale festival, the Cape Town One City Festival, which drew a host of international Black or African performers like Grace Jones and Salif Keita, who joined in the celebration of the South African unified nationhood. The One City Festival opened as the 7th All Africa Games closed in Johannesburg/Soweto. It was followed in October by the traditional Big Walk, dubbed “the biggest timed walk in the world,” a regular Cape charity event since 1903, and adapted in 1999 to reflect the developmental rhetoric of an imagined community (The 1999 One City Big Walk asks us to “show faith in each other” and to put “our best foot forward ... walking ... together with family, friends and strangers” (Big Walk). Interestingly, a month earlier the National (ex-Speech) Communication Association had sent a delegation with a view to develop communication in the new democracy.
4. I keep the South African spelling of “colour.”
8. True Colours, 1.
12. Terminology is a minefield in South African English. Although “black” is commonly used to refer to “non-white,” “African” sometimes does not qualify what is commonly in its compass (such as Coloureds or Afrikaners claiming to be Africans), although in the report Reality Check, conducted in April 1999, the term African was solely used by pollsters (in the sequence “Coloured,” “Indian,” “White”), in other words not as a self-qualification, as in True Colours. The semantic labels “ethnic” or “tribal” are mostly attached to inanimate objects (fashion or design), and when designating persons, are usually replaced by “traditional” (which, however, is hardly ever applied to non-black Africans, although there have been occurrences).
13. The national anthem, as noted earlier, is a combination of the old hymn of the pre-democratic Republic and of the struggle hymn, a Protestant cantata with lyrics written in 1897 by Enoch Sontonga and adopted by the African National Congress in 1925.
14. “National songs necessarily advance, implicitly or explicitly, at least two types of claims regarding national identity: claims about the nation and claims about the relationship between singer(s) and nation” writes Robert James Branham in his remarkable study ‘God Save the—!’ American National Songs and National Identities, 1760–1798,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 85(1) (1999), 19.
16. The RDP was a program of economic and social upliftment staggered over the duration of the first Parliament (1994–1999). Halfway through, it was supplemented by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy.
17. With interesting figures, such as the predominance of females over males (52%/48%), and a sharp increase in urban population (55%). It is also reported that fertility rates (measured by the number of children per woman)
vary from group to group: among Blacks the fertility rate is 3.1 (down from 6.8 in the mid 1950’s); among Coloureds and Indians it is 2.5 (compared with 6.5); and among Whites it stands at 1.9, below replacement level. The overall South African fertility rate given by Census 1996 is 2.9.


20. The President of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Hermann Giliomee, tried to initiate in April 1997 a debate about what he called “we-ness.” It eventually ended. His argument about several competing “communal we” held no attraction, and was mainly argued on the basis or statistics and confidence polls. Under apartheid the SAIRR played a crucial role in formulating debates and monitoring the government as best as they could. With the advent of democracy, the SAIRR was not able to adapt. Giliomee’s article was absurdly illustrated with a photograph of D. F. Malan, Nationalist Prime Minister in the 20s, and this citation: “No race has yet shown greater loyalty for South Africa than the native.” As an exercise in public deliberation the debate petered out because it attracted immediate censure. “We-ness” can more authentically be found in True Colours.


22. The People’s Panel was a “Standing People’s Panel which will express your views on the widest range of issues in the run-up to the election … 30 people deemed representative of our readership by age, gender, race and work status to form the panel … (a project) which will give our 600,000-plus readers a voice amid all the campaigning and electioneering.” It was run by The Star, and can be accessed at: www.star.co.za.

23. “Reality Check was conceived as a means of giving a voice to ordinary South Africans who might otherwise not be heard, to examine the state of our five-year-old democracy from the perspective of the people, to measure our progress on issues of race, reconciliation and national unity, and to underscore the challenges that lie ahead” (Cape Times, April 28, 1999). In terms of editorial strategy, it is clear that People’s Panel and Reality Check, both in the Independent Newspapers stable, were an attempt to cover, by similar methods, the whole country with one paper. The Star is based in Johannesburg. The others in Cape Town. The editorial strategies of both projects require a thorough assessment in terms of mass communication.


CHAPTER 7


2. An excellent philological and philosophical translation in French can be found in Cassin, 141–142. It helps correct the revised English translation by Kennedy,
in his translation of Aristotle already mentioned, 283–288. Here, the quotation is taken from Cassin, pp. 141–148 (compare with Kennedy, 284).

3. Cassin, p. 203.

4. The launch issue was released in May/June 1997.


7. The advertising firm Hunt Lascaris TBWA was awarded the Grand Award at the 1998 New York Festival (South African agencies shared another two gold, three silver, six bronze medals and 30 finalist certificates).

8. I place “icon” in quotation marks because, unless one reflects critically on the Peircean tripartition, icon/index/symbol, the usage of the term is quite unhelpful. An icon is on the same semiotic level as an onomatopeia or a diagram. It would be indeed amusing to envisage a so-called pop or fashion or cinema “icon” as an onomatopeia or a diagram (in other words, a visualization of relations) of their trade. (See Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932.)


11. Ibid., 48.

12. Elle, 2/1, April 1997, 40–44.


16. The chronology of events occurs thus: May 24–26, 1998, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy, the ruling party, wins elections, contested by opposition parties as fraudulent; August 5, protesters storm Parliament; August 10–13, South African Deputy-President brokers a deal that allows for a SADC review of election results; September 10, unrest grows as this report is not released; September 16, the Lesotho Prime Minister requests help from the SADC, warning of the possibility of a coup d’etat; September 21, 600 South African troops enter Lesotho. Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy, independent from Britain since 1966. Its checkered history has been marked by a spate of dictatorships since the annulment of the 1970 elections. It has a history of strained relations between the monarch and the political parties, especially since the current king’s father (once deposed by a South African backed junta in 1986), was an absolute monarch in the style of the Swaziland model, until the loss of his royal prerogatives with his return from exile in 1991). Lesotho held its first democratic elections in 1993. The word “Basotho” is used to qualify the population.

17. For the purpose of this discussion, the following material has been used: Cape Argus, September 22, 1998; Cape Times, September 23, 1998; Cape Times, September 25, 1998; Saturday Argus, September 26/27, 1998.


19. The integration of army cadres and personnel of the ex-Liberation movements into the old SADF, South African Navy and South African Air Force was accomplished swiftly and efficiently over four short years. By the time
of Operation Boleas, this integration was considered complete—the Chief of the SANDF being, notably, a black General. Foreign powers, such as the British, provided help and advice. In fact, this integration is a remarkable feat, matched (in terms of integration) by the demilitarization and transformation of the South African Police from a repressive machine into a civilian, community and “service” oriented police force (albeit largely ineffective in combating crime).

20. In the words of the spokesperson, Cape Argus, September 22, 1998, 1.
22. As above, in the words of the human rights organization the Black Sash and the Ceasefire Campaign, supported by the South African Council of Churches, and led by Desmond Tutu’s successor to the anglican archesiscopal see of Cape Town.
24. Cape Argus, September 26/7, 1998, 1: “They are concentrating on the medic! What kind of war are they fighting? ... They opened fire on peacekeepers on broad daylight without provocation.”
31. The national flag is determined in Schedule 1 of the Constitution.
34. For instance, the marketing of the Shembe Festival in rural Zululand.
37. It is not necessary to outline here current debates on rhetoric and evidence, as remarkably charted in Carlos Lévy & Laurent Pernot (Eds.), Dire l’évidence (Philosophie et rhétorique antiques), Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997.

CHAPTER 8

1. My abbreviated translation, in approximate modern terminology, of Quintilian 3.7.5.
2. Quintilian, 7.1.1. Quintilian specifically refers to *pragmatike*, the handling of public and private affairs that are subject to negotiations. Epideictic rhetoric is, however, at face value not a negotiation, but a spectacle.


4. On Sharpeville as “seemal moment,” see the article by anti-apartheid veteran Tefo Mothibeli, “The day that changed our history,” *The Star*, Friday March 19, 1999, p. 11.


9. The Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights had received 11 000 claims by March 1997. In the 1998/99 Budget, a stated objective was to have expenditure on land redistribution and land reform grow from $114 million to $162 million by 2000/1. The national Budget provided for the expenditure of $33.5 billion for 1998/99. (Budget Speech, March 11, 1998).


11. This refers to the interim Constitution, or Act No. 200 of 1993. In the Constitution, Act No. 108 of 1996, the subsection is numbered 8(3).

12. Or is used to gain political mileage, as we saw in this case.

13. Land Claims Court of South Africa, case number 15/96. The agreement made an order of court can be retrieved (like all judgments of the Court) from the site maintained by the University of the Witswatersrand, Johannesburg, at: www.law.wits.ac.za. (I thank the Legal Resources Centre of Cape Town for their help.)


15. Ibid., 5.


17. Ibid., 7.

18. Ibid., 11.

19. Ibid., 12 to 24.

20. The judge quotes at length an Afrikaans legal author who places staatsveiligheid (in Afrikaans, “state security”) at the top of the list! A legacy from apartheid?

21. Ibid., 25.

22. Land Claims Court of South Africa, case number 90/98.

23. Ibid., 1.

24. Ibid., 4 and 5.

25. Ibid., 6.

26. A referral to the Court to have a settlement made an order of the Land Claims Court, Act 22 of 1994.

27. Ibid., 8.
29. Land Claims Court of South Africa, case number 90/98, 10–12.
30. Ibid., 14.
31. Ibid., 21.
32. Ibid., 13, 15–20.
34. Quintilian, 3.8.9.


47. Nelson Mandela, speech at the opening of Parliament, February 6, 1998. I have perused the copy circulated by the Office of the President to the press ahead of the opening of Parliament and compared it with the televised speech itself. It can be consulted in the South African official Parliamentary records (Hansard), or on www.parliament.gov.za

48. The 1997 budget, passed during the first Parliamentary session of 1997 provided a Housing allocation of R4,038 billion ($670 million) (R stands for the South African currency, the Rand), 156.4 per cent higher than the budgeted amount of R1,575 billion ($260 million) in 1996/97. Between March 1994 and November 1996, 123 139 houses were built or under construction (Budget Review, Vote 17 in Business Report, March 13, 1997). In late 1998, according to the Ministry of Housing, R8,7 billion had been spent since 1994 on the housing program ($1,45 billion), providing accommodation to 2,7 million people who were previously homeless or in informal housing. The 1998 Budget speech (March 1998) records that 385 000 houses have been built and 700 000 subsidies earmarked. The average housing delivery rate is 1 000 units every two-and-a-half working day. Up to September 1998, nearly 940 000 applications had been approved, close to the target of a million homes in 1998. The shortage in 1999 is in the order of 2,5 million homes. (For the sake of simplicity, in quoting R/$ values, I have used a mean exchange rate in 1999 of 1S=6R).


54. For instance, the Cape Town Municipality alone (not including the Metro area, which extends over the Cape Flats, encompassing the areas that form the bulk of informal settlement) counts 20 housing sites, plus eight even more informal sites (backyards, shacks and “hostels”), for a total 120 000 households.
56. “Home is where the heart (and the vote) is,” *Sunday Times*, Metro section, November 29, 1998, 10.
59. As an example, see the advertising feature on the new Boschenmeer Estate (a R300 million, or $50 million, development in the Paarl region), where houses are dubbed “estate lodges” (*The Sunday Independent*, April 4, 1999). The luxurious Atlantic Beach golf estate on the West Coast is a much publicized venture by black empowerment group Johnnic.
64. *City Life*, 1, October 1998.
70. As above, December 9, 1998.

CONCLUSION

2. Although I am not dealing here with “memorials” (Robben Island is not a cemetery or a shrine in the proper sense of the word), I found helpful the essay by Cheryl J. Jorgensen-Earp and Lori A. Lanzilotti, “Public Memory and Private Grief: The Construction of Shrines at the Sites of Public Tragedy,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 84(2), (1998), 150–170.
3. In January 1996, 500 artworks (mainly portraits) were taken down, under the supervision of the Mayibuye Centre (located at the University of the Western Cape) (see the report in *Cape Times*, January 25, 1996).
4. Yet it is similar to a practice that arose during the French Revolution, of, for instance, destroying part of the royal necropolis to build, with the very same material, a new space of “popular monumentality” (hill, grotto and sculptures) to honor the revolutionaries Marat and Le Peletier (see Anthony Vidler, “Grégoire Lenoir et les monuments parlants,” in Jean-Claude Bonnet, (Ed.), La Carmagnole des Muses, 131–154). Alexandre Lenoir, the Convention’s leading theoretician of reinventing museums, even spoke of this project as “a most philosophical lesson” (quoted by Vidler, 134). Is Robben Island quarry also a “republican grotto” in which the materials of oppression have been turned inside out?


6. It is located at the University of the Western Cape.


8. As above, 22.


11. On March 20, 1997, Human Rights Day, a gala dinner had comedian Bill Cosby join United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Hillary Clinton and corporate guests in a fund-raising effort to support Robben Island Museum and to provide welfare for ex-political prisoners (nearly $1 million was raised).


13. District Six was a vibrant multi-racial neighborhood close to central Cape Town. Its destruction was paralleled by that of Sophiatown (renamed “Triomph”) in Johannesburg.


15. President T. Mbeki’s speech, June 16, 1999.

16. See the report by the Directorate of Collections, National Cultural History Museums (a body that runs nine such facilities) quoted in the Sunday Times, December 13, 1998, 5.


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